The Army Nobody Wanted: Maratha Military Problems (1750s)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Charminar Standoff (Continued)

Bushi Gets Kicked Out... Sort Of

What happened:

• Bushi (Gursi) was kicked out by the Nizam
• But he didn't actually leave
• Took a stand near Charminar in Hyderabad
• Charminar = historic tower/area (still exists today, very historic part of city)

The Cannon Defense

Bushi's strategy:

• Set up his cannon regiment in the Charminar area
• Fortified the position
• Nizam couldn't do anything about it

Why the Nizam was helpless:

• ⌠Couldn't defeat Bushi
• He had the cannon regiment
• Finally gave up: "Okay, fine"
• Didn't want to attack him

The stalemate:

• Some discord between them had to be settled
• But Bushi squatted on all the watch points
• Fortified his positions
• Basically said: "This is my land, I'm not going anywhere"

Why This Impressed the Marathas

The Demonstration of Power

Who was watching:

• Sadashiv Rao Bhau
• Nana Saheb Peshwa

What impressed them:

• Strength projection because of the cannon regiment
• One man with cannons could defy an entire kingdom
• Asked themselves: "Can we have this capability within our army?"
• They didn't have it - that kind of capability

The Changing Nature of Warfare

The Old Days Are Over

What was fading away:

• Old-style fighting (Shivaji's tactics)
• Shivaji would routinely go to Pratapgarh or Raigarh
• Get fortified and stay safe in mountain forts

The new reality:

• You could no longer do that so easily
• Marathas had moved to the north, Bengal, Rajasthan
• Everywhere they were going = no mountains

The Mountain Fort Problem: Cannons Change Everything

Historical Example: Purandar & Vajragarh

The forts: Two forts next to each other (visited on trips)

• Purandar
• Vajragarh

The old assumption: Mountain forts are safe, impregnable

The new reality with cannons:

• Even in Maharashtra, you couldn't just hide up in the mountains anymore
• Enemy could go to neighboring mountain
• Point their cannon at your fort

The Vajragarh Strategy (Historical Flashback)

The commander: Diler Khan (working under Mirza Raju Jai Singh's strategy)

Jai Singh's advice:

• "Don't try Purandar - it's heavily fortified"
• "You won't succeed, there will be lots of destruction"
• "Go to Vajragarh first"

What Diler Khan did:

• Took Vajragarh
• Installed wooden scaffolding on Vajragarh
• Started shooting cannons from there
• ⌠Those cannons were still not as powerful as what we're talking about now
• But it was still a clever solution

The lesson: Even mountain warfare was being revolutionized by artillery.

What the Marathas Realized They Needed

The Long-Range Cannon Requirement

The strategic necessity:

• Need long-range cannon regiment
• These cannons could go 1.5 to 2 kilometers range
• HUGE range - Marathas had never heard of this

Why this mattered:

• Shows they were on the lookout for good solutions
• Taking over distant areas with all fertile land
• Not a mountain to be seen
• "How are you going to fight a war?"

The Ace in the Hole Philosophy

The Chanakya principle (repeated):

• Can't leave warfare up to chance
• If you go one-on-one = 50-50 odds
• That's unacceptable

The solution: "We need to have an ace" - and they thought cannons were that ace.

Bushi's Position Becomes Permanent

The Long Haul

Result of Charminar standoff:

• Bushi's position with Nizam was fixed
• Couldn't be thrown out
• He was restored (in a sense)
• There for the long haul

The French in Pondicherry

Two Years Later

The French foothold:

• Pondicherry = deep south India
• French were in control there
• Just like British controlled Bengal
• French had their territory in Pondicherry

The Mercenary Problem: Ibrahim Khan Gardi

The Hired Gun Mentality

Who he was:

• Cannon regiment commander
• Trained by Bushi
• Working for Marathas now

The problem with his mentality:

• Demanded regular monthly salaries (first of every month)
• "No compromise on that one"
• "I will do anything and everything you ask me to do"
• "I'll be fair in the bargain, but you have to be fair with me"

The clash with Maratha culture:

• Traditional Maratha soldiers didn't get fixed monthly salaries
• Payment was irregular
• Sometimes paid through looting rights
• "Loot an area, keep what you want" = that's your salary
• Minor things yours to keep
• Huge loot = Peshwa gets a piece

The contrast: Ibrahim Khan = "Us baby" - wanted modern employment terms in a medieval army structure.

