Introduction to the Third Battle of Panipat (1761)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Book
Title: Solstice at Panipat
Author: Dr. Uday Kulkarni (doctor by profession, historian by passion)
Date of Battle: January 14, 1761
What "Solstice" Means Here
The title doesn't refer to the astronomical event - it's a metaphor for two great powers colliding where neither emerged as a clear winner. Although Ahmad Shah Abdali technically won the battle, the destruction was so severe that he never returned to India again.
Why Panipat Matters
Location: Panipat, Haryana (north of Delhi)
Strategic Importance:
- Delhi was always the capital, no matter who ruled
- Invaders from Afghanistan, Iran, or Central Asia would approach from the Northwest
- Panipat was the first line of defense - the ideal place to stop invaders before they reached Delhi
- This is why THREE major battles happened at the same location
The Three Battles of Panipat
| Battle | Year | Combatants | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| First | ~1526 | Babur vs Ibrahim Lodi | Babur established the Mughal Empire in India |
| Second | ~1556 | Akbar vs King Hemu | If Akbar had lost, Mughals would've been kicked out of India |
| Third | 1761 | Marathas vs Ahmad Shah Abdali | The focus of this book |
The Players
Ahmad Shah Abdali
Who: King of Afghanistan
Motivation: Afghanistan had almost no agriculture or prosperity - needed wealth from elsewhere
Strategy: Raid India, loot as much as possible, return to Afghanistan to build his empire
Previous Invasions:
- Had come to India twice before this battle
- Nobody stopped him those times
- He never intended to rule India - just wanted the loot
- India was the wealthiest nation at the time, and the Mughal Empire had become very weak
The Marathas
Territory at this time:
- North boundary: Narmada River
- South boundary: Krishna River
- West boundary: Arabian Sea coast
Character: Calm by nature but athletic and hardy (kaatak)
Historical Background: How We Got Here
The Suffering Under Foreign Rule
The Marathi people had suffered under:
- Bahamani Sultans
- Mughal Empire
This went on for generations.
Shivaji's Revolution
Shivaji Raje gave the Marathi people freedom from this oppression.
His Impact:
- Transformed the average Marathi person from a passive subject into an active fighter
- Created ideology that spread to the common people
- People understood they needed independence and their own rule
- "Before they were passive actors, now they're live players"
His Innovations (Ahead of His Time):
- Governance & Society: Created prosperity and functioning governance in his territories
- Military Strategy: Invented the Ganimikawa tactic
- Surgical strikes on your own terms
- Hit hard, then withdraw
- Don't make it a prolonged battle
Legacy: We never saw another personality like Shivaji again - he was truly one of a kind, the founder of the Maratha Empire without parallel.
Aurangzeb: The Last Great Mughal
Aurangzeb was the last effective Mughal emperor - after him, they were just namesake rulers with no real authority.
His Obsession with the Marathas
The Numbers:
- Spent the last 26 years of his life (until his death) trying to subdue the Marathas
- Invested enormous resources and time in the Deccan
- Result: Complete failure - Marathas kept rising back up
Despite all his efforts and spending those final decades in military campaigns, he couldn't crush the Maratha spirit that Shivaji had ignited.
The Catastrophes
Two Major Blows to the Maratha Kingdom
The text mentions that two major events struck at the very root (foundation) of the Maratha empire, psychologically and structurally devastating them.
The Aftermath:
- These two catastrophes forced the Marathas to fight in adverse conditions for 25-26 years
- [Note: The specific events weren't detailed in this session - likely covered in the next reading]
The Rajput Context
The Udaipur vs Jaipur Divide
After the Second Battle of Panipat, Rajput kingdoms had to make a choice:
Udaipur Rajputs:
- ⌠Never made peace with Mughals
- Always fought against them
- Maintained resistance
Jaipur Rajputs:
- ✓ Made peace with Mughals
- Created a symbiotic relationship
- Handled their own internal affairs
- Provided taxes and military support when needed
- Mughals left them alone otherwise
Why They Made Peace: The Rajputs realized that if they kept resisting, they would be completely vanquished. Better to maintain autonomy over internal matters while acknowledging Mughal supremacy.
Why This Battle Matters
The Third Battle of Panipat represents the collision of these two rising powers:
- Marathas: The emerging Hindu empire from the Deccan, carrying Shivaji's legacy
- Ahmad Shah Abdali: The Afghan raider-king, looking for one more massive score
Both had everything to gain, everything to lose. The author promises to describe the battle in tremendous detail - claiming he can tell you exactly what was happening on the battlefield with clarity that's almost impossible for such old events.
Key Themes
- Panipat as the Gateway - Whoever controlled this battlefield controlled access to Delhi and the wealth of North India
- The Maratha Rise - From oppressed subjects under foreign rule to a military superpower in less than a century
- The Mughal Decline - From Aurangzeb's massive empire to puppet rulers who couldn't defend their own capital
- The Afghan Raids - Abdali's repeated invasions showing how weak the center had become
- Shivaji's Legacy - How one man's vision transformed an entire people
[Session ended - planning to continue with Chapter 1 details next time]
The stage is set. The puppet master (Sutradhar) is ready to tell this epic tale of empires, ambitions, and the battlefield that decided the fate of India.
The Creation of the Peshwa Position: Balaji Vishwanath's Rise (1713-1714)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Shahu's Weakness & The Crisis
The Problem:
- Shahu was released into Maratha sovereignty with no skills
- No military training, no administrative ability, no statecraft knowledge
- Dependent personality type—never allowed to develop competence
- By early 1710s, things were falling apart around him
The Events Showing Decline:
- Chandrasen Jadav (military commander) left Shahu's service
- Went to Tara Rani initially, then to Nizam of Hyderabad
- Shahu's Peshwa (Prime Minister) was imprisoned by Kanhoji Angre
- Kanhoji had defeated Shahu's forces and held the PM prisoner
- Everything pointing to Shahu's quick decline and failure
The Factional Battle:
- Not open warfare but political skirmishing between Shahu and Tara Rani
- Personality conflicts, rivalry, bickering
- Minor confrontations but no all-out war
- Kanhoji Angre worked for Tara Rani, imprisoned Shahu's PM
The Situation:
- Shahu had no fighting skills like his grandfather or father
- Didn't know how to go on campaigns or lead battles
- Lacked basic management and administration skills
- His rule was going downhill rapidly
Enter Balaji Vishwanath
His Background:
- Originally from Pokhara (coast area)
- Worked in revenue department under Siddhi of Janjira
- Entered Maratha employment around 1699 or earlier
- Had been in service even before Shahu was released (under Tara Rani)
- Worked alongside Dhanaji Jatho
His Rise:
- When Shahu was anointed as Chhatrapati (sovereign) at Satara, Dhanaji Jatho died
- Dhanaji's son became commander-in-chief under Shahu
- Balaji Vishwanath remained in court but in administrative role
- Had already created good impression on Shahu by this point
His Position Before:
- Not yet Peshwa/Prime Minister
- Significant personality in court but supporting role
- Had gained Shahu's trust through competence and ability
- But hadn't yet risen to supreme position
The Kanhoji Angre Problem
Who He Was:
- Powerful commander, originally in Tara Rani's service
- Based in Kokan (coastal region)
- Had defeated Shahu's forces in battle
- Imprisoned Shahu's Peshwa (Prime Minister) in Kolhapur
- Creating major problem for Shahu's authority
His Background:
- Father was Tukoji Angre, served under Shivaji (founder)
- Had inherited position and loyalty to Shivaji's legacy
- But was working for Tara Rani, rival to Shahu
- May have broken with Tara Rani after imprisoning Shahu's PM
Why He Mattered:
- Controlled significant coastal forces and forts
- Was powerful enough to defeat Shahu militarily
- His loyalty could swing power balance either way
- His support would legitimize Shahu's rule
The Strategic Masterstroke
Shahu's Insight:
- Realized he needed someone who was both statesman AND warrior
- Most Peshwas before were just warriors/administrators
- But Shahu needed something rare: diplomat who could fight
The Key Decision:
- Selected Balaji Vishwanath (a Brahmin) as Peshwa
- Revolutionary: Breaking tradition of warrior-class Peshwas
- Shivaji had a Peshwa, but position was minor
- Shahu's Peshwa would be almost "acting CEO" due to his incompetence
Why a Brahmin?
- Brahmins typically did diplomacy and administration
- Marathas typically did fighting (warrior class, Kshatriya)
- Balaji had rare combination: diplomatic smarts + fighting ability
- Path-breaking decision—first time such appointment
The Negotiation:
- Shahu assigned Balaji task: "Turn Kanhoji Angre to our side"
- Balaji immediately countered: "I can't do that as regular courtier"
- "Give me important position—make me Peshwa"
- Shahu agreed—November 17, 1713: Balaji Vishwanath became first Peshwa
The Famous Letter: Balaji's Diplomatic Masterpiece
The Setup:
- Balaji took 10,000 troops to Kokan (where Kanhoji was based)
- Rather than fight immediately, he wrote a letter
- Letter shows both statesmanship and threat
The Message:
-
Appeal to Loyalty: "Your father Tukoji served Shivaji, our founder. This is beneath you."
-
The Choice (Diplomatic):
- Option 1: Go back to Tara Rani, release our PM, serve her
- Option 2: Join Shahu, release PM, get employment with us
-
The Ultimatum (Threat):
- Option 3: Prepare for battle with me
- I will take all your forts and defeat you
- Once battle starts, if you lose and try to make amends, too late
- "Concede now or never"
The Brilliance:
- Not aggressive—offers way out with dignity
- Appeals to family honor (father's service to Shivaji)
- Gives him choices rather than demands
- Combines diplomacy with clear military threat
- Shows he understood Kanhoji personally
The Tone:
- Professional, respectful, but firm
- Not arrogant but confident
- Gives face-saving exit for Kanhoji
- Balaji's brains on full display
The Resolution
The Meeting (February 18, 1714):
- Balaji and Kanhoji met at Lohagad fort
- Made a deal without fighting
- Truce established between them
- Kanhoji agreed to join Shahu's side
The Approval:
- Shahu had to give his formal approval ("stamp of approval")
- Shahu's role as sovereign still ceremonial but real
- Shows Balaji understood chain of command
The Outcome:
- Kanhoji Angre brought his forces to Shahu
- Shahu's position stabilized immediately
- Balaji proved his worth as Peshwa
- Established pattern of diplomatic-military leadership
The Significance of This Moment
Why This Was Pivotal:
1. The Peshwa Institution Born
First time Peshwa position held real power because sovereign was incompetent. Created template for hereditary Peshwa rule that lasted decades.
2. Brahmin-Warrior Combination
Balaji showed Brahmin could fight and lead, not just advise. Broke caste-occupation rigidity. Created space for administrative class to hold military power.
3. Diplomatic-Military Balance
Balaji's letter shows winning without unnecessary war. Uses threat as tool, not first resort. Sets tone for future Maratha expansion: smart + strong.
4. Shahu's Judgment
Despite incompetence in other areas, Shahu showed genius in recognizing what he needed and picking the right person. Trusted Balaji with immense responsibility immediately.
5. Institutional Legitimacy
Rather than seizing power, Balaji was appointed by Shahu. This gave him legitimacy that would sustain his family for generations. Not a usurper but chosen administrator.
The Rare Combination
What Balaji Had:
- Revenue/administrative background (Brahmin training)
- Military fighting ability (rare for Brahmins)
- Diplomatic skill (shown in letter)
- Strategic thinking (offered choices rather than ultimatums alone)
- Loyalty to Shahu (despite being more capable)
Why This Mattered:
- Most military leaders: just fight, no diplomacy
- Most administrators: no combat ability
- Balaji: both competent at war AND politics
- This made him invaluable to weak sovereign
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1699+ | Balaji Vishwanath enters Maratha service |
| Early 1710s | Shahu's situation deteriorating |
| Early 1710s | Kanhoji Angre defeats Shahu's forces, imprisons PM |
| November 17, 1713 | Balaji becomes Peshwa |
| February 1714 | Balaji takes 10,000 troops to Kokan |
| February 18, 1714 | Balaji and Kanhoji meet at Lohagad, make truce |
Critical Insights
1. Competence as Legitimacy
Shahu chose Balaji not for birth but for competence. In moment of crisis, legitimacy comes from ability to deliver, not title alone.
2. The Power of One Good Decision
Single appointment of right person (Balaji) turned Shahu's declining position into stable rule. One decision created trajectory for next 50 years.
3. Diplomacy Over Force
Balaji's letter prevented unnecessary war. Force was backup, not first option. Saved lives, resources, soldiers. Shows strategic wisdom.
4. Institutional vs. Personal Power
Balaji didn't take power—was given it. This made succession possible later. Personal power dies with person; institutional power can transfer.
5. The Rare Combination Needed
Cannot solve complex problems with just brains or just strength. Need rare individuals with both. That's why Balaji was invaluable.
The Letter's Genius Breakdown
Components of Effective Leadership in Letter:
| Element | Function |
|---|---|
| Appeal to legacy | Gives honorable exit |
| Options offered | Shows respect for choice |
| Clear consequences | No ambiguity about stakes |
| Military backup | Makes threat credible |
| Professional tone | Shows confidence not desperation |
| Face-saving | Allows Kanhoji dignity |
Character of Balaji Vishwanath
Strengths Shown:
- Political acumen (understood Kanhoji's pride)
- Military confidence (10,000 troops backup)
- Diplomatic skill (letter tone and content)
- Organizational ability (coordinated campaign)
- Loyalty (worked for weak Shahu despite being able to take power)
Why He Didn't Become King:
- Despite power, chose to remain subordinate to Shahu
- Understood institutional legitimacy matters
- Established precedent: Peshwa serves sovereign
- This restraint gave his family legitimacy that personal rule wouldn't have
The Shahu-Balaji Dynamic
Why It Worked:
- Shahu recognized his limits and hired solution
- Balaji respected Shahu's sovereign position despite inferiority
- Perfect balance: weak sovereign, strong PM
- Mutual benefit: Shahu kept legitimacy, Balaji got power
Why It Couldn't Happen Today:
- Today's Balaji would just take power
- Shahu would demand PM title too
- Institutional legitimacy gone
- Personal ambition replaces duty to office
Where We Left Off: Balaji Vishwanath has successfully stabilized Shahu's rule by bringing Kanhoji Angre to his side. The Peshwa institution is born. Balaji proved that brains + muscle + diplomacy can solve impossible situations. He's set the stage for Maratha expansion. From here, Maratha power will grow exponentially—but it'll depend entirely on having competent Peshwas. The institution he created will matter more than any individual.
Shahu was hopeless. No skills, no training, no ability. Tara Rani was fighting him, Kanhoji was imprisoning his ministers, everything was falling apart. But Shahu had one moment of genius: he recognized exactly what he needed and picked exactly the right person. Not a warrior, because he had plenty of those. A statesman-warrior. A man with brains and muscle. A man who could see that Kanhoji Angre was trapped between honor to a founder and employment by a rival, and could offer him a way out that saved face. Balaji wrote a letter instead of drawing a sword. And it worked. In that single letter, you see the entire future of Maratha power: smart force. Not brute force, not cunning alone—both together. That's what made them different. That's what made them dangerous.
The Syed Brothers' Coup & Bajirao Vishwanath's Triumph (1719)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Day After: Searching for the Emperor
The Morning After the Palace Intrusion
What Happened:
- Emperor Farooq Shiar kicked Syed brothers out of his court
- "Screw you guys" - rejecting their demands
- Fled to the women's quarters (zenana)
- Syed brothers searching for him
- No one sure what's going to happen
- Takes one more day
- New day arrives
The Massacre in Delhi Streets
1,000 Marathas Killed
The Violence:
"1,000 Maratha folks were killed in the streets of Delhi."
The Timing:
"Before it was known that the emperor has been arrested by Syed brothers."
Context:
- Maratha forces in Delhi
- Caught in the violence
- Before news spread about coup
- Chaos in the streets
The Nizam Stays Neutral
The Powerful Courtier's Decision
Who Is Nizam:
"Nizam is basically an emperor appointed official in certain areas, like Hyderabad."
His Title:
- Nizam = title (not a personal name)
- Emperor-appointed official
- Like a Subedar but more powerful
- "Hyderabad Nizam" - very well known
His Background:
- Allied with Aurangzeb originally
- Later became more and more independent
- Had his own kingdom
- During Aurangzeb rule = too powerful to defy
- After Aurangzeb = slowly independent
His Status:
- Powerful courtier
- Influential
- Well-positioned
- Could have intervened
His Choice:
"The Nizam stayed neutral."
What This Means:
- Won't help Farooq Shiar
- Won't oppose Syed brothers
- Staying out of it
- Self-preservation
Finding the Emperor: The Women's Quarter
The Search
The Setting:
"In the women's quarter, all these queens - because the emperor typically had several so-called wives and also they had a lot of unofficial concubines."
The Protection:
- Women wouldn't release the target
- Not Farooq Shiar they were protecting
- They were protecting Bidar Ali (or Bidar Dil)
- Another princeling Syed brothers wanted
Understanding the Royal Family Danger
Why The Women Were Protective
The Problem:
"There were several of these princelings running around."
The Fear #1: Brother Killing Brother
"If one came into power, he may view his brothers as a threat."
The Fear #2: The Syed Brothers' Intentions
"They thought that Syed brothers wanted to establish their own rule. They may slaughter these people because unless they slaughter them, they can't come to power."
The Calculation:
- To truly take power = must eliminate royal family
- All princelings = potential claimants
- Syed brothers = threat to all of them
- Women trying to protect the princes
The Numbers:
"There were several princelings because Aurangzeb may have had several wives and several concubines and there can be several great grandsons and grandsons and stuff like that. There's a lot of them."
The Compromise Emperor: Rafi-ul-Darajat
When They Couldn't Get Their First Choice
The Problem:
- Women wouldn't release Bidar Ali/Bidar Dil
- Syed brothers needed someone quickly
- Had to have someone from royal family
The Solution:
"Rafi-ul-Darajat - this is the princeling who they got hold of. They simply brought him out and put him on the throne."
Why:
"They wanted to have somebody representing the royal family because it has to be from the family."
- Legitimacy requires royal blood
- Can't just take power themselves
- Need figurehead emperor
- This prince will do
Dealing with the Ex-Emperor
Finding Farooq Shiar
What Happened:
"Then they somehow found him in the women's quarter. They brought him out. And they blinded him right there."
Then:
"And then they put him in the prison."
The Poem:
- While blinded and imprisoned
- Farooq Shiar wrote a poem about his situation
- Describing his fate
The Escape Attempt: Bribing the Guards
Planning to Flee to Jodhpur
The Plan:
"He tried to give a bribe to his guards to let him go to his father-in-law in Jodhpur - some Rajput guy."
The Family Connection:
- His wife = princess from Jodhpur
- Her father = the Jodhpur ruler
- Wife's father = father-in-law
- Wanted refuge with her family
Jodhpur:
- In Rajasthan
- City kingdom
- Vassal king but autonomous
- Rajput stronghold
The Marriage:
"So he was married to a princess from Jodhpur."
Why This Made Sense:
- Rajput family = military power
- Could protect him
- Gather support from Rajputs
- Potential base for comeback
The Final Solution: Assassination
When The Syed Brothers Heard
The News:
"This news went up to Syed brothers."
The Decision:
"Now they decided to finish him off."
Why:
"So far they blinded him and imprisoned him. But if he were to escape, then he becomes a liability because he can come back to throne."
The Danger:
"Because he is a king - even though he was kicked out. But if he gathers some protection and some support from the Rajput side, then it will be difficult."
The Killers for Rent
Bhadotri Marekari
What It Means:
- Killers for rent
- Professional assassins
- Hired guns
What They Did:
"In a few days, they got [it done]."
The Puppet Show Analogy
The New Emperor's Real Status
The Comparison:
"Remember that there are people who have these dolls that they operate by remote."
Modern Term:
- Puppet show
- Marionettes
- Controlled by strings
The Reality:
"The new emperor who was like - he had no power base at all."
What This Meant:
"Through him, Syed brothers got all the rewards met."
- Complete puppet
- No independent power
- Syed brothers pull the strings
- Emperor just signs what they want
The Maratha Rewards: Everything They Wanted
What Bajirao Vishwanath Got
Reward #1: Release the Hostages
"One of the important ones was to relieve Yesubhai and Madan Singh."
Who They Were:
- Madan Singh = not directly Sambhaji's legal son
- "His concubine son, kind of"
- "Half son, you can say"
- Yesubhai = another hostage
The Release:
"Yesubhai and some other people, they were let go. So [Bajirao] was able to leave with them."
Reward #2: The Chautai Rights
The Tax Rights:
"They also got the Chautai rights for that land, which was huge."
What This Meant:
- Right to collect Chauth (one-fourth tax)
- Enormous revenue
- Major financial win
- Economic power
Reward #3: Three Imperial Orders (Sanads)
The Documents:
"They got three orders signed off by the new emperor."
The First Order: Six Provinces in Deccan
Tax Collection Rights
What It Granted:
"One of them granted the Marathas the right of collecting taxes of six provinces in Dakhan."
The Fourth Order: Sardeshmukhi
One-Tenth Tax
What It Granted:
"According to the second order that was signed, Marathas got the right to collect one-tenth of the tax."
Sardeshmukhi:
- Additional 10% tax
- On top of Chauth (25%)
- Combined = 35% of revenue!
- Massive income stream
The Third Order: THE BIG ONE
Recognition of Maratha Kingdom
What It Granted:
"According to the third order that was signed, the emperor accepted the Maratha kingdom."
Why This Was HUGE:
"Which had never happened before. Aurangzeb said they were always illegitimate, just some rebels."
The Significance:
- First time official recognition
- No longer rebels
- Legitimate kingdom
- Imperial sanction
The Reaction:
"Marathas really were delighted. And this is a big, huge accomplishment of Balaji Vishwanath."
The Opposition in Court
The Hardliners Were Furious
Who Opposed:
"The emperor's court had a lot of powerful [nobles]. They were opposed to these orders."
Why:
- Maybe their current land/Jagir/Subeda
- More importantly: hardliners in the court
- "Hate to see the Marathas gaining any advantage"
The History:
"That's why Farooq Shiar was rejecting these demands. And it was a sign of weakness. Because he was with the hardliners."
The Ambush: Stealing the Orders
The Smart Strategy
What Happened:
"When they got the signed orders from the emperor in the Lal Red Fort, then one of the Peshwa officials basically gave the copies to Bajirao Vishwanath and told him to go to wherever they were staying in Delhi."
The Split:
- Copies = given to Bajirao Vishwanath
- Originals = taken by the Peshwa official
- Official left by different route
Why:
"Maybe they were afraid that these orders will be confiscated by the Mughal officers from Bajirao Vishwanath. And they won't end up following it or something."
The Attack on the Wrong Guy
What The Hardliners Did
The Ambush:
"When Bajirao Vishwanath was going to his [camp], they attacked and they got hold of those orders."
Their Goal:
- Take away the evidence
- "Marathas got to have those orders" = can't execute
- "At least in minimum they can delay this or make it non-existent"
The Violence:
"And in that he was killed."
But:
- He only had copies
- The originals were with Bhanu (the other official)
- Safe with different person, different route
The Result:
"So there are some rumors about these orders, officially signed letter. So there's a lot of details around this. It wasn't a clear or cleanly executed order initially. So there was lots of opposition beyond just Farooq Sihan."
The Final Authority
What Made It Legitimate
The Result:
"So now officially Marathas were in charge of their kingdom because the emperor in Delhi had agreed everything that they wanted."
Why It Mattered:
"Nobody could take any exception because this was signed off by the Delhi emperor. So what more do you want?"
The Legitimacy:
"It was then accepted all over India because Mughal was the preeminent power no matter whether they were paper tiger or not. Once they accepted then it became authentic that this is Maratha kingdom of Shahu and nobody could say 'where is your legitimacy?'"
The Power of Recognition:
"Because the Mughals had accepted it. The Mughal emperor said yes. And that means that's that."
Shahu's Reaction
The King's Joy
The Response:
"Shahu must have been very happy. He got everything he wanted and more."
His Confidence:
"So his confidence in Balaji Vishwanath really was at the very peak."
The Honor:
"Shahu was so elated and happy that he honored Balaji Vishwanath as a very important servant of Maratha kingdom. And he was further honored."
The Young Witness: Bajirao's Education
What The 20-Year-Old Learned
Who Was There:
"And all along, his son Bajirao is with him while this is happening. He was a 20-year-old kid at the time. And so he's come to Delhi. He's witnessed all of this happen."
What He Saw:
"So now Bajirao saw everything in Delhi. He understood everything about Mughal emperor and what situation prevailed."
The Crucial Insight: The Mughal Paper Tiger
What Bajirao Realized
The Understanding:
"And he understood that this Mughal emperor is just - I mean, the whole thing is coming down."
The Crucial Insight:
"So that was a crucial insight for him to be able to get that glimpse."
The Reality:
"He realized that Mughal emperor is only effective in Delhi alone. Beyond that, nobody gives him a damn. And so things are changing."
The Shivaji Parallel
Two Generations, Same Lesson
Shivaji's Experience:
"Remember, Shivaji also, when he came to Agra, he saw the whole - I mean, it was a different Agra. It was totally controlled by Mr. Aurangzeb. But he saw with his own eyes."
Bajirao's Experience:
"And the same thing happened to Bajirao Peshwa."
The Difference:
"But of course, they were at different times in the empire."
- Shivaji saw Aurangzeb's strong empire
- Bajirao saw the collapsing empire
- Both got firsthand view
- Both learned from seeing
Why This Mattered for History
The Future Peshwa's Formation
The Importance:
"It is important because then Bajirao Peshwa becomes whole and soul of Maratha empire later on. And what he saw in Delhi was extremely important."
The Impact:
"It influenced all of his decisions and battles after that."
The Realization:
"But he understood that Mughal empire is gone. And that there's a power vacuum forming. And they only ruled the city of Delhi. That's it."
The Contrast:
"At the time Aurangzeb had the kind of terror and the kind of rule that he had is gone. And it wasn't like that anymore. It was a paper tiger."
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Farooq Shiar | Mughal Emperor | Blinded, imprisoned, then killed |
| Syed Brothers | Kingmakers | Orchestrated coup, installed puppet |
| Rafi-ul-Darajat | New Emperor | Puppet with no power base |
| Bidar Ali/Bidar Dil | Princeling | Protected by women, Syed's first choice |
| Balaji Vishwanath | Peshwa | Secured all Maratha demands |
| Bajirao | Vishwanath's son | 20 years old, witnessed everything |
| Shahu | Maratha King | Elated, honored Vishwanath |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Stayed neutral, self-preservation |
| Yesubhai | Hostage | Released, returned to Marathas |
| Madan Singh | Hostage | Sambhaji's "half son," released |
| Bhanu | Peshwa official | Carried originals, different route |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1719 | Farooq Shiar rejects Syed brothers' demands |
| 1719 | Emperor flees to women's quarters |
| 1719 | 1,000 Marathas killed in Delhi streets |
| 1719 | Farooq Shiar found, blinded, imprisoned |
| 1719 | Rafi-ul-Darajat installed as puppet emperor |
| 1719 | Farooq Shiar tries to escape to Jodhpur |
| 1719 | Syed brothers have him assassinated |
| 1719 | Three imperial orders signed for Marathas |
| 1719 | Ambush on Bajirao Vishwanath's group |
| 1719 | Official killed but originals safe |
| 1719 | Bajirao Vishwanath returns to Pune triumphant |
What The Marathas Got
The Complete Victory
| Order | What It Granted | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | Tax collection rights in 6 Deccan provinces | Massive revenue stream |
| #2 | Sardeshmukhi (10% additional tax) | Even more money |
| #3 | Recognition of Maratha Kingdom | LEGITIMACY |
| Bonus | Chautai rights (25% tax) | Huge financial base |
| Bonus | Release of hostages (Yesubhai, Madan Singh) | Family reunions |
Critical Insights
1. The Chaos Creates Opportunity
The Situation:
- Mughal court in chaos
- Coup happening
- Emperor being hunted
- Violence in streets
- 1,000 Marathas killed
The Result:
- Perfect time to get demands met
- Syed brothers need allies
- Will sign anything
- Puppet emperor = rubber stamp
The Lesson:
- Crisis = opportunity
- When empire weak = extract maximum
- Balaji Vishwanath timed it perfectly
2. The Puppet Emperor Strategy
Why Syed Brothers Needed One:
- Can't rule directly (not royal blood)
- Need legitimacy
- Must have figurehead
- Find compliant princeling
Why Rafi-ul-Darajat:
- No power base
- Will do what they say
- From royal family (legitimacy)
- Controllable
The Marionette Metaphor:
"People who have these dolls that they operate by remote."
- Perfect description
- Emperor = puppet
- Syed brothers = puppeteers
- Signs whatever they want
3. The Women's Protection Network
Why They Wouldn't Release Bidar Ali:
- Protecting princelings
- Fear of mass slaughter
- Syed brothers might kill all royal family
- Taking over = eliminating rivals
- Multiple wives/concubines = many princes to protect
The Calculation:
- If Syed brothers win = might kill all princes
- Can't trust their intentions
- Better to hide and protect
- Survival of royal line
4. The Blinding Strategy
Why Blind Instead of Kill:
- Blinded emperor = can't rule (Islamic law)
- Disqualified from throne
- But still alive (mercy?)
- Prison insurance
Why Kill Later:
- Escape attempt = too dangerous
- Rajput connection = potential army
- Could gather support
- Come back with force
- Must eliminate completely
5. The Rajput Escape Plan
Why Jodhpur:
- Wife's family
- Rajput military power
- Autonomous kingdom
- Could provide protection
- Base for comeback
The Danger:
- Rajputs = warrior caste
- Could raise army
- March on Delhi
- Restore Farooq Shiar
- Syed brothers' nightmare
Why Kill Him:
- Can't risk it
- Too dangerous alive
- Must eliminate option
- Final solution
6. The Smart Document Strategy
The Split:
- Copies to Bajirao Vishwanath
- Originals to Bhanu
- Different routes
- Insurance policy
Why This Worked:
- Ambushers went for wrong target
- Got copies, killed official
- But originals safe
- Mission accomplished
The Planning:
- Anticipated ambush
- Prepared backup plan
- Protected the prize
- Professional execution
7. The Hardliner Opposition
Who Opposed:
- Conservative nobles
- Anti-Maratha faction
- Lost land to grants
- Saw it as weakness
What They Did:
- Ambushed Bajirao's group
- Killed official
- Tried to steal orders
- Prevent implementation
Why It Failed:
- Got wrong documents
- Originals escaped
- Can't stop it now
- Emperor signed it
8. The Legitimacy Revolution
What Changed:
"Aurangzeb said they were always illegitimate, just some rebels."
Now:
- Imperial recognition
- Legitimate kingdom
- No longer rebels
- Official status
Why This Mattered:
- Can't be dismissed as bandits
- Must be respected as kingdom
- Legal standing
- Treaties have weight
- Ambassadors recognized
The Power:
"Nobody could say 'where is your legitimacy?' Because the Mughals had accepted it."
9. Bajirao's Education
What The 20-Year-Old Learned:
Lesson #1: Mughal Empire Is Finished
- Saw chaos firsthand
- Coups and murders
- No real power
- "Only effective in Delhi alone"
Lesson #2: Power Vacuum Exists
- Empire collapsing
- No one in charge
- Up for grabs
- Opportunity
Lesson #3: How Court Politics Works
- Saw negotiations
- Saw bribes and deals
- Saw violence
- Saw puppet emperors
Lesson #4: Timing Is Everything
- Strike when enemy weak
- Exploit chaos
- Maximum extraction
- Don't miss opportunity
The Impact:
"It influenced all of his decisions and battles after that."
His Future:
- Becomes greatest Peshwa
- Expands empire massively
- Never loses battle
- All based on this insight
- "Whole thing is coming down"
10. The Shivaji Parallel
Both Saw Firsthand:
- Shivaji at Agra (strong empire)
- Bajirao at Delhi (weak empire)
- Both got reality check
- Both learned from experience
The Difference:
- Shivaji saw: Must rebel carefully (strong enemy)
- Bajirao saw: Must expand aggressively (weak enemy)
The Common Thread:
- Don't rely on rumors
- See for yourself
- Firsthand intelligence
- Shape strategy from reality
11. The Paper Tiger Realization
What Bajirao Understood:
"Mughal empire is gone. And that there's a power vacuum forming."
The Contrast:
- Aurangzeb's terror and rule = gone
- Now = "paper tiger"
- Looks impressive
- No real power
The Strategy This Enables:
- Aggressive expansion (Bajirao's future)
- Direct challenges
- Not afraid of emperor
- Take what you want
12. The Neutrality Calculation
Nizam's Choice:
- Powerful enough to intervene
- Chose to stay neutral
- Self-preservation
- Let others fight it out
Why This Mattered:
- Could have saved Farooq Shiar
- Didn't want to risk it
- Better to wait and see
- Pick winning side later
The Pattern:
- Smart players stay neutral in uncertain coups
- Let chaos resolve itself
- Then ally with winner
- Minimize risk
The Three Orders in Detail
Order #1: Six Provinces Tax Rights
What:
- Collection rights in 6 Deccan provinces
- Massive territory
- Huge revenue
Impact:
- Financial independence
- Don't need Mughal payments
- Direct taxation
- Economic power base
Order #2: Sardeshmukhi (10%)
What:
- Additional 10% tax
- On top of Chauth (25%)
- Total = 35% of all revenue!
Impact:
- Enormous wealth
- Fund armies
- Expand operations
- Self-sufficient
Order #3: Kingdom Recognition
What:
- Official acceptance of Maratha Kingdom
- No longer rebels
- Legitimate sovereign state
Impact:
- Legal standing
- International recognition
- Treaties have weight
- Can't be dismissed
- GAME CHANGER
Where We Left Off
The Situation:
- Farooq Shiar dead (blinded, imprisoned, then killed)
- Puppet emperor installed (Rafi-ul-Darajat)
- Marathas got everything they wanted:
- 6 provinces tax rights
- Sardeshmukhi (10%)
- Chauth (25%)
- Kingdom recognition (HUGE!)
- Hostages released (Yesubhai, Madan Singh)
- Hardliners tried to steal orders (failed)
- Originals safe with Bhanu
- Official killed in ambush (but had copies)
- Shahu delighted
- Balaji Vishwanath honored
- Bajirao (20 years old) learned crucial lesson:
- Mughal empire = paper tiger
- Power vacuum forming
- "Whole thing is coming down"
The Future:
- Bajirao will become greatest Peshwa
- Use this insight to expand massively
- Never lose a battle
- All from what he saw in Delhi at age 20
- Understanding: Empire is finished
A 20-year-old boy walked into Delhi and saw an empire collapse in real time. He saw an emperor blinded and murdered. He saw puppets installed. He saw his father extract everything they wanted from chaos. And he learned the most important lesson of his life: "The Mughal emperor is only effective in Delhi alone. Beyond that, nobody gives him a damn. The whole thing is coming down." That boy - Bajirao - would become the greatest Peshwa in Maratha history. And everything he did, every battle he won, every territory he conquered, came from understanding what he saw in those bloody streets of Delhi in 1719: there's a power vacuum, and it's up for grabs.
Balaji Vishwanath's Legacy & The Chautai System (1719-1720)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fragmented Maratha Kingdom
The Initial Situation:
- Marathas were no longer truly unified
- Kolhapur branch refused to give up its small kingdom
- Prevented from becoming a dominant power
- No real future for the Kolhapur line
The Result:
- Central authority now in Pune under Shahu
- Kolhapur relegated to second rank
- Focus shifted entirely to Shahu's empire
The Chautai System: Ancient Tax-Based Incentive
What It Was:
- System existed before Shivaji
- Chautai = one-fourth (1/4) of tax revenue from conquered territory
- Paid by the losing side to the winning side
How It Worked:
- Loser pays victor the right to collect 1/4 of taxes
- Loser still owns the land but loses tax revenue
- Winner keeps remaining 3/4 of tax revenue
- Revenue used for military maintenance
Shahu's Radical Change: The Incentive Revolution
The Traditional System (Shivaji Era):
"Land belonged to the king"
- King paid soldiers fixed salaries
- King retained all revenues
- No personal tax base for commanders
The New System (Shahu Era):
- Commanders keep their assigned territories
- 3/4 of tax revenue stays with commander
- 1/4 goes to the king/Peshwa
- Each commander responsible for their own army
Why the Change:
- Central power not strong enough
- Kings needed recognition like previous monarchs had
- Incentivized rapid expansion
Sardeshmukhi: The Companion System
The Timeline:
- Chautai: Ongoing system (1/4 tax)
- Sardeshmukhi: Emerged around 1650
- Development period: 1650-1730
The Amounts:
- Chautai = 1/4 of tax revenue
- Sardeshmukhi = 1/10 of tax revenue
The Result:
- Justice Ranade credits these systems with the manifold growth of Maratha Empire
- Commanders had massive incentive to expand territories
- Made empire grow "by leaps and bounds"
The Growth Incentive: Why It Worked
Commander Economics:
- When new areas conquered, commander receives 3/4 of revenue
- Must send 1/4 to Peshwa
- Profit motive was enormous
- Had to maintain their own army from this revenue
The Genius:
- Commanders themselves had to maintain army readiness
- No salary from king to rely on
- Had to make profit to survive
- Incentivized aggressive expansion and efficient governance
Comparison:
- Shivaji's time: King paid salaries, commanders got nothing
- Shahu's time: Commanders got 3/4 of revenue, plus responsibility
- Result: Empire expanded dramatically
The Kolhapur & Tanjavur Problem
Why These Kingdoms Stagnated:
- Tanjavur: Controlled by Vyankoji (Shivaji's brother)
- Kolhapur: Controlled by Rajaram's successors
- Critical difference: Did NOT use Chautai/Sardeshmukhi system
- Kept all revenues for themselves (like Shivaji model)
The Consequence:
- Kolhapur stayed small and limited
- Tanjavur similarly couldn't expand
- Proof: System itself drove expansion, not just military might
- Without incentives, even capable kingdoms stagnated
The Dark Side: Looting and Loss of People's Trust
The Problem with Profit Motive:
"The commanders were only interested in making the most money"
- Commanders maximized profit by looting local populations
- Instead of being protectors, became extractors
- People lost confidence in their rulers
The Mechanism:
- King said: "Go collect taxes, any which way you can"
- "Maintain your own army"
- "No help from me, no salary, no benefits"
- "Keep everything above the 1/4 I take"
The Reality:
- No rain during monsoon? = Locals starve
- Commanders still needed to fund armies
- Only solution: extract whatever possible from the people
- Lost "mandate of heaven" from the population
Balaji Vishwanath's Dilemma
His Timeline:
- Left Delhi (Delhi mission accomplished)
- Returned to Pune
- Died within 1-2 years of return
What He Did:
- Allocated portions of Chautai/Sardeshmukhi revenues
- Some went to Shahu
- Some to local commanders in the 6 provinces
- Set boundaries to prevent quarrels
Why It Mattered:
- System matured under his watch
- Left everything to Shahu to manage
- His death marked end of his active period
- Policies became embedded during Shahu's reign
The Blame Game: Who's Really Responsible?
The Accusation:
"Balaji Vishwanath is faulted for this policy"
The Defense:
- Balaji died within 1 year of returning from Delhi
- Shahu lived 30 more years and was the sovereign
- Shahu had the authority to change the policies
- Shahu chose not to make corrections
The Verdict: According to the historian: Shahu is ultimately responsible, not Balaji
The Dynastic Solution: Bajirao I Appointed
The Year: 1720
- After Balaji Vishwanath's death
- Shahu appointed Bajirao I as Peshwa
- First of the hereditary Peshwas
The Shift:
- Not officially called "dynastic"
- But became hereditary in practice
- After Shahu died (1749), Peshwas had no check on their power
- Effectively became de facto rulers
The Rise of Peshwa Power
Timeline of Power Consolidation:
- 1720: Bajirao I becomes Peshwa (Shahu still alive)
- 1740: Bajirao I dies (Shahu still alive)
- 1749: Shahu dies (no successor to check Peshwa)
- After 1749: Peshwa becomes absolute power
The Power Vacuum:
- Shahu had no son to inherit
- No check on Peshwa authority remained
- Peshwas became "wholesome" (completely in control)
- King position became ceremonial
The Root of Future Disaster
This System's Legacy:
"This is an extremely profound sentence. You can later appreciate why the Marathas lost the Panipat battle."
The Problem:
- 150,000+ died at Panipat
- Root cause: commanders driven by profit, not duty
- No unified vision
- Each commander looking out for themselves
- Politics and personal gain over strategy
The Cycle:
- Balaji created incentive system
- System worked for rapid expansion
- But destroyed social bonds and loyalty
- Commanders became autonomous profit-seekers
- When unified front needed = couldn't deliver it
Key Players
| Name | Role | Key Action |
|---|---|---|
| Balaji Vishwanath | Peshwa | Created Chautai/Sardeshmukhi incentive system |
| Shahu | King | Allowed system to continue unchecked |
| Bajirao I | Peshwa (appointed 1720) | Inherited the system, became de facto ruler |
| Vyankoji | Tanjavur ruler | Failed to use incentive system |
| Rajaram's successors | Kolhapur rulers | Failed to expand despite capability |
Critical Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1650 | Sardeshmukhi system emerges |
| 1650-1730 | Chautai & Sardeshmukhi develop |
| 1720 | Balaji Vishwanath dies; Bajirao I appointed Peshwa |
| 1740 | Bajirao I dies |
| 1749 | Shahu dies; no successor = Peshwa becomes supreme |
| 1761 | Battle of Panipat (150,000 killed) |
Geographic Context
- Pune: Maratha center (Shahu's base)
- Kolhapur: Southern branch, refused to expand
- Tanjavur: Southern branch, stagnated
- Six Provinces: Main areas with Chautai rights
Major Themes
1. Systems Drive Behavior
The Chautai system was perfectly designed to incentivize expansion. It worked. But it also incentivized looting and created commanders who were profit-focused rather than duty-focused.
2. The Expansion-vs-Governance Trade-off
Shivaji balanced expansion with good governance. His successors prioritized expansion. By the time Panipat came, the empire was vast but fragile—held together by profit motives, not loyalty.
3. Power Without Check
When Shahu died without an heir, the Peshwa became absolute. No balance of power. No constitutional check. Just one man making all decisions for an empire that was barely unified to begin with.
4. The Profit Motive's Dark Side
Commanders getting 3/4 of revenue meant they had to maximize extraction. When monsoons failed, they still needed army funds. Result: they looted the very people they were supposed to protect.
5. The Panipat Foreshadowing
"All that, the root cause was this particular system where individual commanders didn't get any salary, but were allowed to keep some tax base for their own army... They were driven by profit."
The seeds of Panipat disaster were planted here. Individual commanders, each running their own profit centers, couldn't unify when the existential threat came.
Key Quotes
"You cannot make enemies out of our natural allies." — Bajirao I's principle (referenced later)
"The problem that happened because of the system that Bajeev Vishwanath put in place is that the whole attention of the Maratha commanders was to maximize their profit."
"This is an extremely profound sentence. You can later on appreciate why the Marathas lost the Panipat battle."
Where We Left Off: The foundation is set. Balaji's system created expansion but destroyed cohesion. Shahu allowed it to continue unchecked. When Shahu died, the Peshwa became supreme. By then, the empire was vast but hollow—a collection of profit-seeking commanders, not a unified force. The seeds of Panipat were already sown.
Balaji Vishwanath returned from Delhi with a brilliant system: commanders get 3/4 of revenue, keep the territory, but must maintain their own army. Perfect incentive for expansion. Perfect system for rapid empire growth. But terrible system for building loyalty or unified purpose. Instead of servants of a king, commanders became entrepreneurs maximizing profit. When Panipat came 41 years later, this fragmented profit-motive structure would collapse entirely. 150,000 would die. The empire would fall. And it all started with a system designed to make commanders rich.
Bajirao I: Strategic Genius & The Peshwa's Rise (1720-1740)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Beginning: A Young Peshwa's Promise
The Year: 1720
- Shahu appoints Bajirao I as Peshwa
- Bajirao was chosen for his talent and muscle
- Had a "great mix of both talent and muscle"
- Valorous and extremely bright
- Would lead Marathas for 20 years until his death at 40
The Tree Analogy: Strategic Genius
Bajirao's Famous Quote (1723):
"If you want to bring the branches of a tree to the ground, then you should not go after each and every branch and try to cut it and bring it down to the ground. Just start hitting the trunk of the tree and then everything, every branch will come down."
Applied to Maratha Strategy:
- The Trunk: The Mughal Empire
- The Branches: Small hostile regimes spawned by Mughals
The Strategy:
- Don't waste time on every small kingdom
- Go after the master power (Mughals)
- Defeat the Mughals = everything else falls
- Strategic thinking over tactical opportunism
Why This Mattered:
- Shahu chose him over experienced commanders
- Because he had strategic vision
- "That turned out to be correct decision"
The Grand Vision
Bajirao's Promise to Shahu:
"Believe in me and I will make sure that Maratha flag was called Jari Patka will reach Attaq"
Attaq:
- Border town where Afghanistan began
- Far northwestern reaches of India
- Now in Pakistan
The Ambition:
- Maratha Empire would expand all the way to the Indus border
- Everything in between would be under Maratha control
- Unprecedented territorial vision
The Expansion Under Bajirao:
- Maratha Empire grew to Marwa (north of Narmada)
- Extended through Bundelkhand (north of Marwa)
- Reached parts of Rajasthan
- Went "all the way to the north"
Why Bajirao Was Different
The Contrast with Previous Leaders:
"Shinde and Holkar were good fighters. But they had no brains."
Their Mistakes:
- Only looked at tactical advantages
- Harassed Rajasthan princes constantly
- Only wanted tributes and money
- Made enemies out of natural allies
- Lost the Rajputs and other Hindu kingdoms
Bajirao's Difference:
- Not just a fighter - had brains
- Great warrior AND great statesman
- Strategic thinker
- Understood that you must maintain allies
The Principle:
"You cannot make enemies out of our natural allies."
Building the War Machine
His Support System:
His Brother: Chimaji Appa
- Tremendous support
- Key military asset
Young Warriors He Cultivated:
- Ramaji Shinde
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Pilaji Jadhav Rao
- Tukoji Pawar
How He Created Them:
- Spotted their potential early
- Were just simple soldiers
- He mentored them into greatness
- Gave them bigger and bigger roles
- Made their careers through recognition
Why They Followed Him:
- Extremely popular with his troops
- He was with them "through thick and thin"
- They loved him
- Nearly same age as them
- Led by example
Bajirao the Warrior: Myth & Reality
His Legendary Status:
- Had no time for formalities
- Would "eat lunch or dinner on the horseback"
- Never sat down for meals if in a hurry
- Marching toward goals while eating
- Could cover a four-day journey in two days
His Presence:
- Extremely popular with his horses (cavalry)
- Really respected by troops
- Shared their hardships
- Young, energetic, capable
His Preference:
- Loved being "in the field with his troops"
- Rather would prefer doing battles
- Established hegemony through campaign
- Not an administrator type
Shahu's Strategic Delegation
Why Shahu Gave Him Everything:
- Shahu was not a warrior king
- Not trained in warfare (unlike forefathers)
- Didn't want to participate in battles
- Refused to go on campaigns
- Lived predictable life in Satara
Shahu's Conditions:
- Got up at 7:30 AM
- Had lunch at 12 PM
- Had dinner at 8 PM
- Held court as needed
- Never left Satara boundary
The Delegation:
- Shahu gave Bajirao complete responsibility for expansion
- Authority to make military decisions
- Freedom to campaign extensively
- Only on "extremely important" decisions would Bajirao check in
The Risk & The Trust:
- Bajirao could have taken over
- Had the power to do it
- But was devoted to Shivaji family
- Trusted implicitly by Shahu
The Fall of the Eight Ministers System
Shivaji's Original Model:
- Ashta Pradhan Mantar (Council of Eight Ministers)
- All equal, reporting to king
- Peshwa was one of eight (prime minister)
- Held checks on each other
What Changed Under Bajirao:
- The council system completely collapsed
- All authority concentrated in one place
- All in the Peshwa
- No council of ministers
Why It Happened:
- Shahu basically said: "You do everything"
- "I'm not going on battlefield"
- "I'm not doing administration"
- "You are whole soul"
- Complete delegation to one person
The Structure That Emerged:
- Peshwa appointed his own advisors
- Not called "ministers" but functioned as such
- They reported to Peshwa, not the king
- Peshwa was their sole boss
- Shahu became ceremonial figurehead
The Fundamental Difference: Shivaji vs. Bajirao
Shivaji's Greatness:
"His forte was actually in giving good governance to the citizens"
- Conquered new areas
- But prioritized citizen welfare
- Wanted people to prosper
- Provided good governance
- That was his ultimate goal
Bajirao's Greatness:
- Forte was conquering new areas
- Expanded kingdom "tenfold almost"
- Reached unprecedented territorial heights
- But didn't prioritize administration or governance
- Delegated that to his subordinates
The Trade-off:
- Shivaji: Balanced expansion with governance
- Bajirao: Expansion for expansion's sake
- Shivaji: Conquered then digested slowly
- Bajirao: Conquered then moved on to next conquest
The Warning:
"Shivaji was balanced. But that practice started getting less important... It was more just expanding for expansion's sake."
Why the Empire Grew So Rapidly
Three Reasons for Explosive Growth:
1. Bajirao's Military Skill
- Himself a warrior of "great repute"
- Tactical and strategic brilliance
- Could execute wars perfectly
2. Created Four Major Commanders
- Gave freedom to his war chiefs
- Let them handle assigned areas
- Made them into capable leaders
- Essentially regional governors
3. Perfect Incentive Structure
- Commanders collected their own revenues
- Kept 3/4 for themselves
- Had to maintain armies
- Profit motive drove aggressive expansion
The Authority Question
How Did It Work Practically?
Shahu's Authority:
- Made major decisions
- Approved war declarations
- Handled retaliations and major moves
Bajirao's Authority:
- Handled day-to-day military decisions
- Couldn't bother Shahu on minor issues
- Made field decisions on his own
- Only consulted on truly major decisions
The Mechanism:
- Bajirao understood what Shahu wanted
- Knew the direction and philosophy
- Made decisions aligned with those principles
- Only escalated when necessary
Shivaji's Legacy & Its Fading
Shivaji's Example: Justice
- Lived in Lal Mahal initially
- A village head raped a girl
- Brought to Shivaji for justice
- Shivaji's response: Cut off right leg and left hand
The Message:
"This is not to be tolerated in my kingdom" "You will be severely punished"
- Making example for entire realm
- Setting standard for justice
- Ensuring people felt protected
- Administration was his forte
Under Bajirao:
- Less focus on such governance
- More focus on conquest
- Delegated administrative justice
- Concentrated on military expansion
Key Players
| Name | Role | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Peshwa | Strategic genius, 20-year reign, conquered vastly |
| Shahu | King | Delegated authority, lived secluded life in Satara |
| Chimaji Appa | Brother | Tremendous military support |
| Ramaji Shinde | Commander | Created/mentored by Bajirao |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Created/mentored by Bajirao |
| Pilaji Jadhav Rao | Commander | Created/mentored by Bajirao |
| Tukoji Pawar | Commander | Created/mentored by Bajirao |
| Shivaji | Historical King | Comparison figure - balanced governance & conquest |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1720 | Bajirao I becomes Peshwa |
| 1723 | Famous quote about tree trunk strategy |
| ~1720-1740 | Major expansion phase |
| 1740 | Bajirao I dies (age 40) |
Geographic Expansion
From Shivaji's Time to Bajirao's Time:
- Started: Core Maratha territory (south-central)
- Marwa: North of Narmada (first time Marathas here)
- Bundelkhand: North of Marwa, closer to Delhi
- Rajasthan: Parts of northwest
- Near Attaq: Border of Afghanistan (vision, not fully achieved)
Major Themes
1. Strategy Over Tactics
Shinde and Holkar were great fighters but lacked strategic vision. They harassed everyone and made enemies. Bajirao understood that strategy meant knowing which enemy to target. The Trunk, not the branches.
2. Leadership Through Empowerment
Bajirao didn't just command—he created. He spotted talent in young soldiers and mentored them into legendary commanders. He built an organization that could execute his vision.
3. The Delegation Model
Shahu was smart enough to recognize his limitations. Instead of pretending to be a warrior king, he delegated to someone better. This freed Bajirao to focus on expansion while Shahu handled the ceremonial/political aspects.
4. The Governance-Expansion Trade-off
Shivaji balanced both. Bajirao chose expansion. This worked brilliantly for 20 years but created an empire that was vast but shallow—huge territory, but fragmented loyalty and local discontent.
5. The Concentration of Power
By putting everything in Bajirao, Shahu created a single point of failure. If Bajirao had died earlier, or if his successor was weaker, the whole structure would have collapsed. The safety of the eight-minister system was gone.
Critical Insights
The Mentoring Model
Bajirao didn't just hire commanders—he created them. He saw potential in ordinary soldiers and developed them into legendary figures. This is a masterclass in leadership and organizational building. He built capacity, not just bought it.
The Alignment Without Micromanagement
Shahu and Bajirao had perfect alignment. Shahu trusted Bajirao to make decisions aligned with his vision without needing constant approval. This is rare and powerful. It requires both absolute trust and perfect understanding of values.
The Youth Advantage
Bajirao was young, energetic, could eat on horseback, travel four days in two. This gave him personal charisma and the ability to lead by example. Not just giving orders from a tent—he was in the field with his troops.
The Cost of Success
Rapid expansion meant rapid governance decay. The more territory conquered, the less attention could be paid to each region. Shivaji's model was slower but more stable. Bajirao's was faster but more fragile.
Key Quotes
"If you want to bring the branches of a tree to the ground... Just start hitting the trunk of the tree and then everything, every branch will come down."
"You cannot make enemies out of our natural allies."
"Shinde and Holkar were good fighters. But they had no brains."
"Shivaji's greatness is that he gave good governance to the citizens... His ultimate goal was that his people would prosper and not feel difficulties."
"Bajirao's forte was to conquer new areas... But he didn't pay as much attention to administration, to governance."
Where We Left Off: Bajirao I has created the most expansive Maratha Empire yet. Through strategic thinking, excellent military leadership, and perfect delegation from Shahu, he's expanded the empire dramatically. But he's done so at the cost of governance and local stability. The empire is vast but held together by profit motives and military might, not loyalty and good administration. The seeds of future instability are being planted even as the empire reaches its apex.
In just 20 years, from age 20 to 40, Bajirao I transformed the Maratha Empire from a regional power into a continental one. Not through conquest alone, but through strategy: recognize that you fight the trunk, not the branches. Identify the real enemy (Mughals), make everyone else realize they're secondary. Build commanders through mentorship, not just hiring. Earn loyalty through presence, not just authority. But he did it all at the expense of good governance. Rapid expansion, slow administration. The empire was becoming vast but hollow. And nobody knew it yet.
The Battle of Palkhed: Bajirao's Masterclass in Strategy (March 1728)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Setup: Two Powers Collide
The Situation (1727-1728):
- Nizam of Hyderabad claiming superiority over Marathas
- Nizam has cannon division (major military advantage)
- Nizam in Pune with his army, harassing villages
- Marathas cannot fight him because of cannons
- Nizam is an autonomous power despite nominal Mughal service
The Problem for Bajirao:
- As long as Nizam has cannons = Marathas vulnerable
- Cannot engage in direct battle
- Cannon division prevents cavalry tactics
- Speed and agility = Bajirao's advantage, nullified by cannons
Nizam of Hyderabad: The Background
Who He Was:
- Originally Subedar (governor) for Mughals in south
- Declared autonomy from Mughal Emperor
- Moved to Hyderabad and established own kingdom
- Now semi-independent, semi-Mughal representative
Why He's a Problem:
- Claiming that Kolhapur branch is true Shivaji heir
- Saying Shahu is "fake"
- Trying to undermine Shahu's legitimacy
- Supporting Shahu's rivals for political advantage
His Military Strength:
- Cannon division (trained regiment)
- Large army
- Fortified positions
- Resources of semi-autonomous kingdom
Bajirao's Dilemma & Strategy
The Cannon Problem:
"As long as Mr. Nizam had the cannon division with him, Bajirao couldn't dare to come any close to Nizam. He could really chew him out."
Bajirao's Insight:
- Must find a way to separate Nizam from his cannons
- Cannons are heavy, require elephants/horses to move
- Cannot move quickly
- Bajirao moves lightning fast
The Strategy:
- Force Nizam to abandon the cannon division
- Make cannons seem like a liability
- Pursue Nizam so aggressively he must leave them behind
- Then fight cannon-free battle
The Aggressive Response: Raiding Nizam Territory
Bajirao's Tactic:
"His technique was if you are in my area, then I will go to your area"
The Execution:
- Went into Nizam territory
- Started raiding villages
- Defeated one of Nizam's commanders in battle
- Created chaos in Nizam-held areas
Geographic Moves:
- Went south and east toward Jalna
- Hit areas like Sindakhe (Nizam territory)
- Moved northwest toward Gujarat border
- Destroyed settlements, fought skirmishes
The Advantage:
- Could move "lightning moves" with cavalry only
- No heavy cannons to slow him down
- Kept appearing where not expected
- Made Nizam increasingly worried
The Psychological Pressure
Nizam's Growing Worry:
- Shahu and Bajirao's brother Chimaji on high ground at Purandar
- Shahu protected from cannon attack
- But villages around Pune vulnerable
- Now Bajirao creating havoc in Nizam's own territory
The Bind:
- If he stays in Pune: loses control of his areas
- If he pursues Bajirao: leaves Pune exposed
- Cannons are liability (too slow)
- Can't fight cavalry with cannons alone
The Rumor That Changed Everything
Creating Doubt:
- Bajirao spreads rumor that he's going to attack Burhanpur
- Burhanpur was old Mughal gateway to Deccan
- Relatively wealthy and lightly defended
- Prestigious Mughal station
Why This Broke Nizam:
- If Marathas raid Burhanpur = Mughal prestige at stake
- Mughals would demand response
- Nizam, as Mughal representative, would be blamed
- Must engage Bajirao in battle
The Genius:
- Not really going to Burhanpur (just rumor)
- Forces Nizam into open field battle
- Makes him abandon cannons if he wants to move fast
The Fatal Decision: Cannons Left Behind
Nizam's Dilemma:
"He had a dilemma. If he were to carry his cannon regiment... these guys were expert in cannon fighting. They cannot move quickly. These cannons are heavy."
The Choice:
- Cannon regiment can travel with horses/elephants
- But too slow for pursuit
- Bajirao moves "lightning speed"
- If he carries cannons, Bajirao escapes
- If he leaves cannons, no fire advantage
Nizam's Decision:
- Left cannon division in Pune
- Took smaller force with him
- Could move faster
- Pursued Bajirao with cavalry/infantry only
The Battle of Palkhed: Setting the Trap
The Location:
- Town called Palkhed near Rangabad area
- Strategic positioning for Bajirao
Bajirao's Trap:
- Surrounded Nizam in critical directions
- Blocked major roads
- River nearby = water source controlled
- Cut off supplies and water
The Encirclement:
"Surrounded meaning it's not like every direction Bajirao was around him, but in critical directions Bajirao's forces were there"
- Not completely surrounded
- But major escape routes blocked
- Cannot get to water stream
- Food and water cut off
The Desperation:
- Without water = death sentence in battle conditions
- Horses cannot drink = animals dying
- Men getting desperate
- Survival measured in hours/days
The Negotiation: Water for Hostages
The Crisis:
- Nizam's army trapped
- No water access
- Soldiers starting to suffer
- Commanders realize they're trapped
The Mercy Petition:
- Nizam's commanders approached Bajirao
- Begged for their leader's life
- Desperate situation
Bajirao's Terms:
"If you want to get the water source, then keep some hostages with me. I will allow you to access the water source."
The Hostage Exchange:
- Approximately 300 people taken as hostages
- Nizam allowed access to river water
- Army got access to vital resource
- But at terrible price
The Treaty of Palkhed: The Terms
What Nizam Had to Accept:
1. Kolhapur Boundaries:
- Kolhapur branch cannot cross Krishna river north
- Cannot expand toward northern territories
- Permanently sidelined
- Maratha unity confirmed under Shahu
2. Territorial Concession:
- Southern provinces previously held by Mughals directly
- Were granted to Marathas
- Nizam acknowledged these were Maratha territories now
- Expansion of Maratha-controlled areas
3. Sanada Confirmation:
- Imperial order from Delhi (Sanada) confirming six provinces
- Chautai and Sardeshmukhi rights
- Nizam now officially accepts this
- No longer disputes Maratha territorial rights
The Significance: More Than a Battle
Why It Mattered:
- Settled the Kolhapur question definitively
- Removed Nizam's claims about succession
- Confirmed Maratha Chautai/Sardeshmukhi rights
- Nizam accepted Mughal imperial orders
- No longer challenges Maratha authority
The Diplomatic Win:
"Because Nizam he even though he had his autonomous Kingdom in Hyderabad, he still was kind of a representative of the Mughal Empire"
- Nizam was semi-independent BUT still Mughal representative
- His acceptance legitimized Maratha position
- Mughal Emperor's orders now binding
- Maratha position strengthened in Mughal politics
The Strategic Outcome:
- Bajirao forced opponent to abandon best advantage (cannons)
- Achieved victory without heavy artillery
- Did it through strategy and psychology
- Not through brute force but brilliant maneuvering
Key Players
| Name | Role | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Maratha Commander | Victorious, strategic genius |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Defeated, accepts terms |
| Shahu | Maratha King | Legitimacy confirmed |
| Kolhapur Branch | Rival Marathas | Permanently sidelined |
| Mughal Emperor | Nominal overlord | Authority validated |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1727 | Nizam begins causing trouble, camps in Pune area |
| 1727-1728 | Bajirao raids Nizam territory, creates pressure |
| March 1728 | Battle of Palkhed (or series of engagements) |
| Post-March 1728 | Treaty signed, terms accepted |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Pune: Shahu's base, Nizam camped here with cannons
- Purandar: High ground where Chimaji and Shahu stationed
- Palkhed/Rangabad Area: Where trap was set
- Jalna/Sindakhe: Nizam territory raided by Bajirao
- Burhanpur: Mughal garrison, rumored target
- Krishna River: Southern boundary for Kolhapur
- Hyderabad: Nizam's actual capital
Major Themes
1. Strategy Over Strength
Nizam had stronger military hardware (cannons). Bajirao won through superior strategy. He forced the opponent into a position where his greatest advantage became irrelevant. Classic strategic thinking.
2. Psychology in Warfare
The rumor about Burhanpur wasn't a direct military tactic—it was psychological. It forced Nizam into a decision. Bajirao understood that battles are won in the mind before they're fought with weapons.
3. The Cavalry Advantage
Bajirao's entire strategy relied on speed. He couldn't match Nizam's cannons, so he created conditions where speed mattered more than firepower. He changed the game instead of playing the same game.
4. Resource Denial as Weapon
Water isn't typically thought of as a weapon, but Bajirao understood it was. He didn't kill Nizam's army directly—he cut off water and let desperation break their will to fight. Elegant and economical.
5. Legitimacy Through Victory
The victory wasn't just military. It forced Nizam to accept political terms. The Sanada (imperial order) rights were confirmed. Shahu's legitimacy was established. Kolhapur was definitively sidelined. Politics and military strategy intertwined.
Critical Insights
The Cannon Handicap Becomes an Advantage
Nizam thought his cannons were an advantage. Bajirao understood they were actually a liability in the situation. He designed the campaign to make the cannons irrelevant. Classic judo move—use the opponent's strength against them.
The Rumor Strategy
Most military history focuses on direct tactics. But Bajirao's rumor about Burhanpur was pure strategy. It wasn't meant to be true. It was meant to force a decision. This shows how sophisticated military thinking was, beyond just battles.
The Water Siege
Modern military thinks in terms of attrition warfare, supply lines, logistics. Bajirao was doing this in 1728. He understood that an army marches on supplies and water. Control those, and the army collapses without a shot fired. The hostage exchange was elegant—he gets guarantees while maintaining control.
The Political Calculation
The battle wasn't really about defeating Nizam. It was about confirming Shahu's legitimacy, settling the Kolhapur question, and getting Nizam (as Mughal representative) to accept imperial orders. The military victory enabled the political victory.
Why Bajirao Succeeded Where Others Failed
Shinde and Holkar were good tacticians but lacked strategy. They would have fought Nizam head-on and gotten slaughtered by cannons. Bajirao understood the entire situation—psychological, geographic, political. He designed a campaign that forced Nizam into a losing position before any direct battle.
Key Quotes
"His technique was if you are in my area, then I will go to your area"
"As long as Mr. Nizam had the cannon division with him, Bajirao couldn't dare to come any close to Nizam."
"If you want to get the water source, then keep some hostages with me. I will allow you to access the water source."
"Because Nizam he even though he had his autonomous Kingdom in Hyderabad, he still was kind of a representative of the Mughal Empire"
Montgomery's Assessment
British historian Montgomery apparently wrote about this campaign as a model of strategic warfare. Even centuries later, military strategists recognize Bajirao's brilliance here.
Where We Left Off: Palkhed is a complete victory for Bajirao. More than that, it settles major political questions. Shahu's legitimacy is confirmed. Maratha rights to six provinces are validated by Nizam's acceptance. Kolhapur is permanently relegated to minor status. Bajirao's strategy proved that superior military hardware (cannons) can be neutralized by superior thinking. And most importantly, Marathas have now beaten not just a local rival, but a quasi-Mughal power. They're no longer just south Indian kingdom anymore. They're a major continental force.
Nizam arrived in Pune with cannons, confident in his superiority. Bajirao didn't have the heavy artillery to match them. So he didn't try. Instead, he made the cannons a liability. He created situations where speed mattered more than firepower. He denied water to an army surrounded in critical directions. He forced the leader into a desperate choice: abandon his best advantage or abandon his army. When Nizam chose to pursue with cavalry only, he'd already lost. The rumor about Burhanpur wasn't even true—it was just the psychological pressure needed to make him move into the trap. And when it was over, Nizam didn't just lose a battle. He accepted treaties that confirmed Shahu's legitimacy, validated Maratha territorial rights, and permanently sidelined his own potential rival (Kolhapur). Bajirao won everything without even using his strongest asset: his cavalry's speed. He won by thinking better. That's why Montgomery wrote about it as a masterclass.
Bajirao's Northern Campaigns: Marwa & Bundelkhand (1728-1729)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Moving North: A New Frontier
The Change in Strategy:
- After Palkhed victory, Bajirao turned north
- First time Marathas conquered Marwa
- Marwa = province north of current Marathi territory
- Not traditional Maratha homeland
Why This Matters:
- Marwa has no mountains, flat plains
- Forces different tactics than Sahyadri region
- Marathas had to adapt warfare style
- Must now fight open field battles
The Warrior's Dilemma: Speed vs. Geography
The Problem:
- South of Marwa: Mountains, hills (Sahyadri)
- Shivaji era tactics: Guerrilla warfare, surprise attacks, mountain forts
- North of Marwa/Bundelkhand: Flat plains
- Can't use terrain advantage anymore
Bajirao's Solution:
"He would only engage in open warfare when he does a surprise attack on the enemy"
- Adapted hybrid strategy
- Combined Shivaji's surgical strike mentality
- With open field capability
- Hybrid = psychological surprise + tactical positioning
The Confidence:
- Maratha armies now "much more powerful than at time of Shivaji"
- Could handle open warfare
- But still careful about when and how
The Marwa Campaign: New Territory
The Geographic Situation:
- Marwa: North of current Marathi territory
- Not the Deccan (Khan)
- First major Maratha incursion
- Mughal-controlled territory
The Execution:
- Bajirao and his brother went different routes
- Attacked Mughal garrison areas
- Defeated Mughal forces
- Giridhar Bahadur was the Mughal Subedar
The Strategic Value:
- Marwa itself valuable territory
- But more importantly = gateway to Bundelkhand
- Bundelkhand = northern part of Marwa, even closer to Delhi
Bundelkhand: The Opportunity Emerges
What Happened:
- While campaigning in Marwa
- Got opportunity to enter Bundelkhand
- Bundelkhand is north of Marwa
- Even further toward Delhi
The Geography:
- Bundelkhand = province by itself
- Northern outpost of Marwa region
- After Bundelkhand = closer to Delhi
- Increasingly important territory
Why It Mattered:
- Moves Maratha presence closer to Mughal heartland
- Extends control to northwest
- Challenges Mughal authority directly
- New frontier opened
Chhatrasal's Desperate Appeal
Who He Was:
- Independent king of Bundelkhand
- Aged warrior
- Experienced but aging
- His army no match for Mughal commander
His Crisis:
- Faced Mohammed Bangush (Mughal commander)
- Bangush's army superior
- Chhatrasal couldn't win alone
- Literally imprisoned by Bangush
- Escaped from prison but kingdom still in danger
His Famous Comparison:
"The elephant's foot is in the mouth of a crocodile. It is up to you to safeguard the reputation of that elephant."
- Comparing himself = old elephant
- Crocodile = Mohammed Bangush
- Chhatrasal stuck, cannot escape on his own
- Asks Bajirao to save him
The Language:
- Originally spoken in Hindi variant (Bundelkhand language)
- "Please help me and keep my reputation intact"
- "Nobody else can save me"
- "Preserve my honor"
Bajirao's Impulsive Decision
The Situation (January 1729):
- Bajirao at Garha Mandala
- Not close to Bundelkhand
- Had army of 25,000 men (cavalry-based)
- Chhatrasal's desperate message arrives
The Procedure Broken:
- Normally: such decisions go to Shahu (sovereign decision)
- Getting into war with Mughal commander = major decision
- Technically should wait for approval
Bajirao's Response:
"What the heck, you know, I am going. Another Hindu king is asking me for help."
The Executive Authority:
- Bajirao knew Shahu would approve
- Had some autonomous decision-making power
- Said: "I am sure that Shahu will not object"
- Took his cavalry army and marched
The Speed: The Legendary Ride
The Distance:
- Normal journey: 4 days
- Bajirao's march: 2 days
- Covered same distance in half the time
How:
- Day and night marching
- No rest stops
- Pushed horses and men hard
- Incredible pace
Why It Mattered:
- Mohammed Bangush expected Bajirao in 4 days
- Had 4 days to prepare, build defenses, reinforce
- Bajirao arrived in 2 days
- Caught Bangush unprepared
- No time to fortify or reinforce
The Advantage:
- Surprise element preserved
- Bangush wasn't ready for immediate battle
- Maratha forces fresh despite the ride
- Psychological impact of sudden arrival
The Battle Unfolds
Chhatrasal's Escape:
- Had been imprisoned by Bangush
- Escaped to his own fort
- But kingdom still under threat
- Needed Bajirao to defeat Bangush completely
Bangush's Complications:
- His son was coming to reinforce him
- From different direction
- Would arrive with additional army
- Would threaten Bajirao's position
The Interception:
- Kajankhan (possibly Bangush's son or ally) was coming
- Bajirao caught him en route
- Defeated and turned him away
- Prevented reinforcements from arriving
The Fort Siege: Water & Food
Bangush's Position:
- Retreated to a fort
- Not a mountain fort
- Land fort = fortified compound
- Hedged in, defended positions
Bajirao's Tactic:
- Surrounded the fort
- Blocked food supply
- Blocked water supply
- Standard siege warfare
The Pressure:
- Fort can't last long without supplies
- Garrison gets weaker
- Bangush's options narrowing
- Surrender or starvation
The Negotiated Settlement
Bangush's Dilemma:
- Can't break siege
- No reinforcements coming
- Supplies running out
- Fort can't hold indefinitely
The Truce Terms:
1. Non-Aggression Pledge:
"I will never again come back to Chhatrasal's area in Bundelkhand"
- Bangush promises to never attack Chhatrasal again
- Written into treaty
- Binding agreement
2. Bundelkhand Secured:
- Chhatrasal's kingdom guaranteed protection
- Mughal forces withdraw
- Territory remains under Chhatrasal
- But now allied with Marathas
The Significance:
- Maratha presence established in Bundelkhand
- Hindu king (Chhatrasal) now under Maratha protection
- Mughal authority challenged and pushed back
- New territory added to Maratha sphere
The Larger Context
Marathas Expanding North:
- Started in Deccan (south)
- Moved through Marwa (central)
- Now into Bundelkhand (north)
- Getting close to Delhi itself
Power Shift:
- Mughal authority weakening
- Marathas becoming continental power
- Previously: regional kingdom
- Now: competing for all-India dominance
The Pattern:
- Palkhed: Defeated semi-independent Nizam
- Marwa: Defeated Mughal garrisons
- Bundelkhand: Defeated Mughal commander, protected Hindu king
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Maratha Peshwa | Campaigned, won battles, made alliances |
| Chhatrasal | Bundelkhand King | Asked for help, got Maratha protection |
| Mohammed Bangush | Mughal Commander | Defeated, forced to sign non-aggression pact |
| Kajankhan | Bangush's ally | Intercepted, defeated en route |
| Giridhar Bahadur | Mughal Subedar | Defeated in Marwa |
| Shahu | Maratha King | Approved/didn't object to campaign |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1728 | Palkhed victory establishes northern presence |
| 1728 | Marwa campaign, Mughal garrisons defeated |
| January 1729 | Chhatrasal's message arrives |
| Early 1729 | Bajirao marches to Bundelkhand in 2 days |
| ~1729 | Battle/siege around Mahoba |
| 1729 | Treaty with Bangush, Bundelkhand secured |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Garha Mandala: Where Bajirao was when message arrived
- Mahoba: Where Bajirao met Chhatrasal and fought battle
- Bundelkhand: Chhatrasal's kingdom, now protected
- Marwa: Mughal province, now Maratha-controlled
- Narmada River: Southern boundary (earlier campaigns)
- Krishna River: Boundary set in Palkhed treaty
- Delhi: Now much closer to Maratha sphere
Major Themes
1. Speed as Strategy
Bajirao's legendary 2-day journey wasn't just about bravery. It was strategy. It prevented Bangush from preparing, from getting reinforcements, from optimizing his position. Speed created psychological and tactical advantage.
2. Alliance vs. Conquest
Instead of just conquering Bundelkhand, Bajirao made an alliance. Chhatrasal remained king but became Maratha protectorate. This was smarter than direct rule—fewer enemies, easier administration, local legitimacy preserved.
3. Expanding the Maratha Sphere
With each campaign, Marathas move further north. From Deccan → Marwa → Bundelkhand → approaching Delhi. Not conquering and holding everywhere, but establishing presence and alliances.
4. Using Hindu Solidarity
Chhatrasal's appeal worked because of Hindu solidarity. A Hindu king asking another Hindu king for help against Muslim Mughal. Bajirao responded. This was part of the narrative, whether explicitly stated or not.
5. Mughal Authority Crumbling
Each Mughal commander defeated, each territory lost, each alliance forged with local Hindu kings—this all shows Mughal power in Deccan is fading. Marathas are replacing them as the hegemon.
Critical Insights
The Decision-Making Authority
Bajirao had enough authority to march an army north without explicit Shahu approval. This shows the trust and delegation is working. Shahu didn't object (and probably approved). But Bajirao had freedom to act in moment of opportunity.
The Executive Decision vs. Sovereign Decision
Normally such decisions require sovereign approval. But in practice, Bajirao was making strategic decisions in real time. This works when there's perfect alignment (which there was between Bajirao and Shahu). But it's fragile—only works with absolute trust.
The Hybrid Warfare
Marathas were trained in Shivaji-era guerrilla tactics. Now fighting in open plains where those don't work. Instead of forcing the old way, Bajirao adapted. Kept the psychological element (surprise) but added ability to fight open battles. True strategic flexibility.
The Siege vs. Pitched Battle
Instead of fighting pitched battle, Bajirao surrounded and starved out Bangush. This wasn't dramatic but was effective. Shows understanding that warfare has options beyond direct combat. Supply denial is as effective as combat.
The Chhatrasal Alliance
Most interesting decision: didn't absorb Bundelkhand directly. Left Chhatrasal as autonomous ruler but now protected by Marathas. This meant:
- Chhatrasal's legitimacy preserved = local support stays
- Maratha gets alliance and influence = strategic gain
- Easier to hold than direct rule
- Creates buffer against Delhi
Key Quotes
"The elephant's foot is in the mouth of a crocodile. It is up to you to safeguard the reputation of that elephant."
"What the heck, you know, I am going. Another Hindu king is asking me for help."
"I am sure that Shahu will not object"
"I will never again come back to Chhatrasal's area in Bundelkhand"
The Warrior Ethos
Chhatrasal was aged, not as militarily powerful as Bangush. But he had pride, reputation, honor. When he asked for help, he wasn't asking to be conquered or ruled—he was asking for a warrior alliance. Bajirao understood this. He didn't treat Chhatrasal as conquered subject. He treated him as allied king. That respect was what created the lasting alliance.
Where We Left Off: In just a few months, Bajirao has expanded Maratha control northward dramatically. He defeated Mughal commanders, protected a Hindu king, and established Maratha presence in Bundelkhand. The empire now extends from Deccan all the way north toward Delhi. Marathas have transitioned from regional power to continental power in one decade. They're now challenging Mughal authority directly, winning battles, making alliances with other Hindu kingdoms. The dominoes are falling. And the Mughal Empire's grip on the Deccan is slipping away.
Chhatrasal was an old elephant with his foot in a crocodile's mouth. Bajirao was the young warrior who pulled him out. But he did something smarter than conquest—he made an alliance. Chhatrasal remains king, but now protected and allied with Marathas. The territory is secured not through occupation but through mutual interest. And in doing so, Bajirao moved the Maratha frontier all the way north to the gates of Delhi. The Mughals were crumbling, the Marathas were rising, and the old order was giving way to the new. One decade of strategy, speed, and smart decisions had transformed everything.
Bajirao I: Marwa Expansion & The Delhi Demonstration (1736-1737)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Mastani Story: The Woman Who Changed Everything
Who She Was:
- Court dancer sent by Chhatrasal (Bundelkhand king) as tribute/wife to Bajirao
- Muslim background; Hindus very conservative about conversion
- Married Bajirao despite opposition
The Problem:
- Conservative Pune society refused to accept her
- Son Samshir Bahadur (born to Mastani) not recognized as heir or legitimate
- Despite being Hindu-eligible, Hindus wouldn't let him convert to gain acceptance
- Had to remain Muslim = no rights to Peshwa line
The Unintended Consequence:
- Mastani's presence established the precedent: wives now insisted on following armies to battle
- Created "deadweight" that slowed military operations
- Would become major factor in Panipat disaster (25+ years later)
Marwa Campaign: 1736
The Achievement:
- Bajirao defeated Sawai Jai Singh (Jaipur king) + combined Mughal forces
- Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah awarded Marwa subhedari (military governorship) to Marathas
- First time Marathas ruled outside Deccan
- Now collecting Chautai from Bundi & Kota (Rajasthan territories)
Why It Mattered:
- Expansion north of Narmada = beyond traditional Maratha lands
- Marathas entering Rajasthan politics directly
The Rajasthan Problem: Unintended Enemy-Making
The Good Old Days (Shivaji Era):
- Marathas & Rajputs were natural allies (both Hindu)
- Rajputs respected Shivaji
- Friendly, cooperative relationship
What Changed (Bajirao Era):
- Marathas now collecting taxes, enforcing authority
- Manipulating Rajput succession wars by taking sides
- When Rajput king dies with multiple sons, Shinde supports one son, Holkar supports another
- Marathas became kingmakers, not protectors
The Rajput Reaction:
- Lost trust in Marathas
- Saw them as usurpers exploiting internal disputes
- Felt powerless to resist (Marathas too strong)
- Deep resentment & bitterness grew
- Natural allies became rivals
The Irony:
"Marathas were so powerful that Rajputs had no alternative. But we don't want you here."
Delhi Gets Jealous: March 1737
The Setup:
- Bajirao in Agra (deep in Mughal territory)
- Three major Mughal commanders attacked him:
- Subedar of Ayodhya
- Mir Bakshi (army chief)
- Nawazir
The Battle:
- Bajirao's commanders: Malhar Rao Holkar, Pilaji Radhaurao, Baji Bhurau
- Holkar's contingent was routed (but not Bajirao's main force)
- Holkar retreated to Gwalior to regroup with Bajirao
The False Victory:
- Sadat Khan (one of the Mughal commanders) claimed he defeated Bajirao
- Actually only defeated Holkar's subsidiary force
- Emperor believed him & gave massive rewards
- Courtiers jealous: "Finally someone beat Bajirao!"
Bajirao's Response: The Psychological Strike
The Plan:
- Show the Emperor Bajirao is undefeated
- Prove Sadat Khan's victory was fake
- Demonstrate supreme confidence
The Distance Problem:
- Gwalior to Delhi = 10 days journey
- Bajirao covered it in 2 days & 2 nights (cavalry, day-night march)
- Ate bread on horseback while moving
The Geographic Miracle:
- Gap between Mir Bakshi's army and Sadat Khan's army
- Bajirao split them down the middle
- Appeared 10 miles from Red Fort (March 28, 1737)
The Location: Kalka Devi Temple
- Ram Navami festival happening (Rama's birthday)
- Bajirao's forces created havoc at the temple/fair
- Caught elephants, camels, looted shops, caused chaos
- Goal: Make sure news reaches the Emperor immediately
Delhi's Shock & Fear
The Reality Check:
- Emperor thought Bajirao was defeated
- Thought he was 10 days away
- Suddenly: he's 10 miles away at Red Fort entrance
- Their armies still 100+ miles south
The Verification:
- Courtiers couldn't believe reports
- Sent spies disguised as beggars to confirm
- Spies captured Maratha provisions (bread & vegetables in bags)
- Spy report: "When daybreak comes, Marathas will attack Red Fort"
The Terror:
- Entire court started shaking with fear
- Realized they had no home defense
- Main armies celebrating false victory down south
- Bajirao could attack anytime
The Calculation: Why He Didn't Attack
The Reason:
- Direct attack on Red Fort = full war with Mughal Empire
- Bajirao's goal: psychological humiliation, not conquest
- Show the Emperor he's vulnerable & unbeaten
- Make the point: "You're vulnerable. Don't underestimate me."
Captain Gordon's Assessment (1741)
Who: British officer observing from the sidelines
Observations:
- Pune: Well-built, fertile, prosperous city
- Manufacturing: 13-inch cannons being produced
- Textile industry thriving
- Farmers get tax concessions = good morale
- 40,000 standing army under Bajirao's command
Military Discipline:
- Soldiers have absolute trust in Bajirao
- Don't even know campaign destinations before departure
- Perfect loyalty without information
- Ability to mobilize large forces quickly
British Takeaway: Bajirao is a force to be reckoned with
The Internal Problem: Shinde vs. Holkar
Two Major Commanders in North:
- Ranoji Shinde
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Posted permanently in northern territories
- Rarely returned to Pune (only once every 1-2 years)
The Conflict:
- Economic: Both getting Chautai (1/4 taxes) from different Rajasthan areas
- Personal: Ego & animosity
- If one wins territory = other loses revenue
- Shinde supported some Rajput succession candidates; Holkar supported others
Why It Mattered:
- Bajirao was too mobile to manage day-to-day relations
- Conflicts escalated toward end of Bajirao's life
- Died in 1740 before resolving it
- Their interests were "exactly opposite" = unmeditable
The Sangharaja Problem: Decentralization
What Emerged:
- Empire became Sangharaja (federation of warlords)
- Local commanders had autonomy over their territories
- Made day-to-day decisions without Peshwa approval
- As long as they hit overall goals & sent revenue up
Why Different from Shivaji:
- Shivaji: Centralized, personal leadership
- Bajirao: Distributed, geography-forced decentralization
- Commanders thinking of personal wealth, not empire welfare
- Rajput vassal kings increasingly unhappy
The Structural Problem:
- Peshwa couldn't monitor everything (news took 1 month to arrive)
- Delegated power = less control
- Local commanders exploiting Rajput divisions
- Rajputs resented Maratha interference in succession
- Bad blood forming between natural allies
The Downside of Success
What Was Building:
- Mastani Precedent: Wives now demanding to accompany armies (logistical nightmare later)
- Rajasthan Alienation: Former allies becoming hostile
- Commander Feudalism: Shinde & Holkar becoming quasi-independent rulers
- Decentralization: No unified strategy, just local profit-seeking
- Overreach: Marathas now enemies of everyone (Rajputs, Mughals increasingly hostile)
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Peshwa | Undefeated but dying (dies 1740) |
| Mastani | Court dancer/wife | Rejected by society, not accepted |
| Samshir Bahadur | Bajirao-Mastani son | No inheritance rights |
| Ranoji Shinde | Northern commander | Competing with Holkar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Northern commander | Competing with Shinde |
| Sadat Khan | Mughal general | Falsely claims victory |
| Mir Bakshi | Mughal army chief | Defends Delhi |
| Muhammad Shah | Mughal Emperor | Frightened of Bajirao |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1736 | Marwa campaign, awarded subhedari |
| March 1737 | Battle with Mughal forces in Agra |
| March 28, 1737 | Demonstration at Delhi, 10 miles from Red Fort |
| 1740 | Bajirao dies |
| 1741 | British emissary visits Pune |
Critical Themes
1. The Double-Edged Victory
Success in Marwa meant expansion, but also entering Rajasthan politics. Took natural allies and turned them into rivals through manipulation and overreach.
2. The Mastani Foreshadowing
Her story established the pattern of wives following armies. Seemed romantic then; becomes a millstone 25 years later at Panipat.
3. Psychology Over Force
Demonstration at Delhi wasn't about conquest—it was about making a psychological point. Shows Bajirao understood warfare as much psychological as military.
4. The Delegation Trap
Autonomy to commanders worked when Bajirao was there. But with geographical distance and his early death, delegation became fragmentation.
5. The Decay of Governance
Shivaji prioritized governance + conquest. Bajirao prioritized conquest. By now, local welfare was secondary to commander profit-seeking.
Key Quotes
"So the women and families, they started insisting that they go with them" — Mastani effect on military operations
"Marathas are here to exploit our differences and swallow our kingdom" — Rajput sentiment
"Whatever truth the Emperor has understood we have to make sure that it is turned into a lie" — Bajirao to Chimaji before Delhi demonstration
"A gap of several miles between the armies, and he went through that" — The Delhi split maneuver
Where We Left Off: Bajirao's empire is at its height—vast, powerful, feared by Mughals, envied by Delhi courtiers. But cracks are forming. Rajput alienation is building. Commander egos are clashing. The centralized control is fragmenting. And Bajirao is dying. In just 3 years, he'll be gone. What emerges won't be the unified empire he built, but a federation of ambitious warlords. The seeds of Panipat are being planted right now.
Bajirao seemed invincible in 1737. Covered impossible distances, appeared at Delhi gates, frightened the Emperor. But success was deceiving. Mastani's presence seemed personal; it actually changed military logistics forever. Marwa expansion seemed brilliant; it actually made enemies of the Rajputs. Decentralization seemed efficient; it actually fragmented the empire. And his two northern commanders, Shinde and Holkar, who were supposed to be lieutenants? They were becoming independent rulers with conflicting interests. Bajirao could manage it because he was everywhere, doing everything. But he was dying. And when he died, nobody else could hold it all together.
Bajirao's Delhi Demonstration: Psychological Warfare Masterclass (March 28, 1737)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Setup: The False Victory Narrative
What Happened:
- Holkar (Bajirao's commander) clashed with Sadat Khan (Mughal general)
- Holkar's contingent was routed and retreated to Gwalior
- Sadat Khan claimed total victory over Bajirao
- Emperor awarded Sadat Khan massive tributes & honors
The Reality:
- Sadat Khan only defeated Holkar's secondary force
- NOT Bajirao's main army
- But framed it as defeating Bajirao himself
Why It Mattered:
- Bajirao's reputation was fearsome
- Any "victory" over him was a big deal
- Court assumed Bajirao was now weakened/defeated
The Psychological Counter-Strike
Bajirao's Goal:
- Not military conquest
- Transform false narrative back into truth
- Humiliate Sadat Khan
- Show Emperor: "You're vulnerable to me"
The Message to Chimaji (his brother):
"Whatever truth the Emperor has understood we have to make sure that it is turned into a lie"
Two Options:
- Attack Sadat Khan directly (revenge)
- Attack Delhi itself (psychological terror)
He Chose: Go straight to Delhi
The Impossible Speed
The Distance Problem:
- Gwalior to Delhi = 10-day journey
- Sadat Khan expected this
- Thought he had time to celebrate, reinforce Delhi
What Bajirao Did:
- Covered same distance in 2 days & 2 nights
- Constant cavalry movement
- Ate bread on horseback
- No stops, no rest
The Execution:
- Gap existed between Mir Bakshi's army (near Delhi) and Sadat Khan's army (south)
- Bajirao threaded the needle
- Appeared between them undetected
- Reached 10 miles from Red Fort before anyone realized
The Temple Demonstration
The Location:
- Kalka Devi Temple near Delhi
- Ram Navami festival happening (Rama's birthday celebration)
- Thousands of people gathered for fair/festival
What He Did:
- Created "havoc" at the temple premises
- Captured elephants & camels
- Looted shops at the fair
- "Generally created chaos"
Why:
- Wanted news to reach Emperor immediately
- Demonstration to masses = word spreads fast
- Message: "I'm here, I can do what I want"
Delhi's Complete Shock
The Cognitive Dissonance:
- Thought: Sadat Khan defeated Bajirao (far away)
- Reality: Bajirao is 10 miles away with army
- Main Mughal armies still 100+ miles south
- No home defense available
The Verification Process:
- Courtiers couldn't believe spies' reports
- Sent additional spies disguised as beggars to verify
- Needed confirmation Bajirao was really there
- "This can't be happening"
What the Spies Found:
- Captured Maratha soldier bags/provisions
- Found bread & vegetables (soldier rations)
- Expected to find weapons/secret plans
- Instead found lunch supplies
- Spy conclusion: "When daybreak comes, Marathas will attack Red Fort"
The Court's Terror
The Fear Spreads:
- Whole court "started shaking with fear"
- Realization: Bajirao could attack anytime
- Red Fort is vulnerable
- Their armies can't defend them (too far away)
The Worldview Collapse:
"This is uprooting their very worldview"
- Thought their forces were superior
- Thought Sadat Khan defeated Bajirao
- Now realizing: Bajirao can appear anywhere, anytime
- Nobody expected this speed
The Strategic Brilliance
Why He Didn't Attack:
- Direct attack = full war with Mughal Empire
- Bajirao's point: "I could attack if I want, but I'm showing restraint"
- Message > Conquest
- Goal achieved: Emperor knows he's vulnerable
What Was Communicated:
- "Your commanders are incompetent"
- "Your home is defenseless to me"
- "You need better relations with Marathas"
- "Don't underestimate Maratha speed & power"
The Psychological Victory:
- No blood spilled
- No conquest achieved
- But entire power structure shaken
- Forced Emperor to recalibrate
Key Factors That Made It Work
| Factor | Why It Mattered |
|---|---|
| Speed | Enemies couldn't react; element of surprise total |
| Timing | While celebrations happening; defenses down |
| Visibility | At public festival; news spreads organically |
| Minimalism | Didn't attack; showed restraint = confidence |
| Information War | False narratives got turned back around |
| Geography | Used gap between armies perfectly |
The Red Fort's Isolation
The Problem for Delhi:
- Sadat Khan celebrated victory far from the capital
- Mir Bakshi was also distant
- No coordinated defense at Red Fort
- Emperor surrounded by courtiers, not soldiers
Bajirao's Advantage:
- Knew this
- Exploited the gap
- Created time pressure (dawn attack threat)
- Forced panicked decisions
The Larger Game
This Wasn't About:
- Conquering Delhi
- Defeating armies
- Territory gain
This Was About:
- Demonstrating absolute superiority
- Psychological dominance
- Information control
- Making enemies doubt themselves
The Message to Mughal Court:
"I can reach your capital whenever I want. Sadat Khan's victory means nothing. You're vulnerable."
Strategic Implications
For the Emperor:
- Must rebuild relationship with Marathas
- Cannot rely on victory narratives
- Needs to understand Maratha capabilities
For Sadat Khan:
- His "victory" is exposed as fraud
- Lost all credibility
- Emperor now knows he can't trust Sadat Khan's reports
For Marathas:
- Demonstrated they're the real power
- Showed psychological superiority
- Proved speed > numbers
The Unspoken Rules of Engagement
What Bajirao Established:
- Marathas can go anywhere, anytime
- Mughal armies can't stop them
- Delhi is not safe from Maratha reach
- Information matters more than territory
- Psychological impact > military conquest
Critical Insight
Why This Was Masterful:
- Didn't need to win a battle
- Didn't need to conquer territory
- Just needed to demonstrate capability
- And he did it without firing a shot
- Against a superior-numbered enemy
- In 2 days instead of 10
"He did the unthinkable by reaching there in such a quick time"
Key Quotes
"Whatever truth the Emperor has understood we have to make sure that it is turned into a lie"
"He went through that and splitting them up the middle"
"The whole courtiers and the Delhi court, they just started shaking with fear"
"The unthinkable" — the repeated phrase for his achievement
"Basically did the unthinkable by reaching in there in such a quick time and splitting them up the middle"
Timeline of Events
| Action | Time |
|---|---|
| Battle with Sadat Khan | March 1737 |
| Sadat Khan claims victory | Few days after |
| Bajirao decides response | Immediately |
| Bajirao leaves Gwalior | ~March 26 |
| 2-day/night journey | March 26-27 |
| Arrives at Kalka Devi Temple | March 28, 1737 |
| Court hears news | March 28 evening |
| Verification spies sent | March 28-29 |
| Fear spreads through court | March 29-30 |
Where We Left Off: Bajirao has humiliated the Mughal court without firing a shot. He's demonstrated that speed, intelligence, and psychological dominance matter more than armies. He's shown the Emperor that "victory" narratives can be dismantled just as quickly as they're created. And most importantly, he's established that Marathas are now the real power in India—not just militarily, but strategically. The Mughal Empire's authority has been fundamentally challenged. And it all happened in 2 days.
Sadat Khan thought his false victory was real. Bajirao knew better. While the Mughal court celebrated, Bajirao covered a 10-day journey in 2 days, appeared 10 miles from the Red Fort, created havoc at a public temple during a festival, and vanished psychological terror throughout the court. No battles, no casualties, no conquest. Just pure strategic brilliance. The Emperor learned: his armies couldn't protect him. His commanders were incompetent. And Marathas could appear anywhere, anytime. That's how you win without fighting.
Bajirao's Tactics & The Nadir Shah Crisis (1739)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Bajirao's Warfare Strategy: Ganimikawa
The Principle:
"Attack enemies when they are resting, least expecting it"
The Legacy:
- Following Shivaji's tradition of surgical strikes
- Not fair fights or mutually agreed battles
- Surprise attacks = core doctrine
The Problem:
- Unlike Shivaji, Bajirao had no mountain forts to retreat to
- After attack, couldn't escape to fort safety
- Had to rely on speed & light cavalry instead
The Solution:
- Used fast moves & light cavalry
- Got tremendous success despite lack of fort refuge
- Never faced defeat in 20-year fighting career
- Maintained undefeated record through tactics, not just numbers
Why It Worked:
- Simple living (ate on horseback)
- Relationship with cavalry troops (camaraderie)
- Brother Chimaji Appa's support & loyalty
- This combination made him nearly invincible
Chimaji Appa: The Portuguese Removal
The Situation:
- Portuguese controlled northern Konkan (coastal region)
- Would have become "formidable force" if left unchecked
Chimaji's Action:
- Expelled Portuguese from Konkan
- Contained them to Goa only
- Prevented their expansion inland
The Irony:
- In gratitude (?), Portuguese gifted Mumbai island to British
- Strategic location given away
- Set up British foothold in India
Nadir Shah: The External Threat (1739)
Who He Was:
- Emperor of Persia/Iran
- Looking for wealth to fund his empire
His Attack:
- Attacked Delhi in 1739
- Wanted to seize wealth: diamonds, gold, precious stones
- No resistance—Mughals were "paper tigers"
The Fear in Deccan:
- Worried Nadir Shah might come south across Narmada
- Would threaten Maratha homeland (Deccan/Khan)
- Potential existential threat
Bajirao's Strategic Position: Waiting at Narmada
The Placement:
- Narmada River = imaginary line into Deccan
- Bajirao stationed there with army
- Monitoring for Persian threat
- No direct defense of Delhi ordered
The Reality Check:
"There was no understanding that Bajirao will defend Mughal Empire"
- No treaty between Marathas & Mughals on mutual defense
- Bajirao only cared about defending the Deccan
- Wasn't interested in defending Delhi itself
- His only interest: Keep threat south of Narmada
Why He Was There:
- Personal interest, not duty
- "If Nadir Shah comes to Delhi, maybe he comes to Khan"
- Prevention > response
Shahu's Geopolitical Philosophy
The Theory:
"Those inside India should band together against those outside"
The Thinking:
- Inside powers (Mughal, Maratha, Rajput, etc.) = insiders
- Outside powers (Nadir Shah, Abdali, etc.) = outsiders
- When outsider attacks = insiders unite
- When outside threat ends = go back to fighting each other
The Logic:
- Enemy of my enemy during crisis
- But temporary only
- Outsiders just want to loot, not govern
- Create no value, only destruction
Why It Mattered:
- Shahu told Bajirao: "Help Mughals if possible"
- Not because of love for Mughals
- But because looters from outside are worse for everyone
- Better Mughals (insiders) than Persians (outsiders)
Why Outside Powers Were Worse
Their Model:
- Loot as much as possible
- Return home with wealth
- No interest in governance
- No interest in development
Their Economics:
- Iran impoverished compared to India
- Needed resources to fund empire
- India = treasure chest to exploit
- Take what you can, leave chaos
The Mughal Reality:
- By 1739, Mughals were weak
- But still "insiders" in Indian system
- Still maintained some governance infrastructure
- Provided some stability (however fragile)
The Outside Threat:
- Would only extract & destroy
- Leave nothing behind
- Destabilize entire region
- Maratha interests = everyone's interests (for moment)
The Letter: Shahu's Strategic Message
What Shahu Wrote to Bajirao:
"When I was in house arrest in Aurangzeb's camp, I gave him word that if foreign power attacks Mughal Empire, we as Marathas will do whatever possible to support and defend"
The Historical Reference:
- Back during Shahu's captivity with Aurangzeb
- Made promise to Mughal emperor
- Now invoking that old commitment
The Instruction:
- Help Mughals however possible
- Not all-out war, just whatever support needed
- Defend against outside threat
The Flexibility:
- Bajirao interpreted this his way
- Stationed at Narmada (defensive, not aggressive)
- Monitored threat without direct engagement
- Maintained autonomy in how to respond
The 1739 Crisis Resolution
What Actually Happened:
- Nadir Shah attacked Delhi
- Came "all the way to Delhi"
- There was "no resistance" to him
- "Just a successful looting"
The Outcome:
- Mughals were pleading: "We'll give you X amount, just be satisfied"
- Nadir Shah basically took what he wanted
- Mughals couldn't stop him
- Bajirao stayed at Narmada (didn't intervene militarily)
Why Bajirao Didn't Go North:
- Wasn't ordered to
- Nadir Shah didn't cross Narmada
- His mission: Protect Deccan = accomplished
- Direct defense of Delhi wasn't his concern
The Strategic Outcome
For Marathas:
- Avoided direct conflict with Nadir Shah
- Protected home territory
- Established themselves as "insiders" (one side of Indians)
- Strengthened moral position
For Mughals:
- Got looted but not conquered
- Remained sovereign (barely)
- Understood Maratha could have helped more
For Nadir Shah:
- Got massive wealth to take back
- Satisfied his empire-funding needs
- Left before getting bogged down
For India:
- Persian invasion didn't penetrate south
- Maratha force acted as "shield"
- But also showed Mughal weakness
The Unspoken Hierarchy
Shahu's Implicit Message:
- Outsiders (Persian, Afghan) are permanent enemies
- Insiders (various Indian powers) are temporary competitors
- When outsider threat = use insiders to unite against it
- When outsider threat passes = go back to normal competition
- But outsiders should be contained, never allowed to dominate
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Peshwa | Stationed at Narmada, defensive posture |
| Chimaji Appa | Brother/Commander | Expelled Portuguese from Konkan |
| Shahu | King | Gave directive to help Mughals (if needed) |
| Nadir Shah | Persian Emperor | Attacked Delhi, looted, left |
| Muhammad Shah | Mughal Emperor | Pleaded for peace, gave treasure |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1720-1740 | Bajirao's 20-year undefeated career |
| ~1737 | Portuguese expelled from Konkan by Chimaji |
| 1739 | Nadir Shah attacks Delhi |
| 1739 | Bajirao stationed at Narmada (defensive) |
Critical Insights
1. Geography is Destiny
Narmada wasn't just a river—it was the boundary of Maratha interest. South of it = defend fiercely. North of it = not our problem (unless threat crosses it).
2. The Insider-Outsider Distinction
Shahu understood geopolitics: compete with insiders, unite against outsiders. This is sophisticated strategic thinking.
3. The Looting Model
Nadir Shah came, looted, left. No interest in governance. Marathas recognized this as inferior to even weak Mughal rule.
4. Defensive Positioning Works
Bajirao didn't need to defeat Nadir Shah. Just needed to position himself so Nadir Shah would avoid Deccan. Success without battle.
5. The Guerrilla Warrior Evolution
Bajirao adapted Shivaji's tactics (surprise, speed, mobility) to open plains warfare. Maintained undefeated record through tactical brilliance, not forts.
Key Quotes
"Attack enemies when they are resting, least expecting it"
"He never had to see any defeats in his 20-year fighting career"
"Portuguese were expelled from Konkan. Otherwise they would have been formidable force."
"Those who are inside India and those outside... when outsiders attack, insiders should band together"
"Their only idea was to loot. They didn't want any governance."
Where We Left Off: Bajirao's defensive positioning at Narmada shows his strategic thinking—not just tactical genius, but geopolitical understanding. Shahu's instruction to help Mughals against Nadir Shah reveals sophisticated insider-outsider thinking. The empire is managing multiple threats: Portuguese in Konkan, Persians from north, Mughals in middle, Rajputs in west. And Bajirao is handling it all from position of strength.
Bajirao never fought Nadir Shah. He didn't need to. He just positioned himself at Narmada and said: "Come south of this river, and I'll stop you." Nadir Shah went to Delhi instead, looted it, and went home. Bajirao protected the Deccan without firing a shot. That's strategic positioning. Shahu understood the bigger picture: outsiders are worse than insiders. Better weak Mughals you can compete with than strong Persians you can't negotiate with. Geography, positioning, and understanding your enemy's objectives—that's how you win before battles begin.
Shahu's Support for Bajirao & The Commander Conflict Crisis
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Bajirao: The Irreplaceable Pillar
Shahu's Perspective:
"Bajirao was the main supporting column of Maratha Empire"
The Reality:
- Bajirao was primary reason for expansion
- Shahu understood his critical importance
- Gave him maximum autonomy & resources
- Any reasonable request = approved
The Conservative vs. Pragmatic Split:
- Conservative Pune society: Opposed Mastani relationship
- Shahu: Pragmatic about Bajirao's private life
- Wrote to court secretary: "Don't make Bajirao unhappy"
- Message: Leave him alone about Mastani
The Consequence:
- Conservative elements ignored Shahu's order
- Separated Mastani from Bajirao anyway
- Bajirao "much aggrieved in his last months"
- Tension between ruler & ruled created
British Reconnaissance: 1741
The Visitor:
- British lawyer came to Pune after Portuguese defeat
- Wanted to know: What's Shahu's policy toward British?
- Portuguese had just been expelled from Vassal (south of Mumbai)
- British worried: "Will we get the same treatment?"
Captain Gordon's Report on Pune:
- "Well-built, well-developed city"
- "Most fertile land I've ever seen"
- Manufacturing: 13-inch cannons being produced locally
- Textile industry thriving
- Tax concessions for farmers = prosperity
Military Assessment:
- 40,000 standing army
- Can raise bigger forces if needed
- Bajirao maintains absolute secrecy about campaigns
- Even soldiers don't know destination until march
- Complete trust despite information blackout
- "Force to be reckoned with"
British Conclusion: Marathas are serious power. Better maintain good relations.
