Scout Encounters and Pre-Battle Positioning (Late October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The First Major Skirmish: Sonipat Encounter
The Setup: Advanced Forces Meet
Maratha Scouts in Forest:
- Dense forest between Sonipat and Panipat
- Baji Hari's Maratha scouts sent ahead
- Shinde troops (experienced with Abdali's forces) ready
- Baji Hari's troops more relaxed/unprepared
- Horses sent out to graze (standard practice)
Abdali's Advance Force:
- 4,000 troops under Najib Khan
- Leading element of larger crossing operation
- Swift, agile attack force
- Exploiting element of surprise
- Aimed at destroying Maratha scouts
The Violent Encounter
The Attack:
- Afghan forces swept in suddenly
- Maratha forces caught off-guard
- Baji Hari's troops especially vulnerable
- No time to gather grazing horses
- Intense, violent skirmish in forest
The Casualties:
- ~1,000 Afghans killed
- ~1,500 Marathas killed
- Heavy losses for both sides
- Disproportionate Maratha casualties
- Scout force largely destroyed
Strategic Significance:
- Not the main armies, just advance elements
- But destroyed Maratha scouting capability
- Prevented information reaching Bhau
- First blood of eventual confrontation
- Showed Afghan offensive capability
The Difference: Shinde vs. Baji Hari Troops
Experience Matters
Shinde Troops:
- Had fought Afghans before
- Knew Afghan tactics and vigor
- Ready for the encounter
- Experienced and prepared
- Better positioned despite surprise
Baji Hari's Troops:
- Less battle experience with Afghans
- Relaxed, horses grazing in area
- Couldn't mobilize quickly
- More casualties in fighting
- Not ready for sudden engagement
The Lesson:
- Veteran troops perform better under pressure
- Experience of knowing enemy = advantage
- Preparation crucial in surprise situations
- Fresh troops more vulnerable to sudden attack
The Movement Toward Convergence
Abdali's Progress South
October 27-31 Timeline:
- October 27: Massacre at Sonipat
- October 28-30: Consolidation period
- October 31: Reached Sambhalka
- 6-7 days from crossing at Gauripur
- Moved ~40 km south toward Panipat
Why the Pause:
- Recovery from river crossing ordeal
- Reorganizing after scattered operation
- Reconnaissance of Maratha positions
- Allowing main force to consolidate
- Testing Maratha reaction/readiness
Bhau's Repositioning
The Turnaround:
- Marathas in Kurukshetra initially
- Got news of Abdali crossing (5-6 days delayed)
- Realized mistake of going north
- Turned around heading south
- Racing to intercept before Abdali escapes
The Distance Factor:
- Marathas ~150 km away
- Takes 2 weeks to move with full army + artillery
- Abdali ~40-50 km from Panipat
- Marathas have to cover much more ground
- Race now in Abdali's favor
Geographic Context: Why Panipat
The Road System
Grand Trunk Road:
- Delhi to Lahore main route
- Best road in region for large armies
- Abdali must use to return to Afghanistan
- Only practical route north from Delhi
- Built for trunk commerce and military movement
Panipat's Strategic Location:
- On or near Grand Trunk Road
- Linking Delhi and Lahore
- Town on elevated ground (small hill)
- Has small fort (Bhui Kot = ground fort)
- Controls major transportation corridor
The Canal Resource:
- Sweet water canal near Panipat
- Built by someone in past
- Critical for 100,000+ soldiers
- Need constant water supply
- Not available elsewhere in area
The Forest Barrier:
- Dense forest to west of Panipat
- Also small villages scattered around
- Affects movement and positioning
- Can hide forces or limit visibility
- Strategic terrain advantage possible
The Historical Pattern: Three Battles of Panipat
Why Panipat Became Battleground:
- First Battle (1526): Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodhi
- Second Battle (1556): Akbar defeated Hemu
- Third Battle (1761): Marathas vs. Afghans
The Strategic Reason:
- Gateway location on Grand Trunk Road
- Forces converging from different directions must meet there
- Controls access to Delhi from north
