The Final Gamble: Negotiations Fail & Battle Is Decided

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary


The Strategic Impasse (Early January 1761)

The Realization:

  • December 7, 1760 skirmish: Marathas nearly won but lost commander Mangare
  • Peshwa received this news in late January (month late)
  • Time has come to "settle the account"—debt must be paid
  • Procrastination no longer possible

Why Marathas Couldn't Wait:

  • Understood this would be epic battle with terrible casualties
  • Both sides suffering significant losses already
  • But supplies running critically short on Maratha side only
  • No hope for reinforcements (Peshwa stuck in Deccan, Nizam obstructing)
  • Waiting = guaranteed starvation; fighting = chance at victory

Failed Negotiation Attempts

Initial Proposal (Late December/Early January):

  • Bhau tried negotiating through Suja Uddhawla
  • Suja had contacts with Shah Wali Khan (Abdali's Prime Minister)
  • Shah Wali Khan was "reasonable and peacemaker" type
  • Suggested: Abdali accept tribute from Marathas and return to Afghanistan

Why Abdali Hesitated:

  • Concerned about Afghan settlers in India (Rohilas, especially Najib Khan)
  • What would happen to them once Abdali left and Marathas regrouped?
  • Felt responsibility to protect fellow Afghans in India

Consultation with Rohila Chiefs:

  • Abdali asked Najib Khan, Dundee Khan, and other Rohila leaders
  • Most Rohilas were willing to accept truce (didn't want bloodbath)
  • Battle outcome unpredictable (50-50 odds)—too much risk
  • Would prefer certain terms to uncertain warfare

Najib Khan's Ultimatum

The Decisive Voice:

  • Najib Khan stood alone against compromise
  • Had religious support from Kazi Idris (Islamic preacher)
  • Idris framed it as Jihad (holy war against infidels)

Najib's Logic to Kashiraj Pandit:

"His excellency Suja is my prince and I consider myself his servant. But owing to youth, he does not realize the consequences. His proposal shows sympathy with Marathas—not realistic. Peace is not a chain that prevents breaking of faith. All this Maratha humility is due to cunning and deceit. As soon as the Shah turns back to Afghanistan, this storm will break upon my head and sweep away Islam. The Maratha is a thorn in the garden of Hindustan. If not uprooted now, it will pierce my safety again."

The Shrewd Calculation:

  • Najib understood: moment Abdali leaves, Marathas will return
  • Marathas always try to eliminate Muslim power in India
  • Even accepting tribute doesn't change their long-term goal
  • Any peace is temporary; Marathas will eventually come back to finish job
  • Therefore: must destroy them completely while Abdali is present
  • Abdali is only protection mechanism Rohilas have

Kazi Idris's Religious Argument

The Jihad Frame:

  • Idris Khan (Islamic religious preacher) supported Najib
  • Argued this was religious duty, not material concern
  • Believers fight regardless of consequences
  • If they die: martyrs for Islam
  • If they win: greatest victory

The Message:

"This is Dharma Yuddha (religious war/Jihad). Don't worry about shortages, supplies, or death. That's Allah's concern. Your duty is to fight the infidels (Kafirs) and kill them. That is what Allah commands. Material concerns don't matter. Your duty is Jihad."

The Logic:

  • Removes cost-benefit analysis
  • Makes it binary: fight or betray Islam
  • No middle ground acceptable
  • Following Chanakya's logic: if death equals victory, what's there to lose?
  • Makes Afghan fighters extremely dangerous (willing to die, so might take enemy with them)

Abdali's Decision

The Turning Point:

  • Abdali agreed with Najib and Idris Khan
  • Accepted their argument: Marathas = fundamental threat to Muslim power
  • Rejected all truce proposals
  • Declared: "Either I gain victory or I completely wipe you out"
  • Single-minded commitment to total victory

Why Abdali Sided with Najib:

  • Understand Maratha pattern: constantly try to displace Muslim power
  • Peace treaty = temporary respite, not permanent solution
  • Once Abdali leaves, Marathas will resume their expansion
  • History showed Marathas not to be trusted once danger passes
  • Better to settle it now, decisively

The Entourage Problem

Bhau's Burden:

  • Responsible for 40-50,000+ dependents in camp
  • Wives, servants, old men, pilgrims visiting holy sites
  • Cannot fight while protecting non-combatants
  • Cannot abandon them (creates moral/political crisis)
  • Stuck with them: they consume supplies but can't contribute to defense

Two Options Only:

  1. Fight it out without regard to outcome
  2. Surrender

No Middle Ground Left


Suja's Position & Final Mediation

The Trapped Ally:

  • Suja still in Abdali's camp (nominally his ally)
  • Not fully committed to Abdali (compelled to be there)
  • Afraid of Abdali but also negotiating with Marathas through courtiers
  • If Marathas lose: still has to deal with them later (they'll come back)
  • Tried to find middle ground between camps through Kashiraj Pandit

Historical Reality Check:

  • Marathas DID come back after Panipat
  • Returned to Delhi with full force within 5 years
  • Retook the city completely
  • Suja's fear of permanent Maratha presence was justified

Bhau's Desperation Moves

Distribution of Funds (Before Battle):

  • Distributed 50,000 rupees to army
  • Told soldiers: "You've fought valiantly, continue doing so"
  • Attempted morale boost before final battle
  • Soldiers already somewhat demoralized (starvation, waiting, constant skirmishes)

Attempt to Protect Vishwasrao:

  • Bhau offered proposal for Vishwasrao to return to Deccan before battle
  • Wanted to save young prince (had taken responsibility for his safety)
  • Worried about explaining to Peshwa if Vishwasrao died

Vishwasrao's Refusal:

  • Young prince rejected escape option
  • Refused to abandon army that had protected him
  • Said: "I came here to get battle experience and become hard. I'm not leaving now."
  • Bhau and Vishwasrao had become very close during year together
  • Vishwasrao wrote to father: "You'll get a son like me, but you won't get a brother like Bhau"
  • Symbolic of trust between them despite age/experience gap

The Battle Council

The Participants:

  • Sadashiv Rao Bhau (overall campaign commander)
  • Vishwasrao (Commander-in-Chief by title, but inexperienced)
  • Malhar Rao Holkar
  • Jankoji Shinde (age 22-23, head of Shinde clan)
  • Other important personalities (experienced warriors)

The Consensus:

  • Starvation = certain death
  • Waiting = guaranteed loss (supplies exhausted)
  • Fighting = chance at victory (50-50 odds)
  • Decision: Fight the battle and decide tactics

What Wasn't Discussed:

  • No written notes survived the battle
  • Documents likely destroyed when Marathas lost
  • Can't know exact tactical discussions planned
  • Only general strategy known: go to battle

Timeline (Final Days)

DateEvent
Dec 7, 1760Skirmish where Marathas nearly win (Mangare killed)
Late DecShah Wali Khan proposes truce to Abdali
Early JanNajib Khan refuses truce ("Marathas are thorn")
Jan 4Jaankoji's letter (last from camp)
Jan 6Courier ambushed; funds lost
Jan 10Final negotiation attempts fail
Jan 10+Commanders demand battle
~Jan 13Battle council convenes; final decision made
Jan 14Battle of Panipat begins

Key Insights

The Negotiation Failure: Not due to unreasonable demands but due to fundamental incompatibility. Abdali (via Najib) understood: any peace is temporary if Marathas aren't destroyed. Given Maratha history of expansion, this analysis was correct.

Religious Motivation vs. Pragmatism: Kazi Idris's Jihad argument won over Shah Wali Khan's pragmatism. Religious framing made fighting mandatory, removed cost-benefit analysis, made compromise impossible.

The Rohila Paradox: Most Afghans wanted truce. But their representative (Najib) refused, forcing them into battle against their preference. Shows how one principled person (or religious authority) can override majority will.

Suja's Impossible Position: Tried to be mediator but trapped between camps. Correct in realizing Marathas would return. But his youth and inexperience (as Najib noted) made his peace proposals unpersuasive.

The Young Prince's Choice: Vishwasrao rejecting escape isn't naive—it's politically/militarily sound. Leaving would destroy morale, suggest leadership lacks confidence, weaken army psychologically. His commitment to stay with army was strategically necessary.

The Moment of No Return: Once Najib and Idris convinced Abdali, negotiations were dead. No compromise possible when one side frames it as religious duty. The battle became inevitable—not from military logic but from religious conviction and political calculation.


Where We Left Off: Battle council meets. All options exhausted. No more negotiations possible. Tactics and strategies discussed (notes lost). Abdali has decided: total victory or total destruction. Marathas understand: fight now or starve later. The armies face each other waiting for someone to give the signal. January 14, 1761 is hours away.


Bhau tried everything: patience (waiting for reinforcements), diplomacy (offering surrender terms), religious claims (matching Afghans' Jihad with Maratha pride). Nothing worked. Because Najib Khan understood something Bhau was still learning: some conflicts can't be negotiated away when one side believes the other's fundamental existence threatens them. Abdali didn't fear losing soldiers—he feared that without this victory, Marathas would eventually push Afghans entirely out of India. So he said no to peace. And on January 14, Bhau finally understood: there was no option left but to kill or be killed.