The Shinde-Holkar Problem: Roots of Conflict
The Setup:
- Ranoji Shinde & Malhar Rao Holkar: Two major northern commanders
- Both permanent stations in north (rarely came to Pune)
- Were supposed to work together, didn't
The Issues:
-
Economic Competition
- Both collect Chautai (1/4 taxes) from their zones
- If one gains territory = other loses revenue
- Zero-sum game created tension
-
Ego & Personal Animosity
- General personality conflicts
- Some degree of personal hatred
-
Succession Competition in Rajasthan
- When Rajput king died with multiple sons
- Shinde would support one son
- Holkar would support other son
- Both using Maratha forces to influence succession
Why Bajirao Couldn't Fix It:
- Happened toward end of his life
- Vested interests were "exactly opposite"
- No compromise possible
- Died 1740 before resolving
The Rajasthan Succession Problem
How the System Worked:
- Local Rajput kingdom: King dies, leaves 2+ sons
- Each son wants to be next king
- Shinde backs eldest; Holkar backs younger
- Marathas fight on both sides of same family
The Rajput Perception:
- Treated Marathas as kingmakers, not allies
- Felt like Marathas were exploiting internal disputes
- Resentment: "We'll handle succession ourselves"
- But too weak to resist: "You're too powerful"
The Bitterness:
- Rajputs saw Marathas as usurpers trying to take over
- Destroyed bond between Hindu brothers (Marathas & Rajputs)
- Turned natural allies into bitter enemies
- Rajputs: "Make money off us, then absorb our kingdom"
The Sangharaja Problem: Federation of Warlords
What Emerged:
- Empire became Sangharaja (literally: mixed/hybrid)
- Not centralized like Shivaji's
- But decentralized network of regional commanders
- Each had autonomy over assigned territories
- As long as: (1) Met quotas, (2) Sent revenue up, (3) Didn't rebel
Why the Change:
- Geographic distance too vast
- Peshwa couldn't be everywhere
- Information took month to reach Pune
- Commanders needed autonomy to act
The Downside:
- Commanders thought of personal wealth, not empire welfare
- "What will make me rich?" instead of "What helps Marathas?"
- Day-to-day governance was their responsibility alone
- No oversight or coordination
How It Differed from Shivaji:
- Shivaji: Centralized power in king, good governance priority
- Bajirao: Delegated power to commanders, expansion priority
- Shivaji: Personal leadership everywhere
- Bajirao: Mobile but couldn't manage decentralization chaos
The Structural Weakness
The Problem:
- Commanders in far-flung areas (north, Rajasthan)
- Based there permanently
- Reporting to Peshwa they saw once every 1-2 years
- De facto independent rulers despite nominal subordination
The Information Gap:
- News took month to reach Pune from north
- By then, damage done or situation changed
- Peshwa couldn't make real-time decisions
- Had to trust commanders' judgment
The Vested Interest Problem:
- Shinde & Holkar had exactly opposite interests
- Both wanted to expand their zones (= other's loss)
- Competing for same Rajasthan resources
- No natural cooperation incentive
The Lost Rajput Alliance
What Happened:
- Shivaji: Earned Rajput respect through martial courage & governance
- Bajirao: Lost Rajput respect through manipulation & extraction
- Hindu-Hindu relationship broken by greed & power play
The Resentment:
"Marathas want to exploit our differences and swallow our kingdom"
"You're kingmakers behind the scenes, deciding our succession"
"This is not your role, but we can't resist you"
The Strategic Loss:
- Lost potential allies
- Turned them into passive-hostile
- Could become active enemies if given chance
- Will matter at Panipat
The Three Root Causes Building
Already Identified (from this session):
- Mastani Precedent: Wives now follow armies (logistical problem)
- Rajasthan Alienation: Lost Rajput trust through interference
Now Adding: 3. Shinde-Holkar Split: Two northern commanders with opposite interests, unable to coordinate 4. Decentralization Chaos: Empire becoming federation of profit-seeking warlords 5. Information Breakdown: Peshwa can't control or even know what's happening in territories
The Governance vs. Expansion Trade-off
What Shivaji Prioritized:
- Good governance
- Citizen welfare
- Stable administration
- Balanced expansion
What Bajirao Prioritized:
- Rapid expansion
- Military victory
- Territory acquisition
- Delegated administration
The Cost:
- Vast empire, but shallow roots
- Many territories, but few loyal allies
- Military victories, but political enemies
- Expansion, but decentralization
Bajirao's Legacy (The Mixed Picture)
Positives:
- Expanded empire dramatically
- Defeated major enemies
- Created 40,000-person standing army
- Demonstrated military genius
- Made Marathas continental power
Negatives:
- Lost Rajput alliance
- Created commander rivalries
- Established decentralized system bound to fragment
- Set precedent (Mastani) that affected future operations
- Prioritized expansion over governance stability
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Peshwa | Dying (1740) |
| Shahu | King | Supportive but powerless |
| Ranoji Shinde | Northern commander | Competing with Holkar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Northern commander | Competing with Shinde |
| Mastani | Bajirao's wife | Separated by conservative society |
| British | Observers | Cautiously watching |
| Rajput Kings | Local rulers | Increasingly resentful |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1737 | Shinde-Holkar tensions begin |
| 1741 | British lawyer visits Pune |
| 1741 | Captain Gordon observes & reports |
| 1740 | Bajirao dies (before resolving conflicts) |
Critical Insights
1. The Decentralization Trap
Autonomy to commanders = expansion. But also = loss of control. Works great with one genius (Bajirao). Falls apart when he's gone.
2. The Information Lag
Month to get news from north = month too late to fix problems. Peshwa essentially flying blind.
3. The Rajput Mistake
By manipulating Rajput succession, Marathas created enemies from would-be allies. Short-term gain, long-term disaster.
4. The Mastani Precedent
Romantic story, but unintended consequence: wives following armies. Creates logistical nightmare 25 years later.
5. The Opposite Interests Problem
Shinde & Holkar couldn't be mediated because their interests are literally opposite. One's gain = other's loss. Built-in conflict.
Key Quote
"The bottom line was that Marathas were becoming powerful... But day to day decisions they had the freedom to decide what they wanted to do"
Where We Left Off: Bajirao is at his apex—feared by Mughals, observed by British, commanding 40,000 troops. But the structure underneath is cracking. Commanders are becoming autonomous warlords. Rajputs are turning hostile. Succession conflicts are brewing between Shinde & Holkar. And Bajirao is about to die. When he does, there won't be anyone strong enough to hold this decentralized empire together. The centrifugal forces will take over.
Bajirao built an empire on military genius, but forgot to build the infrastructure to hold it together. He delegated to commanders because he had to—geography was too vast. But he never solved the problem of what happens when those commanders have conflicting interests and he's not there to mediate. He died thinking he'd built something permanent. He'd actually built something fragile. Within years, it would start cracking. Within decades, it would collapse at Panipat.
Shinde-Holkar Split & The Sangha Rajya: Maratha Decentralization (1740)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Commander Problem: Shinde vs. Holkar
The Setup:
- Both commanders in north, managing different Rajasthan territories
- Competed for same resources & tax revenues
- Zero-sum game mentality: One's gain = other's loss
- Added personal egos & animosity on top
Why They Couldn't Cooperate:
- Both collected Chautai (1/4 taxes) from assigned zones
- Needed to pay armies from own revenue
- Competed for succession disputes in Rajput kingdoms
- Supported opposite sides of same families
- Vested interests "exactly opposite"
- Unmeditable by design
The Timeline:
- Started happening toward end of Bajirao I's life
- Bajirao was too busy/mobile to resolve
- Died 1740 before fixing it
- Problem inherited by successor
The Sangha Rajya: Federal Empire Model
What Emerged:
- Maratha Empire became Sangha Rajya (federation/union of kingdoms)
- Not centralized like Shivaji's
- Distributed command structure across territories
The American Parallel:
- Federal level: Peshwa in Pune (executive, warfare decisions)
- State level: Local commanders (territorial governance, revenue)
- When local issues = commanders decide
- When empire-wide threat = Peshwa mobilizes everything
Why This System Happened:
- Geographic distances too vast (north territories, south Deccan)
- Peshwa couldn't be everywhere like Bajirao was
- Communications took 1 month to reach north
- Commanders needed autonomy to act quickly
Shivaji vs. Bajirao: The Governance Trade-off
Shivaji's Model:
- Centralized authority
- Personal leadership everywhere
- Focus on good governance + conquest
- Exclusive Maratha army (no outsiders)
Bajirao's Model:
- Delegated authority to regional commanders
- Geographic distribution by necessity
- Focus on conquest over governance
- Inclusive army (Rajput contingents, local soldiers)
Why Inclusivity Became Necessary:
- Maratha soldiers didn't want to be far from homes for years
- Many were half-time farmers, needed to tend lands
- Could only recruit locally in far-flung areas
- Even later Peshwas hired Muslim & Arab soldiers on salary
- Never happened under Shivaji
Bajirao I's Financial Crisis
The Problem:
- Rapid expansion = needed money upfront
- Building governance infrastructure = time-consuming
- Bajirao was in hurry, couldn't wait
- Took on massive loans to fund campaigns
The Debt Trap:
- Loans carried over to next Peshwa
- Had to be repaid eventually
- Monetary side became "lopsided"
- Empire expanded territory but not wealth proportionally
The Irony:
- Military capability to conquer India
- But lacked financial capacity to fund it
- "If we had money, we could take everything"
- "But we don't have money"
Nana Sahib Peshwa: The Administrator (Third Peshwa)
Who He Was:
- Eldest son of Bajirao I
- Also called Baraji or Bajirao II (confusing naming)
- Appointed by Shahu after his father's death (1740)
His Character:
- NOT a warrior like his father
- Governance/administration man
- Good at planning, logistics, finance
- Based in Pune (unlike Bajirao who was constantly mobile)
His Achievements:
- Architect of modern Pune city
- Built temples on Parvati hill
- Set up museums
- Urban planning & development
- But: Had to fund ongoing wars while doing this
His Challenge:
- Inherited massive debts from father
- Wars happening everywhere (north, east, west)
- Had to fund them all from Pune
- Basically broke all the time
The TB Disease: Nana Sahib's Metaphor for Debt
The Problem:
- Nana Sahib called the debt problem "TB" (tuberculosis)
- Like a disease slowly weakening the body
- Gradually destroying empire from inside
- If not solved: slow death
Why This Metaphor:
- TB doesn't kill instantly
- Weakens gradually until system collapses
- Exactly like debt: Empire keeps functioning but getting weaker
- Eventually leads to total failure
The Solution:
- Had to pressure commanders for tributes & revenue
- Demanded more & more money
- Commanders had to extract more from their territories
- Created cycle of exploitation
The Root Cause Problem Identified
The Third Root Cause (Previously two identified):
Mastani precedent(wives follow armies)Rajasthan alienation(lost natural allies)- NOW: The Debt/Funding Problem
What Marathas Couldn't Do:
- Generate sufficient tax revenue
- Build stable financial infrastructure
- Keep expansion funded without loans
- Pay armies sustainably
The Ambition-vs-Resources Gap:
- Military: Could conquer anything
- Financial: Couldn't sustain expansion
- Confidence: "We can take India"
- Reality: "We can't afford it"
Chimaji Appa: The Quick Exit
The Tragedy:
- Bajirao I died: 1740
- Chimaji Appa (brother) died: 1741 (within a year)
- Both pillars of military success gone
- Nana Sahib lost his uncle's support immediately
The Succession & Legitimacy Question
Why Nana Sahib Was Chosen:
- Shahu wanted to reward Bajirao I's loyalty
- Decided to make it hereditary (not explicitly said, but de facto)
- Peshwa position now stays in the family
After Shahu's Death (1749):
- Shahu had no heir to succeed him
- Or heir was ignored/not recognized
- No one to appoint new Peshwa
- So: Nana Sahib just continued (status quo remained)
- Peshwa position became "whole and sole"
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Peshwa | Died 1740 |
| Chimaji Appa | Military support | Died 1741 |
| Nana Sahib | 3rd Peshwa | Administrator, governor-builder |
| Shahu | King | Died 1749 |
| Ranoji Shinde | Northern commander | Competing with Holkar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Northern commander | Competing with Shinde |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1740 | Bajirao I dies |
| 1740 | Nana Sahib becomes 3rd Peshwa |
| 1741 | Chimaji Appa dies |
| 1741-1759 | Nana Sahib's 19-year reign |
| 1749 | Shahu dies (no clear successor) |
Critical Insights
1. The Governance Problem
Rapid expansion without governance infrastructure = debt crisis. You need to build administrative capacity before you expand further.
2. The Delegation Trap (Extended)
Decentralized commanders work when Peshwa has money to delegate AND when commanders' interests are aligned. Neither was true now.
3. The Financial System Failure
Marathas had military genius but zero financial sophistication. Empire expanded in territory but not in wealth generation.
4. The TB Metaphor's Accuracy
Debt works exactly like disease—invisible from outside, but slowly eating away at strength. Marathas looking powerful while getting weaker.
5. The Legitimacy Question
After Shahu's death, no one questioned Nana Sahib's rule. Precedent + capability = acceptance. De facto dynastic rule established.
Key Quotes
"Marathas became more like a union of kingdoms with some freedom given to individual commanders"
"Peshwa in Pune couldn't send them money... do whatever it takes, maintain your army"
"They had to think about what's in their own interest... only worried about how to sustain themselves"
"The TB disease: gradually weakening until collapse if not solved"
Where We Left Off: Bajirao I's expansion has left the empire in debt. Nana Sahib inherits not just the empire, but the financial crisis. He's an administrator, not a warrior, so he stays in Pune trying to manage finances while commanders in the field do wars. Shahu dies in 1749, removing the last check on Peshwa power. But also removing clarity on succession. Nana Sahib just continues. The empire is now 100% dependent on Peshwa family ability to hold it together financially.
Bajirao I built an empire but didn't build the financial infrastructure to sustain it. Nana Sahib inherited the expansion and the debt. He tried to govern well, build Pune into a great city, and manage finances. But there was never enough money. The empire kept growing, expenses kept growing, and he kept borrowing. Meanwhile, commanders in the north were fighting each other over resources. And Shahu died with no clear heir, so Nana Sahib became the de facto ruler. Good administrator, but bad timing. He had all the responsibility and none of the money.
Nana Sahib Peshwa's Reign: Maratha Continental Dominance (1740-1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Transition: Warrior to Administrator
Bajirao I's Death (1740):
- Sudden, short illness
- Died in his prime (age 40)
- Never lost a battle in 20 years
- Left massive debts
Nana Sahib Takes Over:
- Shahu appoints Bajirao's eldest son
- Also called "Baraji" or "Nana Sahib Peshwa"
- Third Peshwa overall (after Balaji Vishwanath, Bajirao I)
- Different style from father
His Character:
- Administrator, NOT warrior
- Skilled in governance, planning, finance
- Based in Pune (unlike mobile Bajirao)
- Architect of Pune city (temples, planning, development)
- Prefers planning to fighting
The Impossible Inheritance
What He Got:
- Massive empire (too large to control personally)
- Massive debts (inherited from father)
- Wars ongoing everywhere (north, east, south, west)
- Commanders competing with each other
- Shahu still alive, still nominally sovereign (until 1749)
The Impossible Math:
- Wars need funding
- Revenue collection takes time
- Can't wait for normal tax collection
- Must use loans, tributes, extraction
- Debt cycle spirals
The 19-Year Expansion: 1740-1759
The Geographic Reach:
- West to East: Attaq (Afghanistan border) to Bengal
- North to South: Dwaab (between Ganga-Yamuna) to Deccan
- Literally from Indian subcontinent's edges
The Numbers:
- First 19 years of his reign
- Maratha armies went "everywhere"
- No organized resistance (Mughals confined to Delhi)
- Expanded 7-8 times beyond Bajirao I's extent
The Coverage:
- "Deshvyapi" = All over the nation
- Not one province anymore
- Pune became capital of all-India empire
- Literally every direction from Pune
The Comparison:
- Shivaji's time: Limited to nearby areas
- Nana Sahib's time: Everywhere
- Completely different scale of operation
The "Star Position" Quote
Local Legend:
"His star positions were in good place during his reign"
The Reality:
- Nana Sahib was good administrator
- But he wasn't fighting battles himself
- Commanders-in-chief did the actual fighting
- He stayed in Pune, managed logistics & money
The Irony:
- Expanded more than Bajirao I
- But through better organization, not personal heroics
- Had professional military families to handle campaigns
- He was the strategist, they were the executors
The Victory Record
Almost Undefeated:
- Victorious every year of his reign
- Except the very last year
- (This foreshadows Panipat, which happens in last year)
How It Worked:
- He appointed "commander-in-chief within Peshwa family"
- Family had people interested in military glory
- They went on campaigns, he stayed in Pune
- Coordinated strategy from capital
- Prevented losing wars through better planning
Shahu's Death (1749)
The Succession Crisis:
- Shahu dies with no recognized heir
- Or had heir that nobody cared about
- No one to appoint new Peshwa
- No sovereign left to make decisions
The Result:
- Nana Sahib just continued
- Status quo maintained by inertia
- No one questioned it
- Became de facto rule
From Sovereign to De Facto Ruler
Before (With Shahu):
- Peshwa nominally prime minister
- Shahu nominally sovereign
- Peshwa checks in on major decisions
- Some balance of power
After (Without Shahu):
- Peshwa became "whole and sole"
- Decision-maker with no oversight
- No sovereign to object
- Everyone knew he was the real king
- But he never claimed the title
The Clever Arrangement:
- Peshwa always acted like "prime minister"
- Never declared himself "king"
- But everyone obeyed his orders
- Established precedent for succession (father to son)
- People got used to hereditary Peshwa rule
The Power Structure That Emerged
Visible:
- No sovereign (after Shahu)
- Peshwa claimed to be administrator
- Maintained fiction of subordinate role
Actual:
- Peshwa made all decisions
- No one objected
- Succession passed father to son to son
- Completely hereditary despite claims
Why It Worked:
- Nana Sahib was competent administrator
- Kept empire expanding
- Kept funding flowing (barely)
- No competitor arose to challenge him
- Generals in family cooperated reasonably well
The Maratha Military Machine
What Existed Now:
- 40,000+ standing army
- Thousands in reserves
- Commanders throughout subcontinent
- Professional military families
- Well-organized logistics
The Fear Factor:
- "No one to stop them"
- "Just taking over whole subcontinent"
- Mughal armies "totally ineffective"
- "Limited only to Delhi"
- Mughal Empire "in pathetic shape"
The Reality:
- Marathas were military superpower
- But financially unsustainable
- Living on loans & tributes
- Growing weaker financially while expanding militarily
The Paradox
Military: Never been stronger
- Defeated every opponent
- Expanded to continental scale
- 19 years of victories
- 7-8x larger than at Bajirao's death
Financial: Never been worse
- Debt spiral from Bajirao's loans
- Can't generate enough revenue
- Extraction creating resentment
- System unsustainable long-term
Political: Unstable despite appearances
- Shahu gone (no legitimacy anchor)
- Commander rivalries unresolved (Shinde/Holkar)
- De facto rule without de jure authority
- Hereditary succession not yet tested
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Sahib | 3rd Peshwa | Administrator, expansionist |
| Shahu | King | Dies 1749 |
| Maratha Commanders | Military families | Carry out campaigns |
| Mughal Emperor | Figurehead | Confined to Delhi |
| Shinde & Holkar | Northern commanders | Still competing |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1740 | Nana Sahib becomes Peshwa |
| 1740-1759 | 19-year expansion period |
| 1749 | Shahu dies |
| 1761 | Battle of Panipat (Maratha defeat) |
Geographic Expansion
From Narmada north:
- To Attaq (Afghanistan/Pakistan border)
- Through Delhi area (contested)
- Into Doab (between Ganga-Yamuna rivers)
- Through Bengal
From Deccan north:
- Maharatra core
- Through Rajasthan
- Into north-central plains
- Everywhere
Critical Insights
1. The Competent Successor Paradox
Nana Sahib was MORE competent administrator than Bajirao I. But the empire needed Bajirao I's military genius, not administrative skill. Wrong man for wrong time.
2. Centralization Through Legitimacy Loss
Losing Shahu meant losing legitimacy anchor, but GAINING centralization. No sovereign to check Peshwa = Peshwa could do anything. More power but less legitimate.
3. Expansion Masking Weakness
Every year more territory conquered = looks like getting stronger. Actually getting weaker financially. Classic empire-in-decline pattern.
4. The Command Structure That Works
Having military family members as "commanders-in-chief" while Peshwa manages from Pune = good coordination. Better than Bajirao's constant movement.
5. The Financial Illusion
Expanding 7-8x while debt spiraling = mathematical impossibility. Something has to give. And it will: At Panipat, money won't be there to pay armies.
Key Quotes
"During his 19 years, Maratha armies were going everywhere"
"No one to stop them. Just taking over whole subcontinent"
"Mughal armies were totally ineffective in resisting this"
"He had a lot to do with that organization and statesmanship"
Where We Left Off: Nana Sahib's reign (1740-1759) is the apex of Maratha expansion. Armies everywhere, no serious opposition, continuous victories. But financially unsustainable, militarily dependent on scattered commanders who don't cooperate, politically delegitimized (no sovereign). The empire is vast but fragile. And the last year of his reign ends badly. It's 1759—Panipat is just 2 years away. The cracks are about to widen.
Nana Sahib was a better administrator than his father, and the empire expanded farther than ever. But expansion without financial foundation is just empire on borrowed time. He conquered like a tiger and managed like a banker, but the banker didn't have enough money. Shahu died and suddenly Nana Sahib was de facto king but couldn't claim the title. And in the north, Shinde and Holkar were still competing. And at Panipat, everything would collapse. The last year of his reign would be the worst. He'd win every battle except the one that mattered.
Nadir Shah's Threats & The 1747 Letter to Delhi
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Bajirao I at Narmada: The Defensive Stance
The Situation (1739):
- Nadir Shah attacked Delhi, looted massively
- Wealth of Delhi was astonishing (even to Afghans)
- Question: Why didn't Bajirao defend Delhi?
The Answer:
- No treaty between Marathas & Mughals
- No obligation to defend Delhi
- Bajirao only cared about defending Deccan
- Stationed at Narmada River (southern boundary)
The Logic:
- "If Nadir Shah comes south of Narmada, I'll stop him"
- "But Delhi is not my concern"
- Strategic boundary defense, not empire-wide defense
- Worked: Nadir Shah never crossed Narmada
- Got too rich looting Delhi to pursue further
Iran's Motivation: Poverty & Empire
Why Nadir Shah Attacked India:
- Iran was relatively impoverished
- Needed resources to build empire
- Neighboring lands had wealth
- India = treasure chest
The Economics:
- Agriculture in Iran = limited taxes
- Not enough to fund ambitious empire
- Afghan territories even worse (wasteland)
- India = known wealth, known resources
- Simple solution: Go take it
Ahmad Shah Abdali: The Observer Who Learned
Who He Was:
- Afghan serving in Nadir Shah's army
- Watched 1739 Delhi looting
- Saw unprecedented wealth being carted away
- Understood the lesson: India = infinite looting opportunity
His Learning:
- "This is how much wealth, and they only took partial"
- "There's way more untouched"
- "When I'm free, I'll come back to this"
- Planned future invasions even while serving Nadir Shah
Nadir Shah's Paranoia & Death
What Happened After Looting:
- Nadir Shah became paranoid back in Iran
- Thought everyone was plotting against him
- Tortured own citizens without cause
- Created atmosphere of fear
The Result:
- Commanders got scared
- Thought: "We might be tortured next"
- Decided: Eliminate Nadir Shah
- Assassinated in 1747 (8 years after Delhi looting)
The Consequence:
- Ahmad Shah Abdali suddenly freed
- No longer bound to Nadir Shah's army
- Could return to Afghanistan
- Could pursue his India plans
Nadir Shah's 1747 Letter to Muhammad Shah
The Context:
- Written 8 years after 1739 looting
- Nadir Shah still thinking about India
The Message:
"It has been 8-9 years since I last came to India" "You are not able to defend your empire from outside forces" "You are still weak" "Even now, you can start protecting your empire" "If you need my help, I am ready"
The Threat:
- Implied: "People like me are waiting to raid you"
- "When will you protect yourself?"
- "Better defend now before it's too late"
- Semi-mocking tone about Mughal weakness
The Strategic Message:
- Delhi remains vulnerable
- No effective defense system
- Mughal Empire is paper tiger
- Raiders (like Nadir Shah) will keep coming
- You should prepare, or I will come again
The Real Problem: Mughal Weakness
What Nadir Shah Understood:
- Mughals weren't recovering
- Getting weaker, not stronger
- No army could stop raiders
- Essentially undefendable
The Warning Was Accurate:
- Delhi would be attacked again (by Abdali)
- Muhammad Shah couldn't defend it
- Mughal position was terminal
- Just matter of time until next raid
Ahmad Shah Abdali's Timeline to Power
1739: Watches Delhi looting, learns the lesson
1747: Nadir Shah assassinated, Abdali freed
Next decades: Builds Afghan kingdom, plans return to India
Later: Will become major threat to Marathas
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Maratha Peshwa | At Narmada, defensive |
| Nadir Shah | Persian Emperor | Looting Delhi |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan officer | Learning from Nadir, planning future |
| Muhammad Shah | Mughal Emperor | Vulnerable, warned |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir Shah loots Delhi |
| 1739 | Abdali sees wealth, plans return |
| 1747 | Nadir Shah assassinated |
| 1747 | Letter to Muhammad Shah |
| ~1747 | Abdali leaves Iran, returns to Afghanistan |
| Next phase | Abdali builds Afghan kingdom |
| Much later | Abdali invades India again |
Critical Insights
1. Boundary Defense Strategy
Bajirao at Narmada = perfect defensive positioning. Doesn't need to defend all of India, just his boundary. Works perfectly when enemy doesn't cross it.
2. The Predator's Learning
Abdali watched and learned. Information more valuable than loot in this case. One looting trip = template for future invasions.
3. The Warning Ignored
Nadir Shah was warning Muhammad Shah about future threats. Muhammad Shah couldn't do anything about it. Mughal Empire was terminal—no recovery possible.
4. Paranoia & Assassination
Nadir Shah's paranoia in Iran = what caused his assassination. Created threat that freed Abdali to pursue own ambitions.
5. The Cycle Continues
Pattern: Loot → Learn → Plan → Return. Abdali saw what Nadir did and thought: "I can do this too, and better, and repeatedly."
Key Quotes
"If Nadir Shah comes down south of Narmada, I will protect it. But I have no business defending Delhi."
"Ahmad Shah Abdali understood how much wealth there was to be gained by attacking India"
"It has been 8-9 years since I last came to India. You are not able to defend your empire."
"People like me are waiting to raid you. When will you protect yourself?"
Where We Left Off: Bajirao has strategically positioned at Narmada to protect Deccan. Nadir Shah looted Delhi but didn't go further south. Ahmad Shah Abdali learned the lesson and started planning. Nadir Shah's letter warned Muhammad Shah (but too late for him to do anything). 8 years later, Nadir Shah is dead, Abdali is free, and a new threat is forming. The Marathas and Afghans will eventually collide. And it will happen at Panipat.
Nadir Shah's 1747 letter was basically saying: "Your empire is weak. Raiders will keep coming. Better protect yourself." Muhammad Shah got the message but couldn't do anything about it. His armies were weak, his treasury was empty, his confidence was gone. Within 14 years, Abdali would attack and Marathas would fight him at Panipat. But that letter was the warning: Delhi is vulnerable, and predators know it.
Nadir Shah's Delhi Loot & Paranoia: Seeds of Abdali's Future (1739-1747)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The 1739 Looting: Delhi as Piggy Bank
What Nadir Shah Found:
- Unprecedented wealth in Delhi
- Courtiers had gold, silver, diamonds hidden in houses
- Royal treasury overflowing
- Temples with donated precious metals
- Mughal royalty's accumulated treasure
The Problem for Looting:
- Emperor offered: "Take 50 million, just don't go further"
- But Nadir Shah realized: If 50 million is on offer, there's way more
- Decided: "Why take 50 when I can take everything?"
- Went all the way to Red Fort
- Looted imperial treasury completely
The Extraction Process:
- Soldiers went house to house
- Demanded: "Tell us where your treasure is"
- Tortured people who refused
- Dug into walls, foundations
- Extracted everything
The Transport Problem:
- Loot so massive needed:
- Hundreds of horses & elephants
- Camels, bullock carts
- Miles-long caravans
- Took weeks to transport back to Iran
- Required massive logistical operation
Ahmad Shah Abdali: The Observer
Who He Was:
- Afghan officer in Nadir Shah's army
- Probably achieved some rank/position
- Impressed Nadir Shah progressively:
- Started: Private revenue collection
- Promoted: Army positions
- Rising: Getting better roles
His Observation:
- Watched entire Delhi looting operation
- Saw unprecedented wealth being extracted
- Even Nadir Shah was amazed at the quantity
- Realized: "There's even MORE wealth untouched"
- "If one looting gets this much, future ones could too"
The Learning:
"He appreciated how much wealth there was to be gained by attacking India"
- Not just loot once, but understand the pattern
- India = renewable treasury
- Can come back again and again
- Wealth regenerates between raids
- Business model: Periodic invasions
The Mental Decision:
- While serving Nadir Shah
- Already planning: "I will come back"
- "I will do what Nadir did"
- "Afghanistan needs this wealth to develop"
- Mental commitment formed during 1739
Nadir Shah's Paranoia: The Downward Spiral
What Happened in Iran:
- After Delhi success, Nadir Shah became paranoid
- Thought people were plotting against him
- Became "mentally affected" (possibly schizophrenic episodes)
- Had "visions" of conspiracies
The Victims:
- Tortured own citizens constantly
- Based on imaginary plots
- No evidence, just suspicion
- "Somebody might be against me"
- Solution: Torture them
Even Family:
- Suspected own son of plotting
- Tortured him
- Eventually killed his own son
- Because of paranoid delusion
The Effect on Army:
- Commanders extremely scared
- Never knew if they'd be tortured next
- No safety, no predictability
- Created atmosphere of terror
- "We could be next"
The Assassination: Mercy Killing
The Setup:
- Nadir Shah called Ahmad Shah Abdali to his tent
- Said: "Protect me from conspirators"
- Asked Abdali to arrest certain officers
- Then news leaked that Abdali got this assignment
The Plotters' Reaction:
- Officers realized: They're under gun now
- Thought: "If we don't act, we'll be tortured"
- Decided: Kill Nadir Shah before being arrested
- "This is the only way to stay alive"
The Assassination:
- 57-70 soldiers decided to attack Nadir Shah's tent
- But most got scared and turned back
- Only 2 soldiers actually went through: Sahil Khan, Mohammad Khan
- Nadir Shah tried to fight back with sword
- Tripped on rope in darkness, fell down
- Sahil Khan cut off his hand
- Mohammad Khan beheaded him
- Dead immediately
The Irony:
- Man who created fear got killed by fear
- Man who tortured got tortured in his mind into assassination
- His paranoia created the conspiracy he feared
- Self-fulfilling prophecy
Ahmad Shah Abdali: Freed & Returning
What Changed:
- Nadir Shah gone = Abdali no longer bound
- Was kind of "bonded" to Nadir's service
- Couldn't just leave (contract/loyalty obligations)
- Now: Free agent
His Priorities:
- Not interested in staying in Iran
- Originally Afghan, not Persian
- Iran was "foreign country"
- Wanted to go back to Afghanistan
- Return to roots
Building an Afghan Kingdom:
- Went back to Afghanistan
- Created own small kingdom
- But knew: Afghanistan is extremely poor
- No agriculture developed
- No resources
- Basically wasteland
- "Just dirt"
The Financial Need:
- To develop Afghanistan = needed money
- Afghanistan had nothing: Zero resources
- Where to get development funds?
- India = The answer
- Knew exactly where: Delhi & surrounding territories
The Legend: Nadir's Prediction
The Story:
- Allegedly, Nadir Shah predicted Abdali would become great
- Made prophecy by cutting Abdali's nostril with knife
- Said: "This will remind you when you become great that I predicted it"
- Abdali carried this mark (disfigured nostril) for life
Historical Accuracy:
- Uncertain if true or false
- But: Shows Nadir Shah recognized Abdali's talent
- And: Abdali was indeed great general (later proved)
- The scar became symbolic of his rise
Ahmad Shah Abdali: The Rising Power
His Character:
- Great military mind
- Talented general
- Ambitious
- Strategic thinker
His Next Steps:
- Built Afghan kingdom 1747-onward
- Created military force
- Planned India invasions
- Will clash with Marathas
- Will lead to Panipat
The Strategic Pattern: Nadir → Abdali
What Nadir Demonstrated:
- India has massive wealth
- Delhi especially rich
- Mughals can't defend
- Can extract enormous treasure
- Worth multiple campaigns
What Abdali Learned:
- Same observations
- Added: Can do this repeatedly
- Build stable kingdom on Indian wealth
- Periodic raids = sustainable model
- Afghanistan will be funded by India
The Future:
- Abdali will invade multiple times
- Each time learning more
- Will become major threat to Marathas
- Will finally face them at Panipat (1761)
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Nadir Shah | Persian Emperor | Loots Delhi, then assassinated |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan officer | Learns lesson, plans return |
| Sahil Khan & Mohammad Khan | Assassins | Kill Nadir Shah |
| Muhammad Shah | Mughal Emperor | Victim of looting |
| Delhi Courtiers | Wealthy residents | Looted, tortured |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir Shah loots Delhi |
| 1739 | Abdali observes, learns, plans |
| 1739-1747 | Nadir Shah becomes paranoid |
| 1747 | Assassination plot forms |
| 1747 | Nadir Shah assassinated |
| 1747+ | Abdali returns to Afghanistan |
| 1747+ | Abdali builds kingdom |
| 1761 | Abdali vs. Marathas at Panipat |
Geographic Context
Delhi: The piggy bank Iran: Nadir Shah's home, where paranoia developed Afghanistan: Abdali's home, where he'll build kingdom from Indian wealth
Critical Insights
1. The Predator's Education
One successful raid = blueprint for future raids. Abdali didn't invent the strategy; he just copied and refined Nadir's model.
2. Information > Individual Loot
For Abdali, seeing the logistics and wealth location more valuable than the loot itself. He learned WHERE and HOW to attack.
3. Paranoia Creates Conspiracy
Nadir Shah's fear = what killed him. The torture he inflicted created actual enemies. His paranoia became prophecy.
4. The Afghan Need
Afghanistan is poor by geography/nature. Needs external wealth to develop. India is natural source. Abdali understood this early.
5. The Cycle Continues
Pattern: Nadir looted → Abdali watched → Nadir died → Abdali planned → Abdali invaded. Marathas would face this threat next.
Key Quotes
"He appreciated how much wealth there was to be gained by attacking India"
"Afghanistan is extremely poor, basically wasteland. Nothing developed."
"He had never seen so much wealth"
"This will remind you when you become great that I predicted it" — Nadir's prediction about Abdali
"They will be tortured if we don't kill him. This is the only way to stay alive."
The Nostril Scar
The Marking:
- Whether true or symbolic
- Represents Nadir's recognition of Abdali's greatness
- Symbolizes the prophecy of rise
- Physical reminder of connection to Nadir's court
The Irony:
- Mark came from man who tortured him
- Mark reminded him of Nadir's foresight
- Mark connected him to Delhi wealth discovery
- Mark = tie to his empire-building
Where We Left Off: Nadir Shah looted Delhi but didn't survive to capitalize on it. His paranoia led to his assassination in 1747. Ahmad Shah Abdali, who watched the entire operation, learned the lesson and freed himself. He returned to Afghanistan and started building a kingdom. He knew exactly where to get the money to develop it: India. He would become the next major threat to Marathas. And within 14 years (1761), he'd invade India and clash with Marathas at Panipat.
Nadir Shah came to loot and succeeded beyond imagination. But success didn't make him happy—it made him paranoid. He thought everybody was plotting, tortured everyone, and created real enemies from imaginary ones. Two soldiers killed him for it. Abdali watched the whole thing: the looting, the paranoia, the assassination. He learned: India is the answer to Afghanistan's poverty. And he planned to do it better than Nadir did. Not just once, but repeatedly, systematically. He'd be back. And Marathas would meet him at Panipat.
Ahmad Shah Abdali's Rise: From Assassination to Afghan Unification (1747)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Nadir Shah's Assassination: The Final Night
The Setup:
- Nadir Shah had called Ahmad Shah Abdali to his tent
- Asked him to protect him from plotters
- News leaked that Abdali got this assignment
The Assassination:
- 57-70 soldiers decided to attack Nadir Shah's tent
- Most got scared and turned back (feared him too much)
- Only 2 soldiers went through: Sahil Khan & Mohammad Khan
- Nadir Shah tried to fight with sword
- Tripped on rope in darkness, fell down
- Sahil Khan cut off his hand
- Mohammad Khan beheaded him
- Dead immediately
The Irony:
- Man who created fear through torture = killed by fear
- His paranoia created the actual conspiracy he feared
- Self-fulfilling prophecy
Abdali's Escape: The Kohinoor Capture
The Morning After:
- Early morning, Abdali reached Nadir Shah's tent
- Found the dead body
- Nadir's Iranian army busy looting treasury
The Discovery:
- Abdali alone in tent when he inspected Shah's clothes
- Found Kohinoor diamond in possessions
- Found royal seals/stamps
- These had been taken from India originally
- Now in Nadir Shah's hands = now in Abdali's hands
The Escape:
- Got out of Nadir's military encampment
- Took his 4,000 Afghan army with him
- Left with the Kohinoor
The Collapse:
- Within a day: Nadir's treasury was gone
- Military camp in complete disorder
- Transformed from organization → chaos
- Abdali had basically dissolved the power structure
Abdali's Age & Experience
His Status:
- Only 25 years old at this moment
- But had been in Nadir Shah's army for 10 years
- Battle-hardened, experienced commander
- Expert knowledge in warfare
Afghanistan's Political Situation
The Context:
- Afghanistan NOT independent at this time
- Divided between Persian & Mughal control:
- Kabul: Under Mughal control
- Kandahar: Under Persian control
- Both cities shared; no separate Afghan identity
The Reality:
- Afghanistan was essentially vassal territories
- No separate "Afghanistan" as nation
- Part of larger Persian/Mughal sphere
- Extremely poor, underdeveloped region
The Opportunity:
- With Nadir Shah dead and Persia destabilized
- Afghanistan could potentially unify
- Abdali saw the opportunity
- Had military experience to lead
The Ambition: Building an Afghan Kingdom
Abdali's Plan:
- Return to Afghanistan (his home)
- Establish own independent kingdom
- Unify the fragmented territories
The Financial Need:
- Afghanistan is extremely poor (wasteland)
- "Nothing developed there, zero resources"
- Can't build kingdom without money
- Knew exactly where to get it: India
- Observed Nadir's looting: understood the model
The Loya Jirga: Afghan Tribal Assembly
The Problem:
- Afghanistan divided into many tribes
- Each tribe had own headman/leader
- Tribes fought each other constantly
- No unified leadership
The Solution:
- Loya Jirga = Assembly of tribal chiefs
- Idea: Select one unified leader
- End tribal fighting, create united front
- Common goal: Build independent Afghan kingdom
The Process:
- Assembly convened with all tribal leaders
- Discussion lasted 9 days
- Every tribe wanted their headman to be chief
- No consensus could be reached
- All competing for leadership
The Election: Divine Intervention
The Breakthrough:
- One tribal leader stood up on day 9
- Made a speech pointing to Ahmad Shah Abdali
- Said (approximately):
"Allah has sent Ahmad Khan who is superior to all of you" "Why are you making these pointless discussions?"
The Instant Resolution:
- All assembled leaders showed approval
- Ahmad Shah Abdali elected unanimously
- Became unified leader of all tribes
- Based on military credentials, not tribal politics
Why He Was Chosen:
- Military experience (10 years under Nadir)
- Young but battle-hardened
- Had already escaped with 4,000 troops
- Had proven leadership ability
- Not tied to any single tribe (could be neutral)
The Predictions: Multiple Prophecies
Nizam ul Mulk's Prediction (1739):
- During Nadir Shah's 1739 Delhi invasion
- Nizam ul Mulk (same guy defeated by Bajirao I) in Delhi
- Saw Ahmad Shah Abdali among Nadir's commanders
- Said: "This young man has royal aura"
- Predicted he would become great leader
Why Nizam Could Tell:
- Had ability to "read faces" (Mukhasamudrik)
- Could sense leadership qualities from appearance
- Told Nadir Shah about Abdali's potential
Nadir Shah's Reaction:
- Trusted Nizam ul Mulk's judgment
- Believed in his forecasting abilities
- Cut Abdali's ear lobes with dagger
- Said: "When you become emperor, you'll think of me"
- (Note: Some sources say nostrils, others say ear lobes - unclear which)
Three Days Before Assassination:
- Someone else told Abdali same thing
- "You are destined to be emperor"
- Another prophecy fulfilled
- Multiple people seeing his destiny
Nizam ul Mulk's Background
Who He Was:
- Same Nizam defeated by Bajirao I at Palkhed
- Had cannons = heavy, slow, strategic liability
- Bajirao forced him to abandon cannons
- Surrounded him, cut off water & food
- Made him sign humiliating treaty
His Later Career:
- Returned to Delhi after Palkhed defeat
- Became important courtier in Delhi court
- Witnessed Nadir Shah's 1739 looting
- Saw destruction and waste
- Understood Mughal weakness
His Assessment:
- Realized Mughal court was "paper tiger"
- Eventually established own kingdom in Hyderabad
- Said he'd be loyal to Mughals BUT independent
- Foreshadowing broader pattern of Mughal collapse
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan commander | Elected tribal leader, age 25 |
| Nadir Shah | Persian emperor | Assassinated, dead |
| Sahil Khan & Mohammad Khan | Assassins | Killed Nadir Shah |
| Nizam ul Mulk | Hyderabad ruler | Predicted Abdali's rise |
| Tribal chiefs | Afghan leaders | United under Abdali |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir loots Delhi, Abdali observes |
| 1739 | Nizam predicts Abdali's greatness |
| 1747 | Nadir Shah assassinated |
| 1747 | Abdali escapes with Kohinoor, 4,000 troops |
| 1747 | Loya Jirga assembles |
| 1747 | Abdali elected unified leader |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Delhi: Where Nadir looted and Nizam saw Abdali
- Afghanistan: Tribal territories, now unified
- Kabul: Mughal-controlled part of Afghanistan
- Kandahar: Persian-controlled part of Afghanistan
- Iran: Nadir's empire, now destabilized
Critical Insights
1. The Opportune Moment
Nadir's assassination created power vacuum. Abdali was right place, right time, with right experience. Seized opportunity instantly.
2. Tribal Unification
Nine days of impasse → one speech → unanimous election. Abdali's military credentials + neutrality solved tribal problem.
3. The Prophecies as Foreshadowing
Multiple people predicting Abdali's rise suggests genuine charisma/capability recognition. Not just luck but recognized talent.
4. The Kohinoor Symbol
Abdali capturing Kohinoor = symbolic capture of India's wealth. Not just military symbol but economic statement.
5. The Geographic Advantage
Afghanistan suddenly independent with unified leader, 4,000 troops, and Kohinoor. Ready to pursue Nadir's model: raid India for wealth.
Key Quotes
"Allah has sent Ahmad Khan who is superior to all of you. Why are you making these pointless discussions?"
"This young man has royal aura... has royal symbols or royal future ahead of him"
"When you become emperor, you will think of me" — Nadir's prediction while cutting Abdali
"Ahmad Shah Abdali was noticed for his leadership abilities... maturing as a battle-hardened commander"
The Connection to Marathas
What Comes Next:
- Abdali will use Afghanistan as base
- Will invade India repeatedly
- Will clash with Marathas over control of subcontinent
- Will eventually meet Marathas at Panipat (1761)
- Nizam ul Mulk's prediction = Abdali becomes major threat
Where We Left Off: Ahmad Shah Abdali has unified Afghanistan, captured the Kohinoor, and established himself as independent ruler at age 25. With 4,000 troops and the knowledge of India's wealth (from observing Nadir), he's ready to execute his own invasion plan. Marathas don't know it yet, but their next major enemy has just been born from the ashes of Nadir Shah's paranoia.
Nadir Shah came to loot India and did. But his paranoia created enemies who killed him. Abdali watched it all: the looting method, the wealth location, the power collapse. When Nadir died, Abdali escaped with 4,000 troops and the Kohinoor diamond. Nine days later, he's elected by tribal assembly to lead unified Afghanistan. At 25, with military experience and a master plan (raid India periodically like Nadir did), he's ready to start building his empire. Marathas are at their peak. They don't know what's coming. A young Afghan is about to change everything.
Satara Succession Crisis: Tara Rani's Chaos & Peshwa's Rise (1749+)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Shahu's Death: The Power Vacuum
The Crisis:
- Shahu died in 1749
- No clear successor to throne
- Question: Who inherits sovereignty?
- Entire Maratha politics thrown into chaos
The Instability:
- Before: Shahu = sovereign anchor, Peshwa = administrator
- After: No sovereign = no legitimacy source
- Power structure collapses
- Multiple factions compete for control
Tara Rani: The Queen's Power Play
Who She Was:
- Queen/widow of Maratha royal family
- Wanted power for herself
- Had been imprisoned earlier (she imprisoned someone herself)
- Ruthless, manipulative
Her Actions:
- Started causing chaos in Satara court
- Tried to undermine existing power structure
- Used political manipulation to gain leverage
- Called in military allies to enforce her will
Her Power Grab Method:
- Got someone appointed as successor (Ramraja?)
- But wanted to control him
- Wanted the levers of power to stay with her
- Expected him to be puppet
Ramraja: The Unwilling Puppet
The Setup:
- Tara Rani got Ramraja made successor/nominal ruler
- Expected him to be controllable
- Expected to keep real power
What Happened:
- Ramraja decided to keep truth to himself
- Decided to actually hold power
- Didn't want to be puppet
- Refused to surrender authority to Tara Rani
The Result:
- Betrayed Tara Rani's expectations
- Created internal conflict
- Royal court in chaos
- Satara palace became center of dysfunction
The Instability: Nana Sahib's Response
Nana Sahib's Attempt:
- Tried to stabilize situation
- Stayed in Satara for 7 months
- Attempted to sort things out
- Tried to create order from chaos
Why It Failed:
- Too much dysfunction
- Factions too entrenched
- Tara Rani refusing to yield
- Ramraja refusing to submit
- Couldn't be fixed
Nana Sahib's Decision:
- Realized staying in Satara ineffective
- Decided to shift power elsewhere
- Eventually led to Peshwa supremacy
- Satara became irrelevant
Tara Rani's Military Adventure
The Call to Arms:
- Called upon Damaji Gaikwad (commander in Gujarat)
- Asked him to attack Pune
- Used him as tool against Peshwa/Nana Sahib
Damaji's Response:
- Was deputed in Gujarat (western region)
- Came when called by Tara Rani
- Believed she was rightful sovereign
- Brought army toward Pune
The Attack:
- Damaji's forces attacked Pune
- Defeated Peshwa contingent in Khandesh (east of Pune)
- Threatened Shanwarwada (royal palace)
- Palace vulnerable (big walls but no real fortification)
- Peshwa family forced to flee
The Escape:
- Peshwa family fled Pune
- Went to Simhagad (safer location)
- Left Satara exposed
- Made vulnerable to takeover
Sadashiv Rao Bahu: The Disciplinarian Commander
Who He Was:
- Military commander under Peshwa
- Disciplinarian, not politician
- Strict, rule-based, uncompromising
- Would later be key figure at Panipat
His Character:
- Believed in order, discipline, hierarchy
- Not good at compromise
- Not good at politics/negotiation
- Good at military execution
- Poor at alliance-building
His Role:
- Took control of Karnataka (southern region)
- Asserted Peshwa authority there
- Forced accountability to Pune
- Created "feeling that boss is in Pune"
- Prevented local commanders from becoming independent
Nana Sahib's View:
- Disappointed with Bahu's harsh methods
- Understood they needed flexibility sometimes
- But Bahu was inflexible
- Didn't understand compromise
- Created friction despite shared goals
The Conflict: Karnataka Consolidation
The Issue:
- Local Karnataka commander trying to become independent
- Wanted to create his own subhedari (territory)
- Wanted autonomy from Pune control
Bahu's Solution:
- Took control away from him
- Reasserted Peshwa authority
- Made clear: "Boss sits in Pune"
- No tolerance for autonomy
The Problem:
- Effective militarily
- But harsh politically
- Alienated local commanders
- Created resentment
The Power Shift: From Sovereign to Peshwa
What Was Happening:
- Shahu's death removed sovereign legitimacy
- Tara Rani couldn't maintain authority
- Ramraja was weak/disputed
- Peshwa became de facto power
The Transition:
- Nana Sahib wasn't officially sovereign
- But made all real decisions
- Commanders looked to him, not Satara
- Satara became powerless figment
The Recognition:
- Damaji Gaikwad didn't realize shift yet
- Still believed Tara Rani was sovereign
- Followed her orders (attacked Peshwa)
- Made mistake of backing wrong side
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Shahu | Sovereign | Dead (1749) |
| Tara Rani | Queen | Power-grabbing, losing |
| Ramraja | Nominal successor | Refusing to be puppet |
| Nana Sahib | Peshwa | Becoming de facto ruler |
| Damaji Gaikwad | Commander (Gujarat) | Backed wrong side |
| Sadashiv Rao Bahu | Commander | Disciplinarian, harsh |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1749 | Shahu dies |
| 1749+ | Tara Rani's chaos begins |
| 1749+ | Ramraja refuses to be puppet |
| ~1750 | Nana Sahib tries to stabilize (7 months) |
| ~1750 | Damaji attacks Pune |
| ~1750 | Peshwa family flees to Simhagad |
| ~1750+ | Sadashiv Rao Bahu consolidates Karnataka |
Critical Insights
1. The Sovereign Vacuum
Without Shahu, no legitimacy anchor. Tara Rani tried to fill role but lacked gravitas. Peshwa filled vacuum by default.
2. Misreading Power Shift
Damaji & others still believed Tara Rani was sovereign. Didn't realize power had already shifted to Peshwa. Made strategic mistake based on outdated assumptions.
3. The Disciplinarian Problem
Sadashiv Rao Bahu was effective militarily but politically incompetent. Couldn't build alliances. Just enforced hierarchy. Good for Peshwa, bad for empire at large.
4. The Satara Collapse
Satara went from seat of power to irrelevant. Tara Rani unable to govern. Ramraja too weak. Place become afterthought while real power consolidated in Pune.
5. The Transition Period
Empire unstable for crucial years. Internal fighting while external threat (Abdali) was rising. Bad timing for civil war.
Key Quotes
"She wanted to take away the power from Nana Sahib"
"Tara Rani didn't understand politics of India. She was sitting in a small town with no clue about statesmanship."
"Nana Sahib is going to basically take over the default sovereign position"
"Satara will have zero importance. Nobody will give importance to any so-called sovereign."
The Larger Context
What Was Happening Simultaneously:
- Abdali unifying Afghanistan
- Marathas in civil war with themselves
- Nizam consolidating south
- Rajputs still alienated
- British watching opportunities
The Bad Timing:
- Internal chaos when external threats rising
- Weakened leadership when strong needed
- Disciplinarian commander (Bahu) when diplomat needed
- No coherent strategy while enemies preparing
Where We Left Off: Shahu's death created power vacuum. Tara Rani tried to grab power but failed. Ramraja refused to be puppet. Nana Sahib emerged as de facto ruler by simple fact that nobody else could manage the chaos. But it took months of internal fighting. Meanwhile, Abdali was unifying Afghanistan. Marathas at their territorial peak but politically fragmented. The stage was being set for Panipat disaster—external threat rising while internal divisions deepening.
When Shahu died, everyone expected Tara Rani to take over. But she was out of her depth. Ramraja didn't want to be controlled. So Nana Sahib just took over because nobody else could. For 7 months he tried to fix things in Satara but couldn't. Damaji attacked Pune thinking he was protecting the queen, not realizing power had already shifted to Pune. Everyone was confused about who was actually in charge. And while they fought each other, Abdali was getting ready. Bad timing doesn't cover it.
Nana Sahib & Sadashiv Rao Bhau: The Pre-Panipat Tension (1750s)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Cousin Relationship: Tension & Trust
Who They Were:
- Nana Sahib Peshwa (3rd Peshwa, in charge)
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau (cousin, military commander)
- Both fathers were brothers (direct cousins, not uncle-nephew)
The Problem:
- Nana Sahib feared Bhau as potential competitor
- Wife Gopika Bhai may have fueled suspicion
- Bhau could have been Peshwa himself (same family line)
- Nana Sahib wanted his own son to inherit, not Bhau
The Threat Dynamics:
- Bhau "got too brash"
- One-sided actions made Nana Sahib unhappy
- Bhau may have threatened to go to Kolhapur & become Peshwa there
- But Nana Sahib appointed him commander-in-chief anyway (strategic move)
The Resolution:
- Given Bhau responsibilities & autonomy
- Made him second-in-command
- But kept close watch through son Vishwas Rao
Panipat Preparation: The Strategic Setup
The Decision:
- Martial north campaign seemed like "given" victory
- Confidence: "No two ways about it, we will win"
- Control entire India seemed possible after victory
The Problem:
- If Bhau gets credit for huge victory = threat to Nana's son's future
- Solution: Send Vishwas Rao (19 years old) with Bhau
- Vishwas = "sovereign representative"
The Clever Arrangement:
- Bhau = actual military commander-in-chief
- Vishwas = nominal sovereign authority figure
- Bhau had to consult Vishwas on decisions
- Vishwas had no military experience, just symbolic role
How It Worked:
- Bhau would brief Vishwas 5 minutes before formal meeting
- Vishwas would propose same decision in meeting
- "Perfect harmony" between them despite the setup
- No actual tension (Vishwas trusted & respected Bhau)
Vishwas's Testimony:
- Wrote letters to father from battlefield
- Praised Bhau: "You will not get a brother like Bhau"
- "Bhau is loyal and will serve you"
- "Forget about any backstabbing"
- Completely defended Bhau's character
The Satara Crisis: Tara Rani's Ambitions
The Situation:
- Ram Raja (adopted heir) back in Satara
- Tara Rani demanded he accept her as surrogate authority
- He refused
- She imprisoned him
- Removed him from line of succession
The Family Problem:
- Ram Raja had 2-3 wives (strategic alliances)
- Married into powerful Maratha families
- Families upset their daughters lost status
- Now married to nobody (inmate, no succession)
Nana Sahib's Dilemma:
- Couldn't get involved in royal family politics
- Either side had problems for him
- Decided to stay away from Satara issues
The Karnataka Campaign
Why Now:
- Nizam vulnerable (succession chaos with Charles de Bushy)
- French hired general Bushy put new Nizam (Salabat Jang) on throne
- Weak moment to attack
Who Went:
- Nana Sahib himself (unusual for him)
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Shinde & Holkar couldn't come (stuck in Rajasthan succession politics)
The Risk:
- Left Pune & Satara unprotected
- Hoped situation would stay calm
Tara Rani Strikes: The Political Bomb
What She Did:
- Got ambitious while Peshwa was away
- Invited prominent Maratha commander to Satara
- Plan: Get rid of Peshwa, put herself in charge
The Executor:
- Damaji Gaikwad (based in Gujarat)
- Called by Tara Rani to attack Peshwa
- Attacked one Peshwa contingent in Khandesh
- Defeated them
The Attack on Pune:
- Damaji came to Pune itself
- Shanwarwada (Peshwa palace) NOT defensible
- "Grand bungalow" with walls, but no moat
- Can be taken by cannons
- Not meant as hardcore fort
The Escape:
- Peshwa family fled to Shivagad Fort
- Nearest secure location
- Took everything to safety
The Result
For Peshwa:
- Can't go to Karnataka now
- Must deal with home crisis
- Damaji continues toward Satara
- Will meet Peshwa's loyal commanders
For Empire:
- Fratricidal war (Maratha vs. Maratha)
- Commander gets involved in Satara politics
- Tara Rani makes dangerous move
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Sahib Peshwa | Ruler | In Karnataka, forced to return |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander-in-chief | At Panipat campaign |
| Vishwas Rao | Peshwa's son | Nominal leader of Panipat |
| Tara Rani | Queen Mother | Ambitious, starts chaos |
| Ram Raja | Adopted heir | Imprisoned by Tara Rani |
| Damaji Gaikwad | Gujarat commander | Called by Tara Rani, attacks |
| Gopika Bhai | Nana's wife | May have fueled Bhau suspicion |
Timeline
| Event | When |
|---|---|
| Bhau made commander-in-chief | ~1750 |
| Vishwas Rao going to Panipat | ~1760 |
| Karnataka campaign starts | ~1760 |
| Tara Rani chaos in Satara | ~1760 |
| Damaji's rebellion | ~1760 |
Critical Insights
1. The Arranged Military Leadership
Genius move by Nana Sahib: Put Bhau in charge militarily, Vishwas nominally in charge sovereignly. Gives Bhau real power, Vishwas gets credit, Nana controls both.
2. Perfect Harmony Despite Political Setup
Most political setups like this fail. Bhau & Vishwas actually trusted & respected each other. No backstabbing despite suspicious setup.
3. The Tara Rani Wildcard
Nobody expected Tara Rani to move. She'd been sidelined for 10+ years. Now she sees vulnerability & strikes.
4. The Damaji Problem
Damaji responds to Tara Rani's call. Shows commanders still think Satara sovereign = real power. Peshwa hasn't fully established de facto rule.
5. The Wrong Time for Crisis
Nana Sahib going to Karnataka at same moment Tara Rani moves. Bad timing. Had to abandon campaign to handle home crisis.
Key Quotes
"You will not get a brother like Bhau" — Vishwas Rao about Bhau in letters home
"Perfect harmony between them" — Description of Vishwas & Bhau relationship
"This is given, we are going to win" — Maratha confidence about Panipat before campaign
"Shanwarwada is not meant to be a hardcore defensible position"
Where We Left Off: Nana Sahib sent his son Vishwas Rao with Bhau to fight in the north (Panipat). While they're gone, Tara Rani strikes at home, sending Damaji Gaikwad to attack. Peshwa family flees to Shivagad. Crisis on the home front just as Panipat war is starting. The timing is catastrophic.
Nana Sahib wanted Bhau's military genius but feared his ambition. So he put Bhau in charge with his son nominally in charge. Clever political move. But it worked only because Bhau & Vishwas actually trusted each other. Meanwhile, Tara Rani saw the Peshwa was gone and struck. Damaji came to attack. By the time Nana Sahib realized the home front was on fire, he couldn't get back in time. The empire was split between two battles: Panipat in the north, Satara crisis in the south. And Panipat would be lost.
Damaji Gaikwad's Rebellion & Peshwa's Power Consolidation (1750)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Rebellion: Damaji's Internal War
The Trigger:
- Tara Rani called Damaji Gaikwad from Gujarat
- Damaji was deputed there as commander
- She said: Attack Pune (implied: for me as sovereign)
- Damaji believed Tara Rani was rightful sovereign
Damaji's Force:
- Commander in chief of Maratha forces in Gujarat
- Had entire Gujarat territory under control
- Brought army toward Pune
- Defeated one Peshwa contingent in Khandesh (east of Pune)
Why He Thought He Was Right:
- Followed orders of Tara Rani (believed sovereign)
- Didn't realize power had shifted to Peshwa
- Thought he was serving legitimate royal authority
- Made catastrophic strategic mistake
The Problem: Fratricidal War
The Nature:
- Not civil war with external enemy
- Maratha vs. Maratha
- Damaji Gaikwad = Maratha commander
- Peshwa = Maratha administrator
- Both same faction, now fighting each other
The Cost:
- Weakened unified Maratha force
- Divided military resources
- Took attention away from external threats
- Exactly wrong time for internal fighting
Nana Sahib's Response: The Counterattack
The Situation:
- Nana Sahib in Karnataka fighting Nizam
- Heard about Damaji's rebellion
- Had to abandon Karnataka campaign
- Had to return north to handle internal crisis
The Negotiations:
- Was dealing with Nizam succession issue
- Paid 17 lakh rupees to settle Nizam problem quickly
- Essentially bought his way out of south
- Freed up forces to go north
The Return:
- Crossed 400 kilometers back to Pune/Satara
- Marched north with forces
- Defeated Damaji's army near Venna River
- Two Peshwa commanders (Purandare, Pethi) helped defend
The Military Victory
The Confrontation:
- Damaji wanted to go toward Satara from Pune
- Met Peshwa commanders who obstructed him
- Battle at Venna River
- Damaji defeated
The Political Opportunity:
- Damaji was major commander (important figure)
- Nana Sahib didn't kill him outright
- Instead: Invited him for negotiations
- Used diplomacy, not just military victory
The Political Genius: The Negotiation
Damaji's Position:
- Realized he'd backed wrong side
- Realized Peshwa was actually in control
- But still had leverage (was commander in chief)
- Had family network, regional support
Nana Sahib's Offer:
- Negotiations instead of execution
- Message: "You made mistake, but you're Maratha"
- Offered: Reinstatement with conditions
- Offered: Half of Gujarat territory (instead of full)
- Demanded: Acknowledgment of Peshwa authority
The Arrest & Release:
- When Damaji didn't comply initially, arrested him
- Held him at Lohogat Fort
- Kept his relatives arrested too
- Leverage: "Agree to my terms = release everyone"
The Final Deal:
- Damaji agreed to Peshwa being "rightful minister/wazir"
- Acknowledged Peshwa superiority
- In exchange: Released, given half of Gujarat
- Previously he had full Gujarat
- Lost half but kept enough to maintain status
The Difference: Damaji vs. Yashwantrao Dabhade
Damaji Gaikwad:
- Commander under Dabhade
- Admitted mistake, agreed to terms
- Got: Half of Gujarat back, reinstatement
- Accepted subordination to Peshwa
Yashwantrao Dabhade:
- Commander in Chief (superior position)
- Orchestrated the rebellion
- Didn't admit mistake
- Demanded continued autonomy
Nana Sahib's Response:
- Dabhade: Punished severely, lost everything
- Higher position = higher responsibility
- Shouldn't have followed Tara Rani's narrative
- No mercy for Senapati (army chief)
The Message:
- Junior commanders who admit mistakes = forgiven
- Senior commanders who rebel = destroyed
- Clear hierarchy being established
- No tolerance for insubordination from top
The Crucial Problem: Lack of Legitimacy
Nana Sahib's Weakness:
- Had all the power
- But not sovereign legitimacy
- Wasn't the "king"
- Peshwa was still nominally subordinate
Damaji & Dabhade's Belief:
- Still thought Tara Rani was sovereign
- Believed she had legitimacy
- Didn't realize power had shifted
- Followed "sovereign's" orders (wrong)
The Result:
- Nana Sahib could enforce his will
- But couldn't claim divine/traditional authority
- Had to use force, not just legitimacy
- Had to destroy anyone who defied him
The Transition: Eighth Ministers to Peshwa Supremacy
The Historical Context:
- Ashta Pradhan Mantar = Eight Ministers Council (Shivaji's system)
- All eight ministers equal, reported to sovereign
- Peshwa was just one of eight
- Sovereign (king) was the center
What Changed:
- After Shahu: No sovereign with authority
- Peshwa became center of gravity
- New commanders appointed by Peshwa
- Reported to Peshwa, not to sovereign
- All officials answered to Peshwa directly
The Power Shift:
- Eight Ministers Council became nameplate only
- Nobody cared about it anymore
- Power rested entirely with Peshwa
- Peshwa had his own officials reporting to him
- System inverted: Peshwa at center, not sovereign
The Gradual Process:
- Started when Shahu died (1749)
- Accelerated during Damaji crisis
- Fully consolidated when Damaji capitulated
- By end of this period: Peshwa = absolute authority
- Satara = irrelevant
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Sahib Peshwa | De facto ruler | Consolidating power |
| Damaji Gaikwad | Commander (Gujarat) | Defeated, accepted subordination |
| Yashwantrao Dabhade | Commander in Chief | Defeated, destroyed |
| Tara Rani | Satara queen | Authority exposed as false |
| Peshwa commanders | Purandare, Pethi | Defended Peshwa authority |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1749 | Shahu dies |
| ~1750 | Damaji attacks under Tara Rani's orders |
| ~1750 | Nana Sahib negotiates with Nizam (17 lakh rupees) |
| ~1750 | Peshwa returns, defeats Damaji at Venna |
| ~1750 | Damaji arrested, negotiations |
| ~1750+ | Damaji agrees to terms, accepts half Gujarat |
| ~1750+ | Dabhade destroyed completely |
Critical Insights
1. The Legitimacy Problem
Nana Sahib had power but no legitimacy. Could enforce will through force but couldn't claim rightful authority. Dangerous position: Can't defend rule philosophically.
2. The Hierarchy Clear
Damaji (junior) forgiven when he admitted mistake. Dabhade (senior) destroyed for same mistake. Clear message: Accept hierarchy or be eliminated.
3. The System Inversion
Eight Ministers = equal council under sovereign. Now: All officials under Peshwa. Peshwa = center, not Satara. Complete power structure reversed.
4. The Timing Problem
Spent weeks/months fighting internal rebellion while Abdali building Afghanistan. Couldn't afford this distraction at this critical moment.
5. The Sovereignty Question
Even after consolidating power, Peshwa never claimed sovereignty. Maintained legal fiction that Satara was still relevant. But everyone knew truth: Peshwa = absolute power.
Key Quotes
"Damaji didn't realize power had shifted to Peshwa. He followed the sovereign's orders—wrong sovereign."
"He was higher up in responsible position—shouldn't have behaved this way. You're done with."
"For namesake, the Eighth Prime Ministerial Council remained absent"
"Power rested with Peshwa and he had his own officials reporting directly to him"
"Satara will have zero importance. Nobody will give importance to any so-called sovereign."
The Larger Implications
What This Consolidation Meant:
- Peshwa = de facto absolute ruler
- Satara = ceremonial figuration
- All commanders answered to Pune, not Satara
- No more sovereign veto on Peshwa decisions
- Administrative efficiency increased, but legitimacy lost
The Problem at Panipat:
- Peshwa had power but no legitimacy foundation
- Soldiers fought for Maratha cause, not for Peshwa personally
- When defeat came, no rallying around sovereign or religion
- Just defeat of administrative entity
Where We Left Off: Nana Sahib has consolidated Peshwa power. Damaji learned the cost of backing wrong side but kept half his territory (mercy). Dabhade lost everything (severity). Ashta Pradhan Mantar system is dead—Peshwa is supreme. Satara is officially irrelevant. The empire is unified under Peshwa rule. But it's unified through force, not legitimacy. And Abdali is ready. The collision is approaching.
Damaji made a choice: he followed the queen, not realizing the king was already dead and his successor was the Peshwa. He lost half his territory for that mistake. Dabhade made the same choice from a higher position—he lost everything. The message was clear: Peshwa is in charge now, and everyone better understand it. The Eighth Ministers were obsolete. The sovereign was irrelevant. Pune ruled, not Satara. And just when everyone finally accepted that unified structure? Abdali was coming. The timing couldn't have been worse.
Power Shift from Satara to Pune: The Rise of the Peshwa (1749+)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Collapse of Satara Sovereignty
The Institutional Shift:
- After Shahu's death, the sovereign position lost its power anchor
- Tara Rani was unable to maintain control as queen/regent
- Ramraja (the successor) refused to be a puppet ruler
- This created a vacuum that the Peshwa filled by default
Why the Sovereign Failed:
- Tara Rani and Ramraja lacked governance training
- Neither understood administration, statecraft, or warfare
- They were unprepared to handle actual decision-making
- The Peshwa became indispensable by simple necessity
The Peshwa Takes Power
What Actually Happened:
- The Peshwa didn't seize power—he inherited it by default
- Satara became ceremonially irrelevant while Pune became the actual seat of power
- Nana Sahib was too busy stabilizing Satara affairs to properly develop northern strategy
- Eventually realized staying in Satara was futile and shifted focus to expanding Peshwa authority
The Key Quote (Napoleon on power transfer):
"The Prime Minister did not take away the crown from somebody's head, but he picked it up from the dust"
The Sovereignty Transfer Mechanics
Before Shahu's death:
- Peshwa = nominally subordinate administrator
- Shahu = sovereign with legitimacy and approval power
- Power structure had balance
After Shahu's death:
- Peshwa became "whole and sole" decision-maker
- No sovereign left to object or approve
- Everyone looked to the Peshwa instead of Satara
- System became hereditary (father to son succession established precedent)
British Observations: Why They Stayed Out of Western India
The Strategic Reality:
- British expanded easily in Bengal (east) and Madras (south)
- Unopposed expansion was possible there
- But in western/central India: Maratha/Peshwa blocked them
- If Tara Rani had retained power instead of Peshwa, British would have expanded west too
Historical Consequence:
- Peshwa's consolidation of power actually kept British contained to coasts
- This bought time but eventually weakened as Marathas fragmented
The End of the Gosle Dynasty
The Final Transition:
- With Ram Raja's imprisonment, the Gosle family rule ended completely
- Balaji Vishwanath (first Peshwa) came to power because he solved internal crises
- The Peshwas were Chitpavan Brahmins, not Kshatriya/warrior class like Shivaji
- New era began: Brahmin administrative rule replacing warrior king rule
Key Context from History
Balaji Vishwanath's Rise:
- Came to power by helping Shahu against Tara Rani's challenge
- Picked up power from the "gutter" when royal family was dysfunctional
- Established that competent administrators could rule without royal birth
The Chitpavan Brahmin Era:
- Origins: From Kokan region (coastal strip with limited resources)
- Migrated inland to Desh (fertile central plateau) seeking opportunity
- Became administrators and strategists rather than warriors
- By Nana Sahib's time (1740-1759): Had consolidated complete power
Critical Shifts
1. Sovereignty Without Legitimacy
Peshwa had all power but lacked the hereditary legitimacy of the sovereign. Created tension: de facto king, de jure PM.
2. Institutional Collapse
When Shahu died, the institution of sovereignty collapsed faster than expected because no one could replace him effectively.
3. Class Transition
Power shifted from Kshatriya (warrior class) to Brahmin (administrative class). Different values, priorities, methods.
4. Decentralization Opportunity
Peshwa had to manage an empire too vast to control personally—commanders in north, south, west developed independence. Created future fragmentation.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1749 | Shahu dies, no effective successor |
| 1749+ | Tara Rani fails to consolidate power |
| ~1750 | Nana Sahib abandons Satara, focuses on Pune |
| Historical precedent | Balaji Vishwanath's earlier rise (early 1700s) |
| End result | Peshwa becomes hereditary ruler in all but name |
Key Insights
Why Satara Failed:
- Institutional power without governance competence doesn't survive
- Ramraja's refusal to be controlled blocked Tara Rani's plan
- No one else strong enough to unify the empire under Satara's name
Why Peshwa Succeeded:
- Nana Sahib was administratively competent
- Had existing Peshwa infrastructure and loyalty
- Succession looked legitimate (son following father pattern)
- No viable competitor for the role
The British Element:
- Peshwa's consolidation paradoxically strengthened Maratha resistance to British
- But it also centralized all power in one person's hands—fragile long-term
Where We Left Off: The Peshwa has consolidated de facto authority but hasn't yet faced major external threats during this transition. The structure works as long as Nana Sahib lives and maintains competence. The fragmentation risks are building but not yet visible.
The crown fell into the gutter when Shahu died. No one else could pick it up except the Peshwa. He didn't steal it—he just happened to be standing there when it landed. And because he was competent enough to use it, everyone accepted it. Balaji Vishwanath showed earlier that an administrator-Brahmin could rule if he solved the royal family's problems. Now Nana Sahib proved it could be hereditary. But it meant the Peshwa carried all the responsibility with none of the legitimacy of a real king. And when things went wrong, there'd be no sovereign to blame—just the Peshwa.
The Wazir-Rohila War & Afghan Migration to North India
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Rohila Identity: Afghan Soldiers of Fortune
Who Were the Rohilas?
- Afghan-origin soldiers and able-bodied people seeking opportunity
- Not rebels, but economic migrants—"soldiers of fortune"
- Fled Afghanistan due to persecution by Nadir Shah or seeking better prospects
- India offered wealth, fertile land, agriculture, and opportunities unavailable at home
Migration Waves:
- After 1707: New wave of Afghan migration into India
- After Nadir Shah's persecution (1730s-40s): Larger exodus
- Settled primarily in Rohilkhand region (between Ganga and Himalayas)
- Region named Rohilkhand after them—name stuck even after they were gone
The Rohila Military Machine
The Numbers:
- ~40,000 strong fighting force by 1740s
- Disciplined, cohesive fighters
- Showed no mercy to enemies or captured prisoners
- Reputation: Formidable, organized, deadly
Why They Were Effective:
- First-generation immigrants with military backgrounds
- Experience from Afghanistan's tribal conflicts
- Unified tribal bonds (especially among Yusufzai clan members)
- Religious unity (Sunni Islam) created internal cohesion
Rohila Politics: The Afghan Lobby
Their Strategic Goal:
- Establish Afghan hegemony in Mughal court and army
- Were essentially a "fifth column" for Afghan interests
- Worked with Ahmed Khan Bangash and other Afghan chiefs
- Tribal bond stronger than anything else (Afghan identity > personal loyalty)
Their Problem:
- Marathas (Hindu) were gaining power in Mughal Delhi court
- Concerned this would undermine Muslim character of empire
- Couldn't defeat Marathas alone—needed outside help
- Allied with Ahmed Khan Abdali (Afghan external power)
Key Rohila Figures
Ahmed Khan Bangash:
- Chief of Farukhabad
- Son of Muhammad Khan Bangash (appointed by Emperor Farukh Siar)
- Fought against Marathas early (lost to Bajirao I, accepted terms)
- Attacked Maratha ally (Bundelkhand king) but was repelled by Marathas
Nazib Khan (Najib Khan):
- Yusufzai Afghan clan from Kandahar
- Arrived India around 1743, age 35 (already adult, experienced)
- Started as foot soldier in Ali Muhammad Rohila's army
- Rose to become ruler of holdings between Ganga and Himalayas
- Built capital at Nazibuabad, fort at Patargarh
- Called "Nazib ud-Daula" (Administrator of the State)
- Critical figure for future Panipat events
Nazib's Key Relationship:
- Enemy of Marathas in general
- BUT had special relationship with Malhar Rao Holkar
- Viewed Holkar as adopted father figure
- Holkar had soft corner for Nazib
- Exception to Rohila hatred of Marathas
The Afghan-Maratha Conflict Dynamic
The Tension:
- Marathas expanding north under Bajirao I and beyond
- Rohilas/Afghans saw this as threat to their new territories
- Different religious interests: Hindu vs. Muslim
- Competing for control of Mughal court and northern regions
The Mughal Weakness:
- Empire confined to Delhi area by this period
- Local chiefs taking territory piece by piece
- Rohilas, Marathas, Rajputs all carving out kingdoms
- Emperor powerless to stop any of them
The Mutual Defeat:
- Marathas under Bajirao I defeated Ahmed Khan Bangash
- Bangash forced to accept terms and retreat
- But Marathas also had to accept that Rohilas were a serious power
- Region became divided: Maratha zone, Rohila zone, others
The Structural Reality
North India by 1740s:
- Not unified under Mughal emperor
- Patchwork of regional powers: Marathas, Rohilas, Rajputs, others
- Each controlling territory and extracting taxes
- Alliances and enmities based on immediate interest
Afghan Strategic Calculation:
- Too weak to resist Marathas alone
- Invited Ahmed Khan Abdali (powerful Afghan in Afghanistan) to counter Marathas
- Created alliance: Rohila + Abdali vs. Maratha expansion
- Tribal loyalty and religious kinship made alliance natural
The Self-Made Afghan: Nazib as Model
Nazib's Path:
- Came as foot soldier with nothing
- Demonstrated military skill
- Rose through ranks via personal ability
- Became small kingdom chieftain
- "Afghan Shivaji" - self-made from humble start
Comparison to Shivaji:
- Shivaji: Son of jahagirdar (noble with assigned territory)
- Nazib: Came with nothing, built from scratch
- Both: Effective military organizers and kingdom builders
- Nazib's rise shows Afghan immigrants matched Hindu warriors in military ability
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1707+ | Afghan migration wave begins |
| 1730s-40s | Nadir Shah persecution drives larger exodus |
| ~1740 | Rohila force reaches ~40,000 strong |
| ~1740 | Ahmed Khan Bangash era |
| 1743 | Nazib Khan arrives from Kandahar |
| ~1745+ | Rohila-Maratha tensions increase |
Critical Insights
1. Economic Migration as Geopolitical Force
Afghan immigrants weren't ideological warriors—they were seeking opportunity. But their collective arrival shifted north Indian power balance.
2. Tribal Bonds Trump Nations
Rohilas remained cohesive due to Afghan identity and Sunni Islam. These bonds lasted longer than any individual loyalty.
3. The Self-Made Military Class
Nazib Khan and others showed that birth didn't determine success. Ability to fight and organize did. This model attracted many more soldiers to join.
4. Hindu-Muslim Divide in Practice
Marathas and Rohilas represented different power structures (Hindu warrior class vs. Muslim administered state). This would eventually create religious dimension to political conflicts.
5. Mughal Irrelevance
By this era, the Mughal emperor was ceremonial. Real power belonged to regional chieftains fighting for territory. Mughal legitimacy was just a fig leaf.
Key Quotes
"First generation immigrants played a stellar role in north Indian events for many years"
"From foot soldier he rose to be ruler of large holdings between the Ganga and Himalayas"
"Rohilas were soldiers of fortune seeking opportunity in fertile India"
Geographic Context
Rohilkhand Region:
- Between Ganga and Yamuna rivers (northern portion)
- Between Ganga and Himalayas (as Nazib's territory)
- North of Maratha-controlled Deccan
- Proximity to Delhi made it strategically important
- Fertile agricultural area = tax revenue potential
Where We Left Off: Rohilas are established as formidable northern power. Marathas have proven they can defeat them but aren't trying to occupy their territory. Nazib Khan has risen to prominence and is managing to balance his Afghan identity with respect for Malhar Rao Holkar. Meanwhile, Abdali in Afghanistan is watching this situation and preparing to play a role. The pieces for Panipat are being positioned.
Afghan immigrants came to India seeking opportunity and found it. They built armies disciplined enough to rival Marathas. They remained unified through tribal and religious bonds. But they couldn't quite dominate northern India alone. So they looked to Abdali. And when Abdali came, they became his instrument. The irony: Nazib Khan hated Marathas but loved Holkar. So when Panipat happened, he'd have to choose between his adopted father figure and his people. That choice would haunt him.
Rohila Politics & Afghan Tribal Dynamics: The Fifth Column Strategy
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Rohila Identity: Where They Came From
Origins:
- Rohilas from specific areas of Afghanistan
- Pathans from different Afghan region/tribe
- Both are Afghan ethnic groups but from different tribes
- Slight differences between them but shared Afghan origin
Migration to Rohilkhand:
- After Nadir Shah's persecution of Afghans in 1730s-40s
- Wave of Afghan soldiers of fortune came to India
- Found employment, opportunity, and prosperity in India
- Settled in Rohilkhand region (between Ganga and Yamuna)
Why India?
- Mistreatment and atrocities by Nadir Shah drove them out
- Afghanistan was poor; India was land of opportunity
- Wealth, agriculture, good prospects—everything lacking at home
- Naturally gravitated to better prospects
The Afghan Lobby: Tribal Bonds Over National Loyalty
The Strategic Alliance:
- All Afghans (regardless of tribe) had unwritten understanding
- Goal: Establish Afghan hegemony in Mughal court and army
- Wanted to ensure Muslims dominated (vs. rising Hindu Maratha influence)
- Tribal bond stronger than individual national loyalty
Religious Dimension:
- Afghans were Sunni Muslims
- Afraid that Hindu Marathas gaining power would undermine Islamic character of Mughal Empire
- Concerned about "Muslimness" being eroded
- Religious bond (Sunni Islam) reinforced tribal bond
The Fifth Column Concept:
- Rohilas functioned as Afghan fifth column within Mughal structure
- Took orders from external Afghan power (Abdali)
- Had loyalty to Afghan tribe before any other allegiance
- Tried to maintain Afghan influence in Mughal court
The Rohila Military Force
The Numbers:
- 40,000 disciplined soldiers
- Fought as cohesive unit with one mind
- Showed no mercy to enemies
- Formidable fighting force by regional standards
Regional Control:
- Stationed throughout north India
- Not centralized under single ruler initially
- Individual chiefs commanded areas but coordinated through tribal ties
- Could mobilize quickly through tribal networks
The Rohila Problem: Not Strong Enough Alone
Their Dilemma:
- Wanted to maintain/expand Afghan influence in Mughal court
- Marathas were strong rival for that influence
- Couldn't defeat Marathas without outside help
- Were facing military inferiority on their own
Their Solution:
- Looked to Ahmed Khan Abdali (powerful Afghan in Afghanistan)
- Thought together they could be formidable force against Marathas
- Expected Abdali's alliance would give them numbers + experience
- Figured combined strength could dominate Mughal court
Safdar Jang: The Peculiar Wazir
His Background:
- Wazir (Prime Minister) of Mughal Empire
- Also Nabab (king) of Awadh kingdom
- Kingdom was wealthy and fertile (between Yamuna and Ganga)
- Occupied dual position: administrator at center, king in province
His Conflicting Interests:
- As Wazir: responsible for all-empire affairs
- As Nabab: responsible for Awadh prosperity
- Often these interests clashed
- Had to choose which hat to wear in each situation
His Relationship with the Emperor:
- Emperor was weak, untrained, interested only in merrymaking
- Safdar Jang had effective power while emperor had title
- Everyone knew real power belonged to Wazir
- But Safdar Jang still needed nominal loyalty to emperor
His Threat to Rohilas:
- Rohilas were in northern Doab (Safdar Jang's backyard)
- They were wealthy territorial power he couldn't control
- Represented threat to his Awadh kingdom's stability
- Wanted to reduce their power or bring them under his control
The Nazib Khan Anomaly
His Unique Status:
- Started as foot soldier in Rohila army
- Rose through ranks to become regional chieftain
- Built personal kingdom between Ganga and Himalayas around Saharanpur
- Held strong fort and commanded significant territory
- Called himself Nazib ud-Daula (Administrator of State)
His Special Relationship:
- Hated Marathas generally
- Exception: Mallar Rao Holkar
- Viewed Holkar as adopted father figure
- Holkar had soft corner for Nazib
- This personal bond created crack in Afghan-Maratha hostility
Why This Mattered:
- Most Afghans: uniform hatred of Marathas
- Nazib: special relationship with one key Maratha commander
- This would create internal tension among Afghans when conflicts escalated
- Personal relationships vs. tribal loyalty—a problem waiting to explode
The Wazir-Rohila Conflict
Why They Fought:
- Safdar Jang tried to control Rohila territories
- Rohilas resisted—they had their own agenda
- Safdar Jang wanted hegemony; Rohilas wanted independence
- Neither willing to submit to the other
The Geographic Issue:
- Rohilkhand was near Delhi—close to center of power
- Safdar Jang from Awadh kingdom (also in north, near Delhi)
- Both competing for same territory and influence
- Proximity meant constant friction
The Religious Angle:
- Both Sunni Muslim but different ethnic backgrounds
- Safdar Jang: Persian administrator (administrator class)
- Rohilas: Afghan warriors (military class)
- Different approaches to power—both wanted control
The Afghan Lobby Inside Mughal Court
Who Was Involved:
- Duradi (Afghan-influenced) faction in emperor's court
- Opposed Safdar Jang because he was Persian Shia (not Sunni Afghan)
- Wanted Sunni Muslim (preferably Afghan) leadership
- Used court politics to undermine his position
Their Strategy:
- Couldn't defeat Safdar Jang militarily (he had imperial resources)
- So used court intrigue and politics
- Encouraged emperor to reduce Wazir's power
- Tried to replace him with someone more sympathetic to Afghan interests
The Failure:
- Marathas intervened on Safdar Jang's side
- Bapu Hingne (Maratha representative) warned him of conspiracy
- Nana Sahib mobilized Shinde and Holkar to threaten counter-action
- Emperor got cold feet and backed down
- Safdar Jang survived due to Maratha support
Timeline of Rohila-Wazir Conflict
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1740s | Rohilas firmly established in Rohilkhand |
| ~1745 | Safdar Jang becomes Wazir |
| ~1745-50 | Sporadic conflicts between Safdar Jang and Rohilas |
| ~1748 | Conspiracy in court to replace Safdar Jang |
| ~1748 | Marathon alliance with Safdar Jang begins |
| ~1750 | Major battle near Farrukhabad |
| ~1750+ | Marathas get involved in Rohila conflicts |
The Larger Pattern
Afghan Tribal Loyalty:
- Transcended national boundaries
- Afghans in India answered to Abdali in Afghanistan
- Afghans in court answered to Afghan tribesmen in field
- Created network of allegiance independent of Mughal structure
The Weak Mughal Center:
- Emperor couldn't enforce decisions
- Wazir had power but was under constant threat
- Regional powers (Marathas, Rohilas, Rajputs) doing what they wanted
- Central authority was fiction maintained by inertia
The Maratha Entry Point:
- Safdar Jang's vulnerability drew them into northern affairs
- Simple act of warning him created alliance
- Once allied, couldn't easily disengage
- Deeper involvement in northern politics inevitable
Critical Insights
1. Tribal Networks Over Nations
Afghan tribal loyalty created super-national organization. Afghans in India were part of Afghan world, not just Mughal subjects.
2. The Wazir's Paradox
Safdar Jang had formal power but was constantly under threat. Real power was diffused among regional commanders. Wazir position was increasingly ceremonial.
3. The Fifth Column Reality
Rohilas weren't just regional power—they were actually Afghan expansion into India via migration. Their loyalty to Abdali was real and structural.
4. Personal Relationships Matter
Nazib Khan's affection for Holkar created exception to general Afghan-Maratha hostility. Showed that tribal logic could be overridden by personal bonds.
5. The Entanglement
By supporting Safdar Jang, Marathas committed to northern politics. By fighting Rohilas, they committed to opposing Afghan expansion. Both commitments would pull them toward Panipat.
Key Concepts
Rohilkhand as Region:
- Informally named after Rohila occupation
- No formal district, just colloquial name
- Important because: Afghans created settlement pattern that persisted
- Name survived even after power shifted
The 40,000 Figure:
- Repeated for reason—shows consolidated military force
- Not scattered groups but coordinated army
- Could mobilize as unified force under tribal command
- This is what made them formidable despite being numerically small vs. Marathas
The Self-Made Warrior Pattern:
- Nazib Khan: foot soldier to chieftain
- Ahmed Khan Bangash: administrative chieftain
- Showed Afghan immigrants could rise through merit
- Created incentive for more soldiers to come to India
Where We Left Off: The Rohila-Wazir conflict is escalating with Maratha involvement. Afghans are cohesive through tribal bonds and religious ties. Nazib Khan is the anomaly—loving Holkar while hating other Marathas. Safdar Jang is barely holding on with Maratha help. The Mughal center is hollow. Everyone can see it. This is the situation when Abdali starts watching and planning to intervene.
The Rohilas came to India as economic migrants and became political players. They bonded through tribal and religious ties into a unified force of 40,000. But they couldn't beat the Marathas alone. So they looked to Abdali. They thought Afghan brothers would help. What they didn't realize was that being Afghan would eventually mean choosing between local success and external loyalty. Nazib Khan saw this problem early—he loved Holkar despite hating Marathas. But most Afghans never resolved that contradiction. When Panipat came, they'd have to choose. And the choice would destroy them.
Safdar Jang & The Wazir-Rohila War: Marathas Enter Northern Conflict
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Mughal Court Crisis (1745-1750)
The Emperor's Weakness:
- New emperor after Muhammad Shah (Rangila)
- Mother (Udhambai) was ambitious dancer/former courtesan seeking power
- Emperor had no training in governance, warfare, or statecraft
- Emperor's interests: merrymaking, art, entertainment, luxury—not ruling
The Power Dynamic:
- Mughal emperors were ceremonial figureheads by this era
- Real power belonged to the Wazir (Prime Minister)
- Udhambai realized this and wanted to limit Wazir's power
- Safdar Jang (current Wazir) controlled too much authority—this worried her
Safdar Jang: The Dual-Power Wazir
His Unique Position:
- Wazir (Prime Minister) of Mughal Empire—ostensibly the highest post
- Also Nabab of Awadh (independent kingdom between Ganga and Yamuna rivers)
- Awadh was his personal kingdom with its own taxes and army
- Split time between Delhi (as Wazir) and Awadh (as ruler)
- Left dummy administrators in Awadh when absent
Why He Wanted Both:
- Wazir position gave him power over all empire
- Awadh gave him independent economic base and forces
- If removed as Wazir, could retreat to Awadh as king
- Had cake and ate it too—until he had to choose
The Conspiracy Against Safdar Jang
Who Opposed Him:
- Udhambai: Wanted manageable Wazir she could control
- Duradi Lobby: Afghan influencers in court who opposed Safdar Jang
- Why they opposed: Safdar Jang was Persian (born in Iran) and Shia Muslim
- They were Afghan (Sunni) and wanted Sunni Muslim leadership
The Plan:
- Emperor invited Nasir Jang (Nizam of Hyderabad's son) to court
- Nasir Jang was supposed to replace/remove Safdar Jang as Wazir
- Safdar Jang wasn't informed—it was secret conspiracy
The Alert:
- Bapu Hingne: Maratha representative at Mughal court
- Discovered the conspiracy
- Secretly warned Safdar Jang about the plot
- Message: "They're planning to replace you"
The Unexpected Alliance: Safdar Jang & Marathas
Why This Mattered:
- Bapu Hingne had no official business warning Safdar Jang
- But he did it anyway—showed Marathas were watching
- Safdar Jang recognized this as sign of potential support
- Immediately understood: Marathas might be allies
Safdar Jang's Response:
- Began building his own army secretly
- Sent word to Nana Sahib (Peshwa): "I need help"
- Peshwa authorized Shinde and Holkar: "Stop Nasir Jang from heading north"
- Rapid Maratha mobilization showed serious response
The De-Escalation:
- Emperor realized secret was out and situation was spiraling
- Got nervous about civil conflict at court
- Sent word to Nasir Jang: Go back to the Deccan
- Explained it away without admitting the conspiracy
- Safdar Jang stayed as Wazir
Result:
- Safdar Jang understood Marathas had his back
- Built trust: Marathas proved they'd counter schemes against him
- New alliance formed: Wazir + Marathas vs. Rohilas/Afghans
- This was beginning of Maratha involvement in northern affairs
Safdar Jang's Northern Strategy
The Real Problem:
- Rohilas were 40,000 strong and in his territory
- Afghans had tribal loyalty to each other and to Abdali
- They weren't going to submit to Mughal Wazir authority
- Safdar Jang saw them as serious threat to his Awadh kingdom
His Decision:
- Use new Maratha alliance to deal with Rohila threat
- Attack Rohila positions near Farrukhabad and Bareilly
- Try to reduce Rohila power in northern Doab region
- Hoped Marathas would help if it got serious
The Battle Near Farrukhabad (1750)
The Setup:
- Safdar Jang attacked Rohila territories
- Rohilas fought back (disciplined 40,000-strong force)
- Safdar Jang's army was insufficient for the task
- Called on Marathas for support
What Happened:
- Battle was intense and brutal
- Safdar Jang got wounded and knocked unconscious during fighting
- Had to be carried off battlefield on elephant
- Maratha reinforcements hadn't arrived yet
- Safdar Jang's forces were defeated and retreating
The Aftermath:
- Rohilas pursued into Awadh territory
- Looted Lucknow
- Invaded Safdar Jang's home kingdom between the rivers
- Safdar Jang lost control of significant portions of Awadh
- Embarrassing defeat for the Mughal Wazir
Why This Victory Surprised Everyone
The Context:
- Under Aurangzeb: Mughal armies were devastating
- Mughal Empire had aura of military superiority
- By 1750: That myth was shattered
- Rohilas—mere regional power—defeated the Wazir
The Credit:
- Fighting spirit came from Bajirao I's era
- Shinde and Holkar weren't created by Nana Sahib—they were mentored by Bajirao I
- Bajirao I took simple soldiers and made them into great warriors
- He led expansion north, created the warrior class
- Even 10 years after his death, that fighting spirit remained in Maratha forces
Bajirao I's Legacy in Military Culture
What He Did:
- At age 20, went north with Syed brothers
- Saw that Delhi was hollow—no fighting spirit left
- Realized Mughal armies were declining force
- Built Maratha expansion on this insight
How He Built Warriors:
- Shinde and Holkar started as simple soldiers
- Bajirao I identified military talent
- Mentored them into great commanders
- Later: Shinde had 10-15,000 troops, Holkar similar
- Built professional military families out of nothing
His Strategic Mind:
- Unparalleled war strategies
- Picked up pieces after Aurangzeb destroyed Maratha kingdom
- Put it back together through expansion and reorganization
- Military genius rivaled Shivaji's
- Different challenges but equally difficult
The Comparison: Shivaji vs. Bajirao I
Shivaji's Challenges:
- Started from nothing
- Faced multiple powerful adversaries simultaneously
- Built entire system from scratch
- Foundational genius—created the template
Bajirao I's Challenges:
- Started with broken pieces
- Had to reorganize after internal collapse
- Expanded 7-8 times the territory
- Systemic genius—scaled what was created
Both Extraordinary:
- Military geniuses of different eras
- Faced different problems, solved them brilliantly
- Created the warrior culture that still endured in 1750
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1745 | Safdar Jang becomes Wazir |
| ~1745 | Udhambai gains influence over new emperor |
| ~1748 | Conspiracy to replace Safdar Jang (Nasir Jang plot) |
| ~1748 | Bapu Hingne warns Safdar Jang; Marathas mobilize |
| ~1748 | Emperor de-escalates, Nasir Jang recalled |
| 1750 | Battle near Farrukhabad; Safdar Jang defeated |
| ~1750 | Rohilas loot Lucknow, invade Awadh |
Critical Insights
1. The Maratha Entry into North India
Safdar Jang became the wedge that drew Marathas deeper into northern affairs. Not conquest—support for an ally. But it entangled them in complex northern politics.
2. The Wazir's Dilemma
Safdar Jang had enough power to be dangerous but not enough to be supreme. His dual position (Wazir + Nabab) meant he could be attacked from both directions.
3. Mughal Myth Shattered
The Rohila victory over Wazir's army showed that Mughal central authority was completely hollow by 1750. Any regional power could defeat them.
4. Bajirao's Shadow
Ten years after his death, Bajirao I's warrior culture still dominated. His mentorship of simple soldiers into great warriors was bearing fruit in battles he never saw.
5. The Entanglement Begins
By supporting Safdar Jang, Marathas committed themselves to northern politics. This will lead to deeper involvement—eventually Panipat.
Key Themes Emerging
The Wazir as Pivot Point:
- Safdar Jang represented transitional era
- Old Mughal center of power vs. rising regional powers
- Last time someone tried to use traditional Wazir position as real authority
- After this, Wazir position became ceremonial
The Warrior Class Transfer:
- Military dominance passed from Mughal central army to regional commanders
- Marathas (Hindu warrior class) replacing Persian/Afghan (Islamic administrative class)
- Religious dimension emerging alongside political one
The Alliance Pattern:
- Wazir + Marathas vs. Rohilas + Afghans
- This pattern would intensify
- Eventually: Abdali's Afghans would fight Marathas for northern dominance
- Rohilas would be caught in the middle (especially Nazib Khan)
Where We Left Off: Marathas have gotten their first real taste of northern warfare by helping Safdar Jang. Victory was limited (Wazir still got defeated), but it showed Marathas could project power north. Meanwhile, Rohilas proved they could defeat even the Mughal Wazir's army. Both sides now know what they're facing. The stage is being set for larger confrontation. Abdali is watching. Nazib Khan is torn between his Afghan people and his affection for Holkar.
Safdar Jang thought he could use Marathas as mercenaries. But it doesn't work that way. Once you call in allies, you're entangled. Marathas came north to help a Wazir. But they stayed. And the more they stayed, the more they invested. And the more invested, the more they had to expand to protect their interests. Bajirao I had done this dance decades earlier. Now Nana Sahib was dancing it too. It would end at Panipat. Ten years away, nobody knew it yet. But the pattern was set.
Maratha Military Victory & Northern Consolidation: The Safdar Jang Partnership (1750-1751)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Mughal Court's Three Factions
The Political Reality:
- Shia Faction: From Iran (Safdar Jang's group)
- Sunni Faction: From Afghanistan (Rohila/Afghan allies)
- Hindustani Muslim: Converted Indian Muslims
- Few Hindus in power, mostly in minor positions
Why This Mattered:
- Safdar Jang (Shia from Persia) was unusual as Wazir
- Sunni Afghan faction opposed him naturally
- Religious-ethnic divide became political divide
- Afghan Sunni faction allied with local Rohilas (common ethnicity + religion)
The Failed Coup & Its Aftermath
The Plot:
- Emperor Ahmad Shah weak, easily manipulated by court
- Udhambai (ambitious mother/courtesan) pushed to reduce Wazir's power
- Emperor summoned Nasir Jang (Nizam's son) from Deccan to replace Safdar Jang
- Nasir Jang advanced north to Narmada River (boundary between Deccan and north)
The Counter-Move:
- Bapu Hingane (Maratha diplomat at Delhi) secretly warned Safdar Jang
- Safdar Jang sought Maratha help immediately
- Peshwa ordered Shinde and Holkar to intercept Nasir Jang
- Rapid Maratha mobilization alarmed Emperor
The De-Escalation:
- Emperor got cold feet seeing Maratha involvement
- Recalled Nasir Jang to Deccan from Narmada (before he crossed north)
- Tension defused without civil war
- Safdar Jang kept Wazir position but now indebted to Marathas
The Rohila War & Early Maratha Victories
Safdar Jang's Strategy:
- Decided to enlarge influence by suppressing Rohilas and Afghans
- They had grabbed Mughal territories with impunity
- Invaded Rohila territories around Bareilly
- Attempted to confiscate Ahmed Khan Bangash's estates at Farrukhabad
The First Battle (September 1750):
- Before Marathas could arrive, Safdar Jang lost at Kasganj
- Safdar Jang was beaten unconscious, carried away on elephant
- Rohilas pursued into Awadh territory
- Looted Lucknow and invaded Allahabad (Safdar Jang's kingdom base)
- Wazir's fortunes sinking rapidly
Why Awadh Mattered:
- Between Yamuna and Ganga rivers (Doab region)
- Extremely fertile land—best tax base in north India
- Even today: dig 40 feet and find no stone (pure soil depth)
- Farmers were wealthy, so taxes were enormous
- Vassal state to Mughal but semi-independent due to emperor's weakness
The Maratha Entry as Mercenaries
The Agreement (Late 1750):
- Safdar Jang urgently seeking help with large daily cash payments
- Shinde and Holkar demanded guaranteed money (not volunteers)
- Became mercenaries—"going to the highest bidder"
- Accepted Safdar Jang's offer after settling Rajasthan succession issues
The Intelligence to Peshwa:
- Divans (administrators) of Shinde and Holkar informed Peshwa on February 12, 1751
- Agents from Safdar Jang came seeking help
- They advised Peshwa: "This is opportunity to create impact in north"
- Peshwa authorized the operation (already aware through diplomatic channels)
The Strategic Calculation:
- Malhar Rao Holkar had been requesting standing army in north for years
- Northern politics too unstable; emergencies needed quick response
- Distance from Pune to Delhi too great for reactive deployment
- Solution: Station permanent Maratha force in north under Jayappa Shinde
- By time messages reached Pune from north, damage already done in old system
The Maratha Military Dominance
The Campaign:
- Rohilas sustained successive defeats in Doab (Safdar Jang's territory)
- Also defeated near Kumaun hills (border region)
- Maratha armies finally arrived and turned tide
- Bangash was completely defeated
- Victory was "beginning of many Maratha successes in the north"
The Result:
- Marathas created hegemony over north Indian territories
- Rohilas now careful not to attack Marathas directly
- Maratha influence replaced Afghan/Rohila dominance
- Areas came under Maratha control; tributes collected
Govind Bundel: The Administrator-Fighter
His Background:
- Revenue manager, accountant-come-fighter
- Went north with Bajirao I in 1730s
- Stayed in Bundelkhand to administer the 1/3 kingdom gifted to Bajirao I (along with Mastani)
- Collected taxes and handled administration for Maratha holdings
His New Role:
- Led revenue managers collecting tributes in newly conquered areas
- Accountant-like work coordinating taxation across north
- Govindpant Bundel: Important character for future events
- Will play significant role as Maratha territories expand
The Complicated Victory
The Problem:
- Marathas defeated Bangash but allowed him to survive
- Denied Marathas access to holy sites: Kashi, Ayodhya, Allahabad
- Safdar Jang blocked Maratha access to these sacred places
- Marathas "let the Vazir enjoy empty victory"—meaning Marathas held back
Why This Mattered:
- Safdar Jang was Muslim, wanted to maintain Muslim character of sites
- Marathas (Hindu) wanted to control/access these sacred places
- This denial created tension—Marathas limited by religious restrictions
- Eventually would become issue in future northern campaigns
Ahmed Khan Abdali: The External Threat Preparing
Who He Was:
- Afghan ruler unifying Afghanistan
- Earlier invaded India but was defeated at Manupur by Mughal Suhedar
- Afghanistan: Poor, nothing but dirt
- Had "tasted blood" in that earlier invasion attempt
His Motivation:
- Not interested in becoming emperor in Delhi
- Interested in looting wealth: money, diamonds, gold
- Plan: Take Indian wealth back to Afghanistan to build empire there
- Afghanistan too poor to be self-sufficient; must extract external wealth
His Strategic Position:
- Abdali watching situation in north India unfold
- Saw Marathas defeating Rohilas
- Understood Marathas were rising power
- Would need to reckon with them eventually
- Already planning return invasions (next chapter: "Abdali Invades Punjab")
The Pattern:
- First invasion: Defeated at Manupur
- Will keep coming back because Afghanistan has nothing
- "Pathetic" by Abdali's own assessment
- Only positive: good fighters
- Will be back again and again seeking plunder
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1748 | Nasir Jang plot; Maratha warning to Safdar Jang |
| 1748 | Emperor de-escalates, recalls Nasir Jang from Narmada |
| September 1750 | Safdar Jang defeated at Kasganj; carried unconscious |
| Late 1750 | Shinde/Holkar accept Safdar Jang's mercenary offer |
| February 12, 1751 | Divans inform Peshwa of northern opportunity |
| 1751 | Maratha victories over Rohilas in Doab |
| Post-1751 | Maratha hegemony established over north Indian areas |
Critical Insights
1. The Mercenary Transition
Marathas move from free allies to paid mercenaries. This creates different dynamic—they fight where paid, not where strategically necessary. Makes Peshwa vulnerable to financial exhaustion.
2. The Standing Army Realization
Holkar understood standing north army needed. Reaction-based deployment too slow. This insight leads to permanent Maratha presence in north—sets stage for Panipat.
3. The Holy Sites Problem
Marathas exclude themselves from sacred Muslim sites. This Hindu-Muslim religious divide limits Maratha territorial ambitions even as military power grows.
4. The Declining Mughal Reality
During Aurangzeb: Central army dominated. By 1750: Wazir needs mercenaries to fight regional powers. Shows complete collapse of Mughal military authority.
5. Abdali's External Threat
Rohilas/Afghans allied with Abdali because tribal kinship. Abdali's earlier defeat didn't discourage him—just whetted appetite. Will try again. Marathas now need to prepare for this threat too.
6. The Entanglement Deepens
By taking mercenary contracts from Safdar Jang, Marathas committed to permanent northern presence. Can't just leave when done. This is entanglement, not conquest.
The Declining Mogul Center vs. Rising Maratha Power
Mughal Weakness Exposed:
- Wazir needs mercenary help against regional rebels
- Emperor too weak to command respect
- Central army can't maintain order
- Territories breaking away piece by piece
Maratha Strength Demonstrated:
- Can move armies rapidly north
- Win battles decisively against experienced fighters
- Create administrative structure (Bundel collecting taxes)
- Can fight for pay indefinitely if funded
The Vulnerability:
- If funding dries up (mercenary model), Marathas leave
- If multiple demands (north + south), armies split
- If Abdali invades with unified force, Marathas scattered
- This is the weakness that Panipat will expose
Key Themes Emerging
The Tribal Loyalty Problem:
- Rohilas looked to Abdali because Afghan kinship
- Marathas looked to profit because mercenary interest
- Neither had deep institutional loyalty
- All based on individual commanders' relationships
The Standing Army Insight:
- Holkar's request for permanent north force was prescient
- Shows strategic thinking beyond immediate campaign
- But also shows Marathas now committed to indefinite engagement
- No "return to south" once north becomes expensive commitment
The Sacred-Secular Divide:
- Hindu Marathas excluded from Muslim holy sites by Muslim Wazir
- Creates religious dimension to power struggle
- Afghans and Rohilas also motivated by "preserving Islam"
- Religion becoming factor alongside money and power
Where We Left Off: Marathas have achieved military victory in north and established hegemony. Safdar Jang is grateful and friendly. But Marathas are now permanently stationed in north, dependent on payment, and blocked from controlling holy sites. Meanwhile, Abdali is preparing to invade again. He won't give up after one defeat. The stage is set for larger confrontation. Next chapter: Abdali's second invasion.