- Whoever wins Panipat controls Delhi access
- Road junction makes it natural battleground
The Mughal Pattern:
- Babur and Akbar both won decisive victories here
- Established Mughal dominance
- Route to power through Panipat
- Historical precedent for decisive battles
- Geography made it inevitable
The Standoff Begins: Wait and Watch
Both Armies Taking Measure
Cautious Approach:
- Both armies now ~5 miles apart
- Early November 1760
- Neither immediately attacking
- Both taking time to assess other
- Understanding this won't be easy
What They Were Evaluating:
- Troop strength and composition
- Artillery pieces and capabilities
- Supply lines and logistics
- Command structure and discipline
- Cavalry vs. infantry balance
- Morale and organization
Why No Immediate Battle:
- Both matched in size (~100,000-120,000 each)
- Both realize consequences enormous
- Both know this could be decisive battle
- Both recognize no easy victory possible
- Both want to maximize advantage before engaging
The Calculation
Abdali's Thinking:
- Impressed by Maratha force
- Need to understand their strengths
- Need to exploit their weaknesses
- Desperately wants to return home
- But not at cost of army destruction
Bhau's Thinking:
- Wants to stop Abdali going home
- Need to understand Afghan capabilities
- Artillery gives advantage but not decisive
- Must use terrain and positioning
- Cannot afford another loss like Dattaji
The Pre-Battle Analysis: Identifying Weaknesses
Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Artillery Ace
His Strategy:
- Advised Bhau to position ahead of Panipat town
- Panipat would be "in back" (secure retreat)
- Build massive camp fortifications
- Dig trenches around entire camp
- Use terrain for defense
The Defense System:
- Trenches 2-3 feet deep minimum
- Prevent cavalry from entering camp easily
- Line of defense against assault
- Protects supply and artillery
- Creates controlled battle space
Why This Matters:
- Artillery needs protected position
- Afghans mobile/agile (surgical strikes)
- Trenches slow down rapid movement
- Allows artillery better targeting
- Gives Marathas positional advantage
The Mutual Understanding
What Both Forces Realized:
- This isn't like previous battles
- Previous encounters were skirmishes
- Raghunath Rao fought Abdali's son (not Abdali)
- This is first direct confrontation
- Both are facing unknown opponent
The Recognition:
- Neither side is weak
- Neither side can be overrun easily
- Consequences will be immense
- Casualties on both sides certain
- Only one victor can emerge
- No quick victory possible
The Philosophical Dimension: Ram vs. Krishna
The Historical Parallel:
- Mahabharata happened in Kurukshetra (nearby)
- 3,000 years ago same general area
- Two sides fought over principle
- Similar to current situation
- History repeating itself
Ram's Approach (Straight, Righteous):
- Followed dharma (duty) precisely
- No corners cut
- Straight like an arrow
- Operated in Satya Yuga (age of truth)
- Society was mostly truthful
Krishna's Approach (Flexible, Pragmatic):
- Operated in Kali Yuga (age of degeneration)
- Bent rules to achieve results
- Cut corners but achieved same goal
- Deception permitted against wicked
- Adapts to reality of his time
The Application:
- Abdali = Krishna approach (flexible, deceptive, pragmatic)
- Bhau = Ram approach (direct, warrior code, principled)
- Different philosophies about warfare
- Different methods, same objective
- Evolution of military thinking
Hindu Philosophy on Dharma
Key Distinction:
- Hinduism doesn't prescribe exact rules
- Tells followers to use logic and reasoning
- Adapt approach to circumstances
- Consider context and time period
- Preserve good, destroy bad (principles)
The Mahabharata Model:
- Pandavas and Kauravas both Kuru clan
- Same family fighting each other
- But Kauravas abandoned truth/goodness
- Therefore had to be destroyed
- Even internal fight acceptable if principle at stake
Modern Application:
- Not "family loyalty over morality"
- But "universal principles over particularism"
