The Breaking Point: Commanders Demand Battle & Strategic Options Collapse

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Three-Month Accumulation of Horror

The Stench Problem (From Abdali's Biography):

• After three months stationary in one place: ~100,000+ people in small area
• Constant skirmishes occurring (minor battles daily)
• Dead bodies in ditches (human and animal)
• Uncleanliness compounded by dead body stench
• Became unbearable—something HAD to be done
• But Marathas couldn't move away from camp (trapped by Afghan siege)

The Desperation: From Abdali's Farsi biography:

"The Marathas after the late battle were confined within their fortification and their distresses arising from stenches and scarcity of provisions increased every day."

This was Abdali's strategy working: make them desperate enough to attack in weakened state.

The Commanders' Revolt at Bhau's Tent

The Informal Assembly:

• Important commanders and sardar (chiefs) crowded around Bhau's tent
• Not threatening but intensely demanding
• Totally bothered by continuing situation: how much longer to wait?
• People dying, animals dying, stench unbearable

The Ultimatum: From the commanders (reported by Kashiraj Pandit 19 years later):

"We don't want to die here. We haven't eaten anything for two days. Don't keep us dying here without food and water. We will go to battle with zest. Whatever happens will happen. We don't care. But we can't stay here."

The Psychological Shift:

• Not worried about dying on battlefield
• Deeply worried about dying slowly here without supplies
• Better to die fighting than rotting in camp
• Frame: death in battle = honor; death from starvation = degradation

Bhau's Decision-Making Process

The Acceptance: Bhau said: "I agree with you and we will do whatever is agreed upon by the majority."

This was crucial: decision made by CONSENSUS, not just command.

The Strategic Dilemma: Bhau was wrestling with three conflicting concerns:

1. Afghan Strength Growing Daily:

   • "Gilchiyat se bar diwas bahut jaali" (Afghan power increasing daily)
   • Our army is getting rotten (from lack of food/supplies)
   • Many horses dead; cavalry becoming foot soldiers

2. The Escape Route Problem:

   • Wanted to go to Delhi (on return route to Deccan)
   • But Afghan army blocking the Delhi road
   • Forest too thick on other routes—no good paths out
   • Trapped: blocked forward, blocked to sides, surrounded by forest

3. The Geometric Trap:

   • Marathas: on western side of Yamuna
   • Afghans: to the south, blocking Delhi road
   • Can't go north (back to original position—makes no sense)
   • Can't go west (thick forest)
   • Can't go directly south (Afghan army)
   • Only real option: go southeast toward Yamuna, then follow river south to Delhi

The Initial Plan: Retreat While Fighting

Bhau's Concept:

• Use artillery in front to keep Afghans at distance
• Move whole entourage (including 40-50,000 non-combatants) down south along Yamuna bank
• Not primarily to fight but to escape
• Artillery creates "no man's land"—keeps Afghans from advancing too close
• Slow progression toward Delhi

Retreat & Fight Simultaneously:

• Can't do both effectively (Holkar's objection)
• Must either fight or retreat, not both
• But Bhau's idea: limited skirmishes/artillery duels while moving, NOT full battle

The Goal:

• Reach Delhi where Maratha garrison stationed
• Get supplies, rejuvenate army
• Then decide next steps from position of strength
• Not to fight all-out battle, but to escape with army intact

Commander Disagreements

Shinde & Holkar's Position:

• Agreed plan made sense IF they survive the escape
• Right now under duress and starving
• Better to move to secure location with supplies first
• THEN fight if necessary
• But don't engage all-out battle while retreating

Malhar Rao Holkar's Specific Objection:

• Can't retreat and fight at same time
• This is militarily impossible
• If you're fighting, you're committed; if retreating, you're committed
• You can't do both effectively simultaneously

Bhau's Response:

• Acknowledged difficulty but it's the plan we have
• Doesn't mean starting tomorrow though
• Proposed delay until Sunday (6 days away)

The Timeline Argument

Bhau's Pressure:

• Today is Tuesday
• Waiting until Sunday = 6 more days
• "In 6 days, people will die from starvation or go join Afghans"
• No point in waiting if people are dying anyway
• START TOMORROW (Wednesday)

Why This Mattered:

• Every day in camp = more deaths from starvation
• Delay meant giving more time for demoralization to set in
• Soldiers losing strength daily (no food for 2+ days already)
• Moving action sooner = while troops still have some strength left

The Non-Combatant Problem

Who Had to Be Protected:

• Women (wives, families)
• Elderly men
• Pilgrims/holy site tourists (came for religious reasons)
• Maintenance staff (cooks, servants, logistics)
• Merchants (needed for supply transactions)
• Non-fighting support personnel

How It Would Work:

• Would place them in center of rectangular formation
• Army surrounds them as they move
• Defense of non-combatants: only AFTER Afghans attack
• Until then, focused on moving and artillery positioning

The Burden:

• 40-50,000 extra mouths to feed
• Don't contribute to fighting
• Consume supplies daily
• Slow down movement
• Required dedicated protection during battle
• But can't abandon them (political/moral crisis)

The Psychological Reality

Death Preference Shift: Originally: "Better to die fighting than starving" Now refined to: "Better to try escaping and fighting limited battles than die in camp" This was a tactical shift, not just emotional

The Officers' Thinking:

• They calculated odds
• All-out pitched battle = catastrophic losses both sides
• Escape attempt while fighting = lower losses, keeps army intact
• Better to lose some to escape than lose all in apocalyptic battle

Abdali's Biography Account

The Decisive Moment (January 14): From Farsi source:

"On Wednesday, the sixth of Jamaudi, the second month, they drew up their forces on the plane, placing the European artillery in front and attacked the enemy."

This confirms: Marathas initiated with artillery in front, planning forward movement (southeast toward Yamuna).

Timeline

Key Insights

The Humiliating Reality: Bhau didn't want to fight. He wanted to escape. The "battle" of Panipat was never intended as a pitched battle—it was intended as a running retreat with artillery support. This completely changes the historical narrative.

Commander Consensus as Strength: Bhau's decision was legitimate because commanders agreed. It wasn't dictatorship; it was consensus under crisis. This gave orders legitimacy even though the situation was desperate.

The Starvation Threshold: Two days without food was THE breaking point. Not psychological but physiological. Soldiers at that point will fight or do anything because their bodies demand action.

The Geometric Trap: Marathas had nowhere to go except toward Afghans. All other routes blocked (forest, rivers, impossible terrain). This forced the confrontation even though Bhau wanted to avoid it.

Artillery-Centric Strategy: This reveals Marathas were thinking: artillery > cavalry > infantry. They wanted to use long-range weapons to avoid close combat where Afghan numbers could overwhelm them. Revolutionary for Indian warfare (more European-influenced approach).

Where We Left Off: Decision finalized: march southeast toward Yamuna tomorrow (January 14). Form rectangular formation with non-combatants in center. Use artillery to keep Afghans at bay while moving south along Yamuna bank toward Delhi. Goal: escape with army intact, not fight all-out battle. The plan is extremely ambitious—requires perfect discipline and coordination.

Bhau had wanted to retreat. He never wanted the all-out battle that everyone remembers. His plan was elegant: form a moving rectangle, put artillery in front, move southeast toward safety, keep Afghans at arm's length with gunfire, reach Delhi. But it required something Maratha armies didn't specialize in: perfect discipline and formation discipline, not individual heroics. It also required Afghans to let them pass peacefully. Both assumptions would prove wrong by the end of January 14.