The Wazir thought he could hire Marathas as mercenaries. But once they arrived, they didn't leave. They beat the Rohilas, controlled territory, collected taxes, stayed. Because mercenaries create permanent interest. Holkar understood this better than anyone—he asked for a standing army in north, realizing emergencies can't wait for deployment from the south. But nobody realized how this would trap them. Abdali watched from Afghanistan, saw Marathas getting stronger in north, and decided he needed to come back stronger too. The two forces—Maratha and Afghan—were on collision course. And Panipat was waiting.
Abdali's Attack on Punjab (1751)
Why War Became Inevitable
The Situation Escalates
The tension between the Marathas and Afghans (Abdali's forces) was reaching its peak - things were becoming very predictable. War was clearly coming.
The Peshwa Was Sleeping 💤
Problem: Down in Pune (deep south compared to Delhi), the Peshwa had no inkling this was coming.
- He wasn't giving the northern situation proper attention
- Totally oblivious that this massive struggle was about to break out
- While everyone up north could see war was inevitable, the Peshwa was clueless
The Rohilla Problem: An Existential Crisis
Who Are the Rohillas?
Rohillas = Afghan soldiers of fortune who had developed their own kingdom in Rohilkhand (region in northern India)
Their Ambitions:
- Saw the power vacuum in the Mughal Empire
- The Emperor was just a puppet (everyone knew this)
- Wanted to establish their own power and have their own viziers
- Were getting increasingly ambitious
The One Problem: Marathas
The Realization:
- Safdar Jung was vizier (temporary figure)
- When Marathas sided with him, they defeated the Rohillas at several places around Delhi
- Rohillas realized: "We are no match for the Marathas"
- Bigger realization: "There is NOBODY in the north who can match Maratha power"
The Existential Crisis
The Muslim Perspective:
- Muslims had ruled India for 200-300 years (first various Sultans, then Mughals)
- They had developed a complete stranglehold on all of North India
- Now they realized: "We are about to lose this entire thing"
- The Marathas were too powerful
- The Rohillas (Afghan army) saw themselves as the last safeguarding army for Islam
The Math:
- If Rohillas can't match Marathas → Muslims lose everything
- Mughals will be evicted eventually
- What happens to us then?
The Only Solution: Invite Abdali
Why Abdali Was Perfect
The Rohillas' Strategy:
- Look to Ahmad Shah Abdali for help
- Rohillas were originally from Afghanistan anyway - natural allies
- Critical advantage: If they invite Abdali, he's not coming as a complete outsider without allies
Abdali's Calculation:
- Without internal allies: High risk, might face lots of pushback
- With internal allies (Rohillas + internal Mughals): Much more secure, fearless
- He LOVES having internal allies
The Inevitable Conclusion:
- Internal Mughals and Rohillas could not handle Marathas
- They could only look up to ONE man and one man only
- That was Abdali
- Marathas were becoming stronger by the day
- Abdali was the only fair match - everyone else was going to fall
What About the Rajputs?
The Rajputs had become weak - basically "jokers" at this point. They were Hindus, so they wouldn't really fight with the Marathas anyway.
Conclusion: It was becoming apparent that Abdali and Marathas were going to battle - it was just a matter of time.
Chapter: Abdali's Attack on Punjab
Why Punjab?
Geographic Context:
- Punjab = "Land of Five Rivers"
- Four rivers empty into the Sindhu River (Indus)
- Once they merge, Sindhu becomes massive
- Creates tremendously fertile land all around it
Strategic Value:
- Extremely fertile province
- Prosperous agriculture
- Lots of taxes levied on farmers
- Westernmost province of the Mughal Empire
- Closer to Afghanistan - "doable distance"
Abdali's Goal: Make Punjab an Afghan province, even though it was squarely within Mughal territory.
Abdali's Justification
His Quote:
"For the last four months, Muslims have been killing each other. Will Allah accept this?"
Abdali was positioning himself as concerned about Muslim infighting.
Abdali Consolidates Afghanistan First: The Herat Campaign
Background on Afghanistan
Herat:
- Westernmost city of Afghanistan
- Lots of Shia Afghans living there (deeply influenced by nearby Iran)
- Kabul and Kandahar were far from Iran - had Pashtun tribes (majority of Afghan population)
Historical Context:
- Iran at one time controlled about half of Afghanistan
- Under Nadir Shah, Iran had total reign
- At that time, Afghanistan wasn't even a separate nation
- Western side was controlled by Nadir Shah
Abdali's Consolidation (September 1748 - 1751)
What He Did:
- Spent about 3 years taking over Herat
- Put Afghanistan together as a unified nation
- Claimed Herat as part of Afghanistan
- Kicked out all Iranian influence from the region
Result: By 1751, Herat was squarely within his control.
His Thinking: "Okay, west is secured. Now let me go east and take over Punjab."
The Reparations Dispute
Background: The Previous Agreement
The Players:
- Mir Manu = Mughal commander/Subedar of Punjab
- Diwan Kaura Mall = Hindu Subedar of Multan (small town in Punjab)
The Deal:
- Last time Abdali came, he demanded taxes from Punjab
- Wazir said: "I'm not coming to help you, do whatever you want"
- Mir Manu had to negotiate a truce
- Agreed to pay khandani (reparations/yearly sum) to Abdali
- Like what Germany had to pay after WWI
The Problem: Mughals Went Back on Their Word
What Happened:
- When Mughals felt stronger, they'd say "we didn't agree to anything"
- They kept going back and forth
- Diwan Kaura Mall advised Mir Manu: "Don't give it to Abdali"
- Mir Manu stopped paying
Abdali's Response:
- Got irate - "It was agreed upon, now it's not coming?"
- "Okay, let me go teach them a lesson about who's boss"
- Also had to deal with Nasir Khan (previous Subedar) and Mughal attempts to retake Kabul
- Realized they were doing "hanky-panky"
The Military Campaign Begins: November 1751
Abdali's Strategy
The Approach:
- Sent two commanders forward (Jahan Khan and Samad Khan)
- He himself led the main force through the Khyber Pass
The Khyber Pass
Geographic Importance:
- Famous mountain pass between Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Big mountain range with this pass cutting through
- Once you cross through → you reach the plains at Peshawar
- Today Peshawar is in Pakistan
- At that time: contested between Afghans and Mughals (but mostly in Mughal hands)
What Happened:
- Abdali crossed through Khyber Pass
- Came to Peshawar in November 1751
- Ready to fall upon the Mughals
The Final Negotiation Attempt
One Last Chance
Haroon Khan (Abdali's representative) met with Muin ul-Mulk (Mughal commander)
The Ask: Pay the reparations you owe to Abdali
Muin's Response:
- ⌠REJECTED the reparation offer completely
- Immediately started war preparations
- The war was now unavoidable (ataar)
Smart Prep Move
Before war breaks out:
- Muin moved his mother, wife, and daughter into a mountainous area where they'd be secure
- Smart thinking - don't have to worry about family when fighting
The Confrontation Setup
The Standoff at Ravi River
The Position:
- Ravi River = one of the tributaries that empties into Sindhu
- Muin was coming from the Mughal side
- He crossed Ravi River
- Dug in his position on the other side with his entire army
- Waiting for Abdali to confront him
Key Players
| Name | Role | Side |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Afghan |
| Rohillas | Afghan soldiers of fortune in North India | Afghan/Anti-Maratha |
| Mir Manu | Original Subedar of Punjab (previous deal) | Mughal |
| Muin ul-Mulk | Current Mughal commander in Punjab | Mughal |
| Diwan Kaura Mall | Hindu Subedar of Multan | Mughal (advised against paying) |
| Jahan Khan & Samad Khan | Abdali's forward commanders | Afghan |
| Haroon Khan | Abdali's negotiator | Afghan |
| Nasir Khan | Previous Subedar (kicked out by Abdali) | Mughal |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1748-1751 (Sept) | Abdali conquers Herat, consolidates western Afghanistan |
| Previous years | Mir Manu makes deal with Abdali for reparations |
| ~1751 | Mughals stop paying, go back on their word |
| November 1751 | Abdali crosses Khyber Pass, arrives at Peshawar |
| November 1751 | Final negotiation attempt - Muin rejects reparations |
| November 1751 | Both sides prepare for battle at Ravi River |
The Big Picture
Why This All Matters
- The Rohillas' Existential Crisis made Abdali's invitation inevitable
- Muslim rulers' vulnerability to rising Maratha power created desperation
- Internal allies transformed Abdali from foreign raider to welcomed champion
- Punjab's wealth and fertility made it the perfect prize
- Mughal weakness (going back on agreements) invited aggression
- The Peshwa's obliviousness meant Marathas weren't preparing for what was coming
The Setup Is Complete
- Abdali has secured his western flank (Herat)
- He has internal allies (Rohillas + disgruntled Mughals)
- He has legitimate grievances (unpaid reparations)
- He has his army at Peshawar
- The Mughal forces are dug in at Ravi River
- The Marathas down south have no idea what's brewing
The collision course is set. War is unavoidable.
The Siege of Lahore (1751-1752)
Abdali's Attack on Punjab Continues
Abdali's Strategy: Starve Them Out
Spreading the Army
Abdali's Tactic:
- Spread his army (wikhudlo) - didn't put them all in one place
- Target: Lahore - the major urban center of Punjab
- Method: Cut off food and water supplies to the city (Chirasad Todli)
- Starve the population to bring them to their knees
The Logic: If you don't have anything to eat or drink, you can't fight any war.
The Emperor Wants Help... But Safdar Jung Is Busy
The Mughal Emperor's Order
What He Wanted:
- Ordered his wazir Safdar Jung to send supplies to Lahore
- Help the Lahore Subedar (Muin Khan) sustain the siege
The Problem: Safdar Jung Had Other Priorities
Where He Was:
- In the Indo-Yamuna Gangetic Plain (the fertile region between Ganga and Yamuna rivers)
- Busy fighting with Khan Bangash and Sadulla Khan (Rohila commanders)
- Multiple skirmishes going on - not one single war
What He Did:
- Couldn't send supplies or reinforcements to Lahore
- Stopped the war he was fighting
- Went to his capital city of Lucknow (also in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, not too far)
Result: The guy in Lahore (Muin Khan) was on his own.
Why Safdar Jung Didn't Want to Help
The Complicated Politics
Two People Needed Help:
- Muin Khan (Subedar of Lahore)
- Kauram Mal (Subedar of Multan - nearby town/kingdom)
Safdar Jung's Reasons for NOT Helping
Problem #1 - Muin Khan:
- Muin Khan was Safdar Jung's main rival/competitor
- Political enemy within the Mughal system
Problem #2 - Kauram Mal:
- Had killed Shahan Vaz Khan - someone who had sought protection with Safdar Jung
- Then took control of Multan
- Betrayed the wazir's protection
The Dilemma:
- ⌠Personal reasons: Didn't want to help either of these guys
- ✓ Official duty: As wazir of the Mughal Empire, he was obligated to help them
Result: Safdar Jung did nothing. 🤷
Round 1: Muin Khan's Commanders Strike Back
The Intense Counterattack
What Happened:
- Muin Khan's commanders attacked Abdali very intensely
- Got success! Abdali had to retreat
- For 10 days there was no remnant of Abdali's army anywhere
Abdali's Retreat:
- Retreated all the way back to his base
- Not to be seen anywhere in the neighborhood
- But he hadn't given up
Regrouping Phase
What Abdali Was Doing:
- Putting together new army units
- Getting reinforcements
- Gathering weapons, cannons, war materials
- Preparing for the next attack
Round 2: Abdali Returns (March 1752)
The Return
Timeline: Summer was about to start (March)
Abdali's Move:
- Came back with new reinforcements and supplies
- Came in front of Muin Khan again
- Confronted him properly this time
The Defection of Adina Bae
The Neighboring Town Betrays
Adina Bae:
- Subedar of Dyaland (neighboring town to Lahore)
- Officially a Mughal subedar
- Secretly on Abdali's side (probably)
The Betrayal:
- One of his administrative officers defected by deception
- This made Abdali stronger
- Internal betrayal within Mughal ranks
Muin Khan Fortifies Lahore
The Defensive Strategy
Understanding Walled Cities:
- Major cities in those days were walled in with gates
- You couldn't just get into the city - had to come through gates
- Cities like Lahore typically had 4-5 gates
- Each gate had big doors
Muin Khan's Defense
What He Did:
- Closed all the city doors/gates
- Put cannons on top of the city walls
- Prepared to face Abdali with 10,000 soldiers inside the walled city
The Advantage:
- Cannons on top of walls = higher ground
- Attacking army is in the lower position
- Very difficult to wage war from below while cannons fire down
- Massive disadvantage for the attacker
Abdali's Letter: "Muslims Are Killing Each Other"
Abdali Realizes the Cost
His Calculation:
- There will be lots of people killed
- Cannons on the walls, doors closed
- Not going to be easy
- Would be too costly for his army
His Decision: Try diplomacy first.
The Letter
Delivery Method:
- Abdali wrote the letter himself
- Gave it to two of his commanders: Wazir Shah Wali Khan and Jahan Khan
- They delivered it to Muin Khan
The Letter's Contents
"For four months, Muslims have been killing each other. Will this be acceptable to Allah?"
The Invitation:
- "Without doubt (nishanka), come meet with me"
- "Or send somebody you trust"
- Let's negotiate a truce
- End this fighting
Why Abdali Wanted to Negotiate
Strategic Thinking:
- He was a good commander
- Only wanted to attack if casualties would be limited
- If it would be a massacre of his own troops → not worth it
- Better to find a diplomatic solution
The Famous Meeting
Muin Khan Accepts
Decision: Muin Khan decided to go meet with Abdali in his tent
Who He Met: Shah Wali Khan (Abdali's commander-in-chief)
The Negotiation: An Epic Exchange
Abdali's Gracious Welcome
Opening Move:
- Gave Muin Khan a warm welcome
- Congratulated him for protecting Lahore in such a robust manner
- "You're doing a good job, you defended well"
The Rapid-Fire Questioning
Abdali's Style:
- Fired questions at him one after the other
- Multiple questions in quick succession
- Was very happy with Muin Khan's answers
The Q&A That Defined the Siege
Question 1: Why Didn't You Surrender Earlier?
Abdali: "Why didn't you surrender to me earlier?"
Muin Khan's Answer: "My master (khawinda) is in Delhi. My emperor is in Delhi."
Meaning: I'm obligated to fight for my emperor - I can't just surrender.
Question 2: Why Didn't Your Emperor Help You?
Abdali: "How come your emperor didn't come to your rescue? Why didn't they send reinforcements?"
Muin Khan's Answer: "He didn't send me reinforcement because he knows I'm capable of fighting you off myself."
Translation: I'm such a badass commander that my emperor knew I could handle you on my own. 💪
Question 3: What Should I Do With You Now?
Abdali: "Now that you are in my control, what should I do with you?"
🔥 Muin Khan's Legendary Reply 🔥
This is one of the most famous responses in Marathi history literature:
"If you are a MERCHANT (vyapari), then take your reparations (khandani) and let me go."
"If you are a BUTCHER (kasai), then kill me."
"If you are an EMPEROR (shahenshah), then forgive me."
Breaking Down the Epic Answer
Three Options for Abdali:
- Merchant → You came for money? Take the reparations we agreed upon and leave
- Butcher → You just want blood? Then kill me now
- Emperor → You're a true ruler? Then show mercy and forgive me
Why This Is Brilliant:
- Acknowledges Abdali's power
- Puts the ball in Abdali's court
- Challenges him to define himself
- Poetic and dignified even in defeat
- Forces Abdali to choose his identity
Key Players
| Name | Role | Side | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Afghan | Smart commander, avoids costly battles |
| Muin Khan (Muin-ul-Mulk) | Subedar of Lahore | Mughal | Defended Lahore brilliantly |
| Safdar Jung | Wazir of Mughal Empire | Mughal (technically) | Refused to help, busy with Rohillas |
| Kauram Mal | Subedar of Multan | Mughal | Killed Safdar Jung's protégé |
| Shahan Vaz Khan | (deceased) | - | Sought Safdar Jung's protection, killed by Kauram Mal |
| Khan Bangash | Rohilla commander | Rohilla | Fighting Safdar Jung |
| Sadulla Khan | Rohilla commander | Rohilla | Fighting Safdar Jung |
| Adina Bae | Subedar of Dyaland | Mughal (but defected to Abdali) | Neighboring town betrayal |
| Shah Wali Khan | Commander-in-chief | Afghan | Abdali's top military leader |
| Jahan Khan | Commander | Afghan | Delivered Abdali's letter |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Early 1752 | Abdali spreads army, cuts off supplies to Lahore |
| Early 1752 | Mughal emperor orders Safdar Jung to help |
| Early 1752 | Safdar Jung busy fighting Rohillas, goes to Lucknow instead |
| Early 1752 | Muin Khan's commanders counterattack intensely |
| ~10 days | Abdali retreats to regroup |
| March 1752 | Abdali returns with reinforcements |
| March 1752 | Adina Bae (Dyaland) defects to Abdali's side |
| March 1752 | Muin Khan fortifies Lahore, closes gates, mounts cannons |
| March 1752 | Abdali sends letter: "Muslims killing each other for 4 months" |
| March 1752 | The famous meeting and Q&A session |
Geographic Context
Punjab Region:
- Lahore - Major urban center, walled city
- Multan - Nearby town/small kingdom
- Dyaland - Neighboring town
Elsewhere:
- Lucknow - Safdar Jung's capital (Indo-Gangetic Plain)
- Delhi - Mughal capital (where the emperor is)
- Ganga-Yamuna Doab - Fertile plain where Safdar Jung fought Rohillas
Strategic Analysis
Why Abdali Couldn't Take Lahore by Force
The Math:
- ⌠City is walled with closed gates
- ⌠Cannons on higher ground (on walls)
- ⌠10,000 defenders inside
- ⌠Attacking uphill against artillery = massive casualties
- ⌠Not worth the cost
Abdali's Smart Move:
- Recognized when military action would be too costly
- Used diplomacy instead
- Saved his army for battles he could win
Why Safdar Jung's Refusal Mattered
The Domino Effect:
- Wazir refuses to help → Muin Khan fights alone
- No reinforcements → Muin Khan must hold the fort with what he has
- Political rivalries → Mughal system starts breaking down
- Internal divisions → Makes it easier for external invaders
Key Themes
- The Good Commander - Abdali knew when to fight and when to negotiate
- Political Rivalries Over Duty - Safdar Jung let personal politics override official obligations
- Dignity in Defeat - Muin Khan's legendary response showed grace under pressure
- Walled City Warfare - Understanding medieval siege dynamics
- Internal Betrayal - Adina Bae's defection showed Mughal weakness
- The "Muslim Unity" Card - Abdali used religious solidarity as a negotiating tool
Cultural Notes
Khandani (Reparations)
Like what Germany had to pay after WWI - yearly sum paid to a superior power after losing a conflict or making a treaty.
Walled Cities
Major cities in medieval India were fortified with walls and gates for defense. This gave massive advantages to defenders, especially with artillery positioned on the walls.
The Three Identities
Muin Khan's categorization of Abdali as merchant, butcher, or emperor reflects medieval political philosophy about the nature of power and conquest.
Where we left off: Muin Khan just dropped the most legendary response in the negotiation. What will Abdali's answer be? 👀
The Surrender of Punjab & The Fateful Maratha Treaty (1752)
How the Stage Was Set for Panipat
Abdali's Response to Muin Khan
The Epic Answer
Remember the legendary question: "Are you a merchant, butcher, or emperor?"
Abdali's Response:
- Extremely impressed with Muin Khan's courage and dignity
- Decided to show mercy
- Let Muin Khan keep Lahore
The Deal:
- Muin Khan would remain as Subedar of Lahore
- BUT now under Abdali's backing/protection
- Punjab effectively becomes Abdali's territory
- Muin Khan is now Abdali's vassal, not the Mughal emperor's
The Clever Move:
- Abdali doesn't have to fight a costly siege
- Gets control of Punjab without losing soldiers
- Has a loyal governor in place who proved his competence
- Can collect taxes through Muin Khan
The Bigger Picture: Abdali's Master Plan
The Pattern Emerges
Abdali's Strategy:
- Come to India
- Loot and raid
- Establish control over revenue-generating territories
- Go back to Afghanistan with wealth
- Repeat whenever he needs money
Why This Works:
- Afghanistan has no agriculture
- India (especially Punjab) is extremely fertile
- Mughal Empire is too weak to resist
- Punjab's tax revenue funds his Afghan kingdom
Meanwhile: Safdar Jung's Rohilla Problem
The Ongoing Conflict
Where: The Doab (fertile land between Ganga and Yamuna rivers)
Who's Fighting:
- Safdar Jung (Mughal Wazir)
- vs. Khan Bangash and Sadulla Khan (Rohilla commanders)
Safdar Jung's Solution: Call in the Marathas (again)
The First Maratha Treaty: February 1752
The Deal
What Safdar Jung Offered:
- Large areas of the Doab to the Marathas
- Right to collect taxes from these territories
- Keep 80-90% of tax revenue, give 10-20% to Mughal Empire
Why This Was Huge:
- The Doab is one of the most fertile lands in India (like Punjab)
- Between Ganga and Yamuna rivers
- Part of it was Safdar Jung's own kingdom called Awadh
- Tremendous income from agricultural taxes
What Marathas Did:
- Came to Safdar Jung's aid
- Repelled attacks on his territory
- Restored his control over Awadh
The Pattern: Marathas fight for territory, then collect taxes from it. That's their business model.
Abdali Demands Punjab (March 1752)
The Formal Request
March 23, 1752 - The Mughal Emperor receives a demand:
Who Delivered It: Kalandar Khan (Abdali's agent/ambassador)
The Demand: Secession of Punjab - hand it over to Abdali
The Emperor's Response
What He Did:
- Ordered Safdar Jung to get help from the Marathas
- Sent urgent summons for them to come to Delhi
The Timeline:
- Early April 1752 - Safdar Jung obtained Maratha help on his way to Delhi
- This was a more generalized agreement than the February treaty
- Not just about Rohillas anymore - this was about Abdali
The Surrender: April 13, 1752
The Emperor Caves
April 13, 1752 - A day that changed everything:
What Happened:
- The Mughal Emperor was unable to resist Abdali's demand
- Gave a formal letter to Kalandar Khan
- Signed away Punjab to Abdali
Why This Was Catastrophic
What It Meant:
- Total surrender
- Emperor became completely helpless
- Punjab was extremely important - fertile land, massive tax revenue
- Abdali now controls the westernmost, wealthiest province
The Emperor's "Tough Guy" Act
The Empty Threat
What the Emperor Said:
"I am faithful to my promise, but if your master Abdali goes back on his word, I am prepared to fight also."
The Real Message:
- "Be content with Punjab"
- "Don't come east of Punjab"
- "Don't raid Delhi"
- Classic appeasement strategy
The Reality Check:
- The emperor wasn't prepared to fight anything
- This was an empty threat
- Everyone knew it, including Abdali
The Game-Changing Treaty: April 12, 1752
One Day Before Punjab's Surrender
April 12, 1752 - The most important treaty in this entire saga:
Who Signed:
- Safdar Jung (on behalf of the Mughal Emperor)
- Maratha Chiefs (Shinde and Holkar)
The Terms
What It Said:
- The Peshwa is now responsible for protection of the Mughal Emperor
- Against ALL internal and external threats
- In exchange: Marathas get big territories in the north to collect taxes
What This Means:
- If Abdali comes back → Marathas must defend Delhi
- Marathas are now the real military power protecting the empire
- Mughals have outsourced their defense to the Marathas
The Historical Irony 🎭
From Aurangzeb to This
Then (Aurangzeb's time):
- Aurangzeb wanted to destroy the tiny Maratha kingdom
- Spent 26 years trying to crush Shivaji's legacy
- Failed completely
Now (1752):
- Mughal Emperor begging Marathas for protection
- Marathas are the dominant military force
- Complete role reversal in less than 100 years
The Power Shift
Aurangzeb's Era:
- Massive Mughal army
- Marathas were the underdogs fighting for survival
1752:
- Mughal army is one hundredth of what it was
- Marathas are the steel behind the Mughal army
- Mughals have "forgot how to fight" - no appetite for war
The Insurance Policy
Why They Made This Treaty
The Reality:
- Emperor and Safdar Jung knew Abdali wouldn't keep his word
- He's not going to be content with just Punjab
- He's going to come back and raid Delhi
- They needed a contingency plan
The Insurance:
- Marathas get tax revenue from northern territories
- In return: protect us when Abdali inevitably returns
The Stakes:
- If Abdali comes eastward → Marathas must fight him
- Marathas are now on the hook
The Northern Commanders Take Charge
Shinde and Holkar's Heavy Burden
The Situation:
- Shinde and Holkar understood this heavy responsibility
- Made the agreement without reference to the Peshwa
- They're the ones with armies in the north
The Power Structure
Peshwa (in Pune):
- Far in the south
- Says: "Okay, I'll do this because I get lots of revenue"
- Collects the taxes
Shinde & Holkar (in the North):
- Have to do the actual enforcement
- Must keep up with events
- Must be ready to fight Abdali if he comes back
- They're the ones who will bleed when war comes
Too Late to Save Punjab
The Rushed Response
April 25, 1752:
- Safdar Jung reached Delhi with the Marathas
- Ready to repel Abdali's invasion
- But it was too late
What Already Happened:
- Punjab was gone
- Abdali was already on his way home to Afghanistan
- Muin ul-Mulk remains as Subedar of Lahore with Abdali's backing
Why They Can't Just Take It Back
The Problem:
- Can't depose Muin ul-Mulk
- If you try → it's like going to war with Abdali
- Would start a fight they can't win
- Mughal Empire has "no appetite" for war
The Trap Is Set
Why This Guarantees War
Abdali's Perspective:
- Has Punjab now (legal control)
- Collects revenue from the richest province
- But his appetite is never-ending
- Views Delhi as a "treasury" he can raid anytime he needs money
The Marathas' Obligation:
- Get revenue from northern provinces (very fertile)
- Must defend Delhi if Abdali comes
- They're now contractually bound to fight him
The Inevitable Conclusion:
- Abdali will come back (everyone knows this)
- When he does → Marathas must fight
- The Battle of Panipat is now inevitable
Key Players
| Name | Role | Side | Status After Treaties |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Afghan | Controls Punjab legally now |
| Muin ul-Mulk (Muin Khan) | Subedar of Lahore | Mughal → Abdali's vassal | Keeps position under Abdali |
| Mughal Emperor | Emperor | Mughal | Completely helpless, dependent on Marathas |
| Safdar Jung | Wazir | Mughal | Negotiating treaties, calling in Marathas |
| Kalandar Khan | Ambassador/Agent | Abdali | Delivered Punjab demand, received surrender |
| Shinde | Northern Commander | Maratha | On the hook to defend Delhi |
| Holkar | Northern Commander | Maratha | On the hook to defend Delhi |
| Peshwa | Supreme Commander | Maratha (in Pune) | Gets revenue, but far from action |
| Khan Bangash | Rohilla commander | Rohilla | Fighting Safdar Jung in Doab |
| Sadulla Khan | Rohilla commander | Rohilla | Fighting Safdar Jung in Doab |
Critical Dates
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 1752 | First Maratha-Safdar Jung treaty for Doab territories |
| March 23, 1752 | Kalandar Khan demands Punjab for Abdali |
| Early April 1752 | Safdar Jung gets Maratha help, heads to Delhi |
| April 12, 1752 | THE TREATY - Marathas responsible for Mughal protection |
| April 13, 1752 | Emperor surrenders Punjab to Abdali |
| April 25, 1752 | Safdar Jung reaches Delhi with Marathas (too late) |
| April 1752 | Abdali leaves for Afghanistan with Punjab secured |
Geographic Overview
Punjab:
- Westernmost province
- Five rivers (very fertile)
- Major cities: Lahore, Multan, Peshawar
- Now under Abdali's control
The Doab:
- Land between Ganga and Yamuna
- Most fertile region after Punjab
- Includes Awadh (Safdar Jung's kingdom)
- Now Marathas collect taxes here
Delhi:
- Mughal capital
- What Abdali really wants
- Protected by Marathas now
Pune:
- Peshwa's capital (far south)
- Where Maratha decisions are made
- Too far from the action
Strategic Analysis
The Appeasement Failure
The Theory:
- Give Abdali Punjab
- Hope he'll be satisfied
- He'll stay west of Delhi
The Reality:
- Abdali views India as unlimited ATM
- Comes whenever he needs money
- Punjab is just the appetizer
- Delhi is the main course
Why Marathas Are Screwed
The Math:
- They get huge tax revenues from the north
- But must defend an indefensible empire
- If they don't fight → lose all that revenue
- If they do fight → face Abdali's full force
- They're fighting for Mughal interests, not their own
The Trap:
- Signed a treaty without fully understanding the implications
- Shinde and Holkar made the call without Peshwa's input
- Now the entire Maratha confederacy is committed
- No way out without losing face and revenue
The Seminal Event
Why This Chapter Matters
The Father's Words:
"Rohan, remember this agreement that was done? This is going to lead to the big battle that is looming."
Why:
- This treaty is the beginning of the war drums
- The decks are now stacked
- Abdali will come back
- Marathas must fight him
- The Third Battle of Panipat is now inevitable
The Domino Effect
- Mughal weakness → Abdali demands Punjab
- Emperor surrenders → Shows total helplessness
- Marathas sign protection treaty → Now committed to defend
- Abdali gets Punjab → But wants more
- Marathas collect northern taxes → Must protect investment
- Collision course = LOCKED IN
Key Themes
- The Complete Role Reversal - From Aurangzeb crushing Marathas to Mughals begging them for help
- Appeasement Never Works - Giving Punjab won't satisfy Abdali
- Treaties Have Consequences - Shinde and Holkar committed without full awareness
- The Inevitable War - All pieces are now in place
- Abdali's Business Model - India as an ATM, raid whenever needed
- Mughal Collapse - From superpower to puppet in 50 years
Cultural/Historical Context
The Doab (Fertile Crescent of India)
The land between two rivers (Ganga and Yamuna) - one of the most productive agricultural regions. Controlling tax collection here = massive wealth.
The Subedar System
Provincial governors who ruled territories on behalf of the emperor. Now these governors are switching allegiance to whoever has real power (Abdali).
The Maratha Business Model
- Fight wars for territory
- Get tax collection rights
- Send portion back to Peshwa in Pune
- Keep rest for army maintenance
- Expand and repeat
Vassal States
Muin ul-Mulk is now technically a Mughal official, but really serves Abdali. This ambiguous status creates political cover while shifting real power.
The stage is set. The treaties are signed. The trap is sprung. War is coming.
Next: The countdown to Panipat begins...
Chapter 9: The End of Safdar Jung
Corruption, Dynasty, and the Rise of Suja Uddaula
Quick Recap: Where We Left Off
The Situation in 1752:
- Punjab was surrendered to Abdali (April 13)
- Marathas signed treaty to protect Mughals (April 12)
- Marathas get tax collection rights in fertile northern lands
- Shinde and Holkar are on the hook to defend Delhi
- Peshwa gets the money but is far away in Pune
- War with Abdali is now inevitable
Key Point: This was Peshwa's major victory financially, but Shinde and Holkar are the ones who'll have to fight.
Safdar Jung: The Corrupt Wazir
The Treasury Crisis
What Was Happening:
- Whatever taxes the Mughal Empire collected from farmers and provinces
- Safdar Jung was taking the money for his own expenses
- Nothing was getting deposited in the government treasury
- The treasury was running extremely low
The Consequences:
- Couldn't pay salaries of courtiers
- Emperor couldn't fund public works
- Couldn't fund army expenses
- Government was basically broke
The Deliberate Destruction
The Assessment:
- Safdar Jung had made the Mughal Empire poverty-stricken
- He was doing whatever he wanted with the money
- He had almost determined to totally destroy the empire
- Essentially selling it for parts
Source: This was the commentary from a Mughal court historian about Safdar Jung's behavior.
Meanwhile: The Emperor
What He Was Doing:
- Busy enjoying life
- Nothing to do with governance
- Nothing to do with fighting
- Using what little money remained like his personal piggy bank
- Completely checked out
The Awadh Dynasty: Origins of the Shia Power
Where It All Started
Saadat Khan:
- First Nawab of Awadh
- His nephew: Muhammad Mukim (also called Mansoor Khan)
Muhammad Mukim's Journey:
- Until 1723, he was in Iran (or Iraq - sources differ)
- His uncle Saadat Khan called him to join
- He came to Surat (extremely rich port city at the time)
- Traveled 700 miles to reach Faizabad (in Awadh)
The Marriage Alliance
The Deal:
- Saadat Khan welcomed him
- Married him to his daughter: Sadrunissa Begum
- Appointed him as associate subedar of Awadh
- Basically setting him up as the next ruler
The Plan: Keep power in the family through marriage and appointment.
Muhammad Mukim (Mansoor Khan): The Unusual Muslim Ruler
His Unique Character
What Made Him Different:
- Had only ONE marriage (extremely unusual for Muslim rulers of that era)
- No mistresses (angulastar = no extramarital affairs)
- Monogamous in a polygamous world
His Wife: Sadrunissa Begum
- Uncle's daughter (his cousin)
- Had positive traits (samanjas):
- Thoughtful
- Made proper compromises when needed
- Good judgment
Their Son: Suja Uddaula
Who He Is:
- Son of Muhammad Mukim and Sadrunissa Begum
- Going to become VERY important (narrator's emphasis)
His Mother's Role:
- Gave him good advice regularly
- Made sure he stayed on the right path
- She will assume a very important role later in the story
The Awadh Kingdom: Understanding the Power Base
Geographic & Economic Context
Location: Awadh (the correct pronunciation of Ayodhya)
Where It Sits:
- In the Doab region (land between Ganga and Yamuna)
- The Doab is one of the most fertile areas in India
- Awadh is just a small part of the larger Doab
Economic Importance:
- Very, very fertile land
- Tax revenue is enormous
- One of the wealthiest regions
The Political Reality: Shia vs. Sunni
The Awadh Rulers:
- Shia Muslim dynasty
- Originally from Iran
- Now ruling this incredibly wealthy Indian territory
The Afghan/Rohilla Problem:
- Rohillas are Sunni Afghans
- They don't like the Awadh rulers for two reasons:
- They're not from Afghanistan
- They're Shia (Afghans are Sunni)
Religious Division:
- This Sunni vs. Shia tension is a constant political factor
- Affects alliances and enmities
- Will play a role in the coming conflicts
The Dynasty's Ambitions
The Ultimate Goal: Becoming Wazir
What They Wanted:
- The kings of Awadh always desired to become the Wazir of the Mughal Empire
- This was their aspiration
- While keeping their own kingdom, of course
Why the Wazir Position Mattered:
- Most important position in the empire
- Real power behind the throne
- Control over finances and military
- More important than many kings
The Strategy:
- Build wealth in Awadh
- Maintain good relations with Mughals
- Wait for opportunity to become wazir
- Use wazir position to expand power further
Key Players Introduced
| Name | Relationship | Role | Importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saadat Khan | Original patriarch | First Nawab of Awadh | Started the dynasty |
| Muhammad Mukim (Mansoor Khan) | Nephew of Saadat Khan | Associate Subedar, later ruler | Built the power base |
| Sadrunissa Begum | Daughter of Saadat Khan | Wife of Muhammad Mukim | Very important role coming |
| Suja Uddaula | Son of above couple | Heir to Awadh | VERY IMPORTANT - key figure |
| Safdar Jung | Current ruler (wazir) | Wazir & ruler of Awadh | Corrupt, destroying Mughal treasury |
The Family Tree
Saadat Khan (First Nawab of Awadh)
|
|---- Sadrunissa Begum (daughter)
| |
| | (married)
| |
+---- Muhammad Mukim/Mansoor Khan (nephew)
|
|
Suja Uddaula (son)
|
[Future key player]
Understanding the Power Dynamics
The Shia Dynasty Strategy
- Economic Base: Control Awadh's massive tax revenue
- Political Legitimacy: Serve as Mughal officials (subedar, wazir)
- Family Consolidation: Marry within family to keep power concentrated
- Persian Connection: Maintain ties to Iran (cultural/religious support)
- Ambition: Rise from provincial rulers to imperial wazirs
Why This Matters for Panipat
The Setup:
- Safdar Jung is corrupt and destroying the Mughal treasury
- But he's also made the crucial Maratha treaty
- His dynasty (Suja Uddaula) will inherit this mess
- The Awadh forces will play a role in the coming war
- The Shia-Sunni divide affects who allies with whom
Character Notes
Muhammad Mukim's Monogamy
Why This Is Notable:
- Muslim rulers typically had multiple wives and concubines
- Harems were standard
- His monogamy showed either:
- Strong personal conviction
- Exceptional devotion to his wife
- Persian/Shia cultural influence (more restrictive than Sunni practice)
Political Impact:
- No rival sons from other wives
- Clear succession line
- Sadrunissa Begum had more influence
- No harem politics
Sadrunissa Begum's Importance
The Narrator's Emphasis:
- "She assumes a very important role"
- Not just a wife - an actual political player
- Her advice to Suja Uddaula matters
- Strong, thoughtful, good judgment
- Remember this character - she'll be important later
Suja Uddaula: Remember This Name
The Double Emphasis:
- "This character is going to become very, very important"
- "You have to understand who he is"
- Son of the Shia dynasty
- Heir to Awadh's wealth
- Will inherit both the kingdom and the political mess
The Broader Context: Mughal Decline
The Contrast
Then (Aurangzeb's Era):
- Strong central treasury
- Could fund massive armies
- Conquered territories added wealth
- Empire functioned
Now (1752):
- Wazir stealing from treasury
- Can't pay salaries
- Can't fund army
- Empire is a hollow shell
- Dependent on Marathas for protection
The Irony
- The wazir is supposed to manage the empire
- Instead, Safdar Jung is destroying it
- Taking money for personal use
- Deliberately impoverishing the state
- And yet, he's the one who made the Maratha treaty to "protect" the empire
What's Coming
The Foreshadowing
We're Being Told:
- Suja Uddaula will be very important
- His mother will play a significant role
- The Awadh dynasty has ambitions
- The Shia-Sunni divide matters
- The Mughal treasury is destroyed
Why This Matters:
- When Abdali returns (and he will)
- Suja Uddaula will likely be the Awadh leader
- He'll have to decide: Support Mughals? Support Abdali? Stay neutral?
- His mother's counsel will influence these decisions
- The financial weakness makes resistance harder
Key Themes
- Corruption from Within - The empire isn't just weak externally, it's being looted internally
- Dynasty Building - How powerful families consolidate control through marriage and appointments
- The Wazir's Dual Role - Provincial ruler + imperial administrator = massive power
- Religious Divisions - Shia vs. Sunni tensions shape alliances
- Women's Hidden Power - Sadrunissa Begum's influence operates behind the scenes
- The Succession Question - Grooming the next generation for power
Regional Context
Awadh/Ayodhya:
- Not just historically important (Ramayana connection)
- Currently one of the richest regions
- Controls access to the Doab
- Strategic location between Delhi and eastern provinces
The Doab:
- Most fertile land after Punjab
- Now Marathas have tax rights here
- But Awadh dynasty still controls their portion
- Everyone wants a piece of this wealth
Looking Ahead
The Stage Is Set:
- Safdar Jung has bankrupted the Mughal treasury
- Made a treaty committing Marathas to defend the empire
- His successor (Suja Uddaula) will inherit both the wealth and the obligations
- Abdali is coming back (everyone knows it)
- When he does, all these pieces will matter
The Questions:
- Will Suja Uddaula honor the Maratha treaty?
- Will the Shia-Sunni divide affect his choices?
- What role will his mother play in his decisions?
- Can the Awadh forces make a difference in the coming war?
Session ended here - planning to continue later
The corruption within, the dynasty rising, and the religious tensions simmering - all while Abdali sharpens his sword in Afghanistan, waiting for the right moment to strike again.
Safdar Jung Explained: The Lion of Battle
How Mansoor Khan Became Safdar Jung & The Court's Deadly Factions
The Family Tree Clarified
The Confusion Solved
The Question: How does Safdar Jung fit into the Awadh dynasty?
The Answer: Safdar Jung = Mansoor Khan (same person, different titles!)
The Lineage
Saadat Khan:
- First Nawab of Awadh
- Originally from Iran
- Established the dynasty
Muhammad Mukim (Mansoor Khan):
- Nephew of Saadat Khan (his uncle's son)
- Was in Persia/Iran until 1723
- Uncle invited him to come to India
The Journey:
- Came to Surat (extremely rich port city at the time)
- Traveled 700 miles to Faizabad (in Awadh)
- Warmly received by his uncle
The Strategic Marriage
The Alliance
Who Got Married:
- Mansoor Khan (nephew)
- Sadrunisa Begum (Saadat Khan's daughter)
- Uncle's son marrying uncle's daughter (cousin marriage)
The Title: Abul Mansoor Khan (his first title)
The Position: Deputy Governor of Awadh
The Strategy: Keep power in the family
Mansoor Khan: The Unusual Prince
What Made Him Different
His Monogamy:
- Unusual for princes of that day
- Married only once
- No mistress or concubine
- In an era of harems and multiple wives, this was remarkable
His Wife: Sadrunisa Begum
Her Reputation:
- Renowned for her good sense
- Later gave good advice to her son (Suja ud-Daula)
- On more than one occasion
- A thoughtful, wise woman
Remember: Both she and her son will play very important roles later.
The Military Career: Battles with Malhar Rao Holkar
Round 1: Mansoor Khan Wins (1737)
The Setup:
- Mansoor Khan fought by his father-in-law's (Saadat Khan's) side
- Most notable success: 1737
What Happened:
- Drew the Maratha force under Malhar Rao Holkar towards the main Mughal army
- Under Saadat Khan's command
- Won a victory
- Holkar was chased beyond the Yamuna towards Bajirao's camp
Significance: This was before the factional alliances formed - they were still enemies.
Round 2: Holkar Gets Revenge (1738)
The Next Year:
- Malhar Rao got his revenge
- Stopped Mansoor Khan from going to Nizam ul-Mulk's aid near Bhopal
Context Check:
- Nizam ul-Mulk = ruling in Hyderabad (down south)
- Remember: Bajirao had created trouble for him before
- Now Mansoor Khan was trying to help the Nizam
The Score: 1-1 between Mansoor Khan and Malhar Rao Holkar
Historical Note: This is 1737-1738 - about two years before Nadir Shah invades (1739).
The Succession Crisis: Saadat Khan Dies
The Death
When: In the wake of Nadir Shah's attack on Delhi (1739)
The Problem: More than one claimant for governing the province of Awadh
The Contestants:
- Safdar Jung (Mansoor Khan)
- Others (multiple claimants)
The Master Bribe: How to Win a Succession
Mansoor Khan's Strategy
What He Did:
- Argued his case well
- Buttressed by a cash peshkash (tribute) of TWO CRORE RUPEES to Nadir Shah
- That's 20 MILLION RUPEES in 1739 money 💰
The Delivery:
- Cash reached Delhi on May 13, 1739
- Escorted by 200 Qizilbash soldiers
- Plus a special gift: A HUGE ELEPHANT
Understanding the Players
Qizilbash Soldiers:
- Typical Persian soldiers
- Specific attire and weapons
- Iranian style
- Shows Mansoor Khan's Persian/Shia identity
The Elephant:
- Royal animal
- Symbol of power and wealth
- Perfect diplomatic gift
Why This Bribe Worked
The Power Dynamic in 1739
Who Was Really in Charge:
- Nadir Shah had just looted Delhi
- Created absolute terror
- Massacred thousands
- The Mughal Emperor was essentially Nadir Shah's pawn
The Strategy:
- Instead of giving money to his "boss" (the Mughal Emperor)
- Mansoor Khan gave it to the real power (Nadir Shah)
- Nadir Shah was calling the shots
- He would be appointing the Subedar, not the emperor
The Shia Connection
Why It Mattered:
- Mansoor Khan = Shia Muslim
- Nadir Shah = Shia Muslim (from Iran)
- Same religious background
- Natural alliance
The Calculation:
- Presented tribute to fellow Shia who holds real power
- Showed loyalty to Iran/Persian faction
- Demonstrated wealth and capability
- Got in Nadir Shah's good graces thoroughly
The Appointment: Birth of "Safdar Jung"
What Happened
Nadir Shah's Decision:
- Deposited the money in his treasury
- On his departure back to Iran
- The Mughal Emperor Muhammad Shah appointed Mansoor Khan as Governor of Awadh
The New Title
"Safdar Jung" = "Lion of Battle" (or "Lion of War")
Meaning:
- Not his real name - it's an honorific title
- Given for his military prowess
- His actual name remained Mansoor Khan (or Mansoor Ali Khan)
- But he's now known as Safdar Jung
Result: No more succession tussle - Mansoor Khan/Safdar Jung wins decisively.
The Next Decade: Military Campaigns (1740s)
Following the Emperor's Orders
What Safdar Jung Did:
- Led expeditions on orders from the Mughal Emperor
- Campaign to Patna (city in Bihar province)
- Where Nana Saheb Peshwa had also reached on his invasion of Bengal
The Varanasi-Gaya Situation
The Holy Cities:
- Varanasi (Kashi) - one of holiest Hindu cities
- Gaya - where Gautam Buddha attained salvation
- Both were under Safdar Jung's control (part of Awadh territory)
Nana Saheb's Interest:
- Wanted to visit these holy places
- Maratha interest: make them independent cities
- Free them from Mughal/Awadh control
The Emperor's Response:
- When Peshwa visited Varanasi and Gaya
- Emperor ordered Safdar Jung to return to Awadh
- Translation: "Don't bother Nana Saheb, back off"
- Smart move to avoid confrontation
The Big Promotion: Moving to Delhi (1743)
The Summons
1743:
- Safdar Jung was summoned to Delhi
- Made a grand entry into the city
- With lots of pomp and circumstance
- He understood he might be made wazir
What He Actually Got
The Appointments:
- Head of Artillery (Commander of cannon regiments)
- Governor of Kashmir
Not Wazir Yet - but these are major promotions that set him up for it.
Understanding the Mughal Court Factions
The Two-Faction System
The Split:
- Irani (Persian) Group - Shia Muslims
- Turani (Turkish/Central Asian) Group - Sunni Muslims
The Irani/Persian Faction
Who They Were:
- From Iran/Persia
- Shia Muslims
- Led by Safdar Jung (after his rise)
Their Base:
- Persian cultural influence
- Shia religious identity
- Support from Iran
The Turani/Turkish Faction
Who They Were:
- From Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Turkestan, etc.)
- NOT modern Turkey - this is Central Asian Turks
- Sunni Muslims
- Led by Kamruddin Khan (the existing wazir)
Their Base:
- Afghan/Rohilla connection
- Central Asian tribes
- Sunni orthodox identity
Important: They have camaraderie with Afghans - same Sunni background, same region.
The Rise of Tensions
Who Got Displaced
The Positions Safdar Jung Got:
- Head of Artillery
- Governor of Kashmir
- Previously held by Turani/Turkish loyalists
- Loyal to wazir Kamruddin Khan
The Resentment:
- Kamruddin's faction was not considered (overlooked)
- They felt passed over
- Safdar Jung (a Shia) was getting prominent positions
- The Sunni/Turani faction did NOT like this
The Religious Division
Why This Mattered
The Turani/Afghan Position:
- All Sunni Muslims
- Didn't want a Shia getting prominent positions
- Religious rivalry between Sunni and Shia
- Felt under Safdar Jung's thumb
The Power Play
Nadir Shah's Influence:
- Remember: Nadir Shah gave Safdar Jung the subedarship of Ayodhya/Awadh
- Mughal Emperor was under Nadir Shah's pressure
- Emperor gave these new appointments partly due to that influence
The Result:
- Created deep rivalry between the factions
- Rohillas/Afghans/Turanis vs. Safdar Jung and the Shia faction
- This will explode later
Safdar Jung's Strategy: The Maratha Alliance
Why the Afghans/Rohillas Were Weak
The Realization:
- Rohillas knew they didn't have enough power to defeat Safdar Jung
- Why? Because Safdar Jung knew to make alliances with Marathas
- He got their commitment to defending Delhi
The Track Record:
- After Safdar Jung sought Maratha help
- Marathas won quite a few battles in and around the Doab
- These were pitched battles against the Rohillas
- Rohillas realized: We have NO match for Marathas
- They're fighting a superior force
The Consequence:
- Rohillas in a very weak spot
- Can't defeat Safdar Jung militarily
- Can't match the Maratha alliance
- Stuck under Shia faction control
The Nadir Shah Effect (1739)
How Everything Changed
Before Nadir Shah:
- Mughals thought they could handle threats
- Safdar Jung and Malhar Rao were trading victories (1-1)
- Normal political/military competition
After Nadir Shah (1739):
- Nadir Shah created terror in Delhi
- Literally massacred thousands and thousands of people
- A different level of cruelty
- Even the torturous Mughals thought this was inhuman
The Realization:
- Mughals understood they were incapable of dealing with external aggressors
- This level of violence was beyond what they'd seen or done
- They couldn't take this kind of punishment
The Result:
- Mughals started inclining towards Marathas for protection
- Needed allies who could actually fight
- That's when the whole dynamic shifted
Key Players
| Name | Also Known As | Religion | Faction | Position |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mansoor Khan | Safdar Jung, Mansoor Ali Khan | Shia | Irani/Persian | Governor of Awadh, later wazir |
| Sadrunisa Begum | - | Shia | - | Wife of Mansoor Khan, wise counselor |
| Suja ud-Daula | - | Shia | - | Son of above, future key player |
| Saadat Khan | - | Shia | Irani/Persian | First Nawab of Awadh (deceased by 1739) |
| Kamruddin Khan | - | Sunni | Turani/Turkish | Existing wazir, rival to Safdar Jung |
| Nadir Shah | - | Shia | Iranian | Persian conqueror who looted Delhi (1739) |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | - | Hindu | Maratha | Commander under Bajirao, later Safdar Jung's ally |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | - | Hindu | Maratha | Peshwa, wanted holy cities freed |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1723 | Mansoor Khan arrives in India from Persia |
| 1723 | Marries Sadrunisa Begum, becomes deputy governor |
| 1737 | Defeats Malhar Rao Holkar (with Saadat Khan) |
| 1738 | Holkar gets revenge, stops him from aiding Nizam |
| 1739 | Nadir Shah invades and loots Delhi |
| 1739 | Saadat Khan dies → succession crisis |
| May 13, 1739 | Mansoor Khan's bribe reaches Delhi (2 crore rupees) |
| 1739 | Gets appointed Governor of Awadh, title "Safdar Jung" |
| 1740s | Military campaigns to Patna, Bengal |
| 1740s | Varanasi/Gaya situation with Nana Saheb |
| 1743 | Summoned to Delhi, made Head of Artillery & Governor of Kashmir |
| 1743 | Becomes highest Irani noble at court |
| 1740s-1750s | Rising conflict with Rohillas under Ali Muhammad |
Geographic Context
Awadh/Ayodhya:
- In the Doab (between Ganga and Yamuna)
- Very fertile, enormous tax revenue
- Safdar Jung's power base
Kashmir:
- Far north
- Safdar Jung given governorship in 1743
- Previously held by Turani loyalists
Varanasi & Gaya:
- Holy cities under Awadh control
- Peshwa wanted them independent
- Point of tension
The Doab:
- Where Marathas and Rohillas fought
- Safdar Jung's territory
- Most fertile land after Punjab
Strategic Analysis
Safdar Jung's Genius Moves
- Identified Real Power - Bribed Nadir Shah, not the puppet emperor
- Spectacular Bribe - 2 crore + 200 soldiers + elephant = impossible to refuse
- Shia Networks - Leveraged religious connections with Iran
- Maratha Alliance - Understood who the real military power was
- Court Politics - Systematically displaced Turani faction from key positions
Why the Rohillas Were Screwed
- Military Inferiority - Can't beat Marathas on the battlefield
- Political Outmaneuvered - Safdar Jung controls key positions
- Religious Isolation - Shia faction has Iranian backing
- No External Allies - Can't call on anyone strong enough
- Stuck - Under Safdar Jung's thumb with no way out
The Factional Dynamics
Why This Matters for Panipat
The Setup:
- Court divided: Shia (Irani) vs. Sunni (Turani/Afghan)
- Safdar Jung represents Shia faction
- Rohillas/Afghans represent Sunni faction
- Marathas allied with Safdar Jung
- When Abdali comes → Sunni vs. Shia + Hindu alliance
The Inevitable Explosion:
- Religious tensions building
- Political resentments festering
- Rohillas feel weak and desperate
- They need an external Sunni champion
- Enter: Ahmad Shah Abdali (Sunni Afghan with big army)
Key Themes
- The Power of Well-Placed Bribes - 2 crore bought a kingdom
- Religious Factions Matter - Sunni vs. Shia shapes everything
- Know Who Really Has Power - Nadir Shah, not the emperor
- Military Alliances Are Everything - Marathas made Safdar Jung untouchable
- Court Politics Is Deadly - Displacing factions creates permanent enemies
- The Nadir Shah Effect - One invasion changed the entire psychology
The Irony
Mansoor Khan:
- Defeated Malhar Rao Holkar in 1737 (as enemies)
- Later allied with Marathas (became friends)
- This alliance made him powerful
- But also committed him to fighting Abdali
- Which will lead to...
Where we left off: The court factions are set, the tensions are rising, and everyone understands the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the Mughal court. The Rohillas are weak and desperate, waiting for someone who can match the Maratha power...
From nephew to governor to wazir - Mansoor Khan played the game perfectly. But in creating enemies of the Rohillas and Afghans, he set the stage for them to invite the one man who could challenge the Maratha-Mughal alliance: Ahmad Shah Abdali.
The Court Rivalries Deepen
Kamruddin's Faction & The Sunni-Shia Battle for Control
Quick Recap
Where We Are:
- Mansoor Khan = Safdar Jung (same person)
- He became Governor of Awadh after bribing Nadir Shah with 2 crore rupees
- Got title "Safdar Jung" (Lion of Battle)
- By 1743, appointed Head of Artillery and Governor of Kashmir
- Court is split: Irani/Shia faction (Safdar Jung) vs. Turani/Sunni faction (Rohillas/Afghans)
- Marathas allied with Safdar Jung → Rohillas can't match them militarily
The Battle History: Safdar Jung vs. Malhar Rao Holkar
Understanding the Timeline
1737 (Two Years Before Nadir Shah):
- Safdar Jung (with Saadat Khan) defeated Malhar Rao Holkar
- Holkar was one of the commanders Bajirao I appointed to the North
- Safdar Jung helped his uncle Saadat Khan win this battle
1738 (One Year Before Nadir Shah):
- When Safdar Jung was going to help Nizam ul-Mulk in the South
- Near Bhopal
- Malhar Rao Holkar defeated him (or drove him back to Delhi)
The Score: 1-1 - They had a history of trading victories
Critical Context: This is BEFORE Nadir Shah's 1739 invasion that changed everything.
The Nadir Shah Watershed Moment (1739)
How One Event Changed The Equation
Before 1739:
- Mughals and Marathas were competitive rivals
- They'd win some, lose some
- Normal military competition
Nadir Shah Arrives (1739):
- Creates total terror in Delhi
- Literally massacres thousands and thousands of people
- A different level of cruelty
- Even the Mughals (who were "pretty torturous people") thought this was inhuman
- Another level beyond what they'd ever seen or done
The Realization
What Mughals Understood:
- "We are incapable of dealing with external aggressors"
- This violence was something they had never even seen or done
- "We can't take this"
The Strategic Shift:
- Started inclining towards Marathas for help
- Needed real military power
- That's when alliances began forming
- This changed everything
After Nadir Shah Left: The Succession Bribe
The Claimants
After Saadat Khan Died:
- Three, four, maybe five people claimed they were the true heir to Awadh
- Not just one or two - multiple claimants
Mansoor Khan's Winning Move
What He Did:
- Put forth his case "in a very auspicious and strong manner"
- Why? He was Saadat Khan's son-in-law
- Paid two crore rupees (20 million) as tribute to Nadir Shah
Understanding the Power Dynamic
The Question: Who was in charge then?
The Answer: Nadir Shah, NOT the Mughal Emperor
The Reality:
- Mughal Emperor was a standby - just there in name
- He was a pawn of Nadir Shah
- Nadir Shah was calling the shots
- He would be appointing the Subedar
Mansoor Khan's Smart Move:
- Instead of giving money to his "so-called boss" (the emperor)
- Gave it to Nadir Shah (the real power)
- Bribed the person who actually made decisions
The Details of the Tribute
What Was Sent
The Cash:
- Two crore rupees = 20 million rupees
- In 1739 money (absolutely massive sum)
The Military Escort:
- 200 Qizilbash soldiers
- Typical Persian soldiers
- Specific Iranian-style attire and weapons
- Shows his Shia/Persian identity
The Royal Gift:
- A huge elephant
- Royal animal (symbol of power)
- Perfect diplomatic touch
Why It Worked
The Shia Connection:
- Mansoor Khan = Shia Muslim
- Nadir Shah = Shia Muslim (from Iran)
- Same religious background
- Natural alliance
The Message:
- "I want to be in your good graces thoroughly"
- Well thought out presentation
- Basically a sophisticated bribe
- But presented as respectful tribute
The Appointment Confirmed
What Happened
When Nadir Shah Went Back to Iran:
- He basically appointed Mansoor Ali Khan as Subedar of Awadh/Ayodhya
- Gave him the honorific title "Safdar Jung"
- Meaning: Lion of the battlefield
Clarification:
- Safdar Jung = honorific title (like "Sir" or "Lord")
- His actual name = Mansoor Ali Khan (or Mansoor Khan)
- But now known by the title
The Next Decade: 1740s Campaigns
Following Orders
What Safdar Jung Did:
- Led many campaigns based on Mughal Emperor's orders
- One campaign to Patna (city in Bihar province)
- This is where Nana Saheb Peshwa had also reached during his invasion of Bengal
The Holy Cities Issue
The Setup:
- Varanasi and Gaya = holiest places for Hindus
- Both under Safdar Jung's control (part of Awadh territory)
- Nana Saheb Peshwa wanted to visit them
The Emperor's Order:
- When Peshwa went to Varanasi and Gaya
- Emperor told Safdar Jung: Go back to Awadh
- Translation: "Don't bother Mr. Nana Saheb"
- Smart diplomatic move to avoid conflict
The Delhi Promotion: 1743
The Grand Entry
What Happened:
- Safdar Jung was called to Delhi
- Made a grand entry with lots of pomp
- He understood he might be made wazir
What He Actually Got
The Appointments:
- Chief of the cannon regiment (Head of Artillery)
- Subedar of Kashmir (far north)
Plus:
- Kept his own kingdom of Awadh
- Given Kashmir governorship on top of Awadh
- Became the highest Irani noble at the court
Not wazir yet - but these positions set him up for it.
Who Got Displaced: Kamruddin Khan
The Turani Faction Leader
Kamruddin Khan:
- Existing wazir at the time
- Led the Turani faction
- His people previously held these positions
- His loyalists were "overlooked" (not considered)
What "Overlooked" Means
The Example:
- "If I'm considering three candidates for a position"
- "I just say 'Okay Rohan, I'm not going to consider you, get out'"
- That's being overlooked
- Kamruddin's faction got passed over for these key appointments
Understanding the Turani Faction
Who They Were
Kamruddin Khan and His Clan:
- From Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Turkestan, etc.)
- NOT modern Turkey - these are Central Asian Turks
- North of Afghanistan
- Sunni Muslims
- Called "Turani" (Turkish/Central Asian)
Their Natural Allies
The Connection:
- Have camaraderie with Afghans
- Same Sunni background
- Same general region ("in the same line")
- Natural alliance with Rohillas
Important: Kamruddin's Fate (Foreshadowing)
Remember This Character
The Question: What happened to Kamruddin later?
The Answer: He died in battle - his tent was hit by a cannonball
When: During the conflict with Abdali
His Son: Mir Manu (remember him?)
Critical Detail: At that time (when he died), Kamruddin was the wazir
The Connection
This ties back to the Siege of Lahore we read about earlier:
- Mir Manu defended Lahore against Abdali
- His father Kamruddin had been wazir
- Kamruddin died when cannonball hit his tent
- This weakened the Turani/Sunni faction further
The Factional Rivalry Explained
The Religious Division
Irani/Persian Faction:
- Led by Safdar Jung
- Shia Muslims
- From Iran/Persia
- Persian cultural influence
Turani/Afghan Faction:
- Led by Kamruddin Khan
- Sunni Muslims
- From Central Asia and Afghanistan
- Afghan/Rohilla allies
Why They Hated Each Other
The Turani Position:
- All Sunni Muslims
- Didn't want a Shia getting prominent positions
- Religious rivalry (Sunni vs. Shia is deep)
- Felt they were being put under Safdar Jung's thumb
The Dynamic:
- Kamruddin's faction did not like these appointments
- They asked: "Why are you getting this?"
- Felt passed over and disrespected
The Nadir Shah Influence Factor
Why Safdar Jung Got These Positions
The Background:
- Nadir Shah (Iranian Emperor) gave Safdar Jung the subedarship of Ayodhya
- Mughal Emperor was under pressure from Nadir Shah
- Emperor gave these new assignments partly due to that influence
The Resentment:
- It wasn't just merit
- It was Iranian/Shia pressure from Nadir Shah
- The Turani/Sunni faction saw this clearly
- Made them even more bitter
The Strategic Reality: Why Rohillas Were Powerless
The Military Math
The Rohilla Problem:
- Safdar Jung knew to make alliances with Marathas
- Got their commitment to defending Delhi
- Rohillas/Turanis didn't have enough power to defeat Safdar Jung
- Why? The Maratha factor
The Track Record
What Happened:
- After Safdar Jung sought Maratha help
- Marathas won quite a few battles in and around the Doab
- Three or four pitched battles
- Rohillas realized: "We are NO match for Marathas"
The Reality Check:
- Fighting a superior force
- Can't win militarily
- Stuck in a very weak spot
- Can't defeat the Shia faction + Maratha alliance
The Powder Keg
The Situation by the Late 1740s
Safdar Jung's Position:
- Highest Irani noble at court
- Controls Awadh (wealthy kingdom)
- Governor of Kashmir
- Head of Artillery
- Allied with Marathas (military superiority)
Turani/Rohilla Position:
- Losing ground politically
- Can't win militarily
- Feel oppressed by Shia faction
- Resentful and desperate
- Need an external champion
What's Coming
The Inevitable:
- Turanis/Rohillas can't accept this situation
- Too weak to fight Safdar Jung + Marathas
- Too proud to submit
- Need a powerful Sunni ally from outside
- Enter: Ahmad Shah Abdali (Sunni Afghan king with huge army)
Key Players Review
| Name | Religion | Faction | Position | Fate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Safdar Jung (Mansoor Khan) | Shia | Irani/Persian | Governor of Awadh, Head of Artillery, Governor of Kashmir | Leading Shia faction |
| Kamruddin Khan | Sunni | Turani/Turkish | Wazir (at time) | Dies later - cannonball hits tent during Abdali conflict |
| Mir Manu | Sunni | Turani/Turkish | Son of Kamruddin, Subedar of Lahore | Defended Lahore against Abdali |
| Nadir Shah | Shia | Iranian | Persian Emperor | Returned to Iran, but influence remains |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Hindu | Maratha | Commander | Allied with Safdar Jung after 1739 |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Hindu | Maratha | Peshwa | Allied with Safdar Jung |
Timeline Consolidated
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1737 | Safdar Jung defeats Malhar Rao Holkar (with Saadat Khan) |
| 1738 | Holkar gets revenge, drives Safdar Jung back to Delhi |
| 1739 | NADIR SHAH INVADES - Changes everything |
| 1739 | Saadat Khan dies, succession crisis begins |
| May 13, 1739 | Mansoor Khan's 2 crore bribe reaches Delhi |
| 1739 | Nadir Shah appoints him Governor of Awadh, title "Safdar Jung" |
| 1739 | Nadir Shah departs for Iran |
| 1740s | Safdar Jung leads campaigns to Patna, Bengal |
| 1740s | Holy cities issue with Nana Saheb Peshwa |
| 1743 | Safdar Jung summoned to Delhi, given new appointments |
| 1743 | Becomes Head of Artillery & Governor of Kashmir |
| 1743 | Kamruddin's Turani faction gets displaced/overlooked |
| Late 1740s | Marathas defeat Rohillas in multiple Doab battles |
| Late 1740s | Rohillas realize they need external help |
The Geographic Power Map
Safdar Jung Controls:
- Awadh/Ayodhya - His kingdom (very wealthy)
- Kashmir - Given in 1743 (far north)
- Artillery - Military power
- Parts of Doab - Through Maratha alliance
Contested/Rohilla Areas:
- Parts of the Doab - After Maratha victories
- Rohilkhand - Rohilla homeland, but weakened
Strategic Cities:
- Varanasi & Gaya - Holy cities under Safdar Jung's control
- Delhi - Imperial capital, factional battleground
Strategic Analysis
Safdar Jung's Brilliant Strategy
- Read the Room - Knew Nadir Shah had real power, not the emperor
- Made the Right Friends - Allied with Marathas (military superiority)
- Consolidated Power - Multiple governorships + military command
- Used Shia Networks - Leveraged Iranian connections
- Weakened Rivals - Systematically displaced Turani faction
Why the Turani/Rohilla Faction Was Trapped
- Military Inferiority - Can't beat Marathas on battlefield
- Political Losses - Lost key positions to Safdar Jung
- Foreign Pressure - Nadir Shah's influence helped Safdar Jung
- Religious Isolation - Shia faction has Iranian backing
- No Good Options - Too weak to fight, too proud to submit
The Religious Fault Line
Why Sunni vs. Shia Matters
It's Not Just Religious:
- Political alliances form along religious lines
- Iranians (Shia) vs. Central Asians/Afghans (Sunni)
- Each side backs their own
- Compromise is seen as betrayal
The Stakes:
- Control of the wealthiest empire in the world
- Who influences the Mughal Emperor
- Who gets tax revenues
- Who holds military power
The Divide:
- Centuries-old schism
- Different interpretations of succession after Prophet Muhammad
- Shia: Ali and his descendants should lead
- Sunni: Elected caliphs were legitimate
- Now playing out in Indian politics
The Abdali Connection (Setup)
Why Rohillas Will Invite Him
The Calculation:
- Rohillas are Sunni Afghans
- Abdali is Sunni Afghan
- Same religious identity
- Same ethnic background
- Same enemy: the Shia-Maratha alliance
The Inevitability:
- Rohillas can't win alone
- Need powerful external Sunni champion
- Abdali is the only one who can match Maratha power
- He's already raided India before
- He wants Delhi's wealth
- Perfect alignment of interests
What This Means for Panipat
The Setup:
- When Abdali comes back (and he will)
- Rohillas/Turanis will support him
- It becomes: Sunni coalition (Abdali + Rohillas) vs. Shia-Hindu coalition (Safdar Jung + Marathas)
- Religious war + political war + ethnic war
- All the fault lines will erupt at once
Key Themes
- The Nadir Shah Effect - One invasion changed the entire strategic calculation
- Religious Factions Rule Everything - Sunni vs. Shia determines alliances
- Military Power Matters Most - Marathas gave Safdar Jung untouchable status
- The Displaced Seek Revenge - Turani faction won't forget being overlooked
- Bribing the Right Person - Know who really has power
- Trading Victories Creates Respect - Holkar and Safdar Jung's history matters
The Irony Loop
The Pattern:
- Safdar Jung defeats Holkar (1737) → They're enemies
- Nadir Shah terrifies everyone (1739) → Mughals need help
- Safdar Jung allies with Marathas → Now he's powerful
- This alliance crushes Rohillas → They get desperate
- Desperate Rohillas will invite Abdali → Sets up Panipat
- Safdar Jung + Marathas must fight Abdali → The trap springs
The Tragedy:
- In making himself powerful through the Maratha alliance
- Safdar Jung created enemies who will bring Abdali
- The alliance that made him strong will commit him to a war
- That war will be Panipat
Looking Forward
What We Know:
- Kamruddin will die (cannonball during Abdali conflict)
- His son Mir Manu defended Lahore
- Rohillas are weak and desperate
- Abdali has already taken Punjab
- Safdar Jung has committed Marathas to defend Delhi
- The factions are set
- The religious divisions are deep
- War is inevitable
Where we left off: Understanding the factional dynamics completely - Irani/Shia (Safdar Jung) vs. Turani/Sunni (Kamruddin/Rohillas), with Marathas tipping the balance. The Rohillas are trapped and desperate, setting up their eventual invitation to Abdali.
The court politics, the religious divisions, the military realities - all pieces in place. The Rohillas know they're losing, and they know exactly who to call. Ahmad Shah Abdali is waiting in Afghanistan, and when the invitation comes, he'll bring hell with him.
The Fatal Treaty & The Poisoned Nizam
Why the Treaty Was a Mistake & The Murder in the Deccan
Quick Recap: The Players on the Board
The Setup:
- Safdar Jung - Wazir with personal kingdom in Awadh (Doab)
- Rohilla Afghan faction - Proxies of Abdali at Mughal court
- Ahmad Shah Abdali - Staying in Afghanistan (for now)
- Mir Manu - Switched allegiance, now in Lahore between them all
- Holkar and Shinde - Armies positioned in the north
- Nana Saheb Peshwa - In Pune directing everything
- Rajput Madhav Singh - Bitter about Maratha interference
- Jat King Surajmal - Near Agra, irate that provinces given to Marathas
The Potential Allies:
- Jats = good fighters (like Sikhs)
- Could potentially be Peshwa's allies
- But they're angry right now
The Treaty Recap (April 1752)
What Was Signed
When Ahmad Shah Abdali reached Lahore:
- Safdar Jung sought Maratha help on behalf of Mughal Emperor
- Signed agreement with Royal Seal in April 1752
The "Ridiculous Subterfuge"
The Process:
- Maratha chiefs had to first apply to the Emperor on oath for the terms
- Then the Emperor "agreed" to them
- Totally fake formality to make it look legitimate
The Document: The Ahadnama
What It Said:
- Peshwa obliged to defend the Emperor against ALL internal and external enemies
- Payment: 50 lakh rupees
Tax Collection Rights:
- Marathas given right to collect one-fourth of the revenue from:
- The Doab
- Punjab
- Sindh
- Problem: Both Punjab and Sindh were no longer in Mughal control
Additional Grants:
- Peshwa granted governorship of Agra and Ajmer
- Two important imperial provinces
- Jat King Surajmal and Jaipur's Madhav Rao were ALSO vying for these
The Slap in the Face
Creating Enemies
What Just Happened:
- Jat King Surajmal wanted Agra/Ajmer
- Madhav Rao (Rajput) wanted Agra/Ajmer
- Both got slapped in the face - given to Marathas instead
Why They Got Passed Over:
- They weren't capable of protecting the Mughal Empire
- Didn't have that kind of army
- Only Marathas had the military power
The Consequence
The Mughal Grants Succeeded In:
- Sparking a contest between three Hindu powers:
- Marathas
- Rajputs
- Jats
Result: They became rivals instead of allies
The Problem: They're NOT going to be loyal to any "Hindu cause" (if such a thing even exists)
The Northern Reaction
Everyone Wants Marathas Gone
The Rise of Maratha Influence:
- At Delhi
- Territorial ambitions increasing
- Led northern powers to support ANYBODY who could push them back to the Deccan
The Situation:
- Everybody in the north was interested in pushing Marathas south
- Minus the Emperor/Mughals (sort of)
The Mughal Dilemma
What They Actually Thought:
- Wanted to push Marathas down south
- BUT knew there was nobody who could protect them
- Willing to tolerate Marathas in an uneasy alliance
- Lesser of two evils
The Reality:
- Had to have them
- Would rather not have them
- Like a paper tiger - they knew it
- So they tolerated Marathas
The Problem for the Northern Powers
The Math:
- None of them could take on powerful Marathas
- Not individually
- Not even in combination
- Having a tough time with that
The Emperor's Double-Cross (April 1752)
The Timeline Bomb
April 12, 1752:
- Safdar Jung sealed the deal with the Marathas
- Treaty signed, Royal Seal applied
April 13, 1752 (ONE DAY LATER):
- Emperor had already ceded Punjab and Sindh to Abdali
- Before Safdar Jung even arrived!
April 25, 1752:
- Wazir reached Delhi with Shinde and Holkar
- Found out what happened
The Betrayal
What the Emperor Did:
- Refused to ratify the agreement signed by Safdar Jung
- Made the treaty essentially worthless for the Marathas
Safdar Jung's Plan:
- Take the Maratha chiefs with him
- Take Punjab back from Abdali
- Now not possible with the Emperor's capitulation
The Rushed Decision: Why This Was a Mistake
The Problem: No Peshwa Consultation
What Happened:
- Shinde and Holkar made this decision
- Did NOT consult Nana Saheb Peshwa
- Time was running out
- Decision had to be made right away
Their Thinking:
- "Let's do the decision on behalf of Peshwa"
- Took sovereign power into their own hands
- Said: "Yep, we are agreeable on behalf of the Peshwa"
Were They Allowed to Do This?
The Answer: Sort of.
- They had certain powers
- Thought "it should be okay"
- It was a golden opportunity
- Peshwa was always thirsty for money (just like Abdali)
- Within realm of normalcy to spot opportunity and go for it
Why They Thought It Would Be Fine
The Logic:
- Peshwa gets the money
- Shinde and Holkar take care of the northern front
- If any issue develops → they're responsible
- They're autonomous in charge
The Division:
- Responsibility: Shinde and Holkar (do the fighting)
- Benefit: Peshwa (gets the money)
The Assumption: Peshwa would be okay with this, probably
Technically: It was a sovereign decision made without proper authority
Why This Was Disastrous: Sardesai's Analysis
The Historian's Opinion
Sardesai Wrote:
- They had taken a rash decision
- Getting the Peshwa into this kind of contract
- Should have been done after thorough analysis
- Done rashly without proper consideration
The Strategic Problems
Problem #1: The Deccan Was Not Under Control
- Situation in the Deccan was not in complete control
- Maratha power did not have enough soldiers and war machinery
- To take on this new responsibility
- Peshwa had campaigns in the south still going
Problem #2: Getting Stretched Thin
- Already fighting in the south
- Now committing to defend the north
- Not pacified in the south yet
Problem #3: Direct Challenge to Abdali
- With this contract, gave a direct challenge to Abdali
- Provoking him
- Now Abdali understands: if he goes to Delhi → fighting Marathas
- Mughals have completely forsaken protection of their own land
- Farmed it out to the Marathas
The Conclusion
Sardesai's Verdict:
- Had tremendous implications
- Not thorough analysis was done before it was inked
- A strategic mistake
The Tax Collection Problem
The Reality of Implementation
What They Were Given:
- One-fourth taxes from Doab, Punjab, Sindh
- Right to governorship of Agra and Ajmer
The Problem:
- They had to get those themselves
- Had to go fight with Abdali's forces
- Put in the infrastructure
- Hire the people
- All that costs money and troops
Why This Was Hard
The Reality:
- Nobody wants to pay taxes
- You have to force them
- That machinery has to be created
- To back up the machinery → need soldiers
- If town says "we won't pay" → need force to implement threat
- Need a good force
The Consequence: Staying in Delhi
What Happened:
- Had to stay in Delhi
- Agra, Ajmer, and areas closest to Delhi
- Had to maintain presence
The Problem:
- Maratha force camped in Delhi
- Created hassles for civilian population
- Soldiers, machinery, horses in midst of civilian life
- These are foreigners - can't blend in easily
- Created disharmony in Delhi
The Situation:
- Sizable Maratha force presence
- Wouldn't leave until they got paid
- That was their major thing
- Did the whole Ahadnama just for the sake of money
- Certainly not leaving without it
The New Nizam Problem
The Deccan Strategy
Peshwa's Order:
- Get hold of Nizam's son
- Nizam was dead (1749 or 1750)
- Throne not completely filled
The Location:
- Nizam throne = Hyderabad (Deccan)
- His son was in Delhi
The Order:
- Get hold of this son
- Put him on the throne of Nizam
- "Nizam" is a title
Why This Son?
Peshwa's Reasoning:
- This son was relatively calm, quiet, and peaceful
- Won't create constant troubles for Marathas in the south
- That's why he selected him as heir apparent
Historical Context:
- Remember: Bajirao I defeated this Nizam at Battle of Allahabad
- Encircled him, cut off his water supply
- Nizam had no option but to surrender
- That Nizam was now dead
The Plan
Peshwa's Guess (Hope):
- Once Nizam's son is given the throne
- When he sits on throne
- Can disengage forces from Deccan towards north
- Free up armies to deal with northern situation
The Transaction
How It Worked
The Emperor's Business Model:
- This is how the Emperor made money
- Wasn't going to do this for free
What Happened:
- Emperor took 30 lakh rupees from Ghaziuddin (the Nizam's son)
- In order to give him the throne of Nizam
- Beneficiary = Ghaziuddin (gets to be Nizam)
Then:
- Emperor turned around and handed it to the Marathas
- This was their payment (part of it)
- Then Marathas prepared to leave
The Tragedy: Ghaziuddin's Murder
The Assassination
What Happened:
- Ghaziuddin went to Deccan to sit on throne of Nizam
- His stepmother invited him for dinner
- She mixed poison in the food
- Killed him
Why She Did It
The Motive:
- Probably had a son of her own
- Wanted HER son on the throne
- Ghaziuddin was in the way
The Consequence
For the Peshwa:
- His plan of making somebody obedient the Nizam was dynamited
- Completely destroyed
- Cannot have his own obedient personality in the Nizam position
- Not going to happen
For Ghaziuddin's Son:
- Became very scared
- "What's going to happen to me?"
- Probably was a minor (young)
Enter: Imad ul-Mulk
The Survivor
Who He Is:
- Ghaziuddin's son
- Same person who will become Imad ul-Mulk in the future
- Will become somebody important
Where He Was:
- Maybe already in Delhi
- Or had come to Deccan with his father
- Father now dead from poison
His Situation:
- Stepmother probably didn't have it in mind to make him next Nizam
- Had to go back to safe environment
- Was lost day and night (feeling sad, tragic mood)
- Lost his father
- In very precarious situation (could be killed anytime)
- Didn't know who was trying these bad things
Safdar Jung's Adoption
The Rescue
What Safdar Jung Did:
- Started loving him like his own son
- Took him under his wing
- Raised him
- Made him Mir Bakshi (Commander-in-Chief)
Amazing Turnaround:
- Made out pretty well
- Now on the court of the Emperor
- Very powerful position
His Age and Position
How Young:
- Just beyond 20 now (maybe 21, 22, maybe 24)
- Very young
- At age 16, became Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal Army
The Ungrateful Protégé
His Character
Imad ul-Mulk's Qualities:
- Very smart (buddhi maan)
- BUT had no idea about morals or moral standards
- Very bright guy
- Didn't follow any due process
- Had no moral standing
His Principles:
- Victory at any cost, no matter what
- The ends justify the means
The Betrayal Begins
What He Did:
- The moment he was made Mir Bakshi
- Started setting up conspiracies against Safdar Jung
- His own benefactor!
- Biting the hand that fed him
His Nature:
- Very unscrupulous
- Wanted absolute power
His Reputation
In the Next 10 Years:
- Got reputation as the most merciless commander or courtier in the Emperor's court
- Ruthless and efficient
- Known to be without mercy
The Deaths of 1754
Mir Manu Dies (Natural Causes)
What Happened:
- 1754 - Mir Manu died
- By natural death
- Sitting on a horse
- Horse suddenly takes off
- He falls off the horse
- Gets hurt
- Dies from the injury
Significance:
- Just got unlucky
- NOT killed by Marathas
- They were NOT going to attack Lahore
- Natural accident
Safdar Jung Dies (1754)
What Happened:
- 1754 - Safdar Jung also dies
- Believed to be natural causes
The Consequence:
- Now a crop of new people will come up
- Generation shift happening
- Old guard dying off
Key Players Status Update
| Name | Position | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa (Pune) | Active | Gets the money, directs from south |
| Shinde & Holkar | Northern commanders | Active | Made treaty without consulting Peshwa |
| Safdar Jung | Wazir | Dies 1754 | Natural causes |
| Mir Manu | Subedar of Lahore | Dies 1754 | Horse accident |
| Ghaziuddin | New Nizam (supposed to be) | Dead | Poisoned by stepmother |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Mir Bakshi (age 16-24) | Rising | Ungrateful, conspiring against Safdar Jung |
| Surajmal Jat | King near Agra | Angry | Passed over for Agra/Ajmer |
| Madhav Singh | Rajput ruler | Angry | Passed over for Agra/Ajmer |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Waiting | Knows Marathas are now his problem |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| April 12, 1752 | Safdar Jung signs treaty with Marathas (Ahadnama) |
| April 13, 1752 | Emperor cedes Punjab & Sindh to Abdali (ONE DAY LATER) |
| April 25, 1752 | Safdar Jung arrives in Delhi with Shinde & Holkar |
| April 1752 | Emperor refuses to ratify the agreement |
| April 1752 | Emperor takes 30 lakh from Ghaziuddin, gives to Marathas |
| April 1752 | Ghaziuddin goes to Deccan to become Nizam |
| April 1752 | Ghaziuddin poisoned by stepmother at dinner |
| April 1752 | His son (future Imad ul-Mulk) taken under Safdar Jung's wing |
| ~1752 | Imad ul-Mulk made Mir Bakshi at age 16-24 |
| 1752 onwards | Imad ul-Mulk starts conspiring against Safdar Jung |
| 1754 | Mir Manu dies (horse accident) |
| 1754 | Safdar Jung dies (natural causes) |
Strategic Analysis
Why the Treaty Was a Disaster
The Problems:
- Made without proper authority - Shinde/Holkar acted alone
- No thorough analysis - Rushed decision
- Overstretched forces - South not pacified, now committing north
- Provoked Abdali - Direct challenge to Afghan power
- Unenforceable terms - Punjab and Sindh already lost
- Created Hindu rivalries - Jats and Rajputs now enemies
- Implementation costs - Had to collect taxes by force
- Civilian disruption - Maratha presence in Delhi caused problems
The Emperor's Brilliant Treachery
What He Did:
- Let Safdar Jung negotiate with Marathas
- Seal the deal with Royal Seal (April 12)
- Next day - cede Punjab/Sindh to Abdali (April 13)
- Refuse to ratify the agreement
- Take 30 lakh from Ghaziuddin
- Give it to Marathas (partial payment)
- Let everyone fight it out
Result: Played all sides against each other
The Poisoning's Impact
What It Destroyed:
- Peshwa's plan for friendly Nizam
- Stability in Deccan
- Ability to move forces north
- Strategic flexibility
What It Created:
- Imad ul-Mulk (future problem)
- Another conspirator against Safdar Jung
- More instability
The Ironies
Irony #1:
- Safdar Jung saves Ghaziuddin's son
- Raises him as his own
- Makes him powerful
- He immediately betrays him
Irony #2:
- Treaty signed to protect Mughals
- Emperor undermines it the next day
- Makes it nearly worthless
Irony #3:
- Supposed to unite Hindu powers
- Instead creates rivalry between them
- Jats, Rajputs, Marathas now competing
Irony #4:
- Marathas get tax collection rights
- To territories no longer controlled by Mughals
- Have to fight Abdali to collect
The Big Picture
The Trap Tightens
What Just Happened:
- Marathas committed to defending Delhi
- But can't even collect the revenue to pay for it
- Abdali knows they're coming
- Northern Hindu powers are now enemies
- Mughals playing everyone against each other
- Deccan not secured yet
- Forces stretched thin
- Leadership dying off (1754)
The Inevitability
Why War Is Coming:
- Abdali challenged
- Marathas contracted
- Northern powers want Marathas gone
- Emperor wants everyone fighting
- No way to back out without losing face
- No way to succeed without overextending
Key Themes
- Rushed Decisions Have Consequences - No proper analysis
- Treating Effects, Not Causes - Treaty doesn't solve real problems
- The Emperor's Machiavellian Genius - Plays all sides
- Ungrateful Beneficiaries - Imad ul-Mulk betrays Safdar Jung
- The Poison Cup - Court intrigue destroys strategic plans
- Overextension - Can't fight in south AND commit to north
- Creating Enemies - Jats and Rajputs turned against Marathas
The stage is set. The trap is sprung. The mistakes are made. Deaths are coming. War is inevitable. And Abdali is watching...
The Court Conspiracies & Abdali's Return (1753)
Javed Khan's Rise and Fall, Imad ul-Mulk's Ruthlessness, and the Bill Comes Due
The Mughal Empire Hits New Lows
The Downward Spiral
The Commentary:
"Very soon, the Mughal Sansana was going to be facing a lot of murders and going towards its low point. Lots of assassinations. Reaching to the bottom. A new low."
Translation:
- They still had further to fall
- Murders and assassinations coming
- Reaching the lowest level (nichang)
- The empire's decline accelerating
Javed Khan: The Low-Caste Upstart
His Origins
Who He Was:
- Born in a lower caste (heen kurat)
- His master/patron: Udham Bai (the Queen Mother)
The Caste System Issue:
- Even though Islamic people say there's no caste system
- They still enforced it
- Muslims born in high castes wanted to keep their status
- Javed Khan may have been from a Hindu family originally (lower caste)
- Converted to Islam but caste stigma remained
Udham Bai: The Dancing Girl Queen Mother
Her Background
Who She Was:
- In earlier life: dancing girl (dancer in the court)
- Very low profession - something you don't want to be associated with
- Now: Queen Mother (mother of the current Emperor)
Her Power:
- Had tried to reduce the power of Safdar Jung (the wazir)
- Now wielding influence in the court
Her Relationship with Javed Khan
What Happened:
- Javed Khan had become close to her
- Before she became royal, she was also a dancing girl (from low caste)
- They had similar backgrounds
The Scandal:
- Javed Khan rapidly promoted in the court
- This lady used to get into the company of Javed Khan at night
- Lots of jokes started happening about their relationship
- Became public knowledge among citizenry
Javed Khan's Rapid Rise
His Ascension
How High He Got:
- Slowly started rising in court
- Reached level of Nawab Bahadur
- Running things on the home front when wazir was out
His Method
How He Did It:
- Pampered the Emperor
- Got into his good books
- Through his relationship with Udham Bai
The Mismanagement
Bad Administration
What They Did Wrong:
- A lot of servants not getting paid on time
- Udham Bai pampering herself on her birthday
- Mismanaging the funds
- Not worried about lifestyle of hourly workers
- Bad administrators
The Public Protest
The Donkey and Dog Incident:
- Servants tied a donkey and a dog to the door
- Started telling everybody coming in/out:
- "Pay salutes to these two animals"
- Making fun of her and Javed Khan
The Power Play
Javed Khan's Ambitions
What He Did:
- Emperor made lots of money through these two people (Udham Bai and Javed Khan)
- Or more likely: Javed Khan made a lot from the Emperor and Udham Bai
- He appointed his own men in the court
- Instead of able people appointed before
- Doing a coup behind the scenes
Where Was Safdar Jung?
- Safdar Jung had made a lot of officers "free of post" (fired them)
- Using his control as wazir
Javed Khan's Delusion:
- Started feeling that after the Emperor, he was next in line
- Most important and most powerful
The Confrontation
Safdar Jung Returns to Delhi
What Happened:
- Safdar Jung came out of his tent and went to Delhi
- The situation with Balu Jat gave him a good idea of what was going on
- Forced the situation
- Pretense disappeared
- Things became very clear
- About what Javed Khan was doing behind Safdar Jung's back
The Insult on the Path
The Setup:
- Javed Khan wanted to prove he was higher level than Safdar Jung
- Made himself present on a path that was on the way of Safdar Jung
- Expected him to stop and salute him
What Happened:
- Safdar Jung ignored him
- Didn't stop, didn't acknowledge him
The Balu Jat Incident
Javed Khan's Retaliation
What He Did:
- Called Balu Jat (local chief)
- Asked him to invade Sikandarabad (or some town)
- This was Safdar Jung's territory (his subedar or jahagir)
- Directly challenging Safdar Jung's authority
The Result:
- Delhi received news that Balu Jat won over the town
- Safdar Jung was put on the spot
- He insisted to find out what's going on (considered Javed Khan a subordinate)
Safdar Jung's Response
What He Did:
- Sent forces
- Kicked out Balu Jat from Sikandarabad
- Retook the town
The Execution
The Dinner Trap
Safdar Jung's Decision:
- Realized Javed Khan was usurping his power
- Saw him as a threat
- Decided to get rid of him
The Setup:
- Invited Surajmal Jat (king/vassal king of Bharatpur)
- Invited Javed Khan
- To dinner
The Murder
What Happened:
- After dinner deliberations
- His soldiers beheaded Javed Khan
- His head was left on the street
- His body thrown in the Yamuna River (on the riverbed/beach)
Safdar Jung Re-Consolidates Power
Total Control
What He Achieved:
- Had entire power in his hands now
- Emperor became totally dependent on him
- Paravolambi = dependent on somebody else
- (Opposite: Suavolambi = self-reliant)
The Situation:
- Emperor dependent on wazir for:
- All his safety
- Security
- Anything he wanted to do
No Opposition Left
For the Next Several Months:
- No opponent left for Safdar Jung
- He had successfully eliminated all rivals
- Re-consolidated his power
Meanwhile in the Deccan: The Poison Plot Continues
Reminder: Ghaziuddin's Death
What Happened (Previously):
- Ghaziuddin had gone to Deccan to sit on throne of Nizam
- His stepmother invited him for dinner
- She mixed poison in the food
- Killed him
Why She Did It:
- Probably had a son of her own
- Wanted HER son on the throne
The Peshwa's Plan Destroyed
The Consequences
For the Peshwa:
- His plan of making somebody obedient the Nizam was surunga (dynamited)
- Completely destroyed
- Cannot have his own obedient personality in the Nizam position
Enter: Imad ul-Mulk
The Scared Son
Who He Is:
- Ghaziuddin's son
- Became very scared after his father's murder
- "What's going to happen to me?"
- Probably was a minor (young)
His Situation:
- His stepmother probably didn't intend to make him next Nizam
- Had to go back to safe environment
- Was "lost day and night" (feeling sad, tragic mood)
- Lost his father
- In very precarious situation (could be killed anytime)
- Didn't know who was trying all these bad things
Safdar Jung's Adoption
The Rescue
What Safdar Jung Did:
- Started loving him like his own son
- Took him under his wing
- Made him his protégé
- Appointed him to Mir Bakshi position (Commander-in-Chief)
The Turnaround:
- Made out pretty well
- Now on the court of the Emperor
- Very powerful position
- At age 16, became Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal Army
Imad ul-Mulk's Character Revealed
Smart But Amoral
His Qualities:
- Very smart (buddhi maan)
- BUT had no idea about morals or moral standards (niti)
- Very bright guy
- Didn't follow any due process
- Had no moral standing
His Philosophy:
- Victory at any cost, no matter what
- The ends justify the means
- Very unscrupulous
The Immediate Betrayal
What He Did:
- The MOMENT he was made Mir Bakshi
- Started setting up conspiracies against Safdar Jung
- Against his own benefactor!
- Biting the hand that fed him
His Goal:
- Wanted absolute power
His Reputation
In the Next 10 Years:
- Got reputation as the most merciless commander or courtier in the Emperor's court
- Ruthless and efficient
- Known to be without mercy
Abdali Returns: 1753
The Demand
What Happened:
- As soon as 1753 came
- Abdali asked for his yearly collection of 50 lakh rupees
- Sent demand to the Emperor
- It was a big sum
Context: What Marathas Were Getting
The Comparison:
- Marathas were getting paid 50 lakh rupees (from the treaty)
- Abdali wanted the same amount
- Already a huge amount
The Treaty Gets Invoked
Safdar Jung Calls in the Marathas
What He Did:
- Asked the Marathas to help the Mughals out
- This was their Ahadnama (the treaty agreement)
- Part of the agreement: if Abdali comes, help rebuff him or convince him to go away
Understanding Abdali's Claim
Was This Pre-Agreed?
The Question: Was this previously agreed upon?
The Answer:
- Remember they had agreed to pay him some money
- Especially Mir Manu had made such agreements
- But Mir Manu's initiative (not official emperor policy)
The Reality:
- Doesn't matter if it was official or not
- This was between the Emperor and Abdali
- Marathas were bound by their treaty regardless
The Treaty's Terms Clarified
What the Treaty Actually Said
The Conditions:
- NOT to vanquish Abdali in his own land
- ONLY if he attacks and starts doing "funny stuff" in Delhi
- Especially protect Delhi
Why Delhi Mattered
The History:
- The kind of atrocities visited upon Delhi by:
- Iranian Shah (Nadir Shah)
- Abdali
- These guys were familiar with those horrors
- Didn't want it to happen again
Why Punjab Mattered
The Strategic Concern:
- Punjab had already slipped from the Emperor's hands
- Mir Manu had switched sides
- Wanted to save Punjab as much as possible
- Not let it slip into Afghan sphere of influence
- That was another reason to invoke the treaty
The Terms
The Agreement:
- Only if Abdali comes to Punjab or eastwards
- If he stays in Afghanistan without trouble → nobody cares
- If he moves east → Marathas must respond
The Emperor's Response
Appeasing Abdali
What the Emperor Did:
- Didn't totally reject what Abdali asked
- Gave something as a token
- Said: "This is it. We'll look at other things later"
- Basically appeasing Abdali
The Amount:
- Gave him five lakhs for now
- Said they'd raise the rest later
- Whether he wanted to give 50% or 10% of full sum → who knows
Why He Did This
The Calculation:
- Hoping Marathas will save him
- Didn't want to pay the full amount for sure
- Maybe didn't have it in liquid cash at the time
- Seems like a big amount for the time
The Real Fear:
- Didn't want Abdali to come back to Delhi again
- If he descends on Delhi → feared that outcome
- Could be catastrophic
- Wanted to somehow not see Abdali anywhere close to Delhi
The Math:
- If Abdali came looting → would be more costly than 50 lakh rupees
- Better to pay some now, promise more later
- Keep him away
Key Players Status
| Name | Position | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Javed Khan | Nawab Bahadur | DEAD | Beheaded by Safdar Jung, body in Yamuna |
| Safdar Jung | Wazir | Powerful | Re-consolidated all power, no opponents left |
| Udham Bai | Queen Mother | Active | Dancing girl background, relationship with Javed Khan |
| Emperor | Emperor | Dependent | Now totally paravolambi (dependent) on Safdar Jung |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Mir Bakshi (age 16) | Rising | Already conspiring against his benefactor |
| Ghaziuddin | (was to be Nizam) | Dead | Poisoned by stepmother |
| Balu Jat | Local chief | Active | Used by Javed Khan, defeated by Safdar Jung |
| Surajmal Jat | King of Bharatpur | Active | At the dinner where Javed Khan killed |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Demanding | Wants 50 lakh rupees |
| Marathas | Military power | Contracted | Treaty obligates them to help |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1752-1753 | Javed Khan rises rapidly through Udham Bai's patronage |
| ~1752-1753 | Scandal about their nighttime meetings becomes public |
| ~1752-1753 | Servants protest with donkey and dog incident |
| ~1753 | Safdar Jung returns to Delhi, discovers coup attempt |
| ~1753 | Javed Khan insults Safdar Jung on the path |
| ~1753 | Javed Khan uses Balu Jat to attack Sikandarabad |
| ~1753 | Safdar Jung retakes Sikandarabad |
| ~1753 | Dinner trap: Javed Khan beheaded |
| 1753 | Safdar Jung has total power, no opponents |
| 1753 | Imad ul-Mulk made Mir Bakshi at age 16 |
| 1753 | Imad ul-Mulk immediately starts conspiring |
| 1753 | Abdali demands 50 lakh rupees |
| 1753 | Safdar Jung invokes treaty, calls for Maratha help |
| 1753 | Emperor gives Abdali 5 lakh as token, promises more |
Strategic Analysis
Javed Khan's Fatal Mistake
What He Did Wrong:
- Rose too fast - From low caste to Nawab Bahadur
- Made it obvious - Public scandal with Udham Bai
- Appointed his own men - Attempted coup was transparent
- Directly challenged - Used Balu Jat against Safdar Jung's territory
- Insulted the wazir - Expected salute, got ignored
- Underestimated opponent - Didn't realize Safdar Jung would act decisively
The Result: Dead, body in the river, no ceremony
Safdar Jung's Ruthless Efficiency
What He Did Right:
- Saw the threat - Recognized coup attempt
- Acted decisively - Dinner trap, clean execution
- Sent a message - Head in street, body in river (public warning)
- Re-consolidated - No opponents left afterwards
- Made emperor dependent - Total control achieved
The Imad ul-Mulk Problem
Why This Is Dangerous:
- Very smart but completely amoral
- No loyalty (betrayed his savior immediately)
- Wants absolute power
- Ruthless and efficient
- Already becoming "most merciless" commander
- At age 16, he's just getting started
- In 10 years, he'll be unstoppable
The Irony:
- Safdar Jung saved him
- Raised him as a son
- Gave him huge power
- He immediately begins plotting against him
The Abdali Pressure (1753)
Why This Matters
The Situation:
- Abdali demanding 50 lakh
- Emperor can't/won't pay in full
- Gives 5 lakh as token
- Calls in Marathas per treaty
The Consequences:
- Treaty gets tested - Is it real or just paper?
- Marathas must respond - Contractually obligated
- Abdali sees the game - Knows Marathas are now the muscle
- Emperor plays both sides - Appeases Abdali, uses Marathas
- Collision course confirmed - Abdali vs. Marathas inevitable
The Terms Reminder
What Marathas Agreed To:
- Defend against internal AND external enemies
- But ONLY if they threaten Delhi/Punjab area
- NOT to invade Afghanistan
- Reactive defense, not offensive war
The Gray Area:
- Is demanding money "attacking"?
- Is refusing to pay valid?
- Does "convince him to go away" mean pay him?
- Or does it mean fight him?
The Court Dynamics
The Power Structure (1753)
Top Tier:
- Safdar Jung - Wazir, total power, no opponents
- Emperor - Dependent on wazir, losing autonomy
Rising Stars:
- Imad ul-Mulk - Mir Bakshi at 16, already plotting
The Women Behind the Throne:
- Udham Bai - Queen Mother, dancing girl past, scandal-ridden
Dead:
- Javed Khan - Executed for coup attempt
- Ghaziuddin - Poisoned by stepmother
External Threats:
- Ahmad Shah Abdali - Demanding payment
Military Power:
- Marathas - Treaty-bound to protect Mughals
Key Themes
- Low Caste Ambition - Javed Khan's rise and fall shows dangers of rapid ascent
- Ruthless Efficiency - Safdar Jung eliminates threats decisively
- Ungrateful Betrayal - Imad ul-Mulk immediately plots against savior
- Court Scandals - Dancing girls, nighttime meetings, public mockery
- The Poison Cup Returns - Ghaziuddin's death still reverberating
- Abdali's Patience Ends - 1753 marks his return to pressure
- Treaty Obligations - Marathas now must deliver on promises
- The Emperor's Weakness - Totally dependent, playing both sides
The Foreshadowing
What We Know Is Coming:
- Imad ul-Mulk will become most merciless in 10 years
- He's already plotting against Safdar Jung NOW (at age 16)
- Abdali won't accept 5 lakh as final payment
- Marathas will have to respond
- Emperor can't protect himself
- More assassinations and murders coming
- "New low" not yet reached
The Ironies
Irony #1:
- Safdar Jung saves Imad ul-Mulk's life
- Makes him powerful
- He immediately betrays him
- This act of kindness will destroy him
Irony #2:
- Javed Khan rose through scandal with dancing girl
- Died at a dinner (like Ghaziuddin)
- The meal is the weapon
Irony #3:
- Emperor thought he was clever playing both sides
- Now totally dependent on wazir
- Lost all autonomy
Irony #4:
- Marathas signed treaty to get money and power
- Now obligated to fight Abdali
- The payment comes due
1753: The year the bill comes due. Abdali is calling. The Marathas must answer. And inside the court, a 16-year-old sociopath is plotting his next move...
Safdar Jung's Fall & The Attempted Coup
The Final Confrontation, The Conspiracies, and The Desperate Power Play
Quick Recap: The Situation in 1753
The Power Structure:
- Abdali demanded 50 lakh rupees from Delhi
- Wazir (Safdar Jung) asked Marathas for help
- This was not previously agreed upon - Abdali was threatening them
- Actually, some payments HAD been agreed (especially by Mir Manu)
- But Mir Manu's initiative, probably unofficial
The Treaty Terms:
- Between Emperor and Abdali (Marathas weren't party to it)
- Nevertheless, Marathas were bound by their own treaty
- Their treaty: protect Delhi if Abdali attacks
The Conspiracy Against Safdar Jung
Udham Bai's Revenge Plot
The Trigger:
- Udham Bai (Queen Mother) had gotten angry
- Because Javed Khan was killed by Safdar Jung
- Remember: she had a scandal-relationship with Javed Khan
Her Allies:
- Sought help from sons of Kamruddin Khan (previous wazir)
- But NOT from Mir Manu (one of those sons)
- Mir Manu was already in Lahore
- Also sought help from Imad ul-Mulk (the Mir Bakshi)
The Irony:
- Imad ul-Mulk = the co-conspirator that Safdar Jung raised as his own
- Now he's willing to sell him out
- Ungrateful and traitorous
The Maratha Presence at Court
The Representatives
Why They Were There:
- Marathas now had representatives in the Emperor's court
- They had regular presence because:
- They were protectors (per the treaty)
- They had established themselves as a power to reckon with
Their Role:
- Part spy
- Part keeping in touch with what's happening in northern Indian belt
- Keeping aware of developments
The Status:
- They'd earned their place on the court
Antaji Mankeshwar: The Maratha Commander
Who He Is
His Position:
- A commander or warrior
- Has probably 2,000-5,000 force under him
- Administrative role, but not a clerk
- Military commander with troops
His Analysis
What He Thought:
- A lot of people were conspiring against Safdar Jung
- This situation is going to get into some bloody battle
- That was Mankeshwar's prediction
The Key Players Assembling
Who Matters Now
The Most Important:
- Abdali - The external threat
- Bhau - [A new character entering the story]
Always in the Picture:
- Nana Saheb Peshwa - Directing from Pune
Coming Soon:
- Peshwa will send his son from Pune
- His name: Vishwasrao
- Will enter the picture a little later
- Will play a decisive role in the very end (foreshadowing!)
Still to Enter:
- There's one more character that has to enter the picture
- Still waiting to be introduced
The Build-Up to Conflict (Month 1752 → 1754)
The Escalation
What Started Happening:
- In the month of 1752
- Army movement started in Delhi
- Really started looking like there was going to be anarchy
Why:
- Emperor vs. Wazir
- Their relations getting from bad to worse
The Two Camps
Emperor's Camp:
- Had bribed Mankeshwar (the Maratha commander)
- So Marathas were on the side of Emperor
Wazir's Camp:
- Madhav Singh (Rajput)
- Surajmal Jat
Why Rajputs and Jats Sided with Wazir
Their Grievance:
- These guys were irate with Marathas
- Why? Traditionally thought THEY should be getting the revenues from fertile land of North India
- That was given to the Marathas instead
Their Goal:
- "How can we get rid of Marathas from the north?"
- "Drive them to the south"
- That was their big goal
Their Alliance:
- Willing to partner with Safdar Jung
- Against the Marathas
The Final Meeting
Before Leaving Delhi
What Happened:
- Before leaving Delhi
- Safdar Jung Wazir had a one-on-one meeting with the Emperor
- Told him without any sweet words or etiquette
- Just gave it to him as he felt
Safdar Jung's Speech
What He Said:
"My master, I'm in this favor of my master. You can give me permission to go anywhere. I'm ready to go there. Order me wherever you want me to go and I will go there."
"You can give the position to the person who comes to your mind. You can give the position, the prime minister position to whomever you wish."
