Maratha River-Crossing Weakness & The Failed Meeting at Shamli (1759)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary


The Maratha Army's Fatal Weakness

Why Marathas Couldn't Cross Rivers

The Agricultural Origins:

  • Maratha soldiers were primarily farmers
  • Farming happens during monsoon season (June-September)
  • Military campaigns during dry season (winter months)
  • Back to farming when rains came

The Cycle:

  • Farm during monsoon
  • Fight during dry season for 6 months
  • Return to farming
  • Otherwise would be unemployed
  • Never had reason to develop monsoon warfare skills

The Missing Skill:

"They never had any inkling or skills to wage war in the monsoon when it is soggy and wet and rainy."

The Technology Gap:

  • Never had to cross major rivers in Deccan
  • "That was not their expertise"
  • "Technologically, they never developed, you know, they didn't evolve"

The Northern Problem:

  • North India = "lots of rivers that they had to cross"
  • Can't cross during monsoon = stuck
  • "You waste time"
  • Terrible for military campaigns

Abdali's Strategic Timing

The Afghan Invasion Schedule

Abdali's Pattern:

  • Invasions begin: October
  • Return home: April

Why This Schedule:

Avoiding Indian Summer:

"Abdali didn't want to be in India during the summer months. Afghans don't like the Indian heat."

The Climate Difference:

  • Afghanistan: Much cooler (far north)
  • India: Extremely hot and humid summers
  • Afghans couldn't tolerate it

April-June:

  • "Extremely hot" = Indian summer
  • Too brutal for Afghan forces
  • Time to retreat

June onwards:

  • Monsoon begins
  • Heavy rains, soggy earth
  • "Armies don't move"
  • Very difficult to travel
  • Easy to get stuck

Even Abdali Struggled

River Crossing in Monsoon:

  • Even knowing pontoon technique
  • Rivers normally half-mile wide → become three miles wide
  • Makes crossing difficult even for experts

Abdali's Advantage:

"Abdali was more well versed with that though. He was little better than Marathas."

Maratha Situation:

"Marathas were completely dependent."


The Gujar Advantage

Local Knowledge = Critical Resource

Who Were Gujars:

  • Local people living around rivers
  • Had expertise to cross rivers
  • Knew the fords (shallow crossing points)
  • Even in monsoon, knew safe passages

Their Service:

"These locals, often Gujars, were paid for these services by the armies passing through these areas."

What They Knew:

  • Where river depth wasn't too much
  • Best places to cross
  • Safe routes even in monsoon
  • Expert local knowledge

The Strategic Value:

"We are going to see how that made a huge difference. Tremendous difference."


British Learn the Lesson (40 Years Later)

General Wellington's Strategy

The Year: ~1799-1800 (40 years after 1759)

Wellington's Orders to His Troops:

"A war against the Marathas should commence in June to take advantage of flooded rivers that the Marathas could not cross."

What This Proves:

  • Maratha weakness persisted for half a century
  • Never corrected this fundamental flaw
  • British systematically exploited it
  • Started campaigns during monsoon deliberately
  • Knew Marathas would be immobilized

The Long-Term Impact:

  • This wasn't a temporary problem
  • Became permanent strategic vulnerability
  • Contributed to eventual British victory

Dattaji's August 1759 Letter

The Strategy Laid Out

To the Peshwa, 6 August 1759:

The Plan:

"I hope to complete the job in Bengal soon."

The Najeeb Gamble:

"Najeeb Khan's agent has promised he will accompany me with his army. If he comes, it is good. If he does not, I will punish him and go to the east."

The Time Problem:

"This will take time and delay the larger venture of going to Bengal."

The Decision:

"I am therefore taking his help to cross the Ganga and go to Shuja's province."

The Priority:

"The debts the Swami [the Peshwa] has incurred will be paid by the revenues of Bengal."

"Day and night I am seized of the matter of paying off these debts. I will labor to obtain the funds to repay these debts."

