Abdali's Fifth Invasion Begins (September-December 1759)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Setup: Maratha Control of Punjab

What Marathas Had Achieved

By late 1759:

• Marathas controlled all principal Punjab towns:
  • Lahore (capital)
  • Peshawar (extreme northwest, border with Afghanistan)
  • Attaq (even further than Peshawar)
  • Multan
  • Sarhind

The Achievement:

• First time Hindu army had gone that far north and west
• Historic milestone
• Raghunath Rao had established Maratha supremacy earlier
• After Adina Beg died (September 1758), no able governor remained

The Problem:

• Marathas were good at conquering, terrible at securing
• Raghunath Rao got accolades for reaching Attaq
• But within one year it was all falling apart
• No defensive structure properly developed

The Commander Deployments

Sabaji Shinde at Peshawar

Who He Was:

• Part of the Shinde clan
• Younger brother of Jayapa Shinde
• Worked under Dattaji Shinde (the main commander)

His Position:

• Posted at Peshawar
• Most critical junction - Afghanistan's border
• If Abdali's army comes, they enter through here first
• Most difficult post

The Strategy:

• Dattaji had placed Maratha commanders throughout Punjab
• One in Lahore, one in Multan, one in various cities
• Covering all important strategic points
• Sabaji got Peshawar - the front line

Dattaji Shinde at Shukratal

His Situation:

• Stuck at Shukratal (on Ganga river, eastern bank)
• Entire monsoon season 1759 wasted there
• Locked in battle with Najib Khan
• Trying to cross Ganga, nothing working
• Four or five months stuck

What Changed:

• After monsoon ended (October)
• Shuja Uddaula's Naga troops reached Shukratal
• Gave Najib numerical advantage
• Najib's position strengthened

Abdali's Rebellion & Unification (1758-1759)

Why He Didn't Come in 1758-1759

The Afghan Tribal Problem:

• Afghan tribes always battling each other
• Don't want to be under any tribal leader's thumb
• Feel independent

Abdali's Task:

• Fighting rebellions in his own country
• Had to unify Afghanistan under his command
• Called "father of Afghanistan" for this reason
• Left mark of unification - more than ever done before

Result: Successfully emerged from rebellions, ready to invade India again

The Fifth Invasion Begins (September 1759)

The Recruitment Drive

Who Joined Abdali:

• Soldiers from all over Afghanistan
• Enthused by idea of loots
• That was their incentive
• No money in Afghanistan
• India = riches
• "Loot all you can, that's your pay"

The Two-Route Strategy

September 1759 departure from Kandahar:

Route 1 - Khyber Pass (North):

• General Jahan Khan
• 20,000 men

Route 2 - Bolan Pass:

• Abdali himself
• 40,000 soldiers

Why Two Routes:

• These are only ways to enter India from Afghanistan
• Westward = big desert (no water, too hot, not hospitable)
• Only camels could cross, but extremely difficult
• Mountain passes = only viable entry points

The June 1759 Defeat That Triggered Everything

What Happened at Rohutas

The Battle:

• Abdali's general Jahan Khan led army to Peshawar
• Took Peshawar, then attacked
• Faced combined Maratha-Sikh armies
• Major defeat at Rohutas (June 1759)

The Casualties:

• Jahan Khan wounded
• His son killed
• Afghans had to flee

The Result:

"This reverse in June 1759 convinced Abdali that he had to personally lead a campaign to India."

• Couldn't be entrusted to commanders
• Had to come himself
• One year to the day since Raghunath Rao's celebration at Shalimar Bagh in Lahore

The Afghan Advance (October-November 1759)

The Route

Abdali's path:

• Moving along right bank of Indus river (Sindhu)
• Indus comes from Kashmir, enters Afghanistan area, then into Pakistan (was India)
• Passed through Dera Ghazi Khan

Taking Multan

The Attack:

• Drove out Bappuji Trimbak's force
• Took Multan without much resistance

Sabaji Abandons Peshawar

The Situation:

• Facing Jahan Khan approaching with overwhelming force
• 60,000 strong Afghan army total (20k + 40k)
• Realized it was a losing battle
• Abandoned Peshawar

The Retreat:

• Short resistance at Attaq
• Marathas fell back on Lahore
• Then retreated east

The Disastrous Retreat

The Local Hostility

What Happened:

• Hostile peasants looted retreating Maratha stragglers
• These were local Punjabi farmers (not Afghans)
• Marathas lost:
  • Horses
  • Camels
  • Clothes
  • Money

Why Locals Hostile:

• Marathas were not locals
• Stretched themselves too thin
• Not properly reinforced
• Not well-strategized

The Final Count

Last week of November 1759:

• Entire Maratha army in Punjab reduced to:
• Barely a thousand half-naked stragglers
• No horses or weapons
• Reached Dattaji's camp at Shukratal

Govind Panth Bundele's Assessment:

"A great disaster has befallen us."

The Impact:

• Fear permeated entire Shinde camp
• These thousand survivors merged with Dattaji's forces
• Brought terror with them

Meanwhile: Sikhs Resist, Army Swells

Sikh Resistance at Lahore

What They Did:

• Offered resistance to Afghans at Lahore
• But couldn't make a difference
• Against 60,000 strong Afghan army
• Sikhs were becoming a power but not big time yet
• Light resistance

The Growing Afghan Force

Bundele's Description:

"The army of Abdali kept swelling in numbers, like a mighty river that has rivulets and streams joining it till it falls into the sea."