The Message:
- I'll go wherever you command
- You can replace me if you want
- It's up to you
The Emperor Seizes the Opportunity
The Removal
What the Emperor Did:
- This presented a readymade opportunity to replace the wazir
- That is exactly what he wanted to do
The Action:
- Freed him (pad mukta) of his position of wazir
- Gave him permission to go back to Awadh
- As the Subedar of Awadh (which he already was)
The Spin:
- Not technically "kicked out" (though harsh to say)
- "Removed" him from the wazir key
- Gave him permission to manage his own kingdom in Awadh
On Paper:
- "You can go back to Awadh and manage everything in your own kingdom"
- Not a bad offer, actually
Safdar Jung Refuses to Leave
The Unexpected Response
What Happened:
- Even though Safdar Jung said "I'm willing to do blah blah blah"
- He really didn't like it
- Was not hoping Emperor would take such an extreme step
His Decision:
- Didn't want to give up the power
- So he didn't leave Delhi
- Just stayed put in Delhi
The Surajmal Jat Gambit
Escalating the Situation
What Safdar Jung Did:
- Invited Surajmal Jat into Delhi
- Surajmal and his army came into Delhi
- They did a lot of looting in Delhi
The Consequence:
- The Emperor got mad
The Formal Sacking
The Official Removal
What Changed:
- Previously: Emperor said "if you're asking to be relieved, I'm relieving you"
- "You can go back to your kingdom"
- Tried to do it the nice way
But Now:
- "You're still in Delhi"
- "So now I'm sacking you"
- "You're done"
- Formally sacked
The Nuclear Option: Declaring a New Emperor
Safdar Jung's Desperate Move
What He Did:
- Declared someone else should be Emperor
- Said: "He's royal blood"
- "Safdar Jung did all this" (justifying the move)
Who He Declared:
- "He's the grandson [descendant] of Aurangzeb"
- "I'm making him the new Emperor"
The Coup Attempt
What This Means:
- Trying to do a full-out coup
- Not just refusing to leave
- Actually trying to replace the Emperor
- Claiming a different heir has legitimacy
The Emperor's Reaction
The Insult
What This Was:
- A big insult (upma)
- The Emperor got mad
- "This is too much"
- A huge slap in the face
Key Players Update
| Name | Position | Side | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safdar Jung | Former Wazir | His own | Attempting coup |
| Emperor | Emperor | His own | Fighting to keep throne |
| Udham Bai | Queen Mother | Anti-Safdar Jung | Organizing conspiracy |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Mir Bakshi | Anti-Safdar Jung | Betraying his benefactor |
| Kamruddin's sons | Various | Anti-Safdar Jung | Except Mir Manu |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha commander | Pro-Emperor | Bribed by Emperor |
| Marathas | Military power | Pro-Emperor | Following their commander |
| Madhav Singh | Rajput | Pro-Safdar Jung | Hates Marathas |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat King | Pro-Safdar Jung | Hates Marathas, looted Delhi |
| Bhau | [New character] | Maratha | Coming into focus |
| Vishwasrao | Peshwa's son | Maratha | Will come later |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | External | Watching and waiting |
The Factional Breakdown
Why Rajputs and Jats Backed Safdar Jung
Their Calculation:
- Enemy of my enemy is my friend
- They HATE the Marathas
- Marathas took "their" revenues
- Marathas are with the Emperor
- Therefore: side with Safdar Jung against Emperor
Their Logic:
- If Safdar Jung wins → maybe he'll give THEM the revenues
- If Safdar Jung replaces Emperor → new deal possible
- Anything to get rid of Marathas from the north
Why Marathas Backed the Emperor
Their Calculation:
- They have a treaty with THIS Emperor
- Bribed by the Emperor (through Mankeshwar)
- If new Emperor → treaty might be void
- Better to stick with the devil they know
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1753 | Abdali demands 50 lakh rupees |
| 1753 | Safdar Jung invokes treaty, calls Marathas |
| ~1753-1754 | Udham Bai organizes conspiracy against Safdar Jung |
| ~1754 | Imad ul-Mulk joins anti-Safdar Jung faction |
| ~1754 | Marathas establish regular court presence |
| ~1754 | Emperor bribes Mankeshwar, gets Maratha support |
| 1752-1754 | Army movements in Delhi, anarchy building |
| 1754 | Relations between Emperor and Wazir deteriorate |
| 1754 | Safdar Jung offers to resign in meeting |
| 1754 | Emperor removes him as wazir (first attempt) |
| 1754 | Safdar Jung refuses to leave Delhi |
| 1754 | Safdar Jung invites Surajmal Jat to Delhi |
| 1754 | Surajmal's forces loot Delhi |
| 1754 | Emperor formally sacks Safdar Jung |
| 1754 | Safdar Jung declares a new Emperor (coup attempt) |
| 1754 | Emperor enraged at the insult |
Strategic Analysis
Safdar Jung's Fatal Mistakes
Mistake #1: The Bluff
- Offered to resign
- Thought Emperor wouldn't accept
- Emperor called his bluff
Mistake #2: Staying in Delhi
- Refused to leave after being removed
- Made his intentions obvious
- Gave Emperor time to organize against him
Mistake #3: The Surajmal Gambit
- Brought in forces that looted Delhi
- Made him look like the bad guy
- Turned public opinion against him
Mistake #4: The Coup Attempt
- Went too far
- Declaring a new Emperor = treason
- Point of no return
- Forced everyone to pick sides
The Emperor's Smart Moves
Move #1: Bribing Mankeshwar
- Secured Maratha support
- They're the real military power
- Made them choose him over wazir
Move #2: Taking the Resignation Offer
- Called Safdar Jung's bluff
- Made him look like he was refusing legal orders
Move #3: Formal Sacking
- Escalated legally and officially
- Made Safdar Jung's position untenable
The Conspiracy Web
Who's Plotting Against Safdar Jung:
- Udham Bai (revenge for Javed Khan)
- Imad ul-Mulk (ungrateful protégé)
- Kamruddin's sons (revenge for their father's faction)
- The Emperor (wants control back)
Who's Supporting Safdar Jung:
- Madhav Singh (hates Marathas)
- Surajmal Jat (hates Marathas)
- [His own forces from Awadh]
The Wildcard:
- Marathas backed the Emperor
- But if new Emperor → who knows?
- They're there for money, not loyalty
The Rajput-Jat Calculation
Why They Hate Marathas
The Resentment:
- These fertile northern lands were "theirs" traditionally
- They had claims to Agra and Ajmer
- Marathas are outsiders from the Deccan
- Getting revenues that should go to local powers
The Goal:
- Push Marathas back south
- Reclaim the revenues
- Restore "proper" order (in their view)
Why They Back Safdar Jung
The Logic:
- Safdar Jung is fighting the Emperor
- Emperor is backed by Marathas
- Therefore: help Safdar Jung fight Marathas
- If Safdar Jung wins → he might reward them with territories
- Worth the gamble
The Maratha Dilemma
Why They Backed the Emperor
The Practical Reasons:
- The Bribe - Mankeshwar was paid
- The Treaty - Made with THIS Emperor specifically
- The Revenue - Granted by THIS Emperor
- The Risk - New Emperor might cancel everything
The Problem:
- They're mercenaries essentially
- Following the money
- But this puts them at odds with other Hindu powers
- Rajputs and Jats now see them as the enemy
The Long-Term Consequence
What This Means:
- Marathas vs. Rajputs vs. Jats
- Hindu powers divided
- When Abdali comes → disunited
- Each pursuing their own interests
- No united front possible
The Characters Still to Enter
Bhau
What We Know:
- One of the "most important" figures
- Already mentioned
- Coming into focus now
- Will play major role
Vishwasrao
What We Know:
- Peshwa's son
- Will enter "a little later"
- Will play a decisive role in the very end
- This is major foreshadowing
The Unknown Character
The Tease:
- "One more character that has to enter"
- Still waiting to be introduced
- Must be important if specifically mentioned
The Impending Disaster
What We're Building Towards
The Elements:
- Civil war in Delhi (Emperor vs. former Wazir)
- Maratha involvement on Emperor's side
- Rajput-Jat involvement on Wazir's side
- Abdali waiting for the right moment
- Internal conspiracies (Imad ul-Mulk, Udham Bai)
- New characters coming (Bhau, Vishwasrao, mystery person)
The Prediction:
- "Going to get into some bloody battle" (Mankeshwar)
- "Anarchy" in Delhi
- Reaching "new low" for Mughal Empire
Key Themes
- The Resignation Gambit Backfires - Offering to quit when you don't mean it
- Refusing to Accept Reality - Staying in Delhi after being fired
- Escalation Through Looting - Surajmal's forces in Delhi
- The Nuclear Option - Declaring a new Emperor
- Bought Loyalty - Marathas following the bribes
- Hindu Disunity - Marathas vs. Rajputs vs. Jats
- The Conspirators Circle - Everyone plotting against Safdar Jung
- The Foreshadowing - Vishwasrao's "decisive role in the very end"
The Ironies
Irony #1:
- Safdar Jung executed Javed Khan for attempted coup
- Now attempting a coup himself
- Becoming what he destroyed
Irony #2:
- Raised Imad ul-Mulk as his own son
- Imad ul-Mulk now conspiring against him
- Kindness repaid with betrayal
Irony #3:
- Marathas signed treaty to protect Emperor from external threats
- Now protecting him from internal threat (former wazir)
- But this makes other Hindus hate them
Irony #4:
- Safdar Jung allied with Marathas to beat Rohillas
- Now Marathas are his enemies
- The alliance that made him strong will destroy him
Irony #5:
- Rajputs and Jats side with Safdar Jung (Muslim)
- Against Emperor (Muslim) and Marathas (Hindu)
- Religion matters less than revenue
What Happens Next?
The Cliffhanger:
- Safdar Jung has declared a new Emperor
- Current Emperor is enraged
- This is "too much" - the ultimate insult
- Where we left off
The Questions:
- Will the coup succeed?
- Will Marathas stay loyal to current Emperor?
- Will Rajput-Jat forces be enough?
- What will Abdali do while Delhi tears itself apart?
- When do Bhau and Vishwasrao arrive?
- Who is the mystery character still to enter?
The Big Picture
The Situation in Late 1754
The Factions:
- Emperor's side: Marathas (bribed)
- Safdar Jung's side: Rajputs, Jats (hate Marathas)
- Conspirators: Imad ul-Mulk, Udham Bai, Kamruddin's sons
- External threat: Abdali (waiting)
- Coming reinforcements: Bhau, Vishwasrao, mystery person
The Crisis:
- Two claimants to the throne
- Civil war in Delhi
- Hindu powers divided
- Abdali watching and waiting
- "Anarchy" and "new low" approaching
The Inevitability:
- Someone will win the Delhi fight
- But they'll be weakened
- Abdali will strike then
- The divided Hindus won't unite
- Panipat is coming
1754: The year the Mughal Empire tears itself apart. Two Emperors. One throne. Civil war in Delhi. And Abdali sharpening his sword in Afghanistan, waiting for the perfect moment...
Mughal Court Politics & Maratha Intervention (1754)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Eunuch Emperor Strategy
Someone (likely a power broker in Delhi) chose a eunuch to become the new emperor.
Why a eunuch?
- Believed to be more obedient and controllable
- Unlike Imad-ul-Mulk (who wasn't a eunuch and became scheming), this guy was expected to be reliable
- Previously a servant - this was an upgrade for him
- The theory: he wouldn't create trouble and would stay under command
The Problem: There must be loyalists who remained loyal to Udham Bai and the previous emperor. And Imad-ul-Mulk has sided with them. Time for a coup!
Safdar Jang's Failed Power Play
The Emperor's Dilemma
Safdar Jang's scheming backfired spectacularly. By "adding oil to the fire," he created so much instability in Delhi that the emperor had no choice but to call in the Marathas.
What went wrong:
- Safdar Jang invited Surajmal Jat to Delhi
- This created major instability
- Things spiraled out of control
- Emperor forced to rely on Maratha military power
The Maratha Forces Already in Delhi
The Marathas weren't starting from scratch - they already had a military presence:
- 3,000-5,000 fighters stationed in Delhi
- Under command of Antaji Mankeshwar
- Ready to be mobilized
The Coalition Defeats Safdar Jang
The Winning Team
Imad-ul-Mulk + Antaji Mankeshwar + Rajendra Gir Gosavi formed an alliance that crushed Safdar Jang's forces.
Rajendra Gir Gosavi: Identity unclear - definitely not Muslim, probably not Maratha. May get more info later. Likely not with Surajmal/Madhav Singh since they're in opposite camps.
Result: Safdar Jang's forces were completely defeated and routed.
The Rohilla Wild Card
Najeeb Khan Rohila Enters the Game
Najeeb Khan = Rohilla sardar/warrior who opposed Safdar Jang
The Enemy-of-My-Enemy Logic:
- Rohillas normally oppose Marathas
- Marathas were siding with Imad-ul-Mulk and the Emperor
- But Rohillas hated Safdar Jang even more
- So they chose to oppose Safdar Jang (picking between two evils)
Court Factions Reminder
Two major groups in the Mughal court:
- Rohilla/Afghan group
- Persian courtiers
Safdar Jang belonged to the Persian faction, which the Rohillas despised.
The Three Maratha Commanders
Nana Saheb Peshwa (in Pune) sent three heavy hitters north to Delhi:
| Commander | Role/Background |
|---|---|
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Major Maratha commander |
| Jayapa Shinde | Major Maratha commander |
| Raghunath Rao Peshwa | Nana Saheb's younger brother |
Raghunath Rao: The Ambitious Brother
Family Tree:
- Father: Bajirao I (the legendary Peshwa)
- Elder brother: Nana Saheb Peshwa (current Peshwa - got the throne as elder son)
- Younger brother: Raghunath Rao Peshwa (this guy)
Character traits:
- Extremely ambitious
- Good fighter himself
- Will play a huge role in future events
- Spoiler alert: He will eventually kill Nana Saheb's son (Narayan Rao) because he wants the Peshwa position for himself
Current status: Not creating trouble yet because tradition dictates the elder son inherits. But his ambition is simmering...
Plot Twist: Too Little, Too Late
BEFORE the three Maratha commanders could reach Delhi:
- Safdar Jang's army was already defeated
- He retreated back to Awadh (his home territory)
So the big cavalry arrived after the main battle was over!
The Peace Brokers
Two characters stepped forward to negotiate a truce between the emperor and Safdar Jang:
1. Madhav Singh
- King of Jaipur (Rajasthan)
- Regional power broker
2. Shuja-ud-Daula
- Son of Safdar Jang himself
- About to become a MAJOR player in future events
- His mother: Daughter of Safdar Jang's uncle (who originally invited Safdar Jang to India from Iran)
- Mother described as thoughtful and intelligent
CRITICAL CHARACTER ALERT: Shuja-ud-Daula will be at the center of the next several years of conflict. Remember this name!
The Pardon
Safdar Jang and Surajmal Jat were both pardoned for their "stupidities" and the trouble they created.
Surajmal Jat's territory: Vassal king in Bharatpur (close to Agra)
Imad-ul-Mulk's Revenge Plot
The Problem
Imad-ul-Mulk was NOT happy with the pardons. He believed these two needed to be punished properly.
The Challenge
Imad-ul-Mulk challenged the Marathas to conquer:
- Awadh
- Allahabad
Both were prosperous areas under Safdar Jang's governorship.
The Strategy:
- If Marathas take these territories, Safdar Jang loses his power base
- Remember: The emperor had already offered tax collection rights to Antaji Mankeshwar
- This was the completion of the original conspiracy to take down Safdar Jang
Why Allahabad Matters
Religious Significance (Prayagraj)
Allahabad = modern-day Prayagraj = meeting point of three holy rivers:
| River | Status |
|---|---|
| Ganga | Active, flowing |
| Yamuna | Active, flowing |
| Saraswati | Mythical/historical - went underground, no longer visible |
Historical note: Saraswati used to be a huge, flowing river. Now only Ganga and Yamuna meet there, creating the Ganga-Yamuna confluence.
Why Marathas wanted it:
- Holy site = religious importance
- Rich agricultural region (on the Gangetic plain)
- Strategic location
The Split: Shuja-ud-Daula's Loyalty
The Father-Son Conflict
Shuja-ud-Daula refused Imad-ul-Mulk's plan.
His position:
- The friendship treaty with Safdar Jang (his father) and Surajmal Jat should remain intact
- No new hostilities should be created
- "What's done is done"
Result: This created a rift between Imad-ul-Mulk and Shuja-ud-Daula
The Degradation of Mughal Politics
Everything is Falling Apart
- Alliances constantly shifting
- Corruption skyrocketing
- Nobody knew who was calling the shots anymore
- Everyone acting purely for profit/self-interest
Examples of alliance chaos:
- First Marathas were desirable allies
- Then Madhav Singh and Surajmal Jat were preferred
- Loyalties changing constantly
The Stage is Set for Tragedy
With the arrival of the three Maratha commanders, combined with Imad-ul-Mulk's intense desire for revenge, the next chapter of tragedy was about to be written.
The Two Factions
By the end of this session, two clear sides had emerged:
FACTION 1: The Maratha-Imad Alliance
- Marathas (Malhar Rao Holkar, Jayapa Shinde, Raghunath Rao Peshwa)
- Imad-ul-Mulk (seeking revenge)
- Ready to attack Awadh and Allahabad
FACTION 2: The Awadh Alliance
- Shuja-ud-Daula (son of Safdar Jang, maintaining loyalty)
- Surajmal Jat (Bharatpur king)
- Safdar Jang (weakened but still in Awadh)
Key Players
| Name | Role | Affiliation |
|---|---|---|
| Eunuch Emperor | New emperor (puppet?) | Mughal Court |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Wazir/Power broker | Mughal Court - anti-Safdar Jang |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Commander | Maratha - stationed in Delhi |
| Rajendra Gir Gosavi | Leader (identity unclear) | Allied with Marathas |
| Najeeb Khan | Rohilla sardar | Rohilla - anti-Safdar Jang |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Maratha |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Maratha |
| Raghunath Rao Peshwa | Commander | Maratha (brother of Nana Saheb) |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa (in Pune) | Maratha - current ruler |
| Safdar Jang | Former power broker | Awadh governor (Persian faction) |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Son of Safdar Jang | Awadh - will become major player |
| Madhav Singh | King of Jaipur | Rajasthan - peace broker |
| Surajmal Jat | King | Bharatpur (near Agra) |
Timeline Context
Year: ~1754 (around the same time as the Kumbher Fort siege)
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Delhi - Mughal capital (chaos central)
- Awadh - Safdar Jang's territory (eastern region)
- Allahabad/Prayagraj - Holy city, target of Maratha expansion
- Bharatpur - Surajmal Jat's kingdom (near Agra)
- Jaipur - Madhav Singh's kingdom (Rajasthan)
- Pune - Maratha capital (Peshwa's base in Deccan)
What's Coming Next
The arrival of the three Maratha commanders + Imad-ul-Mulk's thirst for revenge = recipe for disaster.
Questions left hanging:
- Will the Marathas attack Awadh and Allahabad?
- How will Shuja-ud-Daula respond?
- What role will Raghunath Rao's ambition play?
- Is Imad-ul-Mulk engineering something sinister?
Two factions ready to clash:
- Marathas + Imad-ul-Mulk (aggressors)
- Shuja-ud-Daula + Safdar Jang + Surajmal Jat (defenders)
The Mughal Empire is basically a reality TV show at this point - alliances shifting daily, everyone scheming, nobody knows who's really in charge, and a bunch of powerful military commanders just showed up ready to throw down. Buckle up!
Maratha Northern Strategy & Raghoba's Triumph (1752-1756)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Recap: The Civil War Aftermath
The conflict so far:
- Safdar Jang's faction (with Surajmal Jat and Madho Singh) vs. Everyone else (Marathas, Emperor, Imad-ul-Mulk)
- Safdar Jang was defeated
- His son Shuja-ud-Daula (also called Itnizam ud-Daula) negotiated terms
- Imad-ul-Mulk wanted to punish Safdar Jang by giving his territories to the Marathas
- Shuja-ud-Daula refused → Created long-term enmity with Imad-ul-Mulk
The Peshwa Family Tree (Critical for Understanding)
Bajirao I's Sons
- Nana Saheb Peshwa (elder son) - Current Peshwa, based in Pune
- Raghunath Rao Peshwa (younger son) - Ambitious warrior, sent to Delhi
Bajirao I's Brother
- Chimaji Appa → His son is Sadashiv Rao Bhau
Key Point: Sadashiv Rao Bhau (the cousin) will eventually lead the Panipat campaign, NOT Raghunath Rao (the brother). This decision will have massive consequences.
Why Sadashiv Rao Instead of Raghunath Rao?
The Characters
| Person | Personality | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Political, flexible | Knows North India politics well, negotiator, experienced | Ambitious, expensive |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Disciplinarian, strict | Strong military commander, strategic mind | Hot temper, inflexible, "my way or highway" |
Why This Matters for Panipat
Raghunath Rao's advantages:
- Understood northern politics intimately
- Could negotiate and compromise
- Flexible in difficult situations
- Politically savvy
Sadashiv Rao's limitations:
- More of a disciplinarian - very strict
- Quick to anger, had a temper
- Wouldn't tolerate any misbehavior
- Created problems with inflexibility
The verdict: If Raghunath Rao had led Panipat, it would have been a different battle - still tough, but the political maneuvering could have changed the outcome.
The Commanders Arrive (But Too Late)
The Three Warriors Sent North
Nana Saheb Peshwa dispatched:
- Raghunath Rao Peshwa (his brother)
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Jayapa Shinde
Plot twist: By the time they arrived in Delhi, Safdar Jang had already been defeated and retreated to Awadh. So the big army showed up after the main battle was over!
Historical Flashback: The Marathas in the South (1752-1756)
1752: The Failed Nizam Installation
May 1752: Marathas took Ghazi-ud-Din (chosen to be the new Nizam) from Delhi to Hyderabad to install him on the throne.
October 1752: A royal woman in Hyderabad poisoned and killed him → Situation became "Chigarli" (explosive/highly complex)
Consequences:
- Ghazi-ud-Din's son got scared and fled back to Delhi
- He became Safdar Jang's protégé → Later became Imad-ul-Mulk (Mir Bakshi)
- Eventually betrayed Safdar Jang despite Safdar Jang being his benefactor
Why this matters: This explains Imad-ul-Mulk's background and how he rose to power.
The Replacement Nizam: Salabat Jang
After Ghazi-ud-Din's murder, Salabat Jang became the new Nizam (not Ghazi-ud-Din's family).
The French Connection:
- Salabat Jang hired Bussy (Charles de Bussy) - a Frenchman
- Role: Chief of the cannon force
- Why: Europeans had superior cannon technology that India lacked
The Battle of Balki & Territory Gains
Marathas defeated:
- Bussy (the French cannon chief)
- Salabat Jang (the Nizam)
Maratha gains:
- Nasik (between Tapi and Godavari rivers)
- Trambak Fort
- Territory that had to be ceded to the Peshwa
1756: Emotional Victory
Nana Saheb Peshwa captured Shivneri Fort from the Mughals.
Why this matters:
- This is where Shivaji was born
- Small fort near Pune, not strategically critical
- But HUGE emotional value to Marathas
- Shivaji = founder of the empire, everyone looked up to him
- Getting his birthplace back = symbolic victory
Raghoba's Northern Triumph
The Legendary Campaign
Raghoba = Raghunath Rao Peshwa's nickname ("dada" means elder brother - honorific)
What he achieved:
- Led Maratha army to Punjab
- Kicked out Abdali's remnants from Punjab
- Went all the way to ATTOCK (border with Afghanistan)
Why ATTOCK is Huge
Location: Modern-day Pakistan (Punjab province), at the extreme frontier with Afghanistan
Significance:
- ⌠Hindu forces had NEVER gone this far north before
- ✅ This was the high point of Maratha northern expansion
- ✅ Raghoba achieved the "almost unachievable" and "impossible task"
- ✅ Returned as a victorious Maratha warrior
The Money Problem
The Cost of Victory
Despite the incredible success, there was a major issue:
Raghoba spent TOO MUCH money on the campaign:
- Had to support a huge number of soldiers in the north
- Nana Saheb Peshwa had to take out massive loans
- The debt was becoming unsustainable
The Fateful Decision: Who Goes to Panipat?
The Meeting
When it came time to send forces north again, a meeting was held to select the commander.
First choice: Raghoba
- He knew northern politics inside and out
- He had proven himself militarily
- He understood who was who and how things worked
Why Raghoba Was Rejected
Nana Saheb said NO:
- Raghoba was too expensive
- He demanded 1 crore rupees (10 million) to fund the next northern campaign
- "I can't send you back"
Raghoba's response (pride):
- "If you don't want me to go as commander-in-chief, I won't go at all"
- "I won't go as any lesser personality"
- He refused to serve under someone else
The Alternative: Sadashiv Rao
Result: Sadashiv Rao was selected to go north instead.
This is how Sadashiv Rao ended up leading the Panipat campaign - essentially because Raghoba was too expensive and too proud.
The irony: Raghoba was extremely successful in the north, captured unprecedented territory, and proved he could handle the politics and warfare. But cost too much.
Key Players Reference
| Name | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Bajirao I | Former Peshwa | Father of Nana Saheb & Raghunath Rao |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Current Peshwa (in Pune) | Elder son, administrator/planner type |
| Raghunath Rao (Raghoba) | Commander | Younger son, warrior & politician |
| Chimaji Appa | Bajirao's brother | Father of Sadashiv Rao |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Cousin, disciplinarian, will lead Panipat |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Senior Maratha general |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Senior Maratha general |
| Ghazi-ud-Din | Failed Nizam candidate | Murdered in Hyderabad 1752 |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mir Bakshi (Delhi) | Ghazi-ud-Din's son, power broker |
| Salabat Jang | Nizam | Replaced Ghazi-ud-Din |
| Bussy (Charles de Bussy) | French general | Cannon force chief for Nizam |
| Safdar Jang | Awadh governor | Defeated, returned home |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Son of Safdar Jang | Refused to betray father |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| May 1752 | Ghazi-ud-Din taken to Hyderabad |
| October 1752 | Ghazi-ud-Din murdered → Chigarli situation |
| ~1752 | Battle of Balki - Marathas defeat Bussy & Salabat Jang |
| Mid-1753 | Raghunath Rao, Holkar, Shinde arrive in Delhi (too late) |
| 1756 | Nana Saheb captures Shivneri Fort (Shivaji's birthplace) |
| ~1756-1758 | Raghoba's northern campaign to Attock |
| Post-Attock | Meeting held - Raghoba rejected for being too expensive |
| Result | Sadashiv Rao selected instead → leads to Panipat |
Geographic Context
Key Territories:
- Pune - Maratha capital (Deccan)
- Delhi - Mughal capital
- Awadh - Safdar Jang's territory
- Hyderabad - Nizam's capital
- Nasik & Trambak - Maratha gains from Nizam
- Shivneri - Shivaji's birthplace (near Pune)
- Punjab - Raghoba's campaign area
- Attock - Furthest north Marathas ever reached (Afghanistan border)
Critical Insights
The Expense Problem
- Military campaigns in the north were EXTREMELY costly
- Maintaining armies far from home base drained resources
- Loans were piling up on Nana Saheb
- This financial pressure influenced major strategic decisions
The Pride Factor
- Raghoba's pride prevented him from serving under someone else
- This pride + expense = he didn't go to Panipat
- A less experienced commander (Sadashiv Rao) went instead
The Politics vs. Discipline Dilemma
- Northern campaigns required political savvy (Raghoba's strength)
- But also military discipline (Sadashiv Rao's strength)
- You needed BOTH - but they picked the disciplinarian
- This would have consequences at Panipat
Raghoba went where no Hindu army had ever gone before - to the gates of Afghanistan itself. But being too successful and too expensive meant he wouldn't get to finish what he started. Instead, his cousin would take the reins... and history would take a dark turn at Panipat.
The Cannon Force & Maratha Northern Expansion (1752-1753)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Historical Background: The Nizam Situation
Quick Recap (1752)
October 1752: Murder of Ghazi-ud-Din in Hyderabad
- He was supposed to be the new Nizam (handpicked by Marathas)
- Got poisoned/killed
- Situation became explosive and complex
- Marathas turned their attention to Aurangabad
Why Aurangabad Matters
The Deccan Power Structure
Geographic context:
- Hyderabad = Nizam's capital (base of operations)
- Aurangabad = Former Mughal capital of the Deccan region
- Still under Nizam's control despite Hyderabad being the main base
The Nizam's dual role:
- Semi-independent ruler
- Based in Hyderabad
- Still maintained control over Aurangabad (old Mughal capital)
- De facto all-in-one ruler/subedar of the Deccan
- There was no other Mughal subedar in the Deccan besides the Nizam
Why Marathas targeted it: After Ghazi-ud-Din's death, Aurangabad was the Nizam's key strategic territory to attack.
The Battle of Balki: French Cannons Enter the Stage
The Opponents
Team Nizam:
- Salabat Jang (the new Nizam, after Ghazi-ud-Din's death)
- Bussy (French general) - Chief of the cannon regiment
Team Maratha:
- Maratha forces
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau was impressed by the performance
The Outcome
Marathas won and received territorial concessions:
- Nasik city
- Trimbak Fort (Trimbakeshwar)
- Territory between Tapi and Godavari rivers
The French Cannon Technology
Why This Was Revolutionary
Bussy = French general employed by the Nizam
What made the cannon force special:
- Long-range cannons - could project cannonballs 1.5 to 2 kilometers away
- Required special training (French expertise)
- Highly skilled operation
- Technology developed by the French
- NOT available to every rival in North India (very expensive, needed right contacts)
Sadashiv Rao's Crucial Observation
Even though Bussy and the Nizam's combined forces were defeated by the Marathas, Sadashiv Rao Bhau was deeply impressed by the cannon regiment's performance.
Why this mattered:
- In the Deccan, Marathas could use guerrilla warfare in the mountains (Sahyadri)
- In North India = flat plains → Can't use mountain tactics
- On flat land, battles become 50-50 chances (Kautilya's warning: never fight such battles!)
- Solution: Long-range cannons could be the "ace" that tips the scales
Kautilya's principle: If you fight a battle where your chances are 50-50, never fight it. The risks are too high - you could lose everything.
Sadashiv Rao's logic:
- "If I'm going to fight in the north on flat land against a very strong enemy like Abdali..."
- "I MUST have a cannon force with 1.5-2 kilometer range"
- "This is the only way to avoid a 50-50 battle"
The Cannon Force Switches Sides
Round 2: Nizam vs. Marathas (A Couple Years Later)
Setup:
- Another battle between Sadashiv Rao Bhau (Marathas) vs. Nizam
- This time, Bussy's student (trained by Bussy) is leading the Nizam's cannon force
- Nizam defeated again
The Recruitment
After the second defeat, Sadashiv Rao Bhau made a request:
- "I want that cannon regiment general to join MY force"
- Nizam agreed (had no objection)
What transferred over:
- The cannon force chief (Bussy's student, possibly named Ibrahim Khan Gardi)
- The ENTIRE cannon regiment came with him
The Strategy: Buy Don't Build
The shortcut:
- Instead of teaching Marathas this skill from scratch
- Instead of raising and training a regiment within the Maratha army
- Just get the general and the entire trained regiment
- "Why waste time teaching our people when this guy already has experts?"
Seemed like a brilliant plan at the time.
The Mercenary Problem
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Loyalty (or Lack Thereof)
Key issue: This general (still trained by Bussy) was a soldier for hire.
His mentality:
- Loyalty was NOT to any particular fighting force
- Would go with whoever paid more
- Didn't care if fighting for Marathas, Nizam, Mughals, or anyone else
- No investment in the mission beyond payment
The red flag: "That was not a good thing" - his mercenary nature would become a problem later.
The Emperor's Promise & The Beginning of Major Campaigns
The One Crore Rupee Deal
The arrangement:
- Emperor promised 1 crore rupees (10 million) to the Maratha army in the north
- Purpose: To fight against Safdar Jang
- Around mid-1753
What actually happened:
- By the time Raghunath Rao, Holkar, and Shinde reached Delhi (takes 2-3 months travel with army)
- Safdar Jang had already been defeated
- He went back to Awadh (his home kingdom)
- So they didn't have to fight that battle
But they reached Delhi anyway - and this changed everything.
The Escalation: From Defense to Offense
Before: Small Defensive Force
Previous Maratha presence in Delhi:
- 3,000-5,000 soldiers
- Under command of Antaji Mankeshwar
- Mainly a defensive force
- Small scale operations
After: Major Military Power
New arrivals:
- Raghunath Rao Peshwa (brother of Nana Saheb)
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Jayapa Shinde
- Probably 30,000 soldiers with them
This was the beginning of major Maratha campaigns in the north - now they had enough forces for aggressive offensive actions, not just defensive ones.
The Power of Sovereign Authority
Why Raghunath Rao Changed Everything
Before Raghunath Rao arrived:
- Jayapa Shinde and Holkar = just commanders
- ⌠No sovereign authority
- Limited in what decisions they could make
After Raghunath Rao arrived:
- ✅ He was the sovereign's brother (Nana Saheb's brother)
- ✅ His word carried weight
- ✅ Could take major decisions
- ✅ Could make sweeping strategic calls
The difference: He wasn't just another fighter - he was royalty, so:
- Maratha forces felt empowered
- Big decisions could be made on the spot
- Semblance of sovereignty joined the northern forces
The Long Game: 1753-1761 and Beyond
A Permanent Northern Presence
The campaigns that began in 1753:
- Would continue all the way to 1761 (Panipat)
- Even beyond that
- 4-5 decades total
- Marathas were now a permanent part of North India
- They would be stationed there for the long term
This wasn't a temporary excursion - this was empire building.
Historical Context: Qutub Minar & The Dynasties
Sidebar: Architectural Heritage
Qutub Minar: Very tall tower (minar = pillar/spire)
- Dates back to 13th-14th century
- Seen in Delhi
- Hyderabad has its own Qutub Minar too
Note: This is NOT related to Qutub Shah (who ruled during Shivaji's time and was destroyed by Aurangzeb).
The Dynasties Aurangzeb Destroyed
Three kingdoms Aurangzeb wiped out:
- Nizam Shahi (Ahmednagar) - destroyed by Shah Jahan
- Had Malik Ambar as prime minister/wazir
- Based in Maharashtra (Ahmednagar)
- Adil Shahi (Bijapur) - destroyed by Aurangzeb
- Qutub Shahi (Hyderabad) - destroyed by Aurangzeb
Important: The current Nizam (Salabat Jang and his lineage) has NOTHING to do with the old Nizam Shahi kingdom. He came from Persia (Iran) originally. Totally different dynasty.
Key Players
| Name | Role | Affiliation |
|---|---|---|
| Ghazi-ud-Din | Failed Nizam candidate | Murdered October 1752 |
| Salabat Jang | New Nizam | Ruler of Hyderabad/Deccan |
| Bussy (Charles de Bussy) | French general | Cannon force chief (Nizam's employee) |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Cannon commander | Bussy's student, mercenary, joins Marathas |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Impressed by cannons, gets regiment to switch |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Commander | Led small Maratha force in Delhi |
| Raghunath Rao Peshwa | Commander | Brother of Nana Saheb, sovereign authority |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Senior general |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Senior general |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Based in Pune, strategic planner |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 1752 | Ghazi-ud-Din murdered in Hyderabad |
| 1752 | Marathas defeat Bussy & Salabat Jang at Balki |
| 1752 | Marathas gain Nasik & Trimbak Fort |
| ~1753-54 | Second battle: Sadashiv Rao vs. Nizam (wins again) |
| ~1753-54 | Cannon regiment general switches to Maratha side |
| Mid-1753 | Emperor promises 1 crore rupees to Marathas |
| Mid-1753 | Raghunath Rao, Holkar, Shinde arrive in Delhi |
| 1753 | Beginning of major Maratha offensive campaigns in north |
| 1753-1761+ | Marathas permanently stationed in North India |
Geographic Context
Southern Theater:
- Hyderabad - Nizam's capital
- Aurangabad - Old Mughal Deccan capital (still under Nizam)
- Balki - Location of first defeat of Bussy & Salabat Jang
- Nasik & Trimbak - Territory gained by Marathas
Northern Theater:
- Delhi - Mughal capital
- Awadh - Safdar Jang's kingdom (where he retreated)
Critical Insights
The Cannon Force Gamble
Smart decision:
- Recognized the importance of long-range cannon technology
- Understood that flat land warfare required different tactics
- Outsourced rather than built from scratch - faster
Potential problems:
- Mercenary loyalty = unreliable
- Not integrated into Maratha army culture
- "Soldier for hire" mentality could backfire
The Flat Land Problem
Why cannons became essential:
- Marathas built their empire on guerrilla warfare in mountains
- Shivaji's whole strategy: never fight on flat land, use terrain advantage
- North India = NO mountains = forced to adapt
- Cannons were the solution to the 50-50 battle problem
Sovereign Authority Matters
The Raghunath Rao effect:
- Commanders need authority to make big decisions
- Having the Peshwa's brother = instant legitimacy
- Could mediate between rival commanders (Holkar vs. Shinde)
- Empowered the entire force
From Visitors to Rulers
The shift:
- 3,000-5,000 defensive troops → 30,000+ offensive army
- Temporary presence → permanent occupation
- Reactive defense → proactive expansion
- This was no longer about protecting the Mughal emperor
- This was about Maratha empire building
The Marathas got the cannon technology they needed to compete in the north. But they also got a mercenary force whose loyalty was only as deep as their pockets. Meanwhile, with 30,000 troops and the Peshwa's brother leading them, the Marathas weren't just defending Delhi anymore - they were claiming North India as their own.
The Death of Shahu & The Mughal Emperor Becomes a Burden (1749-1754)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Chapter Title: "Marathas Win Battles, But Lose Friends"
The paradox: Military victories that alienate potential allies and create more enemies than they solve problems.
The Letter from Holkar
The New Emperor Announcement
From: Malhar Rao Holkar To: Raghunath Rao Peshwa
Content summary:
- The old emperor and his mother have been imprisoned
- A new emperor has been placed on the throne: Alamgir II
- The Marathas (specifically Holkar) orchestrated this
- They went around Delhi making announcements
- Had ceremonies with music and celebrations
- "Your success and glory is seen by all residents of the capital"
What this shows: The Marathas have completely manipulated the foundation of the Mughal Empire. They're kingmakers now.
The Death of Shahu: Losing the Moderating Influence (1749)
Who Was Shahu?
Shahu Maharaj = The stabilizing force for the Maratha Empire
His role:
- Had a modest/moderate influence on the rising ambitions of Maratha warriors
- Acted as a brake on unlimited expansion
- Someone the commanders were accountable to
What Shahu Prevented
If it had been left to Bajirao I alone:
- He would have taken over the Mughal throne in Delhi
- Would have replaced the Mughal Emperor with Maratha rule
- Completely destroyed the Mughal Empire
But Shahu said NO:
- "We don't want to get rid of the Mughal Emperor"
- "We shouldn't establish Maratha rule in Delhi"
- "Don't get into destroying the Mughal Empire completely"
- Basically: slow down, be strategic, don't overreach
The Post-Shahu Power Vacuum
1749: Shahu Dies
The aftermath:
- Maratha chiefs had no one left to be accountable to
- No more moderating influence
- No one to keep ambitious commanders in check
- Control over capable Maratha commanders in the north was gone
The Generation Gap Problem
The commanders who flourished under Bajirao I:
- Holkar
- Jayapa Shinde
- Gayakwad
These guys were:
- Older and more experienced than Nana Saheb Peshwa
- Battle-hardened veterans
- Extremely knowledgeable about North India politics
- Originally just normal soldiers mentored by Bajirao I
- Proved themselves and got promoted by Bajirao I
- Felt ownership over their achievements
Nana Saheb Peshwa's challenge:
- He was just Bajirao I's son
- NOT a warrior himself
- More of an administrator, thinker, planner
- These commanders were basically his father's peers
- He couldn't command them the way his father did
- They had already proven themselves before he became Peshwa
The Distance Problem: Strategic Autonomy
The Communication Challenge
From Pune to Delhi:
- About 1.5 months travel time one way
- To get a response back = 3 months total
The impossibility:
- Commanders in Delhi couldn't wait 3 months for every decision
- Some decisions needed to be made immediately
- Strategic autonomy was necessary
The result:
- Commanders made sovereign decisions without waiting for approval
- Peshwa would learn about these decisions afterwards
- Unless they could afford to wait and send a messenger
The Empire Builders: Personal Fiefdoms
The Commanders' Mentality
These Maratha commanders were planning:
- To increase territory under their own control
- Creating personal power bases
- Felt like primary owners of new territories
- Empire was expanding rapidly - they wanted their piece
The dynamic:
- Peshwa was the chief/sovereign (first among equals)
- But Sadashiv Rao Bhau was also important (cousin with strategic mind)
- Together they were the decision-making team
- But reality was messier - commanders operated semi-independently
The Mughal Empire: Fragmentation
The Loss of Cohesion
During Aurangzeb's time:
- Mughal Empire was integrated and cohesive
- Kingdoms tightly tied to the Mughal Emperor
- Central control was real
Now (1750s):
- That cohesiveness was completely lost
- Kingdoms that were tied to Mughals were getting their freedom back
- Operating independently (but wouldn't publicly declare independence)
- Loosely connected to Mughal Empire in name only
The situation:
- These kingdoms took liberties, had their own policies
- Would say "Yeah, we're part of Mughal Empire" publicly
- But in reality, may or may not listen to the Emperor
- Complex, fragmented political landscape
The Buffalo Analogy: The Emperor Becomes a Burden
Traditional Indian Farming Practice
The custom:
- Farmers tie a big wooden log around cattle's neck
- Why: So buffalo/cows can't run away at speed
- Slows them down, weighs them down
- Keeps them from escaping
The Analogy Applied to Marathas
The Mughal Emperor = The wooden log around Marathas' neck
The situation:
- Marathas had made the Ahadnama contract (with Ahmad Shah, previous emperor)
- Contracted to protect the Mughal Empire and the Emperor
- But the Emperor was so weak he couldn't do anything
- Based only in Delhi, no real power beyond that
The contradiction:
- On one hand: Marathas were duty-bound/contract-bound to protect him
- On the other hand: He took all the liberties to do whatever he wanted
- No restrictions on his behavior
- He would create problems
- Marathas had to fix those problems
The Emperor's Empty Promises
Example situations:
-
Emperor says: "You can have the tax rights (chauth/sardeshmukhi) of Agra and Ajmer"
-
Problem: If those districts are controlled by the King of Awadh, and he says no?
-
Emperor's word means nothing - you still have to fight for it
-
Emperor says: "You can collect revenue from Punjab"
-
Problem: If Punjab is under Abdali's influence?
-
Doesn't mean anything - you have to fight Abdali and kick him out first
The reality: Emperor was an obstruction, not an asset. Weighing Marathas down while creating headaches.
The Regional Powers: Everyone Is Semi-Independent
The Northern Threats
| Power | Territory | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Rohilla Afghans | Rohilkhand | Independent operations |
| Awadh | Eastern UP | Safdar Jang → Shuja-ud-Daula (semi-independent) |
| Rajputs | Rajasthan | Semi-independent kingdoms |
| Abdali | Claims Punjab | Totally ignoring boundaries, says "Punjab is mine" |
The Abdali problem:
- Afghanistan's land is not fertile
- So Abdali claimed Punjab (super fertile, lots of water)
- Punjab traditionally part of Mughal Empire
- Abdali: "Nah, it's Afghanistan now"
- This was completely unacceptable to Mughals
- But what could they do about it?
The Southern Powers
| Power | Territory | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Nizam | Hyderabad | Allied with Mughals but had sovereignty |
| Siddhis | Janjira (Genjira) | Independent naval power |
| British | Surat, Mumbai | Starting to understand they could rule |
| Portuguese | Goa | Already ruling |
| French | Pondicherry (deep south) | Colonial presence |
The European realization:
- British hadn't started reinforcing territories yet
- But they understood the deep divisions in the country
- Recognized the weaknesses
- Realized: "We could rule this place one day"
- Goa was already being ruled by Portuguese
- The groundwork for colonialism was being laid
All the Regional Enemies
The complete picture:
- Regional powers spread all through India
- Each one ambitious and opportunistic
- Marathas had nominal power through the Mughals
- But reality = death by a thousand cuts
- All these "minor paper cuts" to deal with
- Each one reacting quickly and efficiently (unlike Marathas)
Why regional powers were dangerous:
- They were "self-contained compact powers"
- Could react quickly to situations
- Focused efficiently
- NOT spread thin like Marathas
- Each one in their territory = very strong
The Marathas' Impossible Position
The Contradictions
The Maratha paradox:
- Have power over Mughals in name
- Required to be the Mughal Emperor's babysitter
- Emperor free to do whatever stupidity he wants
- Marathas have to fix all his problems
- But also deal with multiple regional enemies
- All while being spread thin across a massive territory
They're kingmakers but also cleanup crew.
The Jat Problem & Kumbher Fort
Who Are the Jats?
Jats: Warrior community/tribe (like Sikhs, but not Sikhs)
- Based in and around Agra
- Warrior-like community even today
- King: Surajmal Jat
- Small kingdom: Bharatpur (near Agra)
- Ambitious character who wanted to be kingmaker in Delhi
The Alliance Structure
Remember the factional split:
- Marathas + Imad-ul-Mulk + Emperor (one side)
- Safdar Jang + Shuja-ud-Daula + Surajmal Jat (other side)
Why target Surajmal now:
- It wasn't enough to punish Safdar Jang alone
- His allies also had to pay a price
- Especially Surajmal Jat, whose troops created terror in Delhi
- The Emperor gave 1 crore rupees to Marathas to "take care of the situation"
- That includes putting Surajmal in his place
The Stage Is Set
The chapter ends with:
- Marathas winning battles
- But creating more enemies
- Losing friends and potential allies
- The Mughal Emperor = dead weight around their neck
- Regional powers all watching for opportunities
- And Surajmal Jat about to face the consequences at Kumbher Fort
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Shahu Maharaj | Former stabilizing force | Died 1749 |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Current Peshwa | Administrator, not warrior |
| Bajirao I | Former Peshwa | Dead, but his protégés still active |
| Holkar | Commander | Experienced, older than Nana Saheb |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Experienced, older than Nana Saheb |
| Gayakwad | Commander | Experienced, older than Nana Saheb |
| Raghunath Rao | Commander | Nana Saheb's brother |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Nana Saheb's cousin, strategic mind |
| Mughal Emperor | Alamgir II | Puppet, creates problems |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Controls Kumbher Fort, shrewd |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1749 | Shahu dies - moderating influence lost |
| 1749+ | Maratha commanders operate with more autonomy |
| 1750s | Mughal Empire fragmenting |
| ~1754 | Holkar installs new emperor (Alamgir II) |
| ~1754 | Kumbher Fort siege about to begin |
Critical Insights
The Shahu Factor
- His death removed the adult in the room
- Ambitious commanders no longer had anyone to answer to
- Unlimited expansion became the goal
- No one to say "slow down"
The Generational Problem
- Nana Saheb had to manage his father's peers
- They were more experienced than him
- He lacked his father's warrior credibility
- Made controlling them nearly impossible
The Communication Curse
- 3-month decision cycle was unworkable
- Forced commanders to act independently
- Created inconsistent strategy
- Peshwa found out about decisions after the fact
The Emperor Paradox
- Contractually bound to protect him
- But he was a liability, not an asset
- Created problems Marathas had to solve
- His promises were worthless
- A burden weighing them down
The Fragmentation Opportunity
- All these regional powers = future problems
- But also: sign that Mughal authority was dead
- British were taking notes
- Seeds of colonialism being planted
- Everyone operating for themselves
Shahu's death unleashed the Maratha war machine, but it also removed the guardrails. The commanders were empire building for themselves, the Mughal Emperor was a millstone around their necks, and everyone from Kabul to Pondicherry was watching the chaos and thinking: "Opportunity." Meanwhile, the next chapter was about to be written at a fort in Agra, where a Jat king was about to find out what happens when you make enemies of the Marathas.
Maratha Warfare Crisis & The Road to Kumbher (1754)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Chapter Continues: "Marathas Win Wars, Lose Friends"
The Impossible Position (Recap)
The Maratha dilemma:
- Mughal Emperor at Delhi = appendage they could do without
- On one hand: Sworn to protect him (Ahadnama contract)
- On the other hand: Mughal court free to deal and grant awards as it deemed fit
- Result: Marathas left to resolve the consequences
The competition: Regional powers (Rohillas/Najib Khan, Awadh, Abdali, Nizam, Siddhi of Janjira, English, Portuguese) were all:
- Self-contained
- Compact
- Reacted quickly
- Focused efficiently
- ⌠Way more efficient than the Marathas
The Old Ways vs. New Technology
The Peshwa's Court: Yes-Men Problem
The traditional governance:
- Peshwa's governance followed age-old traditions
- Courtiers focused on keeping the Peshwa happy
- ⌠Rather than telling him the truth
The danger:
- Not getting honest feedback
- Echo chamber effect
- Missing critical information
The Technology Gap: A Fatal Weakness
New European Weapons Arriving
What was happening:
- New weapons and techniques from Europeans being adopted
- Peshwa's army getting access to new technology
- BUT this created new dangers and risks
Why This Was Critical
The problem:
- Maratha army was NOT used to new techniques of warfare
- Still trained in old-style battle techniques and strategies
- Traditional Maratha warfare = guerrilla tactics, surprise attacks
- European warfare = disciplined regiments, frontal battles, cannon warfare
Quote from source: "This is a very, very important point."
The Cannon Disaster at Panipat (Foreshadowing)
What Sadashiv Rao Adopted
The plan:
- Adopted long-range cannons (French technology and training)
- These could fire 1.5 to 2 kilometers
- Seemed like the perfect solution for flat-land battles
The Maratha Army Wasn't Ready
The cultural problem:
- Maratha army more used to old-style contact warfare
- ⌠Not comfortable with this new cannon-centric strategy
- Traditional preference: surgical strikes, hit-and-run
This inexperience with cannon warfare = one of the reasons they lost at Panipat.
The Battle of Panipat: How the Cannons Failed
The Setup
Initial situation:
- Cannon force positioned out in front
- Battle begins with cannons firing
- Long-range cannons (1.5-2 km range)
- Incredibly effective - scorching the enemy
- Enemy soldiers getting burnt, starting to flee
- Cannons were winning the battle!
The Ego Problem
What the front Maratha troops thought:
- "If the cannons win the war, the cannon force gets ALL the credit"
- "What will become of us?"
- "Peshwas will have no use for us!"
The Fatal Decision
What they did:
- Front Maratha troops were told to wait
- Let cannons do their job of softening enemy lines
- This was crucial to the strategy
But after 4-5 hours:
- Front troops couldn't wait anymore
- They launched their own attack on enemy lines
- Charged ahead without coordination
The consequence:
- Once Maratha troops surged ahead → cannons had to stop firing
- Risk of hitting their own troops
- "All hell breaks loose"
Why This Happened
Root cause:
- Marathas had never seen cannon force being so effective
- Didn't understand the discipline it demanded from the rest of the army
- Not used to this style of battle
- Lacked maturity with the new technology
The lesson: Having money to buy cannons ≠ Having expertise to use them properly
The Philosophical Divide in Maratha Army
The Shivaji Doctrine
What Shivaji taught:
- Surgical strike when enemy least expects you
- Hit and vanish within 2-3 hours
- Maximum destruction, minimum exposure
- Never fight frontal battles
The Old Guard Resistance
Certain contingents simply did not like frontal warfare:
- "This is totally wrong"
- "We should NOT be fighting battles like this"
- "We should fall upon the enemy when they least expect"
- "Then vanish after making destruction in enemy camp"
There were fundamental disagreements within the army.
Sadashiv Rao Bhau's Conviction
Why He Insisted on Frontal Warfare
His logic:
- In northern plains, there is no mountain
- Can't use guerrilla tactics (no terrain advantage)
- Fighting a very strong enemy (Abdali)
- This is the only way to fight in the north
The Problem: Couldn't Convince Everyone
Major commanders who disagreed:
- Holkar believed in old-fashioned warfare
- Never believed in frontal attacks
- "Just couldn't take it"
- Eventually left early with his troops
Note: Why Holkar left is important and will be explained more later, but the tactical disagreement was a major factor.
The European vs. Maratha Fighting Styles
European Methods
What Europeans brought:
- Disciplined troops
- Regiments behaving in coordinated fashion
- Collective action as a group
- Concurrent, synchronized movements
Maratha Strengths & Weaknesses
What Marathas were good at:
- Individual bravery
- Personal valor and skill
What Marathas struggled with:
- Collective action as an army
- Working in disciplined fashion as a group
- Coordinated large-scale operations
- ⌠Infighting for credit
The Transition Period
The situation circa 1754:
- Unsettling period of change
- Old methods being challenged
- Transition had just started
- Later they got better at it
- But timing was wrong - still learning
The European Enclaves: Technology Creates Power
Why Europeans Could Establish Settlements
The reason:
- Their weapons and techniques were different from age-old Indian methods
- Superior technology = leverage to carve out territory
- They didn't modernize unlike their contemporaries
- This gave Europeans footholds (French, British, Portuguese)
The Europeans developed their own enclaves within India because of this technological advantage.
Political Dynamics: Why Sadashiv Rao Wasn't Sent North Earlier
The Representation Problem
What the Marathas needed:
- Very able courtier representative in Mughal court in Delhi
- Someone present to represent Maratha interests
- Antaji Mankeshwar was one such person
Nana Saheb's Insecurity
The fear:
- If Sadashiv Rao was appointed as regent in the north
- He could become a threat to the Peshwa position itself
Why this was concerning:
-
Sadashiv Rao could challenge Nana Saheb's position in Pune
- By winning more battles
- Making himself look good
- Taking credit for good actions
-
Much more wealth and power in the north
- Mughals were weak but still had lots of wealth
- He could accumulate massive resources
- Potential to take over Mughal Empire in Delhi
- Displace the emperor himself
- "Free Mughal Empire for himself"
-
Succession concerns
- Nana Saheb wanted to pass throne to his son: Vishwas Rao
- If Sadashiv Rao (cousin) got all the credit in north
- Would undermine Vishwas Rao's case to be next Peshwa
The strategy:
- Keep Sadashiv Rao busy with Karnataka campaign (in the south)
- Could have been relieved and sent north
- But Nana Saheb wanted him under leash
- Trusted him (family) but couldn't let him shine too brightly
Raghunath Rao: The Young Prodigy
Early Success
At barely 18 years old:
- Won over Ahmedabad from the Mughals (Gujarat)
- Very impressive achievement
Who is he:
- Younger brother of Nana Saheb Peshwa (NOT brother of Vishwas Rao)
- Uncle to Vishwas Rao
- Direct brother to the Peshwa
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau was his cousin
Why Raghunath Rao Was Sent North
The Reasoning
Why these three were chosen:
- Jayapa Shinde - senior commander
- Malhar Rao Holkar - senior commander
- Raghunath Rao Peshwa - younger brother of Peshwa
Multiple Reasons for Raghunath Rao
-
Sovereign questions: Could handle matters requiring Peshwa-level authority
-
Fighter credentials: Was a warrior, not just administrator
-
Royal family aura: People trusted him when he said something (family connection)
-
Mediation needed: Shinde and Holkar didn't get along at all
- Needed someone who could lead both
- They wouldn't listen to each other
- Raghunath Rao = mediator between rivals
The Mission: Take Agra and Ajmer
The Situation When They Arrived
By the time the decision was made and they traveled north:
- Safdar Jang already defeated
- Back in Awadh
- ⌠No need to fight him
New mission (per the Ahadnama):
- Take control of two provinces:
- Agra
- Ajmer
The Jat Problem in Agra
Not a Simple Affair
The complication:
- Agra district/province = stronghold of Jat people
- Jats = Hindus, warrior caste
- Giving trouble since Aurangzeb's time
- Not easy opponents
Why Jats Would Resist
The Jat perspective:
- ⌠"Marathas want to take control of Agra?"
- ⌠"We're originally from here"
- ⌠"Not going to like it"
- One thing for emperor to give it away
- Another for Marathas to just take it
- Would be treated as outsiders, usurper force
The reality: Jats were already competitors to Mughals. They were no slouch. Not giving Marathas an easy time.
Surajmal Jat: The Shrewd King
Who He Is
Surajmal Jat:
- King in Agra (or nearby Agra)
- Very shrewd personality
- Built good forts south of Delhi
His fortifications:
- Not perfectly flat land
- Some hills (not mountains like Sahyadri)
- Not mountainous region
- But enough elevation to build fortifications
- Not purely Bhui Kot - kind of in between
His Alliance Choice
Surajmal's fatal decision:
- Had sided with Safdar Jang during the conflict
- Emperor had forgiven him
- But Imad-ul-Mulk was still upset
- Wanted revenge
Imad-ul-Mulk's Play
As Mir Bakshi (commander-in-chief):
- Asked for Maratha help
- "Kick out the Jats"
- "Kick out Surajmal Jat"
The Siege Begins
January 20, 1754
The arrival:
- Raghunath Rao reached Kumbher Fort
- This is Surajmal Jat's stronghold
- Near Agra
- Battle is about to unfold with the Jats
The stage is set for the tragedy that will unfold at Kumbher Fort...
Key Players
| Name | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa (Pune) | Insecure about cousin's success |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Kept busy in Karnataka, will lead Panipat |
| Raghunath Rao | Commander | Age 18, won Ahmedabad, sent north |
| Vishwas Rao | Son of Nana Saheb | Intended heir to Peshwa position |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Sent north, rivals with Holkar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Sent north, old-school tactics |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Cannon chief | French-trained, mercenary |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Shrewd, controls Kumbher Fort |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mir Bakshi | Seeking revenge on Surajmal |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1752-1753 | Marathas acquiring cannon technology |
| ~1753 | Raghunath Rao wins Ahmedabad at age 18 |
| 1753 | Decision made: send Shinde, Holkar, Raghunath Rao north |
| January 20, 1754 | Raghunath Rao arrives at Kumbher Fort |
| 1761 | Battle of Panipat (cannon strategy fails) |
Geographic Context
Key locations:
- Pune - Peshwa's capital (south)
- Karnataka - Where Sadashiv Rao Bhau kept busy
- Ahmedabad - Gujarat, won by Raghunath Rao
- Delhi - Mughal capital
- Agra - Jat stronghold, target territory
- Ajmer - Target territory
- Kumbher Fort - Surajmal Jat's stronghold (near Agra)
Critical Insights
The Technology Trap
The paradox:
- Got the best technology (French cannons)
- But lacked the culture to use it properly
- Maratha warriors = individual heroes
- European warfare = collective discipline
- Cultural mismatch = disaster waiting to happen
The Ego Problem
At Panipat:
- Individual units wanted credit
- Couldn't stand cannons getting the glory
- Abandoned strategy for personal recognition
- Discipline breakdown = defeat
- Having the tech ≠ being able to use it
The Philosophical Split
Old guard vs. new tactics:
- Shivaji doctrine deeply ingrained
- Frontal warfare felt wrong to many commanders
- Even senior leaders (Holkar) couldn't accept it
- Army was divided on fundamental strategy
- United force fighting with divided philosophy = weakness
The Political Calculation
Why Sadashiv Rao kept south:
- Nana Saheb's insecurity
- Fear of being overshadowed
- Succession concerns for his son
- Better to keep powerful cousin on short leash
- But this meant less experienced commander went north initially
The Jat Wild Card
Surajmal Jat:
- Shrewd, experienced
- Had good fortifications
- Warrior community backing him
- Not to be underestimated
- His decision to side with Safdar Jang = sealed his fate
The Marathas had the best cannons money could buy, but they were still fighting with the heart of guerrilla warriors. They had the technology of the future but the mindset of the past. Individual glory mattered more than collective victory. And at Kumbher Fort, this clash of old and new was about to write a tragedy that would echo all the way to Panipat.
The Siege of Kumbher Fort (1754)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Setup
The Marathas (led by Raghunath Rao Peshwa, Malhar Rao Holkar, and Jayapa Shinde) are called to Delhi to help the Mughal Emperor fight against Safdarjung and Surajmal Jat. By the time they arrive, that conflict is over, but the Emperor gives them tax collection rights to Agra and Ajmer provinces.
Problem: Surajmal Jat controls the fort of Kumbher in that territory, and Imad-ul-Mulk (the wazir) is pissed at him, so he tells the Marathas to attack Kumbher fort.
The Negotiations Fail
January 20, 1754 - Marathas arrive at Kumbher fort.
First, Khande Rao (Malhar Rao Holkar's son) arrives early and embarrasses himself at the Mughal court by not knowing proper etiquette:
- Gives only 2 salutes instead of 4
- Forgets tribute entirely
- A courtier has to cover for him with gold coins
- Despite being told to leave, Khande Rao says "nah, I'm staying" which makes everyone nervous
The Money Dispute
Surajmal fortifies the fort and starts negotiations with Raghunath Rao:
| Party | Offer/Demand |
|---|---|
| Surajmal offers | 4 million rupees |
| Raghunath Rao demands | 10 million rupees (1 crore) |
| Surajmal's response | Sends bullets back: "I'm ready for war" |
The Political Conspiracy
The Layers of Intrigue
- Imad-ul-Mulk publicly asks Marathas to attack Surajmal
- The Emperor secretly hopes Marathas succeed (wants Surajmal weakened)
- BUT the Emperor also refuses to give Marathas long-range cannons when they ask
- Surajmal writes to the Emperor: "Hey, all us northern powers should band together and kick the Marathas back to the Deccan"
Why Nobody Wants Marathas in the North
Northern powers include:
- Mughals
- Awadh
- Rohillas
- Surajmal Jat
- Madho Singh (Rajasthan)
Their concerns:
- All worried Marathas will replace the Mughal emperor as the real power
- Marathas are seen as "Deccan-based" power (Peshwa's capital is Pune)
- Nobody wanted to trade one overlord for another
- But Maratha military power was unmatched, so they had to tolerate them
The Siege Fails
March 1754 - Siege is going badly:
- ❌ Marathas' cannons are short-range, not effective
- ❌ They try mines/explosions but the sandy/desert terrain makes them useless
- ❌ Emperor refuses to give them better cannons
- 🔒 Nothing going in, nothing coming out - classic siege
Imad-ul-Mulk comes personally to inspect (because it's his pet project).
THE TRAGEDY ⚡
Khande Rao (Holkar's only son) is inspecting the fort in a palanquin (covered carriage that royals get carried in).
A cannonball from the fort hits the palanquin and kills him instantly.
The Aftermath
Malhar Rao Holkar goes absolutely berserk with grief and rage.
The Sati Ritual
Khande Rao had multiple wives:
- The other wives commit Sati (burn themselves on his funeral pyre)
- Ahilya Devi (one wife) is convinced by Malhar Rao NOT to commit Sati
- She survives and later becomes famous for social work and temple building
Historical parallel: Similar to how Shivaji stopped his mother from committing Sati
Personal Vendetta Begins
Malhar Rao takes the body to Mathura (Krishna temple/Yamuna River) for cremation rituals.
Raghunath Rao and the Emperor send condolences, but Malhar Rao makes a vow:
"I will take Surajmal's head and turn Kumbher fort into mud and dissolve it in the Yamuna"
Surajmal tries to beg for forgiveness, but Malhar Rao's grief/anger cannot be calmed.
The Situation Escalates
What was a professional military campaign becomes a prestige issue for the entire Holkar army.
Why This Changes Everything
- Malhar Rao isn't just some commander - he's in charge of the Peshwa's entire northern strategy
- His troops aren't borrowed - they're his personal army
- Nobody can stop him now - not even Raghunath Rao (who's technically senior as Nana Saheb's brother)
- Only Nana Saheb Peshwa himself could maybe talk him down, but he's not there
The Power Dynamic
The three Maratha leaders were roughly equal in stature:
- Jayapa Shinde
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Raghunath Rao Peshwa (first among equals - brother of Nana Saheb)
But now Holkar is driven by personal vendetta, making him unpredictable and unstoppable.
THE STAKES
This is now personal - a blood feud between Holkar and Surajmal Jat, happening in the middle of complex Mughal court politics where:
- Nobody actually wants the Marathas to win
- But nobody can stop them either
- Multiple layers of conspiracy and counter-conspiracy
- Personal tragedy transforming strategic campaign into vendetta
Key Players
| Name | Role | Affiliation |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao Peshwa | Commander | Maratha (brother of Nana Saheb) |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Maratha |
| Khande Rao Holkar | Son of Malhar Rao | Maratha (killed at Kumbher) |
| Ahilya Devi | Wife of Khande Rao | Survives, later famous for social work |
| Jayapa Shinde | Commander | Maratha |
| Surajmal Jat | Fort Commander | Jat Kingdom |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Wazir | Mughal Court |
| Mughal Emperor | Emperor | Mughal Empire |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa (absent) | Maratha - based in Pune |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| January 20, 1754 | Marathas arrive at Kumbher fort |
| January 1754 | Khande Rao embarrasses himself at Mughal court |
| January 1754 | Negotiations fail - Surajmal sends bullets |
| March 1754 | Siege intensifies, Imad-ul-Mulk arrives |
| March 1754 | Khande Rao killed by cannonball |
| March 1754 | Sati ritual, funeral at Mathura |
| March 1754 | Malhar Rao vows revenge |
Geographic Context
Northern Powers:
- Delhi (Mughal capital)
- Awadh (east of Delhi)
- Rohilla territory
- Agra & Ajmer (disputed - granted to Marathas)
- Kumbher Fort (Surajmal Jat's stronghold)
- Rajasthan (Madho Singh)
Deccan (Maratha Base):
- Pune (Peshwa's capital)
- Karnataka (where Sadashiv Rao was campaigning)
Cultural/Historical Notes
Sati Ritual
The practice where widows would burn themselves on their husband's funeral pyre. Common social custom of the time, though progressive leaders like Shivaji and Malhar Rao would discourage it.
Palanquin (Palki)
Covered carriage carried by bearers for royalty and important figures. Had curtains for privacy but allowed occupants to look out.
Mughal Court Etiquette
- Specific number of salutes required
- Tribute (nazrana) expected
- Complex protocol that outsiders often violated
Maratha Military Strategy
- Heavily dependent on funding campaigns through "chauth" (25% tax)
- Constantly seeking money to support northern armies
- Professional military class with personal armies loyal to commanders
Session ended here - planning to continue at 9-10pm that evening.
This is some Game of Thrones level political complexity - alliances within alliances, secret hopes for failure, and a personal tragedy turning a strategic campaign into a vendetta. Classic 18th century Indian politics.
Bengal Betrayal & The Battle of Plassey (1745-1756)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Bengal Tragedy: Bhaskar Ram's Massacre
The Setup
Bhaskar Ram Kulkarkar = Brave commander-in-chief serving Raghuji Bhosle (Nagpur kingdom)
His mission: Bring the Mughal commander Ali Wardi Khan (Subedar of Bengal) to heel and make him pay tribute (chauth)
The Trap
Ali Wardi Khan's plan:
- Agreed to pay the tribute
- Invited Bhaskar Ram to meet him
- Showed all signs of cooperation
The betrayal:
- Once Bhaskar Ram entered Ali Wardi Khan's tent
- On the way to the throne, he was attacked and killed
- Maratha warriors adjacent to Bhaskar Ram were also massacred
Year confusion in the text:
- The massacre likely happened around 1743-1745
- Exact date not specified in the reading
The Maratha Revenge (1745-1746)
Swift Retribution
1745-1746: Marathas took revenge for the Bhaskar Ram massacre
- Attacked and punished Ali Wardi Khan's forces
- Exacted retribution for the treachery
The Long Negotiation
The aftermath:
- Revenge accomplished in 1745-1746
- BUT truce treaties took much longer to finalize
- 1751: Final settlement reached
- Took 6 years to decide:
- Exact terms of the truce
- How much tribute would be paid
- Final peace articles
Until 1751, the details remained unsettled.
The Succession Crisis in Nagpur (1755)
Raghuji Bhosle Dies
1755: Raghuji Bhosle (ruler of Nagpur kingdom) died
The problem:
- Had three sons
- All started claiming their father's estate and kingdom
- Couldn't come to unanimous opinion
- Fighting among themselves over inheritance
Why This Matters
The Nagpur Marathas were different:
- Not as pervasive and ambitious as the Pune Peshwas
- More content with their territory
- Their focus: Bengal only (as Shahu had decided - territorial division)
- Not as capable as Nana Saheb Peshwa and his forces
The resolution:
- Since the three sons couldn't decide
- The whole affair went to Nana Saheb Peshwa in Pune
- He was the ultimate authority for such disputes
Ali Wardi Khan Dies (1756)
The Capable Leader Lost
1756: Ali Wardi Khan himself died
- He was capable, shrewd, and mature
- Knew how to navigate politics
The Immature Successor
Siraj-ud-Daula became the new Nawab/Subedar of Bengal
- Described as "Paripakwamji" = immature
- NOT like his father
- Lacking in capability and shrewdness
The concern: An immature leader might do something rash or make poor decisions.
The Battle of Plassey: British Enter the Game (1756)
The Small Town That Changed Everything
1756: War in a small Bengal town called Plassey
The opponents:
- British (led by General Robert Clive)
- Siraj-ud-Daula (new Nawab of Bengal)
The Absurd Numbers
Military strength comparison:
- British: 5,000 fighting force
- Siraj-ud-Daula: ~100,000 soldiers
The British won anyway.
How the British Won Despite Being Outnumbered 20:1
Factor 1: Immature Commander
Siraj-ud-Daula's weakness:
- Young and inexperienced
- Poor military decision-making
- Lacked his father's political acumen
Factor 2: British Corruption Tactics
The British playbook:
- Bribed some of Siraj-ud-Daula's generals
- Paid them to not participate in battle
- Generals said: "We're not coming to fight"
- Created division and confusion
Result: Sections of Siraj-ud-Daula's massive army simply didn't show up or fight.
The Consequences: Bengal Falls to British
1756: British Flag Over Mughal Bengal
What happened:
- Bengal went into British hands
- First major Indian province under British control
- The beginning of the British Raj
The Maratha Miscalculation
Why Marathas didn't pay attention:
- Perceived British as "basically merchants with some weapons"
- Thought: "They just want defense for merchant activities"
- Believed: "That's why they fought this battle"
- ⌠Didn't realize British had ambitions beyond commerce
The fatal error:
- This was a BIG DEAL - entire province falling to foreigners
- But Marathas did not pay the attention it deserved
- Underestimated British colonial ambitions
- This blindness would cost them dearly
The European Power Shift
Bussy vs. The British
Remember Bussy? French general who worked with Nizam
The changing balance:
- Bussy was previously the most powerful European in India
- Helped Nizam with his cannon force
- But now: British were getting more powerful than Bussy
- British becoming more entrenched, more powerful
- Starting to overtake French influence
This is just stated as a fact - not discussed whether Marathas/Nizam liked it or not.
The Nizam Connection to Pune
Why Hyderabad Mattered
Geographic reality:
- Mughal Empire based in Delhi (far from Pune)
- But Hyderabad had the Nizam
- Nizam = vassal king representing Mughal Empire
- Hyderabad was not too far from Pune
The representation:
- Even though Mughal Emperor was distant
- Nizam in Hyderabad = Mughal representative
- Relatively close to Maratha power center
- Mattered for regional politics
The Kolhapur vs. Satara Question
Who Should Have Dealt with the Nizam?
The dilemma (unclear in sources):
- Was it Shahu's idea to let Nizam stay in power in Hyderabad?
- OR was it because of Kolhapur king's inaction?
The context:
- Kolhapur Maratha king should have taken action to finish off the Nizam
- But didn't do it
- Unclear if this was by design (Shahu's plan) or negligence
The Maratha Kingdom Division (1730)
The Boundary Settlement
1730: Clear boundaries drawn between two Maratha kingdoms:
| Kingdom | Ruler | Territory |
|---|---|---|
| Satara | Shahu Maharaj | Shahu's territory |
| Kolhapur | Sambhaji II | Rajaram's son's territory |
Important clarifications:
- This Sambhaji = NOT Shivaji's son
- This Sambhaji = Rajaram's son
- Rajaram = interim king after Shivaji's sons
The relationship:
- Friendly Maratha kingdoms (not rival)
- Twin kingdoms, clearly delineated
- Boundaries well drawn by 1730
The Expansion Problem
Sambhaji's Lack of Ambition
The Kolhapur king (Sambhaji and his heirs):
- ⌠Not intent on expanding the kingdom
- Content with what they had
- Couldn't be bothered with southern expansion
The consequence:
- Responsibility for southern expansion fell to the Peshwa
- Only Nana Saheb Peshwa was doing the work
- Kolhapur wasn't pulling its weight
Bajirao's Missed Opportunities with the Nizam
The Four Defeats
Historical fact: Bajirao I defeated the Nizam of Hyderabad FOUR times
But he did NOT vanquish the Nizam's power:
- Could have finished him off
- Every time he won, he let the Nizam live
- Never completely destroyed his capacity to fight
The Nizam's Persistence
Despite four defeats:
- Nizam was not ready to accept defeat
- Never became peaceful
- Always considered Peshwa and Marathas as rivals and enemies
- Kept wanting to fight back
- Never accepted: "I'm never going to win"
- Thought: "Maybe next time I'll do better"
The result: He was a constant threat that never went away.
The connection: This is the same Nizam whose son (or successor) eventually goes to Delhi and becomes Imad-ul-Mulk.
What could have been prevented: If Bajirao had finished off the Nizam, the entire Imad-ul-Mulk situation could have been avoided.
The Bussy Threat to Marathas
Why The French General Mattered
Bussy: French general in service of the Nizam
What made him dangerous:
- Developed novel technique with cannon force
- Long-range cannons (French technology and know-how)
- French fighting techniques
- ⌠Marathas were NOT acquainted with this style
- Marathas had no answer for it
The verdict: Bussy's cannon regiment = real reason the Nizam was a threat
Normally: Nizam was beatable With Bussy: Nizam became deadly - much more dangerous than usual
Bussy Gets Fired (1756)
The Falling Out
1756: Bussy and Nizam Salabat Jang fell apart
- Bad blood developed between them
- Bushi was relieved of duty (fired by the Nizam)
The mistake: Firing Bushi was a strategic error for the Nizam.
The Charminar Standoff
Bushi's Power Play
Location: Charminar area in Hyderabad (historic tower, still stands today)
What Bushi did:
- Took his cannon regiment to the Charminar area
- Set up defensive position
- Wouldn't leave
Why this worked:
- Cannon regiment was incredibly well-defended
- Loyal to Bushi (not to Nizam)
- They were his personal followers
- Some may have been Frenchmen, most were local
- But Bushi paid their salaries, trained them, was their boss
- Loyalty to him > loyalty to Nizam
The standoff:
- Nizam couldn't dislodge him
- Too difficult to attack the cannon regiment
- Bushi basically said: "Come any closer and I'll blow you to bits"
- Everyone was "shit scared"
- Nobody would come close
Result: Bushi got to stay put in his fortified position despite being fired.
Why the Peshwas Were Impressed
The News Reaches Pune
Who heard about it:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau (cousin of Nana Saheb Peshwa)
- Nana Saheb Peshwa himself
Why they were impressed:
- Such a good cannon regiment
- Could keep the Nizam at bay in his own capital
- Demonstrated raw power of cannon technology
The Maratha Realization
The problem:
- Maratha power was now projected to the very north
- No longer a ragtag army
- Established themselves with Mughals and northern players
- BUT in the north = no mountains
- Can't do Ganinikawa (guerrilla warfare)
- No Sahyadri mountains
- No mountain forts
- Had to fight in open, fertile plains
The dilemma:
- Fighting in open warfare = need an ace up your sleeve
- Without some advantage = 50-50 battle
- Can't leave it to chance
The solution they saw:
- "We need long-range cannons"
- "We need a force trained in it"
- "This is the ace we need"
- Otherwise: can't project Maratha power all the way to north
- Otherwise: stuck playing old Shivaji tactics (run to fort when enemy comes)
The strategic shift:
- Old way: Retreat to Raigarh, Rajagarh, Simhagarh when threatened
- New reality: In northern plains, there's nowhere to run
- "You are in front of each other"
- Need this cannon regiment - long range and highly disciplined
Why Bushi's importance comes in: He was a Frenchman who trained his guys for months. They were the best trained cannon force available.
Key Players
| Name | Role | Affiliation |
|---|---|---|
| Bhaskar Ram Kulkarkar | Commander | Marathas (Nagpur - Raghuji Bhosle) |
| Ali Wardi Khan | Subedar of Bengal | Mughal Bengal (capable, shrewd) |
| Raghuji Bhosle | Ruler | Nagpur kingdom (died 1755) |
| Siraj-ud-Daula | New Nawab of Bengal | Succeeded Ali Wardi Khan 1756 (immature) |
| Robert Clive | British General | British East India Company |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Pune (arbiter of Nagpur succession) |
| Shahu Maharaj | Former ruler | Satara (set territorial divisions) |
| Sambhaji II | King | Kolhapur (Rajaram's son, not expansionist) |
| Bajirao I | Former Peshwa | Defeated Nizam 4x but didn't finish him |
| Nizam Salabat Jang | Ruler | Hyderabad (fired Bushi) |
| Bushi (Bussy) | French general | Cannon force chief, stood ground at Charminar |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Cousin of Nana Saheb, impressed by cannons |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1730 | Boundary between Satara & Kolhapur clearly drawn |
| ~1743-1745 | Bhaskar Ram massacred by Ali Wardi Khan in Bengal |
| 1745-1746 | Marathas take revenge for Bhaskar Ram |
| 1751 | Final truce articles/tribute finalized with Bengal |
| 1755 | Raghuji Bhosle dies → succession crisis in Nagpur |
| 1756 | Ali Wardi Khan dies → Siraj-ud-Daula becomes Nawab |
| 1756 | Battle of Plassey - British defeat Siraj-ud-Daula |
| 1756 | Bengal falls to British control |
| 1756 | Bushi fired by Nizam Salabat Jang |
| 1756 | Bushi's standoff at Charminar with cannon regiment |
| 1756 | News reaches Peshwas - decide they need cannons |
Geographic Context
Key Territories:
- Bengal - Eastern India, fell to British 1756
- Plassey - Small town in Bengal (site of battle)
- Nagpur - Raghuji Bhosle's kingdom (eastern Marathas)
- Pune - Nana Saheb Peshwa's capital
- Hyderabad - Nizam's capital (not far from Pune)
- Charminar - Historic area in Hyderabad (Bushi's stronghold)
- Satara - Shahu's territory
- Kolhapur - Sambhaji II's territory
- Delhi - Mughal capital (far from Pune)
Critical Insights
The Fatal Underestimation
The Maratha blindspot:
- Saw British as "merchants with weapons"
- Didn't recognize colonial ambitions
- Thought Plassey was about protecting trade
- Lost an entire province to foreigners and barely noticed
- This casual attitude toward European powers = strategic disaster
The Treachery Pattern
Bengal betrayal:
- Show cooperation → invite to tent → massacre
- Classic tactic when facing superior force
- Bribe enemy generals to not fight
- British learned from local playbook (bribery at Plassey)
The Cannon Awakening
Why Bushi's standoff mattered:
- Demonstrated raw power of modern artillery
- One man with cannon regiment > entire Nizam army
- Could hold off a kingdom with technology
- Marathas realized: "We need this for northern campaigns"
- No mountains = need technological ace
The Succession Curse
Power vacuum problems:
- Raghuji's three sons fighting = weakness
- Immature leaders (Siraj-ud-Daula) = vulnerability
- Lost Bengal because young, inexperienced nawab
- Pattern will repeat (leadership transitions = crisis)
Bajirao's Mercy = Future Problems
The four victories wasted:
- Defeated Nizam four times
- Let him live every time
- Nizam never accepted defeat
- Constant threat that festered
- Eventually his lineage (Imad-ul-Mulk) causes major problems
- Mercy toward enemies = strategic error
The Northern Plain Problem
Geographic determinism:
- Shivaji's tactics = mountain-based guerrilla warfare
- North India = flat plains, no mountains
- Old tactics don't work
- Need to adapt or die
- Cannons = answer to geographic disadvantage
- But cultural resistance to new warfare styles
1756 was a watershed year: Bengal fell to the British while the Marathas barely noticed, the Nizam fired his best general who then held an entire city hostage with cannon power, and the Peshwas finally understood they needed to completely reinvent Maratha warfare for the northern plains. The age of guerrilla tactics was over. The age of artillery had begun. But were they adapting fast enough?
The Army Nobody Wanted: Maratha Military Problems (1750s)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Charminar Standoff (Continued)
Bushi Gets Kicked Out... Sort Of
What happened:
- Bushi (Gursi) was kicked out by the Nizam
- But he didn't actually leave
- Took a stand near Charminar in Hyderabad
- Charminar = historic tower/area (still exists today, very historic part of city)
The Cannon Defense
Bushi's strategy:
- Set up his cannon regiment in the Charminar area
- Fortified the position
- Nizam couldn't do anything about it
Why the Nizam was helpless:
- ⌠Couldn't defeat Bushi
- He had the cannon regiment
- Finally gave up: "Okay, fine"
- Didn't want to attack him
The stalemate:
- Some discord between them had to be settled
- But Bushi squatted on all the watch points
- Fortified his positions
- Basically said: "This is my land, I'm not going anywhere"
Why This Impressed the Marathas
The Demonstration of Power
Who was watching:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Nana Saheb Peshwa
What impressed them:
- Strength projection because of the cannon regiment
- One man with cannons could defy an entire kingdom
- Asked themselves: "Can we have this capability within our army?"
- They didn't have it - that kind of capability
The Changing Nature of Warfare
The Old Days Are Over
What was fading away:
- Old-style fighting (Shivaji's tactics)
- Shivaji would routinely go to Pratapgarh or Raigarh
- Get fortified and stay safe in mountain forts
The new reality:
- You could no longer do that so easily
- Marathas had moved to the north, Bengal, Rajasthan
- Everywhere they were going = no mountains
The Mountain Fort Problem: Cannons Change Everything
Historical Example: Purandar & Vajragarh
The forts: Two forts next to each other (visited on trips)
- Purandar
- Vajragarh
The old assumption: Mountain forts are safe, impregnable
The new reality with cannons:
- Even in Maharashtra, you couldn't just hide up in the mountains anymore
- Enemy could go to neighboring mountain
- Point their cannon at your fort
The Vajragarh Strategy (Historical Flashback)
The commander: Diler Khan (working under Mirza Raju Jai Singh's strategy)
Jai Singh's advice:
- "Don't try Purandar - it's heavily fortified"
- "You won't succeed, there will be lots of destruction"
- "Go to Vajragarh first"
What Diler Khan did:
- Took Vajragarh
- Installed wooden scaffolding on Vajragarh
- Started shooting cannons from there
- ⌠Those cannons were still not as powerful as what we're talking about now
- But it was still a clever solution
The lesson: Even mountain warfare was being revolutionized by artillery.
What the Marathas Realized They Needed
The Long-Range Cannon Requirement
The strategic necessity:
- Need long-range cannon regiment
- These cannons could go 1.5 to 2 kilometers range
- HUGE range - Marathas had never heard of this
Why this mattered:
- Shows they were on the lookout for good solutions
- Taking over distant areas with all fertile land
- Not a mountain to be seen
- "How are you going to fight a war?"
The Ace in the Hole Philosophy
The Chanakya principle (repeated):
- Can't leave warfare up to chance
- If you go one-on-one = 50-50 odds
- That's unacceptable
The solution: "We need to have an ace" - and they thought cannons were that ace.
Bushi's Position Becomes Permanent
The Long Haul
Result of Charminar standoff:
- Bushi's position with Nizam was fixed
- Couldn't be thrown out
- He was restored (in a sense)
- There for the long haul
The French in Pondicherry
Two Years Later
The French foothold:
- Pondicherry = deep south India
- French were in control there
- Just like British controlled Bengal
- French had their territory in Pondicherry
The Mercenary Problem: Ibrahim Khan Gardi
The Hired Gun Mentality
Who he was:
- Cannon regiment commander
- Trained by Bushi
- Working for Marathas now
The problem with his mentality:
- Demanded regular monthly salaries (first of every month)
- "No compromise on that one"
- "I will do anything and everything you ask me to do"
- "I'll be fair in the bargain, but you have to be fair with me"
The clash with Maratha culture:
- Traditional Maratha soldiers didn't get fixed monthly salaries
- Payment was irregular
- Sometimes paid through looting rights
- "Loot an area, keep what you want" = that's your salary
- Minor things yours to keep
- Huge loot = Peshwa gets a piece
The contrast: Ibrahim Khan = "Us baby" - wanted modern employment terms in a medieval army structure.
The Baggage Problem
What "Noteworthy" Means (Lakshani)
When the army moved, it carried:
- Tents
- Grains
- Cooks
- All supplies
- Everything had to be carried for long distances
The consequence: Became difficult to move quickly
Bajirao I's Lightning Speed (The Gold Standard)
How Bajirao Moved Fast
His method:
- Ate lunch and dinner right on horseback
- One of the reasons he was very popular
- Moved light - not too much stuff
The advantage:
- Could cross distances in 1 day that enemy thought would take 3 days
- He was quick
- One of a kind
The Problem: Regular Army vs. Elite Force
You Can't All Be Bajirao
The new reality:
- Now it was a regular army
- Can't expect everyone to be like Bajirao
- Normal logistics required
The Pilgrim Problem
Civilians Tagging Along
What was happening:
- People wanted to go to places in the north
- Do pilgrimage in Kashi (Varanasi)
- In those times: very treacherous to travel alone
- Would get looted or killed
- Wars happening everywhere
The solution people found:
- Travel with the Maratha army
- Do pilgrimage
- Join back when army returns
- Come back with army for protection
Why this was bad for the army:
- ⌠Civilians were a drag on military operations
- Not useful for anything
- Can't cook, can't clean (not their job)
- Not helpful to army operations
- Can't leave them behind (you put them in harm's way)
- They'd try to catch up anyway
- Becomes your burden
- Gives away your position potentially
The strategic mobility issue:
- Bajirao's model was swift moves
- No one could follow him
- Called "strategic mobility"
- Pilgrims drag you down
But this was what was happening - stuck with these civilian tagalongs.
The Warrior Quality Problem
Not Trained Warriors
The recruitment issue:
- "Kaslele" = warriors
- But many were not trained warriors
The Pendari problem:
- Pendaris = actually robbers
- ⌠Not formally trained
- Heart and soul not in fighting
- Just wanted to quickly make a buck and leave
- ⌠Not courageous necessarily
The forced recruitment:
- All kinds of people recruited
- Not properly trained
- Not mentally prepared to be warriors
- "You have to have dedicated people"
- Fighting was forced upon them - not their choice
Why this happened:
- Marathas were in a hurry to recruit
- Didn't have time to properly train everyone
- Didn't create proper mindset
- Needed numbers - had to have 100,000+ people
- ⌠Not an effective or uniform army
The Cleanup Crew
What these low-quality troops did:
- When the war was finished
- They'd do the cleanup work
- Deal with little pockets of resistance
- Mop-up operations
- Support functions
The Teeth-to-Tail Ratio
Military Efficiency Metric
The concept:
- "Teeth" = people who really do the fighting
- "Tail" = people who support the entire operation
- There's a ratio of actual troops to support staff
The problem:
- ⌠Don't want too much support staff
- Lose your fighting ability
- Maratha army had too much of their army comprising backup support staff
Who the support staff included:
- Barbers
- Cooks
- Servants
- ⌠Not going to fight
- ⌠Not trained
- ⌠Not interested
- Won't help you in battle
- Becomes a burden
- Have to protect them
The Loss of Strategic Mobility
What Made Shivaji and Bajirao I Effective
Their model:
- Strategic mobility
- Could move fast
- Pounce on enemy
- Fight 4-5 hours
- Immediately vanish
What changed:
- Now there were restrictions on moving that fast
- Substantial support staff
- Can't move quickly because:
- Support staff not in top physical condition
- Cook doesn't need to be physically fit - his job is to cook
- No reason for support staff to be athletic
The result: Fundamentally a more hamstrung army
The New Fighting Style
Stand and Fight
Old Maratha model:
- Fight and vanish
- Hit and run
- Guerrilla tactics
New model:
- Fight to the finish in front of each other
- Stand and fight
- Win the war and entrench your feet in new land
- Keep it under your control
- Don't just disappear, loot, and leave
Why the change:
- In the north: no forts, no mountains, no mountainous area
- Fighting more like Mughals now (of a generation before)
The Mughal Model
Why Mughals Fought That Way
Their advantages for their time:
- Had standing armies
- Large armies
- No mountains (so couldn't use guerrilla tactics)
- For their times: very advanced killing machine
- Europeans weren't as advanced then
The Technology Gap Widens (1750s)
Times Are Changing
By 1750s:
- Europeans starting Industrial Revolution
- More advanced technology
- Before: they just had boats
- Even during Aurangzeb's time, his army was pretty good
- Europeans couldn't really match Mughal armies then
Now:
- Times are changing
- Europeans doing R&D (research and development)
- Indians have not done it
- Technology gap widening
Why Peshwa was impressed: Understood the power of cannon regiment - this was new and unforeseen. Needed to be kept up with.
The First Half vs. Second Half Problem
Purvardha vs. Uttaradha
18th century divided:
- Purvardha = first half (up to 1750)
- Uttaradha = second half (after 1750)
The assessment:
- Up until 1750: Maratha fighting prowess was so-so
- Had not gotten state-of-the-art fighting techniques/weapons
- Let alone the discipline
- ⌠Not a professional army
The Superpower Problem: Can't Just Win and Leave
The New Responsibility
When you're a superpower:
- Win over an area → have to rule that area
- Can't just move away
- Win a province → must put in administration
Why this matters:
- Can't say "we won the war, going home now"
- Main prize of winning = collect revenue
- Need taxation system
- Need administration
- Need to rule over there
- Rule nicely = well-administered, good government
The Administration Problem
Good at War, Bad at Governance
The Maratha weakness:
- ✅ Good at winning over new provinces
- ⌠Weak at putting together effective administration
- ⌠Not their strong suit
The consequence:
- Win over an area
- Within two years: lose the area
- Why: didn't secure it or administer properly
- Didn't pay attention
- Didn't put together good administrative system
- Didn't maintain strong army base there
The cycle:
- Win it one year
- Next year: rivals come back, it's gone
- Have to take it back again
- Game of cat and mouse
The verdict: Not good at putting in place good administration. That was not their forte.
Key Players
| Name | Role | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Bushi (Gursi) | French general | Held Charminar with cannons, defied Nizam |
| Nizam | Ruler of Hyderabad | Couldn't dislodge Bushi |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Impressed by cannon power |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Understood need for cannons |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Cannon commander | Mercenary with fixed salary demands |
| Diler Khan | Historical commander | Used scaffolding strategy at Vajragarh |
| Mirza Raju Jai Singh | Strategist | Advised Vajragarh-first approach |
| Bajirao I | Former Peshwa | Gold standard for strategic mobility |
Timeline Context
| Period | Status |
|---|---|
| ~1750 | Bushi's Charminar standoff |
| Pre-1750 (Purvardha) | Maratha prowess "so-so", not professional |
| Post-1750 (Uttaradha) | Technology gap widening, need modernization |
| Aurangzeb's era | Mughals still competitive with Europeans |
| 1750s | European Industrial Revolution beginning |
Critical Insights
The Mercenary Loyalty Problem
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's demands:
- Fixed monthly salary
- Professional employment terms
- "Fair bargain" mentality
- ⌠Fundamentally at odds with Maratha culture
Traditional Maratha way:
- Irregular payment
- Loot-based compensation
- Flexible terms
- Loyalty through shared struggle
The clash: Trying to integrate modern mercenary force into medieval army structure = recipe for problems.
The Teeth-to-Tail Disaster
The bloated army:
- Too many cooks, barbers, servants
- Not enough actual fighters
- Can't move fast (logistics drag)
- Can't fight effectively (too many non-combatants to protect)
- Lose Bajirao's strategic mobility
The trade-off:
- Need big numbers (intimidation, occupation)
- But big numbers = slower, less effective
- Quantity ≠ quality
The Pilgrim Burden
The cultural obligation:
- Can't leave civilians to die
- Have to protect pilgrims
- They slow you down
- Give away positions
- Drain resources
No good solution: Part of being the dominant power - people expect protection.
The Administration Curse
The catch-22:
- Must win territories to expand
- Must administer territories to keep them
- ⌠Can't do the second part
- Win → lose → win again = exhausting
Why it matters:
- Revenue = power
- Can't collect revenue without administration
- Can't maintain empire without revenue
- Stuck in perpetual reconquest
The Technology Trap
1750 = inflection point:
- Before: competitive with or superior to Europeans
- After: falling behind rapidly
- Europeans doing R&D
- Indians not keeping up
- Gap will only widen
The cannon obsession makes sense:
- Recognized they were behind
- Saw cannons as equalizer
- But didn't fix underlying problem (no R&D capacity)
- Buying technology ≠ building technology
The Strategic Mobility Loss
What made Marathas great:
- Bajirao's lightning strikes
- Unpredictable movements
- Enemy couldn't prepare
- Based on being LIGHT and FAST
What killed it:
- Becoming a "regular army"
- Support staff bloat
- Civilian tagalongs
- Heavy logistics train
- Can't do guerrilla warfare anymore
The transformation:
- Mountain warriors → plains armies
- Hit-and-run → stand-and-fight
- Shivaji's model → Mughal model
- But without Mughal administrative capacity
The Marathas were stuck between worlds: too "modern" to use their old guerrilla tactics, but not modern enough to compete with European technology. Their army had ballooned into a slow-moving city on wheels - cooks, barbers, pilgrims, and all. They'd abandoned Bajirao's lightning mobility for Mughal-style set-piece battles, but lacked the Mughal capacity to actually govern what they conquered. They were buying cannons from mercenaries, but not building the scientific capacity to make their own. And most fatally: they could win wars, but they couldn't win peace. Every province they conquered, they'd lose within two years. The superpower that couldn't actually rule.
Shah Waliullah & The Invitation to Jihad (18th Century)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Shah Waliullah: The Man Who Changed Islam in India
The Sufi Problem
What was happening:
- Islam was struggling to spread in India
- No hook, no entertainment = very dry theology
- Dry theology = not attractive to people
The Sufi solution (new derivative/twist):
- Started dancing and having music
- More entertaining presentation
- ⌠Message was NOT different
- But the way you present it = more entertaining
- Dancing, playing music, performances
The strategic marketing:
- Present as "another form of Hinduism"
- In Hinduism: can adopt different practices
- More easy to convert people this way
What Sufism actually was:
- Nonetheless, the idea was same as Islam
- Just packaged differently
- "We're not here to convert anybody"
- "Just going town to town, having fun, dancing, gathering people"
Shah Waliullah's Background
Growing Up Sufi
His father:
- Was a Sufi
- Had established a school (madrasa)
- Shah Waliullah became a teacher there at age 60
His early exposure:
- Grew up under Sufi tutelage
- Connected with father's school
- Only knew about Sufi Islam (milder form)
- Not as hardcore
The Transformation: Trip to Saudi Arabia
Learning Jihadi Islam
What changed him:
- Went to Arvastam (Saudi Arabia)
- Learned about jihadi Islam
- Fundamentalist Muslim Islam
- Much harsher version
The conversion:
- From Sufi Islam → Extremist
- Became radicalized
- Changed his entire worldview
Sufi vs. Jihadi Islam
The Philosophical Difference
Sufi Islam:
- Tries to be all things to all people
- Basic elements same
- But wants to attract people
- That's why the music, dancing, etc.
Jihadi Islam:
- ⌠No room for such "stupidities"
- ⌠No music
- ⌠No art
- ⌠No singing, no dancing
- Extremely dry
- Extremely sharp
- No flexibility
Shah Waliullah's Mission: Bring Jihadi Islam to India
The Problem He Saw
So far in India:
- Sufi Islam was spreading
- Converting people
- But people would say: "Okay fine, I'm Muslim"
- Then keep their Hindu traditions anyway
- Wouldn't actually change
- Just wanted to enjoy life
- Made someone happy by saying they converted
His solution:
- ⌠"No no no!"
- ⌠"If you're Muslim, you have to do X, Y, Z"
- ⌠"Reject everything else"
- Wanted to bring this new jihadi Islam to India
The Mughal Empire Fragmenting
The Unified Empire is Gone
Under Aurangzeb:
- Mughal power was homogeneous and uniform
- Centralized control
After Aurangzeb's death:
- Started splitting apart
- "Shakla" = plural = getting divided into pieces
- Being destroyed from within
How It Split: The Independence Movements
Awadh Breaks Away
Before Aurangzeb's death:
- Very closely aligned with Mughal Empire
- Tight relationship
After:
- "I'm independent"
- Safdar Jang: "I'll give you some money"
- "But I'm going to defend myself"
- "I'm going to be for my own interests"
Nizam in Hyderabad
Similar story:
- "I may help you when you come to Deccan"
- "But otherwise I'm going to do my own thing"
Why they did this:
- Felt Mughals couldn't rule effectively anymore
- "Why not take advantage?"
- If Aurangzeb was there: ⌠could never do this (would be crushed)
- But now: opportunity
Punjab: The Militant Hindu Problem
The Jats
Who they were:
- Kind of militant Hindu
- Warrior community
The Sikhs Become Important
Sikhism at the time:
- Basically a reform of Hinduism
- Guru Nanak's innovation:
- Said: "One God" (don't do multiple gods)
- Made Brahmins less important
- Brahmins = priests who interpreted Hinduism
- Guru Nanak: ⌠"Nothing doing with Brahmins"
But the philosophy was exactly the same:
- Still fundamentally Hinduism
- Just presented differently
- Portrayed in a different way
Hindu Polytheism vs. Monotheism Explained
The Flexibility in Hinduism
The traditional Hindu concept:
- Polytheistic = many gods
- BUT the idea: God is ONE
- Just appears in different forms
Why different gods for different people:
- If you're a soldier/warrior → emotionally closer to Kali
- Kali = goddess, militant, has weapons, slaying demons
- If you're a scholarly person → worship Ganpati (Ganesh)
- Appeals to intellectual types
The flexibility:
- Kali is NOT different than Ganesh
- It's the same God
- Just appears to people in different ways based on who they are
- People are different → God appears differently
Guru Nanak's approach:
- Removed this flexibility
- Just: "One God"
- Reduced Brahmin importance (who had monopoly on interpretation)
Why Sikhs Became Militant (18th Century)
The Persecution
The cause:
- Sikhs were being prosecuted by Muslims in Punjab
- Had to defend themselves
- Became militant out of necessity
The result:
- Two Hindu sects became very prominent in Punjab:
- Jats
- Sikhs
Why Muslims were bothered:
- These groups presented a challenge
- Threat to Muslim dominance in the region
The Weak Mughal Emperor
The Central Power Collapses
The Mughal king had:
- Completely into merrymaking
- Enjoying alcohol, women
- ⌠Not doing any leadership
The consequence:
- Central power weakening
- Provinces taking advantage
- Different sects of Hinduism coming to the fore
The players gaining independence:
- Sikhs in Punjab
- Jats rising
- Marathas in the Deccan
- Rajputs having their own ideas about independence
⌠No central power because Mughal king was enjoying poetry, not worried about fighting. Letting it all fray at the edges.
Shah Waliullah's Panic: Who Will Save Islam?
The Crisis
What he saw:
- Marathas attacking Delhi willy-nilly
- Coming and attacking anytime they wanted
- ⌠"Where is my protector?"
- ⌠"Who will protect Islam?"
Who it should be:
- Typically: Mughal Emperor
- But he was so weak
- Dependent on Marathas (the very people threatening Islam)
- Couldn't do anything
Shah Waliullah's state:
- Very disturbed and worried
- Upset
- Searching for a protector of Islam
The Search for a Protector
The Rohillas
Who are Rohillas:
- Originally from Afghanistan
- Soldiers of fortune who came to India
- Been coming for several centuries
- No way to make money or live good life in Afghanistan
- Settled in an area called Rohilkhand
Where is Rohilkhand:
- About 100 miles from Delhi
- Named after these Rohilla Afghans
Can you still find them:
- ✅ Yes, in India today
- Now they look like any other Indian (intermarriage)
- Some evidence remains
- Near Bareilly (town in India, former capital of Rohilkhand)
- May speak Afghani or have some cultural remnants
The Afghan-Indian Connection
Why Afghans Came to India
The economics:
- Only two professions: farmer or soldier
- Maybe merchant (but limited)
- Farming can't be done 12 months/year
- Being a soldier = way to make money
The employment:
- Stick with your Peshwa or whoever
- They'll pay you as you go
- Good employment
- Sometimes: loot areas and keep what you get = your salary
Genetics: Afghanistan to India
The Same People
Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India:
- Genetically IDENTICAL
- Same people, same race
- Not different
The physical differences:
- Height, weight, complexion may differ
- But genetically: no difference
Why Afghans are tall/strong:
- ⌠NOT genetics
- Air: no pollution whatsoever
- Colder climate
- Eat meat (eating meat for long time = protein)
- Beautiful lifestyle (provided you have something)
- ⌠No jobs though
- Exercise a lot by walking
- Eating well, nice weather, no stress
- No huge cities
But: Genetics are exactly identical - same race across all these regions.
Najibullah Khan: The Rohilla Leader
Who He Is
Background:
- Rohilla commander
- Ancestry: father (or earlier ancestors) came to Delhi to serve Mughal army
- Afghan originally
The connection Shah Waliullah made:
- Searching for protector of Islam
- Search took him to Najibullah Khan
- Then ultimately to Abdali
The Holkar Connection: The Fatal Mistake
Najibullah and Holkar's Relationship
The bond:
- Holkar considered Najibullah like his son
- Not biological, but "Manasputra" (son in mind/heart)
- Loved him as such
- They had a relationship
The Missed Opportunity
What happened:
- Marathas campaigning in north for 1.5 years
- There was a chance to capture and kill Najibullah
- Najibullah was a prankster and troublesome
- He was actually captured
Holkar's intervention:
- Marathas wanted to kill him
- Holkar got in the way
- Said: ⌠"No, don't do that"
- ⌠"He is my son" / "He is innocent"
- Because of their relationship
Holkar lets him go = BIG HUGE MISTAKE
Why This Matters: The Cause of Panipat
Najibullah's Role
What he does:
- Sends invite to Abdali
- "Visit India and take on the route"
- "Get rid of Maratha Empire for months"
- Shit scared of Marathas
- Doesn't want them there
The consequence:
- ✅ Najibullah = CAUSE of the Panipat battle
- He convinces Abdali to come
- Invites him to invade
The irony:
- Holkar spared him out of affection
- Najibullah then engineers the battle that destroys Maratha power
- Holkar's mercy = Maratha disaster
Key Players
| Name | Role | Connection |
|---|---|---|
| Shah Waliullah | Islamic scholar | Son of Sufi, became jihadi, searched for Islam's protector |
| Guru Nanak | Sikh founder | Reformed Hinduism, reduced Brahmin importance |
| Mughal Emperor | Weak ruler | Into merrymaking, not leadership |
| Najibullah Khan | Rohilla commander | Holkar's "adopted son", invites Abdali |
| Holkar | Maratha commander | Spared Najibullah's life (mistake) |
| Abdali | Afghan invader | Invited by Najibullah, causes Panipat |
| Safdar Jang | Awadh ruler | Declared independence from Mughals |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Semi-independent |
Timeline Context
| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| Post-Aurangzeb | Mughal Empire fragmenting |
| 18th century | Shah Waliullah goes to Saudi Arabia, converts |
| 18th century | Sikhs become militant due to persecution |
| 18th century | Marathas attacking Delhi frequently |
| ~1750s | Holkar spares Najibullah's life |
| Later | Najibullah invites Abdali → Panipat |
Geographic Context
Key Regions:
- Punjab - Sikhs and Jats gaining power, Muslim concern
- Rohilkhand - Afghan settlers, ~100 miles from Delhi
- Bareilly - Former capital of Rohilkhand
- Delhi - Weak Mughal center, under Maratha pressure
- Awadh - Breaking away under Safdar Jang
- Hyderabad - Nizam going independent
- Deccan - Maratha base
- Rajasthan - Rajputs seeking independence
Critical Insights
The Sufi Marketing Strategy
The approach:
- Can't sell harsh theology
- ✅ Add entertainment (music, dance)
- ✅ Say it's "like Hinduism"
- ✅ Make it attractive
- People convert but keep Hindu traditions
Why it worked:
- Flexibility = accessibility
- People could be "Muslim" without fully changing
- Growth through adaptation
Why Shah Waliullah hated it:
- ⌠Not "real" Islam
- ⌠Compromising the faith
- ⌠Letting people stay Hindu in practice
The Fragmentation Pattern
Why empires fragment:
- Strong leader dies (Aurangzeb)
- Weak successor (poetry-lover)
- Provinces sense weakness
- Start asserting independence
- Center can't stop them
- Cascading collapse
Who took advantage:
- Awadh ("I'm independent now")
- Nizam ("I'll help sometimes")
- Sikhs (militant reform)
- Jats (warrior community)
- Marathas (attacking at will)
- Rajputs (independence ideas)
The Rohilla Wildcard
Who they were:
- Afghan economic migrants
- Soldiers for hire
- Settled near Delhi
- Could go either way (Mughal or Maratha or independent)
Why they mattered:
- Military power near Delhi
- Afghan connection (link to Abdali)
- Najibullah = key figure
- Bridge between India and Afghanistan
The Mercy That Killed an Empire
Holkar's decision:
- Spare Najibullah (like a son to him)
- Emotional, not strategic
- Seemed humane
The consequence:
- Najibullah invites Abdali
- Causes Panipat battle
- Destroys Maratha northern expansion
- One act of mercy = strategic catastrophe
The lesson: In war, personal relationships can doom empires.