- Good behavior > religious/family identity
- Truth > tribal loyalty
- This distinguishes Hindu ethics
The Blocking Problem: Mutual Obstacle
The Geographic Trap
Abdali's Perspective:
- Needs to return via Grand Trunk Road
- Road goes through Panipat area
- Marathas block his return path
- Can't go around (geography prevents it)
- Must fight his way through
Bhau's Perspective:
- Wants to prevent Abdali's return
- Wants to push him back across Yamuna
- Positioned to block Grand Trunk Road
- Abdali blocks his southern movement
- Can't go around easily either
The Impasse:
- Even if both wanted to avoid battle
- Geographic reality prevents it
- Both armies blocking each other's path
- Must move past each other
- Only way is through military confrontation
The Bad Blood:
- Dattaji killed (Marathas want revenge)
- Kunjapura destroyed (Afghans want revenge)
- Mathura massacred (Marathas outraged)
- Hundreds killed in skirmishes
- Too much blood spilled for negotiation
The Waiting Game: 2.5-3 Month Standoff
Timeline: Late October to January
The Duration:
- Left Pune: March 1760 (7.5 months ago)
- Now: Early November 1760
- Will wait: Until January 1761
- Additional: 2.5-3 month delay
- Total: 10 months from start
Why Wait So Long:
- Assess weaknesses/strengths
- Exploit terrain advantages
- Wait for better conditions
- Avoid rash decisions
- Both armies too evenly matched
The Stalemate Period:
- Both armies camped near Panipat
- Probing and reconnaissance
- Small skirmishes
- Gathering intelligence
- Preparing for decisive engagement
Key Players in Position
| Leader | Role | Age | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abdali | Commander-in-Chief | 40s | Afghan side |
| Bhau | Maratha Commander | 29 | Maratha side |
| Shahpasand Khan | Afghan Chief Commander | ? | Operational command |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery Master | ? | Strategic advisor |
| Holkar | Army Commander | 67 | Experienced voice (sidelined) |
| Baji Hari | Scout/Advance Force | ? | Reconnaissance |
| Shinde Troops | Veterans | Various | Battle-hardened units |
| Vishwas Rao | Nominal Commander | 19 | Ceremonial rank |
| Jankoji | Young Commander | 19 | Inexperienced |
The Waiting Period: What They're Doing
Intelligence Gathering:
- Sending spies into opposite camp
- Observing force composition
- Testing defensive positions
- Understanding supply lines
- Identifying weak points
Preparation:
- Fortifying camp positions
- Improving water supply
- Organizing troops
- Training and discipline
- Building morale
Diplomatic Probes:
- Possibly sending envoys
- Testing willingness to negotiate
- Exploring surrender options
- Understanding other side's resolve
- Looking for advantage
Key Themes
- Convergence is Inevitable - Geography makes battle unavoidable
- Information War - Scouts critical; controlling information crucial
- Measured Approach - Both sides avoid rash decisions
- Philosophical Divide - Different approaches to warfare
- Even Matching - No side has clear advantage
- Time as Weapon - Waiting allows preparation and assessment
Where This Leads: By early November 1760, both armies are positioned near Panipat. They've come 1,400 km and 7.5 months for this encounter. Neither is eager to fight immediately, despite the bad blood. They'll spend the next 2.5 months assessing each other, probing defenses, and preparing. The waiting period allows both sides to finalize plans. By January 1761, they'll be ready. The Third Battle of Panipat—one of history's most consequential battles—is now inevitable.
They're close enough to see each other now. 100,000 Marathas. 100,000 Afghans. Neither certain of victory. Both aware that this battle will be catastrophic for someone. So they wait. They watch. They probe. They gather intelligence. And through the winter months, both armies prepare for the moment when all these months of struggle, all this distance traveled, all this blood spilled—will come down to a single day. A single battle. At a place called Panipat.