The Baggage Problem

What "Noteworthy" Means (Lakshani)

When the army moved, it carried:

• Tents
• Grains
• Cooks
• All supplies
• Everything had to be carried for long distances

The consequence: Became difficult to move quickly

Bajirao I's Lightning Speed (The Gold Standard)

How Bajirao Moved Fast

His method:

• Ate lunch and dinner right on horseback
• One of the reasons he was very popular
• Moved light - not too much stuff

The advantage:

• Could cross distances in 1 day that enemy thought would take 3 days
• He was quick
• One of a kind

The Problem: Regular Army vs. Elite Force

You Can't All Be Bajirao

The new reality:

• Now it was a regular army
• Can't expect everyone to be like Bajirao
• Normal logistics required

The Pilgrim Problem

Civilians Tagging Along

What was happening:

• People wanted to go to places in the north
• Do pilgrimage in Kashi (Varanasi)
• In those times: very treacherous to travel alone
• Would get looted or killed
• Wars happening everywhere

The solution people found:

• Travel with the Maratha army
• Do pilgrimage
• Join back when army returns
• Come back with army for protection

Why this was bad for the army:

• ⌠Civilians were a drag on military operations
• Not useful for anything
• Can't cook, can't clean (not their job)
• Not helpful to army operations
• Can't leave them behind (you put them in harm's way)
• They'd try to catch up anyway
• Becomes your burden
• Gives away your position potentially

The strategic mobility issue:

• Bajirao's model was swift moves
• No one could follow him
• Called "strategic mobility"
• Pilgrims drag you down

But this was what was happening - stuck with these civilian tagalongs.

The Warrior Quality Problem

Not Trained Warriors

The recruitment issue:

• "Kaslele" = warriors
• But many were not trained warriors

The Pendari problem:

• Pendaris = actually robbers
• ⌠Not formally trained
• Heart and soul not in fighting
• Just wanted to quickly make a buck and leave
• ⌠Not courageous necessarily

The forced recruitment:

• All kinds of people recruited
• Not properly trained
• Not mentally prepared to be warriors
• "You have to have dedicated people"
• Fighting was forced upon them - not their choice

Why this happened:

• Marathas were in a hurry to recruit
• Didn't have time to properly train everyone
• Didn't create proper mindset
• Needed numbers - had to have 100,000+ people
• ⌠Not an effective or uniform army

The Cleanup Crew

What these low-quality troops did:

• When the war was finished
• They'd do the cleanup work
• Deal with little pockets of resistance
• Mop-up operations
• Support functions

The Teeth-to-Tail Ratio

Military Efficiency Metric

The concept:

• "Teeth" = people who really do the fighting
• "Tail" = people who support the entire operation
• There's a ratio of actual troops to support staff

The problem:

• ⌠Don't want too much support staff
• Lose your fighting ability
• Maratha army had too much of their army comprising backup support staff

Who the support staff included:

• Barbers
• Cooks
• Servants
• ⌠Not going to fight
• ⌠Not trained
• ⌠Not interested
• Won't help you in battle
• Becomes a burden
• Have to protect them

The Loss of Strategic Mobility

What Made Shivaji and Bajirao I Effective

Their model:

• Strategic mobility
• Could move fast
• Pounce on enemy
• Fight 4-5 hours
• Immediately vanish

What changed:

• Now there were restrictions on moving that fast
• Substantial support staff
• Can't move quickly because:
  • Support staff not in top physical condition
  • Cook doesn't need to be physically fit - his job is to cook
  • No reason for support staff to be athletic

The result: Fundamentally a more hamstrung army

The New Fighting Style

Stand and Fight

Old Maratha model:

• Fight and vanish
• Hit and run
• Guerrilla tactics

New model:

• Fight to the finish in front of each other
• Stand and fight
• Win the war and entrench your feet in new land
• Keep it under your control
• Don't just disappear, loot, and leave

Why the change:

• In the north: no forts, no mountains, no mountainous area
• Fighting more like Mughals now (of a generation before)

The Mughal Model

Why Mughals Fought That Way

Their advantages for their time:

• Had standing armies
• Large armies
• No mountains (so couldn't use guerrilla tactics)
• For their times: very advanced killing machine
• Europeans weren't as advanced then

The Technology Gap Widens (1750s)

Times Are Changing

By 1750s:

• Europeans starting Industrial Revolution
• More advanced technology
• Before: they just had boats
• Even during Aurangzeb's time, his army was pretty good
• Europeans couldn't really match Mughal armies then

Now:

• Times are changing
• Europeans doing R&D (research and development)
• Indians have not done it
• Technology gap widening

Why Peshwa was impressed: Understood the power of cannon regiment - this was new and unforeseen. Needed to be kept up with.