What Dattaji Has Done

The Trade-off:

  • Left Punjab on its own
  • Priority = paying off loans
  • Must get to Bengal for that
  • But must cross Ganga first
  • Depending entirely on Najeeb for bridge

The Risk:

  • Punjab undermanned
  • No high-caliber commander there
  • Vulnerable if Abdali comes
  • All eggs in Bengal basket

The Failed Meeting at Shamli

The Setup

Dattaji's Position:

  • Camped at Shamli
  • East of Yamuna (has crossed it)
  • West of Ganga (still needs to cross)

The Invitation:

  • Dattaji invited Najeeb to meeting
  • Supposed to discuss cooperation

The Hidden Agenda

What Dattaji's Aides Planned:

"Dattaji's aides decided to use the meeting as a ruse to capture the wily Rohila."

The Trap:

  • Meeting was a pretext
  • Real goal: kidnap/capture Najeeb
  • Eliminate the problem once and for all

Najeeb's Escape

The Rohila's Instincts

What Happened:

"When Najeeb came for the meeting, his aides rushed him out of Dattaji's tent in a hurry, sensing a danger to his life."

Najeeb's Awareness:

  • He was very careful
  • Understood the invitation might be trap
  • His aides sensed danger
  • Told him: "You are not safe here. Get out."
  • Escaped before capture attempt

Najeeb's Assessment:

"On his return, Najeeb remarked, 'These people don't look good. It is not safe to meet these people.'"

The Skill:

"So he was a good reader of men."

  • Knew they were out to get him
  • Trusted his instincts
  • Refused future cooperation

The Botched Operation

Why This Was a Disaster

The Failed Meeting:

"The failed meeting was not a good omen for Dattaji's hopes of securing Najeeb's help to head eastwards across the Ganga."

What Went Wrong:

  • Najeeb was now alerted
  • He would never help Dattaji
  • Relationship turned hostile

The Question of Blame

Was It Dattaji's Fault?

On One Hand:

  • "His aides kind of decided to do this"
  • Maybe they acted independently

On the Other Hand:

  • Dattaji was "not a friend of Najeeb"
  • Just wanted to use him
  • Must have known about or approved the plan

The Screw-Up:

"But why sour the relations then? If he didn't actually kidnap him, he should have done one or the other. Why did he let him go then?"

The Analysis:

  • Vibes were not good between two camps
  • Someone (aides or Dattaji) set out to capture Najeeb
  • But then Dattaji decided not to (or couldn't)
  • Got nothing from this meeting
  • Both soured relationship AND failed to capture
  • "He screwed up one way or another"

The Cost:

"But it was a costly mistake."

  • Could have gotten Najeeb's help
  • Now that option is gone
  • Relationship is hostile
  • Bridge will never be built

Najeeb's Strategic Position

Geography is Destiny

Where Najeeb's Territory Was:

"Najeeb's territories lay predominantly on the left bank of the Ganga extending to the foothills of the Himalayas."

His Capital:

  • Nazibabad - his capital
  • Pathargarh - his strong fort
  • Both safe beyond the Ganga (east side)

Why Location Mattered:

  • Rohilkhand was east of Ganga
  • If Najeeb helps Dattaji cross Ganga
  • Dattaji enters Najeeb's territory
  • "He's inviting him into his front yard"

The Self-Interest:

"So he's not going to want to help him for many reasons."

As Long As:

  • Dattaji stays on west bank of Ganga
  • Najeeb is safer
  • River is natural barrier
  • Protects his small kingdom

The Double-Cross Begins

Even While Promising Help

The Public Face:

"Even as Najeeb was promising Dattaji all possible help..."

The Reality:

"...he began recruiting the other Rohilas to his cause and went about fortifying his own position."

What Najeeb Was Doing:

  • Lying to Dattaji's face
  • Recruiting other Rohila commanders
  • Building coalition against Marathas
  • Fortifying defenses
  • Preparing for conflict

Dattaji's Continued Delusion

Still Trusting the Snake

Dattaji's State of Mind:

"Dattaji, in the dark about Najeeb's moves, still felt he could use his help to get the bridge across the Ganga ready before the rains set in."

The Contradiction:

  • On one hand: Didn't trust Najeeb
  • Didn't like him
  • Wanted to get rid of him
  • But ALSO: Wanted to use him

The Desperation:

"Because he had no other idea how to cross the Ganga. Marathas didn't have the skill."