Why It Grew:

• Tribes along the way joined
• Baluchistan province - Baluchi tribal people
• Thought: "When he reaches India and loots, we'll get a portion"
• Like a popular parade getting new members
• Everyone wants a piece of the loot

Dattaji's Futile Siege & Belated Response

The Mistake

What He Did Wrong:

• Persisted with now-futile siege at Shukratal
• Wasted more time
• Didn't realize threat coming from west
• Called for help from:
  • Ahmad Khan Bangush
  • Some of Suraj Mal's troops
  • Malhar Rao Holkar (near Jaipur)

The Problem:

• Asked Holkar to face Abdali
• But Holkar not up to the task
• Didn't have wherewithal to face Abdali's forces
• Especially 60,000 men

The Decision to Move

December 11, 1759:

• Finally moved towards Yamuna
• To face this new threat
• Was at Shukratal (Ganga's banks)
• Now going west towards Yamuna
• Plan: Get to eastern bank of Yamuna
• Then probably cross to western bank

The Reality:

• Understood big army coming from west
• No point dealing with Najib Khan anymore
• No point going to Bihar/Bengal
• Had to resist Abdali or leave Delhi wide open

Malhar Rao Holkar: The Ineffective Commander

Where He Was

1759 activities:

• Heading towards Jaipur to punish Madho Singh
• Spent all of 1759 around kingdom of Jaipur
• Not being effective
• Just wasting time trying to get more tribute from Madho Singh
• Madho Singh hadn't been paying up

The Distance:

• Was near Jaipur
• Could have easily joined Dattaji
• But kept wasting time

Key Players

Timeline

Geographic Context

The Rivers:

• Indus (Sindhu): Comes from Kashmir → Afghanistan area → Pakistan
• Ganga: Eastern river, where Shukratal is located
• Yamuna: Western river, where Dattaji is heading

The Passes:

• Bolan Pass: Southern route from Afghanistan
• Khyber Pass: Northern route from Afghanistan
• Only two viable entry points to India

Key Cities:

• Lahore: Capital of Punjab
• Peshawar: Northwestern frontier, border with Afghanistan
• Attaq: Even further northwest than Peshawar
• Multan: Important Punjab city
• Shukratal: On Ganga, where Dattaji was stuck

Critical Insights

The Maratha Weakness: Conquering vs. Securing

The Pattern:

• Great at offense
• Terrible at defense
• Raghunath Rao reached Attaq - huge achievement
• But no defensive structure left behind
• Within one year, everything falls apart

Why:

• Didn't develop proper governance
• Didn't establish loyal local administrators
• Didn't fortify positions
• Didn't maintain supply lines
• Just conquered and left

The Loot Economy

Abdali's Business Model:

• Recruit soldiers with promise of loot
• "That's your pay"
• Afghanistan has nothing
• India has riches
• Everyone wants in

The Growing Army:

• Like a snowball rolling downhill
• Every tribe along the way joins
• Baluchi people join
• Everyone wants a piece
• Army keeps swelling

The Geography Problem

Why Two Passes Matter:

• Desert to the west = impassable
• Only Bolan Pass and Khyber Pass work
• Mountain passes = chokepoints
• Abdali split army to cover both

Implication:

• Marathas should have heavily fortified these passes
• Instead, they spread thin across cities
• Lost the critical entry points

The Peasant Hostility

The Retreat Disaster:

• Punjabi farmers looted retreating Marathas
• Why? Marathas were outsiders
• Never won local hearts
• Probably extracted heavy taxes
• No loyalty developed

The Lesson:

• Can't hold territory without local support
• Military conquest ≠ political control
• Alienating locals = disaster when retreating

Dattaji's Strategic Blindness

The Mistake:

• Continued siege at Shukratal for months
• While Abdali gathering 60,000 men
• While Punjab falling apart
• While only way to Delhi opening up

Why:

• Fixated on Najib Khan
• Didn't recognize changing situation
• No intelligence about Abdali's advance
• By the time he moved (Dec 11), too late

Holkar's Ineffectiveness

The Problem:

• Near enough to help (Jaipur area)
• But wasting time on tribute collection
• Not equipped to face Abdali anyway
• Old-school tactics
• No modern warfare expertise

Foreshadowing:

• This pattern will continue
• Holkar not committed to northern defense
• More interested in personal enrichment

The Monsoon Factor

Why 1759 was Lost:

• Dattaji stuck at Shukratal during entire monsoon
• 4-5 months wasted
• Couldn't cross Ganga
• By the time monsoon ended, Najib reinforced
• And Abdali already on the move

The Climate Weapon:

• Monsoons immobilize armies
• Abdali timed invasion for post-monsoon
• Marathas couldn't respond during monsoon
• Lost critical months

What's Coming

The Stage Is Set:

• Abdali has 60,000 men
• Dattaji has ~25,000 (after 1,000 stragglers joined)
• Dattaji moving to Yamuna
• Holkar still in Rajasthan
• Najib Khan waiting to join Abdali
• Punjab completely lost

The Math:

• Marathas outnumbered 2:1 or worse
• No heavy artillery (Dattaji left it behind)
• Winter approaching (Marathas not prepared)
• Political isolation (no allies)
• Abdali has momentum

November-December 1759: The Punjab dream is over. A thousand half-naked stragglers tell the story. Abdali's army swells like a river collecting tributaries - 60,000 strong and growing. Dattaji finally realizes the threat and turns to face it, but he's months too late. Holkar's still playing tribute-collection games near Jaipur. The Maratha army that reached Attaq in glory is now scattered, defeated, terrified. And Abdali hasn't even reached Delhi yet. The disaster has only just begun.