The Identity Crisis: Hinduism's Flexibility
The Hindu model:
- One God, many forms
- Whatever appeals to you
- Warrior? Worship Kali
- Scholar? Worship Ganesh
- Flexibility = strength
Guru Nanak's reform:
- Too much flexibility?
- Brahmins have too much power?
- Just: "One God"
- Simplified Hinduism
Why Sikhs became militant:
- ⌠Not by choice
- Prosecuted by Muslims
- Had to fight back
- Reform movement → warrior community
Shah Waliullah: The Ideological Catalyst
His transformation:
- Sufi upbringing (mild)
- Saudi Arabia trip
- Learned jihadi Islam (harsh)
- Came back radicalized
His mission:
- ⌠End "fake" Sufi Islam
- ✅ Bring "real" jihadi Islam
- Make converts actually reject Hindu traditions
- Find military protector for Islam
His search:
- Najibullah (Rohilla near Delhi)
- Abdali (Afghan power)
- Result: invitation to invade
The impact: Ideological radical finds military muscle = invasion.
The Weak Center Problem
Mughal Emperor:
- Poetry, alcohol, women
- ⌠Zero leadership
- Dependent on Marathas for protection
- Can't protect Islam when dependent on "threat" to Islam
The vacuum:
- Everyone taking advantage
- Regional powers rising
- Religious communities militarizing
- Ideologues searching for champions
- Chaos = opportunity for outsiders
Shah Waliullah looked at India and saw a nightmare: Sufi Islam had made Muslims into semi-Hindus, the Mughal Emperor was a joke, Marathas were rampaging through Delhi, and nobody was defending the faith. So he went searching for a champion. He found Najibullah Khan, the Rohilla commander. And Najibullah knew exactly where to find an army: his Afghan cousins under Abdali. One conversation between two men would set in motion the Battle of Panipat. And it all could have been prevented if Holkar had just let the Marathas kill Najibullah when they had the chance. But Holkar saw Najibullah as a son. So he saved him. And in doing so, he doomed the Maratha Empire's northern ambitions.
The Conspiracy Against the Marathas (1754-1756)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Ideologue: Shah Waliullah
Background:
- Father was a Sufi
- Studied in Arabia and became a Jihadi (radicalized)
- Not a fighter himself - more of a theologian and ideologue
- His role: Inspire people and orchestrate alliances
The Crisis He Saw
The Muslim "Plight" in India (as described by Waliullah):
| Aspect | Muslim Status | Hindu Status |
|---|---|---|
| Governance | No real power | All advisors and governance structure |
| Wealth | Poverty and difficulties | All prosperity and riches |
| Political Power | Pitiable state (Kevil Wani) | Rising dominance |
The Core Problem:
- Mughal Empire was collapsing
- Marathas were becoming the dominant power
- No Muslim power in India could stand up to the Marathas
- Islam itself seemed at risk of being "uprooted from India"
The Letters to Abdali
Waliullah's Strategy: Looking for a "protector" (Ratha) of Islam - someone who could stop Maratha hegemony.
Why Abdali?
- Only person with the military power to stop the Marathas
- Afghanistan's king with proven military capability
- Had successfully invaded India twice before without being stopped
The Connection:
- Waliullah → Najib Khan (they knew each other from school)
- Najib Khan → Ahmad Shah Abdali (fellow Afghan, natural connection)
The Pitch:
"Islam will be uprooted from India if you don't help. The Maratha power is increasing, Muslim power is decaying. We need you."
Abdali's Response:
- He was already having internal issues in Afghanistan that needed resolution
- Once those were settled, he'd come to India
- But he needed a reason and local allies - you can't just walk into a foreign country without support
- These letters gave him exactly what he needed: invitation + local allies
The Rise of Najib Khan: From Soldier to Kingmaker
The Humble Beginnings
Starting Point: Just a common soldier - nothing special initially
The Breakthrough:
- Proved himself as a capable fighter
- Got recognized by Dunde Khan (a major Rohilla chieftain)
- Dunde Khan was so impressed he married his daughter to Najib
- This marriage opened the door to the leadership circle
Building a Kingdom
The Dowry:
- Got a few villages near Saharanpur as part of the marriage deal
- Small region, but now he was a chieftain with territory to rule
The Expansion:
- With the Mughal emperor being weak and ineffective, Najib expanded his territory
- Flew under the radar and grabbed more land
- Similar strategy to how Shivaji expanded under the Adil Shahan Sultanate
Climbing the Ladder (1751-1754)
| Year | Position | Achievement |
|---|---|---|
| 1751 | Entered service of Safdar Jang (Wazir) | Became 1,000 Mansabdar |
| 1751-1753 | Inside observer | Studied Marathas, Mughals, Rohillas up close |
| 1753 | Switched sides to Emperor | Protected Delhi from Safdar Jang + Surajmal Jat |
| 1753 | Major promotion | Became 5,000 Mansabdar - now a top commander |
| 1754 | Given Saharanpur region | Solid power base in Rohilkhand |
Key Move - The Delhi Defense (1753):
- Najib + Imad-ul-Mulk defended Delhi against the combined force of:
- Safdar Jang
- Surajmal Jat
- Marathas were also helping the Emperor during this
- Successfully defended → massive promotion to 5,000 Mansabdar
His Position by 1754:
- One of the major commanders in North India
- Had his own kingdom in Rohilkhand
- Still loosely allied with Mughals (vassal king arrangement)
- Inside scoop on all the major players from years of observation
Why Najib Wanted Abdali
The Fear Factor
Najib's Concerns:
- Marathas were expanding rapidly
- He knew he'd be "forever at the mercy of Marathas"
- As an Afghan in India (Rohilla), he had natural sympathies with Abdali
- Wanted to preserve Afghan/Muslim power in North India
The Vision
Najib's Pitch to Abdali:
"You should rule India by proxy. Replace the Mughals entirely - they're weak and useless. Give us (Rohillas) importance. We can be your local representatives. We'll work together."
The Logic:
- Mughals were dying anyway
- Why not replace them with Afghan rule?
- Najib could be Abdali's man in India
- Get rid of Maratha hegemony permanently
What He Wanted:
- Break Maratha power completely
- End their importance and overall hegemony
- He knew only Abdali could do it
The Third Conspirator: Madho Singh of Rajasthan
Why a Rajput King Wanted to Ally with Abdali
Recent History:
- Marathas had been interfering heavily in Rajasthani succession battles
- They decided which princes could rule and which couldn't
- Demanded tributes constantly
- Created massive resentment
The Calculation:
- Rajputs were already okay being vassal kings under Mughals
- But Marathas were too headstrong and intrusive
- Better to pay tribute to distant overlords than deal with Maratha interference
The Goal:
"We need to drive them south of the Narmada River. Stay in your territory. We can have long-distance relations, but don't come here and tell us who can rule."
The Price:
- Rajputs were willing to pay a steep price to cut down Maratha power
- Didn't want to eliminate Marathas entirely
- Just wanted them back in the Deccan, out of Rajasthani politics
The United Front Forms
The Alliance Against the Marathas
Members of the Anti-Maratha Coalition:
- Shah Waliullah - The ideologue, writing letters
- Najib Khan - The connector, had direct line to Abdali
- Madho Singh - Rajasthani king, fed up with interference
- Various other Muslim powers (Rohillas, remnants of Mughals)
What They All Wanted:
- Different goals but common enemy
- Cut down Maratha importance
- Drive them back to the Deccan
- Restore some form of Muslim/Northern power structure
What This Gave Abdali:
- Natural local allies - exactly what he needed
- Invitation to intervene
- Intelligence about who's who
- Guides for navigating Indian politics
- Religious justification (protecting Islam)
- Political justification (restoring order)
The Maratha Mistakes: Why They Became So Unpopular
The Military Success Without Political Wisdom
What Marathas Did Right:
- Unmatched military power
- Expanded all the way to Punjab
- Even crossed Punjab and went close to Afghanistan
- Raghunath Rao's campaigns were militarily brilliant
What Marathas Did Wrong:
Mistake #1: No Administration Left Behind
- Conquered Punjab but left no one to run the administration
- No day-to-day governance structure
- No follow-up after military victories
- Just conquered and came back
Mistake #2: Lost All Alliances in the North
- Made military victories but didn't maintain political alliances
- Interfered too much in local succession battles
- Became too headstrong and demanding
- Created enemies out of potential allies
Mistake #3: Didn't Understand Northern Politics
"They didn't understand politics because you can't just keep making military victories without understanding that you're losing alliances."
The Result:
- Created a united front against themselves
- Pushed everyone - Muslims, Rajputs, Afghans - into each other's arms
- Made themselves the common enemy
- Marathas were partially responsible for this unity
The Stage is Set
What's Coming
The book hints that a BIG CATALYST is about to happen - something that will force the Marathas to say:
"This can't be tolerated. We have to deal with this NOW."
And once that happens, Abdali will have to respond, and the collision course toward Panipat will be inevitable.
Timeline
| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| 1751 | Najib Khan enters Safdar Jang's service (1,000 Mansabdar) |
| 1751-1753 | Najib observes all major powers from inside |
| 1753 | Najib defends Delhi, promoted to 5,000 Mansabdar |
| 1754 | Najib given Saharanpur region |
| ~1754 | Shah Waliullah begins writing letters to Abdali |
| ~1754-56 | Marathas expand into Punjab but leave no administration |
| 1756 | Najib Khan is 45 years old, fully established |
| ~1756 | Multiple letters sent to Abdali from Waliullah and Najib |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Motivation | Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shah Waliullah | Ideologue/Theologian | Protect Islam in India | Writing letters to Abdali |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Chieftain | Preserve Afghan power, stop Marathas | Direct line to Abdali, offering alliance |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Loot India, expand power | Waiting for internal issues to settle |
| Madho Singh | Rajput King | Stop Maratha interference | Willing to ally with Abdali |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha Commander | Expand Maratha power | Military campaigns in North |
Geographic Context
Maratha Expansion:
- From Deccan (Peshwa's capital in Pune)
- North to Punjab
- Even reached near Afghanistan
Rohilkhand:
- Region in North India
- Najib's power base (Saharanpur)
- Afghan settlers in India
The Northern Powers:
- Delhi (Mughal capital, but weak)
- Punjab (recently conquered by Marathas, no administration)
- Awadh (Muslim state)
- Rajasthan (Rajput kingdoms)
- Rohilkhand (Afghan/Rohilla territory)
Cultural/Historical Notes
Mansabdar System
Mughal military rank system:
- 1,000 Mansabdar = Commander of 1,000 troops
- 5,000 Mansabdar = Major commander, top-tier position
Vassal Kingdom Model
- Keep your internal affairs autonomous
- Pay tribute to overlord
- Provide military support when needed
- Better than constant warfare
The Afghan Connection
- Rohillas = Afghan settlers in North India
- Natural cultural and ethnic ties to Afghanistan
- Easy for Abdali to find allies among them
Political Intelligence Value
Najib's years inside different courts gave him invaluable knowledge:
- How Marathas operate
- Mughal weaknesses
- Who's allied with whom
- Perfect position to be Abdali's guide
Key Themes
- The Power of Letters - Shah Waliullah never fought a battle, but his letters to Abdali helped trigger a war
- The Rise of the Self-Made Man - Najib Khan went from common soldier to kingmaker
- Military Success ≠ Political Success - Marathas won battles but lost the political game
- The Enemy of My Enemy - How diverse groups (Muslims, Rajputs) united against a common threat
- Local Allies Make Foreign Invasions Possible - Abdali couldn't invade without Najib and others
- The Importance of Administration - Conquering without governing creates power vacuums
[Session ended - the "big catalyst" event coming in the next reading]
The conspiracy is in place. The invitations are sent. The alliances are forming. The Marathas are making enemies without realizing it. The stage is set for catastrophe.
October 25 - The Power Struggle in Punjab & Imad ul-Mulk's Lightning Strike (1753)
October 25 - Mughalani Begum's Revenge: The Letter That Doomed Delhi (1753)
Abdali's Jihad & The Systematic Looting of Delhi (1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Chapter 12: Abdali's Dharma Yuddha (Religious War)
The Framing:
- Dharma Yuddha = Religious war
- In Islamic terms: Jihad
- Even though Abdali's real goal is wealth, he has to frame it as a holy war
Abdali's Own Words (Delhi, January 1757)
His Honest Statement:
"I need wealth, lots of wealth. Even though I may have to exploit good or bad paths to it. Regardless of which path I have to tread, I have to get lots and lots of wealth."
Translation:
- The ends justify the means
- Doesn't matter if it's moral or immoral
- The wealth is mandatory
- "I want it here, right here and immediately"
The Reality:
- Afghanistan has nothing - just rocky mountains
- Not enough rain, not fertile land
- No natural wealth at all
- His entire Afghan empire is built on Indian loot
- Without Delhi's wealth, Afghanistan would be nothing
1757: The Decisive Year
Why 1757 Was Different
The Declaration:
"1757 turned out to be a decisive year" (निर्णायक वर्ष)
What Made It Decisive:
- Peace in North India the previous year
- Multiple power transitions created opportunities
- All the invitations had reached Abdali
- The perfect storm for invasion
The Political Landscape in 1756-1757
The Key Transitions
| Region | Change | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| The Deccan | Raghunath Rao returned south in 1756 | Northern vacuum of Maratha leadership |
| Bengal | New Subedar: Siraj-ud-Daulah | Rash and quick to action (उद्दावला) |
| Awadh | Safdar Jung died (1754), son Shuja-ud-Daulah takes over | Living luxuriously, not governing |
| Delhi | Imad ul-Mulk in control, but paranoid | Severe restrictions on royal family |
Siraj-ud-Daulah's Character:
- Uddhavla = Rash, impulsive (negative connotation)
- Acts without planning
- Quick to action but not thoughtful
- This rashness can backfire
Shuja-ud-Daulah's Character:
- Living a very luxurious and entertaining life
- Not focused on governance or military matters
- Weak link in the defense chain
The Conspiracy Tightens
Who Invited Abdali to Delhi
The Conspirators:
- Najib Khan (Rohilla chieftain)
- Mughalani Begum (the betrayed woman with the treasure map)
Their Goal:
- "Checkmate" the Wazir (Imad ul-Mulk)
- He had become their enemy
- His power was growing beyond control
- Even more important than the Emperor himself
Najib Khan's Double Game
His Official Position
Surface Level:
- Supporting Imad ul-Mulk (the Wazir)
- There was a small Maratha regiment in Delhi (~2,000 soldiers)
- This regiment supported Imad ul-Mulk
- Imad ul-Mulk was dependent on:
- The Maratha regiment
- Najib Khan's Rohilla forces
His Secret Game
The Reality:
- Pretending to help Imad ul-Mulk
- Actually writing letters to Abdali
- Playing both sides
His Real Problem:
- Didn't trust the Marathas
- Knew Marathas would eventually take over everything
- The Mughal Emperor would be gone
- Then Rohillas would be exposed and vulnerable
- Rohillas couldn't match Marathas militarily
- They'd be wiped out
His Master Plan
The Strategy:
- Invite Abdali to Delhi
- Abdali loots Delhi (his primary goal)
- But before leaving, Abdali weakens the Maratha army
- Rohillas are now safe from Maratha domination
- Najib Khan becomes Wazir himself
- Gets unlimited power with weakened Marathas
The Calculation:
- Abdali has no interest in staying in Delhi
- He'll loot and leave
- But he'll damage the Marathas on his way out
- Perfect outcome for Rohillas
The Punjab Campaign Begins
Jahan Khan's Advance
The Route:
- Peshawar (Afghanistan/Mughal border) → Lahore
- Peshawar is the boundary between Mughal Empire and Afghanistan
The Battle:
- Abdali sent a small force to Lahore
- The Mughal army sent to defend Punjab met them
- The Mughal forces were easily defeated
- They had no will to fight
- Nothing to fight for
- Just fled
The Result:
- Jahan Khan (Abdali's commander) took control of Lahore
The Exodus
What Happened:
- Adina Beg was the default defender of Lahore
- Citizens of Lahore panicked
- Knew Jahan Khan was entering the city
- Feared massacre
- Entire population fled to mountainous areas for refuge
- Seeking protection in the hills
Abdali's Follow-Up
The Sequence:
- Jahan Khan in the lead
- Abdali followed quickly behind
- From Lahore → marched to Delhi
- Abdali has arrived
The Political Summary (1757)
Why Everything Aligned for Abdali
The Invitations: | Source | Motivation | What They Offered | |--------|------------|-------------------| | Shah Waliullah | Protect Islam | Ideological justification | | Najib Khan | Weaken Marathas | Local military alliance | | Madho Singh | Drive out Marathas | Rajput political support | | Mughalani Begum | Revenge on Imad | Treasure map of Delhi |
The Weaknesses in India:
- Mughal Emperor - Powerless
- Raghunath Rao - Returned to the south
- Bengal - Rash new ruler
- Awadh - Luxury-focused ruler
- Delhi - Internal conspiracies
- Maratha presence - Only small regiment (~2,000)
- Rohillas - Actively helping Abdali
The Perfect Storm:
- Multiple invitations ✓
- Weak defenders ✓
- Divided leadership ✓
- Local allies ✓
- Treasure map ✓
- Religious justification ✓
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1754 | Safdar Jung dies, son takes Awadh |
| 1756 | Raghunath Rao returns to the Deccan |
| 1756 | Siraj-ud-Daulah becomes Bengal Subedar |
| 1756-1757 | Najib Khan writes to Abdali |
| 1756-1757 | Mughalani Begum writes her letter |
| Late 1756 | Abdali sends Jahan Khan to Punjab |
| Late 1756 | Mughal forces easily defeated in Punjab |
| Late 1756 | Jahan Khan captures Lahore |
| January 1757 | Abdali arrives in Delhi area |
| January 1757 | Abdali makes his "wealth by any means" statement |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position | Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Invader | Loot Delhi, keep Punjab |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Chieftain | Double agent | Weaken Marathas, become Wazir |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Wazir (Delhi) | Target | Dependent on Marathas & Najib |
| Mughalani Begum | Former Punjab ruler | Conspirator | Revenge + restoration |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander | Military | Captured Lahore |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha commander | Absent | Returned to Deccan |
| Siraj-ud-Daulah | Bengal Subedar | Weak | Rash and impulsive |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nabab | Weak | Living luxuriously |
| Adina Beg | Lahore defender | Fled | Couldn't defend |
Geographic Context
The Route of Invasion:
- Afghanistan (starting point)
- Peshawar (border crossing)
- Lahore (captured by Jahan Khan)
- Delhi (final target)
Strategic Province:
- Punjab - Abdali's primary territorial goal
- Five rivers emptying into the Sindhu (Indus)
- Extremely fertile and prosperous
- Agricultural output = recurring income
- Afghanistan had no such fertile land
- This was his ONLY land-based goal
The Rest of India:
- Abdali had no interest in ruling
- Didn't want to annex other provinces
- Only wanted Punjab for the tax income
- Everything else was for looting
Abdali's Clear Goals
What He Wanted
| Goal | Reason | Strategy |
|---|---|---|
| Keep Punjab | Recurring annual income from fertile land | Make it part of Afghanistan permanently |
| Loot Delhi | Massive one-time wealth haul | Get in, get out quickly |
| Weaken Marathas | Remove future threats | Battle them on the way out |
| Don't stay in India | No interest in ruling | Just loot and leave |
What He Didn't Want
No Interest In:
- Ruling India
- Staying in Delhi
- Annexing other provinces (except Punjab)
- Building an administration
- Governing people
His Philosophy:
"Loot Delhi as much as possible in the least amount of time, then get out."
The Religious Cover
Why Frame It as Jihad
The Political Necessity:
- Gives moral justification to Afghan/Muslim supporters
- Rallies religious warriors to the cause
- Creates unity among diverse Muslim factions
- Legitimizes what is essentially robbery
- Silences critics who might object to pure looting
The Irony:
- His real goal: Wealth by any means
- His stated goal: Holy war for Islam
- Everyone knows it's about money
- But the religious framing is politically necessary
The Sources Referenced
Franklin's "History of Shah Alam" (1798):
- Looking back at the 1750s from 40+ years later
- Describes the Mughal Empire as "extremely unstable"
- Notes that Marathas were "by default rulers of India"
- Explains that it would have been "surprising had he NOT exploited this golden opportunity"
- Everything was perfect for Abdali's invasion
Key Themes
- Wealth Above All - Abdali openly states money is his only goal
- The Double Agent - Najib Khan playing both sides perfectly
- The Religious Cover - Framing greed as holy war
- The Weak Chain - Multiple weak rulers at critical positions
- The Leadership Vacuum - Raghunath Rao gone, Marathas reduced to small regiment
- Land for Taxes - Punjab is the only territory worth keeping
- Hit and Run Strategy - Loot Delhi, weaken Marathas, get out
- The Perfect Timing - 1757 as the decisive moment
The Ironic Parallels
Everyone's Using Religious Language:
- Shah Waliullah: "Come protect Islam"
- Abdali: "This is a Dharma Yuddha/Jihad"
Everyone's Real Motivation:
- Shah Waliullah: Power for his faction
- Abdali: Money, money, money
- Najib Khan: Become Wazir, weaken Marathas
- Mughalani Begum: Revenge
The Pattern:
- Religious language = political cover
- Holy war rhetoric = wealth acquisition
- Jihad = looting spree
- Nobody is fooled, everyone plays along
What Happens Next
Abdali Has Arrived in Delhi Area:
- Small Mughal forces already defeated
- Lahore already captured
- Delhi is the target
- Imad ul-Mulk is vulnerable
- The looting is about to begin
The Questions:
- How will Imad ul-Mulk defend Delhi?
- What will Najib Khan do? (probably betray him)
- Will the Marathas respond?
- How much wealth will Abdali extract?
- What happens to the Mughal Emperor?
The Big Picture: Abdali's Business Model
The Economic Reality of Afghanistan
Afghanistan's Problem:
- No agriculture or prosperity
- Rocky mountains
- Insufficient rain
- No fertile land
- No natural wealth source
The Solution:
- Raid India periodically
- Loot Delhi systematically
- Use wealth to build Afghan empire
- Keep Punjab for steady income
The Business Model:
- Invade India every few years
- Extract maximum wealth
- Return to Afghanistan
- Build infrastructure and power
- Repeat when wealth runs out
The Sustainability:
- Punjab = recurring revenue stream
- Delhi raids = one-time big scores
- This model worked multiple times
- Will work again in 1757
January 1757: Abdali stands outside Delhi with his army, having already captured Lahore. He's declared his Jihad, but everyone knows it's about the money. "I need wealth, by good means or bad, and I need it NOW." The invitations have been sent. The conspirators are ready. The treasure map is in his hands. The looting of Delhi is about to begin.
The Siege of Delhi: Betrayal, Failed Negotiations & Abdali's Demands (1756-1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The News Reaches Delhi
October 1756: The Warning
The Messenger:
- News of Abdali's approach reached Delhi in October 1756
- He was already on the march from Lahore toward Delhi
- Ahead of his arrival, Delhi had time to prepare
- But would they?
Imad ul-Mulk's Desperate Situation
His Weakness
The Reality Check:
- Imad did not have a large army in Delhi
- He didn't have many friends to depend on either
- His two potential allies:
- Najib Khan (Rohilla)
- Shuja-ud-Daulah (Awadh)
- But neither would help...
The First Betrayal: Najib Khan's Refusal
The Money Dispute
What Happened:
- Imad ul-Mulk asked Najib Khan for military help
- Najib demanded money first - to pay his soldiers' salaries
- Bachabachi (altercation, hostile back-and-forth)
- They had hot words and couldn't agree
The Positions: | Person | Position | |--------|----------| | Najib Khan | "Pay me first, then I'll help" | | Imad ul-Mulk | "Why should I give it to you?" |
The Truth:
- This was all just excuses from Najib
- He had secretly invited Abdali to Delhi in the first place
- He was never going to help Imad
- Imad understood this - he saw through the excuses
- But what could he do?
The Second Disappointment: Surajmal Jat
Why Surajmal Declined
His Reasoning:
- His only military interest: Keep Marathas south of the Narmada River
- Didn't want to mess with Abdali - why get involved?
- Had a small kingdom - wanted to protect it
- Calculated: If Abdali comes for Delhi, he probably won't bother with me
His Logic:
- Abdali's interest is temporary - loot Delhi and leave
- Marathas' interest is permanent - they want to stay and rule
- Better to let Abdali come, do his thing, and leave
- As long as I don't take Panga (enmity) with Abdali, I'll be fine
- Why would I fight Abdali to protect the Mughals?
The Calculation:
"Abdali will loot and leave. Marathas are the real permanent threat. I'm staying out of this."
Imad's Solo Defense Plans
Making Preparations
His Decision:
- Realized he's on his own
- No help from Najib Khan
- No help from Surajmal Jat
- Started making preparations to defend Delhi himself
- Would fortify the outskirts
His Strategy:
- Prepare for battle on the outskirts of Delhi
- But also keep negotiation channels open
- Cover all bases if possible
- Hope for the best
The Negotiation Attempts
Attempt #1: Yaqub Ali Khan
The Mediator:
- Yaqub Ali Khan was Abdali's Wazir
- He actually resided in Delhi
- Imad asked Najib Khan to send Yaqub Ali Khan to Abdali
- Purpose: Rapprochement (negotiation, peace talks)
- Hope: Maybe buy some time, broker a deal
Why This Made Sense:
- Yaqub Ali had relationships with both sides
- Could potentially mediate
- Maybe prevent the attack
Attempt #2: Mughalani Begum (The Trap)
Imad's Misunderstanding:
- Imad thought Abdali was coming because he was angry about Mughalani Begum
- Thought: "I displaced her from Punjab, so he's coming to rescue her"
- Completely wrong - Abdali was coming to loot
- But Imad didn't know about her secret letters
His "Brilliant" Plan:
- "Let me send Mughalani Begum to negotiate with Abdali"
- "If she asks him to go back, maybe he'll listen"
- "After all, he's here for her, right?"
January 10, 1757:
- Mughalani Begum left Delhi
- Supposedly to convince Abdali to turn around and go home
- This was incredibly stupid because:
- SHE was the one who invited him in the first place!
- She had written letters asking him to come!
- Now she was going to tell him to leave?
- But Imad didn't know this - he was in the dark
Mughalani's Triple-Cross
The Meeting with Abdali
What Happened:
- She met with Shahawali Khan (Abdali's Wazir)
- She met with Abdali himself
- On the outskirts of Delhi
Her Performance:
- Pretended to do her job: "Please go back, blah blah blah"
- Just for show
Abdali's Excuse:
"I can't go back now. I'm so close. How can I not pay my respects to the Mughal Emperor?"
The Reality:
- Complete lie
- His real aim: Get all the treasure out of Delhi
- He knew it wouldn't be given willingly
- He'd have to dig it out
- He'd have to go to rich houses
- He'd have to torture people, kill them, take hostages
- Whatever it takes to get the money
Her Secret Message to Imad
The Double-Cross:
- She sent a secret message back to Imad ul-Mulk
- Her advice:
"If you can't fight Abdali, just leave Delhi. Go hide somewhere. He's asked you to come meet him - that might be dangerous for you. If you can't fight, just let him come to Delhi and take what he wants. At least you'll be safe."
Why She Did This:
- She WANTED Abdali to loot Delhi freely
- She had invited him after all
- If Imad hides, Abdali has free rein
- She looks good in Abdali's eyes
- Classic betrayal
Her Character:
"She has no principles. No loyalty to anyone. Only trying to protect herself and get the best outcome for herself."
Abdali's Demands
The Ultimatum
What Abdali Demanded from the Mughal Emperor and Wazir:
| Demand | Details |
|---|---|
| Province of Punjab | Entire wealthy province |
| Province of Multan | Adjacent to Punjab |
| Jammu & Kashmir | The mountainous region |
| 2 crore rupees | Massive cash payment |
| Emperor's daughter | Political marriage |
His Promise:
"Deliver all this to me, and I'll go back without entering Delhi."
Why These Demands:
- Punjab, Multan, Kashmir = Annual agricultural revenues
- These areas were prosperous, fertile, advanced agriculture
- That's where the big money is
- These were undisputed parts of Mughal Empire
- Abdali was demanding massive territorial concessions
The Impossible Choice
The Problem:
- Neither Imad nor the Emperor had 2 crore rupees sitting around
- They couldn't give up three major provinces without a fight
- But they also couldn't fight
Their Only Option:
- Beg and plead: "Please don't come to Delhi"
- Because they knew what would happen if he entered
The Implications:
- Severe massacre
- Torture
- Destruction of Delhi on a grand scale
- He'd dig up all the courtiers' houses
- All the Mansabdars' wealth would be taken
- He'd raid the Emperor's treasury itself
- Leave them in economic ruin
- The entire high society would be upturned
The Military Movements
Abdali Divides His Army
The Geography:
- Yamuna River flows on the western side of Delhi
- To get into Delhi from the west (Abdali's direction), you MUST cross the Yamuna
- Strategic chokepoint
The Two-Pronged Approach:
Prong 1: Jahan Khan
- Crossed the Yamuna
- Didn't go to Delhi
- Went to Awadh (Shuja-ud-Daulah's kingdom)
- Kicked out the Maratha regiments stationed there
- Came and sat in Luni (outskirts of Delhi)
- Very close now
Prong 2: Shahawali Khan's Army
- Reached Narela
- Had skirmishes (Chakmak) with Antaji Mankeshwar's Maratha forces
- Twice they fought
- Marathas had to retreat both times
But Then:
- On the way back, Marathas had another skirmish with an Afghan/Rohilla commander
- This time Antaji won
- Small victory for the Marathas
Najib Khan's Continued Treachery
The Double-Dealing
Imad's Repeated Requests:
- Once again, Imad ul-Mulk asked Najib Khan to fight Abdali's army
- Still operating under wrong assumptions
- Thought maybe Najib would help
Why Najib Would Never Help:
-
He wanted Abdali's protection
- Abdali had a fearsome reputation
- No way Najib wants to be his enemy
-
He was Afghan himself (Rohilla = Indian Afghan)
- Saw Abdali as their champion
- The only difference: Abdali was "proper Afghan," Najib was settled in India
- But he identified with Afghans
- His origins were Afghanistan anyway
Najib's Games:
- Doing negotiations with Jahan Khan about working together
- On the other hand, asking 2 crore rupees from Imad to "protect" him
- Double-dealing - playing both sides
- Getting ransom from the Mughals
- They were his "piggy bank"
His Strategy:
- Give excuses not to do anything
- "OK, OK, I'll help. But give me this first."
- "Why don't we do this instead?"
- Never actually delivering
- Just stalling and extracting money
The Final Betrayal
Abdali's Message
The Demand:
- Abdali sent a message to Imad ul-Mulk
- "Bring the Mughal Emperor to meet me"
- This could be very dangerous
- Or he'd just demand massive amounts of money
Najib's Open Switch
The Moment of Truth:
- Najib Khan went with his army to Abdali
- Openly joined him
- No more pretense
- Made his loyalty known publicly
Why He Did It:
- Najib knew Abdali was powerful
- Wanted to side with the powerful guy
- Not oppose him
- Self-preservation and opportunism
- Plus ethnic/cultural loyalty to Afghans
The Situation Summary (January 1757)
Who's Where
| Force | Location | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Abdali | Outskirts of Delhi | Demanding entry |
| Jahan Khan | Luni (near Delhi) | Positioned close |
| Shahawali Khan | Narela area | After skirmishes with Marathas |
| Najib Khan | With Abdali | Openly joined the invader |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Delhi | Isolated, desperate |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Near Delhi | Small Maratha force, retreated twice |
| Mughal Emperor | Red Fort | Powerless |
| Mughalani Begum | With Abdali | Triple-crossing everyone |
The Balance of Power
Abdali's Advantages:
- Large, battle-hardened army
- Local allies (Najib Khan, Mughalani Begum)
- Fearsome reputation
- Clear objectives
- Surrounded Delhi from multiple sides
Imad's Disadvantages:
- Small army
- No reliable allies
- Surrounded
- Can't pay what's demanded
- Can't defend effectively
- Knows what's coming
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 1756 | News reaches Delhi: Abdali is coming |
| October-December 1756 | Imad tries to get help, fails |
| October-December 1756 | Najib gives excuses, won't help |
| Late 1756 | Surajmal Jat declines to help |
| Late 1756 | Abdali's forces approach Delhi |
| January 10, 1757 | Mughalani Begum leaves Delhi to "negotiate" |
| January 1757 | She meets Abdali, pretends to ask him to leave |
| January 1757 | She sends secret message to Imad: "Just let him come" |
| January 1757 | Abdali makes his demands (Punjab, Kashmir, 2 crores, etc.) |
| January 1757 | Jahan Khan crosses Yamuna, positions at Luni |
| January 1757 | Shahawali Khan fights skirmishes near Narela |
| January 1757 | Najib Khan openly joins Abdali |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Loyalty | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imad ul-Mulk | Wazir (Delhi) | Mughals | Desperately trying to defend |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Chieftain | Abdali | Openly betrayed Imad |
| Mughalani Begum | Former Punjab ruler | Herself | Triple-crossing everyone |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Himself | Surrounding Delhi |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander | Abdali | Kicked out Marathas from Awadh |
| Shahawali Khan | Abdali's Wazir | Abdali | Fighting skirmishes with Marathas |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha commander | Marathas | Small force, mostly retreating |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat King | Himself | Declined to help either side |
| Mughal Emperor | Emperor | Powerless | Puppet |
Key Themes
- The Isolated Defender - Imad with no allies facing overwhelming force
- The Fake Negotiation - Mughalani pretending to help while sabotaging
- The Impossible Demands - Abdali asking for what can't be given
- The Inevitable Betrayal - Najib openly switching sides
- The Strategic Refusal - Surajmal staying neutral for self-preservation
- The Multi-Front Siege - Abdali surrounding Delhi from multiple directions
- The Reputation Effect - Abdali's fearsome image prevents resistance
- The Torture Preview - Everyone knows what's coming if he enters
The Mughal Army's Decay
Why They Didn't Resist
The Reality:
- Lost their morale
- Not battle-hardened anymore
- Become "loosey-goosey" - soft
- Didn't have the punch they used to
- And they knew it
The Reputation Factor:
- Abdali had a fierce reputation
- His army was feared across the region
- Mughal soldiers knew they couldn't win
- Didn't want to fight
- Took any excuse to get out
The Result:
- Easy defeats
- Quick retreats
- No will to fight
- The empire's military power was fiction
Surajmal Jat's Logic
The Neutral Strategy
His Calculation:
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Abdali's goals | Temporary - loot and leave |
| Maratha goals | Permanent - stay and rule |
| His position | Small kingdom to protect |
| Risk from Abdali | Low - just passing through |
| Risk from Marathas | High - they want permanent control |
His Philosophy:
"Why would I fight Abdali to protect the Mughals? Let him come, loot, and leave. As long as I don't mess with him, I'll be fine. Marathas are the real problem."
The Wisdom:
- Sometimes neutrality is the smartest play
- Pick your battles
- Protect your own interests
- Don't die for someone else's empire
The Cultural/Historical Notes
Bachabachi (बचबाची)
- Hostile back-and-forth argument
- Not just discussion, but altercation
- Indicates serious disagreement
- No resolution possible
Panga (पंगा)
- Enmity, conflict
- "Taking panga with someone" = making them your enemy
- Deliberately creating conflict
- Surajmal didn't want to take panga with Abdali
The Yamuna River Strategy
- Natural defensive barrier
- Must be crossed to reach Delhi from west
- Strategic chokepoint
- Abdali crossed it with two armies from different points
What Comes Next
The Setup:
- Delhi is surrounded
- Imad is isolated
- Najib has openly joined Abdali
- Mughalani has sabotaged negotiations
- Abdali's demands can't be met
- The Emperor is powerless
- There's only one thing left to happen: Abdali enters Delhi
The Questions:
- Will Imad surrender or fight?
- How will Abdali extract the wealth?
- What will happen to the Mughal Emperor?
- Where are the main Maratha forces?
- Will anyone come to Delhi's rescue?
- How much will Abdali loot?
The Ironies
Irony #1:
- Imad sent Mughalani to negotiate peace
- She was the one who invited Abdali in the first place
- Classic move by someone who doesn't know what's really happening
Irony #2:
- Imad kept asking Najib for help
- Najib was actively helping Abdali
- Imad was basically asking his enemy for protection
Irony #3:
- Abdali claims he's just here to "pay respects" to the Emperor
- Everyone knows he's here to loot
- But the polite fiction must be maintained
Irony #4:
- Surajmal makes the smartest move (stay neutral)
- By not fighting for anyone, he protects himself
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best strategy
January 1757: Delhi is surrounded. Abdali makes impossible demands. Najib openly betrays Imad. Mughalani sabotages from within. Surajmal wisely stays out. The Mughal army has no will to fight. The Emperor is powerless. The treasure map is in enemy hands. And "something very important is about to happen..." The fall of Delhi is imminent.
The Fall of Delhi: Surrender, Torture & The Hunt for Hidden Wealth (January 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Imad ul-Mulk's Surrender
January 19, 1757: The Day of Defeat
The Situation:
- Imad realized he was no match for Abdali
- No allies to help him
- Najib had openly joined Abdali
- His defenses were hopeless
- Disappointed and dejected
The Action:
- January 19, 1757 - Imad ul-Mulk surrendered to Abdali
- Complete capitulation
- No battle necessary
- Delhi's gates open
The Price of Power: Buying the Wazir Position
Abdali's Offer
The Deal:
| Option | Price | Who Gets It |
|---|---|---|
| Option 1 | 1 crore rupees | Imad ul-Mulk can keep Wazir position |
| Option 2 | 2 crore rupees | Najib Khan becomes new Wazir |
The Choice:
"Pay me 1 crore and stay as Wazir. Or Najib will pay 2 crores and take your job. Your choice."
Najib's Bid
The Outcome:
- Najib Khan paid 2 crore rupees
- He got the Wazir position
- Put in charge of Delhi's administration (कारभार)
- His dream realized - he's now effectively running the Mughal Empire
Why He Paid More:
- Wanted the position badly
- This was his master plan all along
- Knew it was worth it
- Would extract more than 2 crores from the position
The Ultimate Humiliation: Prayers in Abdali's Name
The Symbolic Victory
What Normally Happened:
- Public prayers always said in the Mughal Emperor's name
- This showed who was the real ruler
- Traditional sign of sovereignty
What Changed:
- Even though the Mughal Emperor was still alive
- Prayers were now said in Abdali's name in Delhi
- Not the Emperor's name
- Showed who the real boss was
The Message:
"I don't need to kill the Emperor. Everyone will pray in MY name anyway. That's real power."
The Red Fort Evacuation
Abdali Takes the Imperial Palace
What Happened:
- It became clear Abdali was going to enter the Red Fort (Lal Qila)
- The Mughal Emperor realized this
- The Emperor left the Red Fort voluntarily
- Just walked out
- Abdali didn't even have to force him
Why Abdali Didn't Depose Him
The Calculation:
- Abdali did not sack (पदच्युत) the Mughal Emperor
- Could have easily done so
- But chose not to
His Reasoning:
- Wanted stability - not chaos
- The Emperor was just a toy - a puppet
- If I replace him, the new guy will also be a toy
- Why bother? As long as he's compliant
- He's my neighbor (and Muslim)
- No personal enmity - just business
- As long as he does my bidding, who cares?
The Philosophy:
"Why change toys when this one works fine?"
The Only Change:
- Kicked out Imad ul-Mulk as Wazir
- Installed Najib Khan instead
- That's all the reform needed
The Entry into Delhi
The Ghost Town
The Fear:
- When Abdali entered Delhi, people were terrified
- Based on previous experiences
- Everyone knew his reputation
The Reaction:
- People hid in their houses
- Streets were near Manushya (without people)
- Like a ghost town
- Empty streets as he rode through
- Via these deserted streets, he entered the Red Fort
The Public Announcement
Abdali's Promise:
- Told the people of Delhi:
"You don't have any reason to be afraid. You won't be harmed."
- Guaranteed their safety
- Wanted them to continue normal business
- Didn't like that they hid from him
The Brutal Examples: Punishing the Mughal Soldiers
The Torture as Message
Who Was Targeted:
- Mughal soldiers who were not compliant
- Those who resisted or caused trouble
- Those who wouldn't cooperate
The Punishments (from historical records):
- Nose mutilation - Cut off their noses
- Disembowelment - Dug into them and took intestines out
- Public humiliation - Put something in their nose (to mark them)
- Parade through Delhi - Put them on donkeys and toured them through the city
- Made examples - So everyone could see
The Effect:
- Every single Mughal soldier was "straightened out"
- Anyone misbehaving before stopped immediately
- Got the message: severe punishment for non-compliance
- Regular people were also "scaredy cats" - terrified
- Nobody wanted to risk punishment
The Systematic Looting Begins
Target #1: Imad ul-Mulk Himself
The Confiscation:
- Imad was obviously a rich man (former Wazir)
- All his gold confiscated
- All his silver taken
- All his ornaments seized
- Everything precious that he owned
But It Wasn't Enough:
- Abdali expected MORE from Imad
- Where's the rest?
- Since he didn't have it (or said he didn't)
- He was insulted in front of his servants
- Public humiliation
Imad's Claim of Ignorance
His Defense:
"I don't know about Mughalani Begum's letter. I have no idea that she wrote to you about hidden wealth in Delhi. I don't know where wealth is buried."
Translation:
- "Maybe it's fake"
- "Not my thing"
- "I can't help you find it"
Abdali's Response:
- Didn't believe him at all
- Suspected he was lying
- Threatened him
The Threat
Abdali's Warning:
"If you don't tell me where the wealth is hidden, I will give you slashes in the public square."
Translation:
- Public whipping/beating
- Severe physical punishment
- In front of everyone
- Ultimate humiliation
The Family Connection
The Mehuda Problem
Who Was Affected:
- Imtiaz was Mughalani Begum's mehuda (sister's husband)
- He was going to be slashed publicly
- He couldn't (or wouldn't) talk about hidden wealth
Mughalani's Dilemma:
- She felt sympathetic to her relative
- Became very disturbed
- Changed her mind about the torture
Her Intervention:
- Asked Imad ul-Mulk to join her
- Together they went to Abdali
- Pleaded: "Please pardon this guy. He really doesn't know anything."
Abdali's Inflexible Response
No Mercy
Why He Refused:
- Had to get tremendous amount of wealth out of Delhi
- His quota was not complete
- Suspected these people were lying
- Believed the wealth was hidden and they wouldn't give it willingly
His Philosophy:
"Whether it's good way or bad way, I have to get the wealth. I will use good means or bad means, but I have to get the wealth. Everything else is secondary."
The Reality:
- He'd squeeze them until they gave up everything
- No sympathy
- No flexibility
- The mission was wealth extraction, nothing else
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| January 19, 1757 | Imad ul-Mulk surrenders to Abdali |
| January 1757 | Najib Khan pays 2 crore rupees, becomes Wazir |
| January 1757 | Prayers said in Abdali's name (not Emperor's) |
| January 1757 | Mughal Emperor evacuates Red Fort |
| January 1757 | Abdali enters Delhi through empty streets |
| January 1757 | Announces safety for citizens |
| January 1757 | Brutally punishes non-compliant Mughal soldiers |
| January 1757 | Confiscates Imad ul-Mulk's wealth |
| January 1757 | Threatens Imtiaz with public slashing |
| January 1757 | Mughalani and Imad plead for mercy (refused) |
Key Players
| Name | Status | Fate |
|---|---|---|
| Imad ul-Mulk | Former Wazir | Lost position, wealth confiscated, humiliated |
| Najib Khan | New Wazir | Paid 2 crores, got the position he wanted |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Conqueror | Entered Red Fort, controlling Delhi |
| Mughal Emperor | Puppet ruler | Evacuated Red Fort, prayers not in his name |
| Imtiaz | Mughalani's brother-in-law | Threatened with public torture |
| Mughalani Begum | Conspirator | Having second thoughts about family member's torture |
| Mughal soldiers | Military | Brutally punished if non-compliant |
| Citizens of Delhi | Civilians | Hiding in fear |
The Power Transfer
Before and After
| Aspect | Before (January 18) | After (January 20) |
|---|---|---|
| Wazir | Imad ul-Mulk | Najib Khan |
| Red Fort | Mughal Emperor | Abdali |
| Prayers | Emperor's name | Abdali's name |
| Real Power | Contested | Clearly Abdali's |
| Street Activity | Normal | Empty (fear) |
| Wealth | Hidden in homes | Being extracted |
The Torture Methods
Making Examples
Why Public Torture:
- Intimidation - Make everyone else compliant
- Information extraction - Force people to reveal wealth locations
- Punishment - For those who resisted
- Control - Show who's really in charge
The Specific Techniques:
- Mutilation (nose cutting)
- Disembowelment
- Public marking
- Humiliation parades
- Threats of worse
The Message:
"This is what happens to those who don't cooperate. Everyone else, comply or face the same."
The Wealth Extraction Strategy
Abdali's Method
The Steps:
- Confiscate obvious wealth - Gold, silver, jewels from rich people's homes
- Demand information - Where is the buried treasure?
- Apply pressure - Threats first
- Use torture - If they don't comply
- Public punishment - Make examples
- Extract everything - Until quota is met
The Targets:
- Former Wazir (Imad)
- His relatives (Imtiaz)
- All rich Mansabdars
- Courtiers
- Anyone suspected of hidden wealth
The Quota System:
- Abdali had a target amount in mind
- "His quota was not complete"
- Would keep going until satisfied
- No mercy until goal achieved
Key Themes
- Surrender Without Battle - Imad knew he couldn't win
- Buying Power - Najib paid for the Wazir position
- Symbolic Victories - Prayers in Abdali's name, taking Red Fort
- Puppet Rulers - Emperor kept alive but powerless
- Public Terror - Brutal punishments as examples
- Systematic Extraction - Methodical wealth confiscation
- Good Cop/Bad Cop - Promise safety, but punish severely
- The Quota Must Be Met - Inflexible about wealth targets
- Family Complications - Even conspirators have limits when family involved
- Ghost Town Effect - Fear empties the streets
The Psychology of Control
Abdali's Sophisticated Strategy
Not Just Brute Force:
-
Selective Mercy:
- Don't kill the Emperor
- Promise safety to citizens
- Makes him seem reasonable
-
Targeted Brutality:
- Punish soldiers specifically
- Make public examples
- Creates fear without mass violence
-
Economic Extraction:
- Go after the wealth systematically
- Use torture for information
- No sentimentality
-
Political Control:
- Install Najib as Wazir
- Keep Emperor as figurehead
- Control through puppets
The Result:
- Maximum wealth extraction
- Minimum resistance
- Stable enough to not collapse
- Can leave it functioning when he exits
Mughalani's Dilemma
The Limits of Revenge
Her Arc:
- Started: Angry, betrayed, wanted revenge
- Middle: Invited Abdali, revealed secrets
- Now: Feeling sympathetic when family member threatened
The Complication:
- Imtiaz was her mehuda (sister's husband)
- Family connection making her reconsider
- But she created this situation
- Too late to stop the machine she set in motion
The Irony:
- She wanted Imad punished
- Now his relative (who's her relative too) is being tortured
- She pleads for mercy
- Abdali refuses
- She has no more control
The Practical Reality
Why People Hid Wealth
No Banking System:
- No safe deposit boxes
- No institutional security
- Had to hide wealth physically
The Hiding Methods:
- Buried in walls
- Beneath floors
- In secret rooms
- In haveli courtyards
- Anywhere they could dig
The Problem:
- Family members knew locations
- Under torture, people talk
- Abdali had time and no mercy
- The wealth WOULD be found
Imad's Fall
From Power to Humiliation
His Descent:
| Stage | Status |
|---|---|
| Before | Wazir, powerful, controlling Delhi |
| January 19 | Surrendered without fight |
| After Surrender | Lost Wazir position to Najib |
| During Looting | Wealth confiscated |
| Lowest Point | Insulted in front of his own servants |
The Ultimate Humiliation:
- Not just losing power
- Not just losing wealth
- But being insulted in front of servants
- Loss of face
- Loss of dignity
- Publicly shown as powerless
What Comes Next
The Setup:
- Abdali is now in control of Delhi
- Najib Khan is Wazir
- Emperor is a puppet
- Citizens are terrified
- Wealth extraction has begun
- Torture is the tool
- No one can stop him
The Questions:
- How much wealth will he extract?
- How long will the looting continue?
- What will happen to the Emperor long-term?
- When will the Marathas respond?
- What's Najib's next move as Wazir?
- How many will be tortured?
Historical Context
Why This Matters
The 1757 Sack of Delhi:
- One of the major lootings in Indian history
- Showed Mughal Empire's complete collapse
- Demonstrated Abdali's ruthless efficiency
- Set pattern for future invasions
- Created power vacuum that Marathas would try to fill
- Led eventually to Panipat in 1761
The Lesson:
- Power without military strength is illusion
- Puppets can be useful
- Terror is a tool
- Wealth extraction requires ruthlessness
- No mercy in conquest
January 1757: Imad surrenders without a fight. Najib buys the Wazir position for 2 crores. The Emperor evacuates his own palace. Prayers are said in Abdali's name. Soldiers are mutilated and paraded through empty streets. The citizens hide. The torture begins. The wealth extraction is systematic. Abdali's philosophy is clear: "Good way or bad way, I will get the wealth. Everything else is secondary." Delhi has fallen. The looting has just begun.
The Systematic Looting of Delhi: Torture, Treasure & The Price of Hidden Wealth (January 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Abdali's Ultimatum (Recap)
The Demands
What He Said:
"Good way or bad way, I have to get my wealth or ransom. Right now and right here. No loans or any business like that."
Translation:
- By any means necessary
- Immediately
- Cash only
- No negotiations
- No installment plans
The First Big Score: Kamruddin Khan's Widow
The Scared Informant
Who Was Itni Zaam:
- Some official/courtier
- Scared to the core (गर्भ गरित)
- Abdali was interrogating him
- He broke under pressure
What He Did:
- Pointed with his finger toward someone
- Kamruddin Khan's widow (Sholapuri Begum)
- Gave up her name to save himself
The Threat to the Widow
Abdali's Words to Her:
"If you show me the exact location of the hidden treasure, I would treat you like my mother or my sister. I will give you the honor of my mother or sister."
OR:
"Otherwise, iron nails would be hit under your nails."
Translation:
- Show me = respect and safety
- Don't show me = extreme torture
- The choice is yours
Who She Was
Her Status:
- Very highly placed in society
- Some famous person's mother
- Another famous person's widow
- Another notable's mother
- Multiple connections to power
- Very well-respected
- High social standing
Why This Matters:
- Even high-status women weren't safe
- Abdali would torture anyone
- No respect for traditional hierarchies
- The wealth was all that mattered
THE HAUL: Three Days of Digging
The Excavation
Location:
- Her haveli (mansion/estate)
- Remember: the reading group had been to a haveli in Rajasthan
The Process:
- Three days of continuous digging
- Following her instructions
- She told them where to dig
- She had no choice
The Discovery
What They Found:
- Approximately 2 crore rupees worth of treasure
- Hidden beneath the ground
- In that single haveli
Specific Items Found:
- मानसाची आकाराची दोनशी सोन्याची कांबी
- Golden sticks in human form/shape
- Elaborate gold sculptures
- Buried in dirt
And More:
- Precious stones (अमूल्य हीरे)
- Diamonds (पत्सु)
- Rubies (माणिक)
- Pearls (मोती)
- Gold objects (सोन्या)
- Silver items (चांदी)
- अगणित संपत्ती - Incalculable/uncountable wealth
Abdali's Reaction
What He Did:
- Took it all under his control (ताबात घेतला)
- "Subhan Allah" - Praise to God (Islamic expression of awe)
- Even he was impressed by the amount
The Historical Accumulation
How Much Wealth? From When?
The Timeline:
- Since Aurangzeb's death (1707)
- To 1757
- 70 years of accumulation
- By Kamruddin Khan and his father Amin Khan
What This Means:
- Three generations of hoarding
- 70 years of hidden treasure
- All procured by powerful Wazirs
- Now taken by Ahmad Shah Abdali in one day
The Bitter Irony
What Kamruddin's Descendants Got:
"His descendants got only the dirt that was dug up in that haveli."
Translation:
- Ancestors accumulated for 70 years
- Hidden it carefully underground
- Abdali took it all in 3 days
- Descendants left with nothing but dirt
- Ultimate reversal of fortune
Why They Buried Wealth
No Banking System
The Reality:
- No banks existed
- No institutional security
- No safe deposit boxes
- Had to physically hide wealth
The Method:
- Bury it underground
- Hide in walls
- Secret rooms
- Only family knew locations
The Reasons:
- Pass it to posterity - Leave inheritance
- Use for luxury - When they wanted to indulge
- Security - Felt safer buried than exposed
- Tax evasion - Government couldn't confiscate what they couldn't find
- Political insurance - If you fall from power, still have secret wealth
The Raid on the Janan Khana (Women's Quarters)
The Sacred Space Violated
What Janan Khana Was:
- Women's quarters (ज़नान खाना)
- Separate living area for women
- Hallmark of highly placed people:
- Mansabdars
- The Emperor
- Very rich people
- Traditional, protected space
- Men (except family) not allowed
The Raid
What Happened:
- Afghans raided the Janan Khana
- Broke all traditional boundaries
- About 100 women were taken
Their Fates: | Group | Fate | |-------|------| | Some | Let go | | Selected ones | Dispatched to Kabul (kidnapped) |
The Violation:
- Not just wealth theft
- But human trafficking
- Taking women as prizes
- Complete disregard for cultural norms
- Ultimate humiliation
The Systematic City-Wide Looting
खांती लगणे (Digging Everything)
खांती = Digging (खणने) खांती लगणे = Starting to dig / digging operation
The Scope:
- Every rich person's house was dug up
- All Mansabdars targeted
- All courtiers
- Anyone who was "who's who" in Delhi
- No one was spared
The Logic
Why Dig Everywhere:
- Abdali's soldiers realized the pattern
- If Kamruddin Khan buried wealth
- Any rich person probably did the same
- It was common practice
- Better to dig everywhere
The Strategy:
"Let's just go after each and every rich person in Delhi. Dig up all their houses."
छळ सत्र आणि आत्महत्या (Torture Sessions & Suicides)
The New Normal
छळ सत्र = Schedule of torture आत्महत्या = Suicide
What Became Daily Routine:
- Torture - To extract information
- Suicides - Out of fear or after torture
Why This Happened
The Reality:
- You can't get wealth from rich people "just like that"
- You have to torture them
- Make them confess
- Nobody wants to give up hard-earned wealth
- People would rather die than reveal everything
The Process:
- Extreme torture became commonplace
- Daily occurrence
- Out of fear, many committed suicide
- Rather than face torture
- Or after being tortured
Abdali's Background: He'd Seen This Before
The 1739 Connection
His Experience:
- Had come to Delhi with Nadir Shah of Iran in 1739
- Seen firsthand all the wealth
- Knew what could be gotten out of Delhi
- This wasn't his first rodeo
The Mughal Accumulation
The Timeline:
- Babur came in 1526 (actually ~1526)
- By 1757: About 230 years of Mughal rule
- Mughals had accumulated wealth for over two centuries
- Most of it concentrated and hidden in Delhi
Abdali's Knowledge:
- Knew exactly what was there
- Had personal experience from 1739
- This time he's in charge
- Would extract even more than Nadir Shah did
Mughalani Begum's Reward
The Informant Gets Paid
What She Did:
- Gave Abdali all the intelligence about Delhi
- Named names
- Revealed who had what wealth
- Told him where to look
- Complete inside information
Her Reward:
- Showered with rewards
- Land grants
- Wealth
- Made good on her promise
- Handsomely rewarded
The Forced Marriage
Another Price
What Happened:
- Some man (likely Imad ul-Mulk based on context)
- Had to divorce his wife
- Was married off to Mughalani's daughter (Umda Begum)
The Irony:
- Remember this was promised to:
- First: Taimur (Abdali's son)
- Then: Imad ul-Mulk (as bribe for help)
- Now: Finally forced through
Why This Matters:
- Shows Abdali keeping track of promises
- Using marriage as political tool
- Forcing compliance through family ties
- Mughalani finally got what she wanted
Letters from the Maratha Camp
Letter #1: Antaji Mankeshwar (January 30, 1757)
From: Faridabad (close to Delhi, but not in Delhi itself) To: Peshwa in Pune
What He Reported:
-
About Imad ul-Mulk:
- Under arrest
- Surajmal Jat and Najib Khan said his appointment shouldn't be permanent
-
His Communication:
- Written to Peshwa (Shrivant Peshwa - honorific) 2-3 times
- Asking for help
-
His Request:
"If Peshwa were to come, everything will be alright."
-
His Position:
- Not safe to stay too close to Delhi
- Will operate from Mathura
- Will keep Peshwa updated
- Doing what he can from a distance
-
About Bapuji Hingne:
- Has written to Abdali
- Will give him land in Antarvedi
- (Antarvedi = fertile land between Yamuna and Ganga rivers)
-
About Najib Khan:
- This is the Rohilla he's referring to
- When he can get hold of him, will meet
- Suggests Wazir should meet him too
-
Military Status:
- "We have killed 4-500 of their soldiers"
- "We are ready for battle"
-
A Cryptic Note:
- Something about "Hindu dveshi" (Hindu hater)
- Won't meet with him
- Unclear who he's referring to
Letter #2: Laxman (February 6, 1757)
From: Delhi itself To: [Unclear, probably Peshwa]
What He Reported:
-
The Looting:
- Abdali digging people's homes
- Taking out valuables
- Found a lot of precious stuff
-
The Shipment:
- All the confiscated gold and precious stones
- Given to his son
- Sent to Afghanistan
- Securing the loot first
-
Abdali's Location:
- Staying close to Shalimar Bagh
- Area in Delhi
- Established base of operations
-
Maratha Forces:
- "Our forces are at some location"
- Not clear where exactly
The Next Phase: Turning on Marathas and Jats
After the Looting
What Happened:
- Abdali finished digging and confiscating
- Got the Mughals under control
- Went to Shalimar Bagh
- Then turned his attention to remaining resistance
The New Targets:
- Marathas - Still fighting, won't accept his hegemony
- Jats - Warrior community, still resisting
Why:
- They wouldn't accept his authority
- Still pockets of resistance
- Had to be dealt with
- Before he could consolidate control
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| January 1757 | Itni Zaam, scared, points to Kamruddin's widow |
| January 1757 | Widow threatened with nail torture |
| January 1757 | Three days of digging in her haveli |
| January 1757 | 2 crore rupees worth found |
| January 1757 | Janan Khana raided, 100 women taken |
| January 1757 | City-wide digging begins (खांती लगणे) |
| January 1757 | Torture and suicides become daily routine |
| January 1757 | Mughalani rewarded for intelligence |
| January 1757 | Forced marriage to her daughter |
| January 30, 1757 | Antaji writes from Faridabad |
| February 6, 1757 | Laxman writes from Delhi |
| February 1757 | Abdali sends treasure to Afghanistan with his son |
| February 1757 | Turns attention to Marathas and Jats |
Key Players & Their Fates
| Name | Role | Fate |
|---|---|---|
| Kamruddin Khan's widow | High-status woman | Tortured threat, revealed treasure, lost everything |
| Itni Zaam | Court official | Scared, betrayed the widow to save himself |
| Mughalani Begum | Informant | Handsomely rewarded with land and wealth |
| Umda Begum (daughter) | Political pawn | Finally married off (forced marriage) |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Former Wazir | Under arrest, possibly forced to marry Umda Begum |
| 100 women | Janan Khana residents | Some freed, some sent to Kabul as captives |
| Rich Delhiites | Mansabdars, courtiers | Houses dug up, tortured, many suicides |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha commander | Operating from Faridabad/Mathura |
| Abdali's son | Prince | Sent to Afghanistan with the treasure |
The Scale of Looting
One Haveli = 2 Crores
The Math:
- Just ONE widow's house = 2 crore rupees
- There were hundreds of rich households in Delhi
- If each yielded even 10% of that = massive haul
- Plus the official imperial treasury
- Plus ongoing extortion
The Estimate:
- Total loot probably in the tens of crores
- Possibly over 100 crore rupees total
- Equivalent to the entire annual revenue of large provinces
- One of the biggest heists in history
The Cultural Destruction
What Was Lost
Not Just Wealth:
- Human Dignity - Torture, humiliation, suicide
- Cultural Norms - Janan Khana raided (unthinkable)
- Social Order - High-status people tortured like criminals
- Family Heirlooms - Generations of wealth lost
- Human Lives - Suicides, torture deaths
- Women's Safety - 100 kidnapped to Afghanistan
- Psychological Security - Entire city traumatized
The Torture Methodology
Why Torture Was Necessary
The Reality:
- Rich people don't give up wealth willingly
- Hidden treasure requires information
- Only torture reliably extracts truth
- Fear of torture makes others comply
- Public torture creates mass compliance
The Types:
- Threat - Like nails under nails (described to widow)
- Physical - Beatings, mutilations
- Psychological - Public humiliation
- Economic - Confiscation of everything
- Social - Family members threatened
Key Themes
- The Price of Information - Itni Zaam betrays widow to save himself
- Even High Status Isn't Protection - Respected widow threatened with torture
- Generational Wealth Lost in Days - 70 years of hoarding gone in 3 days
- Torture as Business Tool - Systematic use to extract wealth
- Cultural Violations - Janan Khana raided, women taken
- The Informant's Reward - Mughalani gets rich for betraying Delhi
- Suicide as Escape - People choosing death over torture
- City-Wide Operation - Every rich house targeted
- Knowledge from Experience - Abdali learned this in 1739
- Send It Home First - Secure the loot immediately (to Afghanistan)
The Maratha Response (or Lack Thereof)
What the Letters Show
From Antaji's Letter:
- Marathas are far from Delhi (Faridabad, Mathura)
- Only killed "4-500 soldiers" - small skirmishes
- Waiting for Peshwa to come - no initiative
- Not safe to get closer
- Essentially observing, not fighting
The Problem:
- Small Maratha forces
- Not enough to challenge Abdali
- Need reinforcements from Pune
- But Pune is 1000+ km away
- By the time help arrives, Delhi will be bled dry
The Systematic Nature
Abdali's Organization
The Process:
- Intelligence - Get informants (Mughalani, scared officials)
- Threats - Like to Kamruddin's widow
- Excavation - Dig based on information
- Extraction - Take everything found
- Expand - Move to next house
- Secure - Send treasure to Afghanistan immediately
- Repeat - Until city is exhausted
Why It Worked:
- Had time (Marathas far away)
- Had information (insiders)
- Had force (no one could stop him)
- Had experience (done this before in 1739)
- Had no mercy (would torture anyone)
The Irony of Hoarding
The Futility of Hidden Wealth
What They Thought:
- Bury wealth = keep it safe
- Hidden = protected
- Future generations will benefit
- Political insurance
What Actually Happened:
- Everything found in days
- Torture extracts location
- Generations of saving lost
- Left with only dirt
- The hiding was futile
The Lesson:
Wealth is only as secure as your society is stable. When conquest comes, buried gold is just a treasure map for invaders.
Comparison to 1739
Nadir Shah vs. Abdali
Similarities:
- Both came from north (Persia vs. Afghanistan)
- Both looted Delhi
- Both extracted massive wealth
- Both left Mughal emperor in place
- Both used torture
Differences:
- Nadir Shah was more brutal (massacred thousands)
- Abdali was more systematic (less killing, more extraction)
- Abdali had better intelligence (Mughalani's help)
- Abdali sent treasure home immediately
- Abdali aimed to come back (Nadir Shah didn't)
What Comes Next
Current Status:
- Delhi systematically looted
- Treasure sent to Afghanistan
- Mughals under control
- Najib Khan installed as Wazir
- Marathas and Jats still resisting
- Abdali now turns to deal with them
The Questions:
- How will he handle Marathas?
- Will there be a major battle?
- When will he leave Delhi?
- How much total did he loot?
- Will the Peshwa send reinforcements?
- What happens to the kidnapped women?
The Preview (from the reading):
- The Battle of Panipat happens in January 1761 (4 years away)
- But movements begin in 1760
- The two armies will face each other for 4-5 months before fighting
- Both within 2 kilometers of each other
- Both afraid to attack (know it will be mutual destruction)
- Multiple peace proposals will fail
- Final sticking point: Punjab (Abdali wants it, Marathas won't give it)
- Jihadi clergy around Abdali push for war
- January 14, 1761 - The battle finally happens
January-February 1757: A respected widow is threatened with nails under her nails. She reveals her family's 70-year treasure hoard. Three days of digging yields 2 crores. The Janan Khana is raided, 100 women taken. Every rich house in Delhi is dug up. Torture becomes daily routine. People commit suicide rather than face it. Mughalani gets rich for betraying her city. The treasure is sent to Afghanistan. Abdali turns to face the Marathas and Jats. Delhi lies bleeding. The looting of the century continues.
Abdali's Rage: The Attack on Mathura & The Siege of Vallabhgarh (January 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
After Delhi: Turning to the Resistance
The Shipment Home
From Laxman's Letter (February 6, 1757, from Delhi):
- All the looted wealth (crores worth) has been given to Abdali's son
- The son has gone to Perali (on the way to Afghanistan)
- Securing the loot immediately - send it home first
- Abdali himself staying at Shalimar Bagh area in Delhi
Maratha Position:
- "Our forces are at Balwal" (some location)
- Small forces, observing
- "Maybe in due time we will meet him in the battleground"
The New Targets: Marathas & Jats
Why He Turned on Them
After finishing off Mughal forces:
- Abdali turned attention to Marathas and Jats
- They were not willing to accept Abdali's hegemony
- Still fighting, still resisting
- Had to be dealt with
The Skirmishes Begin
Early Battles (January 1757)
| Date | Battle | Winner |
|---|---|---|
| January 16 | Afghans vs. Marathas | Afghans won |
| January 21 | Antaji Mankeshwar vs. Afghans | Marathas won |
Abdali's RAGE
The Reaction to Defeat
What Happened:
- Abdali heard about the defeat at the hands of Antaji Mankeshwar on January 21
- His face turned red with anger
- Absolutely furious
The Orders
To Jahan Khan:
"Take Najib Khan and his forces with you. Leave at once. Go into the lands of the Jats. Burn down each and everything. Do a lot of destruction."
Specific Target:
- Surajmal Jat is in Mathura
- "Go there and show him the valor of our swords"
- Defeat him
- Destroy as much as possible
Why Mathura Matters
The Religious Significance
Location: Mathura (south of Delhi)
Why It's Holy:
- Krishna's birthplace
- One of the most religiously significant sites in Northern India
- Born in jail (Kaus's prison)
The Story
The Prophecy:
- First six children would be daughters
- Seventh would be a son
- He would kill his uncle (Kaus)
Kaus's Response:
- Put Krishna's mother in prison
- Killed every child at birth
- Didn't wait for the seventh
- Wanted no chances
The Escape:
- Father took the newborn Krishna at night
- Put him in a basket
- Smuggled him out of prison
- Yamuna River was swollen (monsoon)
- Started walking through the dangerous currents
The Miracle:
- When baby's feet touched the water
- Water started receding around the father
- Gave him a path across the river
- Crossed without effort
The Result:
- Landed in Gokul (other side of Yamuna)
- Krishna grew up there, safe from his uncle
Religious Importance:
- Mathura = birthplace
- Pilgrimage site for Hindus
- Thousands visit for religious rites
- Non-combatant civilians
The Systematic Destruction Orders
Abdali's Commands
The Scope:
"From Akbarabad (Agra) to Mathura, everything has to be leveled. भूइ सपाट (Flat to the ground). If there is any structure, it has to be brought down to ground level."
Translation:
- Don't allow anything to stand
- Complete destruction
- Raze everything
- Make an example
The Ideological Justification
Abdali's Message to Farrukhabad
To Ahmad Khan Bangash (who was scared):
"I have come to re-establish Islam in Delhi and India. How will Darbhadri (third-rate) Marathas survive ahead of me?"
Darbhadri = Third-rate, inferior
His Declaration:
- "I will totally destroy them"
- "They won't even remain as some existence in this country"
- "My firm decision: Throw them out to the south"
- "They should be in Deccan, south of the Narmada"
- "They don't belong here - this is Mughal/Muslim area"
The March to Mathura
Jahan Khan's Big Army
The Movement:
- Jahan Khan had a large army
- Marched toward Mathura
The Massacre Before Arrival:
- Before Antaji Mankeshwar could reach Mathura
- About 1,000 Marathas were massacred
- Quick, brutal attack
The Atrocities Continue
On the Way:
- Afghans started coming south
- Leveled Faridabad - burned it completely
- Bestowed hundreds of heads to Abdali
- Incentive system: 8 rupees per head
Why This Encouraged Killing:
- Financial reward for each murder
- More heads = more money
- Made massacre profitable
- Systematic incentive for genocide
Jawahar Singh's Heroic Stand
The Defender
Who He Was:
- Surajmal Jat's son
- Met the Afghan army on their march
Why He Decided to Fight:
- Mathura had no weapons - just a religious pilgrimage site
- Jahan Khan's army wanted unlimited massacre
- Lots of non-combatants - came for religious rites
- No defense - only temples, no army, no fortifications
- Unarmed civilians would be slaughtered
His Forces:
- Only 5,000 soldiers
- Against Jahan Khan's much larger army
The Battle for Mathura
The Brave Fight
What Happened:
- Jawahar Singh fought bravely
- Gave a tough fight
- Tried to protect the pilgrims
The Casualties:
- 3,000 of his 5,000 soldiers were killed
- 60% casualties
- Heroic last stand
The Retreat
The Decision:
- Realized it was a lost cause
- Couldn't protect the city with remaining forces (only 2,000 left)
- Had to save what remained of his army
- Retreated to Vallabhgarh fort
- Fled for safety
The Result:
- Mathura was now totally unprotected
- Jahan Khan had free run
- The massacre could begin
The Siege of Vallabhgarh
The Fort
Type of Fort:
- Not a mountainous fort (like Raigad or Pratapgad)
- Not totally Bhui Kot (ground-level fort)
- On a hill with steep walls
- Offers some protection
- But not as difficult to scale as mountain forts
Abdali's Decision
The Strategy:
- Decided to lay siege to Vallabhgarh
- Would attack the fort
- Run over it if necessary
- Couldn't let the resistance escape
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 6, 1757 | Laxman writes from Delhi: treasure sent to Afghanistan |
| January 16, 1757 | Afghans defeat Marathas in skirmish |
| January 21, 1757 | Antaji Mankeshwar defeats Afghans |
| January 21, 1757 | Abdali's face turns red with rage |
| January 21, 1757 | Orders Jahan Khan to destroy Jat lands |
| Late January 1757 | March toward Mathura begins |
| Late January 1757 | 1,000 Marathas massacred before reaching Mathura |
| Late January 1757 | Faridabad leveled, hundreds of heads sent to Abdali |
| Late January 1757 | Jawahar Singh meets Afghan army |
| Late January 1757 | Battle: 3,000 of 5,000 Jat soldiers killed |
| Late January 1757 | Jawahar Singh retreats to Vallabhgarh |
| Late January 1757 | Mathura left unprotected |
| Late January 1757 | Abdali lays siege to Vallabhgarh |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Enraged by defeat, orders destruction |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander | Leads march to Mathura, massacres |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Wazir | Joins Jahan Khan in destruction |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha commander | Defeated Afghans (Jan 21), heading to help |
| Jawahar Singh | Surajmal Jat's son | Heroic defender, lost 3,000 men, retreated |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat King | In Mathura, target of Abdali's rage |
| Ahmad Khan Bangash | Farrukhabad ruler | Scared, received threatening message |
| Abdali's son | Prince | Sent to Afghanistan with the loot |
The Incentive System for Genocide
8 Rupees Per Head
How It Worked:
- Kill someone
- Behead them
- Bring the head back
- Get paid 8 rupees
Why This Is Evil:
- Turns murder into profit
- Creates competition to kill more
- Makes genocide systematic
- Financially rewards atrocities
- Encourages soldiers to maximize killing
The Result:
- Hundreds of heads sent to Abdali
- Like a business transaction
- Proof of payment = severed heads
- Commodification of human life
The Religious/Ideological Framing
Abdali's Justification
His Stated Mission:
"Re-establish Islam in Delhi and India"
His View of Marathas:
- "Darbhadri" - Third-rate, inferior
- Don't belong north of Narmada
- Should be kicked out to the Deccan
- This is Muslim territory
His Goal:
- Complete destruction of Maratha presence in North
- Religious war (Jihad)
- Cleanse the "pollution" of kafirs
- Make them not even exist in the region
Why Mathura Was Targeted
Strategic + Symbolic Destruction
Strategic Reasons:
- Base for resistance - Surajmal Jat was there
- Maratha presence - Small forces stationed
- Show of force - Make an example
Symbolic Reasons:
- Most holy site for Hindus - Krishna's birthplace
- Non-combatant pilgrims - Easy targets
- Religious significance - Destroy their faith centers
- Send a message - "This is what we do to kafirs"
The Strategy:
Attack the holiest place. Make the most brutal example. Show what happens to those who resist. Break their spirit by destroying what they hold most sacred.
The Geography
The Region:
- Delhi (north) - Already looted and controlled
- Faridabad (between Delhi and Mathura) - Burned completely
- Mathura (religious center) - Target for massacre
- Agra/Akbarabad (south of Mathura) - To be leveled
- Vallabhgarh (Jat fort) - Under siege
The Yamuna River:
- Flows through the region
- Mathura on western bank
- Gokul on eastern bank
- Strategic waterway
The Maratha Problem
Why They Couldn't Stop It
From Antaji's Letter (January 30):
- Operating from Faridabad/Mathura area
- Small forces
- Not safe to stay close to Delhi
- Waiting for Peshwa to come from Pune
- Asking for help repeatedly
The Reality:
- Small Maratha regiment (~2,000?)
- Faced massive Afghan army
- Won one skirmish (Jan 21) but can't hold
- Need reinforcements from Pune
- Pune is 1,000+ km away
- By the time help arrives...
Jawahar Singh's Heroism
The Impossible Choice
What He Faced:
- 5,000 soldiers vs. massive Afghan army
- Defending unarmed pilgrims
- Religious site with no defenses
- Knew he'd likely lose
What He Did:
- Fought anyway
- Lost 60% of his forces (3,000 killed)
- Saved the remaining 2,000
- Retreated to fight another day
The Character:
- Brave
- Strategic (knew when to retreat)
- Honorable (tried to protect civilians)
- Realistic (saved what he could)
Key Themes
- Rage as Military Strategy - Abdali's anger drives systematic destruction
- Symbolic Targets - Attack the holiest sites to break spirits
- Profit from Murder - 8 rupees per head turns genocide into business
- Heroic Last Stand - Jawahar Singh's impossible defense
- Religious Justification - Framing looting as "re-establishing Islam"
- The Example - "Level everything from Agra to Mathura"
- Unarmed Victims - Pilgrims, civilians, non-combatants targeted
- Too Little, Too Late - Marathas can't respond fast enough
The Build-Up
What's Coming
Current Status:
- Mathura unprotected
- Jahan Khan's army has free run
- Vallabhgarh under siege
- Jawahar Singh trapped
- Antaji Mankeshwar trying to reach them
- Systematic destruction ordered
The Questions:
- What will happen in Mathura?
- Can Vallabhgarh hold?
- Will Jawahar Singh survive?
- How bad will the massacre be?
- When will the main Maratha army arrive?
- How will Pune respond to this?
The Distance Problem
Why Help Can't Come Fast Enough
The Math:
- Pune to Mathura: ~1,400 km
- Travel time: Weeks, possibly months with an army
- Communication time: Also weeks
- Mobilization time: More weeks
By the Time Pune Responds:
- Mathura will be destroyed
- Thousands will be dead
- Abdali may have already left
- The damage will be done
The Tragedy:
- Marathas have the power to stop this
- But they're too far away
- Small local forces aren't enough
- The massacre will happen before help arrives
Historical Context
Why This Matters
The Escalation:
- Started with looting Delhi
- Now: Systematic religious destruction
- Targeting the holiest Hindu sites
- Mass civilian casualties
- Making examples through brutality
The Response It Will Trigger:
- When news reaches Pune...
- This will demand retaliation
- Can't ignore destruction of Mathura
- Sets up the eventual showdown
- Path to Panipat
Late January 1757: Abdali's face turns red with rage at defeat. He orders total destruction from Agra to Mathura. "Level everything. Burn it all." Jahan Khan marches with a massive army. 8 rupees per head. Faridabad burns. 1,000 Marathas massacred. Jawahar Singh makes his stand with 5,000 men. Loses 3,000 defending unarmed pilgrims. Retreats to Vallabhgarh. Mathura lies unprotected. The massacre is about to begin. And the Marathas in Pune don't even know yet...
The Fall of Vallabhgarh: Cannons, Tunnels & The Kizilbad Disguise (Late January 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Siege Begins
The Setup (Recap)
Where We Left Off:
- Jawahar Singh fled to Vallabhgarh fort with remaining ~2,000 soldiers
- After losing 3,000 men defending Mathura
- Abdali laid siege to the fort
- Mathura now unprotected
Before the Fall: The Faridabad Massacre
The Advance South
What Happened:
- Afghan army started coming toward the south
- Faridabad was on their path
- They totally burned Faridabad
- Offered hundreds of heads (mundaki) to Abdali
The Payment System:
- 8 rupees per head
- Systematic incentive for killing
- Turn in proof = get paid
- Genocide as profit
The March Continues
Heading to Mathura
After Faridabad:
- Afghan army turned attention to Surajmal Jat's area
- Started marching toward Mathura
- Met Jawahar Singh's army on the way
Jawahar Singh's Impossible Mission
Why He Fought:
- Mathura had no weapons (शस्त्रभार नाहोता)
- Just a holy site
- Jahan Khan's army wanted unlimited massacre (बेसुमार कातल)
- Had to protect it
His Forces:
- Only 5,000 soldiers
The Battle:
- Gave a tough fight (निकारा = difficult battle)
- When 3,000 soldiers were killed
- Had to save remaining army and himself
- Fled toward Vallabhgarh
The Siege of Vallabhgarh
Abdali's Personal Inspection
The Commander's Survey:
- Shah Abdali (शहा) personally went around the fort
- Walked the peripheral area
- Looked it over carefully
- Assessed how to attack
- Personally oversaw the operation
The Target Selection
The Decision:
- Finalized one particular spot
- Best location for attack
- Ordered: "Measure the distance to the wall"
- Precise calculation needed
- Would use this for cannon placement
THE CANNON BARRAGE
The Weapon
What He Used:
- A particular type of cannon
- Could be directed toward the sky
- Arc trajectory weapon
- For bombarding from above
The Attack Method
The Technique:
- Directed cannon toward sky
- Lit the explosives
- Cannonball went high in the sky
- Dropped on the fort
- Split into two parts mid-air or on impact
- Thrown around the fort - shrapnel effect
- Destroyed whatever they fell on
The Question:
"How can anybody survive with this kind of cannon balls?"
The Bombardment
Duration: 1.5 to 2 hours
The Technique:
- Non-stop firing - one after another
- Changing direction - moving the mouth of the cannon
- Correcting trajectory - adjusting aim and pitch
- No respite - continuous barrage
Inside the Fort:
- Many people killed
- Lots of confusion
- Chaos and terror
- Nowhere to hide
The Defenders' Resistance
The Counter-Fire
What Happened:
- People in the fort were also resisting
- Sent their cannons back
- Shot at Shah's army outside
- Tried to defend
When It Stopped
The Signal:
- When cannons from the fort stopped
- Defenders ran out of ammunition or were killed
- Shah said: "Okay, now attack the fort"
Translation:
- Put ropes on the walls
- Scale the fort
- Get inside
- The final assault
The Breach
Breaking Down the Doors
The Tool:
- A handheld tool for cutting wood
- Like a saw/axe
- Used to destroy the fort doors
- Cut them down
The Entry:
- Broke through the doors
- Got into the fort
- Massacred all the people inside
The Missing Leaders
Who Escaped
The Key Figures:
- Jawahar Singh (Surajmal's son)
- Antaji Mankeshwar (Maratha commander)
- Samsher Bahadur (brave warrior)
- Few other important people
The Mystery:
- They were not found in the fort
- Not among the dead
- Not captured
- Somehow escaped
The Clue:
"There must have been some hidden way or tunnel through which they escaped."
THE GREAT ESCAPE: The Kizilbad Disguise
Who Were the Kizilbads?
Abdali's Elite Force:
- Select division of soldiers
- Abdali's personal army
- Extremely loyal to Abdali
- Actually his personal slaves
Their Devotion:
- If Abdali said: "Do this suicidal attack"
- They wouldn't think twice
- Would just execute
- No matter if they'd be killed or injured
- Life didn't matter - they were slaves
- Totally devoted
Their Uniform:
- Separate dress - unique identification
- Could be recognized immediately
- Distinguished from regular soldiers
The Escape Plan
The Brilliant Strategy
How They Did It:
- Put on Kizilbad dress - Jawahar Singh, Antaji Mankeshwar, Samsher Bahadur, and few others
- Through the tunnel - Escaped via hidden tunnel in the fort
- Came out of the fort - Emerged outside
- Mixed with Shah's army - Blended right in
- Looked like Kizilbads - No one suspected them
- Found a way out - Gradually moved away
- Escaped to Yamuna River - Headed east
The Hiding Place
The Ravine:
- There's a ravine near the Yamuna River
- Natural hiding spot
- Difficult to spot people there
- They hid in this ravine
- Later fled from there
The Result:
- Saved their lives
- Barely survived
- Clever use of disguise
- Knowledge of tunnel was crucial
After the Fall
What Abdali Captured
The Fort: Taken The Soldiers: Massacred The Important People: Escaped - couldn't capture them
Abdali's Frustration:
- He wanted the leadership
- Surajmal Jat
- His son Jawahar Singh
- Antaji Mankeshwar
- Other important figures
But:
- They were clever
- Knew how to save themselves
- Used the disguise trick
- Escaped through tunnel
- Survived to fight another day
Timeline
| Event | Sequence |
|---|---|
| Before Siege | 1,000 Marathas massacred before reaching Mathura |
| Before Siege | Afghans burned Faridabad, hundreds of heads to Abdali |
| Before Siege | Battle with Jawahar Singh: 3,000 of 5,000 killed |
| Before Siege | Jawahar Singh retreats to Vallabhgarh |
| Siege Day 1 | Abdali personally inspects the fort perimeter |
| Siege Day 1 | Selects attack point, measures distance |
| The Bombardment | 1.5-2 hours of continuous cannon fire |
| The Bombardment | Many killed inside, chaos and confusion |
| The Assault | When fort's cannons stop, order to attack |
| The Breach | Fort doors cut down |
| The Massacre | All people inside killed |
| The Discovery | Key leaders not found - escaped |
| The Escape | Via tunnel, disguised as Kizilbads |
| The Survival | Hid in ravine near Yamuna, later fled |
Key Players & Their Fates
| Name | Role | Fate |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Personally directed siege |
| Jawahar Singh | Surajmal's son | Escaped via tunnel in Kizilbad disguise |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha commander | Escaped via tunnel in Kizilbad disguise |
| Samsher Bahadur | Warrior | Escaped via tunnel in Kizilbad disguise |
| Fort defenders | Soldiers/civilians | Massacred after fort fell |
| Kizilbads | Abdali's elite slaves | Their uniform used for escape |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat King | Not at fort, target of the campaign |
Who Was Samsher Bahadur?
The Connection to Bajirao I
His Identity:
- Son of Bajirao I (the great Peshwa)
- Mother was Mastani
Why He Was Ostracized:
- Mother wasn't Hindu - Mastani was Muslim
- Marriage not recognized - Not done according to Hindu rites
- Not considered lawful wife - By Pune/Maratha society
- Conservative society - Very strict at the time
- Never in Peshwa hierarchy - Not allowed to succeed
Where He Lived:
- Mother lived in Pune
- Across the river - Separate from main family
- Had a bungalow
- Never considered part of the family
His Name:
- Samsher = His given name
- Bahadur = "The Brave" (title)
- Fighting to prove himself despite his outcast status
The Kizilbads: Abdali's Death Squad
Why They Were So Effective
The Status:
- Personal slaves of Abdali
- No personal autonomy
- Life belonged to master
- Ultimate loyalty
The Mentality:
- Suicidal courage
- No hesitation
- No self-preservation instinct
- Would die without question
- "Because they were slaves, their life didn't matter"
The Advantage:
- Fearless fighters
- Perfect for impossible missions
- No moral questioning
- Complete obedience
The Identification:
- Unique dress/uniform
- Everyone could recognize them
- Showed they were elite
- Also: how the escape worked (disguise in their uniform)
The Tunnel System
Why Forts Had Secret Exits
The Purpose:
- Last resort escape - When all is lost
- Secret communication - Messages in/out
- Surprise attacks - Exit and attack from behind
- Supply lines - During long sieges
- Leadership survival - Save the command structure
Common in Indian Forts:
- Most major forts had tunnels
- Secret passages
- Hidden exits
- Known only to leadership
- Crucial for survival
Vallabhgarh's Tunnel:
- Led outside the fort
- Exit point unknown to attackers
- Allowed escape during the assault
- Saved the leadership
The Military Innovation: Arc-Trajectory Cannons
The Technology
How It Worked:
- Point cannon toward sky
- Doesn't aim directly at walls
- Arc trajectory - goes up and comes down
- Drops on target from above
- Can hit inside fort walls
The Advantage:
- Fort walls protect from direct fire
- But can't protect from overhead bombardment
- Like modern artillery/mortars
- Revolutionary for the time
The Shrapnel Effect:
- Cannonball splits into two parts
- Or breaks apart on impact
- Pieces thrown around
- Multiple casualties from single shot
- Psychological terror
Key Themes
- Personal Leadership - Abdali personally directed the siege
- Technological Superiority - Arc-trajectory cannons devastated defense
- The Payment System - 8 rupees per head continues
- Brilliant Escape - Disguise as enemy's elite force
- Tunnel Knowledge - Secret exits save leadership
- Slave Soldiers - Kizilbads as ultimate loyal force
- Capture vs. Kill - Wanted leaders alive/dead, not just victory
- The Outcast Warrior - Samsher Bahadur proving himself despite origins
- Systematic Destruction - Massacre after conquest
- Leadership Survival - Fight another day
The Irony
The Kizilbad Disguise
The Perfect Camouflage:
- Abdali's most loyal troops
- Everyone recognizes the uniform
- No one questions a Kizilbad
- Absolute trust in their loyalty
The Exploit:
- That trust becomes vulnerability
- The distinctive uniform = escape pass
- Walk right through enemy lines
- "Look like us = must be one of us"
- Perfect disguise because it's unthinkable
The Parallel:
- Like a prisoner disguising as a guard
- The uniform that means "most loyal"
- Used by the enemy to escape
- Brilliant psychological warfare
The Military Lessons
What This Battle Showed
For Attackers:
- Arc-trajectory cannons beat direct fire
- Continuous bombardment breaks morale
- Personal leadership inspires troops
- Elite slave units give fearless fighters
For Defenders:
- Need tunnels for escape
- Knowledge of enemy uniforms crucial
- Leadership survival > fort defense
- Retreat when you can't win
The Broader Campaign
The Pattern Emerges
Abdali's Strategy:
- Delhi - Loot and terrorize
- Turn on resistance - Marathas/Jats who won't submit
- Faridabad - Burn and massacre
- Mathura - (Coming next) Religious destruction
- Vallabhgarh - Crush military resistance
- Systematic payment - 8 rupees per head throughout
The Goal:
- Destroy resistance
- Make examples
- Extract wealth
- Terrorize population
- Eliminate Hindu/Maratha power in North
What's Coming
Current Status:
- Vallabhgarh has fallen
- Leaders escaped but fort destroyed
- Mathura completely unprotected now
- No military force between Jahan Khan and the holy city
- Civilians with no defense
- Religious pilgrims trapped
The Horror Ahead:
- Mathura massacre imminent
- No one to protect the pilgrims
- Holy site about to be destroyed
- The worst is yet to come
Historical Significance
Why This Escape Mattered
If They Had Died:
- No Jat leadership (Jawahar Singh)
- No Maratha command (Antaji Mankeshwar)
- Resistance would collapse
- Abdali would have complete control
Because They Escaped:
- Leadership survives
- Can regroup
- Can report to Pune
- Future resistance possible
- Eventually leads to Panipat
The Cleverness:
- Shows Indian military intelligence
- Knowledge of enemy systems
- Improvisation under pressure
- Survival despite overwhelming odds
The Cost
What Was Lost
The Fort:
- Vallabhgarh destroyed
- All defenders killed
- Military base lost
The People:
- Hundreds massacred inside
- Civilians caught in fort
- Soldiers who stayed to fight
The Territory:
- Jat heartland exposed
- Mathura defenseless
- Path to Agra open
Late January 1757: Abdali personally directs the siege. Arc-trajectory cannons rain down for two hours. The fort's defenses crumble. Doors are cut down. The massacre begins. But the leaders - disguised as Abdali's own elite Kizilbads - slip through a secret tunnel, walk right through enemy lines, and escape to a ravine by the Yamuna. They survive to fight another day. But Vallabhgarh has fallen. And Mathura lies completely unprotected. The worst massacre in Indian history is about to begin...
The Mathura Massacre: Blood in the Yamuna & The Apocalypse (February 22, 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
⚠️ CONTENT WARNING ⚠️
This session covers extreme violence, genocide, and war crimes. The historical accounts describe mass murder, torture, and atrocities on a massive scale. Reader discretion advised.
The Setup
After Vallabhgarh
Who Escaped:
- Jawahar Singh (via Kizilbad disguise + tunnel)
- Antaji Mankeshwar (Maratha commander)
- Samsher Bahadur (Bajirao I's son from Mastani)
- Few other important people
Current Status:
- Leadership survived
- But Mathura completely unprotected
- No military force remaining
- Pilgrims and civilians trapped
- Jahan Khan's army has free run
February 22, 1757: The Day the Blood Flowed
The Unprotected City
Why Mathura Had No Defense:
- Religious pilgrimage site
- In Awadh Kingdom or Mughal Kingdom (Muslim rule)
- Area already "pacified" by Abdali forces
- No military garrison
- No fortifications
- Just temples and pilgrims
- Left completely unprotected
The Orders: Total Freedom to Kill
Jahan Khan's Command
What He Told His Army:
"I give you full freedom to do whatever you want with the inhabitants of Mathura. Kill them, rob, steal, whatever."
Translation:
- No rules
- No restraint
- No mercy
- Complete license to commit atrocities
- Carte blanche for genocide
THE MASSACRE BEGINS
The Celebration of Horror
What Many Authors Wrote:
"The Afghan army celebrated the Festival of Holi with the blood of the inhabitants of Mathura."
The Sarcasm:
- Holi = Festival of colors (red, yellow, etc.)
- They "celebrated Holi" = Made everything red with blood
- Darkly sarcastic way to describe massacre
- Well-documented by multiple historians
- A "well-known event"
The Yamuna Runs Red
The River of Blood
For One Whole Week:
- The water in the Yamuna was red
- Soaked with blood
- From bank to bank
- Continuous red color
- For seven days
Then:
- Water turned yellow (पीत)
- Had a yellowish tinge (छटा)
- From decomposition
- From the sheer volume of bodies
The Suicides
Women's Desperate Escape
What Happened:
- Many women committed suicide in the Yamuna
- Drowned themselves in the river
- Rather than face capture
Why:
- Afraid of getting raped
- Afraid of being killed after torture
- Afraid of being taken as slaves
- Death was better than what awaited
The Head Count
The Macabre Inventory
What Was Found:
- Children's beheaded heads
- Piled up in different heaps throughout the city
- In every shop
- In every house
- At least one dead body lying
The Payment:
- Every head = 5 rupees (note: earlier it was 8 rupees)
- Financial incentive for murder
- Systematic genocide as business
The Non-Combatants
Who Was Killed
The Victims:
- Bhairagis - Ascetic sect of Hinduism, wanderers
- Sanyasis - Those who gave up material life
- No marriage
- No children
- No material happiness
- Completely devoted to spiritual life
- Pilgrims - Visiting the holy site
- Civilians - Regular inhabitants
- Children - Even infants beheaded
Why They Were There:
- Mathura is a major religious site
- People come for religious rites
- Sanyasis lived in small huts
- All non-combatants
- None were soldiers
The Desecration
The Cow + Human Head Display
The Insult:
- In huts where sanyasis lived
- Their head bound with a cow's head
- Tied together
- Left on display
Why This Was Done:
- Cow is worshipped in Hinduism
- Sacred animal
- Afghans wanted to insult them
- Mock their religion
- Desecrate what they held holy
- Maximum humiliation even in death
The Night Raids
A Muslim Eyewitness Account
What He Described:
The Departure (Midnight):
- Assailants left their tents at midnight
- Each cavalry person took 10-12 horses
- Horses chained together - one's reins tied to next horse's tail
- Long chain of horses
Why So Many Horses:
- To carry back the loot
- To transport slaves
- To bring back heads (proof of payment)
The Return (After Sunrise):
- Came back after dawn
- Out all night
- Systematic overnight looting
The Haul
What They Brought Back
On Every Horse:
- Loot - Valuables and items
- Girls - For slavery or marriage
- Slaves - To be sold in marketplaces
The Slave Trade:
- Would fetch money
- Could be exported anywhere
- Middle East, other regions
- Sold like commodities
The Girls:
- Could be sold
- Could be married off
- Human trafficking
- Property to be traded
THE HEADS
The Sacks of Proof
The System:
"Just like you have grains stored in sacks, there were heads tied up in cloth sacks and brought back."
Who Carried Them:
- Slaves carried the sacks
- On their own heads
- Following the horses
- Or ahead of them
The Irony:
- Slaves carrying heads
- Those heads would earn their captors money
- Soon they too would be killed and beheaded
- Their heads would also be payment
The Towers of Heads
The Monuments to Horror
What They Built:
- Towers made of beheaded heads
- In open grounds
- In open areas
- Public displays
- Like monuments
The Purpose:
- Show the scale of killing
- Terrorize survivors
- Display their "achievement"
- Proof of genocide
The View:
"Like when the whole world is destroyed... apocalyptic view."
The Fate of the Slaves
Used Then Killed
The Work:
- Made to pulverize grain
- Used ज़ातो (zato) - two stones for grinding
- Put grain between stones
- Rotate upper plate
- Hard labor
- No machines in those days
Why This Work:
- Armies need to eat
- Need to process grain
- Slaves do the hard labor
- No pay, just work until death
The End:
- After they finished the work
- They were beheaded
- "Because they were slaves anyway"
- Get money for their heads too
- 5 rupees per head
The Evil Logic:
- Use them for labor
- Then kill them for money
- Double profit
- Complete dehumanization
The Extent of Destruction
From Mathura to Agra
The Sequence:
"This was ongoing until they reached Agra"
Translation:
- Same pattern repeated
- All the way to Agra (north of Mathura)
- Entire region devastated
- Days of continuous massacre
Why They Did This
The Strategic Purpose
Make an Example:
- Mathura = Very highly revered religious site
- Attack the holiest place
- "This is what we will do to you"
- Show what happens to resistance
- Break Hindu spirit completely
Response to Maratha Hegemony:
- Marathas were running North Indian politics
- This was huge pushback against that
- "Drive them south"
- Eliminate their influence
- Marathas were Hindus - attack Hindu sites
The Streets
Too Much Blood to Walk
What It Looked Like:
- So many corpses on the streets
- So much blood flowing
- Difficult to walk on the streets
- Bodies everywhere
- Blood pools
The Smell:
- Stench was unbearable
- Couldn't open your mouth
- Couldn't take a breath normally
- Everyone walking had to keep handkerchief on mouth
- Careful how they breathed
The Headless Bodies
The Count
What Someone Saw:
- Counted 200 corpses
- None of them had any head
- All beheaded
- Heads taken for payment
- Bodies left to rot
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 22, 1757 | Big Afghan army launches attack on Mathura |
| February 22, 1757 | Jahan Khan gives "full freedom" to soldiers |
| Week of Feb 22 | Yamuna runs red with blood for entire week |
| Week of Feb 22 | Then water turns yellow |
| Week of Feb 22 | Women commit suicide by drowning |
| Week of Feb 22 | Children beheaded, heads piled in heaps |
| Week of Feb 22 | Every house/shop has at least one body |
| Week of Feb 22 | Sanyasis' heads tied with cow heads |
| Nightly | Cavalry raids with chains of horses |
| Daily | Return with loot, slaves, girls, sacks of heads |
| Ongoing | Towers of heads built in open areas |
| Ongoing | Slaves grind grain, then beheaded |
| Ongoing | Pattern continues toward Agra |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander | Gave total freedom to massacre |
| Afghan soldiers | Perpetrators | Systematic genocide |
| Mathura inhabitants | Victims | Massacred |
| Women | Victims | Many committed suicide |
| Children | Victims | Beheaded, heads displayed |
| Sanyasis/Bhairagis | Victims | Non-combatant religious people killed |
| Slaves | Victims | Used for labor, then beheaded |
| Girls | Victims | Taken for slavery/marriage |
| Muslim eyewitness | Chronicler | Left written account |
The Scale
The Numbers
Known Facts:
- Week of blood in Yamuna
- 200 headless bodies (just one count)
- Multiple towers of heads
- Every house/shop = at least 1 body
- Thousands killed (exact number unknown)
- Entire population of religious site
The Comparison:
- One of the worst massacres in Indian history
- Comparable to worst genocides worldwide
- Systematic, organized, incentivized killing
- Week-long continuous slaughter
The Payment System
The Economics of Genocide
The Structure:
- 5 rupees per head (some accounts say 8)
- Bring proof = get paid
- More kills = more money
- Competition among soldiers
Why This Made It Worse:
- Turned murder into profit
- Created incentive to maximize killing
- Made it systematic, not random
- Businesslike approach to genocide
- Even children worth money
The Double Profit:
- Loot the living
- Get paid for killing them
- Use slaves for labor
- Get paid for killing slaves
- Maximum extraction of value from human life
The Religious Dimension
The Targets
Who Was Killed:
- At holiest Hindu site
- Pilgrims doing religious rites
- Sanyasis devoted to spiritual life
- Bhairagis (ascetic wanderers)
- All non-combatants
- All religiously significant
The Desecration:
- Cow heads + human heads tied together
- Mockery of Hindu beliefs
- Deliberate insult
- Not just killing - destroying faith
The Message:
"Your gods can't protect you. Your holy sites mean nothing. We will destroy everything you hold sacred."
Key Themes
- Systematic Genocide - Organized, incentivized, businesslike killing
- The Payment System - Money per head turns massacre into profit
- Religious Targeting - Deliberate attack on holiest Hindu site
- Total Freedom to Kill - No rules, no restraint, complete license
- Desecration - Not just killing, but insulting religion
- The Yamuna Runs Red - Week of blood, then yellow
- Women's Suicide - Death preferred to capture
- Children Not Spared - Even infants beheaded
- Apocalyptic Scale - Described as end-of-world scene
- The Slave Cycle - Use for labor, then kill for payment
The Eyewitness Accounts
Why We Know This
Multiple Sources:
- Many authors wrote about it
- Muslim eyewitness left account
- Well-documented event
- "Well-known" massacre
- Historical consensus
The Muslim Witness:
- Part of Afghan army
- Saw the night raids
- Described the system
- Left detailed account
- Shows it wasn't hidden - was open, systematic
The Purpose
Why This Level of Brutality
Strategic Goals:
- Terror - Make an example so extreme no one dares resist
- Religious War - Attack Hindu faith centers
- Break Maratha Power - They were running the North
- Send a Message - "This is what happens"
- Profit - Loot + payment for heads
- Jihad Justification - "Kafirs have no value"
The Calculation:
Attack the holiest site. Make it the most brutal. Use maximum terror. Break their spirit completely. Make it so horrific they'll never resist again.
The Aftermath: When Pune Learned
The Realization
What the Reading Says:
"After this, when the news came to Pune, there was a realization in the Marathas that this has to be stopped. It's game on now. It's serious."
Why This Changed Everything:
- Scale unprecedented - Never happened like this before
- Holiest site - Can't ignore destruction of Mathura
- Hired to protect - Marathas were paid to protect North India
- Beyond looting - This was genocide
The Response:
- "They're going to have to stand up"
- "Send an army"
- But doesn't happen right away
- Takes time to mobilize
- Abdali will likely return before they can respond
- Or go back temporarily
The Shock:
- "This was shocking to everyone"
- Even hardened warriors were horrified
- The scale, the brutality, the targeting
The Path to Panipat
Why This Matters
This Event:
- Made Panipat inevitable
- Marathas couldn't ignore this
- Had to respond with full force
- Not about politics anymore
- About survival and honor
The Timeline:
- Massacre: February 1757
- News reaches Pune: Weeks/months later
- Mobilization: More months
- Battle of Panipat: January 14, 1761
- Almost 4 years to prepare
- But the path was set here
The Comparison
Historical Context
Among World's Worst:
- Comparable to:
- Worst medieval massacres
- Mongol genocides
- Other religious genocides
- Systematic, organized, documented
- Not random violence - planned genocide
In Indian History:
- One of the darkest chapters
- Up there with worst atrocities
- Well-remembered in collective memory
- Part of why Panipat mattered so much
The Geography of Horror
The Yamuna River
The Sacred River:
- Krishna crossed it as infant
- Banks are holy sites
- Pilgrims bathe in it
- Religiously significant
Now:
- Red with blood for a week
- Then yellow from decomposition
- Women drowning themselves in it
- Sacred river becomes death river
The Irony:
- River that saved infant Krishna
- Now filled with blood of his devotees
- At his birthplace
- Ultimate desecration
What Was Lost
Beyond the Dead
Human Cost:
- Thousands killed
- Women traumatized or killed
- Children murdered
- Families destroyed
Cultural Cost:
- Holiest site defiled
- Religious community devastated
- Temples damaged/destroyed
- Sacred space violated
Psychological Cost:
- Entire community traumatized
- Survivors scarred for life
- Fear spread throughout North India
- "If they can do this to Mathura..."
The Systematic Nature
Not Random Violence
The Organization:
- Orders given - "Full freedom"
- Payment system - 5-8 rupees per head
- Night raids - Organized cavalry operations
- Chains of horses - Efficient loot transport
- Head collection - Proof of payment
- Slave labor - Extract value before killing
- Duration - Week-long operation
- Expansion - Continue pattern to Agra
This Wasn't:
- Spontaneous riot
- Undisciplined looting
- Random violence
This Was:
- Planned genocide
- Organized operation
- Systematic killing
- Maximum profit extraction
- State-sponsored terrorism
The Horror in Detail
The Apocalyptic View
What Survivors Saw:
- Streets you couldn't walk on (blood and bodies)
- Air you couldn't breathe (stench)
- Towers of severed heads
- Handkerchiefs required to breathe
- 200 headless bodies (one count)
- Every house with a body
- River running red
- Children's heads in heaps
- Sanyasis with cow heads
- "Like the whole world is destroyed"
The Description:
"Apocalyptic view" - End of world scene
February 22, 1757: The holiest site in Northern Hinduism. "Full freedom to do whatever you want." The Yamuna runs red for seven days. Then turns yellow. Women drown themselves rather than be captured. Children's heads piled in heaps. Every house has a body. Sanyasis' heads tied with cow heads. Cavalry raids all night with chains of horses. Slaves carry sacks of severed heads. Towers of heads built in open grounds. 5 rupees per head. Use slaves for labor, then behead them for payment. So much blood you can't walk the streets. Stench so bad you can't breathe without a cloth. 200 headless bodies in one area alone. "Like when the whole world is destroyed." The massacre continues toward Agra. And when the news reaches Pune... "This has to be stopped. It's game on now. It's serious." The path to Panipat is set.
