The Afternoon Crisis: Cavalry-Artillery Coordination Breaks Down

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Midday Transition (Noon Approaching)

The Situation at 12 Noon:

• 3+ hours of Gardi's artillery dominating
• Afghan right flank (Barkhurdar Khan, Rohilas) devastated
• Thousands dead, lines broken
• Wedge created = opportunity for cavalry exploitation

What Should Happen (According to Irwin/Military Doctrine):

• Rest and rotation: artillery units pull back slightly
• Fresh cavalry unit charges through gap created by artillery
• Hit demoralized/retreating Afghans
• Drive them back, break formation completely
• Fresh cavalry second wave: comes in after first wave retreats
• Continuous pressure keeps enemy off-balance

What Actually Happened:

• Cavalry support (Vithal Shivadev, Yashwant Rao Pawar) got in front of artillery
• Artillery had to stop firing (couldn't hit own cavalry)
• Cavalry got hit by Afghan country-made guns
• Cavalry injured, forced to retreat
• No fresh cavalry available for rotation
• Gap created by artillery: not exploited
• Momentum lost

The Coordination Error Explained

The Position Problem:

• Vithal Shivadev (labeled #2 on formation map)
• Right next to Gardi's artillery
• SUPPOSED to stay "very tightly enmeshed with the artillery"
• Instead: got in front of guns

Why This Mattered: Artillery on battlefield works at ~500-1000 meters range.

• If cavalry protecting them: cavalry should be 300-500 meters away
• Not directly in front blocking the line of fire
• Cavalry position: supposed to prevent enemy from charging artillery
• Cavalry got: wrong position, wrong timing

The Consequence:

• Artillery couldn't continue fire mission
• Lost momentum from devastating first 3 hours
• Afghan lines time to reorganize
• Cavalry had to retreat wounded
• Gardi now without cavalry protection
• Artillery vulnerable to direct attack

The Blocker Doctrine: Slow Artillery Problem

The Core Issue:

"At the time of the battle, the artillery units were static meaning they won't move too much. The foot soldiers and artillery would make all the movements. Because the artillery was being carried by the bulls who were extremely slow."

The Practical Realities:

• Cannons pulled by oxen/bulls (very slow movement)
• Cavalry on horses (very fast movement)
• When cavalry charges forward: artillery left behind
• Artillery can't keep up with cavalry advance
• Creates gap between protecting force and protected asset

If Bulls Are Injured:

• Can't move artillery at all
• No alternative transport available
• Cannons become fixed in position
• Must be defended or abandoned

The Retreat Problem:

• If order comes to retreat: bulls are slow
• Cavalry escapes on horses
• Artillery stuck, moving at bull-speed
• Becomes trapped/captured/destroyed
• This is disaster

The Documented Solution (Blocker Reference)

Historical Record: Blocker researched how armies solved this problem:

"The artillery units were static. The foot soldiers and cavalry made all the movements. Because the artillery was being carried by the bulls who were extremely slow."

The Practical Response:

1. Keep cavalry tightly coordinated with artillery (don't let them separate)
2. Artillery stays forward while cavalry protects locally
3. Don't advance cavalry far ahead of artillery support
4. If cavalry must retreat: artillery retreats with them (or is abandoned)

The Abandonment Option:

• If forced to retreat and bulls too slow
• Spike the guns (drive nails through key parts to disable them)
• Leave cannons behind so enemy can't use them
• Cavalry escapes with horses
• Artillery sacrificed to allow escape

Why This Failed at Panipat

The Mismatch:

• Gardi's artillery: European-trained, skilled, knows doctrine
• Maratha cavalry: traditional warriors, not trained in artillery-cavalry coordination
• Never practiced working together
• No shared doctrine/understanding
• Cavalry expected to charge and win (traditional way)
• Artillery expected: "support my charges"
• But artillery reality: "I need you to stay close and protect me"

The Communication Failure:

• Cavalry didn't understand they should wait for artillery preparation
• Cavalry didn't understand they should stay within range
• Cavalry got impatient (warriors want action)
• Charged at wrong time (before artillery fully demoralized enemy)
• Got damaged (Afghan rifle fire)
• Retreated before achieving breakthrough
• Left artillery exposed

Gardi's Problem:

• 1,000 highly trained musketeers
• Infantry support present
• But no cavalry that understood how to work with artillery
• Expected protection: didn't get it properly
• Expected exploitation of gaps: cavalry got hurt first

Comparative Doctrine: French vs. Maratha

French/European Armies (Working Model):