The Bind:

  • Needed help desperately
  • Torn between:
    • Using Najeeb
    • Killing Najeeb
  • "Because he is no good"

Najeeb Builds His Own Bridge

The Strategic Move

By Monsoon Season:

"By the time rains set in, Najeeb had his own bridge across the Ganga at Shukratal. And he could get provisions for his camp at the western side of the Ganga."

What This Meant:

  • Najeeb built bridge FOR HIMSELF
  • His forces on western bank of Ganga
  • Could get supplies from eastern side
  • Using his own bridge for his logistics

The Question:

"I wonder if Dattaji will try and take this bridge from him."


Building the Anti-Maratha Coalition

Rallying the Rohillas

Message to Bareilly:

"He wrote to the Rohillas at Bareilly that if they did not support him against the Marathas, they would be the next victims of Maratha attack."

The Logic:

  • Rohillas at Bareilly probably not as militant
  • "Not as extremist as he was"
  • Hadn't understood the Maratha threat

The Scaremongering:

"If you don't come on my side and we put up a united front, you will be destroyed by Marathas."

Why It Worked:

  • All Rohillas were Afghan immigrants
  • Shared ethnic/cultural identity
  • Fear of Maratha expansion
  • Better to fight together

Pulling in Shuja-ud-Daula

The Warning to Awadh

Najeeb's Message to Shuja:

"If the Marathas crossed the river, they would attack Awadh."

The Framing:

  • Dattaji is coming YOUR way
  • He wants to cross Ganga
  • Once he does, you're in danger
  • Better help me stop him now

The Religious Angle:

  • Shuja was Shia
  • Najeeb was Sunni
  • Normally some lack of trust

The Unity:

"But both are Muslims at the end of the day."

The Priority:

"Rather than trusting Hindu, which is totally outside of their brotherhood, there may be more trust between them."

The Coalition:

"Slowly but surely, Najeeb forged an anti-Maratha coalition."

The Tactics:

  • Calling Marathas outsiders
  • Calling them kaffir (infidels)
  • Employing religious rhetoric
  • "Every tactic he can"

Najeeb's Weakness:

"Najeeb Khan himself could not resist Maratha force because he didn't have adequate forces. So he had to rally some other people in his cause."


The Call to Abdali

North Indian Princes Reach Out

Who Wrote to Abdali:

"The North Indian princes sent letters to Abdali calling him to India."

Who Were They:

  • Madho Singh (Jaipur)
  • Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
  • Other Rajasthani princes

Why:

  • Harassed by Marathas
  • Succession wars
  • Wanted Marathas gone
  • Wanted them "south of Narmada"

The Maratha Problem

Initial Welcome:

  • Initially princes invited Marathas
  • To get upper hand in local conflicts
  • For help temporarily

The Realization:

"But later on they started realizing that it is more trouble than it is worth."

Why Everyone Hated Marathas:

  • "Overwhelming force"
  • Creating their own power structure
  • Supposed to be oppressive
  • Filling power vacuum left by weak Mughals

The Misunderstanding:

  • Northern princes didn't understand Shivaji's vision
  • Hindu unity concept didn't resonate
  • Rajasthani Hindus, Jat Hindus didn't see common cause
  • Marathas looked like mercenaries
  • "Just wanted to get money"
  • Mercenary spirit ≠ Hindu nationalism

The Shivaji Standard They Failed

What Made Shivaji Different

Shivaji's Innovation:

  • Created mindset: Muslims are outsiders, foreigners
  • Need our own government, our own kingdom
  • Unite Hindus under one banner

Before Shivaji:

  • Maratha warriors (very good warriors)
  • Working for different Muslim kings
  • Killing each other
  • No unity

The Northern Failure:

  • North didn't adopt this mindset
  • Hostility between different forces persisted
  • Didn't understand value of Hindu kingdom concept
  • Especially Rajasthanis (all Hindu)
  • Suraj Mal Jat (also Hindu)
  • But no unified Hindu identity

The Perception:

"Marathas were trying to work as a, they just wanted to get money. They were mercenary. That mercenary spirit did not create this single Hindu identity."