A Note on Historical Documentation
This massacre is well-documented by multiple contemporary sources, including Muslim chroniclers who were present with the Afghan forces. The accounts are consistent across sources, confirming both the scale and the systematic nature of the atrocities. This is not myth or exaggeration - this is documented history.
⚠️ END OF CONTENT WARNING ⚠️
This was one of the darkest chapters in Indian history, well-documented and historically verified. The Marathas' response to this would shape the next phase of the conflict, ultimately leading to the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761.
Nature's Revenge: Cholera, Retreat & Defiance (Late February-March 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Aftermath
The Destruction Complete (Recap)
What Just Happened:
- Mathura massacred for a week
- Yamuna red with blood, then yellow
- Systematic genocide
- Continued toward Agra
- Then Abdali crossed back to Gokul
Gokul: The Second Holy Site
Across the Yamuna
The Geography:
- Mathura - Western bank of Yamuna (Krishna's birthplace)
- Gokul - Eastern bank of Yamuna (where Krishna grew up)
- Abdali crossed the river
Religious Significance:
- Where Krishna's father landed after crossing the Yamuna
- Where river waters receded for him
- Where Krishna spent his childhood
- As a teenager
- Also a very holy site
The Temple:
- Gokul Nath Mandir (temple)
- Major religious site
The Fight at Gokul
The Naga Sadhus
Who Defended:
- Naga Sadhus - Warrior ascetics
- Carried swords
- Put up resistance
- Fought back
The Battle:
- They put up a fight
- But they were all killed
- No match for professional army
- Not enough of them
Why the Temple Was Spared
The Economics of Destruction
Abdali's Calculation:
- His real interest was looting
- Gokul had nothing to loot
- Ascetic people - no wealth
- Maybe some other people, but not much
- Didn't find enough to make it worth staying
The Decision:
- Just returned back
- Didn't destroy Gokul Nath temple
- Didn't stay there long
- Would have taken too long to destroy it
- Wasn't worth the effort
Why This Matters:
- Shows his priorities: Wealth > Destruction
- Religious destruction was secondary
- If there's no profit, don't waste time
- Mathura got destroyed because of wealth + symbolism
- Gokul spared because nothing to gain
The Treatment of Muslims
Not Completely Spared
What Happened to Mathura Muslims:
- Lives were spared - They weren't killed
- But: Had to lose their money
- Property confiscated
- Probably subjected to humiliation/insults
- "Didn't get too much special treatment"
The Message:
- Being Muslim helped you survive
- But didn't save your wealth
- Still got looted
- Just not murdered
The Goldsmith's Story
14 Days Later
The Survivor:
- Found after 14 days of destruction
- No clothes on his body
- Completely bare
- Begging
- Someone saw him and he told his story
His Account
His Life Before:
"I was a goldsmith. I had a big shop."
The Attack:
- During the massacre
- Cavalry guy came
- With an open sword (no sheath)
- On horseback
- Came to kill him
The Exchange:
Goldsmith: "I'm a Muslim!"
Cavalry guy: "Show me the proof."
Goldsmith: [Took off his clothes - circumcision proof]
Cavalry guy: "Give me all your money. That's the only way you can save your life."
But Then:
- Another guy came
- Struck his stomach with a sword
- Despite being shown he was Muslim
- Didn't care about the negotiation
His Escape:
- Ran away
- Hid in some corners
- Survived
- But lost everything
- Naked, wounded, traumatized
The Lesson:
- Even Muslims weren't safe from all violence
- Some soldiers didn't care
- Chaos and brutality everywhere
- Being Muslim helped odds but wasn't guarantee
A Writer's Description
The Pitable State
What Was Seen:
The Bodies:
- Corpses everywhere you look
- Lots of corpses on the streets
The Blood:
- So much blood on the streets
- Difficult to walk through
- Had to navigate around blood and bodies
The Beheadings:
- Many corpses had no head
- Someone counted 200 headless bodies
- Just in one area
The Smell:
- Stench was unbearable
- Couldn't open your mouth
- Couldn't take a breath normally
- Everyone walking had to keep handkerchief on mouth
- Be careful how they breathed
Abdali's Victory Poem
Commissioning the Propaganda
Abdali's Request:
"I want a small poem constructed to commemorate this event. Is there somebody who can come up with this?"
What It Should Say:
- "I have relieved the pollution caused by the kafirs"
- "Look how much I've done"
- Celebrate the "achievement"
- Commemorate the massacre
The Response:
- After two days
- Guy called Khawas Khan
- Constructed a few lines
- Basically said: "Mr. Abdali has established peace in India"
- Something celebratory
- Whitewashing the genocide as "peace"
The Irony:
- Genocide = "relieved pollution"
- Massacre = "established peace"
- Mass murder = "achievement"
- Propaganda poem to celebrate horror
The Agra Fort
Why It Wasn't Taken
The Defense:
- Fort walls had cannons mounted
- Well protected
- Jahan Khan and forces couldn't take it over
- Couldn't easily do a siege
The Reason:
- Unlike Mathura (undefended religious site)
- Agra Fort was military installation
- Proper defenses
- Would take too long
- Not worth the effort
NATURE'S REVENGE: The Cholera Outbreak
The Cause
What Triggered It:
"The unbearable situation of normal people in Mathura and Agra was finally resolved by nature itself."
How:
- Thousands of dead bodies
- River water became polluted
- Yamuna water contaminated
- Started cholera epidemic
Where It Started:
- In the camp and tents of Abdali's forces
- His own army got hit first
- Poetic justice
The Disease Strikes
What Cholera Meant
In 1757:
- No vaccination
- No treatment
- Once you contracted it: You are dead
- Death sentence
- No way to save yourself
The Death Toll
Daily Deaths:
- 150 soldiers dying every day
- In Jahan Khan's army
- In Abdali's forces
- Massive casualties
- From their own actions
The Impact:
- Big problem for Abdali
- Losing more soldiers to disease than to battle
- Army weakening rapidly
- Can't stay much longer
The Decision to Retreat
Time to Leave
Why Abdali Left:
- Looted everything he wanted ✓
- Created massive scare ✓
- Almost all objectives met ✓
- Cholera outbreak - Really scared him and his forces
- Wanted to get out before losing more soldiers
The Invitation to Jahan Khan:
- Abdali invited Jahan Khan back
- Decided to return to Afghanistan
- "Country mother country" = His homeland
- Time to go home with the loot
The Final Shakedown Attempt
Surajmal's Three Forts
On the Way Back:
- Abdali threatened Surajmal Jat
- Demanded Pandani (some amount of money)
- In return: Won't destroy three of Surajmal's forts
- Last-ditch attempt to collect more loot
- Even while retreating
The Tactic:
- One final threat
- "Pay up or lose your forts"
- Trying to extract maximum wealth
- Before leaving India
Surajmal's Defiant Response
The Calculation
What Surajmal Knew:
- Abdali's army is suffering from cholera epidemic
- Not in fierce fighting mode
- Weakened
- Desperate to leave
- This is a bluff
His Decision:
- Instead of giving anything
- Wrote a long letter
- Frank - no proper reverence
- Didn't respect Abdali at all
- Had nothing to worry about now
THE LETTER: Bold Defiance
The Tone
Usually in Letters:
- Use respectful language
- Proper reverence
- Careful wording
- Diplomatic
Surajmal's Letter:
- No such feeling
- Wrote it frankly
- No respect
- Direct and challenging
- Because he knew Abdali was weak
The Content
What He Wrote:
"Whichever forts you think are weak and soft targets that you can easily grab - we will show how strong they are during battle."
Translation:
- Go ahead, attack
- We will see what happens
- I'm not afraid
- Bring it on
The Historical Reference:
"With God's grace, these forts are at least as strong as Sikandar's fort."
Who Was Sikandar:
- Historical king from Persia
- Had come to India long ago
- Known for having extremely strong forts
- Historical reference to invincibility
The Message:
"You shouldn't have any ideas about attacking my forts. They're as strong as legendary forts. Try me."
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Late February 1757 | Mathura massacre complete |
| Late February 1757 | Abdali crosses to Gokul |
| Late February 1757 | Fight with Naga Sadhus, all killed |
| Late February 1757 | Gokul Nath temple spared (nothing to loot) |
| 14 days after massacre | Goldsmith survivor found, tells story |
| ~March 1757 | Writer describes the apocalyptic scene |
| ~March 1757 | Thousands of bodies pollute Yamuna |
| ~March 1757 | Cholera outbreak starts in Afghan camps |
| ~March 1757 | 150 soldiers dying daily |
| ~March 1757 | Abdali decides to return to Afghanistan |
| ~March 1757 | Invites Jahan Khan back |
| ~March 1757 | On way back, threatens Surajmal for money |
| ~March 1757 | Surajmal writes defiant letter |
| ~March 1757 | Abdali retreats to Afghanistan |
| 2 days after request | Khawas Khan writes victory poem |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | King of Afghanistan | Retreating due to cholera |
| Jahan Khan | Commander | Invited back by Abdali |
| Naga Sadhus | Warrior ascetics | Defended Gokul, all killed |
| Muslim goldsmith | Survivor | Wounded, stripped, tells story |
| Cavalry soldiers | Attackers | Even Muslims not fully spared |
| Khawas Khan | Poet | Wrote propaganda poem |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat King | Wrote defiant letter |
| Nature | The Avenger | Cholera outbreak punishes Afghan army |
The Irony
Multiple Layers
Irony #1: Nature's Revenge
- Abdali creates thousands of corpses
- Corpses pollute the water
- Pollution causes cholera
- Cholera kills his own soldiers
- His atrocities become his problem
Irony #2: The Victory Poem
- Commissions poem about "establishing peace"
- While retreating due to disease
- From bodies of his victims
- "Peace" = genocide
- Disease = consequence of his "victory"
Irony #3: The Failed Shakedown
- Tries one more extortion
- But weakened by cholera
- Surajmal sees through it
- Responds with defiance
- Victor becomes supplicant
Irony #4: The Temple Saved
- Mathura destroyed (wealthy)
- Gokul spared (poor)
- Wealth attracted destruction
- Poverty became protection
- Economics trumped ideology
The Power Shift
From Terror to Defiance
Before:
- Everyone terrified of Abdali
- Paid whatever he demanded
- No one dared resist
- Complete domination
Now:
- Surajmal writing frank letter
- No respect, no fear
- Challenging him directly
- "Go ahead, attack"
Why the Change:
- Cholera weakened the army
- 150 soldiers dying daily
- Need to retreat
- Lost the aura of invincibility
- Desperation showing
The Cholera Epidemic
How It Worked
The Transmission:
- Thousands of dead bodies
- Many thrown in Yamuna River
- Water becomes polluted
- Army drinks polluted water
- Cholera spreads through camp
- No immunity, no treatment
- Death sentence for infected
Why It Hit Them Hard:
- Living in close quarters (camps)
- All drinking same water source
- No sanitation
- No medical care
- Disease spreads fast
- Can't escape it
The Daily Toll:
- 150 deaths per day
- Probably 1,000+ total over weeks
- Lost more to disease than to Marathas
- Weakened the army severely
Key Themes
- Nature's Justice - Dead bodies cause disease that kills perpetrators
- Economics > Ideology - Gokul spared because nothing to loot
- Defiance Emerges - Surajmal's frank letter shows power shift
- Propaganda vs Reality - Victory poem while retreating from disease
- The Long Con Fails - Last shakedown attempt doesn't work
- Muslims Not Fully Safe - Even co-religionists get attacked
- Disease as Equalizer - Cholera doesn't care about military might
- The Cost of Atrocities - Actions have consequences
- Forced Retreat - Victory hollow when forced to flee disease
- Historical Parallels - Surajmal invokes Sikandar's legendary forts
The Larger Pattern
Abdali's Campaign Summary
What He Achieved:
- ✓ Looted Delhi extensively
- ✓ Extracted crores in wealth
- ✓ Killed thousands
- ✓ Destroyed Mathura
- ✓ Terrorized North India
- ✓ Installed Najib Khan as Wazir
- ✓ Demonstrated military superiority
What He Lost:
- ✗ Thousands of soldiers to cholera
- ✗ Aura of invincibility (cholera showed weakness)
- ✗ Couldn't take Agra Fort
- ✗ Couldn't extort Surajmal on way out
- ✗ Had to retreat rather than stay
- ✗ Created permanent enemy (Marathas will respond)
The Muslims' Treatment
A Note on "Sparing"
What "Spared" Meant:
- Not killed (usually)
- But lost all wealth
- Subjected to insults
- Probably roughed up
- Not totally exempt
The Goldsmith's Story Shows:
- Identity verification required (circumcision)
- Even then, not fully safe
- Different soldiers had different rules
- Chaos meant anything could happen
- Being Muslim helped odds but wasn't foolproof
The Poem: Propaganda Machine
Whitewashing Genocide
What Actually Happened:
- Mass murder of civilians
- Week-long bloodbath
- Targeting religious sites
- Children beheaded
- Women drowned themselves
What the Poem Said:
- "Relieved pollution of kafirs"
- "Established peace"
- Something "celebratory"
- Made it sound noble
The Purpose:
- Control the narrative
- Make genocide seem righteous
- Justify atrocities
- Create heroic image
- For posterity and supporters
Historical Significance
Why the Cholera Matters
Immediate Impact:
- Forced retreat
- Saved more cities from destruction
- Weakened Afghan forces
- Gave time for Maratha response
Long-Term:
- Showed Abdali wasn't invincible
- Natural consequences of atrocities
- Created window for resistance
- Abdali would return, but weakened
What Comes Next
Abdali Returns to Afghanistan:
- With massive loot
- But weakened army
- Disease still spreading
- Need time to recover
In India:
- News reaches Pune
- Marathas mobilize
- "This has to be stopped"
- Preparation for major response
- Path to Panipat set
The Questions:
- Will Abdali come back?
- When will Marathas respond?
- How long until the showdown?
- Can Marathas unite the North?
- What will Najib Khan do as Wazir?
The Cost-Benefit Analysis
Was It Worth It for Abdali?
What He Gained:
- Tens of crores in wealth
- Control of Delhi (through Najib)
- Destroyed Maratha prestige
- Established dominance
What It Cost:
- Thousands of soldiers to cholera
- Created mortal enemy (Marathas)
- International reputation damage
- Seeds of future defeat
- Made Panipat inevitable
The Verdict:
- Short-term: Successful
- Long-term: Set up his downfall
- The Marathas would come
- With everything they had
- Panipat would be his last major campaign
The Defiant Letter: A Turning Point
Why It Matters
Surajmal's Psychology:
- Saw through the bluff
- Recognized weakness
- Responded boldly
- Set example for others
The Message to Others:
- Abdali can be challenged
- He's not invincible
- Weakness can be exploited
- Don't back down
The Shift:
- From universal fear
- To selective defiance
- Beginning of resistance
- Psychological victory
Nature as Character
The Agency of Consequences
The Pattern:
- Human atrocity
- Environmental damage
- Disease emerges
- Perpetrators punished
- No human intervention needed
The Poetry:
- Victims' bodies in river
- Polluted water
- Killers drink it
- Disease spreads
- Justice through nature
The Message:
- Actions have consequences
- Can't escape them
- Nature itself becomes avenger
- No immunity for victors
March 1757: The massacre is complete. Gokul's temple stands because there's nothing to loot. A Muslim goldsmith survives 14 days, naked and wounded, to tell his story. Abdali commissions a poem: "I relieved the pollution of kafirs and established peace." But thousands of bodies pollute the Yamuna. Cholera erupts in Afghan camps. 150 soldiers dying daily. Abdali decides to retreat. On the way out, tries to extort Surajmal one last time. Surajmal writes back: "Go ahead, attack my forts. They're as strong as Sikandar's legendary fortresses. Try me." Nature's revenge is complete. The tyrant retreats, weakened by disease born from his own atrocities. But the news is spreading to Pune. The Marathas are mobilizing. And Abdali will return. The path to Panipat is inevitable now.
Abdali's Final Departure: The Loot Count & Royal Marriages (1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Cholera Outbreak
Disease Forces Retreat
What Happened:
- Cholera outbreak struck Abdali's camp
- Forced them to leave India
- Perfect timing for Indians
The Threat:
- While leaving, Abdali threatened Surajmal Jat
- "Give me this money or I will destroy three of your forts"
Surajmal's Response:
- "Screw you"
- "I'm ready for battle"
- Defiant stance
Why The Afghans Couldn't Stay
The Climate Problem
The Issue:
- Afghans not used to Indian summer
- Afghanistan is in the north (cold climate)
- Can't handle Indian summer heat
- Gets very hot in India
The Result:
- That's why he didn't want to be in India
- Would be troublesome for Afghan army
- Climate was a natural defense
- Forced departure
The Prisoner Release
Unexpected Mercy?
What Abdali Did:
- Freed a lot of prisoners
- Not "rescued" - freed/released
- Unknown why
The Mystery:
"I don't know why. Instead of in the yards."
- Strange decision
- Unexplained act
- Out of character
The Political Appointments
Manipulating the Emperor
What Happened:
- Abdali appointed Mr. [someone] to position
- Through coercion of the Emperor
- "Twisting his head" metaphorically
- Emperor being forced to make appointments
In India:
- Someone (unclear who) being appointed
- "Mulgi" mentioned (term unclear)
The Power Play:
- Abdali essentially made himself almost royalty
- Running all over the emperor
- In spirit controlling everything
Why Not Declare Himself Emperor?
The Question
The Curiosity:
- Why keep the emperor in place at all?
- Could declare himself Mughal Emperor
- People might fight back
- But he had the power
The Answer:
"He didn't have any interest to settle down in India."
What's Back in Afghanistan?
- Question: "Why? What is there to go back to in Afghanistan?"
- Answer: Can't say for certain
- But he wanted to take the loot and go back
The Fundamental:
- Never wanted to stay regardless
- Never wanted to settle down
- Just loot and leave
- No interest in ruling India
The Royal Marriages
Creating Afghan Alliances
The Confusion Cleared:
- Previously said she married Abdali
- Now: "That was not the case"
- "There is another daughter maybe"
What Actually Happened:
- Taimur (Abdali's son) married Emperor's daughter
- Other Afghan important people also married
- A lot of women from royal families were married
- To Afghan high-ranking officers
The Result:
- Many royal women taken to Afghanistan
- Political marriages
- Creating bonds with Mughal family
- Securing alliances
The Loot: Final Count
The Estimate
The Amount:
"The loot that was loaded onto a lot of hundreds of elephants was approximately 12 crore rupees."
12 Crore Rupees:
- Massive amount in those days
- Hundreds of elephants needed to carry it
- Unimaginable wealth
- Delhi completely drained
Timeline
| Event | Detail |
|---|---|
| Cholera outbreak | Struck Abdali's camp |
| Summer heat | Afghans couldn't handle it |
| Threat to Surajmal | Give money or 3 forts destroyed |
| Surajmal defies | Ready for battle |
| Prisoners freed | Unknown reason |
| Appointments made | Emperor coerced |
| Royal marriages | Emperor's daughters to Afghans |
| Final loot | 12 crore rupees on hundreds of elephants |
| Departure | Abdali leaves for Afghanistan |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Abdali | Afghan invader | Leaving with 12 crore rupees |
| Taimur | Abdali's son | Married Emperor's daughter |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Defied Abdali's threats |
| Mughal Emperor | Powerless ruler | Coerced into appointments |
| Royal daughters | Imperial family | Married off to Afghans |
| Afghan officers | High-ranking | Married into Mughal family |
Key Themes
- Natural Defense - Cholera and heat drove them out
- Defiance - Surajmal stood up to threats
- Coercion - Emperor manipulated into appointments
- Strategic Marriages - Binding Mughals to Afghans
- No Interest in Ruling - Just wanted loot, not throne
- The Massive Haul - 12 crore rupees
- The Mystery - Why free prisoners?
Critical Insights
Why Abdali Never Stayed
The Fundamental Difference:
- Could have declared himself Mughal Emperor
- Had the power to do it
- People might resist but he could force it
But:
- Zero interest in settling down
- Wanted loot, not throne
- Wanted to go back to Afghanistan
- Business model: Raid and return
The Implication:
- Not building empire in India
- Not establishing dynasty
- Just extracting wealth periodically
- Keeping option to return
The Royal Marriages Strategy
Why It Matters:
- Political bonds created
- Mughal family connected to Afghans
- Makes future invasions easier
- Family members as hostages/allies
- Legitimacy for Afghan claims
The Women:
- Imperial daughters
- Other royal family women
- Taken to Afghanistan
- Political pawns
- Creating permanent connections
The 12 Crore Figure
Put in Context:
- "Crore is a huge amount" (even noted in transcript)
- Hundreds of elephants to carry
- This is just the estimated amount
- Likely more that wasn't counted
- Completely drained Delhi
What It Means:
- Afghanistan's empire built on Indian loot
- One invasion = massive wealth transfer
- Sustainable for Abdali (can do again)
- Devastating for India (takes time to recover)
The Prisoner Release Mystery
The Unexplained:
- Freed many prisoners
- No clear reason
- Out of character for him
Possible Reasons:
- Couldn't feed them during journey?
- Cholera risk?
- Wanted to seem merciful?
- Political gesture?
- Unknown
Surajmal's Courage
The Threat:
- Give money or lose 3 forts
- Direct extortion attempt
The Response:
- "Screw you"
- "I'm ready"
- Chose battle over payment
Why It Matters:
- Jats showing spine
- Not everyone submitted
- Resistance continued
- Even as Abdali left
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Abdali got away with it - 12 crore richer
- Royal families now connected - marriages binding
- No permanent conquest - he'll need to come back for more
- Surajmal still defiant - unfinished business
- Coerced emperor - even weaker now
- Afghanistan enriched - but temporary
- India drained - needs time to recover
The Inevitable:
- Money will run out in Afghanistan
- Abdali will need more
- He'll be back
- The cycle continues
1757: Abdali leaves India with 12 crore rupees loaded on hundreds of elephants. Cholera and summer heat finally drove him out. He married his son Taimur to the Emperor's daughter, and other Afghan officers married into the royal family too. Political bonds created. He could have declared himself Mughal Emperor - had the power - but didn't want to. No interest in settling down. Just wanted the loot. As he left, he threatened Surajmal Jat: "Give me money or I'll destroy three of your forts." Surajmal's response: "Screw you, I'm ready for battle." And for some mysterious reason, Abdali freed many prisoners on his way out. Nobody knows why. But everyone knows this: he'll be back. It's just a matter of time. The loot will run out. He'll need more. The cycle continues.
Abdali's Caravan Home & Maratha Strategic Failures (1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Marriage Details (Clarified)
Royal Alliances
The Emperor's Daughters:
- One married to Abdali's son (confirmed)
- Multiple marriages to create bonds
The Scale:
"Many royal women including angels and... many women from royal families married with Afghans."
Who Married:
- Many Hindu women converted and married into Afghan army
- Had to convert to marry (forced conversions)
- Royal princesses married off
- Creating permanent connections
The Caravan: Thousands of Animals
The Beast Train
The Animals:
- Thousands of elephants
- Bulls - used to carry loads
- Horses - for carrying loads
- Camels - beasts of burden
- Anything that could carry weight
Why So Many:
"Because you can use them to carry load. So they will be useful in carrying a lot of the loot that he had collected."
The Purpose:
- All to carry the massive loot
- Needed that many animals
- Shows scale of theft
The Loot Amount: 12 Crore Rupees
The Estimate
The Figure:
"Loot's value: 12 crore rupees - that is the estimate."
In Those Days:
- "Crore is a huge amount"
- Unimaginable wealth
- Loaded onto thousands of animals
Ready to Leave:
- Everything loaded
- Now ready to get back to his home
- Mission accomplished
Raja Keshav Rai's Letter to Peshwa (February 1757)
The Report from the North
Who He Was:
- Raja Keshav Rai (identity not fully clear)
- Writing to Peshwa in Pune
The Cities Mentioned:
- Moradabad
- Saharanpur
- Bareilly
- Shahjahanpur
- Lucknow (Lakhnau)
The Report:
"Up until the boundary of Lucknow, Rohillas and Pathans gave Abdali company."
What This Means:
- Rohillas and Pathans escorted Abdali
- Accompanied him as he left India
- Up to certain distance/towns
- Now he's exiting India
- They gave him company/protection until boundary
The Rajput Kings: Amber & Jodhpur
Who Invited Abdali
The Two Kings:
- King of Amber
- King of Jodhpur
The Backstory:
- These were the two kings with ancestry issues
- Marathas tried to broker their disputes
- Instead, Marathas created enmity
- Now vengeful
Keshav Rai's Claim:
"It looks like these two Rajput kings kind of invited Abdali into India."
Why They Did It:
- Revenge on Marathas
- To drive them out
- Settling scores
Surajmal Jat: Ready to Fight (But...)
The Jat King's Position
His Stance:
"One Jat king is there - Surajmal Jat. If somebody backs up Surajmal Jat, then he will fight with Abdali."
The Problem:
"But as of now he considers Marathas to be his enemies."
The Backstory:
- Marathas and Jats had troubles and hostilities
- Been driving him away
- Created enmity
- Now he won't help Marathas
The Potential:
- Surajmal is amenable potentially
- Ready to fight Abdali
- But needs backing
- Won't work with Marathas (his enemies)
The Tragedy:
- Natural allies against Abdali
- But Maratha mistakes drove wedge between them
- Could have been united
- Instead: enemies
The Fear of the Regional Kings
Worried About Their Own Safety
The Concern:
"If Abdali [returns]... then what will happen to us?"
Who Has Your Back?
- "Party Rakha" = protector (male)
- "Party Rakhi" = protector (female)
- Who watches your back?
- Who protects you?
The Question:
- Regional kings asking: Who's our protector?
- If Abdali returns, who saves us?
- Nobody strong enough
- Everyone vulnerable
Satisfying Someone (Unclear)
The Vague Reference
"So we satisfied him but now who is it talking about I don't know."
- Someone was satisfied
- Identity unclear
- Context missing
The Reality: No Peace Until Abdali Dealt With
The Assessment
The Conclusion:
"Up until we deal with Abdali, there won't be peace."
Keshav Rai Recognizes:
- This is the fundamental problem
- No stability possible
- While Abdali threat exists
- Must be confronted
Delhi's Bad Luck Continues
More To Come
"The bad luck or bad plight of Delhi had not yet ended. More still things were to come. Bad things."
The Implication:
- Worse ahead
- Not over yet
- More suffering coming
- Delhi's nightmare continues
Maratha Officer's Description: Systematic Looting
Digging Everywhere
The Method:
"50 lakh rupees taken. He is digging everywhere in the house, making sure that there is nothing left. No more cash or any kind of gold."
The Thoroughness:
- Searching every house
- Digging up floors
- Looking for hidden wealth
- Making sure nothing left
- Systematic extraction
The Goal:
- Find all the treasures
- Wherever he could find
- Leave nothing behind
- Total cleanup
The Forced Conversions & Marriages
Hindu Women to Afghan Army
What Happened:
"They converted Hindu women and married them off in Afghan army."
The Process:
- Had to convert to marry
- Forced conversions
- Then married into Afghan forces
The Scale:
- Many women
- Throughout the army
- Creating permanent bonds
- Human trafficking essentially
The Suggestion: Chase Him to Karnal (April 1757)
The Tactical Opportunity
The Proposal:
"In April, at least Raghunath Rao should follow up. Up until Karnal (in Punjab), Raghunath Rao should take the army and follow up or chase Abdali at least up until Karnal."
Why:
- Put some kind of pressure
- Create some kind of scare
- Show: "You've done bad things here"
- Don't let him leave peacefully
The Strategy:
"He's suggesting that Raghunath Rao should be attacking Abdali's... the later part of here."
Why It Could Work:
- Abdali has lots and lots of animals
- Lots of cavalry going back
- If Raghunath Rao gives him a chase in the back
- Can create trouble for Abdali
The Vulnerability:
"Abdali is now not in a fighting mode. He is getting out."
- Not prepared for battle
- Just trying to leave
- Vulnerable in retreat
- Perfect target
The Guerrilla Tactic: QIG Strategy
Hit and Run
The Method:
"This is QIG's tactic: suddenly some 2, 3, 5 thousand people come and they try to rob this, because it's going to be a straight line that people are going. Try to attack them and suddenly disappear."
The Strategy:
- Surprise attacks
- Small forces (2,000-5,000)
- Attack the straight column
- Rob/loot them
- Then suddenly disappear
- Come back later, attack again
Why It Works:
"If we were to give him trouble while he is getting out, it will look good on us and it will give us some good publicity."
The Approach:
- Backward attacks
- Not fighting in open field
- Skirmish warfare
- Attack for 1-2 hours
- Then vanish
- Then come back later
- Never let them regroup
The Formation:
- Army traveling in one straight line/column
- Easy to hassle
- Hard for them to defend whole length
- Can't fight back effectively
Why Raghunath Rao Refused
The Calculation
His Decision:
"Raghunath Rao did not accept this challenge."
The Reason:
"Probably he didn't have capable army with him to carry out this kind of backward attacks."
The Reality:
- At this stage, Abdali had fearsome reputation
- Nobody wanted to attack him lightly
- Have to be properly prepared
- Need good size of army
- Otherwise very dangerous
Abdali's Reputation:
- Experienced general
- Not easy to go to war with
- Had this reputation for a reason
- Developed his war machine well
- All his looting depended on army quality
The Risk:
- Even in retreat, dangerous
- Could turn and fight
- Might destroy small force
- Better to let him leave
Sadashiv Rao Bhau Enters (March 16, 1757)
The Letter to Bhau
Who He Is:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau (called "Bhau")
- First cousin to Nanasaheb (the Peshwa)
- Son of Chimaji Appa (Bajirao I's brother)
The Family:
- Bajirao I (first Peshwa)
- Son 1: Nanasaheb (current Peshwa)
- Son 2: Raghunath Rao (currently in North)
- Chimaji Appa (Bajirao I's brother)
- Son: Sadashiv Rao Bhau
March 16, 1757:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau received a letter
- From someone (unclear who)
- About the situation
- He's being brought into the picture
Where Everyone Is
The Dispersed Forces
In Agra:
- Naro Shankar
- Antaji Mankeshwar
- Samsher Bahadur
In Rampur:
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Rajashri Dadasaheb
The Problem:
"They didn't have enough army. They couldn't gather in opposition."
- Forces too dispersed
- Not enough strength
- Can't unite to oppose Abdali
- Each location insufficient
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 1757 | Raja Keshav Rai writes to Peshwa |
| February 1757 | Rohillas/Pathans escort Abdali to boundary |
| March 16, 1757 | Sadashiv Rao Bhau receives letter |
| March 1757 | Maratha forces dispersed (Agra, Rampur) |
| April 1757 | Suggestion to chase Abdali to Karnal |
| April 1757 | Raghunath Rao refuses |
| 1757 | Abdali departs with 12 crore rupees |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Abdali | Afghan invader | Leaving with massive loot |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha commander | Refused to chase Abdali |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha (Nanasaheb's cousin) | Receiving letters, being informed |
| Raja Keshav Rai | Regional king | Reporting to Peshwa |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Ready to fight but considers Marathas enemies |
| Amber & Jodhpur kings | Rajput rulers | Allegedly invited Abdali |
| Rohillas & Pathans | Afghan allies | Escorted Abdali to boundary |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | In Rampur, insufficient forces |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha officer | In Agra |
Key Themes
- The Massive Exodus - Thousands of animals carrying loot
- Forced Conversions - Hindu women converted and married to Afghans
- The Missed Opportunity - Should have chased to Karnal
- The Rajput Betrayal - Amber & Jodhpur invited Abdali
- The Jat Isolation - Surajmal ready to fight but Marathas drove him away
- Dispersed Forces - Marathas too scattered to act
- Guerrilla Strategy Proposed - Hit and run tactics
- Raghunath Rao's Refusal - Didn't have capable army
- Abdali's Reputation - Too dangerous to attack lightly
- Systematic Looting - Digging everywhere for hidden wealth
- More Bad Times Coming - Delhi's plight not over
Critical Insights
The Maratha Self-Sabotage
The Jat Problem:
- Surajmal ready to fight Abdali
- Would have been natural ally
- But Marathas created enmity
- Now he considers them enemies
- Won't help them
The Tragedy:
- Could have united against Abdali
- Jats fierce warriors
- Local knowledge of terrain
- Perfect allies
- Marathas drove them away
The Pattern:
- Also drove away Rajputs (Amber, Jodhpur)
- They invited Abdali in revenge
- Marathas creating their own enemies
- Diplomatic failures
The Missed Tactical Opportunity
Why Chase to Karnal Made Sense:
- Abdali vulnerable - long column, not fighting mode
- Loaded with loot - slow movement
- Thousands of animals - hard to defend
- Getting out - not expecting attack
- QIG tactics - proven effective
- Good publicity - show resistance
Why It Would Have Worked:
- Skirmish warfare (not open battle)
- 2-5k fighters hit and run
- Attack 1-2 hours, vanish
- Come back, attack again
- Never let them rest
- Can't regroup in column formation
Why Raghunath Rao Refused:
- Didn't have capable army
- Abdali's fearsome reputation
- Even in retreat = dangerous
- Risk of being destroyed
- Better safe than sorry
The Cost:
- Let him leave peacefully
- No resistance shown
- No consequences for invasion
- Encouraged future raids
- Missed chance for small victory
The Forced Conversion & Marriage System
The Scale:
- Many Hindu women converted
- Married into Afghan army
- Royal princesses taken
- Creating permanent bonds
The Purpose:
- Political alliances
- Legitimacy for future claims
- Hostages essentially
- Cultural conquest
- Not just looting wealth, taking people
The Impact:
- Families destroyed
- Cultural trauma
- Human trafficking
- Forced conversions
- Religious violence
The Animal Caravan
The Scale:
- Thousands of elephants
- Bulls, horses, camels
- All carrying loot
- Shows magnitude of theft
The Logistics:
- Needed that many animals
- Shows organization
- Shows systematic planning
- Not random looting
- Calculated extraction
The Systematic Search
The Method:
"Digging everywhere in the house."
- Every house searched
- Floors dug up
- Looking for hidden wealth
- Nothing left
- Total extraction
Shows:
- Not rushed - took time to search
- Thorough - found everything
- Organized - systematic approach
- Intelligence - knew where to look
- Left nothing behind
The Regional Kings' Fear
The Question:
"Who is our protector? (Party Rakha?)"
The Reality:
- Every small king worried
- No strong protector available
- Mughal Emperor = powerless
- Marathas = too far/scattered
- Abdali = could return anytime
- Everyone vulnerable
The Implication:
- Power vacuum
- Insecurity everywhere
- Need for strong power
- Someone must fill vacuum
- Or chaos continues
The Rajput Invitation Theory
The Claim:
- Amber and Jodhpur kings invited Abdali
- Revenge on Marathas
- For creating enmity during succession disputes
The Irony:
- Marathas tried to help (mediate disputes)
- Instead created enemies
- Now Rajputs invited invader
- To hurt Marathas
- Diplomacy failure leading to disaster
The Cost:
- Entire North India suffers
- Because of personal grudges
- Regional politics → national catastrophe
- Short-term revenge → long-term disaster
Sadashiv Rao Bhau's Introduction
Who He Is:
- Bajirao I's nephew
- Nanasaheb's first cousin
- Called "Bhau" (short name)
Why It Matters:
- He's being brought into picture
- Receiving letters about situation
- Being informed
- Suggests: future role coming
- Will be important later
The Family Power:
- Bajirao I's line
- Chimaji Appa's son
- Core Maratha leadership
- Next generation
- Being prepared
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Abdali got away cleanly - no resistance in retreat
- Natural allies alienated - Jats and Rajputs hostile
- Diplomatic failures have consequences
- Forces too dispersed - can't act effectively
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau being informed - future role coming
- Guerrilla tactics discussed - will be important later
- Reputation matters - fear of Abdali prevents action
- More suffering coming - Delhi's bad luck continues
- 12 crore stolen - but will run out eventually
- He'll be back - it's inevitable
The Questions:
- Will Marathas fix diplomatic mistakes?
- Will they unite with Jats against common enemy?
- Can they reconcile with Rajputs?
- Will forces be better organized next time?
- When Abdali returns, will they be ready?
- What role will Sadashiv Rao Bhau play?
February-April 1757: Abdali's massive caravan heads home - thousands of elephants, bulls, horses, camels, all loaded with 12 crore rupees worth of loot. The Rohillas and Pathans escort him to the boundary like honored guests. Hindu women have been converted and married into the Afghan army. Royal princesses taken to Afghanistan. He dug up every house in Delhi looking for hidden wealth. Found it all. Someone suggests: "Chase him to Karnal! Hit him while he's vulnerable! Use guerrilla tactics!" The strategy makes sense - Abdali's in a long column, not fighting mode, loaded with loot, can't defend well. But Raghunath Rao says no. Doesn't have capable army. Abdali's reputation too fearsome. Too dangerous even in retreat. Let him go. Meanwhile, Surajmal Jat is ready to fight Abdali - but considers Marathas his enemies now. The Marathas drove him away with bad diplomacy. Same with the Rajput kings of Amber and Jodhpur - they're the ones who invited Abdali in the first place, for revenge on Marathas. Self-sabotage everywhere. And Sadashiv Rao Bhau is receiving letters now, being brought into the picture. More bad things are coming for Delhi. The suffering isn't over. And everyone knows: Abdali will be back.
Abdali's Departure & The Afghan-Maratha Rivalry Setup (1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Retreat Suggestion (March 1757)
Attack the Rear?
The Proposal:
- Someone (possibly Antaji Mankeshwar) suggested to Raghunath Rao Peshwa
- Strategy: Attack Abdali's rear columns as he retreats
- Guerrilla tactics - hit the supply train
- Raghunath Rao declined
Why He Refused:
- Probably didn't have adequate army to execute
- Abdali had developed a fearsome reputation
- Not something to undertake lightly
- Needed proper preparation and sufficient numbers
The Dispersed Maratha Forces (March 17, 1757)
Letter from North India
Who Was Where:
| Commander | Location | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Agra | With Naroshankar and Samsher Bahadur |
| Naroshankar | Agra | |
| Samsher Bahadur | Agra | |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Rampur | With Rajashri Dadasaheb |
| Rajashri Dadasaheb | Rampur | Identity unclear |
The Problem:
- Forces could not be assembled
- Too dispersed
- Not enough strength to confront Abdali
- Had to let him leave
The Massive Loot (March 26, 1757)
Badrinath's Account
From One Fort Alone:
- 20 lakh rupees looted
- Significant wealth from just one location
The Scale of the Haul:
- 28,000 animals loaded with loot
- Camels
- Elephants
- Wolves
- Bulls
- Horses
Cities Completely Looted:
- Delhi - totally drained
- Agra - completely looted
- Vrindavan - stripped bare
- Bled them dry
Even the Animals Were Stolen:
- Merchants used donkeys/animals for transport
- Abdali even took the pack animals
- Needed them to carry his loot
- Nothing left behind
The Weapons Haul
What He Took, What He Left
Left Behind:
- Cannons brought to attack Surajmal Jat's fort
- No space on animals (prioritized loot over cannons)
- Abandoned the siege weapons
Took With Him:
- All swords found in Delhi
- Cannons from the Red Fort (Badshahi Killa)
- Best weapons he could carry
Why Weapons Mattered:
- War was his business model
- Needed superior war machine to keep looting
- Latest equipment = winning battles = more loot
- Investment in future invasions
- Would be back again and again
Mughalani Begum: The Betrayed Conspirator
The Woman Who Got Nothing
What She Did:
- Provided treasure map to Abdali
- Told him where all the hidden wealth was
- Invited him to loot Delhi
- Expected reward
What She Got:
- Deceived by Imad ul-Mulk (no reward)
- Deceived by Abdali (no reward)
- Nobody gave her anything
- Both sides used her, then discarded her
Her Fate
The Retirement:
- Rejected the small pension offered
- Moved to Lahore
- Lived in dejection
- Totally disheartened
- All her schemes came to nothing
The Punishment:
- Jahan Khan (Abdali's commander) beat her
- For her arrogance
- Humiliated by the very people she helped
The Sikh Resistance Begins
Attacks on the Column
What Happened:
- On the way back to Afghanistan
- Sikh warriors attacked Abdali's columns
- Abdali was most vulnerable while traveling
- Army in a long line formation
- Perfect target for hit-and-run attacks
Why Sikhs Were Effective:
- Gave Abdali tough times
- Harassed his retreat
- Not a major army yet, but growing
The Sikh Organization
Their Structure:
- Small armies: 200-500 fighters each
- Separate leaders for each band
- Not united into one force
- Disorganized overall
- But militaristic and fierce
Why They Were Militarizing:
- Being persecuted by Muslims in Punjab
- Had to defend themselves
- Out of necessity, not choice
- Reform movement → warrior community
The Hindu Problem:
- Hindus in Punjab were not battle-ready
- Not warlike people
- Sikhs provided the resistance to Muslims
- Filled the military vacuum
Abdali's Revenge: Destroying Holy Sites
The Retaliation
What He Destroyed:
- Kartarpur - Sikh holy site
- Amritsar - Sikh holy site (Guru's doors destroyed)
Why:
- Revenge for Sikh attacks on his retreat
- Had to go through Punjab to reach Afghanistan
- Deliberately desecrated sacred places
- Sent a message
The Pattern:
- Sikhs attack → Abdali retaliates by destroying temples
- Violence escalating
- Religious conflict intensifying
Taimur Shah: The Governor of Punjab
Abdali's Son Stays Behind
The Appointment:
- Taimur Shah (Abdali's son) became Subedar of Lahore
- Based in Lahore (capital of Punjab)
- Left to control the province
- Abdali's way of holding Punjab
The Resistance Continues:
- Sikhs gave Taimur tough times
- He was staying, they were local
- Constant harassment
- Ongoing struggle for control
Abdali's Goal:
- Abdali would cross Punjab and go to Afghanistan
- But wanted son controlling Punjab
- His only territorial ambition (for the tax revenue)
- Rest of India = just for looting
The Lasting Impact of 1757
What People Remembered
The Atrocities:
- Massacres in Mathura (Hindus slaughtered)
- Massive looting of wealth
- Temple destruction throughout the region
- Total devastation
The Psychological Damage:
- Very distressing attack
- Not something people would forget easily
- Burned into collective memory
- Trauma lasting for generations
The Power Structure After Abdali Left
Who Got Control
Najib Khan's Reward:
- Abdali gave government controls to Najib Khan
- His loyal Rohilla follower
- Now in strong position
The Reality:
- Mughal Emperor - namesake only, powerless
- Wazir - very weak
- Najib Khan - strong position but...
- Rohilla forces - only 10-15,000 soldiers
The Problem:
- 10-15k was no match for Marathas
- Neither in numbers
- Nor in war tactics
- Nor in valor
- Rohillas were outclassed
The Maratha Return
Filling the Vacuum
During Abdali's Presence:
- Marathas had totally dispersed
- Tactical retreat
- Couldn't face him directly
- Waited him out
After He Left:
- Started coming back
- Re-establishing hegemony in North
- Total vacuum of power
- Emperor weak, wazir weak
- Najib Khan insufficient
- No big dog in town
The Maratha Advantage:
- Superior in every way to Rohillas
- Natural candidates to fill power vacuum
- Expanding empire northward
- Picking up where they left off
The Great Rivalry: Afghans vs. Marathas
Two Powers, One Target
The Setup:
- 1757 invasion set up this rivalry
- Both wanted North India
- Both knew it was the money purse
- Both had ambitions to control it
The Afghan Perspective
What They Wanted:
- Punjab - only territorial goal (for taxes)
- Delhi - to loot periodically
- No permanent rule - just raid and leave
Why They Needed India:
- Afghanistan had nothing
- No riches, no money
- To get wealth = come to India
- Delhi and nearby areas = where the money was
- Business model: periodic raids
Their Status:
- Foreigners to India
- Afghanistan = separate country
- Could come and go (no visa requirements)
- Invaders
- Even recognized as such at the time
The Maratha Perspective
What They Wanted:
- Expand empire northward
- Control North India permanently
- Collect tributes and taxes
- Build proper administration
Their Advantage:
- In their own country
- India was their home
- Not foreigners
- Not invaders
- Natural claimants to Mughal successor status
The Money Problem:
- Constantly needed funds
- Couldn't conquer North without money
- Armies need salaries
- Equipment, horses, supplies
- Had to keep raising funds
The Critical Difference: Foreign vs. Domestic
The Contrast:
| Factor | Marathas | Afghans |
|---|---|---|
| Origin | Indian | Foreign (Afghan) |
| Goals | Permanent rule | Periodic raids |
| Territory | All of North India | Only Punjab |
| Administration | Build systems | Don't care |
| Intent | Stay and govern | Loot and leave |
Why This Mattered:
- Afghans would come and go
- Marathas would stay
- Made the conflict inevitable
- One had to win, one had to lose
- Stage set for confrontation
The Book's New Section
Part Two Begins
The Title:
- "Khanda Don: Grishma"
- Volume/Part Two
- "Grishma" (meaning unclear - possibly "summer"?)
The Implication:
- Major section break
- New phase of the story
- The rivalry phase
- Building toward confrontation
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| March 17, 1757 | Letter from North - Maratha forces dispersed |
| March 26, 1757 | Badrinath reports on Abdali's looting |
| March 1757 | Suggestion to attack Abdali's rear - rejected |
| March-April 1757 | Abdali's retreat begins |
| 1757 | Sikhs attack Abdali's columns on retreat |
| 1757 | Abdali destroys Kartarpur and Amritsar in revenge |
| 1757 | Taimur Shah left as Governor of Lahore |
| After 1757 | Najib Khan given control by Abdali |
| After 1757 | Marathas begin returning to North |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Returned to Afghanistan | Wants to come back |
| Taimur Shah | Abdali's son | Governor of Lahore | Controlling Punjab |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Given control of Delhi | Only 10-15k forces |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha commander | Declined rear attack | Lacked sufficient force |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha officer | In Agra | Proposed attacking retreat |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | In Rampur | |
| Mughalani Begum | Conspirator | Betrayed and beaten | Living in dejection in Lahore |
| Jahan Khan | Afghan commander | Beat Mughalani Begum | Abdali's officer |
| Sikh Warriors | Resistance fighters | Attacking Abdali | Small bands, disorganized |
Key Themes
- The Missed Opportunity - Should have attacked the retreat
- The Betrayed Conspirator - Mughalani Begum got nothing
- The Rise of the Sikhs - Beginning to organize and resist
- Religious Retaliation - Destroying holy sites as revenge
- The Loot Economy - War as business for Abdali
- The Power Vacuum - Everyone too weak to control North
- Foreign vs. Domestic - The fundamental difference
- The Inevitable Clash - Two powers, one target
- The Money Problem - Can't conquer without funding
- The Stage is Set - Rivalry that will lead somewhere
The Geography of Control (1757)
Afghan Control:
- Attaq (disputed)
- Peshawar (border area)
- Lahore (through Taimur Shah)
- Punjab (contested with Sikhs)
Maratha Control:
- Deccan (home base)
- Central India (traditional areas)
- Attempting: North India, Delhi area
No Control:
- Delhi - weak emperor, weak wazir, Najib Khan insufficient
- Transition Zone - up for grabs
The Business Model Comparison
Abdali's Model
The Cycle:
- Invade India when need money
- Loot Delhi systematically
- Take maximum wealth
- Return to Afghanistan
- Build Afghan empire with Indian loot
- Repeat when funds run low
The Sustainability:
- Punjab = steady income (keep it)
- Delhi = one-time scores (raid periodically)
- Model worked multiple times
- Will continue working
Maratha Model
The Strategy:
- Conquer territory
- Build administration
- Collect regular taxes/tributes
- Reinvest in army
- Expand further
The Challenge:
- Need money to conquer
- Need to conquer to get money
- Chicken and egg problem
- Constant fundraising
Critical Insights
Why Raghunath Rao Declined the Rear Attack
The Calculation:
- Abdali's reputation was fearsome
- His army was experienced
- His general skills were proven
- He was dangerous even in retreat
What Would Be Needed:
- Properly prepared force
- Good-sized army
- Can't attack "lightly"
- Risk of being destroyed
The Guerrilla Option:
- Suggested strategy: Skirmish warfare
- Pounce, create trouble, vanish
- Attack for 1-2 hours, then disappear
- Come back, attack again
- Don't fight open battle
- Harass the column repeatedly
Why It Could Work:
- Army in column formation (vulnerable)
- Can't regroup easily when marching
- Supply train exposed
- Not a fair fight (that's the point)
Why Raghunath Rao Still Refused:
- Still needed capable army
- Even guerrilla warfare has risks
- Didn't have the forces available
- Better to let him leave
The Sikh Evolution
From Religious Reform → Warrior Community:
- Started as reform of Hinduism
- Guru Nanak simplified theology
- "One God" message
- Reduced Brahmin importance
Why They Militarized:
- Persecution by Muslims forced it
- Had to defend themselves
- Became warriors out of necessity
- Now a force to be reckoned with
Their Growing Organization:
- Still in early stages (1757)
- Small bands, separate leaders
- Not unified yet
- But fierce and effective
- Attacking Abdali shows confidence
The Power Vacuum Problem
Everyone Too Weak:
- Mughal Emperor = powerless
- Wazir = ineffective
- Najib Khan = only 10-15k (insufficient)
- No single power could control North
Who Could Fill It:
- Only Marathas had the strength
- But they were in the Deccan (far away)
- Distance made control difficult
- Would have to build presence
The Opportunity:
- Vacuum won't last forever
- Either Marathas fill it
- Or Abdali keeps raiding
- Or someone else rises
- But status quo unsustainable
The Weapons Priority
What Abdali Kept:
- Red Fort cannons (best ones)
- All swords from Delhi
- Latest military technology
What He Left:
- Cannons used against Jat fort
- Too heavy to transport
- Prioritized loot over all weapons
The Logic:
- War machine = future income
- Must stay superior
- Latest weapons = winning battles
- Winning battles = more loot
- Investment in the business
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Abdali will return - just a matter of time
- Marathas will expand north - filling vacuum
- Sikhs will grow stronger - organizing resistance
- Najib Khan insufficient - can't hold North
- Collision inevitable - two powers, one target
- Money problem persists - Marathas need funds
- Punjab remains key - both sides want it
The Question:
- When Abdali returns (not "if")
- Will Marathas be ready?
- Will they have money?
- Will they have forces in place?
- Or will it be 1757 again?
March 1757: Abdali leaves India loaded with loot, 28,000 animals carrying treasures, weapons, everything he could grab. Sikhs harass his retreat. He destroys their holy sites in revenge. His son Taimur stays in Lahore as governor. Marathas start creeping back into the vacuum. Najib Khan holds Delhi with insufficient forces. The stage is set. Two powers want the same territory. One is foreign and just wants to raid. The other is domestic and wants to rule. The rivalry has begun. The collision is inevitable. The only question is when.
The Aftermath of 1757 & Raghunath Rao's Return (1756-1758)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Eyewitness Account: Horror at the Yamuna
The Quote (Post-Massacre)
What the Witness Saw:
"When I arrived at the banks of Yamuna River, I realized I can cross the Yamuna River to the other bank. The river water that was polluted by blood was looking with a yellow tinge."
The Timeline of Blood:
- First week: River water turned completely red
- Second week: Developed a yellow tinge
- Blood pollution so severe it changed the river color
- Visible evidence of the massacre scale
The Destruction: Complete Devastation
What Was Lost
Material Destruction:
- Everything Abdali destroyed
- All possessions looted
- Nothing left intact
- Total wipeout
Spiritual Destruction:
- Temples totally defiled
- Holy places desecrated
- Sanctity destroyed
- Prestige annihilated
- Cultural heritage violated
The Warning:
"If we allow these kind of tribes to come into India, then the wealth, women and any civilization will not be intact. It will be all destroyed."
The Historical Parallel: Nadir Shah Redux
The 1739 Comparison
Nadir Shah's Invasion (1739):
- Brought Abdali as his soldier
- Did similar destruction
- Massive looting
- Civilian massacres
Abdali's 1757:
- Same level of destruction as Nadir Shah
- Following his mentor's playbook
- Potentially even worse
- The student became the master
The Failure of Protection
Nobody Came to Help
The Local Kings & Royals:
- Didn't come to rescue
- Stayed hidden in forts
- Protective sanctuaries
- Just saving their own lives
- Too scared to act
The Military Failure:
- Marathas couldn't stop it
- Jats couldn't stop it
- Nara Samvar = massacre of humans
- Insufficient forces
- Unprepared
What Saved Them:
-
Cholera epidemic struck Abdali's camp
- Soldiers dying like insects
- Divine curse (according to survivors)
-
Summer heat
- Pathans couldn't bear Indian summer
- Afghanistan is cold, India is hot
- Heat drove them out
- Natural defense
The Pathan Identity
Who Are Pathans?
Definition:
- Afghan tribe (prominent one)
- Abdali was part of a Pathan tribe
- Several sub-tribes within Pathan
- Collectively called "Pathan"
Why They Couldn't Stay:
- Accustomed to cold Afghan climate
- Indian summer = unbearable
- Would have stayed longer otherwise
- Heat was India's defensive advantage
The Inevitable Return
The Fear
The Reality:
"Now Abdali has left. But there is no telling when he can come back. It's probably that he will come back. It's just a matter of time."
The Question:
- Which force in India will take up fight with Abdali?
- Is there a protector?
- Who can save India from these savage barbarians?
The Border: Attaq Fort
The Boundary Town
Location:
- West and north of Lahore
- Town on the boundary between India and Afghanistan
- Strategic fort at Attaq
Historical Control:
- During Aurangzeb's time: Controlled by Mughals
- Had proper Subedar there
- Secure border
Current Status (1757-1758):
- Very contested
- Going back and forth in control
- Abdali getting stronger
- Mughals getting weaker
- Out of Mughal control
- Out of Maratha control
- In flux
- Getting under Abdali's control
The Shrinking Empire (September 1757/1758)
Raja Kishwarath's Letter to Nanasaheb
What He Wrote:
Past Territory:
- Attaq was part of Indian territory
- Under Aurangzeb or Marathas
- Secure boundary
Current Territory (Lost):
"Attaq, west: Multan, Kabul. East: Bengal, Ayodhya, Prayag, Rohilkhand."
New Reality:
- Attaq is gone (lost to Abdali)
- Can only control from Multan eastward
- Multan (much east and south of Attaq)
- Everything going eastward
- To Ayodhya
- To Bengal (far east)
The Conclusion:
- Mughal Empire has shrunk drastically
- Major territory loss
- Border pushed far back
His Response:
"Why should we be worried? The Mughals are so downtrodden anyway."
- Not worried about Mughals
- But what about Abdali?
- Bigger threat ignored
Flashback: 1756 Campaign Planning
The Rajput Tribute Collection
The Plan:
- 1756 - Peshwa decided campaign in North
- Goal: Collect tribute from Rajputs
- Going back two years before 1757 invasion
The Backstory - How Tributes Began:
-
Shinde and Holkar helped Rajputs
- In succession battles (brothers fighting for power after father's death)
-
Desperate deals were made
- Rajputs under duress
- Agreed to whatever terms
- "Give us X amount per year"
- "In 10 years we'll pay everything we agreed to"
-
After coming to power:
- Realized it's impossible to pay
- Didn't have the tax base
- Didn't have capacity
- Bad deals to begin with
-
Started backtracking
- Within 1-2 years
- Couldn't keep paying
- Broke agreements
Why Peshwa Needed the Money:
- Constantly in need of funds
- Cannot conquer North India without money
- Army salaries needed
- New equipment required
- Horses, supplies, etc.
- Resources for money were limited
The Only Option:
- Go back and insist on tributes that were agreed to
- Force collection
- Needed for campaigns
Raghunath Rao's Fatal Mistake
The Failure to Hold Territory
What He Did Wrong:
"Raghunath Rao didn't think about a permanent force in Punjab or in Delhi or all the way to the northwest."
What He Should Have Done:
- Keep strong Maratha force in conquered areas
- Create administration
- Establish government
- Maintain law and order
- Like Shivaji did
Shivaji's Method:
- Whichever areas he conquered
- Created system immediately
- Administration in place
- Government functioning
- Wouldn't be left in chaos
Raghunath Rao's Failure:
- No permanent presence
- Only X number of forces (insufficient)
- Gave Abdali easy way to reconquer
- Could have held the territory
- But didn't establish proper control
The Distance Problem
Pune to Punjab
The Geography:
- Thousands of kilometers/miles away
- From Pune (home base) to Punjab
- Huge distance to maintain
- Even communication difficult
- Leadership nearly impossible
The Result:
- Had some stations
- But woefully short of resources
- Insufficient personnel
- No proper system
- Not sustainable
The Lesson:
- Can't control territory from that far
- Must have local administration
- Must have permanent forces
- Distance defeats empire-building
The Delhi Complexity (1756-1757)
Beyond Just Collecting Tribute
The Situation Was More Complex:
- Not just about getting money from Rajputs
- Delhi was in chaos
The Power Struggle:
| Person | Position | Goal |
|---|---|---|
| Mughal Emperor | Weak ruler | Powerless |
| Current Wazir | In position | "I'm not going anywhere" |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Wanted to be Wazir |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab (Safdar Jung's son) | Wanted to be Wazir (father had been) |
The Prestige:
- Being Wazir of Mughal Empire = great thing
- Huge prestige
- Almost like being king
- Everyone wanted it
The Result:
- Lot of tussle between power centers
- Nobody to control anything
- Everyone weak
- Basically chaos
- Anarchy
- Constant complexity
Why Marathas Had to Step In
The Rohilla Insufficiency
Najib Khan's Forces:
- Had probably 5,000-15,000 Rohillas
- Woefully short to establish order
- Could say "listen to me"
- Could say "I'll set up order"
- But couldn't actually do it
- Insufficient strength
The Vacuum:
- Somebody had to create order
- Only party that potentially could: Marathas
- They had the strength
- They had the organization
- Natural candidates
The Three Problems:
- Money shortage for Peshwa (constant)
- Delhi totally unstable (chaos)
- Abdali question (will return anytime)
Abdali's Status:
- Not a 24/7 issue
- Would suddenly come
- Stay 3-4 months
- Get what he could
- Then leave
- Intermittent problem
The Constant Problems:
- Peshwa's money needs
- Delhi's instability
- Mughal emperor weak
- Too many power centers
The Second Campaign North (1756)
Sending Raghunath Rao Again
The Decision:
"So then once again, Mr. Peshwa decided to send his younger brother to the north."
- "Once again" = had already come back once
- But circumstances required return
- Sent Raghunath Rao north again
The Fighting Season: Post-Monsoon Tradition
Why October?
The Tradition:
- New invasions begin after monsoon
- Monsoon ends by October
- "Seema Ullanghan" = Boundary crossing
- Tradition of starting campaigns then
Two Critical Reasons:
Reason 1: Rivers Become Crossable
During Monsoon:
- Rivers swell massively
- Width of 100 meters → becomes a mile wide
- Almost impossible to cross
- Elephants, camels, horses can't cross
- No bridges
- Maybe small boats
After Monsoon:
- Water recedes
- Rivers crossable
- Army can move
Reason 2: Farmers Become Available
The Farming Calendar:
- Farmers needed in monsoon
- Plant grains
- Do harvest
- Essential work
Maratha Army Composition:
- 60% were part-time fighters
- Primarily farmers
- Needed for agriculture during monsoon
After Harvest:
- From October/November onward
- Until summer
- Farmers are unemployed
- "I don't have anything to do"
- "I can join for fighting"
- Available for campaigns
The Logic:
"They might as well be fighting. Hey, I'm available."
Seema Ullanghan: Boundary Crossing
The Concept
Definition:
- Seema = boundary
- Ullanghan = cross
- Together: Cross the border into new territory
The Tradition:
- Around October/November
- After monsoon over
- Ground is not wet anymore
- Otherwise army gets bogged down
The Strategy:
- Cross your kingdom's boundary
- Go into foreign territory
- Capture it by fighting
- New battle season begins
- In enemy territory
The October 1756 Plan
Raghunath Rao's Departure
The Decision:
- Start from Pune in October 1756
- Standard timing
- After monsoon
- When farmers available
- When ground dry
The Goals:
- Collect tributes from Rajputs
- Stabilize Delhi
- Establish Maratha presence
- Create administration
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's younger brother | Being sent north again (Oct 1756) |
| Nanasaheb (Peshwa) | Maratha leader | Making strategic decisions in Pune |
| Raja Kishwarath | Regional king | Writing reports about territory loss |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Insufficient forces, wants to be Wazir |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab | Wants to be Wazir |
| Current Wazir | Delhi official | In position, resisting others |
| Mughal Emperor | Nominal ruler | Weak and powerless |
| Abdali | Gone but will return | Left after summer heat and cholera |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir Shah's invasion (brought Abdali as soldier) |
| 1756 | Peshwa plans campaign to collect Rajput tributes |
| October 1756 | Raghunath Rao to depart from Pune |
| 1756-1757 | Campaigns in North |
| 1757 | Abdali's invasion and destruction |
| After 1757 | Cholera and summer heat drive Abdali out |
| September 1757/1758 | Raja Kishwarath writes about territory loss |
| 1758+ | Abdali expected to return |
Geography
The Border Zone:
- Attaq - boundary fort (lost to Abdali)
- Lahore - major city (east/south of Attaq)
- Multan - new boundary point (further east/south)
The Empire:
- West boundary: Moved from Attaq → Multan
- East boundary: Still reaches Bengal
- Shrinkage: Significant territory lost
The Distance:
- Pune (south) → Punjab (northwest) = thousands of km
- Too far to control effectively
- Communication difficult
- Leadership impossible
Key Themes
- The Horror Witnessed - Yamuna River red with blood
- Natural Defenses - Cholera and summer heat
- Nobody Protected - Local kings hid in forts
- The Inevitable Return - Abdali will come back
- Border in Flux - Attaq lost, empire shrinking
- The Tribute Problem - Rajputs can't pay, Marathas need money
- Raghunath Rao's Error - No permanent forces left behind
- The Distance Problem - Can't control from Pune
- Delhi Chaos - Multiple claimants, no order
- Seasonal Warfare - Post-monsoon campaign tradition
- Part-Time Army - 60% are farmers who join after harvest
- The Vacuum - Only Marathas can fill it
Critical Insights
The Natural Defenses
What Saved India:
- Not military strength (failed)
- Cholera epidemic (divine intervention per survivors)
- Summer heat (Pathans couldn't handle it)
Why This Matters:
- Can't rely on these forever
- Abdali will come back
- Need actual military solution
- Natural defenses are temporary
The Nadir Shah Pattern
The Mentor-Student Relationship:
- Nadir Shah (1739) brought Abdali as soldier
- Abdali learned from the master
- Now doing same destruction
- Same looting tactics
- Same brutality
- Potentially worse
The Implication:
- This is a proven model
- Worked for Nadir Shah
- Working for Abdali
- Will work again
- Need to break the cycle
The Tribute Trap
The Vicious Cycle:
- Rajputs desperate (succession crisis)
- Promise huge tributes to Shinde/Holkar
- Get help, win power
- Realize tributes impossible to pay
- Start backtracking
- Marathas need the money
- Have to force collection
- Creates resentment
- Weakens alliances
The Problem:
- Bad deals from the start
- Rajputs couldn't pay
- But Marathas needed money
- No good solution
Raghunath Rao vs. Shivaji
Shivaji's Model:
- Conquer territory
- Immediately create administration
- Establish government
- Law and order systems
- Leave it functional
- Move to next conquest
Raghunath Rao's Model:
- Conquer territory
- Leave insufficient forces
- No administration
- No government
- Leave it in chaos
- Return to Pune
The Result:
- Shivaji's territories stayed conquered
- Raghunath Rao's territories lost again
- Abdali easily reconquered
- Fundamental strategic error
The Wazir Musical Chairs
Three People Want It:
- Current Wazir (in position)
- Najib Khan (Rohilla, has local forces)
- Shuja-ud-Daulah (son of former Wazir)
Why They Want It:
- Huge prestige
- Almost like being king
- Real power (emperor is weak)
Why It Matters:
- Internal fighting weakens everyone
- Nobody can actually govern
- Everyone competing, nobody leading
- Creates the vacuum Marathas could fill
The Part-Time Army Problem
The Reality:
- 60% of Maratha army = farmers
- Only available after harvest
- Need to return for planting
The Advantage:
- Large army when needed
- Don't pay them year-round
- Cost-effective
The Disadvantage:
- Seasonal warfare only
- Can't campaign during monsoon
- Must finish before planting season
- Time-limited campaigns
Why October Start:
- Harvest done
- Farmers available
- Rivers crossable
- Ground dry
- Perfect timing
The Distance Doom
The Math:
- Pune to Punjab = thousands of kilometers
- Communication takes weeks
- Orders take weeks
- Reinforcements take months
The Impossibility:
- Can't govern from that far
- Can't respond to crises
- Can't maintain control
- Must have local presence
Raghunath Rao's Failure:
- Understood the conquest
- Didn't understand the hold
- Won battles, lost territories
- Tactical success, strategic failure
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Raghunath Rao going north again (Oct 1756)
- Without learning the lesson (no permanent forces)
- Money still a problem (need tributes)
- Delhi still chaos (no order established)
- Abdali will return (it's inevitable)
- Border shrinking (Attaq lost, Multan next?)
- Marathas must fill vacuum (only ones who can)
The Questions:
- Will Raghunath Rao establish permanent presence this time?
- Will he collect enough tribute?
- Will Delhi stabilize?
- When will Abdali return?
- Will Marathas be ready?
1757-1758: The Yamuna runs yellow with blood, temples lie desecrated, and Abdali is gone - driven out by cholera and summer heat, not by any army. Nobody protected the people. The kings hid in their forts. The Marathas and Jats couldn't stop it. Only nature saved India this time. But everyone knows he'll be back. It's just a matter of when. Meanwhile, the Mughal Empire shrinks. Attaq is lost. The border moves east to Multan. Delhi is chaos - three men fight to be Wazir while the emperor is powerless. Raghunath Rao is being sent north again in October 1756, after the monsoon, when the farmers are available and the ground is dry. But will he learn from his mistake? Will he leave permanent forces this time? Or will he conquer and abandon again, leaving the door open for Abdali's inevitable return?
Raghunath Rao's Second Northern Campaign (October 1756 - 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Second Campaign Begins
Seema Ullanghan: Boundary Crossing
The Tradition:
- Seema = boundary
- Ullanghan = to cross
- Seema Ullanghan = crossing your kingdom's boundary to wage war
The Timing:
- After monsoon is over (around October)
- After Dasara festival is celebrated
- When harvest season is complete
- October 1756 - Raghunath Rao prepared to go north
Why After Dasara:
- Harvest is done
- Farmers are free
- Ground is dry (not muddy from monsoon)
- Rivers are crossable
- Traditional war season begins
Meeting at Indore (February 6, 1757)
The Commanders Unite
What Happened:
- Malhar Rao Holkar met/joined with Raghunath Rao at Indore
- Indore is around where you cross the Narmada River
- Holkar brought his troops
- Combined forces heading north
The Timing Problem:
- At the same time (February 1757)
- Abdali was destroying temples in Mathura
- Killing people
- Taking away women
- Massacring civilians
The Distance:
- Raghunath Rao and Holkar were still hundreds of miles away
- Too far to help
- Couldn't reach in time
Why They Couldn't Face Abdali
The Resource Problem
Raghunath Rao's Situation:
- Lacked resources
- Lacked manpower
- Not enough to clash with Abdali
- Not possible to go to battle with him
Who Had to Fight:
- Antaji Mankeshwar and his forces
- Jawahar Singh (Surajmal's son)
- Some others
- They offered whatever little resistance they could
The Reality:
- Not really enough forces to battle Abdali
- Did whatever they could
- But it was not enough
- Simply not prepared
- Not enough numbers
The Rajasthan Detour
Collecting Tributes
Where They Went:
- Instead of Delhi, went to Rajasthan (to the west)
- Purpose: Get tributes
- Collect promised payments
- Raise funds for campaign
The Strategic Avoidance:
- Raghunath Rao knew Delhi situation
- This was his second time north
- Experienced commander
- Understood politics of North
- Wise enough not to fight losing battle
- Avoided Abdali while he was there
Raja Keshav Rai's Letter (April 30, 1757)
The Eyewitness Report
Who He Was:
- Seven generations served in Mughal court
- Well-wisher of Marathas (hitachintak)
- Had detailed insight about what's happening
- Good understanding of developing situations
- Understood likely future events
What He Wrote:
- Letter to Peshwa dated April 30, 1757
- Gave exact details (hube hub = very accurate)
- How people were massacred
- How temples were destroyed
- All the bad things Abdali did
- Comprehensive description
The Cholera & Abdali's Departure
Why He's Leaving
From Keshav Rai's Letter:
"It is said that Abdali is trying to depart because his troops are getting sick because of different epidemics that are coming."
- Cholera outbreak
- Troops getting sick
- Forcing retreat
- Natural disaster helping India
Najib Khan's Elevation
The Wazir's Former Servant
Who He Was:
- Former servant of the Wazir
- Nobody in the Mughal Empire
- Low-ranking position
What Happened:
- As soon as Abdali came to Delhi
- Najib Khan got himself Mir Bakshi position
- Forced the Emperor to appoint him
- Because he was very close confidant of Abdali
Why It Mattered:
- Abdali wanted him higher in Mughal camp
- Reward for loyalty
- Reward for inviting Abdali to Delhi
- Among those who invited him (like Mughalani Begum)
His Power:
- Has 15,000-20,000 troops
- Emperor now totally dependent on Najib Khan
- Will do whatever Najib Khan says
- Emperor has no force of his own
The Pathan Problem
The Warning
From Keshav Rai's Letter:
The Spread:
"There is no area where there are no Pathans."
Two Accounts:
- Abdali's forces are present
- Najib Khan and Rohilla commanders (all Pathans)
- Came and settled in India
- Ancestry goes back to Pathan tribe
The Hatred:
- These Pathans hate Hindus a lot
- Even Lahore, Multan (Punjab cities)
- Earlier: inherent part of Mughal Empire
- Now: full of Pathans as well
The Advice:
"We have to control the Pathan forces that are trying to intrude into the Mughal Empire. Otherwise they will take over most of North India."
The Assessment of Mughal Strength
How Weak Are They?
The Reality:
- Emperor has no force
- Nothing to command
- Even if all Mughal forces collected or unified
- Still Abdali will be superior to them
- No comparison
Addressing Raghunath Rao
"Maharaj Pratapi Ahith"
The Respect:
- Keshav Rai calling Raghunath Rao "Maharaj"
- Writing letter to him directly
- Addressing him respectfully
The Message:
"You have to take into consideration what is happening in the North and act accordingly. But we have to tell you what is going on for sure. It is our duty."
The Tone:
- Not being yes men
- Being straight with him
- Honest assessment
- Duty to inform
- Good counsel
The Timing: April-May 1757
Abdali Leaves, Marathas Arrive
The Sequence:
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| April 1757 | Abdali went back to Afghanistan |
| May 1757 | Marathas arrived in Agra |
Why They Waited:
- Probably busy in Rajasthan collecting tributes
- Waited until Abdali was well on his way to Afghanistan
- Didn't want to be in Agra while Abdali was there
- Purposefully came after the fact
The Calculation:
- Knew their numbers and resources insufficient
- Didn't want to butt heads with him
- If they had the force, would have gone much earlier
- Avoided confrontation intentionally
- Raghunath Rao experienced commander
- Understood the politics of North
- Wise decision not to fight losing battle
Shuja-ud-Daulah: The Awadh Problem
Abdali's Instructions
What Happened:
- Shuja-ud-Daulah = Awadh Nawab (son of Safdar Jung)
- As per Abdali's instructions
- Bangash and other people opened front against him
Why:
- He didn't like him
- Or he didn't cooperate with Abdali
- Now being targeted
- Strategizing against him
Sakharam Bapu Arrives (June 1757)
The Diplomat from Pune
Who He Was:
- One of the diplomats from Pune
- Worked for Nanasaheb Peshwa
What He Did:
- Reached near Delhi in June 1757
- Waited for Raghunath Rao's arrival
- Not ambushing
- Just meeting under good conditions
- Coordinating arrival
Manaji Paigude: Securing Delhi
The Cannons at the Gates
What He Did:
- Manaji Paigude = Maratha commander
- Put cannons at some gates of Delhi
Why Gates Mattered:
- Delhi during Mughal period had several gates
- Gated city with walls
- Only a few entry points
The Strategy:
- Should not be easy to get into inner city
- If outside army tries to come
- Can be withheld outside
- Delhi not protected by natural mountain
- Needed strategic defense
The Buffer:
- Gates created buffer zone
- Didn't want enemy reaching gates of Red Fort
- Enemy waits at gates of Delhi (outer)
- Defense in depth
Today:
- Old Delhi was smaller area to encircle
- Now if you go to Delhi, all gates removed
- But once upon a time, critical defense
The Imperial Dilemma
Shuja-ud-Daulah's Proposal
What He Asked:
"Shuja-ud-Daulah asked Marathas to do: fight with the Mughal Emperor."
The Maratha Response:
- Thought it's not right to fight emperor
- He's the central power
- That's who they've been hired to protect
- And that too for king of a province (vassal)?
- Doesn't seem right to switch allegiance
The Problem with Shuja:
- He was literally a Vassal king
- On behalf of the Mughals
- Should have had loyalty toward Mughal Emperor
- That's how arrangements were struck up
- But instead trying to resist him
- Things were that bad now
- Willing to challenge even the emperor
Why Marathas Refused
The 1752 Treaty
The Backstory:
- Marathas had struck a deal with Mughal Emperor
- Just five years ago in 1752
- Got victories on behalf of emperor
- Received certain provinces and their tax income
The Calculation:
- Didn't want to go back on that
- Didn't want to jeopardize gains
- Would lose everything they had gained
- Provinces, tax income, all of it
The Strategic Choice:
- Shuja-ud-Daulah only nabab of smaller kingdom
- Didn't have any loyalty to him
- Emperor = bigger prize
- Shuja = not worth it
The Decision:
- "We are not going to get into this mess"
- Stay out of internal power struggle
- Maintain alliance with emperor
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 1756 | Raghunath Rao departs from Pune for second northern campaign |
| February 6, 1757 | Malhar Rao Holkar joins Raghunath Rao at Indore |
| February 1757 | At same time: Abdali destroying Mathura (RR too far away) |
| 1756-1757 | Raghunath Rao in Rajasthan collecting tributes |
| April 1757 | Abdali departs India (cholera, troops sick) |
| April 30, 1757 | Raja Keshav Rai writes detailed letter to Peshwa |
| May 1757 | Marathas arrive in Agra (after Abdali gone) |
| June 1757 | Sakharam Bapu reaches near Delhi |
| June 1757 | Manaji Paigude puts cannons at Delhi gates |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Leading second northern campaign |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Joined at Indore with troops |
| Raja Keshav Rai | Mughal court official (7 generations) | Well-wisher of Marathas, detailed reports |
| Antaji Mankeshwar | Maratha officer | Fought Abdali with insufficient forces |
| Jawahar Singh | Surajmal's son | Fought Abdali with insufficient forces |
| Najib Khan | Former wazir's servant | Elevated to Mir Bakshi by Abdali |
| Abdali | Afghan invader | Leaving due to cholera, troops sick |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab | Wanted Marathas to fight emperor |
| Sakharam Bapu | Pune diplomat | Arrived Delhi June 1757 |
| Manaji Paigude | Maratha commander | Put cannons at Delhi gates |
| Mughal Emperor | Nominal ruler | Dependent on Najib Khan, no forces |
Geography
The Route:
- Pune → Indore (cross Narmada) → Rajasthan (detour for tributes) → Agra → Delhi
Key Locations:
- Indore - where Holkar joined Raghunath Rao
- Rajasthan - where they collected tributes (west)
- Mathura - where Abdali was massacring (they were too far away)
- Agra - where they arrived in May 1757
- Delhi - ultimate target, gated city
The Distance Problem:
- Hundreds of miles from Indore to Mathura
- Too far to help during massacre
- By time they could reach, too late
Key Themes
- Strategic Avoidance - Wait out Abdali rather than fight him
- The Resource Problem - Never enough forces/money
- Diplomatic Mistakes - Alienating potential allies
- The Tribute Mission - Money always the primary concern
- Seema Ullanghan Tradition - Formal war season timing
- The Pathan Threat - Taking over North India
- Najib Khan's Rise - From servant to Mir Bakshi
- Wise Counsel - Keshav Rai's honest assessments
- The Treaty Trap - Can't betray 1752 agreement
- Cholera Saves India - Natural disaster drives Abdali out
- Defensive Preparations - Cannons at gates
- The Vassal Problem - Shuja wants them to fight emperor
Critical Insights
The Strategic Avoidance Decision
Why Raghunath Rao Avoided Abdali:
- Second time north - experienced now
- Understood politics of the region
- Knew his resources insufficient
- Wise enough not to fight losing battle
- Better to stay alive and wait
The Cost:
- Couldn't help during Mathura massacre
- Hundreds of miles away in Rajasthan
- Collecting tributes while people died
- Pragmatic but tragic
The Justification:
- If they fought and lost
- No Maratha presence in North at all
- Better to preserve forces
- Live to fight another day
- Strategic retreat vs. suicidal charge
The Seema Ullanghan Tradition
Why October:
- Monsoon over - rivers crossable
- Harvest done - farmers available (60% of army)
- Ground dry - not muddy
- Dasara celebrated - traditional timing
The Military Calendar:
- October-April - fighting season
- May-September - monsoon, can't campaign
- Agricultural cycle dictates war
- Part-time army needs farmers free
Raja Keshav Rai: The Inside Man
Why He Mattered:
- Seven generations in Mughal court
- Insider knowledge
- Detailed insight into politics
- Well-wisher of Marathas (not just informant)
- Honest assessment - not yes man
His Value:
- Told them truth about Pathan threat
- Warned about Najib Khan's power
- Explained Mughal weakness
- Strategic intelligence from the inside
- "It's our duty to tell you" - commitment to truth
The Najib Khan Elevation
The Transformation:
- From servant of wazir
- To nobody
- To Mir Bakshi (high position)
- Totally dependent emperor on him
How It Happened:
- Invited Abdali to Delhi
- Very close confidant of Abdali
- Abdali forced emperor to appoint him
- Reward for loyalty and conspiracy
The Result:
- 15,000-20,000 troops
- Emperor has no forces of his own
- Real power in Najib's hands
- Puppet master situation
The Pathan Takeover
The Warning:
- No area without Pathans anymore
- Abdali's forces present
- Rohilla settlers (Najib Khan's people)
- Even Lahore, Multan (Punjab) full of them
- Taking over North India
Why They Hate Hindus:
- Jihadi mentality
- See North India as Muslim territory
- Religious extremism
- Not just political, ideological war
The Threat:
"We have to control the Pathan forces... otherwise they will take over most of North India."
The Shuja-ud-Daulah Dilemma
His Proposal:
- Fight the Mughal Emperor for me
- I'm the Awadh Nawab
- Help me against the center
Why Marathas Refused:
- Not right to fight central power
- Hired to protect emperor, not fight him
- Just made treaty in 1752 (5 years ago)
- Would lose all gains (provinces, taxes)
- Shuja only vassal king (small kingdom)
- No loyalty owed to him
- Emperor = bigger prize
The Irony:
- Shuja should be loyal to emperor
- That's the arrangement
- But things so bad now
- Even vassals challenging emperor
- Shows total collapse of authority
The Gates of Delhi
Why They Mattered:
- Delhi not naturally protected (no mountains)
- Needed artificial defenses
- Walls and gates created
- Few entry points only
- Buffer zone strategy
The Defense:
- Enemy stopped at outer gates
- Keeps them away from Red Fort
- Can hold them outside
- Defense in depth
- Manaji Paigude: cannons at gates
Today:
- Gates all removed now
- Old Delhi was smaller, enclosed area
- Modern Delhi much larger
- But historically, gates critical
The Tribute Problem
Why They Went to Rajasthan:
- Need money constantly
- Armies cost money
- Salaries, equipment, supplies
- Tributes = income source
- Have to collect or go broke
The Tragedy:
- While in Rajasthan collecting money
- Mathura being massacred
- Hundreds of miles away
- Money-focused while people dying
- Pragmatic but morally costly
The Dilemma:
- Can't campaign without money
- Can't get money without campaigning
- Rock and hard place
- Desperate situation
- Unpopular result
The 1752 Treaty Anchor
What They Got:
- Certain provinces
- Their tax income
- Legal recognition
- Fighting on behalf of emperor
Why It Matters:
- Just five years ago
- Still recent agreement
- Can't betray it now
- Would lose everything
- Foundation of position in North
The Constraint:
- Can't fight against emperor
- Locked into central alliance
- Limits flexibility
- But provides legitimacy
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Najib Khan's power - now Mir Bakshi, 15-20k troops
- Pathan threat - taking over everywhere
- Emperor weakness - dependent on Najib, no forces
- Cholera drove Abdali out - not military defeat
- Raghunath Rao learning - second campaign, more experienced
- Keshav Rai's warnings - Pathan takeover coming
- Gates being fortified - preparing for siege?
- Alliance with emperor - locked in due to 1752 treaty
- Shuja-ud-Daulah hostile - refused his proposal
- Money still problem - always need more
- Arrived after Abdali left - still avoiding confrontation
The Questions:
- Will they confront Najib Khan?
- Can they control the Pathan spread?
- Will Shuja-ud-Daulah become enemy?
- When will Abdali return?
- Will they be ready next time?
- Can they establish permanent presence?
October 1756 - May 1757: Raghunath Rao leads his second campaign north after Dasara. Joins with Holkar at Indore in February. But while they're in Rajasthan collecting tributes, Abdali is massacring Mathura - hundreds of miles away, too far to help. Cholera drives Abdali out in April. Marathas arrive in Agra in May, purposefully after he's gone - don't have the forces to face him. Raja Keshav Rai sends detailed reports: "Pathans everywhere. Najib Khan elevated from wazir's servant to Mir Bakshi. Has 15-20k troops. Emperor totally dependent on him. They're taking over North India. You have to stop them." Shuja-ud-Daulah wants Marathas to fight the emperor. They refuse - "Not right. We have a treaty from 1752. We fight for the emperor, not against him. You're just a vassal." Sakharam Bapu arrives in Delhi in June. Manaji Paigude puts cannons at the gates. The stage is set. Najib Khan is powerful. The Pathans are spreading. And the Marathas are locked into their alliance with a powerless emperor.
Maratha Strategy Failures & The Siege of Delhi (1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Shuja-ud-Daulah's Rejected Proposal
The Request
What He Asked:
- Shuja-ud-Daulah asked for help to fight with Mughals
- Wanted Marathas on his side
- Against the Mughal Emperor
The Maratha Response:
"It's not right to work on behalf of a subedar of a province against the Mughal court (Mughal Emperor)."
- Doesn't make sense
- Not the right way to go about it
- Rejected his proposal
Why They Refused:
- Marathas had gotten victories through the medium of emperor
- Made alliance with him
- Didn't want to wreck that alliance
- He screwed up (Shuja made bad move)
The Hierarchy:
- Emperor = Sheriff in town (big boss)
- Shuja-ud-Daulah = small little nabab
- Not worth betraying emperor for a provincial ruler
Raghunath Rao's Letter to Sakharam Bapu
Writing from Jaipur
Who Sakharam Bapu Was:
- In Pune
- One of the important courtiers in Nanasaheb Peshwa's court
The Letter's Message:
On Shuja-ud-Daulah's Proposal
"You have suggested that we should go help Shuja-ud-Daulah, but he won't give you any money. So how does it advance the interest of Peshwa?"
The Rhetorical Question:
- "Sakharam" = referring to his older brother (who happens to be Peshwa)
- If help Shuja-ud-Daulah without monetary help
- How will it advance Peshwa's cause?
The Strategy:
"Wherever we get money, we go there and get new land, new areas as well. Every which way to get money is helpful to us as well as to the Sarkar (Nanasaheb Peshwa, Maratha Empire)."
The Explicit Instructions (English Version)
From the Book
The Direct Quote:
"Abdali has left. Shuja is not offering a single rupee for Maratha help. Why then is help being offered? Go to the territories that yield money and that can be annexed. Get money for the state in whichever way you can."
The Jaipur Reminder:
"It is due to Malhar Rao and his diwan Gangadhar Yashwant that here too, in Jaipur, this could not be achieved. So you should not fall prey to pressure and use all your ingenuity to get more money."
The Context:
- Remember: Holkar tried to help in Jaipur
- Didn't get all the money promised
- Reminding of that lesson
The Bottom Line:
- Work only when we get paid
- Don't fall for promises
- Get actual money
The Soldiers of Fortune Strategy
How Marathas Operated
The Business Model:
"You can see the Maratha strategy was to... they were working like soldiers of fortune."
Why This Made Them Unpopular:
- Not trying to develop their own power structure
- Just working for pay
- Working against them
- Became unpopular partially because of this
The Tough Situation:
- Going nationwide (especially Northern India)
- Needed military resources
- Soldiers' salaries
- War materials
- All of it needs money
Rock and a Hard Place:
- Easy to be desperate like they were
- Couldn't help it
- But net effect: not popular where they were conquering
The Detailed Instructions Continue
More from Raghunath Rao's Letter
The Core Message:
"Keep an army and join an endeavor that earns you something. We left Pune to obtain funds for the state and to this day have not got anything. This is a unique situation. I sent you ahead of me to capture territory and get funds, not to go and help somebody. Nor have I sent you for a pilgrimage to a holy place."
The Strategy:
- Take over land
- Start controlling it ourselves
- Put governance structure in place
- Sure shot way of getting money
Why:
- Once you take governance in your hands
- The taxes will be owed to you
- Don't depend on somebody else giving it to you
The Clarification:
"I haven't sent anybody for the holy pilgrimage."
Why This Matters:
- Often when army went north
- They would carry pilgrims with them
- To visit holy places (in dangerous Mughal areas)
- Pilgrims wanted protection
Making It Clear:
- That's not the aim here
- Not a religious journey
- This is a money-making expedition
The Debt Problem: Why This Matters
Raghunath Rao's Financial Disaster
The Critical Point:
"This is a very important point. From the second time when Raghunath Rao was sent to north to sort out issues, problems, when he came back, he had loans."
The Failure:
- Went north to get money
- Came back in debt
- Borrowed money to fund campaign
- Didn't recover costs
- Major problem
The Temporary Army Problem
Why Marathas Couldn't Stay
The Reality:
- Maratha soldiers were temporary
- Had families back in Deccan/Pune
- Missing their own family members
- Not going to North forever
- That wasn't their intention
The Consequence:
"If you are going to come back, then you are not setting up a government and taking over the land and becoming part of the entire ecosystem there."
The Problem:
- Not establishing permanent presence
- Not building administration
- Not integrating into region
- Part of the problem
The Looted North Problem
Why Second Campaign Failed
The Situation:
"He went to get money to the North, Raghunath Rao, but the North provinces were already looted. There was no wealth remaining."
Why:
- Abdali wouldn't allow them to keep anything
- Already stripped the region
- Nothing left to extract
The Result:
- Raghunath Rao partially had nothing to gain
- Went there second time
- Came back with empty hands
- That was the problem
- Foolhardy errand
Crossing the Yamuna to Surajmal Jat
The Geography
The River:
- Delhi mostly on western bank of Yamuna
- Surajmal Jat must be on eastern bank of Yamuna
What Marathas Had to Do:
- Cross Yamuna River from west to east
- To get to Surajmal Jat
- Trying to get money from him
Conquering the Doab (July 1757)
The Territory Between Two Rivers
What is Doab:
- "Do" = two
- "Ab" = water/river
- Doab = land between two rivers
- Between Yamuna and Ganga
The Geography:
- Delhi on western bank of Yamuna
- To get to Doab: cross Yamuna River
- Ganga River is to the east of Yamuna
- Yamuna comes and meets with Ganga from western side
- Area between them = Doab
What Happened (July 1757):
- Anupshahr town - Raghunath Rao set up control
- Marathas won over many cities and towns in Doab
- Once crossed eastern bank of Yamuna
- Entered Doab territory
- Took control
The Power Shift in Delhi
Wazir Imad ul-Mulk Takes Charge
What Happened:
- Wazir Imad ul-Mulk put his hand in with Marathas
- Asked Marathas to get rid of Najib Khan
- Because he was loyal ally of Abdali
- Now that Abdali gone, wanted Najib gone too
Najib Khan:
- Was the Mir Bakshi
- Removed and kicked out from Delhi
Ahmad Khan Bangash:
- From Farrukhabad
- Thought he would become Mir Bakshi
- Followed in footsteps (kitta girawla) of Imad ul-Mulk
- Remember: Imad ul-Mulk also became Mir Bakshi
- Then became Wazir (took both roles)
- Bangash doing same - following same path
The Siege of Delhi (July 1757)
Surrounding the Capital
Who Arrived:
- Both Sakharam Bapu and Raghunath Rao
- Reached banks of Yamuna
- In that town
- July 1757
The Siege:
- Within a month
- Laid siege to Delhi
- Stopped all incoming, outgoing stuff from Delhi
- Nothing could get out
- Nothing could come in
Najib's Response:
- Started preparations for defending Delhi
The Alliance Shift:
- Imad had made treaty/alliance with Marathas
- Because of this
- Relations with Shuja-ud-Daulah became bad
The Holy Cities Goal
What Raghunath Rao Wanted
The Objective:
- Get control of Hindu holy cities
Which Cities:
-
Kashi (Varanasi)
- Vishwanath Temple in Kashi
-
Mathura
- Krishna's birthplace
-
Prayagraj (Allahabad)
- Where three rivers meet
- Two visible: Ganga and Yamuna
- Third: Saraswati (mythical, underground now)
- For practical purposes: two rivers meeting
- Town at banks, then becomes Ganga
Ayodhya:
- Is holy
- But at the time not much in Ayodhya
- Nobody talks about it at this moment
- Only had that mosque
- Not a focus
The Geography:
- Ganga and Yamuna start in Himalayas
- Yamuna is west of Ganga
- Once in plains: area between = Doab
- Incredibly fertile
- Doab ends at Prayagraj (where rivers meet)
The Shuja-ud-Daulah Problem
Why It Was Difficult
The Situation:
- Marathas wanted control of these towns
- Get some kind of autonomy
- Now difficult
Why:
- Shuja-ud-Daulah wanted friendship with Marathas
- But Marathas said: "We're sticking with our alliance with emperor and wazir"
- So obviously Shuja said:
- "If you're going to stick with my opponents"
- "So be it"
- "I don't want to help you or do anything good for you"
The Cost:
- Lost potential ally
- Made enemy of powerful nabab
- For sake of emperor alliance
Kutub Shah's Raid: The Najib-Imad Rift
The Religious Teacher's Revenge
Who Kutub Shah Was:
- Najib Khan's guru (teacher)
- Religious guru/teacher to Najib Khan
- Important figure (will come up later)
What Happened:
- Because Imad was against Najib Khan
- Kutub Shah just raided Imad's residence
- Took his revenge
The Atrocities:
- Killed everyone there
- Mistreated women
- Took away valuables
- Destroyed everything
The Result:
"Because of that, Imad became like a total enemy of Najib Khan. Bitter enemies."
Why:
- Imad's residence raided
- Women mistreated
- Valuables stolen
- Destruction everywhere
- Not going to go well with Imad
The Rift:
- Major split created
- Najib's teacher comes and does this
- Creates permanent enmity
- Bitter enemies now
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | Raghunath Rao writes from Jaipur to Sakharam Bapu |
| July 1757 | Anupshahr taken, control established |
| July 1757 | Marathas won many towns in Doab |
| July 1757 | Najib Khan removed as Mir Bakshi, kicked out of Delhi |
| July 1757 | Sakharam Bapu and Raghunath Rao reach banks of Yamuna |
| July 1757 | Siege of Delhi begins |
| Within a month | Complete siege - nothing in or out of Delhi |
| 1757 | Imad makes treaty with Marathas |
| 1757 | Relations with Shuja-ud-Daulah become bad |
| 1757 | Kutub Shah raids Imad's residence |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Leading campaign, writing from Jaipur, reaches Delhi |
| Sakharam Bapu | Pune courtier | Receiving instructions, reaches Delhi with RR |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab | Proposal rejected, becomes hostile |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Wazir | Makes treaty with Marathas, enemy of Najib |
| Najib Khan | Mir Bakshi | Kicked out of Delhi, bitter enemy of Imad |
| Kutub Shah | Najib's guru/teacher | Raids Imad's residence, creates rift |
| Ahmad Khan Bangash | Farrukhabad ruler | Wants to become Mir Bakshi |
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Marathas crossing Yamuna to get money from him |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Referenced in Jaipur tribute failure |
Geography
Key Rivers:
- Yamuna (west)
- Ganga (east)
- Saraswati (mythical, underground)
Key Regions:
- Doab - between Yamuna and Ganga, incredibly fertile
- Delhi - western bank of Yamuna
- Prayagraj - where Yamuna meets Ganga
Holy Cities:
- Kashi (Varanasi) - Vishwanath Temple
- Mathura - Krishna's birthplace
- Prayagraj - three rivers meet
- Ayodhya - holy but not focus at this time
Strategic Locations:
- Anupshahr - town taken in July 1757
- Jaipur - where Raghunath Rao writing from
- Farrukhabad - Ahmad Khan Bangash's base
Key Themes
- Money Above All - "Work only when we get paid"
- Soldiers of Fortune - Not building permanent structures
- The Temporary Army - Want to go home, not stay north
- The Looted North - Abdali left nothing to extract
- Strategic Geography - Rivers as barriers, Doab as prize
- Holy Cities Goal - Control religious sites for legitimacy
- Alliance Betrayal Refused - Won't fight emperor for Shuja
- The Debt Problem - Raghunath Rao came back with loans
- The Kutub Shah Raid - Creates Najib-Imad rift
- Siege Warfare - Cutting off Delhi completely
- Diplomatic Failures - Making enemies (Shuja)
- Unpopularity - Seen as mercenaries, not rulers
Critical Insights
The Soldiers of Fortune Problem
The Strategy:
- Work for money only
- Don't build permanent structures
- Don't create governance
- Temporary presence
Why It Doesn't Work:
- Unpopular where conquering
- No loyalty from locals
- Can't hold territory
- Temporary armies go home
- Not integrating into region
The Dilemma:
- Need money to campaign
- Need to campaign to get money
- But spending money on campaigns
- Not investing in administration
- Vicious cycle
The Debt Disaster
The Critical Failure:
- Raghunath Rao went north second time
- Purpose: get money
- Result: came back with loans
- Borrowed to fund campaign
- Didn't recover costs
Why This Matters:
- Unsustainable model
- Each campaign costs more than it earns
- Going deeper in debt
- Eventually can't fund more campaigns
- Death spiral
The Looted North Problem
The Situation:
- Abdali already stripped North India
- No wealth remaining
- Nothing left to extract
- Foolhardy errand
The Irony:
- Went to get money
- But Abdali took it all
- Chasing empty treasury
- Should have known this
The Lesson:
- Can't extract what isn't there
- Abdali beat them to it
- Wrong timing
- Wrong strategy
The Temporary Army Problem
Why They Can't Stay:
- Soldiers miss families (back in Deccan/Pune)
- Not going to North forever
- Not their intention
- Want to go home
The Consequence:
- Not setting up government
- Not taking over land
- Not integrating into ecosystem
- Part of the problem
The Fundamental Issue:
- Can't conquer and hold with temporary army
- Need permanent garrison
- Need settlers, not raiders
- Need administration, not occupation
The Holy Cities Strategy
Why It Matters:
- Control Hindu holy sites
- Gives religious legitimacy
- Shows protecting Hinduism
- Not just mercenaries
The Three Cities:
- Kashi/Varanasi - Vishwanath Temple (most sacred)
- Mathura - Krishna's birthplace (just massacred by Abdali)
- Prayagraj - where rivers meet (pilgrimage site)
The Politics:
- If control holy cities
- Hindus see as protectors
- Legitimacy for rule
- Not just soldiers of fortune
But:
- Shuja-ud-Daulah now hostile
- Controls some of this territory
- Made harder by diplomatic failure
The Kutub Shah Raid
What Happened:
- Najib's guru (teacher)
- Raided Imad's residence
- Killed everyone
- Mistreated women
- Stole valuables
- Destroyed everything
The Impact:
- Created permanent rift
- Imad and Najib now bitter enemies
- Personal now, not just political
- Women mistreated = unforgivable
Why It Matters Later:
- Kutub Shah important figure going forward
- This rift will have consequences
- Najib-Imad feud will shape events
- Religious violence mixing with politics
The Doab: Geography is Destiny
Why Doab Matters:
- Incredibly fertile land
- Between two rivers (Yamuna, Ganga)
- Wealth of region
- Strategic importance
The Control:
- Marathas conquering Doab in July 1757
- Taking many towns and cities
- Anupshahr as base
- Establishing presence
The Geography:
- Must cross Yamuna to reach Doab
- Rivers as barriers (especially during monsoon)
- No bridges in this era
- Control crossings = control region
The Siege Strategy
What They Did:
- Stopped all incoming/outgoing from Delhi
- Nothing in, nothing out
- Within a month of arriving
- Complete siege
The Goal:
- Starve them out
- Force surrender
- Remove Najib Khan
- Install friendly government
Najib's Response:
- Preparations for defense
- But already kicked out as Mir Bakshi
- Weakened position
- Need to defend
The Shuja-ud-Daulah Failure
The Diplomatic Blunder:
- Shuja wanted friendship
- Marathas chose emperor over him
- He becomes hostile
- "If you're with my opponents, so be it"
The Cost:
- Lost powerful ally
- Awadh Nawab = major player
- Controls strategic territory
- Now he won't help
- Might actively oppose
The Reason:
- Loyalty to 1752 treaty with emperor
- But emperor is powerless
- Shuja is powerful nabab
- Strategic mistake?
The Instructions: Money Money Money
The Explicit Orders:
- "Work only when we get paid"
- "Go to territories that yield money"
- "Get money in whichever way you can"
- "Don't help people for free"
- "This is not a pilgrimage"
The Reminder:
- Holkar didn't get paid in Jaipur
- Don't fall for promises
- Get actual money
- Use all your ingenuity
The Desperation:
- "We left Pune to get funds"
- "To this day have not got anything"
- "This is a unique situation"
- Clear failure admitted
The Strategy:
- Take over land directly
- Control governance
- Taxes owed to you
- Don't depend on others giving it
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Siege of Delhi ongoing - will Najib surrender?
- Kutub Shah will return - important later
- Najib-Imad bitter enemies - permanent rift
- Shuja-ud-Daulah hostile - lost ally
- Doab under control - Maratha presence established
- Holy cities goal - trying to get legitimacy
- Debt problem - Raghunath Rao in loans
- Temporary army issue - can't hold territory
- Soldiers of fortune - unpopular strategy
- Money obsession - will drive decisions
- Ahmad Khan Bangash - following Imad's path to power
The Questions:
- Will siege succeed?
- Can they establish permanent governance?
- Will they control holy cities?
- How will debt problem resolve?
- When will temporary army go home?
- Will Najib Khan return?
- What will Kutub Shah do?
- Can they make Shuja an ally again?
1757: From Jaipur, Raghunath Rao writes to Sakharam Bapu: "Shuja won't pay us. Why help him? Go where the money is. Take over land directly - control the taxes yourself. Remember Jaipur? Holkar didn't get paid. Don't fall for that. Work only when we get paid. This is not a pilgrimage." The instructions are explicit: money above all. But there's a problem - the North has been looted by Abdali. Nothing left. Raghunath Rao came back from his first campaign with LOANS. Went to get money, came back in debt. And the army wants to go home - missing families, not staying forever. Can't build permanent structures with temporary soldiers. In July, they cross the Yamuna, conquer Doab, take Anupshahr. Lay siege to Delhi within a month - nothing in, nothing out. Najib Khan kicked out as Mir Bakshi. But then Kutub Shah - Najib's religious teacher - raids Imad's residence. Kills everyone, mistreats women, steals everything. Creates permanent rift. Bitter enemies now. And Shuja-ud-Daulah wanted friendship, but Marathas stuck with the emperor. So he's hostile now. "If you're with my opponents, fine. I won't help you." Lost another ally. Working as soldiers of fortune, unpopular everywhere. Going deeper in debt. Temporary army that wants to go home. And everyone saying: "They just care about money, not governance." The model isn't working. But they can't stop. Need money for the next campaign. Vicious cycle.
The Geography Lesson & Najib Khan's Surrender (August-September 1757)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Geography Lesson: Rivers and the Doab
Understanding the Landscape
Old Delhi's Location:
- Completely on the western side of Yamuna bank
- Had to cross the river to get to Doab
The Doab Region:
- Area between Ganga and Yamuna (shown in orange on map)
- Very, very fertile land
- "Do" = two
- "Ab" = water/river
- Doab = land between two rivers
Where the Rivers Meet:
- They meet in the south-east
- NOT as far as Bengal
- Town called Prayagraj where they meet
The Third River:
- Third river: Saraswati
- Now totally underground
- Used to be there ~4,000 years ago
- Today only two rivers visible
- But still called Prayagraj (three-river meeting)
Why the Yamuna River is Important
Strategic Barriers
The Challenge:
"In those days there is no way to cross rivers during the monsoons. Even otherwise also it was not easy for an army."
Even in Summer/Low Tide:
- Still difficult for big army
- Armies have:
- Elephants
- Horses
- Bullock carts
- Camels
- When monsoon is full blown
- How do you cross with all these animals and big cannons?
The Problem:
- Big challenge
- No bridges existed
- Rivers act as deterrent
- Natural barriers
The Tributaries:
- Some rivers come and meet with Yamuna
- From the south
- Chambal River comes and meets Yamuna
- Several rivers come together to become Chambal
- Many tributaries even for one tributary
Going Forward:
"That's why it's important. These rivers are going to play an important part going forward."
The Urban Geography
Delhi and Agra
The Layout:
- Delhi - on western flank of Yamuna
- Agra - to the south of Delhi
- Agra ALSO on western flank of Yamuna
- Close enough to Doab but not technically in it
- On the western side
Where Rivers Start:
- In the Himalayas (way up in mountains)
- When they start: very small
- As they enter the plains:
- Slowly get speed
- A lot of flow increases
- Become bigger and bigger
After They Meet:
- Once they meet at Prayagraj
- Becomes Ganga (consumes the Yamuna)
- Keeps flowing toward east
- Finally empties into Bay of Bengal
Today's Delhi:
- To connect old Delhi with east-west: bridges exist
- Across Yamuna
- Most of Delhi still on western flank
- Old Delhi is what's really bordering the Yamuna
- New Delhi kind of to the northwest of normal Delhi
Neighboring Countries:
- Nepal visible on map
- Bangladesh to the east
The Kutub Shah Raid (Flashback)
Creating the Rift
What Happened:
"Because Mr. Imad went against Mr. Najib Khan, his teacher or his guru decided to teach a lesson to Imad."
The Raid:
- Went to Imad's residence
- Killed his bodyguards
- Treated all the women of household badly
- Complete violation
The Result:
- Najib Khan was once his subordinate
- Now Imad started treating him as arch enemy
- Really was pissed off now
- Permanent enmity created
The Maratha Attack on Delhi (August 10, 1757)
The Siege Begins
The Date:
- 10th of August, 1757
- Maratha attack began
- Attacked Delhi
The Speed:
- Within a month
- By end of August
- Basically laid siege to Delhi
- Made sure nothing could go in or go out of Delhi
The Ceasefire:
- 27th and 28th of August = Eid celebration
- On the Muslim calendar
- To cater for Muslim feelings during their festival
- Maratha stopped the battle for two days
- Complete ceasefire
- Respect for religious observance
Najib Khan's Surrender (September 3, 1757)
The Defeat
The Date:
- Finally, on 3rd of September
- Najib surrendered
The Strategy:
- To placate Holkar
- Najib Khan said: "Please consider me as your son"
The Holkar-Najib Relationship
Why This Worked
The History:
"This is a very important thing. Because they were on good terms."