The First Half vs. Second Half Problem

Purvardha vs. Uttaradha

18th century divided:

• Purvardha = first half (up to 1750)
• Uttaradha = second half (after 1750)

The assessment:

• Up until 1750: Maratha fighting prowess was so-so
• Had not gotten state-of-the-art fighting techniques/weapons
• Let alone the discipline
• ⌠Not a professional army

The Superpower Problem: Can't Just Win and Leave

The New Responsibility

When you're a superpower:

• Win over an area → have to rule that area
• Can't just move away
• Win a province → must put in administration

Why this matters:

• Can't say "we won the war, going home now"
• Main prize of winning = collect revenue
• Need taxation system
• Need administration
• Need to rule over there
• Rule nicely = well-administered, good government

The Administration Problem

Good at War, Bad at Governance

The Maratha weakness:

• ✅ Good at winning over new provinces
• ⌠Weak at putting together effective administration
• ⌠Not their strong suit

The consequence:

• Win over an area
• Within two years: lose the area
• Why: didn't secure it or administer properly
• Didn't pay attention
• Didn't put together good administrative system
• Didn't maintain strong army base there

The cycle:

• Win it one year
• Next year: rivals come back, it's gone
• Have to take it back again
• Game of cat and mouse

The verdict: Not good at putting in place good administration. That was not their forte.

Key Players

Timeline Context

Critical Insights

The Mercenary Loyalty Problem

Ibrahim Khan Gardi's demands:

• Fixed monthly salary
• Professional employment terms
• "Fair bargain" mentality
• ⌠Fundamentally at odds with Maratha culture

Traditional Maratha way:

• Irregular payment
• Loot-based compensation
• Flexible terms
• Loyalty through shared struggle

The clash: Trying to integrate modern mercenary force into medieval army structure = recipe for problems.

The Teeth-to-Tail Disaster

The bloated army:

• Too many cooks, barbers, servants
• Not enough actual fighters
• Can't move fast (logistics drag)
• Can't fight effectively (too many non-combatants to protect)
• Lose Bajirao's strategic mobility

The trade-off:

• Need big numbers (intimidation, occupation)
• But big numbers = slower, less effective
• Quantity ≠ quality

The Pilgrim Burden

The cultural obligation:

• Can't leave civilians to die
• Have to protect pilgrims
• They slow you down
• Give away positions
• Drain resources

No good solution: Part of being the dominant power - people expect protection.

The Administration Curse

The catch-22:

• Must win territories to expand
• Must administer territories to keep them
• ⌠Can't do the second part
• Win → lose → win again = exhausting

Why it matters:

• Revenue = power
• Can't collect revenue without administration
• Can't maintain empire without revenue
• Stuck in perpetual reconquest

The Technology Trap

1750 = inflection point:

• Before: competitive with or superior to Europeans
• After: falling behind rapidly
• Europeans doing R&D
• Indians not keeping up
• Gap will only widen

The cannon obsession makes sense:

• Recognized they were behind
• Saw cannons as equalizer
• But didn't fix underlying problem (no R&D capacity)
• Buying technology ≠ building technology

The Strategic Mobility Loss

What made Marathas great:

• Bajirao's lightning strikes
• Unpredictable movements
• Enemy couldn't prepare
• Based on being LIGHT and FAST

What killed it:

• Becoming a "regular army"
• Support staff bloat
• Civilian tagalongs
• Heavy logistics train
• Can't do guerrilla warfare anymore

The transformation:

• Mountain warriors → plains armies
• Hit-and-run → stand-and-fight
• Shivaji's model → Mughal model
• But without Mughal administrative capacity

The Marathas were stuck between worlds: too "modern" to use their old guerrilla tactics, but not modern enough to compete with European technology. Their army had ballooned into a slow-moving city on wheels - cooks, barbers, pilgrims, and all. They'd abandoned Bajirao's lightning mobility for Mughal-style set-piece battles, but lacked the Mughal capacity to actually govern what they conquered. They were buying cannons from mercenaries, but not building the scientific capacity to make their own. And most fatally: they could win wars, but they couldn't win peace. Every province they conquered, they'd lose within two years. The superpower that couldn't actually rule.