The Result:

"They were also looked upon as mercenaries who didn't have anybody's interest in mind."

Just chaos without regard:

  • Sowing confusion
  • No clear purpose
  • No one's interests protected
  • Just extraction and violence

The Emperor Writes to Peshwa

Multiple Fronts

Imad-ul-Mulk's Terror:

  • Emperor felt "terrorized by Imad"
  • Imad was supposed to be Vazir
  • But acting like tyrant

The Irony:

  • Emperor writing to Peshwa
  • Emperor writing to Najeeb Khan
  • Playing both sides
  • "He's really" panicking

North India Becomes Friendless

The Isolation

Rajput Kings:

  • Madho Singh (Jaipur)
  • Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
  • "Keen to see the end of Maratha attacks"
  • Wrote to Abdali asking him to defeat Marathas

The Summary:

"North India had become a friendless place for the Marathas. Everyone hated them, either openly or secretly."


Key Figures

NameRoleKey Actions
Dattaji ShindeMaratha CommanderFailed to capture Najeeb, still trusting him
Najeeb Khan RohilaEnemyBuilding coalition, lying, fortifying
Malhar Rao HolkarSenior CommanderBad advice to befriend Najeeb
Shuja-ud-DaulaSubedar of AwadhWarned by Najeeb, joining coalition
Madho SinghRaja of JaipurWriting to Abdali to come save them
Vijay SinghRaja of JodhpurAlso calling for Abdali
GujarsLocal guidesCritical knowledge of river fords
General WellingtonBritish (future)Will exploit this weakness 40 years later

Geographic Context

Key Locations:

  • Shamli - Dattaji's camp, east of Yamuna, west of Ganga
  • Ganga River - Major barrier, must be crossed
  • Shukratal - Where Najeeb built his bridge
  • Nazibabad - Najeeb's capital (east of Ganga)
  • Pathargarh - Najeeb's strong fort (east of Ganga)
  • Rohilkhand - Najeeb's territory (east of Ganga)
  • Bareilly - Town where other Rohillas based
  • Awadh - Shuja-ud-Daula's kingdom
  • Bengal - Dattaji's ultimate target (far east)

Timeline

  • 6 August 1759 - Dattaji writes to Peshwa explaining strategy
  • August-September 1759 - Meeting at Shamli fails
  • By Monsoon (July-August) - Najeeb builds his own bridge
  • Late 1759 - Coalition building accelerates
  • Late 1759 - Letters to Abdali multiply

Major Themes

1. The Structural Weakness

Marathas' inability to cross rivers = permanent strategic flaw that lasts 50 years.

2. The Botched Kidnapping

Worst of both worlds: Failed to capture Najeeb AND made him hostile.

3. The Agricultural Curse

Being farmer-soldiers means never developing monsoon warfare capability.

4. The Snake's Skill

Najeeb building coalition while promising cooperation. Master manipulator.

5. The Hindu Disunity

Northern Hindus don't adopt Shivaji's vision. Marathas seen as mercenaries, not liberators.

6. The Isolation

Everyone hates Marathas. Zero real allies in North India.

7. Local Knowledge Advantage

Gujars' knowledge of fords = the difference between movement and paralysis.


The Ominous Pattern

What's Building:

  • Failed meeting → hostile relationship
  • Najeeb building coalition
  • All northern princes calling Abdali
  • Dattaji still deluded about using Najeeb
  • River-crossing problem unsolved
  • Monsoon coming or just passed
  • No real allies
  • Overextended
  • Punjab undermanned

40 Years Later:

  • British will systematically exploit same weakness
  • Shows this isn't temporary problem
  • Permanent flaw in Maratha military system

Dattaji just made an enemy out of the one man who could have helped him cross the Ganga. Najeeb is building a coalition while lying to his face. Every northern prince is writing to Abdali begging him to come. The Marathas have no friends. They can't cross rivers. Monsoon makes it worse. And in 40 years, the British will read this same playbook and use it to destroy them. The noose is tightening, and Dattaji doesn't even know it.