Their Relationship:
- Relations were good earlier also (before all this)
- Holkar had a soft corner for Najib Khan
- Najib Khan had a soft corner for Holkar
- Reciprocated relationship
Najib's Character:
"Najib Khan was a very shrewd human being."
- Wanted to use this relationship
- To get off easy
- Strategic manipulation
The Pattern:
- In general, all these Rohillas (especially Najib Khan)
- Literally hated Marathas
- But for Holkar?
- Treated softy (made an exception)
- And same thing reciprocated by Holkar
Najib's Plea to Holkar
The Surrender Terms
What He Did:
- Najib Khan came into Holkar's tent
- Gave him a big sum of money
The Request:
- Raghunath Rao and Imad were upset with him
- Begged Holkar to ask them to forget his follies
- "You deal with these guys"
- "Convince them they should let me go softly"
- "Please fight on my behalf"
- "Tell them they should pardon me"
Najib's Four Promises
The Deal
Point 1:
"Whatever you order me, I will behave accordingly. You have done a lot of good things to me, so I acknowledge that. You have been benevolent to me."
Point 2:
- Will return whatever areas
- That Marathas had won in the Doab area
Point 3:
- Not to ever dabble
- Into the politics of Mughal court in Delhi
- Won't upset the order
Point 4 (Implied):
"I will return once I have made up my mind."
- Gave the assurance he'd behave
- Promise not to interfere
The Reality: Najib's True Nature
A Shrewd Politician
The Assessment:
"But you know, he was a very shrewd politician."
The Situation:
- He was in a very tight spot
- Wanted to get out
- Could have been as bad as losing his life
- Could have been killed
- Found guilty of treachery against Mughals
The Ploy:
"So he wanted to get out of it so he just could have played a ploy."
- "Oh, please, please forgive me"
- Maybe that's what he was doing
- Just bidding for time
- Waiting to fight another day
Najib's True Intentions
The Big Plan
His Real Intent:
"Obviously he hated Marathas. I mean, he just said that one way or the other I'm going to evict these people from here."
His Ambitions:
- He himself had big ambitions
- Knew that Marathas are the only force that can stop him
- They were the threat to be eliminated
Two Reasons to Oppose Marathas:
-
Political:
- Had ambitions
- Wanted to be big boss in Mughal areas
-
Religious:
- Was a Jihadi Muslim
- Just didn't want Marathas there at all
- Marathas were Hindus
- Couldn't tolerate them
- Thought Northern India belonged to the Muslims
His Compromise:
- Could make peace with Mughal Emperor
- Could accept Mughal system of governance
- But not with Marathas
- That was a bridge too far
- Because of his Jihadi mindset
- True extremist
The Strategy:
- Because he was weak
- Willing to surrender for a while
- Would be patient and wait
- Willing to say whatever they wanted to hear
Najib's Trump Card
The Abdali Connection
His Big Ploy:
"His big ploy was to make sure Abdali comes back. That was his ace in the hole."
Why He Needed Abdali:
- Couldn't fight with Marathas on his own
- His army size insufficient
- Overall resources not enough
- Not a match for Marathas
The Plan:
- Just going to do bidding
- Bid for time
- Wait for Abdali's return
- Abdali was his big daddy
The Escape
Holkar Gives Safe Passage
What Happened:
- Najib Khan could have become prisoner of Raghunath Rao
- But because in good terms with Holkar
- Finally Holkar helped him get out of Delhi
- Gave him safe passage
- That's what let him escape
The Sweet Talk:
- Basically gave his word
- "I won't meddle in your affairs"
- "You know I'm your slave"
- "All the lies"
- "Let me go"
Holkar's Trust:
- Because he thought he had great relationship
- Gave him the safe passage out of Delhi
- Trusted the promises
The Result:
- Najib Khan took his army
- Left Delhi
- Went toward his area of the Rohilkhand
Holkar's Power Move
Installing New Government
What Holkar Did:
- Put his men in the Delhi court
The Context:
- Remember: Abdali had come few months earlier
- Basically put his people in charge in court
- Najib Khan was there as Mir Bakshi
- And blah blah blah
The Change:
- Now Holkar changed all that
- Put people who were friendly to Marathas
- And Imad and everyone again
- Complete power shift
The Transfer of Authority
Raghunath Rao Takes Command
The Salute:
"So all of them went into Raghunath Rao's tent and they saluted him."
The Result:
- Basically, Marathas now completely got control of Mughal court
- Ultimate authority was Raghunath Rao Peshwa
The Hierarchy:
- Holkar still didn't have the ultimate authority
- Raghunath Rao was representing Nanasaheb Peshwa
- Because he was his brother
- Had some authority level that Holkar could not bring
Grant Duff's Assessment
The British Historian's View
Who He Was:
- Grant Duff = British historian
What He Wrote:
"Najib Khan could have been imprisoned by Raghunath Rao. But no other Maratha leader was more powerful than Malhar Rao Holkar."
The Reality:
- Even though Najib could have become prisoner
- Because good terms with Holkar
- Finally Holkar helped him get out of Delhi
Why It Worked:
- Gave him a safe passage
- Said all the sweet words:
- "I won't meddle in your affairs"
- "I'm your slave"
- "All the lies"
- Let him go
The Test Ahead
Holkar's Abhay (Protection)
The Grant of Life:
"Holkar gave Abhay to Najib. Abhay means giving the lease on his life."
The Prediction:
- How far this Abhay would hold
- Going to be tested
- Kasoti = test
The Outcome:
"Just within a couple of years, Najib Khan is going to completely behave exactly opposite."
What's Coming:
- Going to throw it back in Maratha's face
- Create big troubles for Marathas
- So-called hand jay for being slave
- All that talk going to be completely vaporized
The Reality:
- Just meant to get out of tough situation
- Had no intention of keeping his word
- Was in tough spot
- No Abdali around
- Would be on good behavior for a while
The Moment:
- Moment he got opportunity
- Would go back
- Try and expel them by however means
- Intent was to kill Marathas
- Expel them out of Northern India
The Cow Slaughter Incident
The Unholy Sight
The Location:
- Wherever Raghunath Rao was taking a dip in Yamuna
- That's where Marathas' tent was
- Najib Khan's tent
What Raghunath Rao Saw:
- Could see cows being slaughtered in that tent
- All the way along the path
- Blood and meat (beef)
The Hindu Perspective:
- These were devout Hindus
- Just cannot allow cows slaughtered
- Very unholy sight for Raghunath Rao
- Couldn't stand by this
Why Cows Are Holy in Hinduism
The Historical Explanation
The Ice Age Connection:
- When humans came out of Ice Age
- Started moving about
- Becoming warm enough
- Get out of caves
- Trying to somehow survive
The Exploration:
- Started exploring land around them
- Going about in nature
- Trying to see what is where
The Role of Cows:
- That's when they would use the cows
- Sit on the cow
- Cow will take them wherever they want to go
- Source of transportation AND food
Why Perfect:
- Don't have to carry food
- Just drink the milk
- Cow feeds off plants, trees, leaves
- Basically: go around on back of cow
- Drink milk as source of food
The Value:
- Came to be looked upon as very valuable animal
- Goes back to when people came out of Ice Age
- Started looking around and going places
- Could do that only because of cow being source of food
- Let them explore
The Tamable Factor:
- Could be tamed (important)
- Not wild/dangerous
- Cooperative animal
The Wealth Measure:
- Number of cows = measure of richness
- Every family/group counted cows
- More cows = richer
The Lasting Impact:
"Cow was like a very useful and very important animal starting from those days. And they never forgot that."
The Sacred Status:
- Led to the holiness
- Said: "Don't kill cows"
- Really important for prosperity
- Essential to survival and growth
Holkar's Intervention
Trying to Prevent Violence
What Holkar Did:
- Tried to tell Najib Khan
- Explain to him
- Convince him not to do such things
The Argument:
- Going to disturb Hindu sensitivities
- Raghunath Rao etc. are Hindus
- Didn't stand for this killing of cows
- Cow is holy animal in Hinduism
- They don't like to see this
Najib's Response:
"No, I'm not going to stop cows slaughtered."
Raghunath Rao's Reaction:
- Was irate
- Decided to use violence using weapons
- To solve this situation
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| August 10, 1757 | Maratha attack on Delhi begins |
| August 27-28, 1757 | Ceasefire for Eid celebration |
| End of August 1757 | Complete siege - nothing in/out of Delhi |
| September 3, 1757 | Najib Khan surrenders |
| September 1757 | Najib pleads to Holkar, gives money |
| September 1757 | Najib promises to return Doab, not meddle |
| September 1757 | Holkar gives safe passage to Najib |
| September 1757 | Najib leaves Delhi for Rohilkhand |
| September 1757 | Holkar installs friendly people in Delhi court |
| September 1757 | All authority transfers to Raghunath Rao |
| September 1757 | Cow slaughter incident |
| Next couple years | Najib will betray promises |
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Surrendered Sept 3, given safe passage, escapes |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Has soft spot for Najib, gives safe passage |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Ultimate authority, irate about cow slaughter |
| Imad ul-Mulk | Wazir | Bitter enemy of Najib after Kutub Shah raid |
| Kutub Shah | Najib's guru | Raided Imad's residence, created rift |
| Nanasaheb | Peshwa (in Pune) | Raghunath Rao representing him |
| Grant Duff | British historian | Wrote about Holkar's power |
Geography Summary
Rivers:
- Yamuna (west) - starts in Himalayas
- Ganga (east) - starts in Himalayas
- Saraswati (underground now, mythical)
- Chambal - tributary meeting Yamuna from south
Regions:
- Doab - between Yamuna and Ganga, very fertile
- Old Delhi - western bank of Yamuna
- New Delhi - northwest of old Delhi
- Agra - south of Delhi, also western bank
Strategic Points:
- Prayagraj - where Yamuna meets Ganga
- Rivers act as natural barriers
- No bridges in this era
- Monsoon makes them impassable
Key Themes
- Geography is Destiny - Rivers as strategic barriers
- The Holkar Mercy - Personal relationship over strategy
- Najib's Deception - Shrewd politician playing for time
- The Abhay Test - Will be betrayed within years
- Religious Extremism - Najib's Jihadi mindset
- The Abdali Card - Najib's ace in the hole
- Cow Sanctity - Deep cultural/religious significance
- Power Transfer - Marathas control Delhi court
- Grant Duff's Assessment - Holkar most powerful leader
- The Eid Ceasefire - Respecting religious observance
- Kutub Shah Revenge - Creating permanent rifts
- The Big Daddy - Abdali as ultimate power
Critical Insights
The Geography Lesson's Importance
Why They Taught This:
- Rivers will be crucial going forward
- Act as natural barriers
- No way to cross during monsoon
- Even otherwise difficult for armies
The Strategic Reality:
- Elephants, horses, camels can't swim rivers easily
- Big cannons can't be ferried
- Bullock carts can't cross
- No bridges exist
The Doab's Value:
- Very, very fertile
- Between two rivers (irrigation)
- Wealth of the region
- Worth controlling
The Flow:
- Start small in Himalayas
- Get bigger in plains
- Meet at Prayagraj
- Become Ganga
- Empty into Bay of Bengal
Holkar's Fatal Mistake
The Decision:
- Give safe passage to Najib
- Based on personal relationship
- Soft spot for each other
- Reciprocated affection
Why It's a Mistake:
- Najib is shrewd politician
- Just playing for time
- Has no intention of keeping word
- Hates Marathas (except Holkar)
- Will betray within couple years
The Prediction:
"Just within a couple of years, Najib Khan is going to completely behave exactly opposite. Going to throw it back in Maratha's face. Create big troubles."
Grant Duff's Warning:
- Even British historian noted
- Holkar most powerful Maratha leader
- But his personal feelings
- Override strategic necessity
- Should have imprisoned Najib
- Or killed him
- Instead: let him go
Najib's Two-Front Strategy
Against Marathas:
-
Political Reason:
- Has big ambitions
- Wants to be big boss in Mughal areas
- Marathas only force that can stop him
- Must eliminate the threat
-
Religious Reason:
- Jihadi Muslim
- Thinks Northern India belongs to Muslims
- Can't tolerate Hindus (Marathas)
- Religious extremism
- True extremist
His Acceptance:
- Can make peace with Mughal Emperor ✓
- Can accept Mughal system ✓
- But NOT with Marathas ✗
- That's a bridge too far
- Ideological line he won't cross
The Abdali Card
Najib's Trump:
"His big ploy was to make sure Abdali comes back. Abdali was his big daddy."
Why He Needs It:
- Can't fight Marathas on his own
- Army size insufficient
- Resources not enough
- Not a match
The Strategy:
- Bid for time
- Be patient
- Wait for Abdali's return
- Then strike
The Reality:
- Right now: no Abdali around
- So: good behavior for a while
- But moment he got opportunity
- Would go back on promises
- Expel Marathas by any means
The Cow Slaughter Provocation
What Happened:
- Najib slaughtering cows in his tent
- Blood and meat along path
- Right where Raghunath Rao taking dip in Yamuna
- Unholy sight
Why It Matters:
- Hindus are devout
- Cannot allow cow slaughter
- Deeply offensive
- Religious violation
Holkar's Intervention:
- Tried to explain to Najib
- "This disturbs Hindu sensitivities"
- "These people are Hindus"
- "Cow is holy"
- "Don't do this"
Najib's Refusal:
"No, I'm not going to stop cows slaughtered."
The Deliberateness:
- Najib knows what he's doing
- This is provocation
- Testing boundaries
- Religious warfare
- Won't compromise even when asked
Raghunath Rao's Response:
- Was irate
- Decided to use violence
- To solve this situation
- About to escalate
The Cow's Historical Significance
The Post-Ice Age Role:
- When humans emerged from caves
- Started exploring
- Used cow for:
- Transportation (ride it)
- Food (drink milk)
- Exploration (go places)
The Perfect Animal:
- Tamable (could control)
- Mobile (could travel)
- Self-sustaining (eats plants)
- Provides food (milk)
- Don't need to carry supplies
The Wealth Measure:
- Number of cows = wealth
- More cows = richer
- Every family counted cows
- Status symbol
The Sacred Status:
- Never forgot its importance
- Essential to prosperity
- Essential to survival
- Therefore: don't kill cows
- Became holy
Why It Endures:
- Deep historical memory
- Cultural significance
- Religious protection
- Goes back thousands of years
The Power Transfer Complete
What Happened:
- Marathas control Mughal court
- Ultimate authority: Raghunath Rao
- All officials saluted him
The Hierarchy:
- Raghunath Rao = ultimate authority
- Representing Nanasaheb Peshwa
- He's the brother (family connection)
- Authority Holkar can't match
- Holkar = powerful but not ultimate
- Most powerful Maratha leader (Grant Duff)
- But still subordinate to Peshwa family
The Installation:
- Holkar's men in Delhi court
- Friendly people to Marathas
- Friendly to Imad
- Changed Abdali's appointees
- Complete power shift
The Eid Ceasefire
What They Did:
- August 27-28 = Eid celebration
- Maratha stopped battle for two days
- Complete ceasefire
Why:
- To cater for Muslim feelings
- During their festival
- Respect for religious observance
- Strategic tolerance
The Irony:
- Showing respect for Muslim festival
- While besieging Muslim-controlled city
- Political calculation
- Win hearts even while winning war
The Test of Abhay
What Abhay Means:
- Giving the lease on life
- Protection granted
- Safe passage
- Trust
The Prediction:
"How far this Abhay would hold... going to be tested (kasoti). Just within a couple years, Najib Khan is going to completely behave exactly opposite."
What Will Happen:
- Throw it back in face
- Create big troubles
- All that talk (being slave)
- Completely vaporized
Why:
- Just meant to escape
- No intention of keeping word
- In tough spot (no Abdali)
- Good behavior temporary
- Waiting for opportunity
The Betrayal Coming:
- Intent to kill Marathas
- Expel them from North
- Jihadi mindset
- Ambitions for power
- Will use Abdali when he returns
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Najib will betray - within couple years
- Holkar's mercy - will be fatal mistake
- Abdali will return - Najib's ace in hole
- Cow slaughter - religious violence escalating
- Raghunath Rao irate - about to use violence
- Marathas control Delhi - but for how long?
- Najib in Rohilkhand - regrouping, waiting
- Jihadi extremism - ideological war
- Rivers as barriers - will matter in battles ahead
- Grant Duff's warning - Holkar's power and mistake
- The Abhay test - will fail spectacularly
- Two years - that's the timeline for betrayal
The Questions:
- How will Najib betray them?
- When will Abdali return?
- Will Raghunath Rao attack over cow slaughter?
- Can Marathas hold Delhi without Najib threat?
- Will Holkar regret his mercy?
- How will rivers affect coming battles?
- What troubles will Najib create?
August-September 1757: Geography lesson first - rivers are natural barriers, no bridges, can't cross during monsoon, Doab is the prize. August 10: Marathas attack Delhi. By end of August: complete siege, nothing in or out. August 27-28: ceasefire for Eid, respecting Muslim festival. September 3: Najib Khan surrenders. But he's shrewd - pleads to Holkar, "Consider me your son." Gives big sum of money. "I'm your slave. I won't meddle. I'll return the Doab." Holkar has soft spot for him - reciprocated relationship. Gives safe passage. Grant Duff warns: "Holkar most powerful Maratha leader" but this is a mistake. Because Najib is jihadi extremist, has big ambitions, hates Marathas, waiting for Abdali's return - "his big daddy." Within couple years will betray everything, throw it back in their face, create big troubles. Najib escapes to Rohilkhand. Holkar installs friendly people in Delhi court. All authority transfers to Raghunath Rao. Then cow slaughter incident - Najib doing it right where Raghunath Rao bathing in Yamuna. Holkar begs him to stop - "disturbs Hindu sensitivities." Najib refuses: "No, I'm not stopping." Raghunath Rao irate, about to use violence. The test of Abhay is coming. It will fail.
Horkhar's Last Stand: "Over My Dead Body" (1757-1758)
The Father-Son Bond, The Punjab Invitation, & Why Afghans Were Masters of Rivers
The Cow Slaughter Incident
Religious Tension at the Yamuna
The Scene:
- Yamuna bank - for taking a dip in the river
- Raghunath Rao sees Najeeb Khan slaughtering cows
- Doesn't like it (cows sacred to Hindus)
The Confrontation:
- Horkhar tries to calm Raghunath Rao down
- "Stop it, stop this kind of stuff"
- Najeeb says: "No, I'm not gonna"
Why It Matters:
- Raghunath Rao and his forces suffering from feelings of the Hindus
- Religious offense
- Najeeb has denied this (refused to stop)
- Raghunath Rao has decided to use weapons
The Escalation:
"Weapons are weapons, weapons are power. He decided to use weapons."
Najeeb Khan Flees (Again)
The Pattern Continues
What Happened:
- Mr. Najeeb Khan and his army
- They just flee
- Decide it's not worth it
The Standoff:
- Both armies came in front of each other
- About to engage
Horkhar's Intervention: "Over My Dead Body"
The Dramatic Block
The Setup:
- Horkhar and his army was in the middle of both armies
- Between Raghunath Rao's forces and Najeeb Khan's forces
- Dividing them
Raghunath Rao's Move:
- Tried to sideline Horkhar
- Go forward (toward Najeeb Khan)
Horkhar's Response:
- Invoked Bajirao I (Raghunath Rao's father)
"Even if Bajirao the First, that means your father, had he been here, he would have listened to me. Because I'm an old timer who worked with your father."
The Physical Block:
- Raghunath Rao not ready to back down
- Horkhar got off the horse
- Grabbed the horse's leg of Raghunath Rao
- Said: "Get off the horse and then go forward"
- "First go over me and then only you can go forward"
Translation: Over my dead body. 💀
The Result
Raghunath Rao Backs Down
What Happened:
- Raghunath Rao got very angry
- But he came back to his tent
- Didn't fight Najeeb Khan
- Horkhar successfully stopped the battle
The Father-Son Bond
Why Horkhar Protected Najeeb Khan
The Count:
"Horkhar had saved the life of Nazeep Khan twice because of some objective that was inside him, which was difficult to fathom for others."
He Only Knew: The real reason was known only to Horkhar.
The Relationship:
- Horkhar considered Najeeb Khan as his son
- Najeeb Khan considered Horkhar like his father
- Deep personal bond
- Not just political alliance
Why It Mattered:
"Nazeep was really lucky that Horkhar was willing to go to bat for him."
The Future Problem
A Headache for Marathas
The Situation:
- In the future, this was going to be difficult for the Marathas
- Nazeep Khan was going to be the problem
- Horkhar was willing to safeguard him
The Assessment:
"This was not the best way forward, but this was going to be a headache."
Why:
- Not very sustainable for Marathas
- To just let Nazeep run without any consequence
- But Horkhar kept protecting him
- Created ongoing problem
The Holy Dip
After Putting Delhi in Order
What Happened:
- After putting Delhi in proper order
- Went to holy place for dip in the Ganges
Why the Ganges:
- For Marathas: Ganges and Yamuna both holy
- But more Ganges is holy river in itself
- Not something they could do every day
- They lived in far south
- So it was a big occasion when they could do such things
Najeeb Khan's Retreat
Leaving Saharanpur
What Happened:
- Najeeb Khan and his army
- Left the Saharanpur area
- At the foothills of Himalayas
The Result:
- Now Marathas were having access to all that area
His Thinking:
"This is getting too hot. So he just decided to retreat."
About Saharanpur:
- Their natural area for Rohila Khand (Rohilas)
- That's where they spent a lot of time
- But they retreated from there
The Tribute Collection Spree
Kunjapura & Sirhind
Kunjapura:
- Went up to Kunjapura
- Got tribute of 5 lakh rupees
- From some strong man there
- Majabat Khan or somebody like that
Sirhind:
- Abdas Samad Khan (or whoever) was at Sirhind
- Sirhind = one of the towns before Punjab
- If you go west of that, then you get into Punjab
- He took control of Sirhind
The Assessment:
"He was having a good spree. Winning spree."
The Sikhs Rising
New Power in Punjab
What Was Happening:
- The Sikhs were now getting some power
- Along with them (Marathas), they got hold of Sirhind
Important: Sikhs were beginning to emerge as a force in the region.
The Punjab Invitation
Adina Beg's Call
New Part:
- Adina Beg gave the invitation for Marathas to attack Punjab
- (Was he Punjab Subedar? Will come up later)
- But yeah, he invited Marathas to attack Punjab
The Context:
- Adina Beg came to power after "this lady" was kicked out
- The one who invited Abdali to India
- (Name forgotten in conversation)
Why Punjab Matters
The Strategic Importance
The Geography:
- Punjab is on the border
- Once you cross Punjab, you get into Afghan territory
- West of Punjab = more Afghan
The Historical Context:
- When Aurangzeb was around
- Even that area was under Mughal control
- But then Abdali came
- Started making things difficult
How Much Has Changed:
"Much has changed here in the last 50 years since Aurangzeb's death."
Delhi's Security = Punjab Control
The Weakest Link
The Reality:
"Delhi's security was dependent on Punjab's being able to control Punjab. Because that's how Abdali would come into India."
The Logic:
- Punjab you have to control
- Otherwise, very easy for Abdali to come into India
- It's the weakest link
Who Needs to Control It:
- Has to be in the hands of either Mughals or Marathas
- Mughals now were not very powerful (implied)
The Punjab Power Structure
Taimur Shah vs Adina Beg
In Lahore:
- Taimur Shah (Abdali's son)
- Was like in his teenage (11 years old mentioned)
- Was the Subedar
- Supposed to be taking care of Punjab
- Lahore = capital of Punjab
In Jalandhar:
- Adina Beg
- His writ went up to Jalandhar
- Not quite as west as Lahore
- Living in kind of uneasy peace with Taimur Shah
Adina Beg's Betrayal
Breaking with Taimur Shah
What Changed:
- Adina Beg did not cooperate with Taimur
- Called Raghunath Rao for help
- Basically decided not to cooperate with Taimur Shah anymore
Why:
- Share the power or income or whatever
- Taimur Shah was in Lahore
- Hoping to get control of entire Punjab
- That was Abdali's dream
The Problem:
"That wasn't their conventional kingdom or conventional province because that has nothing to do with Afghanistan."
But:
- Because Abdali was a strong man
- He thought he had to get Punjab
- Keep it going
The Hatred of Jahan Khan
Punjab's Resentment
Who He Was:
- Jahan Khan = commander-in-chief of Abdali
- People in Punjab hated him
The Threat:
"At any given time, there could be a revolt against the Afghan rule in Lahore."
Why He Was There:
- Probably stationed in Lahore
- Because Taimur Shah was barely a teenage boy
- Obviously doesn't know how to wage war
- Jahan Khan = adult in the room
- He was the commander-in-chief
The Money Offer
One Lakh Rupees Per Day
Adina Beg's Promise:
- Promised Marathas he would help them
- By giving them 1 lakh rupees a day 💰
- Hundred thousand rupees EVERY DAY
Why Marathas Agreed:
"It was a monetary offer that they thought was attractive. They were working like soldiers of fortune, more or less."
The Common Theme: Getting paid lots and lots.
Abdali's Punjab Problem
The Back-and-Forth
The History:
- Abdali had tried to take control three times before
- Failed - meaning it was going back and forth
- He's installing his Subedar
- Then Marathas or Mughals would drive them out
- In contention
Now:
- Marathas were thinking of getting their control on Punjab
- That was their objective
The March to Lahore
From Sirhind
What Happened:
- Marathas took off from Sirhind toward Lahore
Jahan Khan's Response:
- Was in Lahore (commander-in-chief of Abdali)
- Decided to go meet Marathas midway (probably)
The Problem:
- Because of huge force that Marathas had assembled
- He kind of lost his courage
- Maybe didn't have enough army with him
- Just thought: not going to be easy to win that battle
The Result:
"He lost his will to fight."
Abdali's Afghan Problem
Can't Send Reinforcements
The Hope:
- Jahan Khan and Taimur Shah were hoping
- They will get some extra troops from Abdali in Afghanistan
The Reality:
- Abdali himself was trying to pacify the revolt
- In certain areas of Afghanistan
- There are lots of tribes
- They have local strongholds
What Abdali Was Trying to Do:
- Develop a nationwide government presence
- Make sure all the tribes come with him
- But they're fiercely independent tribes
The Challenge:
"He was trying to bring it under one rule (his rule), but that was not going to be easy. He has to basically pacify them in their own stronghold areas."
The Consequence:
- He couldn't send any extra troops
- Because he needed them himself
- Couldn't afford it
- Stretching too thin
The Ravi River Crossing
Afghan Retreat Strategy
What Happened:
- Afghans left Lahore
- Crossed the Ravi
- Probably felt a little safe
Why:
- By crossing the river, thought they wouldn't be followed
- And even if they were:
- Crossing the river for Maratha army = not a given
- Difficult maneuver
The Logistics:
- For such a big force
- Wasn't happening easily
- Would be easily noticeable
- With all your camels, elephants, horses
- Would take some time
Afghan Mastery of Rivers
Their Secret Advantage
The Skill:
- Afghans had mastered that art
- Not of "retreat strategically"
- Of crossing the rivers
Why They Had To:
"To come to Delhi, he had to cross at least four or five rivers."
The Result:
- That was something he had developed
- Asked (mastered)
- Strategic advantage
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Horkhar | Maratha veteran | Protected Najeeb Khan twice, "old timer" who worked with Bajirao I |
| Najeeb Khan | Rohila leader | Like son to Horkhar, retreated from Saharanpur |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha commander | Wanted to fight Najeeb, backed down when Horkhar blocked him |
| Bajirao I | Deceased Peshwa | Raghunath Rao's father, respected by Horkhar |
| Adina Beg | Punjab power broker | Invited Marathas, promised 1 lakh/day, broke with Taimur Shah |
| Taimur Shah | Abdali's son | 11-year-old teenage Subedar of Lahore |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander-in-chief | Lost courage, will to fight when saw Maratha force |
| Abdali | Afghan king | Busy pacifying tribal revolts, can't send reinforcements |
| Majabat Khan | Strongman | Paid 5 lakh rupee tribute at Kunjapura |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757-1758 | Cow slaughter incident at Yamuna |
| 1757-1758 | Horkhar blocks Raghunath Rao from fighting Najeeb ("over my dead body") |
| 1757-1758 | Najeeb Khan retreats from Saharanpur (foothills of Himalayas) |
| 1757-1758 | Marathas get access to Saharanpur area |
| 1757-1758 | Tribute of 5 lakh collected at Kunjapura (Majabat Khan) |
| 1757-1758 | Control of Sirhind taken (with Sikhs) |
| 1757-1758 | Adina Beg invites Marathas to attack Punjab |
| 1757-1758 | Adina Beg breaks with Taimur Shah, stops cooperating |
| 1757-1758 | Adina Beg promises 1 lakh rupees per day |
| 1757-1758 | Marathas march from Sirhind toward Lahore |
| 1757-1758 | Jahan Khan loses courage when seeing Maratha force |
| 1757-1758 | Abdali busy with Afghan tribal revolts, can't send help |
| 1757-1758 | Afghans flee Lahore, cross Ravi River |
Geographic Context
The Journey:
- Yamuna → religious incident
- Saharanpur → foothills of Himalayas, Najeeb retreats
- Kunjapura → 5 lakh tribute
- Sirhind → control taken (gateway to Punjab)
- Jalandhar → Adina Beg's territory
- Lahore → capital of Punjab, Taimur Shah's base
- Ravi River → Afghan retreat line
The Strategy:
- Sirhind = before Punjab
- West of Sirhind = Punjab
- West of Punjab = Afghan territory
Key Themes
1. Horkhar's Loyalty
- Protected Najeeb Khan twice
- Father-son bond
- "Over my dead body" moment
- Invoked Bajirao I's memory
- Stopped battle physically
2. The Future Headache
- Horkhar protecting Najeeb = problem for Marathas
- Not sustainable
- But Horkhar won't stop
- Creates ongoing issue
3. The Money Motivation
- 1 lakh rupees per day from Adina Beg
- "Soldiers of fortune"
- Monetary offer = attractive
- Common theme: getting paid lots
4. Adina Beg's Game
- Lived in uneasy peace with Taimur Shah
- Then broke with him
- Invited Marathas
- Promised huge daily payment
- Playing both sides
5. Jahan Khan Loses Courage
- Saw huge Maratha force
- Lost will to fight
- Hoped for reinforcements
- But Abdali can't send any
6. Abdali's Afghan Problem
- Tribal revolts consuming his attention
- Fiercely independent tribes
- Trying to create nationwide government
- Has to pacify them in strongholds
- Stretching too thin
7. Afghan River Mastery
- Had to cross 4-5 rivers to reach Delhi
- Developed and mastered river crossings
- Strategic advantage
- Used Ravi as defensive line
Critical Insights
Why Horkhar's Protection Matters
The Problem:
- Najeeb Khan = ongoing threat
- Horkhar = powerful Maratha veteran
- But protects the enemy
- Creates impossible situation
The Relationship:
- Father-son bond (not blood)
- Deep personal connection
- Loyalty overrides strategy
- "Difficult to fathom for others"
The Future:
- Najeeb Khan WILL be a problem
- Horkhar WILL protect him
- Marathas can't touch Najeeb while Horkhar lives
- Not sustainable
The "Over My Dead Body" Moment
What It Shows:
- Horkhar's courage (blocking his own commander)
- His authority (invoked Bajirao I)
- His physicality (grabbed horse's leg)
- His determination (literally "go over me")
Why Raghunath Rao Backed Down:
- Horkhar was respected veteran
- Worked with his father (Bajirao I)
- "Old timer" with credibility
- Couldn't dishonor him publicly
- Got angry but came back to tent
The Significance:
- Shows Horkhar's power within Maratha ranks
- Shows limits of Raghunath Rao's authority
- Shows deep bonds transcend politics
- Foreshadows problems when loyalties conflict
The Money Trail
The Offer:
- 1 lakh rupees PER DAY
- That's 100,000 rupees daily
- From Adina Beg
The Math:
- If campaign lasts months...
- That's millions of rupees
- Very attractive offer
But:
- Remember from other transcripts
- They came back 80 lakh MORE in debt
- So where did the money go?
- Adina Beg didn't deliver?
- Or it all went to expenses?
The Pattern:
- "Soldiers of fortune"
- Working for money
- But not bringing profit home
- Just spending to maintain army
Abdali's Vulnerability
The Window:
- Abdali can't send reinforcements
- Busy with tribal revolts
- Fiercely independent Afghan tribes
- Trying to create central government
- Never happened before in Afghanistan
The Task:
- Pacify tribes in their strongholds
- Bring them under one rule (his rule)
- Not going to be easy
- Stretching too thin
The Opportunity:
- Jahan Khan lost courage
- Taimur Shah just a teenage boy
- No reinforcements coming
- Afghans fleeing
But:
- This is temporary
- Abdali WILL pacify the tribes (eventually)
- Then he'll be back
- With full force
Afghan River Mastery
Why It Matters:
- Had to cross 4-5 rivers to reach Delhi
- Developed and mastered the technique
- Strategic skill
The Advantage:
- Can retreat across rivers safely
- Difficult maneuver for pursuers
- Time-consuming with elephants, camels, horses
- Easily noticeable
- Gives them defensive position
The Implication:
- Marathas not as skilled at river crossings
- Afghans use this as defensive tactic
- Natural barrier they exploit
- Part of why they can raid and retreat successfully
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The Horkhar Problem:
- He'll keep protecting Najeeb
- Creates ongoing headache
- Not sustainable for Marathas
- Eventually something has to give
The Abdali Return:
- He's temporarily busy
- But he's pacifying those tribes
- When he's done → he's coming back
- With full force
- Jahan Khan and Taimur Shah waiting
The Money Problem:
- 1 lakh per day promised
- But we know they end up MORE in debt
- Something goes wrong
- Either Adina Beg doesn't pay
- Or costs exceed revenue
The River Crossings:
- Afghans mastered them
- Marathas less skilled
- Will matter in future battles
- Geographic advantage for Afghans
The Sikhs:
- Getting "some power"
- Rising force
- Will be factor in Punjab
- Wild card in future conflicts
1757-1758: Horkhar's finest hour and the seed of future problems. Raghunath Rao wants to fight Najeeb Khan over cow slaughter at the Yamuna. Horkhar physically blocks him - gets off his horse, grabs Raghunath Rao's horse's leg. "Even your father Bajirao would have listened to me. I'm an old timer. First go over me, then you can go forward." Over my dead body. Raghunath Rao backs down, furious but respectful. Horkhar saved Najeeb twice now. Father-son bond, not blood but deeper. Will be a headache for Marathas. Meanwhile, Najeeb retreats from Saharanpur. Marathas on winning spree - 5 lakh from Kunjapura, control of Sirhind with rising Sikhs. Then Adina Beg's golden invitation: "Come attack Punjab, I'll give you 1 lakh rupees PER DAY." Soldiers of fortune say yes. They march from Sirhind to Lahore. Jahan Khan sees the force, loses courage, loses will to fight. Hopes for reinforcements from Abdali. But Abdali's busy - fiercely independent Afghan tribes revolting, trying to create central government, stretching too thin, can't send help. So Afghans flee Lahore, cross the Ravi River. Their secret advantage: mastered river crossings (had to, coming to Delhi requires crossing 4-5 rivers). Defensive position now. But window is open. Abdali's vulnerable. For now.
Marathas Reach Attock: The Pinnacle That Wasn't (1757-1758)
Raghunath Rao's Northern Campaign, Iran's Offer, & The Empire on Borrowed Money
The Afghan Retreat
Why Taimur Shah Fled
The Situation:
- Taimur Shah (Abdali's son) and Jahan Khan (commander-in-chief) in Lahore
- Abdali couldn't send reinforcements
- Too busy with internal Afghan revolts
- Afghanistan itself in turmoil
The Strategy:
- Left Lahore
- Crossed the Ravi River toward Afghanistan
- Got closer to safety
Why This Mattered:
- If Marathas pursued, they'd have to cross the Ravi
- River crossings = time-consuming
- Quick defensive position
Punjab: Land of Five Rivers
Understanding the Geography
What "Punjab" Means:
- "Punj" = Five
- "Ab" = Rivers/Waters
- Punjab = Land of Five Rivers
The Rivers:
- All start in the Himalayas
- Empty into the Sindhu (Indus) River
- Provide fresh sweet water
- Make Punjab extremely fertile
Why This Matters:
- Fertile = high agricultural output
- High output = enormous tax revenue
- Punjab was a prize worth fighting for
April 19, 1758: Lahore Falls
The Maratha Victory
What Happened:
- Manaji Paigude (important Maratha commander) entered Lahore
- 10,000 Maratha forces
- 1,000 Mughal soldiers with them
- 11,000 total
Afghan Response:
- Left all their stuff behind
- Just fled
- Wanted to escape quickly
- Everything fell into Maratha hands
The New Power Structure
Adina Beg:
- Probably the new Subedar of Punjab
- Working with the Sikhs
The Sikhs:
- Rising power in Punjab
- Multiple groups (misls)
- Each misl = 100-200 fighters (like tribes)
- Developing their own power structure
- NOT fully in control yet, but gaining strength
The Sikh Backstory
Why Sikhs Were Rising
History:
- Previous Punjab Subedar (the one who fell off horse and died)
- His father was Kamruddin Khan (Mughal Wazir)
- That Subedar was dead set against Sikhs
- Massacred Sikhs in a big way (~10 years ago)
Now:
- Sikh community gaining serious strength
- Fighting both Mughals AND Abdali's forces
- Still not in full control of Punjab
- But getting stronger
Important: They were gathering steam, not yet dominant.
The Ultimate Achievement: Attock
The Border Town
Attock:
- Town across the Sindhu River
- Border between Mughal Empire and Afghanistan
- During Aurangzeb's time, Mughals controlled beyond it
- Now, because of Abdali, Attock was the boundary
What Marathas Did:
- Reached all the way to Attock
- Pushed Afghan forces beyond Attock into Afghanistan
- Took the fort at Attock
Why This Was HUGE:
- Marathas had never gone that far north
- Mughal forces hadn't been that far north in ages
- Located on banks of Sindhu River
- A hallmark achievement
Today: Attock is in Pakistan (northwest Punjab)
Beyond Attock: Peshawar
Even Further North
Who Went:
- Tukoji Holkar (Holkar clan, maybe younger brother of Malhar Rao)
- Sabaji Shinde (Shinde clan)
Where They Went:
- All the way to Peshawar
- Even further north and west from Attock
- Getting close to Kabul (Abdali's capital)
The Achievement:
- No Maratha force had EVER gone this far
- Great feat of achievement
- Credited to Raghunath Rao's campaign
- Pretty amazing
The Fatal Flaw
What They Didn't Do
The Problem:
- Didn't establish permanent administration
- Didn't set up governance structures
- Didn't leave permanent forces to defend the areas
- Very weak administration
The Result:
- Once Raghunath Rao came back (he wasn't staying)
- Started losing the areas they'd conquered
- Couldn't hold Attock and Peshawar
- All that ground would be lost
Why:
- Abdali wasn't going to sit still
- Currently busy putting down rebellions in Afghanistan
- But as soon as he pacified those tribes, he'd be back
The Celebration in Lahore
Raghunath Rao's Coronation Ceremony
Shalimar Bagh, Lahore:
- Raghunath Rao built a memorial
- To commemorate Marathas reaching Attock/Lahore
- Honored in a grand public function
The Ceremony:
- Elevated throne
- Raghunath Rao welcomed
- People came to pay respects
- Rose water sprinkled through fountains
- Lights burning everywhere in the city
The Meaning:
"This was the pinnacle of Maratha success. This kind of thing had not been achieved in the past."
Iran's Shocking Proposal
The Shah's Offer
What Iran Proposed:
- Iran's king showed willingness to help Marathas
- Goal: Crush Abdali in combined fashion
- Proposed boundary: Attock should be the border between Iran and India
The Strategy:
"Both of us can squeeze Abdali out of existence"
- Get rid of Afghanistan as a country
- Shah didn't believe in Afghanistan as separate country anyway
- Just split the difference and divide it up
Why Afghanistan Didn't Exist Before
The Tribal Reality
History:
- No such country as Afghanistan before Abdali
- Mughals were strong on one side
- Iranian king was strong on the other
- Afghan tribes in between never held territory
- Tribes fought each other constantly
The Nature of Afghans:
- No interest in permanent government
- If no outside pressure, they fight each other
- Never got along
- Very freedom-loving people (even today)
- Protect their freedom, way of life, belief systems
Why No One Conquers Afghanistan:
- Nothing there worth fighting over
- Huge mountains
- No sweet water
- No oil, no minerals
- No food, no grains
- No animals
- Just barren, mountainous terrain
Raghunath Rao's Refusal
The Arrogant Response
What Raghunath Rao Did:
- Didn't show interest in eliminating Afghanistan
- Didn't want to divide it with Iran
What He Wrote to Nana Saheb:
- Communicated via letters to Pune
- "Kabul and Kandahar are part of India"
- No reason to negotiate with Shah of Iran
- "It's not Iran's either. It's all ours."
The Message: No negotiation needed. It's ours to take.
Nana Saheb: The Uncrowned Emperor
India's Real Power (1757-1758)
The Achievement:
- In his 18 years of rule, taken most of India under his rule
- Well, "rule" is a loose term
What "Rule" Actually Meant:
- Marathas never really ruled areas beyond the Khan
- No permanent forces, garrisons, or stations
- Didn't have that kind of structure or force
- Would require huge force they didn't have
But:
- No other force could give them a run for the money
- Undisputed champs by default
- By default lords of India
The Southern Front: Battle of Sindkhed
Nizam Still a Problem (1757)
What Happened:
- End of 1757
- Peshwa defeated Nizam at Battle of Sindkhed
- Sindkhed is in the Deccan area (south)
- Nizam based in Hyderabad
- Big success for Nana Saheb
Why This Matters:
"While Marathas were doing all these politics and battles in the north, they still had a permanent enemy in terms of Nizam."
The Reality:
- Always had to keep a force ready around Pune
- Nizam was right next door
- Never knew when situation might develop
- Could get ugly at any moment
Pune: The Unannounced Capital
The New Power Center
1757-1758 Reality:
- Pune had become the unannounced capital of India
- Peshwa so famous his name was known all over India
What Everyone Believed:
- Marathas were able to keep control of Punjab
- So far away from their native land (at least 1,000 miles)
- No small feat to maintain control
- That's what everybody believed
The Problem:
"They were not really there yet because they didn't have that kind of human resource, but everybody else believed that they were capable of doing that."
Translation: Everyone THOUGHT Marathas could hold Punjab. Abdali would prove them wrong.
Abdali: Squeezed and Scrambling
Why He Was Vulnerable
The Pressure:
- Iran bothering him on western flank
- Internal revolts - tribes attacking, revolting
- Different Afghan tribes in different areas
- No central rule in Afghan history
- Abdali trying to create central authority
The Task:
- Deal with internal disturbances constantly
- Afghanistan = big empire (Iran) on one side
- Mughal Empire on the other side
- Squeezed between two powers
- No resources - that's why he raided India all the time
The Risk:
"It was difficult to know whether he would come out of this in an unscathed manner. He could have been overwhelmed and failed."
The Missed Opportunity
Why Raghunath Rao Should've Accepted
If He'd Accepted Iran's Offer:
- Could have squeezed Abdali between Iran and Marathas
- Potentially eliminated him
- Ended the Afghan threat
Why He Didn't:
- Marathas believed Kandahar and Kabul were part of India
- Historically true:
- Iran had claimed Kandahar
- Mughals controlled Kabul
- Only when Abdali became powerful did he take both
Raghunath Rao's Thinking:
"He didn't even think Abdali would come back to Punjab because he thought Abdali would be mired in internal strife and Iranian threat."
The Miscalculation:
- Abdali had tried to control Punjab three times before
- It went back and forth (installing Subedars, getting driven out)
- Raghunath Rao thought: "He's too busy, won't come back"
This was the wrong guess.
The Nephew's Defection
A Potential Asset
Who:
- Abdur Rahman
- Abdali's nephew (brother's son)
What He Did:
- Came to Pune
- Came to the Peshwa
- Wanted Peshwa's help
Why:
- To support his own claim?
- Turning against Abdali?
- [Details unclear, will be explained more later]
What Peshwa Did:
- Sent him to Raghunath Rao
The Implications:
- Having Abdali's nephew as an ally
- Undermines Abdali if Peshwa backs the nephew
- Could be useful leverage
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha general | Led northern campaign, reached Attock |
| Taimur Shah | Abdali's son | Fled from Lahore |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander-in-chief | Fled with Taimur Shah |
| Manaji Paigude | Maratha commander | Entered Lahore city |
| Adina Beg | Punjab power broker | New Subedar of Punjab |
| Tukoji Holkar | Holkar clan | Reached Peshawar |
| Sabaji Shinde | Shinde clan | Reached Peshawar |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Real power in India |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Defeated at Sindkhed (1757) |
| Shah of Iran | Iranian king | Offered to help crush Abdali |
| Abdur Rahman | Abdali's nephew | Defected to Peshwa |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | Nana Saheb defeats Nizam at Sindkhed |
| 1757-1758 | Pune = unannounced capital of India |
| April 19, 1758 | Marathas take Lahore |
| 1758 | Marathas reach Attock (border with Afghanistan) |
| 1758 | Tukoji Holkar & Sabaji Shinde reach Peshawar |
| 1758 | Celebration ceremony for Raghunath Rao in Shalimar Bagh |
| 1758 | Shah of Iran proposes joint operation vs Abdali |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao refuses, claims Kabul/Kandahar for India |
| 1758 | Abdur Rahman (Abdali's nephew) comes to Pune |
Geographic Context
The Rivers of Punjab:
- Five rivers from Himalayas → Sindhu
- Make Punjab extremely fertile
- Sweet water abundance
Key Locations (North to South):
- Kabul - Abdali's capital (Afghanistan)
- Peshawar - Furthest Marathas reached
- Attock - Border town on Sindhu River
- Lahore - Capital of Punjab
- Ravi River - Afghans crossed for safety
- Punjab - The prize province
- Delhi - Mughal capital
- Pune - Real power center
Key Themes
1. The Glory Without Foundation
- Marathas achieved something never done before
- But didn't build infrastructure to hold it
- Symbolic victory, not sustainable victory
2. The Missed Alliance
- Iran + Marathas could have eliminated Abdali
- Raghunath Rao's arrogance prevented it
- "It's all ours" attitude
3. Financial vs Military Success
- Military achievement was spectacular
- But as we'll see, financial situation was disaster
- Nana Saheb cared about the bottom line
4. Perception vs Reality
- Everyone THOUGHT Marathas could hold Punjab
- Reality: they didn't have the resources
- Abdali would prove them wrong
5. The Sikh Variable
- Rising power in Punjab
- Not yet dominant, but getting stronger
- Would become major factor in the region
6. Abdali's Vulnerability
- Squeezed between Iran and Mughals/Marathas
- Internal revolts consuming his attention
- But temporary vulnerability
7. No Real Governance
- Marathas never truly "ruled" their conquests
- Just collected tribute
- No permanent presence = no permanent control
Critical Insights
The Afghanistan Question
Why It Never Existed:
- Tribes too busy fighting each other
- No resources worth controlling
- No one could unite them before Abdali
Abdali's Achievement:
- Actually creating central authority
- Uniting the tribes (slowly)
- Making Afghanistan a real power
The Mistake:
- Thinking he'd stay busy with internal problems
- Underestimating his ability to bounce back
- Not taking the opportunity to eliminate him
The Punjab Problem
Why It Was So Hard to Hold:
- Distance - 1,000+ miles from Maratha heartland
- Climate - Different weather patterns (will be important)
- Rivers - Five major rivers to cross
- Sikhs - Rising power, could fight Marathas
- Afghans - Would keep trying to retake it
- Cost - Maintaining large army = financially impossible
The Real Achievement
What Raghunath Rao Actually Did:
- Took advantage of Abdali being distracted
- Pushed further north than any Maratha before
- Created perception of invincibility
- Built Maratha prestige
What He Didn't Do:
- Create lasting governance
- Build permanent defenses
- Make sustainable arrangements
- Bring back enough money (more on this next)
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up
The Inevitable:
- Abdali will pacify Afghan revolts
- He will return to Punjab
- Maratha control will collapse
- Because they didn't build proper infrastructure
- Financial problems are coming (as we'll see)
- The nephew's defection will complicate things
The Question:
- Was this great campaign worth it?
- Or just an expensive ego trip?
- Nana Saheb will have thoughts about this...
The Ominous:
"Abdali would prove everyone wrong."
April 1758: Raghunath Rao reaches the highest point any Maratha ever reached - Attock, and even Peshawar beyond it. Rose water fountains and city lights celebrate him in Lahore. The Shah of Iran offers to squeeze Afghanistan out of existence together. Raghunath Rao refuses arrogantly: "Kabul and Kandahar are ours, not yours." Pune is now the unannounced capital of India. Everyone believes the Marathas can hold Punjab permanently, 1,000 miles from home. They're wrong. No permanent administration, no permanent forces, no sustainable structure. Just a spectacular raid that touched the northwestern corner and pulled back. Abdali is temporarily busy with revolts and Iran. But it's temporary. He'll deal with his problems. Then he'll be back. And that weak infrastructure? That arrogant refusal of Iranian help? That overconfidence? It's all going to matter. The pinnacle of success was actually the beginning of the fall.
Raghoba Bharari: The Grand Campaign That Bankrupted the Empire (1758)
The Weather Problem, The Money Problem, & The Day Everything Collapsed
The Name of the Campaign
"Raghoba Bharari"
What It Means:
- Raghoba = Raghunath Rao (nickname: "Raghoba Dada")
- Bharari = When a bird of prey makes a big leap/flight
Why This Name:
- Raghunath Rao went all the way to Attock
- Further than Marathas had ever gone
- Like a massive leap
- Campaign to the northwest corner of India
The Symbolism:
- Maratha Kingdom started with Shivaji - just three districts
- Slowly grew drastically
- Now thousands of Maratha soldiers in Attock
- Something tremendous
The Legacy:
- Raghobadada is credited with this tremendous victory
- His pinnacle/high point of career
- Had never been done, never done again
The Irony:
"He also caused a lot of troubles later on, but let's not get into that."
The Nephew Gets Peshawar
Abdur Rahman's Reward
What Raghunath Rao Did:
- Gave Abdali's nephew Subhedarship of Peshawar
- The nephew who came to defect from his uncle
Raghunath Rao's Plan:
- Stayed in Lahore for about one month only
- Didn't want to stay longer
- Gave Adina Beg the title of Subedar of Punjab
- Appointed Mughal officers under him
The Deal:
- Every year Adina Beg promised:
- Send tribute of 75 lakh rupees
The Sikh Problem
Why Raghunath Rao Used a Proxy
The Rising Sikhs:
- Sikhs were rising in Punjab
- Had several groups (no central command yet)
- Working toward same goal: bringing their own power in Punjab
Raghunath Rao's Understanding:
- Guessed it wouldn't be easy to control Punjab
- Didn't want to control it first-hand
- That would pit Marathas against Sikhs
The Religious Connection:
- Sikhs considered same/similar to Hindus at the time
- Sikhism and Hinduism not that different in Punjab then
- Sikhs were more militant
- But smaller compared to Hindu majority
The Pattern:
- In Hindu households, elders would become Sikh
- Because Sikhs were more militant
- They would do warfare
The Strategy:
"Raghunath Rao didn't want to take the fight with the Sikhs. He understood that they are on the ascendancy."
The Solution:
- Let Adina Beg be Subedar
- As long as he pays tribute (it was all about money)
- Adina Beg will be the face of Mughal power
- But left behind small chunk of Maratha army for maintenance
The Disillusionment
Why Punjabis Hated Marathas
The Reception:
- Disappointment with Marathas
- Didn't look upon them positively
- Disillusionment
Why:
- Total foreigners - didn't speak the language
- Only concern: tribute and money
- Same as Abdali's goals - just money, not governance
- No intention to settle down or govern long-term
The Equivalence:
"Both Abdali and Marathas, basically their goals were the same: tribute, money."
The Climate Problem
Why Marathas Couldn't Stay
VERY IMPORTANT POINT:
The Weather Pattern:
- Punjab weather different than what they were used to
- In the Khan (Deccan), weather is much warmer
- As you go north, becomes fairly cold
- Marathas not used to cold weather
- Especially winter - four months of cold
Why This Matters:
"This also has importance to the Panipat battle as well."
The Geography:
- Panipat is as north as Punjab towns/cities
- Today Panipat is in Haryana state (adjacent to Punjab)
- Weather pattern exactly the same
- Weather can be very cold during winter
- Marathas not used to that weather
Translation: The weather will be a factor at Panipat. ❄️
The River Problem
The Five Rivers & Monsoon Season
The Challenge:
- After monsoon begins (mid-June)
- For about four months during monsoon
- Difficult to cross rivers
Punjab's Geography:
- Five rivers including Sindhu
- All five/four rivers dump into Sindhu
- Carries on toward Arabian Ocean
- Have to cross these five rivers coming from Afghanistan
- Big obstacle
The Reality:
- No bridges at that time
- Crossing rivers = major problem
- Especially with large army
The Financial Impossibility
Why They Had to Leave
The Economic Reality:
"To keep a large Maratha army in Punjab was not economically possible for Maratha or Peshwa."
The Question: How to sustain them?
- Pay their salaries
- Provide supplies
- All the logistics
Not possible due to monetary situation.
The Letter to Pune
Raghunath Rao's Report
What He Wrote:
- Told Peshwa all he had done in northern campaign
- The great success he had
The Wise Decision:
- Decided to come back
- Would be in deeper hole financially if stayed longer
The Problem:
- Peshwa sitting in Pune
- Not swayed by military glory
- Peshwa = very good politician
- Understood the great success
- But in his eyes: success = financial success
The Question:
"What did Raghoba/Raghunath Rao bring back?"
If money is lacking: What good is the rest of the accomplishment?
The Borrowed Money
How the Campaign Was Funded
The Reality:
- To fund Raghunath Rao's northern campaign
- Peshwa collected lots of money from moneylenders
- At some point: have to return the money
- At least as much as you borrowed
The Consequence:
"If you can't do that, then you go into deeper hole as a Maratha Empire. Nobody likes it."
The Disaster: Raghunath Rao Came Back in DEBT
The Financial Catastrophe
What Happened:
- When Raghunath Rao came back
- He was in debt - big time
- Peshwa was NOT impressed at all
The Relationship:
- Raghunath Rao = Nana Saheb's younger brother
- Took it personally
The Expectation vs Reality:
- Expectation: Surplus money for Marathas to grow
- Reality: Deeper hole than before
- Whatever he borrowed to go north
- Didn't even bring back that much money
Critical Point: This is why Peshwa wasn't happy despite the military success.
The Temple Visit: Kashi
The Holy City
What Happened:
- Peshwa himself came to Kashi (Varanasi) before this
- Took a holy dip in the Ganga
Why Kashi:
- One of holiest Hindu cities
- City of Lord Shankar (Shiva)
- Very important pilgrimage site
Location: Kashi/Varanasi on the Ganga River
The Burning Ghats
Manikarnika Ghat
What Shankar Represents:
- The Destroyer (in the Hindu trinity)
- Creator, Sustainer, Destroyer
Where Shankar "Lives":
- Manikarnika Ghat in Kashi
- The ghat where bodies are burned
What You See:
- Ghat full of burning pyres
- Dead bodies brought there
- Being burned constantly
- Lots and lots of fires
Why:
"Shankar is the destroyer. He doesn't mind roaming around these ghastly sites where bodies are being burned. That's where he lives or wanders."
The Uniqueness:
- You don't see this with other gods
- Shankar is comfortable with death and cremation
- Makes sense: he's the destroyer
The Letter to Holkar-Shinde
The Orders
What Peshwa Wrote:
- Ordered Shinde-Holkar to finish the job in north
- Continue what Raghunath Rao started
- Complete the conquest
The Confidence:
"Once the order goes to Shinde-Holkar, it's as good as the job is done. I have no worries."
Translation: These guys will get it done. Peshwa has full faith.
The Same Day Disaster
Adina Beg's Death
The Timing:
"The day Mr. Raghunath Rao landed in Pune, on the same day, Adina Beg was dead in Lahore."
How: Assassinated? [Details to come]
The Setback:
- This is BAD
- Raghunath Rao had dealt with Adina Beg
- Had agreements with him (75 lakh tribute, etc.)
- But he's dead
The Consequence:
"Now this is tough. What to do? It will create instability and restlessness."
The Collapse:
- Whatever arrangements Raghunath Rao put in place
- Now they look like they will collapse
The Son-in-Law Fails
Khwaja Can't Hold Punjab
Who Took Over:
- Khwaja [somebody]
- Adina Beg's son-in-law (zawai)
The Problem:
- Not able to defeat Afghan revolt in Punjab
- Afghans hadn't forgotten about Punjab
- Punjab = lots of taxes and revenue
- Afghan tribes probably had blessings of Abdali
- They were revolting
The Result:
- Khwaja couldn't defeat these Afghan tribes
- They won out over him
- Created instability
Sabaji Shinde Steps In
Holding the Line (Barely)
Who Was Left Behind:
- Sabaji Shinde was left with some force by Raghunath Rao
What He Did:
- Somehow controlled the Afghan tribal revolt in Punjab
- Took control of Peshawar
- Essentially in charge now
Not Official:
- Not declared Subedar (would create trouble with locals)
- They wouldn't like it (he's an outright foreigner)
- But he had practical control
- Because of him, there was stability
The Pattern Continues
The Moment He Left
What Happened:
- Sabaji Shinde stepped out of Punjab (maybe went to Delhi)
- Afghan tribes that had quieted down
- Surged back up again
The Realization:
"Now it became clear that it was difficult to maintain superiority or total control over these Afghan tribes for Sabaji Shinde because he was far away from his power base (Deccan)."
The Force:
- Probably left with 7,000-10,000 horse
- Not enough
The Hegemony
How Far Maratha Influence Went
Peshwa's Hegemony:
- Up to Attock (on Sindhu River)
- As far north as Marathas had ever gone
- Sabaji still able to maintain tenuous control
Who Was Sabaji Shinde:
- Brother of Jayapa Shinde (deceased, killed during siege)
- Also brother of Dattaji Shinde
- One of five Shinde brothers
- Younger brother even
The Division:
- Sabaji Shinde based in Punjab
- Dattaji Shinde based in Delhi
- Dattaji now in charge of northern army
The Mughal Emperor: Powerless
Reduced to Red Fort
The Reality:
- Mughal Emperor = namesake only
- No power to appoint Subedars or officers
- Totally reduced to within the walls of Red Fort
Attock = New Boundary:
- Attock became the boundary in the north
- Of Maratha "empire" (loose term)
- Far north, on border with Afghanistan
- Tremendous achievement
The Debt Problem (Revisited)
The 80 Lakh Increase
The Numbers:
- Raghunath Rao went on northern campaign
- Huge loan sought from moneylenders
- Both Malhar Rao Holkar and Raghunath Rao
When They Came Back:
- That huge loan was still intact (almost)
- New ground was covered (went to Afghanistan)
- But Nana Saheb Peshwa heavily in debt
The Increase:
- There was an addition of 80 lakh rupees
- The debt even increased in size
Over Budget: They were 80 lakh rupees MORE in debt.
Nana Saheb: The Financial Manager
The Man Who Cared About Money
His Strengths:
- Could go to battle
- But more interested in: governance, administration, finances
His Reaction:
- Didn't like it at all
- Fact that they were going deeper into debt
- Over budget by 80 lakh rupees
- On top of what they'd already sought
The Situation:
- Raghunath Rao has returned
- But new trouble is brewing
- Shinde brothers left in north to figure it out
In Punjab:
- Sabaji Shinde somehow keeping it together (barely)
In Delhi:
- Dattaji overall in charge of northern frontiers
- But based in Delhi
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Younger brother of Peshwa | Led "Raghoba Bharari" campaign |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Financial manager, NOT happy |
| Adina Beg | Punjab Subedar | Died same day Raghunath Rao returned |
| Khwaja | Adina Beg's son-in-law | Failed to control Afghan revolts |
| Sabaji Shinde | Younger Shinde brother | Left in Punjab, barely holding on |
| Dattaji Shinde | Older Shinde brother | Based in Delhi, in charge of north |
| Jayapa Shinde | Eldest Shinde brother | Deceased (killed in siege) |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior Holkar | Also in debt from campaign |
| Abdur Rahman | Abdali's nephew | Given Peshawar Subhedarship |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao in Lahore for ~1 month |
| 1758 | Gives Adina Beg title of Punjab Subedar (75 lakh tribute/year) |
| 1758 | Leaves small Maratha force behind with Sabaji Shinde |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao lands in Pune |
| SAME DAY | Adina Beg dies in Lahore |
| 1758 | Khwaja (son-in-law) fails to control Afghan revolts |
| 1758 | Sabaji Shinde takes control, barely maintains it |
| 1758 | Returns with 80 LAKH MORE debt than when he left |
Geographic Context
The Weather Problem:
- Punjab/Haryana = cold in winter (4 months)
- Panipat = in Haryana, same cold weather
- Deccan/Khan = much warmer
- Marathas not used to cold
The River Problem:
- Five rivers in Punjab
- No bridges
- Monsoon season = even harder to cross
The Distance Problem:
- 1,000+ miles from Deccan to Punjab
- Power base = Deccan
- Too far to maintain effectively
Key Themes
1. The Name Says It All
- "Bharari" = great leap of a bird of prey
- Never done before, never done again
- Raghobadada's pinnacle
2. The Weather Will Matter
- Cold winter = problem for Marathas
- Important for Panipat battle
- They're not prepared for it
3. Financial Disaster
- Military glory ≠ financial success
- Came back deeper in debt
- Nana Saheb NOT impressed
- 80 lakh MORE in debt
4. Proxy Leadership Failed
- Adina Beg died immediately
- Son-in-law couldn't handle it
- Afghan revolts resumed
- Arrangements collapsed
5. The Sikh Factor
- Raghunath Rao wisely avoided fighting them
- They were rising
- Used Adina Beg as buffer
- But that buffer is now gone
6. Sabaji's Impossible Task
- Left with insufficient force
- Far from power base
- Moment he leaves, revolts resume
- Tenuous control at best
7. Same Goals as Abdali
- Marathas also just wanted money/tribute
- Didn't want to settle or govern
- Punjabis disillusioned with both
- No difference between invaders
Critical Insights
Why the Campaign Failed Financially
The Math:
- Borrowed huge loans from moneylenders
- Went to Punjab, reached Attock/Peshawar
- Didn't bring back enough to repay
- Actually increased debt by 80 lakh
- Nana Saheb expected surplus, got deficit
The Expectation:
- Military success → capture territory → collect tribute → repay loans + profit
The Reality:
- Military success → weak administration → can't hold territory → can't collect sustained tribute → still owe money + MORE debt
The Adina Beg Timing
The Coincidence:
- Same day Raghunath Rao lands in Pune
- Adina Beg dies in Lahore
What This Means:
- All arrangements immediately vulnerable
- No strong local leader to maintain order
- Afghan revolts resurge
- Everything Raghunath Rao set up = collapsing
The Metaphor:
- Built a house of cards
- Strong wind (Adina Beg's death) knocked it down
- Before Raghunath Rao even got home
The Shinde Brothers' Burden
Five Brothers:
- Jayapa Shinde - dead (killed in siege)
- Dattaji Shinde - Delhi, northern command
- Sabaji Shinde - Punjab, barely holding
- Two others - not mentioned yet
The Impossible:
- Hold Punjab with insufficient force
- Far from home base
- Afghan revolts constant
- No financial support
- Climate hostile
- Rivers blocking retreat
They're being asked to hold something that can't be held.
The Climate Foreshadowing
Why This Matters:
"This also has importance to the Panipat battle."
The Setup:
- Marathas not used to cold
- Punjab cold = Panipat cold (Haryana)
- Four months of winter
- Will be fighting in that weather eventually
- They don't know how to handle it
The Omen: Their inability to stay in Punjab due to weather = foreshadowing their problems at Panipat.
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The Financial Crisis:
- 80 lakh MORE in debt
- Nana Saheb unhappy
- Brothers expected to fix it
- But how? With what money?
The Military Crisis:
- Sabaji barely holding Punjab
- Dattaji managing Delhi politics
- Insufficient forces
- Adina Beg dead
- Afghan revolts ongoing
- Abdali will return
The Weather Crisis:
- Can't stay in Punjab long-term
- Cold winters unbearable
- But they've committed to holding the north
- What happens when winter comes at Panipat?
The Inevitable:
"Now things are coming into picture. Hopefully in a couple of pages we'll get into the real story. We'll see how it shakes out."
1758: "Raghoba Bharari" - the great leap to Attock and Peshawar. A name for the ages, a campaign that goes further than any Maratha ever went. Rose water and lights and memorials and glory. But underneath? A financial disaster. Came back 80 lakh rupees deeper in debt than when he left. Nana Saheb is pissed. His younger brother made promises and arrangements with Adina Beg, but the day Raghunath Rao lands in Pune, Adina Beg dies in Lahore. Everything collapses. Afghan revolts surge back. Sabaji Shinde left behind with insufficient force, barely holding on, far from home in the cold that Marathas can't handle. The moment he leaves an area, revolts resume. It's tenuous. It's unsustainable. It's expensive. The Punjabis hate the Marathas as much as they hated Abdali - same goals, just tribute and money, no real governance. The great campaign's legacy: massive debt, weak administration, hostile climate, and a false sense of achievement. The bird of prey made its great leap. But it couldn't stay in the air. Now it's falling.
The Symbolic Victory: How Marathas Drew First Blood & Made Abdali Their Enemy (1757-1758)
Why the Great Campaign Was Hollow, Bengal's Power, & The Succession Crisis in Nagpur
The Shinde Brothers: Quick Review
Who's Where
The Five Shinde Brothers:
- Jayapa Shinde - Eldest, deceased (killed during siege)
- Dattaji Shinde - Based in Delhi, manages northern politics
- Sabaji Shinde - Based in Punjab (Lahore), younger brother 4-5. Two others - Not mentioned yet
The Confidence:
- Dattaji Shinde thought of very highly in Pune
- Peshwa has lot of confidence in him
- Trusted to finish the job in the north
The Debt Recap
80 Lakh Additional
The Numbers:
- To gain Punjab province
- Set up control over Delhi and other areas
- Loan incurred to finance Raghunath Rao's northern trip
- Not paid back
- In fact, increased by 80 lakh rupees
The Reality:
"Forget about paying off - now they increased it. They got them deeper in debt."
The Real Reason Marathas Had It Easy
It Wasn't Their Military Prowess
When Raghunath Rao Went North (1758):
- Defense mechanism for northwest province had become weaker
- Adina Beg died
- Sabaji Shinde didn't have enough forces for real fight
- Whole flank on northwest (Punjab and beyond) was weak
The Task:
- Sabaji Shinde given the impossible task
- Had to maintain control
- But didn't have to retake or go further
- Just maintain what Raghunath Rao won
- Not an easy task with minimum troops
The Truth About Raghunath Rao's Victory
Why It Was Actually Easy
The Explanation:
"It's like the other way."
What They Mean:
- Remember: Before Raghunath Rao landed in Punjab
- It was in hands of Abdali, Taimur Shah, Jahan Khan
- But they didn't have supplies coming from Abdali
- Abdali was so mired in his own affairs
- Couldn't do anything for Taimur Shah (his own son)
That's Why:
"It was easier for Raghunath Rao and his army to take over Punjab and even go all the way up to Attock."
The Reality: They Didn't Really Win
The Afghan Army Just Gave Up
What Actually Happened:
- It's not that Marathas won by overwhelming force
- Taimur Shah and Afghan army stationed there
- They just lost morale
- Realized nobody's coming to help them from Abdali's side
- Simply fled
- Went beyond Sindhu River toward Attock and north
The Flight:
- They fled because they realized:
- Unless they get reinforcement from Abdali
- No way they could fight Marathas
- Didn't put up a stiff fight
The Truth:
"It was not as though Marathas fought valiantly and they got hold of the areas. It basically was that the Afghan army lost morale and they simply said, 'OK, we are fleeing back.'"
Najeeb Khan Surrenders
The Delhi Front Collapses Too
Who He Was:
- Najeeb Khan (Rohila leader)
- Abdali had given him charge of Delhi
- "The whole weight of Delhi"
What Happened:
- Once Najeeb Khan was defeated
- Not too difficult because he wasn't very strong
- He had some forces but couldn't stand to fight Maratha army
- He knew that
His Decision:
- Surrendered
- Said: "OK, I'm going. You do whatever you want."
- Realized he's not going to win
- Abdali was not around this time
- Even though Abdali wanted him to hold the fort in Delhi
- Realized it's a lost cause
- "I'm not going to fight with you guys. I'm leaving."
The Maratha-Sikh Alliance
Why Taimur Shah Had to Flee
What Happened:
- Marathas got into Punjab
- Took help of the Sikhs
- Sikhs were basically Hindus (at that time, closely related)
- Understood there's camaraderie with Marathas
The Logic:
- No fight to be had with Marathas
- No Jihad or religious conflict
- Marathas weren't coming from outside anyway (same region basically)
- Marathas and Sikhs = combined force
- Taimur Shah and Jahan Khan had to flee
The Pattern Repeats
What Goes Around Comes Around
1757:
- Afghan army couldn't put up stiff fight
- Against Maratha and Sikh power
- They fled
Later (1758 onward):
"The same thing happened to Marathas."
Why:
- Abdali probably sent forces with reinforcement
- Marathas had to flee
- Realized it was just smaller contingent with Sabaji Shinde
- Couldn't put up with Abdali's overwhelming force
The Situation:
- Impossible to keep big force in Punjab for Raghunath Rao
- Only thing Marathas did: change the commanders
- Not big changes, just changed leadership
The New Command Structure
Replacing the Leaders
Who Left:
- Raghunath Rao
- Malhar Rao Holkar
Who Took Over:
- Dattaji Shinde
- Jankoji Shinde (youngest of the Shinde brothers)
The Reality:
- In Delhi: Dattaji and Jankoji in charge
- In Punjab: Sabaji Shinde
- But Sabaji doesn't have enough force
The Inevitable:
"When Abdali sends back his force or he comes back himself, Sabaji is in a woeful condition. He cannot put up with Abdali's force if it comes in full strength."
The Symbolic Victory
The Truth About "Raghoba Bharari"
Raghunath Rao's Story:
- When he went back to Pune
- Made boastful speeches
- "I went all the way up to Attock!"
- "Did such a great thing nobody had ever done!"
- Whole Maratha army extremely proud
But:
"It really wasn't such a big deal."
Why:
- They kind of walked through
- The governance structure he put in place
- The protective cover he gave Sabaji Shinde
- The Maratha army left behind
- Not enough
The Consequence:
"It was going to collapse. It was just a symbolic victory that Marathas can boast about, but it had no real implication whatsoever."
The Proof:
- Couldn't even hold on to victory
- Not even for a few months or maybe not even a year
- "You just went and touched Attock."
- Like touching base in a game - doesn't mean you control it
Why Kicking Out Taimur Shah Was a Mistake
They Challenged Abdali for Nothing
The Logic:
"Unless Marathas wanted to rule Punjab by themselves, which they didn't (they put Adina Beg in power)..."
What They Actually Did:
- Just removed Taimur Shah from power
- Kicked him out
- Didn't accomplish anything real
Why:
- You only accomplish something if you rule it yourself
- And control it yourself
- They didn't do that
What They Actually Did:
"By kicking out Taimur Shah, they basically challenged Abdali."
Drawing First Blood
How Marathas Made Abdali Their Enemy
The Consequence:
- Abdali was now irate
- Became a challenge to him
- "We are removing your son and kicking him out"
- They were challenging Abdali
- Now he's not going to forget this
- He will take revenge
The Problem:
- Marathas were not in position of power
- On one hand: didn't get anything
- On the other hand: kicked out Taimur Shah
- Got onto the bad side of Abdali
The Escalation:
"Now Abdali is pissed with the Marathas. He's going to take revenge because it became like sisters, because now Marathas have drawn the first blood."
Rivals vs Enemies
The Transformation
Before:
- So far Abdali had no real hostility or enmity with Marathas
- No actual conflict
- Just competitors/rivals
How He Viewed Them:
- "These guys are a problem"
- "They will try to fight me if I come to Delhi"
- Stop him from looting
- But no bad blood so far
- Just considered them competitor or rival
- They had not done any damage to him
Now:
"What Marathas did was to have some skirmishes fighting with Mr. Taimur Shah and ultimately they kicked him out physically. That was like drawing the blood. They drew the blood now. Their first contest or battle."
The Shift:
- So far: no such engagement between Abdali's forces and Maratha forces
- Now: with kicking out Taimur Shah, they drew blood
- Now they became enemies
The Insult
Making It Personal
Before:
- They were rivals
- Both wanted to loot Delhi
- Maybe Marathas wanted to stop Abdali's massacres
- But basically: rivals in that both wanted to loot Delhi
Now:
- First time they got into battle
- They kind of became enemies
- His son was kicked out of Punjab Subhedarship
- Had to flee
- Taimur Shah looks bad (he literally fled)
- That is the insult
The Honor:
"Now Abdali is not going to take it lying down. His honor is on the line. He will say, 'This will ruin my reputation and it's my son and all that stuff.'"
Who He Was:
- Considered himself to be a strong man, as a king
- But truly was a good warrior
- Knew how to fight battles
Translation: Now it's personal. Now he has to respond.
Bengal: The Real Prize
The Most Prosperous Province
While All This Was Happening:
- Marathas busy with fighting and politicking in Delhi
- Province of Punjab (extreme northwest)
- But in Bengal (extreme east of India)
- Most prosperous and tax generating revenue province in Mughal Empire
- Winds of change were going on there
Why Bengal Was So Rich:
-
Agriculture - lots of sweet water
- Why? Ganga River
- By the time it exits Prayagraj (confluence), it's Ganga only
- Becomes bigger and bigger going toward ocean
- Gets really big
- That's where Bengal is located (very east side)
- Bay of Bengal (ocean)
-
Other Products:
- Coconut trees
- Rubber and other businesses
- Many products
- Very fertile
-
Population:
- Generated lot of revenue (taxed)
- Large population
The Result:
"Bengal was the most prosperous province at that time."
The Nagpur Bhosles
The Bengal Operators
Who They Were:
- In Nagpur, there was a Bhosle family
- Like a king with small territory
- Had hegemony in Bengal and Orissa (allied province in east)
Related to Shivaji:
- Allied family with Shivaji
- Part of broader Maratha network
What They Did:
- Would collect lot of loot
- Send army to Bengal
- That would fill their treasury
- From Subedar of Bengal, get big tributes
The Dynamic:
- They were the hegemonic power there
- Even though Bengal Subedar was Mughal
- But ever since Mughals became weak
- Bhosles were "eating their lunch"
The Method:
- Send large contingent of army
- Go and ransack places
- Collect tributes
- They were the real important power there
- Subedar's army (Mughal army) = basically nothing
Not the Peshwa's Army
Different Power Centers
Important Distinction:
- This is not the Peshwa army going to Bengal
- This was the Nagpur Bhosles
- Different branch of Maratha power
The Ruler:
- Nagpur had ruler called Raghuji Bhosle
The Succession Crisis
Raghuji Bhosle Dies (1757)
What Happened:
- 1757: Raghuji Bhosle died
The Consequence:
- As typically happens in India at that time
- "Varsa Hakka" - the succession battle started
- Probably had 2-3-4 sons
- Each one will say: "Hey, I'm the new king"
The Problem:
- Internal feud and fight going on
- They're going to be feuding
What This Means:
- Bengal operations disrupted
- Another problem for Marathas to deal with
- More instability in the east
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Sabaji Shinde | Based in Punjab | Insufficient force, woeful condition |
| Dattaji Shinde | Based in Delhi | In charge of northern politics |
| Jankoji Shinde | Youngest Shinde brother | With Dattaji in Delhi |
| Jayapa Shinde | Eldest Shinde | Deceased (killed in siege) |
| Taimur Shah | Abdali's son | Kicked out of Punjab, fled |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander | Fled with Taimur Shah |
| Najeeb Khan | Rohila leader | Surrendered, left Delhi |
| Abdali | Afghan king | Now personally insulted, will take revenge |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha general | Back in Pune, made boastful speeches |
| Raghuji Bhosle | Nagpur ruler | Died 1757, succession crisis |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | Afghan army can't fight, flees from Punjab |
| 1757 | Najeeb Khan surrenders, leaves Delhi |
| 1757 | Raghuji Bhosle dies → succession crisis in Nagpur |
| 1758 | Taimur Shah kicked out of Punjab (first blood drawn) |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao & Malhar Rao return |
| 1758 | Dattaji & Jankoji Shinde take over command |
| 1758 | Sabaji Shinde left with insufficient force |
| Later | Same thing happens to Marathas (have to flee when Abdali returns) |
Geographic Context
The Extremes:
- Punjab/Attock - Extreme northwest (border with Afghanistan)
- Bengal - Extreme east (Bay of Bengal)
The Distance:
- Marathas trying to control both ends of India
- Thousands of miles apart
- Completely different situations
The Reality:
- Can't effectively manage both
- Spread too thin
- Each area has unique problems
Key Themes
1. The Symbolic Victory
- Looked impressive
- Sounded impressive
- Raghunath Rao made boastful speeches
- But no real substance
- Couldn't hold it
- Just "touched Attock"
2. They Didn't Really Win
- Afghan army gave up (lost morale)
- Najeeb Khan surrendered
- Taimur Shah fled
- Not because Marathas were overwhelming
- But because Abdali couldn't send help
3. Drawing First Blood
- Kicked out Taimur Shah
- Made it personal
- Transformed rivals into enemies
- Abdali's honor on the line
- Now he must respond
4. Pattern Repeats
- What happened to Afghans (1757)
- Happened to Marathas later
- Insufficient force → flee when overwhelmed
- History rhymes
5. Bengal: The Real Prize
- Most prosperous province
- Nagpur Bhosles operate there
- But succession crisis (1757)
- Another problem emerging
6. The Impossible Task
- Sabaji Shinde in woeful condition
- Can't put up fight against full Abdali force
- Just changed commanders
- Didn't change fundamental problem
7. Rivals → Enemies
- Before: competitors for Delhi's loot
- After: personal insult, drawn blood
- Now it's about honor and revenge
Critical Insights
Why the Victory Was Hollow
The Formula for Real Victory:
- Conquer territory ✓ (they did this)
- Establish governance ✗ (they didn't)
- Leave sufficient force ✗ (insufficient)
- Create sustainable administration ✗ (weak)
- Hold it long-term ✗ (couldn't)
The Reality:
- Just touched the territory
- Like a raid, not a conquest
- Symbolic, not substantial
The Proof:
- Collapsed within months
- When Abdali returned, Marathas fled
- Same thing that happened to Afghans
- Pattern repeated
The Abdali Problem Gets Worse
Before Kicking Out Taimur Shah:
- Abdali = competitor/rival
- Wanted to loot Delhi (so did Marathas)
- Might fight if paths crossed
- But no personal grudge
After Kicking Out Taimur Shah:
- Abdali = sworn enemy
- Personal insult (his son fled)
- Honor at stake
- Reputation on the line
- MUST take revenge
The Calculation:
- What did Marathas gain? Nothing permanent
- What did they lose? Made Abdali their enemy
- Was it worth it? NO
The Strategic Error
What They Should Have Done:
- Accept Iran's offer to squeeze Abdali
- Establish real governance in Punjab
- Leave sufficient forces
- OR: Don't kick out Taimur Shah at all
- Avoid making it personal
What They Actually Did:
- Rejected Iran's help
- Weak governance
- Insufficient forces
- Kicked out Taimur Shah
- Made it personal
The Result: All pain, no gain.
The Bengal Variable
Why This Matters:
- Most prosperous province in empire
- Nagpur Bhosles operate there
- But Raghuji Bhosle died (1757)
- Succession crisis = infighting
- Can't collect loot during crisis
The Implication:
- Another revenue stream compromised
- More instability
- Marathas losing control of east
- While trying to hold north
- Spread too thin
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The Abdali Revenge:
- He's busy now with internal Afghan problems
- But he's not going to forget
- His son was humiliated
- His honor demands response
- When he comes back → full force
The Maratha Weakness:
- Sabaji in woeful condition
- Can't stand against full Abdali force
- When Abdali returns → Marathas will flee
- Same pattern that happened to Afghans
The Financial Crisis:
- 80 lakh deeper in debt
- Bengal revenue disrupted (succession crisis)
- Punjab not generating promised tribute
- How to sustain armies in the north?
The Multiple Fronts:
- North: Abdali coming
- South: Nizam still enemy
- East: Bengal succession crisis
- Center: Debt piling up
The Inevitability:
"When Abdali sends back his force or comes back himself, Sabaji is in a woeful condition."
1757-1758: The truth emerges. The great Raghoba Bharari? The Afghans just gave up. Lost morale. Fled. Najeeb Khan surrendered without a real fight. Taimur Shah fled across rivers. Not because Marathas were overwhelming - because Abdali couldn't send help. He was busy. So Marathas walked through. Boasted about it. Built memorials. Made speeches. "We went to Attock!" But it was hollow. Symbolic. They just touched it and left. Couldn't hold it. Insufficient force. Weak governance. And then - the mistake. They kicked out Taimur Shah. Abdali's son. Made him flee. Made him look weak. Drew first blood. Before this? Rivals, competitors, maybe fight over Delhi's loot. After this? Enemies. Personal. Honor. Revenge. Abdali's reputation on the line. His son humiliated. Now he MUST respond. And when he does, Sabaji Shinde is in woeful condition. Can't put up a fight. The pattern will repeat. What happened to Afghans (flee when overwhelmed) will happen to Marathas. The symbolic victory bought them nothing permanent. But it bought them something very real: Abdali's personal enmity. The enemy they didn't need to make. The challenge they didn't need to issue. The first blood they didn't need to draw. Now it's personal. Now it's inevitable. Now he's coming.
Battle of Plassey: How Britain Got Its Foothold While Marathas & Afghans Fought (1757)
The Worst Governance, The Victory Parade, & Why Shivaji Was Different
The Winds of Change in Bengal
While Marathas Were Busy...
The Setup:
- Marathas busy with Delhi politics
- Fighting and battles in the north
- Meanwhile: winds of change blowing in Bengal
- Bengal = most prosperous Mughal province
The Question:
"There is another interesting power in India that is eyeing to get into political scene."
The Answer: The British.
The British: 100 Years of Waiting
The Long Game
Their Timeline:
- Been in India as merchants for at least 100 years
- Working in trade, commerce
- But always interested in ruling India
- Even when they came 100 years ago
- Were just waiting for their time to come
The Opportunity:
- Sense that Bengal political power is on the wane
- Mughal power is very weak
- Waiting for the opportune moment
During Aurangzeb's Time:
- They knew it was not going to be possible
- Impossible to succeed against strong Mughal power
Now (1757):
"They sense that Bengal is ripe for picking."
The Situation in Bengal
Why It Was Perfect for British
The Chaos:
- Things becoming very weak
- Mughal power on the wane
- Marathas basically interested in looting
- Nagpur Bhosle family had troops in Bengal
- They would come and loot
- It was anarchy almost
The British Calculation:
"In this anarchy, we can fill this vacuum."
The Bigger Picture
Marathas vs Afghans
The Dynamic:
- In northern part of India
- Afghans and Marathas going at each other
- Constantly having skirmishes
Why:
- First battle had taken place
- Raghunath Rao entering Punjab
- Kicking out Taimur Shah and Jahan Khan
- First blood has been drawn
Abdali's View:
- Interest in India has not gone down
- He's going to come again and again
- Now they are hostile powers
- Not just looking at Marathas from a distance anymore
- They've engaged in battles in Punjab
- Taimur Shah had to retreat
- Afraid he would lose the battle
The British Strategy
Battle of Attrition
What This Gives British:
"Marathas and Afghans are going to battle each other and both are going to become weaker."
The Beneficiary:
- Battle of attrition
- Both sides exhausting each other
- Big beneficiary: British
The Beginning:
- This is the story of how Britishers came to power in India
- Started their takeover foothold in Bengal
- First province they tested power
- Almost anarchy
The Capital:
- Kolkata was their capital
- Later moved it to Delhi
Siraj ud-Daula: The Worst Subedar
Why Everyone Hated Him
Who He Was:
- Mughal Subedar in Bengal
- NOT related to Shuja ud-Daula
- (Shuja was Nawab of Awadh, not Bengal)
His Governance:
- So bad in terms of governance
- Administration was terrible
- People were extremely angry, upset, tired of him
The Sentiment:
"People wanted anybody but Siraj ud-Daula."
The Battle of Plassey (1757)
How It Happened
The Tension:
- Already tension between Siraj ud-Daula and British
- British officer in charge of Kolkata warehouse (vakhar)
- Asked Colonel Robert Clive to come
- Safeguard their establishment
What British Did:
- Needed military support
- Asked for intervention and help
- Robert Clive and his troops came
June 23, 1757:
- Robert Clive came to Plassey
- With 2,000-3,000 fighters
- Basically fighters from Andhra Pradesh/Telangana
The Betrayal
Mir Jafar's Treachery
Who Was Mir Jafar:
- Commander of Siraj ud-Daula
- Supposedly loyal
- Acting as though he wanted to support his Nawab
- But it was just a drama
What Robert Clive Realized:
- Mir Jafar was disloyal
- Even though acting loyal
- Easier to deal with this Nawab militarily
The Deal:
- Mir Jafar and Raja Durlabh (another commander)
- Were given money by the British
- Also given promise of rewards
- Once British come to power
- They will be rewarded appropriately
The Battle
What Actually Happened
The Forces:
- Siraj ud-Daula's army was much bigger
- Than Robert Clive's army
- Just in terms of sheer size
But:
- Mir Jafar and Raja Durlabh
- Remained neutral
- Or just left the battlefield
- Didn't fight with their troops
The Result:
- British defeated the much larger army
- Because commanders didn't fight
Siraj ud-Daula's End
Flight and Death
What Happened:
- Siraj fled the battlefield
- Successful in fleeing away
- His army was defeated by much smaller British army
- Battle happened around June 23
July 2, 1757:
- He was captured
- Killed by Mir Jafar's son
Why:
"Mir Jafar must have been irate with Nawab Siraj ud-Daula. He took revenge. This guy was so arrogant and difficult to deal with. The relationship was very bad."
British Take Control
The Facade
What British Did:
- Made Mir Jafar the new Nawab
- For namesake only
- To keep people in the dark about what was happening
The Reality:
"Real power rested with the British. They started getting all the political controls, the power controls. Mir Jafar was the facade."
The Transformation:
- So far: merchants (buying, selling)
- Now: Getting political control
- Mir Jafar knew he had no real control over Bengal
- British were really going to rule by keeping him in front
Peshwa Loses Bengal
Before He Could Move
What Happened:
- Peshwa in Pune was keeping an eye on Bengal
- Wanted to get power in Bengal
- But before he could move and do anything
- British already in power in Bengal
How:
- Mir Jafar and Raja Durlabh
- Facilitated British takeover
- Of the entire province of Bengal
- Huge province
- Very prosperous (revenue from taxes)
The Advantage:
- Britishers had a disciplined army
The Surprise:
"This happened suddenly without Peshwa understanding what is going on there. How bad the situation in Bengal was."
The Victory Parade
Robert Clive's Realization
What Happened:
- Battle of Plassey was famous battle of 1757
- First time Britishers fought a battle in India
- Before that: never had done any battling
- And they won it
The Parade:
- Had barely 5,000 troops under Robert Clive
- To commemorate victory
- Took out a victory parade through town of Plassey
- Plassey was very small town (10,000-15,000 people)
The Scene:
- British soldiers going through village
- With musical things (drums, etc.)
- In line, in very disciplined fashion
- Middle of the road
- On both sides: people of Plassey village watching
- Robert Clive in the lead
- Some soldiers dead, some injured
- Those in good shape went through in victory parade
Clive's Question
Why Are They So Peaceful?
What He Was Thinking:
- Thousands of villagers on both sides watching
- He wondered: Why are these people watching in very peaceful manner?
His Reasoning:
"I am a total foreigner, so are my soldiers. We don't share their looks, skin color, religion, language, nothing, culture. And yet they are very peaceful and they are allowing us to take out this victory parade."
The Realization:
- Literally thousands of villagers
- Could easily attack them
- Why are they so peaceful and tolerating all this?
The Research
What Clive Discovered
What He Did:
- Kept doing research of what is going on in Bengal
- Later wrote it in his memoirs
What He Found:
"People of Bengal were so sick and tired of Nawab Siraj ud-Daula and his governance, administration, the way he collected taxes and he ruled on his whims without any regard to what was good for his people, that they were extremely angry, upset, incensed."
Their Outlook:
"We want anybody but Siraj ud-Daula."
That is the extreme to which they were driven.
The Stone Metaphor
Why They Didn't Resist
Clive's Thought:
"Even if every villager picks up one stone and throws it at our contingent marching through the village streets, we'll all be dead. There are thousands upon thousands of people watching."
But:
- None of them wanted to resist
- Even though British = total foreigners
- Don't follow their religion, language, skin color, nothing
- Yet they're happy, they look happy
Why:
"All this was possible because the governance was so terribly bad. They just said, 'Okay, fine, maybe this guy is better and we'll have some better days.' So they tolerated all that."
The Shivaji Comparison
Understanding the Magic
On That Background:
"Now you can understand the Shivaji magic. Shivaji was exactly opposite."
Why Shivaji Was Successful:
- His governance was top notch
- Always considered welfare of his citizens to be number one priority
The Difference:
- Was unusual for the time
- He was loved by his people
- Wherever he ruled
- Didn't matter where
- Wanted to provide best governance
- Administration
- Tax collection apparatus
- Do justice to the people
His Priority:
- Extremely quick in providing justice
- Making sure people didn't get bothered by:
- National calamity
- Wars
- Battles
- Things like that
The Historian's View
What Can and Cannot Be Questioned
The Assessment:
"There is one historian who has said: You can question whether Shivaji was the greatest general who waged battles and conquered new areas and stuff like that - but that you can question. But you can never question his administrative apparatus and skills."
The Verdict:
- One of the best administrators
- Provided the best governance
The Eight Ministers
Where the Money Went
When Shivaji Was Anointed as King (Chhatrapati):
- Had eight ministers
The Highest Salary:
- Given to the home minister
- Who was supposed to provide:
- Administration
- Conveniences
- Those kinds of things to the citizenry
NOT the Top General:
- Guy who waged wars
- Conquered new areas
- His salary was NOT the maximum
Why:
"The guy who provided governance, his salary was the maximum. Shivaji valued that more than anything else."
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Siraj ud-Daula | Bengal Subedar | Terrible governor, hated by people, killed |
| Colonel Robert Clive | British commander | Won Battle of Plassey with 2-3k troops |
| Mir Jafar | Siraj's commander | Betrayed him, took British bribes, became puppet Nawab |
| Raja Durlabh | Siraj's commander | Also betrayed him for British money |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Lost Bengal before he could move |
| Shivaji | Founder of Maratha Empire | Example of good governance (contrast) |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| ~1657 | British arrive as merchants (~100 years before) |
| 1757 | Situation in Bengal ripe for picking |
| June 23, 1757 | Battle of Plassey |
| June 1757 | Mir Jafar & Raja Durlabh betray Siraj, stay neutral |
| June 1757 | British defeat much larger army |
| June 1757 | Siraj flees battlefield |
| July 2, 1757 | Siraj captured and killed by Mir Jafar's son |
| 1757 | Victory parade through Plassey village |
| 1757 | Mir Jafar made puppet Nawab |
| 1757 | British take political control of Bengal |
Geographic Context
Bengal:
- Extreme east of India
- Most prosperous Mughal province
- Large population
- High tax revenue
Kolkata:
- British capital
- Warehouse (vakhar) location
- Power base
Plassey:
- Small village (10-15k people)
- Site of famous battle
- Where victory parade happened
Key Themes
1. The Opportune Moment
- British waited 100 years
- Knew they couldn't succeed under Aurangzeb
- Waited for weakness
- Pounced when time was right
2. Battle of Attrition
- Marathas vs Afghans fighting
- Both becoming weaker
- British = big beneficiary
- Classic third-party winner
3. The Worst Governance
- Siraj ud-Daula so bad
- People wanted anybody but him
- Even foreign invaders looked better
- Governance matters MORE than identity
4. The Betrayal
- Mir Jafar's treachery
- British bribed commanders
- Much larger army defeated
- Because commanders didn't fight
5. The Facade Strategy
- Made Mir Jafar puppet Nawab
- Keep people in the dark
- Real power with British
- Smart political move
6. Peshwa Lost It
- Was keeping eye on Bengal
- But before he could move
- British already there
- Too slow
7. The Victory Parade Lesson
- Thousands could have killed them
- None resisted
- Because governance was so bad
- They hoped British would be better
8. The Shivaji Contrast
- Opposite of Siraj
- Best governance
- Citizen welfare #1 priority
- That's why he was loved
Critical Insights
Why the British Won
Not Military Superiority:
- Had smaller army (2-3k vs much larger)
- Should have lost
The Real Reasons:
- Internal betrayal - commanders bribed
- Popular hatred - people wanted Siraj gone
- Disciplined army - better trained
- Strategic timing - moment of weakness
- Political savvy - puppet Nawab strategy
The Governance Lesson
Siraj ud-Daula:
- Terrible governance
- Ruled on whims
- No regard for people
- Collected taxes harshly
- Bad administration
Result:
"People so angry, they'd rather have foreign invaders than their own Nawab."
Shivaji:
- Best governance
- Citizen welfare first
- Quick justice
- Protected from calamities
- Home minister paid most
Result:
"Loved by his people. Can't question his administrative skills."
The Lesson:
- Governance matters more than ethnicity
- People will accept foreigners if they govern better
- Bad governance = invitation to conquerors
The Stone Metaphor
Clive's Realization:
"If every villager threw one stone, we'd all be dead."
But They Didn't:
- Because they hated Siraj more
- Than they feared foreigners
What This Means:
- When governance is that bad
- People will accept anyone
- Even those who share nothing with them
- No common language, religion, culture
- Doesn't matter if governance is better
The British Long Game
100 Years:
- Came as merchants
- Built infrastructure
- Built relationships
- Built disciplined army
- Waited patiently
The Moment:
- Mughal power weak
- Marathas busy with Afghans
- Bengal in anarchy
- Perfect vacuum
The Move:
- First military battle
- First political control
- Foothold established
- From here: expand across India
Foreshadowing
What This Means Going Forward
For British:
- Foothold in India established
- Bengal = prosperous province
- Can expand from here
- Marathas and Afghans busy fighting each other
- British get stronger while they get weaker
For Marathas:
- Lost Bengal before they could act
- Most prosperous province gone
- Now have to deal with three powers:
- Afghans (north)
- Nizam (south)
- British (east)
For Peshwa:
- Needed Bengal for money (to pay loans)
- Can't get it now
- British took it right under his nose
- Too slow to act
- Now what?
The Pattern:
- While two powers fight each other
- Third power takes advantage
- British playing smartest game
1757: The year everything changed. While Marathas and Afghans drew first blood in Punjab, the British made their move in Bengal. Siraj ud-Daula was so hated—governed so badly, taxed so harshly, ruled so whimsically—that people wanted anybody but him. Robert Clive came with barely 2-3 thousand troops. Bribed Siraj's commanders Mir Jafar and Raja Durlabh. They stayed neutral or fled. The much larger army defeated. Siraj fled, captured, killed. British made Mir Jafar puppet Nawab. Real power: British. For namesake only: Mir Jafar. Victory parade through Plassey. Clive realized: thousands of villagers watching. Could kill us all if each threw one stone. But they didn't. Why? Because they hated Siraj more than they feared foreigners. When governance is that bad, people accept anyone. Peshwa wanted Bengal. Too slow. British got there first. While Marathas and Afghans exhaust each other in battle of attrition, British establish foothold in most prosperous province. Disciplined army, political savvy, puppet strategy, perfect timing. The contrast: Siraj—worst governance, hated by his people. Shivaji—best governance, loved by his people, paid home minister more than top general because citizen welfare came first. The lesson: governance matters more than identity. The reality: British now have Bengal. Marathas lost it before they could move. The future: British get stronger while Marathas and Afghans fight. The beginning of the end started in a small village called Plassey.
Dattaji Shinde: The Soldier of God Gets His Orders (August 17, 1759)
"I'm Worried Day and Night": The Loan Crisis, The Three-Task Letter, & Bengal Slips Away
Peshwa Lost Bengal
Before He Could Bounce
What Happened:
"Peshwa lost out on Bengal. Because before he could bounce on Bengal, it was taken over by the British."
How:
- British bribed some of Siraj ud-Daula's commanders
- They stayed neutral
- Or just ran away from battlefield
- At Plassey
The Result:
- Siraj ud-Daula had to flee
- Lost the war, the battle
- Finally: was caught and killed
What British Did:
- Got control of Bengal
- One of the most prosperous provinces of Mughal Empire
- They put one of Siraj's commanders
- Who helped them (Mir Jafar)
- Made him Subedar
- But just for namesake
The Reality:
"Basically Britishers were running the show."
Chapter 14: Dattaji Shinde - The Soldier of God
The Title
Ishwar Cha Sipahi:
- Ishwar = God
- Sipahi = Soldier
- "The Soldier of God"
What It Means:
- He had great warring skills
- He was a great warrior
The Letter: August 17, 1759
"I'm Worried Day and Night"
From: Dattaji Shinde
To: Nana Saheb Peshwa
Date: August 17, 1759
What Dattaji Wrote:
"Nana Saheb Peshwa is saddled with a loan. I am worried about it day and night. Whatever we come across that can help you get that loan repaid, we will keep sending it to you. We will send you whatever helps you to repay the loan."
The Acknowledgment:
- Dattaji also comes to know
- Peshwa has incurred a lot of loan
- He says: "We understand that"
- Will try to support with whatever:
- Wealth
- Tributes
- Money that we get
- So Peshwa can pay off some of the loan
Who Is Dattaji Shinde?
The Man
His Nature:
- Adventuresome
- Full of adventure
- Very sharp intellect warrior
Decision-Making:
"There is no confusion in his mind. If he decides to take action, he will just take a very crisp action."
Translation: Decisive
The Assessment:
- One of a kind military leader
Dattaji's Personality
Physical & Skills
Body:
- Stout
- Body complexion: brownish black (kara saurah varan)
Skills:
- Expert in riding horse
- Good at warfare
- Cavalry person
His Duties:
- Fulfilled his duties as assigned by Peshwa
- With loyalty
- And honesty
His Track Record
Marwar Campaign (February 1756)
What He Did:
- Took revenge for his elder brother Jayapa Shinde's murder
- Gained victory in Marwar
- Marwar = where Jodhpur is located
- Where Vijay Singh was
- Some issue between two brothers/cousins
When He Returned:
- Concluded it nicely
- Came back February 1756
- Most probably to Delhi
Geography:
- Marwar = larger area
- Jodhpur = district within Marwar (smaller area)
- He was given that responsibility
- Concluded it nicely
- Came back to Delhi
October 1756: The Campaign He Missed
Why He Wasn't There
What Happened:
- October 1756
- Malhar Rao Holkar and Raghunath Rao came to north
- In that campaign
- Dattaji did not participate
Why:
- Probably assigned to different area
- Just didn't have time
- Or was not asked to participate
Correction:
- After victory in Jodhpur
- With succession battle and taking revenge for brother's murder
- Probably Dattaji came back to Deccan
The New Assignment
Sent to the North
The Timing:
- After Malhar Rao Holkar and Raghunath Rao
- Went to north and came back
The Need:
- Peshwa was thinking
- To have somebody who was very capable commander in north
Who Was Sent:
- Thought about Dattaji Shinde
- And his younger brother Jankoji Shinde
About Jankoji:
- Just a kid
- Probably 23-24 years old at most
About Dattaji:
- An accomplished fighter and commander
Why:
- Now that Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao had come back
- Had to have somebody of capability
- Representing Maratha army in the north
Result:
"Dattaji was sent to the north (Delhi) after Raghunath Rao came back."
The December 17, 1758 Letter
Three Big Tasks
From: Nana Saheb Peshwa
To: Amatya Ramaji Ananta (probably based in Delhi)
Date: December 17, 1758
The Context:
- By this time, Abdali had come to Delhi
- Destroyed Delhi
- Wanted to get all the money he could
- In Mathura: murders, killings, barbaric behavior
- Then went back to Afghanistan
But Before Leaving:
- Made sure Najeeb Khan Rohila would be appointed
- As important personality
- Made Mir Bakshi
Najeeb Khan's Ambition
The Power Play
His Goal:
- Ambition: become Wazir himself
Current Position:
- Right now: made Mir Bakshi
The Letter's Instructions:
"Take the side of the Wazir in Delhi and destroy Najeeb Khan Rohila."
Translation:
- Team up against him
- By teaming up against him
- Destruction or total termination
The Adina Beg Problem
Dead on Arrival
The Background:
- Remember: Raghunath Rao appointed Adina Beg
- As Subedar of Punjab
- When he decided to come back
The Problem:
"He's just no more. He's dead."
Why This Matters:
- Have to have good presence
- And control over Punjab
- Adina Beg can't control everything by himself
- He needs help
Peshwa Knew:
- Abdali has one eye on Punjab all the time
The Solution:
"Make sure you give him proper supplement. I'm assigning Dattaji Shinde to make sure he will be able to give proper protection to Adina Beg or to Punjab."
The Duty:
- Make sure if Punjab needs help
- In case of Abdali's invasion
- Dattaji will be fulfilling that duty
The Bengal Task
Still Hope?
The Instruction:
"The task in establishing control in Bengal is also important."
The Timing Question:
- This letter: December 1758
- Or actually maybe December 17, 1758 (was written as 1656, error)
- Battle of Plassey: 1757
- So Peshwa must know about it
What Peshwa Wants:
- Probably wants Dattaji to get rid of British influence in Bengal
The Reality:
- Britishers were still trying to put their influence in Bengal
- They were not completely done yet
- Still a little progress to go
The Hope:
"Peshwa knew that there is scope to make money in Bengal. So Bengal is prosperous province. If Dattaji can establish our rule or at least have some partial control, then we can make money off of Bengal and some of our loan issues will go down."
The Awadh Alliance
Shuja ud-Daula
The Instruction:
- Can take help from Shuja ud-Daula of Awadh
- Shuja ud-Daula = Nawab of Awadh
- Awadh = one of very prosperous provinces
The Plan:
- Can ask Shuja ud-Daula to help us with his army
- In case Mansoor Khan needs it in Punjab
Who Is Mansoor Khan:
- The son-in-law of Adina Beg
- He tries to succeed Adina Beg
- (After Adina Beg died)
Dattaji's Determination
Once He Sets His Mind
The Assessment:
"If Dattaji takes upon his mind, he will do it. Dattaji is a very capable personality. Once he says 'I will do this' or he wants to do something, he will not let anything come in between."
Translation:
- Once he sets his mind to it
- He will do it
- He has that kind of mindset
The Confidence:
"Once we have Dattaji and some other things, we don't need anybody else."
The Holy Places
Kashi, Mathura
The Goal:
- Thinking about rescuing Kashi, Mathura
- And all these holy places
- From the Islamic influence
Why:
- Hindus could not go there
- And be without any concerns
- Because they were in enemy territory
The Bottom Line
What Peshwa Really Wants
The Summary:
"In summary: I need money. Because I have a lot of loan to repay. Make sure that you make money and send it my way."
Why:
- He is saddled with all the loans
- He knows the only way money can come to him
- Is from the north
- He needs the money
The Three Tasks
Peshwa's Priorities
Task 1: Bengal
"Get to Bengal and there is lots of money there. You can get tributes or you can loot the people, whatever it takes. But Bengal is our place because it is prosperous."
Task 2: Punjab
"Punjab is dicey because Abdali has his eye on it. Make sure that you beef up Mansoor Khan or whoever that guy is after Adina Beg. Punjab also is prosperous."
Task 3: Holy Places
"Some of the holy places that are under Muslim influence, try to rescue them. Because Hindus could not go there without concerns."
The Real Goal:
"Ultimately in summary: I need money. Send it my way."