• Artillery softens enemy thoroughly
• Cavalry waits, disciplined, in reserve
• When enemy demoralizes: cavalry charges
• Cavalry stays coordinated with artillery
• Infantry follows cavalry (supports exploitation)
• Continuous coordination throughout battle
• Result: artillery advantage translated to victory

Maratha Approach (Broken Model):

• Gardi's artillery attacks (European style)
• Maratha cavalry sees enemy breaking
• Cavalry charges immediately (traditional warrior style)
• Doesn't wait for full demoralization
• Gets in front of artillery fire
• Gets hit by Afghan guns
• Loses momentum
• No follow-up possible
• Result: artillery advantage NOT translated to victory

The Cultural Problem: Individual warrior culture doesn't naturally understand "wait for support."

• Cavalry warrior mentality: see opportunity, charge
• Artillery mentality: support is essential, coordinate timing
• These don't naturally mix

The Afternoon Turning Point

By Early Afternoon (Post-Noon):

• Maratha momentum fading
• Cavalry damaged/scattered
• Artillery still functional but isolated
• Afghan right flank hurt but not defeated
• Afghan center (Shah Wali Khan, 16,000 soldiers) still intact
• Afghan reserves (Abdali's 5,000-7,000 slave units) never engaged

The Shift:

• Morning: Maratha advantage (artillery dominating)
• Afternoon: Battle becomes grinding attrition
• Night/continuing: Maratha exhaustion, Afghan reserves fresher
• Numbers start mattering more than technology

The Failure to Exploit:

"No one was taking advantage of this hole that they had carved. So the whole thing did not was not as advantageous."

Three hours of artillery success: wasted because cavalry couldn't follow up properly.

The Larger Historical Lesson

Why Professional Armies Beat Traditional Warriors: Not always because of better weapons, but because of:

• Understanding how weapons work together
• Discipline to coordinate actions
• Patience to execute doctrine
• Communication between units
• Support for specialized forces

Gardi vs. Maratha Army:

• Gardi: professional, understands artillery
• Rest of army: traditional warriors, doesn't understand new warfare
• Mismatch = failure to capitalize on advantage
• Better weapons don't guarantee victory if not coordinated

The Irwin Analysis: Historian researched why Indian armies struggled with artillery:

• Had the cannon technology
• Didn't have the doctrine to use it properly
• Cavalry still charged (old way)
• Infantry still fought individually (old way)
• Artillery isolated, not supported properly
• European armies: integrated artillery into coordinated tactics
• Indian armies: added artillery to old tactics

Timeline (Noon to Afternoon)

Key Insights

The Morning-to-Afternoon Failure: Maratha artillery won the morning completely. Should have translated to afternoon victory through exploiting the gap. But cavalry coordination failure prevented this. By afternoon, momentum lost, opportunity passed, battle returned to balance/grinding.

Technology vs. Doctrine: Having artillery doesn't mean you'll win with artillery. You need to understand how to use it. Gardi understood. Maratha cavalry didn't. This mismatch turned morning victory into afternoon stalemate.

The Bull Problem Was Real: Artillery pulled by slow bulls created actual constraint. Cavalry had to choose: advance (leaving artillery behind), or stay back (not exploiting gap). Either way: coordination breaks down. This wasn't just tactical error—it was structural to 18th-century warfare.

Professional vs. Traditional: Blocker's research shows this pattern across battles: traditional cavalry armies adding European artillery but still using traditional cavalry tactics. Never fully coordinating. Result: waste of artillery advantage.

The Afternoon Shift: This is where the battle turned from Maratha advantage to even contest. Morning: technology won. Afternoon: discipline mattered more. By evening: numbers mattered most. Afghans had more soldiers. Marathas' one advantage (artillery) couldn't be sustained without coordination.

Where We Left Off: Afternoon approach. Artillery advantage not exploited due to cavalry coordination failure. Maratha momentum lost. Afghan right flank damaged but not defeated. Afghan center and reserves still untouched. Afternoon will be grinding battle. Night approaching. Marathas exhausted. Afghans have fresh reserves. The question: can Gardi's artillery sustain enough pressure through afternoon/evening? Or does Afghan numerical advantage become overwhelming?

By noon on January 14, Gardi had proven something: European artillery could devastate traditional warriors. Three hours of perfect execution. But then Maratha cavalry, trained for a thousand years to charge and win, got impatient. They charged before the artillery finished the job. Got in the way of the guns. Got hit by Afghan rifles. Had to retreat. And suddenly the perfect morning was just the morning. The afternoon would be different.