December 24 Letter
The Long One
What Happened:
- On 24th of December
- Peshwa wrote another long letter
- Long letter means long letter
What It Contained:
- Gave a lot of information
- On the issues in previous letter
- And what to do in various situations
- Those three things explained
- Gave three scenarios or three ways
- About what to do on different matters
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Note |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Military commander | "Soldier of God," decisive, sent to north |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Saddled with loans, worried day and night |
| Jankoji Shinde | Younger Shinde brother | 23-24 years old, sent with Dattaji |
| Jayapa Shinde | Eldest Shinde brother | Murdered, Dattaji avenged him |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Mir Bakshi | Ambitious, wants to be Wazir, target for destruction |
| Adina Beg | Punjab Subedar | Dead |
| Mansoor Khan | Adina Beg's son-in-law | Succeeds Adina Beg in Punjab |
| Shuja ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Can provide army support |
| Abdali | Afghan king | Has eye on Punjab, destroyed Delhi before leaving |
| Amatya Ramaji Ananta | Based in Delhi | Recipient of Peshwa's letter |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 1756 | Dattaji returns from Marwar after avenging brother's murder |
| October 1756 | Malhar Rao & Raghunath Rao go north (Dattaji doesn't participate) |
| 1757 | Battle of Plassey - British take Bengal |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao returns from north |
| 1758 | Dattaji sent to north (Delhi) |
| 1758 | Abdali comes to Delhi, destroys it, leaves |
| 1758 | Abdali appoints Najeeb Khan as Mir Bakshi before leaving |
| 1758 | Adina Beg dies |
| December 17, 1758 | Peshwa's letter to Amatya with 3 tasks |
| December 24, 1758 | Peshwa's long letter with detailed scenarios |
| August 17, 1759 | Dattaji's letter to Peshwa acknowledging loan problem |
Key Themes
1. The Money Crisis
- Peshwa saddled with loans
- Worried day and night
- Need money desperately
- Only source: north
2. Bengal Lost
- British took it before Peshwa could move
- Still hope for partial control?
- Most prosperous province gone
- Britishers still consolidating
3. Dattaji: The Solution
- Decisive commander
- No confusion
- Once sets mind → will do it
- Don't need anybody else with him
4. Three Big Tasks
- Bengal = money
- Punjab = protect from Abdali
- Holy places = rescue from Muslims
5. The Real Priority: Money
- Bottom line: send money
- Whatever it takes
- Tribute or loot
- Loans must be repaid
6. Najeeb Khan Problem
- Ambitious Rohila
- Made Mir Bakshi
- Wants to be Wazir
- Must be destroyed
7. Punjab Vulnerability
- Adina Beg dead
- Mansoor Khan not enough
- Abdali has eye on it
- Must beef up defenses
Critical Insights
Why Dattaji Was Chosen
His Qualities:
- Decisive - no confusion
- Accomplished - proven track record
- Loyal - fulfilled duties with loyalty
- Capable - very capable commander
- Determined - won't let anything come in between
- Avenged - got revenge for brother's murder
What Peshwa Needed:
- Someone who could handle multiple tasks
- Bengal + Punjab + Holy places
- Someone independent (doesn't need others)
- Someone trustworthy with money
The Bengal Miscalculation
The Hope:
"Still scope to make money in Bengal."
The Reality:
- Battle of Plassey: 1757
- This letter: December 1758
- Over a year later
- British already consolidating
The Delusion:
- Thinking there's still partial control possible
- British not "completely done"
- Can still loot or get tributes
The Truth:
- Probably too late
- British have disciplined army
- Mir Jafar is puppet
- Real power: British
The Money Math
The Sources:
- Bengal - most prosperous (but lost to British)
- Punjab - prosperous (but Abdali has eye on it)
- Delhi/North - impoverished (Abdali already looted it)
The Problem:
- Best source (Bengal) = gone
- Second source (Punjab) = dicey
- Third source (Delhi) = already looted
The Reality:
Where is the money going to come from?
The Three-Task Impossibility
Task 1: Get to Bengal (far east)
- Fight British
- Establish control
- Extract money
Task 2: Secure Punjab (far northwest)
- Protect from Abdali
- Beef up defenses
- Keep it prosperous
Task 3: Rescue holy places
- Kashi, Mathura, etc.
- Throughout north
- From Islamic control
The Geographic Spread:
- Bengal = extreme east
- Punjab = extreme northwest
- Holy places = scattered throughout
The Question:
How can one commander do all three?
The Najeeb Khan Dilemma
The Instruction:
- Destroy Najeeb Khan
- Team up with Wazir against him
The Reality:
- Najeeb Khan has protection (we'll see)
- Ambitious and capable
- Made Mir Bakshi by Abdali
- Has Afghan backing
The Complication:
- Easier said than done
- Will create problems trying
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The Money Problem:
- Loans ballooning
- Main sources gone or vulnerable
- Bengal lost to British
- Punjab threatened by Abdali
- Delhi already looted
- Where's the money?
The Three Tasks:
- Impossible to do all three
- Will have to prioritize
- Something will suffer
- Likely: can't secure Bengal
The Najeeb Khan Problem:
- Ordered to destroy him
- But he has protection (Holkar)
- Will this create conflict?
The Dattaji Pressure:
- Lots of expectations
- "Don't need anybody else"
- Multiple fronts
- Geographic impossibility
- What happens when he can't deliver?
The Bengal Reality:
- Probably already too late
- British consolidating
- Disciplined army
- Not going anywhere
- Peshwa might not accept this
August 17, 1759: Dattaji Shinde writes to Nana Saheb Peshwa. "You're saddled with loans. I'm worried about it day and night. Whatever we get that can help you repay, we'll send your way." The acknowledgment of the crisis. Meanwhile, Peshwa already sent his instructions (December 1758). Three big tasks: Get to Bengal (lots of money there, loot if you have to), secure Punjab (Abdali has his eye on it, beef up Mansoor Khan after Adina Beg died), rescue holy places (from Islamic control). Bottom line in summary: I NEED MONEY. Send it my way. Because he's saddled with all the loans. Only source: the north. But Bengal's already gone (British took it in 1757). Still hoping for partial control? Too late probably. Britishers consolidating. Punjab dicey (Abdali watching). Delhi looted (Abdali already destroyed it). Where's the money going to come from? And Dattaji has to do all three? Bengal (extreme east), Punjab (extreme northwest), holy places (scattered everywhere)? Geographic impossibility. But Peshwa confident: "Once we have Dattaji, don't need anybody else. He's decisive. Once he sets his mind, he'll do it. Won't let anything come in between." The Soldier of God gets his orders. Three impossible tasks. One urgent need: money. The pressure is on.
"Don't Kill Your Enemy": Malhar Rao's Fox Logic & The Loan That Won't Stop Growing (1758-1759)
The Shinde Family Tree, The Career Advice, & "Over My Dead Body" Regrets
The Shinde Family Tree Clarified
Who's Who
The Father Figure:
- Ranuji Shinde = the father/patriarch
His Four Sons:
- Jayapa Shinde - eldest son
- Jyotiba Rao Shinde - second brother
- Tukoji Shinde - third brother
- Mahadaji Shinde - fourth brother
The Next Generation:
- Jankoji Shinde = son of Jayapa Shinde (eldest)
- (Note: Dattaji Shinde is one of the four brothers, not Jayapa's son)
Ranuji Shinde: The Humble Beginning
The Personal Attendant
Who He Was:
- In service of Bajirao I
- Very low position
- Like he would pick up Bajirao
- Personal attendant of Bajirao I
But:
- Because he showed promise
- Bajirao I gave him good positions
The Sons' Training
Under Bajirao I
Jayapa Shinde:
- Eldest son
- When Ranuji died
- Jayapa also learned under Bajirao I
The Younger Brothers:
- Jyotiba, Tukoji, Dattaji, Mahadaji
- Younger people
- Didn't have much role to play initially
Jankoji Shinde:
- Son of Jayapa Shinde
- So grandson of Ranuji Shinde
- The next generation
Jankoji in Kota (1759)
Succession Sorting
What Happened:
- Jankoji Shinde went to Kota (town in Rajasthan)
- Took tribute
The Pattern:
"Same kind of thing: King dies, then there is rivalry between his sons."
The Deal:
- To sort it out, he took the tribute first
- Then said: "I will sort it out"
Translation:
- Give me money right now
- Then I'll handle your succession problem
The Meeting in Kota
Jankoji Meets Malhar Rao
Who Was There:
- Jankoji Shinde - 19 or 20 year old kid
- Malhar Rao Holkar - like 50 or 52 years old (in his 50s)
The Age Difference:
- Malhar Rao had fought/worked with Bajirao I
- But lot of difference in their age
Malhar Rao: The Old Timer
The Beliefs
His Experience:
- Spent lot of time in Northern India
- Had his own opinions about politics of Northern India
- Was an old timer
What "Old Timer" Means:
"He believed in the principles of warfare that were enunciated by the great Shivaji."
The Principle: Ganimikawa
- Surprise surgical strike on the enemy
- Engage them when they least expect you
- Fight the battle until surprise element is over
- Then suddenly retreat
What He Did NOT Believe In:
- Frontal warfare
His Politics:
- Had opinions about every Tom, Dick and Harry in Northern area
- Well versed with the politics of North
- Because you can't just be commander
- Have to understand what the politics is
Special Relationships:
- Had this relationship with Najeeb ud-Daula (Rohila commander)
- Special relationship
The Bitterness Lessens
Holkar-Shinde Rivalry
The Background:
"Remember where that all started? Between Jayapa and Holkar. It was carried over from Jankoji's father. Started in Jaipur over the Madho Singh situation."
What Happened:
- Both Holkar and Jayapa Shinde were involved
- Both trying to benefit from battle of two sons
- To inherit the kingdom
- Because of that, developed bitterness
- That carried on for some time
The Competition:
- Both appointed to northern parts of India
- Both wanted to show Peshwa
- They were doing a great job
- Trying to impress the Peshwa
- That's where enmity was coming into picture
Initially:
- Was a friendly bout initially
- But later became more like bitterness
Remember the Son:
"Remember what happened when Holkar's son was killed? He was very mad. Because Jayapa says 'Let's do truce.' And Holkar said 'No way, I'm gonna kill him myself.'"
The Promise:
- Took it very negatively
- How can you let this guy go?
The Kota Meeting Effect
Subduing the Bitterness
What Happened:
"Between this meeting - Jankoji and Malhar Rao - their bitterness somewhat subdued."
Why:
- Jankoji being the young guy
- Relatively not informed about politics of the North
- Asked about his opinions and things like that
- About the politics of Mughal North
Malhar Rao's Status:
- Considered as old, elderly personality
- People kind of respected him
- Like his father's age or even a little older
The Career Advice
"Don't Kill Najeeb Khan"
What Malhar Rao Said:
"Don't try to bother Najeeb ud-Daula, that Rohila guy."
Why:
- Partly because Malhar Rao wanted to protect him
- They had special relationship
The Washing Clothes Metaphor:
Malhar Rao's Logic:
"If you get rid of Najeeb ud-Daula, then Peshwa will ask you to clean the clothes on the banks of Ganga."
Translation:
- Najeeb Khan is big time enemy of Marathas and Peshwas
- If you kill him or get rid of him
- Your utility to Peshwa will be zilch
- He won't need you anymore
- He will ask you to do mundane things
- Like washing clothes (profession where you wash and dry)
The Analogy:
"If you are working for Ford and if you display all your knowledge to your employer, then would the employer need you anymore? No."
The Logic:
"Don't get rid of this enemy of ours or Peshwa's enemy. Because if you do, Peshwa won't need you anymore. Keep him around so you can show that you are taking action, you are being of help to Peshwa, you are going after Najeeb ud-Daula. We need him."
The Impact on Jankoji
What He Thought
The Reality:
- Jankoji was a young guy
- We don't know what impact this logic had on Jankoji's mind
But:
- He would not have taken action on it anyway
- Because at the time, head honcho of Shinde family: Dattaji Shinde
- All important decisions will be taken by Dattaji
- Unless Dattaji agrees or has particular viewpoint
- That is what they will implement
Translation:
"Telling Jankoji doesn't mean too much. He cannot take independent action unless Dattaji agrees with him."
Dattaji's Role
In Charge of the North
His Position:
- Basically in charge of northern situation
- Because Raghunath Rao came back
- From his campaign
- Without putting any governance structure in Punjab
The Situation:
- Punjab was volatile
- Contested territory between Marathas and Afghans
- Dattaji was given the responsibility
- To manage the affairs
- Make sure it's not taken over again by Abdali
Malhar Rao: The Fox
The Ulterior Motive
Why the Advice Was Disingenuous:
"The old man was a fox."
His Ulterior Motive:
- He also had ulterior motive
- Because he considered Najeeb as his Manusputra
- Manusputra = adopted son (Putra = son)
- Wanted him to not get killed
- Wanted to protect him
The Interdependence
Najeeb Khan & Abdali
Why Najeeb Needs Abdali:
- Najeeb Khan extremely afraid of Maratha power
- Because they kind of unofficially running the empire
- He cannot survive in front of Maratha power
- So he needs Abdali
Why Abdali Needs Najeeb:
- From Abdali's point of view
- Najeeb ud-Daula is extremely important
- He unlocks the India for him
- He needs him
The Bond:
- Both are Afghans
- Natural allies
- They are interdependent
Raghunath Rao's Letter (1758)
"Get Rid of Najeeb Khan"
What Happened:
- 1758 when Raghunath Rao took over Delhi
- Raghunath Rao always felt sorry
- Or felt angry with himself
- That he was not able to get rid of Najeeb then and there
Why He Couldn't:
- One thing or the other, he couldn't do it
- He should have, but he didn't
The Reason:
"Raghunath Rao was about to attack Najeeb Khan, but who stopped his horse? Malhar Rao came in the way and said 'Over my dead body'."
The Cow Incident:
- Najeeb started killing cows in front of him
- On banks of Ganga or Yamuna
- Raghunath Rao wanted to go and attack Najeeb ud-Daula
- But Holkar said: "Hold your horses. If you want to go kill him, you have to do it over my dead body."
The Result:
"One thing or the other, he just was stopped from getting rid of Najeeb ud-Daula. Now looking back, he was feeling upset with himself. Why didn't he do it when he had him in his hands? But the moment was gone."
The Letter to Jankoji
Finish the Job
What Raghunath Rao Did:
- When he goes to Pune
- Writes a letter to Jankoji
- Says: "Get rid of this man"
- Finish the job
Why Raghunath Rao Couldn't Do It:
- Reason Raghunath Rao couldn't do thing about Najeeb
- Because Malhar Rao Holkar considered him as his own son
- Would not allow Raghunath Rao to take action
The Respect:
- To certain extent, Raghunath Rao respected Holkar
- Holkar was older than him
- Kind of legendary Malhar Rao commander
- Also had worked with his father (Bajirao I, who was Peshwa)
The Age:
- Even though Raghunath Rao was part of ruling clan
- Still didn't want to go against Malhar Rao Holkar's advice
- Because he was respected
- And Raghunath Rao was much younger to him also
- Raghunath Rao was like 25 years old
- Much younger
The Experience:
- Holkar was always placed in the north
- Understood the politics of the north
- Raghunath Rao was mostly in Pune or thereabouts
The Loan Balloons
Rajya Kshama
The Situation:
"The loan amount was ballooning on Peshwa's head by this time."
What It Was:
- Raghunath Rao had compiled lot of loans
- Then it was increasing every month
From Bajirao I:
- Lot of the loan was collected from Bajirao I
- Remember Bajirao I had done lot of campaigns to the north
- He needs money to go there
- With army of 10,000, 20,000 people
- All that was financed based on loans
- Kind of collected over time
- All that was still outstanding
- Was becoming too much, way too much
What Nana Saheb Called It:
"He used to give it some name (Rajya Kshama) but basically it was becoming untenable."
Dattaji's Task
Lower the Loan
What He Was Given:
"The task that was given to Dattaji was to lower down this loan, which was now becoming untenable."
Why:
- Raghunath Rao didn't do a good job
- In terms of lowering the loan
- Because he increased it actually
Why the North Was Impoverished
Abdali's Impact
The Important Reason:
- Because Abdali has sacked Delhi
- And neighboring areas
- Twice or thrice
- As a result, whole thing was impoverished in the north
What Was Lost:
- Lots and lots of riches in Delhi alone
- But because he has sacked it two, three times
- The revenue that Marathas were getting from north
- Had dwindled
What Marathas Lost:
- Marathas would have been happy to sack it themselves
- So they couldn't get it from payments or by looting
Before Abdali: Nadir Shah
The Barbarians
The Timeline:
- Whole thing had become totally impoverished
- Because of Abdali
- And before that, before Abdali even
- 1739, there was the king of Iran
- Nadir Shah
Who They Were:
"They basically were barbarians."
The Comparison:
"Marathas were not as barbarians as these people. They had a little bit of humanity."
The Methods:
- Once they understood
- Some of the stories during Abdali's invasions
- He would torture people
- Make sure he would get all the money
- Wherever it was hidden
- That was the barbarian side
The Marathas:
- Weren't so keen on that
- Not that barbaric
- But most of the riches were gone
The Emperor:
- Mughal emperor himself was poor for the people
- They took horses, elephants, bullock carts, everything
- Just took it away
- He had nothing left or not much
Key Players
| Name | Relationship | Age/Status |
|---|---|---|
| Ranuji Shinde | Father figure | Bajirao I's personal attendant, showed promise |
| Jayapa Shinde | Eldest son of Ranuji | Deceased, eldest brother |
| Jyotiba Rao Shinde | 2nd brother | Younger |
| Tukoji Shinde | 3rd brother | Younger |
| Dattaji Shinde | 4th brother | Head honcho, in charge of north |
| Mahadaji Shinde | 5th brother | Younger |
| Jankoji Shinde | Son of Jayapa | 19-20 years old, at Kota meeting |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | 50-52 years old, "the fox" |
| Najeeb ud-Daula | Rohila commander | Malhar Rao's "adopted son," needs Abdali |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | ~25 years old, regrets not killing Najeeb |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Loan ballooning, calls it "Rajya Kshama" |
| Abdali | Afghan king | Needs Najeeb, sacked Delhi 2-3 times |
| Bajirao I | Deceased Peshwa | Father of Raghunath Rao, trained Jayapa |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir Shah (Iran) loots Delhi |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao in Delhi, wants to kill Najeeb |
| 1758 | Malhar Rao stops him "over my dead body" |
| 1758 | Raghunath Rao returns to Pune feeling upset |
| 1758 | Writes letter to Jankoji: "Get rid of Najeeb" |
| 1759 | Jankoji in Kota, takes tribute for succession |
| 1759 | Meets Malhar Rao in Kota |
| 1759 | Malhar Rao advises: "Don't kill Najeeb" |
| 1759 | Loan ballooning, becoming untenable |
| 1759 | Dattaji tasked to lower the loan |
Key Themes
1. The Career Advice
- Don't kill your enemy
- Because then you're not needed
- Keep them alive = job security
- Fox logic
2. The Washing Clothes Metaphor
- Kill Najeeb = no utility
- Peshwa asks you to wash clothes
- Mundane work
- Career suicide
3. The Old Timer
- Malhar Rao = experienced
- Believes in Ganimikawa (Shivaji's principle)
- No frontal warfare
- Surprise strikes, then retreat
4. The Bitterness Subdues
- Holkar-Shinde rivalry from Jaipur
- Lessened in Kota meeting
- But ulterior motives remain
5. The Interdependence
- Najeeb needs Abdali (protection from Marathas)
- Abdali needs Najeeb (unlocks India)
- Natural allies (both Afghans)
6. Raghunath Rao's Regrets
- "Over my dead body" moment
- Should have killed Najeeb
- Had him in his hands
- Moment is gone
7. The Loan Crisis
- Ballooning on Peshwa's head
- From Bajirao I campaigns
- Raghunath Rao increased it
- Becoming untenable
8. The Impoverished North
- Abdali sacked Delhi 2-3 times
- Before that: Nadir Shah (1739)
- Barbarians (torture for money)
- Marathas not as barbaric
- Riches are gone
Critical Insights
The Fox's Game
Surface Level:
- "Don't kill Najeeb = job security"
- Logical career advice
- Protecting Jankoji's interests
Real Level:
- Protecting Najeeb (adopted son)
- Disingenuous advice
- Ulterior motive
- The old man was a fox
The Genius:
- Frames it as helping Jankoji
- Actually helping Najeeb
- Jankoji thinks it's good advice
- Wins both ways
The Career Logic
The Argument:
- Najeeb = big enemy of Peshwa
- You're here to fight big enemies
- If you eliminate big enemy
- No more need for you
- Peshwa assigns you mundane work
- Career over
The Employment Analogy:
- Work for Ford
- Display all your knowledge
- Employer doesn't need you anymore
- Don't show everything
The Strategy:
- Keep enemy alive
- Show you're working on it
- Maintain your utility
- Job security
Why It Works on Jankoji
He's Young:
- Only 19-20 years old
- Not informed about northern politics
- Asking for opinions
- Respects elders
Malhar Rao's Status:
- Old timer (50s)
- Worked with Bajirao I
- Father's age or older
- People respect him
The Advice Sounds Wise:
- Logical career strategy
- Protecting Jankoji's interests
- From experienced commander
- Why would you doubt it?
But It Doesn't Matter
The Reality:
- Jankoji can't take independent action
- Dattaji is head honcho
- All important decisions = Dattaji
- Telling Jankoji = doesn't mean too much
So Why Tell Him?
- Plant the seed
- Maybe he influences Dattaji
- Or at least he won't push to kill Najeeb
- Passive protection of Najeeb
The "Over My Dead Body" Regret
What Happened:
- Raghunath Rao about to attack Najeeb
- Cow slaughter incident
- Malhar Rao physically stopped him
- "Over my dead body"
Why He Backed Down:
- Respected Malhar Rao
- Malhar Rao older (Raghunath Rao only 25)
- Malhar Rao worked with his father
- Malhar Rao = legendary commander
- Understood northern politics better
The Regret:
"Now looking back, feeling upset with himself. Why didn't he do it when he had him in his hands? But the moment was gone."
The Letter:
- Returns to Pune
- Writes to Jankoji
- "Finish the job"
- But will Jankoji?
The Loan Math
The Sources:
- Loans from Bajirao I campaigns
- Loans from Raghunath Rao campaigns
- Increasing every month
The Problem:
- North = impoverished
- Abdali sacked it 2-3 times
- Before that: Nadir Shah (1739)
- Riches are gone
The Task:
- Dattaji: lower the loan
- But how?
- Where's the money coming from?
The Irony:
- Raghunath Rao was supposed to lower it
- He increased it instead
- Now Dattaji has to fix it
- With even fewer resources
The Barbarian Comparison
Nadir Shah & Abdali:
- Barbarians
- Torture people
- Get all the money (wherever hidden)
- No humanity
Marathas:
- Not as barbaric
- Had little bit of humanity
- Weren't so keen on torture
But:
- Marathas would have been happy to loot
- Just not as brutally
- The difference: degree, not kind
The Result:
- By the time Marathas arrived
- Nothing left to loot
- Barbarians got there first
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The Najeeb Problem:
- Raghunath Rao wants him dead
- Malhar Rao wants him alive
- Jankoji got conflicting advice
- Dattaji will have to decide
- What happens when he chooses?
The Career Logic:
- Will it influence anyone?
- Or will Peshwa's orders override?
- Can Malhar Rao protect Najeeb forever?
The Loan Crisis:
- Ballooning out of control
- Becoming untenable
- Dattaji tasked to lower it
- But north is impoverished
- Where's the money?
The Fox:
- Malhar Rao = old timer
- Believes in Ganimikawa (surprise attacks, retreat)
- Not frontal warfare
- Will this philosophy clash with others?
The Interdependence:
- Najeeb needs Abdali
- Abdali needs Najeeb
- If Marathas kill Najeeb
- Abdali loses his key to India
- Will he let that happen?
The Regret:
- Raghunath Rao missed his chance
- "Over my dead body" stopped him
- Moment is gone
- Will Jankoji (or Dattaji) succeed where he failed?
- Or will history repeat?
1758-1759: The fox gives his advice. Malhar Rao Holkar meets young Jankoji Shinde (19-20 years old) at Kota. The bitterness between their families lessens. And then the old man speaks: "Don't kill Najeeb ud-Daula. If you do, Peshwa won't need you anymore. Your utility will be zilch. He'll ask you to wash clothes on the banks of Ganga. Keep your enemy alive - it's job security." Fox logic. Career advice. But the real reason? Malhar Rao considers Najeeb his adopted son. Wants to protect him. The advice is disingenuous. The ulterior motive clear. Meanwhile, Raghunath Rao in Pune writing letters full of regret: "Kill Najeeb. Finish the job." Because he had his chance. 1758 in Delhi. Najeeb slaughtering cows. Raghunath Rao about to attack. But Malhar Rao stopped his horse. "Over my dead body." And Raghunath Rao backed down. Respected him. Old timer. Worked with his father. Only 25 himself. Now looking back: upset with himself. Had Najeeb in his hands. The moment is gone. And the loan? Ballooning. From Bajirao I's campaigns. From Raghunath Rao's campaigns. Increasing every month. Becoming untenable. Nana Saheb calls it "Rajya Kshama." Dattaji tasked to lower it. But how? The north is impoverished. Abdali sacked Delhi 2-3 times. Nadir Shah before him in 1739. Barbarians. Torture. All the money gone. Nothing left to loot. And Najeeb? Needs Abdali (protection from Marathas). Abdali needs Najeeb (unlocks India). Interdependent. Natural allies. Both Afghans. The fox protects his adopted son with clever advice. The young commander doesn't know it's disingenuous. But it doesn't matter. Jankoji can't act independently. Dattaji decides. And Dattaji has his orders.
Dattaji's Impossible Tasks: Rivers, Raghuji, & The Rajput Who Wrote to Abdali (1758-1759)
The Inheritance Debt, The Pontoon Bridge Lies, & The Secret Letter That Changed Everything
The Loan: An Inheritance
"Rajya Kshama"
What Nana Saheb Called It:
"Rajya Kshama" - something that is his father's inheritance portion.
The Reality:
- Loan was staggering on the Peshwa
- Continuously growing
- The burden of loan
Where It Came From:
- A lot of the loan was outstanding
- From the reign of Bajirao I (Peshwa)
- So Nana Saheb's father
How He Thought About It:
- Used to call it "Rajya Kshama"
- Something he inherited
- Like an inheritance
- But of debt, not wealth
Dattaji's Campaign: The Objective
Why He Was Sent North
The Goal:
"Dattaji's campaign to the north - the objective was to lessen the loan burden."
The Problem:
- Abdali's invasions had made northern provinces poorer
- Revenue that Peshwa was getting from those provinces
- Becoming smaller and smaller
- Because there was no capacity for wealth generation
The Only Hope: Bihar and Bengal
Go East
The Situation:
- Northern provinces like Punjab, Delhi, Rajasthan, Awadh
- The fertile land between Ganga and Yamuna
- These provinces had been impoverished
The Only Chance:
- To make money: basically go east
- Two provinces there:
- Bihar
- Bengal
The Direction:
"That's where Peshwa was hoping to get money. That's why he told Dattaji Shinde to go east and not waste his time in Rajasthan or around Delhi or even Awadh."
Who Is In Awadh:
- Shuja ud-Daula is the Nawab
- Son of Safdarjung (who is dead)
- Shuja ud-Daula still there
- Will play central role in the future
- Makes a huge difference
- Don't forget him
The Plan:
- Whole idea was to go to East
- That was the direction given to Dattaji Shinde
The Three Tasks
What Dattaji Had to Do
Before Dattaji could go east:
- He had several things to accomplish
- Several tasks
Task 1: Secure Punjab
Task 2: Knock Down [Najeeb Khan or enemy forces]
Task 3: Pass Through Awadh
- Which is under control of [Shuja ud-Daula]
The River Problem
Why Marathas Struggled
The Geographic Challenge:
- When going towards Bihar and Bengal
- He has to cross some rivers
If He's West of Yamuna:
- Has to cross Yamuna
- Then has to cross Ganga
- Then there are some minor rivers
Why It's Difficult:
"Crossing the rivers was not a simple task in those days. And Dattaji Shinde and specifically Maratha army was not adapt to the crossing of the rivers."
When You Can Cross:
- Only time you can cross them: winter or summertime
- Monsoon was out of the question
Why:
- Ganga and Yamuna are huge rivers
- Even smaller rivers that appear small in summer
- Become three, four times big in terms of width
- In the monsoon
Translation:
"That is what he was hampered [by]."
Najeeb's Pontoon Bridge Lie
The Empty Promise
The Technique:
- Najeeb or Najeeb ud-Daula
- Had mastered the technique
- Of putting pontoon bridges across the river
What He Promised:
- Dattaji Shinde was dependent on him
- Najeeb kept telling him:
"I will help you, I will help you"
The Reality:
- But he never really had any intention to help him
When Shinde Realized:
- Realized it too late
- That this guy doesn't intend to help me
- He just wants to delay
- Doing this help for me
- Until it's too late
The Result:
- He kept on depending on this guy Najeeb
- And it never materialized
- That kind of technique or help
- Never materialized
Bengal: Already Under British Spell
One More Thing
The Situation:
"Now there was one more thing: Bengal was kind of under the spell of British."
The Timing:
"While Peshwa was... it happened right under his nose."
The Eastern Campaign Details
What He Had to Do
Go Through Awadh:
- Which is Shuja ud-Daula
Take Control of Patna:
- Patna is important city
- Capital of Bihar (today's Bihar state)
Keep Going East:
- When you go even east of Bihar
- You get into Bengal
Why:
- That's where the revenue or the money
- Because Abdali did not have the time
- To go into Bihar and Bengal
The Result:
"The riches in those states were still more or less intact."
What Could Be Done:
- They could be looted
- Or they could be taken under control
- Then you start getting the taxes, revenue and all that
The Raghuji Bhosle Problem
"Bengal Is Mine"
Another Problem:
- Raghuji Bhosle of Nagpur
- He considered Bengal as his territory
- Kind of to loot
Why:
- That was something they had decided
- Division of where they will operate
- Kind of an unwritten agreement
- "Okay, Raghuji Bhosle, you take over or you deal with Bengal"
- "We'll deal with northern provinces like Punjab and this and that"
But:
- Now Raghuji Bhosle was dead
- Within his sons, there was problem
- Who gets the throne
What Peshwa Decided:
- Peshwa had made up his mind
- We will take over
- Or at least go to Bengal
- And start getting the riches from there
The Real Goal:
- His immediate goal was not even to consolidate control
- He wanted to get his loans paid up
Why:
- He was doing all these campaigns
- Not to get more territory
- But to get the money
- To pay off these loans
The Reality:
"He couldn't afford these battles because now they are overstretched."
After 1758: Maratha Hegemony
The Extent of Control
What They Had:
"After 1758, almost all of northern India was under Maratha control or hegemony. Meaning they didn't rule it, but they were the leading power."
The Problem:
"But to keep that control, hegemony, and yet go in Bengal - that was not even possible for a very experienced and capable commander like Dattaji Shinde."
His Reputation:
- Dattaji was a very highly thought of commander
- In Maratha, in Pune
- He was based in and around the northern parts
- He wasn't going back and forth
- Would just stay in the north
Late 1758: Jankoji in Jaipur
Collecting What's Owed
What Happened:
- End of 1758
- Jankoji went to Jaipur
- Madho Singh was there
- Jankoji made sure whatever was owed was given
- "Vasuli" = to make sure payment is collected
The Deal:
- Madho Singh had promised certain amount
- Jankoji made sure that was paid
Then:
- After that, both Dattaji and Jankoji went to Delhi
Malhar Rao's Illness
Recuperating
What Happened:
- At that time, Malhar Rao Holkar
- Had just was recuperating
- From a serious illness
He Came to Pune:
- Now he came to Pune
- Explained to Nana Saheb Peshwa
- Why he could not accomplish certain goals
- When he was in the north
Why:
- Maybe there was criticism
- That he didn't accomplish enough
- Also money management was important portion
- They thought that it wasn't done well
Sent to Rajasthan
Udaipur and Jaipur
What Peshwa Did:
- Then Peshwa sent him to Rajasthan
- Both to Udaipur (where we have been)
- And also to Jaipur (where Madhav Singh was based)
The Goal:
- So he can gather some of the promised amounts
The Jaipur Wall Problem (1759)
Entire Year Wasted
The Challenge:
- Because he could not make much progress
- In pressurizing Madhav Singh
- Who was in Jaipur
Why:
"The simple reason was that Jaipur had this big wall. It was a walled city to protect people inside and the king and the palace and all that."
The Reality:
- Because of that, he couldn't do much progress
- Couldn't get inside
- Because all the doors were closed
- And high walls
- And cannons and all that
The Result:
"He basically couldn't do anything. So 1759, he just spent trying to see, make progress to get in, but that was not going to be because it had protective cover. He spent the entire year."
Madhav Singh's Secret
In Contact With Abdali
What Was Happening:
"At that time, Madhav Singh was in contact with Abdali."
Why:
- To screw over the Marathas
- And collaborate on this
The Background:
- Madhav Singh and a couple of other Rajput kings
- Were constantly being attacked by the Marathas
- Rajput kings were constantly being badgered
- For paying tributes to Marathas
The Problem:
- They were in deep trouble
- Because their revenue probably was not that high
- And they probably had committed giving big money to Marathas
Why They Promised Big:
- Because they wanted to get their Maratha help
- They promised big amounts
The Realization:
- Once Marathas delivered the goals
- They realized: we have given them too big a promise
- In comparison, their revenue from taxes
- Or whatever else they had in their kingdom
- Wasn't that high
- Because you can't just start giving money you don't have
The Constant Badgering
Why Madhav Singh Hated Marathas
The Pressure:
- Marathas were constantly badgering them
- Especially Madhav Singh
Why Marathas Did This:
- Because Marathas, in turn
- Had to pay their army soldiers
- And get supplies
- And make it, if not profitable
- At least even venture
The Harassment:
"But they were being badgered, the Madhav Singhs especially."
Madhav Singh's Plan
Bring Abdali to Drive Marathas South
His Thinking:
"He thought: if Abdali can come, then he can drive Marathas back to the south of Narmada."
Why:
- This constant harassment will stop
- Because he wanted somebody to weaken the Marathas
- They don't bother him all every now and then
His Weakness:
- He himself was weak
- He couldn't stand up to Maratha army's might
His Solution:
"He thought Abdali may help him beating Marathas to the south and he will be able to leave [them alone]."
The Letter (1759)
"When Are You Coming?"
What He Did:
- He wrote a letter to Abdali
- 1759
- Basically must have said:
"Hey, when are you coming?"
Who Knew:
- Nobody knew about it (anabhiknya = he didn't know)
- That this guy was writing letter
- And being in correspondence with Abdali
- He was totally in the dark
- Of course
Why Secret:
- Madhav Singh is not going to tell Marathas
- That I am writing to Abdali
- This was totally secret
- He was in the dark
- Didn't know what was going on
The Assessment:
"So it was a big conspiracy."
Following Abdali's Advice
Creating Problems
What Abdali Told Him:
"As per advice he got from Abdali, Madhav Singh didn't even waste one possibility to create problems for Marathas."
The Execution:
- Whichever way he could
- Create problems for Marathas
- He would do it
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Commander | Tasked to go east, hampered by rivers |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Calls loan "Rajya Kshama" (inheritance) |
| Bajirao I | Deceased Peshwa | Father of Nana Saheb, original debt source |
| Jankoji Shinde | Younger Shinde | Collected payment from Jaipur (1758) |
| Shuja ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Central role in future, don't forget him |
| Najeeb ud-Daula | Rohila commander | Promised pontoon bridges, never delivered |
| Raghuji Bhosle | Nagpur ruler | Dead, had claim to Bengal |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Serious illness, sent to Rajasthan |
| Madhav Singh | Jaipur king | In secret contact with Abdali, wrote letter |
| Abdali | Afghan king | Being invited by Madhav Singh |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Post-1758 | Northern India under Maratha hegemony |
| Late 1758 | Jankoji collects payment from Madhav Singh (Jaipur) |
| Late 1758 | Dattaji and Jankoji go to Delhi |
| 1758-1759 | Malhar Rao recovering from serious illness |
| 1759 | Malhar Rao comes to Pune, explains failures |
| 1759 | Sent to Rajasthan (Udaipur & Jaipur) |
| 1759 | Spends entire year outside Jaipur walls, makes no progress |
| 1759 | Madhav Singh writes secret letter to Abdali |
| 1759 | Following Abdali's advice, creates problems for Marathas |
Geographic Context
The Journey East:
- Start: Delhi/North
- Cross: Yamuna River
- Cross: Ganga River
- Cross: Minor rivers
- Through: Awadh (Shuja ud-Daula)
- Reach: Patna (Bihar capital)
- Continue: Bengal (extreme east)
The Provinces:
- Punjab - northwest (impoverished by Abdali)
- Delhi - north (impoverished by Abdali)
- Rajasthan - west (being badgered by Marathas)
- Awadh - center (fertile, between Ganga & Yamuna)
- Bihar - east (riches intact)
- Bengal - extreme east (riches intact, but British there)
Key Themes
1. The Inheritance Debt
- "Rajya Kshama"
- From Bajirao I
- Nana Saheb's inheritance
- But of debt, not wealth
2. Go East
- North = impoverished
- Only hope = Bihar and Bengal
- Riches more or less intact
- Abdali didn't have time to go there
3. The River Problem
- Marathas not adapt to river crossings
- Can only cross in winter/summer
- Monsoon = impossible
- Rivers become 3-4 times bigger
4. Najeeb's Lies
- Promised pontoon bridges
- "I will help you"
- Never intended to help
- Realized too late
- Just wanted to delay
5. The Raghuji Problem
- Had "claim" to Bengal
- Unwritten agreement
- But now he's dead
- Sons fighting for throne
- Peshwa decided: we'll take it
6. The Goal: Pay Loans
- Not to get territory
- To get money
- To pay off loans
- Can't afford these battles
- Overstretched
7. The Impossible Task
- Keep hegemony over north
- And go to Bengal?
- Not possible even for Dattaji
- Very capable commander
- But impossible
8. Jaipur's Wall
- Entire year wasted (1759)
- Couldn't get inside
- Walled city
- High walls, cannons
- No progress
9. The Secret Letter
- Madhav Singh → Abdali
- "When are you coming?"
- Big conspiracy
- Nobody knew
- Creating problems for Marathas
10. The Badgering
- Rajput kings constantly pressured
- For tributes to Marathas
- Promised too much
- Revenue not that high
- Can't pay what they don't have
Critical Insights
The Inheritance of Debt
"Rajya Kshama":
- What a name
- Like calling cancer a "gift"
- Inheritance from father
- But it's debt
- Continuous burden
- Staggering, growing
The Psychology:
- Frames it as something inherited
- Not something he caused
- His father's legacy
- But he has to deal with it
The Geographic Impossibility
The Math:
- Keep hegemony over all northern India
- Secure Punjab (northwest)
- Knock down enemies (throughout north)
- Pass through Awadh (center)
- Go to Bihar (east)
- Continue to Bengal (extreme east)
The Reality:
"Not even possible for a very experienced and capable commander like Dattaji Shinde."
Why:
- Too many fronts
- Too much distance
- Not enough forces
- Geographic spread impossible
The River Trap
The Problem:
- Marathas not skilled at river crossings
- Need help
- Depend on Najeeb
Najeeb's Game:
- Has the skill (pontoon bridges)
- Promises to help
- "I will help you, I will help you"
- Never intends to help
- Just wants to delay
When Realized:
- Too late
- Dattaji dependent on him
- Kept depending
- Never materialized
The Trap:
- Can't go east without crossing rivers
- Can't cross rivers without Najeeb
- Najeeb won't help
- Stuck
The Only Hope Already Gone
The Plan:
- North = impoverished (Abdali)
- Go to Bihar and Bengal
- Riches intact there
But:
- Bengal under British spell
- Happened right under Peshwa's nose
- Battle of Plassey: 1757
- This is 1758-1759
- Too late
So:
- Only hope = Bihar?
- But have to get there first
- Rivers in the way
- Najeeb won't help
- Good luck
The Raghuji Excuse
The Claim:
- "Bengal is my territory"
- Unwritten agreement
- Division of operations
The Reality:
- Raghuji is dead
- Sons fighting
- No one actually operating there
- British took it anyway
Peshwa's Decision:
- "We'll take it"
- Immediate goal: not control
- Immediate goal: pay loans
The Truth:
- Using Raghuji's death as excuse
- To break the agreement
- Because desperate for money
The Walled City Problem
1759:
- Entire year outside Jaipur
- Can't get inside
- High walls
- Closed doors
- Cannons
Malhar Rao:
- Recovering from serious illness
- Sent there to collect promised amounts
- No progress
- Basically couldn't do anything
The Waste:
- Whole year wasted
- No money collected
- Meanwhile: Madhav Singh inside
- Writing secret letters to Abdali
The Rajput Trap
How It Happened:
- Rajput kings want Maratha help
- Promise big amounts to get help
- Marathas deliver the goals
- Rajputs realize: promised too much
- Their revenue not that high
- Can't pay what they don't have
- Marathas badger them constantly
- Because Marathas need money to pay soldiers
- Rajputs get desperate
- Write to Abdali for help
The Cycle:
- Promise → can't pay → badgered → desperate → invite enemy
Madhav Singh's Calculation
His Situation:
- Weak (can't stand up to Marathas)
- Being badgered constantly
- Can't pay what he promised
- Revenue too low
His Solution:
- Get Abdali to come
- Drive Marathas south of Narmada
- Constant harassment stops
- He can breathe
The Letter:
- "When are you coming?"
- Secret conspiracy
- Nobody knows
- Following Abdali's advice
- Creating problems for Marathas
The Invitation:
- Rajput king inviting Afghan invader
- To drive out Hindu Marathas
- Because of money pressure
- Irony: selling out to pay debts
The Najeeb Strategy
Why He Won't Help:
- Dependent on Abdali
- Interdependent relationship
- If Marathas get to Bengal
- They get money
- They get stronger
- Can threaten Najeeb and Abdali
The Delay:
- "I will help you"
- But never do it
- Keep delaying
- Until too late
- Rivers can't be crossed
- Monsoon comes
- Have to wait
- By then: situation changes
The Genius:
- Simple passive resistance
- Just don't help
- They can't force you
- Because they need the skill
- Don't have it themselves
Foreshadowing
What's Coming
The River Trap:
- Dattaji can't cross rivers without help
- Najeeb won't help
- Stuck in the north
- Can't reach Bihar/Bengal
- Where the money is
The Secret Letter:
- Madhav Singh invited Abdali
- Nobody knows yet
- Following his advice
- Creating problems
- When will Marathas find out?
The Impossible Task:
- Keep hegemony everywhere
- And go to Bengal
- Not even possible for Dattaji
- Something will break
The British in Bengal:
- "Under the spell of British"
- Happened right under Peshwa's nose
- Too late now
- Hope for Bihar only?
The Loan Math:
- Need money from east
- But can't get there (rivers)
- Bengal gone (British)
- North impoverished (Abdali)
- Rajasthan won't pay (walled in Jaipur)
- Where's the money coming from?
The Conspiracy:
- Rajput king inviting Abdali
- To drive out Marathas
- Abdali already planning to come
- Now he has local allies
- The invitation is coming
Shuja ud-Daula:
- "Don't forget him"
- "Central role in future"
- "Makes huge difference"
- What will he do
- When Abdali comes?
1758-1759: The loan Nana Saheb inherited from his father—"Rajya Kshama"—staggering, growing, burden. Dattaji's objective: lessen it. Go east. Bihar and Bengal. Only places with riches intact. Abdali didn't have time to go there. But to get there? Cross Yamuna. Cross Ganga. Cross minor rivers. Marathas not adapt to river crossings. Monsoon? Impossible. Rivers become 3-4 times bigger. Need help. Najeeb has the skill. Pontoon bridges. Promises: "I will help you, I will help you." Never intends to. Realized too late. Just delaying. Until too late. The trap. And Bengal? Already under British spell. Right under Peshwa's nose. Too late. Bihar only hope. But have to get there. Rivers in the way. Najeeb won't help. Meanwhile: Jaipur. Entire year wasted (1759). Malhar Rao outside the walls. Can't get inside. Walled city. High walls, closed doors, cannons. No progress. And inside those walls? Madhav Singh writing secret letters. To Abdali. "When are you coming?" Big conspiracy. Nobody knows. Being badgered by Marathas constantly. For tributes. Promised too much. Can't pay. Revenue too low. Wants Abdali to drive Marathas south of Narmada. Constant harassment would stop. Following Abdali's advice. Creating problems for Marathas. Whichever way he could. The invitation is being written. The conspiracy taking shape. And Dattaji? Tasked to keep hegemony over all northern India AND go to Bengal. Not even possible for experienced and capable commander like him. Geographic impossibility. The rivers. The British. The walls. The secret letters. The inheritance of debt. The task that can't be done.
Dattaji Shinde's Punjab Campaign & Strategic Appointments (1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Double-Dealing of Madho Singh
Secret Alliance with Abdali
Madho Singh of Jaipur was playing a dangerous double game:
- Publicly: Agreeing to pay tribute to Marathas
- Secretly: Corresponding with Abdali and following his instructions
- Mission from Abdali: Obstruct Marathas at every opportunity
Malhar Rao's Ignorance:
- Malhar Rao Holkar had no idea about this secret alliance
- He was operating under the assumption that Madho Singh was cooperating
The Strategy:
- Madho Singh used every opportunity to create trouble for the Marathas
- This was direct advice from Abdali
- All northern powers were coordinating against Maratha expansion
Delhi Power Dynamics (Early 1759)
Force Positions
When Dattaji and Jankoji arrived at Delhi:
- Malhar Rao was still in Pune (not yet in the north)
- The two Shinde commanders were at the gates of Delhi
The Vazir's Promise
Mughal Vazir (Imad-ul-Mulk):
- Promised to pay tribute/indemnity to Dattaji
- This was to buy time and appease the Marathas
- Money was always the negotiation tool
Crossing the Yamuna (January 1759)
Burari Ghat Encampment
Strategic Position:
- Dattaji's army camped at Burari Ghat on the Yamuna River
- Location: A few miles north of Delhi
- Yamuna flows on the western side of Delhi, leaving the city on the western bank
The Crossing:
- Water levels had receded (post-monsoon period)
- Timing: January 1759 (dry season)
- This allowed troops to cross from western to eastern bank
Why Cross?
- To pursue Najeeb Khan Rohila
- Rohilas' territory (Rohilkhand) was on the eastern side
- Dattaji wanted to pressure this natural enemy
The Peshwa's Power Play
Deciding the Vazir Position
Unprecedented Authority:
- The Peshwa (sitting in Pune) was now deciding who becomes Vazir of the Mughal court in Delhi
- This shows how far Maratha power had extended
- The Emperor in Delhi had become essentially a puppet
The Target:
- Peshwa wanted to remove Imad-ul-Mulk from the Vazir position
- This was part of ongoing political maneuvering
Personality Contrast: Dattaji vs. Malhar Rao
Different Leadership Styles
Dattaji Shinde's Approach:
- Brusque and impatient (Adhir = impatient)
- To the point (Tuttak = direct, no-nonsense)
- Wanted results quickly
- No time for "hanky panky discussions"
- Demanded action and compliance immediately
Malhar Rao Holkar's Approach:
- More patient and accommodating
- Willing to engage in longer negotiations
- Not as quick to demand immediate action
- More diplomatic in style
Impact on Mughal Court:
- The Delhi court had to adjust to this new, more aggressive Maratha personality
- Previous dealings with Malhar Rao had been more relaxed
- Now they faced a soldier who would "brook no nonsense"
Dattaji's Order to Imad-ul-Mulk:
- He ordered (pharmaula) Imad to accompany him
- Purpose: To preserve relationship with the emperor
- This was not a request—it was a command
The Punjab Problem
Why Punjab Was a Headache
Distance from Home:
- Punjab was extremely far from Maharashtra (Maratha homeland)
- Cultural differences: Different language, customs
- Climate: Much colder than Maharashtra
Why They Couldn't Leave:
- Contractual obligation: Marathas had signed agreement to protect Mughal Empire
- Punjab was under constant threat from Afghan invasions
- Abdali could use it as entry point to Delhi
The Maratha Dilemma:
- Soldiers didn't want to stay in Punjab long-term
- But they had to maintain presence to fulfill their duty
- It was a constant burden
The Population Problem
Two Competing Power Centers:
-
Muslim Majority:
- Punjab's population was predominantly Muslim
- They viewed Marathas (Hindu) as outsiders
- Natural resistance to Maratha authority
-
Rising Sikh Power:
- Sikhs were gaining strength and organization
- Multiple Sikh tribes operating in Punjab
- Had aspirations of their own political power
- Even though Hindu-Sikh relations were close, Sikhs said: "You're outsiders, this is our home"
Caught in the Middle:
- Marathas had to deal with hostile Muslim citizenry
- AND navigate Sikh aspirations for independence
- Sikhs were anti-Muslim but also wanted Marathas gone
- Neither group wanted foreign (Maratha) rule
Supply and Support Issues
Marathas Were Struggling With:
- Shortage of supplies (Sadhanancha abhav)
- Local population against them
- Muslims opposed them religiously
- Sikhs opposed them politically
- Distance from supply lines
- Weak Mughal authority to back them up
The Realization:
- Dattaji came to understand the massive obstacles in safeguarding Punjab
- He realized this was potentially a losing battle
- Questions arose: "Is it really worth staying here?"
The Western Push (April 1759)
Reaching the Sutlej River
Timeline: Up until April 1759
Geographic Progress:
- Dattaji pushed all the way to the Sutlej River
- Sutlej = major river flowing through Punjab
- Eventually empties into the Indus River (Sindhu)
- This was moving westward into deeper Punjab territory
Meeting with Sabaji Shinde
Sabaji Shinde:
- Came from Peshawar (far northwest, near Kabul/Afghanistan border)
- Likely a relative of Dattaji (possibly not brother, but family)
- Had been stationed in Peshawar to watch the Afghan invasion route
Purpose of Meeting:
- Dattaji needed to understand the political situation from someone on the ground
- Sabaji had been based in that region and knew the dynamics
- Strategic discussion about defending the western frontier
Strategic Appointments in Punjab
Dattaji's Mission
Primary Objective from Peshwa:
- Stabilize Punjab
- Understand the political landscape
- Make key appointments so Maratha presence could be maintained
- Prevent outside aggression (mainly from Afghanistan)
The Appointments:
| Location | Commander | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Peshawar | Sabaji Shinde | Western frontier defense (closest to Afghanistan) |
| Atak | Tukoji Holkar | Northern defense |
| Multan | Bappuji Trimbak | Southern Punjab |
| Lahore | Naro Shankar | Central Punjab (capital city) |
The Strategy:
- These commanders and their armies would safeguard respective regions
- Create a defensive network across Punjab
- Prevent Abdali from using Punjab as invasion corridor to Delhi
- Intercept any Afghan forces before they could threaten Delhi or eastern territories
The Larger Strategic Picture
Abdali's Threat Assessment
Why Punjab Mattered:
- Any Afghan invasion must pass through Punjab to reach Delhi
- Punjab had to be stable with strong Maratha leadership
- The goal: Stop Abdali in Punjab, not let him get further east
The Challenge:
- Abdali's armies were familiar with the terrain
- They had support networks in the region
- Maratha armies were overstretched and undersupplied
Implementation Phase
What Came Next:
- Dattaji began implementing the Peshwa's strategy
- First element: Secure and stabilize Punjab ✓
- Next objectives:
- Move towards Delhi and handle Najeeb Khan
- Head east towards Bengal for revenue collection
- Maintain communication lines
Resource Constraints
Why This Was Nearly Impossible
Sabaji Shinde's Problem:
- He was "Peshawar's man" but had insufficient forces
- Given a critical job without adequate resources
- Expected to defend the most vulnerable invasion route
- This foreshadows future problems
Pattern of Overstretching:
- Marathas kept taking on more territory
- But couldn't provide enough troops or supplies
- Commanders set up to fail
- The empire was expanding faster than capacity to hold it
Key Figures in This Session
| Name | Role | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha Commander | Main protagonist, aggressive leadership style |
| Madho Singh | Raja of Jaipur | Secret collaborator with Abdali |
| Abdali | Afghan Ruler | Puppet master, coordinating anti-Maratha efforts |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior Maratha Commander | In Pune during this period, more diplomatic style |
| Jankoji Shinde | Younger Shinde Commander | Accompanied Dattaji to Delhi |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Rohilla Leader | Dattaji's target, natural Maratha enemy |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mughal Vazir | Under Maratha control, ordered to accompany Dattaji |
| Sabaji Shinde | Commander at Peshawar | Dattaji's relative, understaffed position |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Delhi - Mughal capital, Maratha staging ground
- Burari Ghat - Yamuna crossing point north of Delhi
- Yamuna River - Natural barrier, crossed when water low
- Punjab - Northwestern province, constant threat zone
- Sutlej River - Major Punjab river, Dattaji's western limit
- Peshawar - Far northwest, near Afghan border
- Lahore - Punjab capital city
- Atak - Northern strategic town
- Multan - Southern Punjab city
Timeline
- January 1759 - Dattaji camps at Burari Ghat, crosses Yamuna
- January-April 1759 - Operations in and around Delhi area
- April 1759 - Pushed west to Sutlej River, met Sabaji Shinde
- After April 1759 - Made strategic appointments across Punjab
Major Themes
1. Overextension
The Marathas were trying to control too much territory with insufficient resources.
2. Cultural Clash
Hindu Maratha armies trying to govern hostile Muslim populations and navigate Sikh aspirations.
3. Leadership Styles Matter
Dattaji's aggressive, no-nonsense approach contrasted sharply with previous Maratha diplomacy.
4. Secret Alliances
Regional powers like Madho Singh were coordinating with Abdali behind Maratha backs.
5. The Punjab Dilemma
A territory that HAD to be defended but was nearly impossible to hold effectively.
What's Coming Next
Immediate Priorities:
- Dattaji must maintain Punjab stability
- Deal with Najeeb Khan situation
- Eventually move east toward Bengal for revenue
- Keep defensive network functioning with limited resources
Looming Threats:
- Abdali is watching and waiting
- Secret alliances working against Marathas
- Undersupplied commanders vulnerable
- Long supply lines and distance from home
The Marathas are playing a dangerous game—stretched thin across hostile territory, relying on commanders who don't have enough support, facing enemies who are coordinating behind the scenes. Dattaji's aggressive style might get things done quickly, but the structural problems of holding Punjab remain unsolved.
Bengal Territorial Disputes & Dattaji Shinde's Northern Assignment (1758-1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Bengal Problem: Territorial Disputes
Historical Background
The Delineation (1743):
- Chhatrapati Shahu mediated a division of territories
- Created clear boundaries between:
- Peshwa's sphere (western and northern regions)
- Raghuji Bhosle's sphere (eastern regions, including Bengal)
- This agreement lasted about 20 years peacefully
Why Bengal Was Valuable
Geographic Importance:
- Ganga River flows all the way through Bengal
- Empties into the Bay of Bengal near Kolkata (capital of Bengal)
- Extremely fertile Gangetic plains
- Rich agricultural output
- Wealthy province with good tax base
The Source of Conflict
Raghuji Bhosle's Operations:
- Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar = Raghuji Bhosle's able commander
- Invaded Bengal multiple times to collect tribute
- Extracted payments from Ali Vardi Khan (Mughal Subedar of Bengal)
- This was Raghuji's exclusive territory per the 1743 agreement
Why Peshwa Now Wants Bengal:
- The Peshwa kept his end of the bargain initially
- Maintained good relations with Raghuji Bhosle
- BUT financial pressures are mounting
- The Peshwa is desperate for revenue
Ali Vardi Khan's Death:
- When he died, his son took over as Subedar
- The son was "no good" - ineffective ruler
- This created instability in Bengal
- Eventually British defeated this son and took control of Bengal
- This was the first time British gained control of a major Indian province
The Financial Crisis Driving Everything
Nana Saheb Peshwa's Debt Problem
The Mounting Crisis:
- Described as "consumption" (like tuberculosis) - eating away at finances
- Much debt inherited from his father, Bajirao I
- Northern expeditions giving diminishing returns
- Abdali's raids had left northern territories barren of wealth
The Vicious Cycle:
- Peshwa borrows money to send armies north
- Armies go north, fight, expand territory
- Armies return with INCREASED debt (expenses > revenue collected)
- Peshwa now in worse financial position
- MUST find new revenue sources or face bankruptcy
Why Northern Campaigns Failed Financially:
- Abdali had already looted much of the north
- The prosperous areas had been stripped
- Local rulers couldn't pay promised tributes
- Maintaining armies in hostile territory was expensive
- Long supply lines drained resources
Raghunath Rao's Second Northern Campaign
The Attock Achievement
Attock (Atak):
- Town at the far northwestern frontier of Mughal Empire
- Today located in Afghanistan
- Considered beyond realm of possibility for Maratha armies
- Too far north and west for any previous Maratha expedition
The Question in Chapter Title:
- "Atak - beyond conception?" (with question mark)
- Asking: Is reaching Atak too far-fetched?
- The answer: They actually did it!
Raghunath Rao's Campaign (1758):
- Sent north by Nana Saheb Peshwa (second time)
- Took control of Lahore
- Pushed forces even beyond Lahore to northwest
- Reached Attock - unprecedented achievement
- Greatest territorial extent of Maratha power in the north
Military Achievement vs. Financial Reality:
The Military Victory:
- Raghunath Rao was proud of the accomplishment
- Maratha army had gone where "nobody could ever imagine"
- Reached the literal edge of the empire
The Financial Disaster:
- Came back with INCREASED debt
- Instead of paying back loans, he took on MORE loans
- Nana Saheb Peshwa was furious
- "I don't give a shit if you went to the end of the earth - I need MONEY"
Nana Saheb: The Hard Realist
His Position:
- He was a "good accountant"
- Understood the business of running an empire
- Could not continue operations that lost money
- "What was the point of all this expansion?"
The Problem:
- Raghunath Rao went north with an army of ~100,000 people
- Nana Saheb had to take out loans to fund this
- Expected Raghunath Rao to collect enough tribute to pay back loans + profit
- Instead: Army returned, debt had INCREASED
- Nana Saheb: "Pretty soon I will be bankrupt!"
Why Raghunath Rao Failed Administratively
The Shivaji Standard
What Shivaji Would Have Done:
- After conquering territory, immediately set up administrative structures
- Establish defensive forces to hold the territory
- Put governing mechanisms in place
- Make sure areas don't revert back to enemy control
- Ensure tax collection systems are functioning
What Raghunath Rao Did:
- Swept through Punjab
- Reached Attock
- Just came back without establishing anything
- Left territories in disarray
- No defensive mechanisms in place
- No administrative government units
- No tax collection infrastructure
The Consequences:
- Enemy could easily return
- No wealth being generated from conquered territories
- Abdali's forces could march right back in
- All that military effort was essentially wasted
- No long-term strategic value
Three Objectives for Dattaji Shinde
Why Dattaji Was Chosen
Nana Saheb's Reasoning:
- Highly capable military commander
- Gets things done - completes assigned tasks
- Honest - won't engage in corruption
- Won't use "Machiavellian schemes"
- Won't try to enrich himself at Peshwa's expense
- Trusted completely by Nana Saheb
Character Description:
- Well-built, sturdy physique
- "A little bit brownish" (darker complexion, not fair-skinned)
- Would finish tasks assigned by Peshwa "in an honest and proper way"
- Known as reliable and ethical
The Three-Part Mission
OBJECTIVE 1: Collect Dues from Rajasthan
The Situation:
- Rajput kingdoms (Jaipur, Udaipur, etc.) had agreed to pay annual tributes
- They had pledged huge amounts over 5-10 year periods
- They were consistently unable to pay
- Mountains of unpaid debt accumulated
The Mission:
- Act as a "collection agency"
- Modern equivalent: Tax collectors/debt collectors
- "I don't care how you do it, but get our dues"
- Use military pressure if necessary
OBJECTIVE 2: Establish Permanent Maratha Presence in North
The Problem Raghunath Rao Created:
- Conquered territories but didn't secure them
- No administrative structures left behind
- No defensive forces stationed
- Territory vulnerable to reconquest
The Solution:
- Station a permanent, powerful Maratha army in the north
- Create fear in the minds of enemies
- Ensure someone of "high caliber" is always present
- Put proper defensive mechanisms in place
Why Dattaji?
- Malhar Rao and Raghunath Rao had said: "We're not settling there forever"
- They wanted to eventually return home
- Need someone willing to stay long-term
- Dattaji was that person
OBJECTIVE 3: Invade Bengal for Revenue
The Best Hope:
- Peshwa knew Bihar and Bengal were best hope for retiring debt
- These provinces had NOT been looted by Abdali
- Still wealthy and prosperous
- Good agricultural output, functioning economy
The Problem:
- 1743 agreement with Raghuji Bhosle said Bengal was OFF LIMITS
- But Nana Saheb was desperate
- His position: "I don't care about that old consensus anymore"
The Calculation:
- Nana Saheb thought he could negotiate new arrangement with Bhosle family
- Raghuji Bhosle was dead by this point
- Succession battle between sons was happening
- Peshwa thought: "We can take advantage of that chaos"
- Maybe strike a deal with one of the sons
- Or just ignore the old agreement entirely
The Distance Challenge:
- Bengal is very far east
- Punjab is very far west
- Distance between the two: at least 2,000 kilometers
- This is a "tall task" even for capable Dattaji
- Managing both fronts simultaneously would be incredibly difficult
Strategic Complexity
The Sequential Plan
BEFORE invading Bengal, Dattaji needed to:
-
Ensure security of Punjab
- Prevent Abdali invasion
- Maintain defensive positions
-
Secure/neutralize Najeeb Khan Rohila
- Deal with this persistent troublemaker
- Eliminate threat in Rohilkhand
-
Take control of Doab region
- The fertile land between Ganga and Yamuna rivers
- Strategic central position
-
Cross through friendly Shuja-ud-Daula's Awadh
- Need cooperation of Awadh's Subedar
- Avoid hostile territory while moving east
-
Take Patna (in Bihar)
- Major city, gateway to Bengal
- Establish base before pushing into Bengal proper
The River Problem
Major Obstacle:
- Had to cross several major rivers while moving army east
- No bridges existed in those days
- Army included horses, cannons, sometimes elephants
- Crossing rivers with full military equipment was "a tall order"
- Timing had to coincide with low water levels
- Monsoon season made this impossible
The Supremacy Moment (Late 1758)
Maratha Peak Power
The Situation:
- Marathas were supreme in the north in late 1758
- Only thing remaining: Secure Bengal
- If Bengal fell, entire subcontinent would be under Maratha control/influence
- This was the closest they came to total dominance
The Reality Check:
- Even with Raghuji Bhosle collecting tributes from Bengal
- There was no direct control over Bengal
- Raghuji was just collecting money, not ruling
- Peshwa wanted actual administrative control
- Full incorporation into Peshwa's sphere
Adina Beg's Invitation (1758)
The Punjab Opening
Who Was Adina Beg:
- Appointed as new Subedar of Punjab by Raghunath Rao
- Was supposed to handle Punjab administration
- Create stability in the region
What Happened:
- Adina Beg DIED (shortly after appointment)
- This left Punjab without strong leadership
- Created power vacuum
- Made Punjab vulnerable again
The Invitation:
- Before dying, Adina Beg had invited Marathas to help secure Punjab
- This invitation was used as justification
- Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao decided to go to Punjab in response
- But timing got complicated with Adina Beg's death
Timeline of Dattaji's Movements
The Marwad Campaign (1756)
February 1756:
- Dattaji campaigned in Marwad (Rajasthan province)
- Taking revenge for Vijay Singh's actions
- Vijay Singh had caused the death of Dattaji's elder brother Jayapa
- After completing this revenge mission, returned to Pune
Staying in Pune (1758)
October 1758:
- Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao were sent north (second northern expedition)
- Dattaji did NOT accompany them this time
- He stayed in Pune after returning from Marwad
- Got married around this time (1758)
Going North (Late 1758/Early 1759)
When Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao returned:
- They came back from the Attock expedition
- They had achieved tremendous territorial expansion
- But created huge financial problems
- Made clear they wouldn't stay in north permanently
Nana Saheb's Decision:
- Realized need for permanent high-caliber presence in north
- Someone who would "create fear in minds of enemies"
- Someone willing to be stationed there long-term
- Chose Dattaji Shinde and Jankoji
Key Personalities
| Name | Role | Key Traits |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa (ruler in Pune) | Practical, accountant-minded, facing bankruptcy |
| Dattaji Shinde | Military Commander | Honest, capable, gets things done, trusted |
| Raghunath Rao | Nana Saheb's brother | Ambitious, great military leader, poor administrator |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior Commander | Experienced, diplomatic, not staying north permanently |
| Raghuji Bhosle | Ruler of Nagpur | Now dead, had exclusive rights to Bengal |
| Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar | Raghuji's commander | Collected tributes from Bengal effectively |
| Ali Vardi Khan | Subedar of Bengal | Now dead, used to pay tribute to Raghuji |
| Adina Beg | Subedar of Punjab | Invited Marathas, then died, creating vacuum |
| Shivaji | Founder (past) | Standard for proper territorial administration |
| Jayapa Shinde | Dattaji's elder brother | Killed by Vijay Singh, avenged by Dattaji |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Bengal - Far eastern province, wealthy, contested territory
- Bihar - Province west of Bengal, also wealthy
- Patna - Major city in Bihar, gateway to Bengal
- Punjab - Northwestern province, under constant Afghan threat
- Attock (Atak) - Far northwestern frontier town
- Lahore - Punjab capital
- Awadh - Province ruled by Shuja-ud-Daula, between Delhi and Bengal
- Doab - Region between Ganga and Yamuna rivers
- Marwad - Province in Rajasthan where Dattaji campaigned
- Pune - Maratha capital, Peshwa's base
Major Themes
1. Financial Desperation
The Peshwa's crushing debt was driving all strategic decisions. Glory meant nothing without revenue.
2. The Administration Gap
Military conquest without administrative follow-through was worthless. Raghunath Rao learned this the hard way.
3. Breaking Old Agreements
Financial pressure forced Peshwa to consider violating the 1743 Bengal agreement with Raghuji Bhosle.
4. The Trust Factor
Nana Saheb needed someone he could trust completely - that was Dattaji. Honesty and reliability mattered more than brilliance.
5. Overextension Problem
The distance between Punjab (west) and Bengal (east) - 2,000 km - made simultaneous control nearly impossible.
What's at Stake
If Dattaji Succeeds:
- Collect desperately needed revenue from Rajasthan
- Secure permanent Maratha presence in north
- Potentially gain control of Bengal's wealth
- Save Peshwa from bankruptcy
- Complete Maratha control over entire subcontinent
If Dattaji Fails:
- Peshwa faces financial collapse
- Northern territories revert to enemy control
- Bengal remains independent
- Maratha expansion halts or reverses
- Empire unsustainable
The Irony
Late 1758 = Peak of Maratha Power:
- Supreme in the north
- Only Bengal remaining for total subcontinent control
- Closer than ever to complete dominance
BUT:
- Financially on the edge of bankruptcy
- Overextended across vast territories
- Dependent on single honest commander (Dattaji) to save everything
- One wrong move could collapse the whole structure
The Marathas stand at their greatest territorial extent and their most precarious financial position simultaneously. Everything now depends on Dattaji Shinde - can one honest, capable commander solve the crushing debt, secure two thousand kilometers of hostile territory, and potentially conquer the richest province in India? The empire's survival hangs in the balance.
Peshwa's Strategic Instructions to Dattaji & The Holkar-Shinde Dynamic (December 1758)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Peshwa's Letters to Dattaji Shinde
Letter to Ramaji Anant (17 December 1758)
Who Was Ramaji Anant:
- Shinde family's Amatya (Chief of Staff)
- Administrative head handling Shinde clan affairs
- Recipient of official instructions from Peshwa
The Core Instructions:
"Take the side of the Wazir and destroy Najeeb Khan Rohila"
Why This Mattered:
- Nana Saheb Peshwa KNEW Najeeb Khan was a troublemaker
- "He is never going to come around" - irredeemable enemy
- Needs to be eliminated, not negotiated with
- More like an extremist - no room for compromise
The Missed Opportunity:
- When Nana Saheb was in Delhi previously, he could have dealt with Najeeb
- But Malhar Rao Holkar interfered - protected Najeeb
- So Najeeb survived and remained a problem
- Now giving Dattaji clear orders: finish the job
The Punjab Leadership Vacuum
The Adina Beg Problem:
The Setup:
- Lahore and Punjab had been secured (briefly)
- Adina Beg appointed as new Subedar of Punjab by Raghunath Rao
- Was supposed to handle administration and defense
- Sabaji Shinde stationed to help Adina Beg
- Sabaji = younger brother (or close relative) of Dattaji Shinde
The Crisis:
- Adina Beg DIED
- Left Punjab without a Subedar (governor)
- Sabaji Shinde was an outsider with insufficient forces
- No legitimate local authority figure
- Power vacuum creating instability
Peshwa's Response:
- This is why Dattaji Shinde MUST go to Punjab
- Must provide strong leadership presence
- Establish new administrative structure
- Can't leave Sabaji alone with inadequate resources
The Bengal Directive
Why Bengal Matters
Nana Saheb's Calculation:
"The work to be done in Bengal is also important. In Bengal, we can make money."
The Strategy:
- Head east towards Bengal after securing Punjab
- Bengal = revenue source desperately needed
- This is the solution to Peshwa's debt crisis
The Shuja-ud-Daula Factor
Who Was Shuja-ud-Daula:
- Subedar of Awadh (also called Ayodhya)
- The "kingdom of Ayodhya" (later called Awadh by Muslims)
- His territory lay between Delhi and Bengal
- Key ally for eastern expansion
The Plan:
- When moving east toward Bengal, take the Wazir with you
- Having the Mughal Wazir along provides legitimacy
- If you need help, the Wazir's presence helps negotiations
- Adds official Mughal sanction to the campaign
The Trust Factor
Peshwa's Confidence in Dattaji
"If Dattaji Shinde really focuses on something, he will definitely do it."
Why Such Confidence:
- Nana Saheb had complete faith in Dattaji's abilities
- Track record of completing assigned tasks
- Honest and reliable
- Focused and determined
The Warning About Trust:
"There's no need to take help from people whom we cannot trust."
The Mansoor Ali Mystery:
- Someone named "Mansoor Ali" mentioned in the letter
- Identity unclear - possibly unreliable ally
- Definitely NOT the same person as Shuja-ud-Daula
- Peshwa warning against involving untrustworthy characters
The Desperate Financial Plea
Peshwa's Personal Request
The Summary of the Letter:
"Please do me a favor because I'm in debt. I need to pay it off, at least partially. Make sure you make some money for me."
The Backstory:
- Raghunath Rao went north with borrowed money
- Peshwa gave him treasure acquired through loans
- Raghunath Rao came back with INCREASED debt
- Peshwa now desperate for revenue
The Order:
"Do whatever it takes, but get me some money."
The Pressure:
- This wasn't just a military mission
- This was a financial rescue operation
- Dattaji HAD to return with tribute/revenue
- The Peshwa's government was on the edge of bankruptcy
The Second Letter (24 December 1758)
A Comprehensive Strategic Document
To: Dattaji Shinde directly
Length: Several pages long - very detailed
Content:
- Reinforced points from the first letter
- Provided detailed ideas and directions
- Outlined different scenarios Dattaji might face
- Gave three alternatives for various situations
- Comprehensive strategic guidance
Purpose:
- Ensure Dattaji understood the mission completely
- Prepare him for multiple contingencies
- Show the complexity and importance of the task
- Demonstrate how much thought Peshwa had put into this
Jankoji Shinde's Rajasthan Mission
The Kota Succession Crisis (Late 1758)
Jankoji Shinde:
- Another member of Shinde clan
- Son of Jayappa Shinde (Dattaji's elder brother who died)
- Young commander, around 20-22 years old
The Mission:
- Went to Rajasthan
- Small kingdom called Kota (like Jaipur or Jodhpur)
- The king had died
- Succession battle between two or more sons
The Resolution:
- Jankoji successfully mediated/resolved the dispute
- Got tribute payment for this service
- This money would help Nana Saheb
- Successful completion of mission
The Generational Meeting: Jankoji & Malhar Rao
Age and Experience Gap
At the Meeting:
- Jankoji: 20-22 years old, young and fresh
- Malhar Rao Holkar: 50-55 years old, seasoned veteran
Experience Difference:
- Malhar Rao had operated in North India for decades
- Had "fixed opinions" about northern politics
- Set in his ways - "old hag" mentality
- Years of experience hardened his views
Jankoji's Perspective:
- Just forming his opinions
- Open-minded to new ideas
- Hadn't developed rigid views yet
- More flexible in thinking
The Shinde-Holkar Rivalry Softens
Traditional Rivalry
Background:
- Shinde and Holkar families were traditional rivals
- Competing for influence and resources
- Tension between the two clans
The Breakthrough:
- This meeting between Jankoji and Malhar Rao
- Helped reduce the intensity of rivalry
- Personal connection helped bridge clan divide
- Not complete resolution, but significant improvement
Malhar Rao's Controversial Advice
The Najeeb Khan Strategy
Jankoji's Question:
- Asked Malhar Rao about politics of the North
- Seeking advice from experienced commander
Malhar Rao's Response:
"Don't get entangled with Najeeb Khan."
The Logic Behind the Advice
Surface Reasoning:
The Argument:
- In Peshwa's eyes, Najeeb Khan Rohila is a big obstacle
- If you kill Najeeb Khan, problem is solved
- But then: Why does Peshwa need you anymore?
- With Najeeb gone, northern situation improves dramatically
- You become obsolete, no longer valuable
The Self-Preservation Strategy:
"Let Najeeb Khan stay in the picture. By doing that, you're doing yourself a favor."
The Calculation:
- As long as Najeeb exists, you're needed to deal with him
- Peshwa will keep you around, value your presence
- You remain "precious" to Peshwa
- Maintain job security by maintaining the problem
The Warning:
"If you don't let go of Najeeb Khan, the Peshwa will punish you? NO. If you DO kill Najeeb Khan, you make yourself obsolete."
The Hidden Agenda
The Real Reason:
- Malhar Rao had adopted Najeeb Khan as his "son"
- Special father-son relationship
- Personal bond, not just political calculation
The Concealment:
- Malhar Rao tried to hide this real motivation
- Framed it as career advice for Jankoji
- "You'll be of use to Peshwa because he needs someone to handle Najeeb"
- But actually protecting his adopted son
The Manipulation:
- Telling Jankoji to spare Najeeb
- Claiming it's for Jankoji's benefit
- Really protecting his own relationship
- Classic case of self-interest disguised as mentorship
The Complex Triangle
Three-Way Dynamic
Peshwa's Position:
- Wants Najeeb Khan eliminated
- Sees him as irredeemable troublemaker
- Direct orders to destroy him
Malhar Rao's Position:
- Wants Najeeb Khan protected
- Personal relationship (adopted son)
- Career justification as cover
- Actively working against Peshwa's wishes
Jankoji/Dattaji's Position:
- Caught between contradictory guidance
- Peshwa says kill Najeeb
- Senior respected commander says spare him
- Must make final decision
The Authority Structure
Shinde Clan Hierarchy
Decision-Making:
- Dattaji Shinde = Head of Shinde clan (after Jayappa's death)
- All major decisions go through him
- Jankoji is youngest member of the clan
- Even if Jankoji has ideas, must get Dattaji's approval
Previous Leaders:
- Jayappa Shinde - former head, now deceased
- Killed by Vijay Singh (avenged by Dattaji in Marwad)
Parallel Structure:
- Holkar clan headed by Malhar Rao Holkar (also called "Malharba")
- Each clan operates somewhat independently
- But both serve under Peshwa ultimately
Raghunath Rao's Regret
The 1758 Delhi Opportunity
What Happened:
- Raghunath Rao took Delhi in 1758
- Had opportunity to remove Najeeb Khan
- Failed to do so - mainly because Malhar Rao adopted Najeeb as son
- Protected him from elimination
The Regret:
- Raghunath Rao now repents this decision
- Wishes he had dealt with Najeeb when he had the chance
- But it's in the past, nothing can be done
- Najeeb survives to cause more problems
The Pattern:
- Malhar Rao consistently protecting Najeeb
- Blocking efforts to eliminate him
- Creating ongoing problems for Maratha strategy
- Personal relationships interfering with strategic objectives
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Age/Experience | Key Trait |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Mature, experienced | Desperate for money, practical |
| Dattaji Shinde | Commander, clan head | Middle-aged | Trusted, honest, capable |
| Jankoji Shinde | Young commander | 20-22 years old | Open-minded, son of Jayappa |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior commander | 50-55 years old | Experienced, set in ways, protective of Najeeb |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Enemy/Troublemaker | Unknown | Malhar Rao's adopted son |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Mature | Regrets not killing Najeeb in 1758 |
| Ramaji Anant | Shinde's Amatya | Unknown | Chief of Staff for Shinde clan |
| Sabaji Shinde | Commander in Punjab | Young | Brother/relative of Dattaji, understaffed |
| Adina Beg | Former Subedar of Punjab | Deceased | Left vacuum in Punjab leadership |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Mature | Key ally for eastern expansion |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Pune - Peshwa's capital, where letters sent from
- Punjab - Northwest, needs strong leadership after Adina Beg's death
- Lahore - Punjab capital
- Delhi - Mughal capital, staging ground
- Awadh/Ayodhya - Eastern kingdom ruled by Shuja-ud-Daula
- Bengal - Far east, target for revenue collection
- Kota - Small Rajasthan kingdom (succession crisis)
- Rajasthan - Region with multiple kingdoms owing tribute
Timeline
- 17 December 1758 - Peshwa writes to Ramaji Anant (Shinde's Amatya)
- 24 December 1758 - Peshwa writes lengthy letter directly to Dattaji
- Late 1758 - Jankoji resolves Kota succession, meets Malhar Rao
- Late 1758 - Adina Beg dies, leaving Punjab without Subedar
Major Themes
1. Conflicting Loyalties
Malhar Rao's personal loyalty to Najeeb Khan vs. his duty to Peshwa creates confusion in strategy.
2. Financial Desperation
Every strategic decision driven by Peshwa's crushing debt. "Get me money" is the primary objective.
3. Generational Divide
Young Jankoji (open-minded) vs. old Malhar Rao (fixed opinions) represents changing of the guard.
4. Hidden Agendas
Malhar Rao frames personal protection of Najeeb as career advice, disguising true motives.
5. Trust and Reliability
Peshwa's complete confidence in Dattaji contrasts with warning against unreliable allies.
Strategic Objectives Summary
For Dattaji Shinde:
- Punjab: Establish strong leadership, fill Adina Beg's vacuum
- Najeeb Khan: Destroy him (despite Malhar Rao's advice to spare)
- Bengal: Move east, generate revenue desperately needed
- Allies: Use Wazir and Shuja-ud-Daula, avoid unreliable people
- Finance: Above all - MAKE MONEY for the Peshwa
The Contradiction
Peshwa's Orders:
- Kill Najeeb Khan
- He's irredeemable troublemaker
- Complete the job we failed to do in 1758
Malhar Rao's Advice:
- Don't kill Najeeb Khan
- Keep him alive for job security
- You'll be obsolete if problem is solved
Dattaji's Dilemma:
- Must obey Peshwa (ultimate authority)
- But respects Malhar Rao (senior commander)
- Personal relationships vs. strategic necessities
- Which guidance to follow?
What's Coming
Immediate Challenges:
- Dattaji must balance contradictory advice
- Punjab needs immediate attention
- Najeeb Khan decision looming
- Eastern campaign toward Bengal must be planned
- Financial pressure mounting
Underlying Tensions:
- Shinde-Holkar rivalry (though improved)
- Malhar Rao's protection of Najeeb
- Peshwa's desperate financial situation
- Young commanders vs. old guard
- Personal loyalties vs. strategic objectives
The letters reveal the complexity of Maratha politics - a Peshwa desperate for money, a trusted commander given impossible tasks, a senior leader protecting his adopted enemy son, and a young commander caught between conflicting advice. Everyone has their own agenda, and somehow Dattaji must navigate all of this while saving the empire from bankruptcy.
Malhar Rao's Cynical Advice & Dattaji's Punjab Operations (Late 1758-1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Malhar Rao's Infamous Warning
The "Soldier of God" Chapter
Chapter Title: Dattaji Shinde - Soldier of God
The Blunt Statement
Malhar Rao Holkar explained to Jankoji:
"We chiefs will be no use for the Peshwa, and the Brahmin chief of the empire will make us wash his soiled clothes."
Translation:
- If we eliminate all problems (like Najeeb Khan)
- We become useless to the Peshwa
- We'll be reduced to menial servants
- "Washing soiled clothes" = degrading, lowly position
- Our military value disappears
The Cynical Logic:
- Najeeb Khan is the REASON Peshwa needs us
- Remove him = remove our purpose
- Keep the problem alive = keep our jobs secure
- Controlled opposition strategy
The Question:
"Did you understand, Lurwe?"
- Direct question to Jankoji - making sure the message landed
- "Lurwe" might be affectionate term or nickname
Jankoji's Response - Unclear
Did He Buy It?
The Text Says:
"Whether Jankoji was influenced by this remark and advice, one cannot say."
The Shinde Family Dynamic:
- Jankoji is the youngest member of the Shinde clan
- He's not the decision-maker
- Dattaji Shinde is the head of the family/clan
- All major decisions taken by Dattaji
- Jankoji might have opinions, but needs approval from head
So Even If Influenced:
- Jankoji couldn't act independently
- Would have to convince Dattaji
- Ultimate call rests with the clan head
Raghunath Rao's Counter-Order
Direct Command to Jankoji
Meanwhile, Raghunath Rao:
- Writing to Jankoji while returning from the north
- Clear instructions: Take post at Delhi
- Mission: "Extirpate Najeeb Khan" (destroy completely)
- Description: "The only thorn for the Marathas in the north"
The Contrast:
- Malhar Rao: "Keep Najeeb alive for job security"
- Raghunath Rao: "Eliminate Najeeb completely"
- Jankoji receiving contradictory orders
- One protects the problem, one solves it
The Shinde Clan Structure
Leadership Hierarchy
Current Head:
- Dattaji Shinde ("Dattaba" - affectionate nickname)
- Makes all major clan decisions
- Succeeded his elder brother Jayappa
Previous Head:
- Jayappa Shinde
- Died/was killed (by Vijay Singh in Marwad)
- Dattaji avenged his death
The Holkar Parallel:
- Malhar Rao Holkar heads the Holkar clan
- Also called "Malharba" (affectionate nickname)
- Same structure as Shinde clan
The System:
- Each clan operates somewhat independently
- But all ultimately serve under Peshwa
- Clan leaders make strategic decisions for their people
Raghunath Rao's 1758 Regret
The Missed Opportunity
What Happened in 1758:
- Raghunath Rao took Delhi
- Had perfect opportunity to remove Najeeb Khan
- FAILED to do so
- Main reason: Malhar Rao's adoption of Najeeb as his son
Current Feelings:
"Raghunath Rao regretted that he could not remove the nuisance of Najeeb Khan... mainly due to Malhar Rao's adoption of Najeeb as his son."
The Pattern:
- This is becoming a recurring problem
- Malhar Rao keeps blocking elimination of Najeeb
- Personal relationship interfering with strategy
- Raghunath Rao now wishes he'd acted anyway
Malhar Rao's Secret Motivation Revealed
The Real Reason for the Advice
We Now See:
"But now we also see he has the secret kind of reason that we are no use to the Peshwa without Najeeb. So he keeps him as controlled opposition kind of."
The Two-Layer Strategy:
Layer 1 (Public Justification):
- "Keep Najeeb alive for your career"
- Framed as mentorship advice to younger commanders
- Job security argument
Layer 2 (Hidden Personal Motive):
- Protecting his adopted son
- Personal father-son bond with Najeeb
- Emotional attachment driving strategic advice
The Manipulation:
- Disguising personal protection as professional advice
- Making others complicit in keeping Najeeb alive
- Creating strategic justification for emotional decision
The Peshwa's Mounting Debt
The Inherited Problem
Sources of Debt:
-
Inherited from Bajirao I (his father)
- Much of the debt pre-existed Nana Saheb
- Starting from a hole financially
-
Northern Expeditions
- Consistently giving diminishing returns
- Costs outpacing revenues
-
Abdali's Raids
- Left northern territories "barren of wealth"
- The richest areas had been looted already
- Nothing left to extract
The Comparison:
"The Peshwa's debt was mounting. Much of this was inherited from his father, Bajirao. Dattaji's expedition was to help reduce this mountain of debt that Nana Saheb Peshwa called 'consumption'."
Consumption = Tuberculosis:
- A disease that eats away at the body
- Slowly destroys from within
- Eventually fatal if untreated
- Perfect metaphor for the debt crisis
Bihar and Bengal: The Last Hope
Why These Provinces Matter
The Calculation:
"The Peshwa knew that Bihar and Bengal were the best hope of retiring his debt."
Why They're Different:
- Abdali had NOT raided these provinces
- Still wealthy and prosperous
- Functioning economies
- Good tax bases
- Agricultural output intact
Contrast with North:
- Delhi and surrounding areas: looted by Abdali
- Punjab: constantly unstable, costly to maintain
- Rajasthan: Rajputs not paying promised tributes
- Only the east remained untapped
The Sequential Strategy Before Bengal
Dattaji's To-Do List
Before invading Bengal, Dattaji needed to:
-
Ensure security of Punjab
- Can't leave exposed northern flank
- Abdali threat remains
-
Secure Najeeb Khan (neutralize or eliminate)
- Can't leave this enemy in rear
- But Malhar Rao complicating this
-
Take Doab
- Region between Ganga and Yamuna
- Strategic central position
- Rich agricultural land
-
Go east through friendly Shuja-ud-Daula's Awadh
- Need safe passage
- Can't fight on all fronts
- Awadh cooperation essential
-
Take Patna (capital of Bihar)
- Gateway to Bengal
- Major city and strategic base
The Complexity:
- Each step depends on previous steps
- Can't skip ahead
- Linear progression required
- Any failure breaks the chain
Late 1758: The Supremacy Moment
Maratha Peak Power
The Situation:
"In late 1758, the Marathas were supreme in the north, and it only needed an invasion of Bengal to secure the entire subcontinent."
What This Meant:
- Marathas had maximum territorial control
- Delhi under their influence
- Punjab nominally secured
- Only Bengal remained independent
- Complete subcontinent control within reach
The Bengal Question
Even with Raghuji Bhosle:
- Raghuji Bhosle was collecting tributes from Bengal
- BUT there was no direct control over Bengal
- Raghuji was just taking money, not ruling
- Not the same as administrative control
Peshwa's Position:
"Peshwa was saying, I don't give a damn about that previous accord that Shahu had negotiated with Raghuji Bhosle."
The 1743 Agreement:
- Shahu had mediated division of territories
- Bengal was Raghuji Bhosle's exclusive sphere
- Lasted peacefully for about 20 years
Breaking the Agreement:
- Nana Saheb now ready to violate this
- Desperate financial situation overriding old treaties
- "I will be looting here as I please"
- No other option but to look to Bengal
The Impossible Task
Why This Was So Difficult
For Even the "Soldierly Dattaji":
"However, this was a tall task, which is the invasion of Bengal for even the soldierly Dattaji."
The Challenges:
- Distance from home base
- Multiple enemies in between
- River crossings with full army
- Supply line maintenance
- Financial pressure for immediate results
- Breaking treaty with fellow Marathas
- Dealing with British presence in Bengal
Jankoji's Early Success
The Jaipur Tribute (Closing Days of 1758)
The Mission:
- Jankoji obtained assurances of promised tribute from Jaipur
- Madho Singh (Raja of Jaipur) agreed to pay
- This was important preliminary success
Moving Towards Delhi:
- Jankoji and Dattaji proceeded towards Delhi together
- End of 1758 / early 1759
- Preparing for major operations
Malhar Rao's Illness and Return to Pune
The Senior Commander Steps Back
The Illness:
- Malhar Rao recovering from "serious illness"
- Had to return to Pune for recovery
- Out of action in the north temporarily
The Explanation:
- Once in Pune, Malhar Rao tried to explain himself to Peshwa
- "His acts of omission in the north"
- Basically explaining why he missed opportunities
- Why he didn't do certain things (like eliminate Najeeb)
- Peshwa was "not very pleased with him"
Back to Rajasthan
The Tribute Collection Mission
Peshwa's Orders to Malhar Rao:
- Go back to Rajasthan
- Obtain pending payment from:
- Maharana of Udaipur
- Madho Singh of Jaipur
The Problem:
- These Rajput kingdoms had made agreements to pay yearly tributes
- They consistently failed to meet these payments
- Always making promises, never delivering
- Had to be "constantly watched over"
Malhar Rao's Year-Long Siege (Entire Year of 1759)
The Jaipur Stalemate
What Happened:
- Malhar Rao remained in Rajasthan for entire year of 1759
- Trying to extract payment from Madho Singh
- Madho Singh organized strong defense
- Jaipur protected by strong compound walls all around the city
The Failure:
"Malhar Rao could not make much headway as long as Jaipur was protected by its strong walls."
The Frustration:
- Whole year spent laying siege
- Couldn't breach the walls
- Couldn't force payment
- Eventually loses patience
- No results to show
Madho Singh's Betrayal Revealed
The Secret Correspondence
The Shocking Discovery:
"What Holkar did not know was that Madho Singh was corresponding with Abdali at this time and following his instructions to obstruct the Marathas at every opportunity."
The Double Game:
On the Surface:
- Madho Singh agreeing to pay tribute
- Negotiating with Marathas
- Appearing cooperative
Behind the Scenes:
- In contact with Abdali
- Following Abdali's orders
- Mission: Obstruct Marathas at every opportunity
- Part of coordinated anti-Maratha alliance
Why This Worked:
"See all the powers in the north were tired of Marathas, you know, trying to pester them for money."
The Northern Powers' Perspective:
- Marathas constantly demanding tribute
- No way to counter them militarily (individually)
- Even collectively, couldn't defeat Marathas
- Only power capable of challenging them: Abdali
- So coordinate with Abdali against common enemy
Dattaji and Jankoji at Delhi Gates
The Timeline Split
Geographical Positions:
- Malhar Rao: In Pune, recovering from illness
- Dattaji and Jankoji: At the gates of Delhi
The Vazir's Promise:
- Mughal Vazir promised funds to Dattaji
- Trying to buy time/cooperation
- Negotiating payment amounts
Burari Ghat Encampment (Early 1759)
Strategic Position
The Location:
"The Shinde army encamped at Burari Ghat on the Yamuna, a few miles north of Delhi."
Why Here:
- North of Delhi
- On the Yamuna River
- Strategic position for multiple operations
- Close to Rohilkhand (Najeeb's territory)
Crossing the Yamuna
Invading Najeeb Khan's Territory
The Water Conditions:
"The water of the Yamuna was low."
The Crossing:
- Dattaji's troops crossed over
- Invaded the territory of Najeeb Khan
- Moving into Rohilkhand (Rohila territory)
About Rohilkhand:
- This is the Rohila's home territory
- Rohilas: Originally Afghan soldiers
- Came to India as "soldiers of fortune"
- Became immigrants, settled in this region
Why They Stayed:
"They just stayed there because they were immigrants and they said, well, this looks like a great land. It has rivers, it has fertile land."
Contrast with Afghanistan:
- Afghanistan: dry, harsh, limited water
- Rohilkhand: fertile, rivers, good agriculture
- No reason to return to Afghanistan
The Loyalty Problem:
"But they never forgot their real loyalty was with Afghans."
The Double Identity:
- Settled in India
- But emotionally/politically still Afghan
- "Acting as spies of Abdali"
- "Still loyal to their mastery" (Afghanistan)
- Anything to do with Afghanistan = their real loyalty
The Delhi Area Wait (January 1759)
Negotiating Indemnity
The Entire Month:
"The entire month of January 1759 was spent in the environs of Delhi."
The Reason:
- Negotiating with the Vazir
- Coming to agreement on amount of indemnity
- How much would be paid to Marathas
Only After Agreement:
- Dattaji finally moved northwards to Punjab
- Couldn't leave until finances secured
- Money was always the priority
The Punjab Mission
Why Dattaji Had to Go West
The Leadership Vacuum:
"And what was the business in Punjab? Because Mr. Adina Beg, the Subedar, had died."
The Requirements:
- Appoint new Subedar
- "Beef up Punjab" - strengthen defenses
- Put administrative structures in place
The Constant Danger:
"Punjab was constantly in danger of being attacked by Afghan army."
Why Afghans Wanted Punjab:
Geographic:
- Bordering Afghanistan
- Direct access
Economic:
- Rich in agricultural outputs
- Fertile land
- Lots of rivers
- Good water supply
The Contrast:
"None of that existed in Afghanistan."
Afghan Claim:
- Afghans said: "Punjab is ours"
- Viewed it as natural extension
- Historically had controlled it
- Wanted it back for resources
Peshwa's Decision on Imad-ul-Mulk
Changing the Vazir
The Decision:
"The Peshwa had at this time decided to remove Imad-ul-Mulk from the Vazir's position."
The Treatment Difference:
Malhar Rao's Approach:
- More "hands off"
- Tolerant
- Passive
- Little "pacific" (peace-loving, non-confrontational)
Dattaji's Approach:
- "If he says something, he will do it"
- Expects others to follow through same way
- No tolerance for excuses
- Proved by his actions and words
The New Dynamic:
"The Mughal court was now dealing with a brusque, impatient soldier who would brook no nonsense."
Dattaji's Order:
- Ordered Imad-ul-Mulk to accompany him
- "In the defense of the emperor's interests"
- Not a request - a command
- Imad had to comply
The Punjab Governing Problem
Why It Was So Difficult
Geographic/Cultural Challenges:
"Far away from their home base and surrounded by a predominantly hostile Muslim population with a roving Sikh presence, Punjab was a difficult province to govern for the Marathas."
The Triple Problem:
- Distance: Far from Maharashtra
- Muslim Population: Hostile to Hindu rulers
- Sikh Aspirations: Wanted self-rule
The Sikh Dynamic:
"Even though the bond between Hindu and Sikh was good and solid..."
The Issue:
- Marathas were "outright foreigners" in Sikh eyes
- "This was supposed to be our land"
- Sikhs wanted to rule themselves
- Main enemy was Muslims, but also didn't want Maratha rule
The Contractual Obligation
Why Marathas Had to Stay
The Mughal Agreement:
"The collapse of Mughal authority and the Maratha bond to defend the emperor had placed this responsibility on them."
What This Meant:
- Marathas signed contract to protect Mughal Empire
- This included defending Punjab
- Couldn't just abandon it
- Contractual duty to maintain
The Resource Problem:
"However, the Marathas did not possess the resources or the local support to hold the Punjab in strength."
The Catch-22:
- Had to defend Punjab (contractual duty)
- Didn't have resources to do it properly
- Couldn't get local support
- Set up for failure
Dattaji's Realization
Understanding the Difficulty
The Quick Assessment:
"Dattaji did not take long to discern the difficulty of having strong defensive arrangements in Punjab."
What He Realized:
- Nearly impossible to maintain strong defense
- Local population against them
- Resources insufficient
- Supply lines too long
- Enemy constantly watching
The Western Push to Sutlej (April 1759)
Maximum Extent
By April 1759:
- Dattaji pushed forward to River Sutlej
- Major river flowing through Punjab
- Eventually empties into Indus River (Sindhu)
Geographic Movement:
- Moving westward into deeper Punjab
- Further from home base
- Closer to Afghan territory
Meeting Sabaji Shinde
The Peshawar Commander
Who Was Sabaji:
- Came from Peshawar (far northwest, near Kabul)
- Family member of Dattaji
- Had been stationed watching Afghan invasion route
The Meeting:
- Met Dattaji at River Sutlej banks
- Briefed him on ground situation
- Shared intelligence about the region
The Problem with Sabaji's Position:
"Basically Maratha army was highly stretched, overly stretched. Because the job was very difficult and challenging, but the army that they had been given was extremely small."
The Setup for Failure:
- Sabaji given critical mission
- But "insufficient forces"
- Expected to defend most vulnerable route
- Not enough resources
- Nearly impossible task
The Historical Context
First Time This Far North
Unprecedented:
"This is happening for the first time in Maratha history because Marathas had never ever come so much to the north."
The Pattern with Bajirao I:
- Even when Bajirao I came north
- Maratha soldiers always wanted to go home
- Would campaign for 6-8 months
- Then: "We want to go home now"
The New Challenge:
- Now required to stay put for long periods
- They were "not ready" for this
- Cultural/psychological barrier
- Homesickness and distance
The Enemy Advantage:
"Because their enemy was not taking vacation at all."
Why:
- Punjab was Afghan/Rohila home territory
- They lived there
- No vacation needed
- Always present, always watching
- Marathas at disadvantage
Strategic Appointments Across Punjab
The Defensive Network
After Taking Stock:
"After taking stock of the situation with a view to head eastwards, Dattaji appointed several officers to the main towns of the Punjab."
The Appointments:
| Location | Commander | Strategic Importance |
|---|---|---|
| Peshawar | Sabaji Shinde | Western frontier, closest to Afghanistan/Kabul border |
| Attock | Tukoji Holkar | Northern defense, strategic town |
| Multan | Bappuji Trimbak | Southern Punjab city |
| Lahore | Naro Shankar | Punjab capital, central command |
Note on Tukoji Holkar:
- From Holkar clan
- But part of the broader Maratha army
- Clans working together in this campaign
Implementing the Peshwa's Strategy
The Sequential Plan
The Orders in Earnest:
"Dattaji then began to execute the Peshwa's orders in earnest."
The Plan:
- ✅ Stabilize Punjab - Done with appointments
- ✅ Understand political landscape - Done through meetings
- ✅ Make key appointments - Done across major towns
- 🔄 Prevent outside aggression - Ongoing mission
- ⏳ Next objectives:
- Head towards Delhi area
- Deal with Najeeb Khan
- Eventually move east toward Bengal
Key Figures in This Session
| Name | Role | Current Status |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde ("Dattaba") | Maratha Commander, Clan Head | At Delhi/Punjab, executing mission |
| Jankoji Shinde | Young Commander | With Dattaji, receiving conflicting advice |
| Malhar Rao Holkar ("Malharba") | Senior Commander, Holkar Clan Head | In Pune (ill), then Rajasthan (besieging Jaipur) |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Sending orders to eliminate Najeeb |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Desperate for money, ordering aggressive action |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Enemy leader | Malhar Rao's adopted son, target for elimination |
| Madho Singh | Raja of Jaipur | Double-dealing with Abdali behind scenes |
| Abdali | Afghan ruler | Coordinating anti-Maratha resistance |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mughal Vazir | Ordered to accompany Dattaji |
| Sabaji Shinde | Commander at Peshawar | Understaffed, difficult position |
| Adina Beg | Former Punjab Subedar | Deceased, created vacuum |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Delhi - Mughal capital, Maratha staging ground
- Burari Ghat - Yamuna crossing north of Delhi
- Yamuna River - Natural barrier, low in January
- Rohilkhand - Najeeb Khan's territory, east of Yamuna
- Punjab - Northwestern province needing defense
- Sutlej River - Western extent of Dattaji's push
- Peshawar - Far northwest, near Afghanistan
- Attock - Northern strategic town
- Multan - Southern Punjab city
- Lahore - Punjab capital
- Jaipur - Rajasthan kingdom, under siege by Malhar Rao
- Pune - Maratha capital, Peshwa's base
Timeline
- Late 1758 - Marathas supreme in north, only Bengal remaining
- Late 1758 - Jankoji gets assurances from Madho Singh
- Late 1758 - Malhar Rao ill, returns to Pune
- Late 1758 - Peshwa sends Malhar Rao back to Rajasthan
- January 1759 - Dattaji camps at Burari Ghat, negotiates with Vazir
- January 1759 - Troops cross Yamuna into Rohilkhand
- Entire 1759 - Malhar Rao besieging Jaipur (unsuccessfully)
- April 1759 - Dattaji reaches River Sutlej, meets Sabaji
- After April 1759 - Makes appointments across Punjab
Major Themes
1. Cynical Career Preservation
Malhar Rao's advice to keep problems alive for job security - dark realpolitik.
2. The Debt as Disease
Consumption (tuberculosis) metaphor perfectly captures the slow death of Peshwa finances.
3. Secret Alliances
Madho Singh coordinating with Abdali while pretending to cooperate - widespread betrayal.
4. Impossible Expectations
Commanders given critical missions with insufficient resources - set up to fail.
5. Cultural Distance
Marathas trying to govern hostile populations far from home - cultural imperialism failing.
6. The Personal vs. Strategic
Malhar Rao's father-son bond with Najeeb overriding strategic necessities.
7. Peak and Precipice
Maximum territorial extent coinciding with maximum financial crisis - empire at breaking point.
The Overarching Irony
Late 1758 = Simultaneous Peak and Crisis:
The Peak:
- Supreme in the north
- Only Bengal remaining for total subcontinent control
- Maximum territorial extent ever achieved
- Delhi under control
- Multiple provinces secured
The Crisis:
- Crushing debt described as consumption (fatal disease)
- Northern territories barren from Abdali's raids
- Resources stretched impossibly thin
- Commanders undersupplied
- Secret alliances working against them
- Cultural resistance everywhere
- Financial collapse imminent
The Question: Can they complete the conquest of Bengal before the debt consumes them? Or will the empire collapse under its own weight just as it reaches its greatest extent?
The Marathas stand at the highest point they've ever reached - and it's a precipice. One wrong step and everything collapses. Dattaji Shinde must somehow hold Punjab with insufficient forces, collect tribute from double-dealing Rajput kingdoms, eliminate Najeeb Khan despite Malhar Rao's interference, and then march 2,000 km east to conquer Bengal - all while the debt slowly kills the empire like tuberculosis. No pressure.
Peshwa's Strategic Instructions & The Fatal River-Crossing Problem (Early-Mid 1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Nana Saheb's Clear Strategic Vision
The Peshwa's Instructions
From Pune, Nana Saheb gave precise directions:
- Defined allies, adversaries, and demands lucidly
- Laid out broad principles of policy
- Gave Dattaji clear strategic framework
The Title:
- Peshwa considered Dattaji: "Ishwaratha Shipai" = "God's Soldier"
- Righteous and powerful
- Trustworthy executor of divine/righteous mission
The Assumptions
These plans were plausible in early 1759 because:
- No opposition from Indian princes to Marathas
- Abdali was embroiled in civil war in Afghanistan
The Problem:
"If those assumptions were not to be true, then there is a problem."
The Fatal Flaw:
- Everything depended on Abdali staying busy in Afghanistan
- If he resolved his internal problems and came to India...
- The entire strategy would collapse
The Najeeb Khan Warning (March-May 1759)
Peshwa's Repeated Warnings
Letter of 21 March 1759:
"You have written that Najeeb would pay 30 lakhs to be made the Mir Bakshi of the Mughals. However, he is very treacherous. If he settles in Delhi, it is like Abdali being in Delhi."
The Snake Metaphor:
"Advancing him is like feeding a cobra with milk. Crush him."
Letter of 2 May 1759:
- Nana Saheb calls Najeeb Khan a "crook"
- Labels him "half Abdali"
- Basically Abdali's proxy in India
Over Six Months of Warnings
The Pattern:
- Peshwa warned Dattaji repeatedly
- Every letter: "Crush Najeeb Khan"
- Recognized his treacherous nature
- Knew he could never be trusted
Dattaji's Proposal (Rejected)
What Dattaji Wanted:
- Offer Najeeb the Mir Bakshi post in Delhi
- Try to co-opt him into Maratha system
- Use his skills for Maratha benefit
Peshwa's Response:
- Absolutely NOT
- Cannot be trusted under any circumstances
- Will betray at first opportunity
- Must be eliminated, not promoted
The Insight:
"Peshwa was prescient. Dattaji probably didn't understand because he was relatively new to the politics of the North."
The Deal with Shuja-ud-Daula
The Proposed Exchange
What Peshwa Wanted from Shuja:
-
The Three Holy Cities:
- Allahabad (Prayagraj)
- Kashi (Varanasi)
- Mathura
-
50 Lakh Rupees
What Marathas Would Give:
- Back Shuja-ud-Daula as Imperial Wazir
- Give him power and legitimacy
- Support against his enemies
Why the Holy Cities Mattered
Religious Significance:
- These are the holiest of holy sites for Hindus
- Even for Marathas from Maharashtra, these three sites are paramount
- Had been under Islamic rule for centuries
- Sore point for Hindu identity
Shivaji's Legacy:
"Marathas have the character of a Hindu kingdom given by Shivaji."
Pride Factor:
- Taking back these holy sites = symbolic victory
- Reclaiming Hindu sacred geography
- Fulfilling Hindu nationalist aspirations
The Economic Reality
Why Shuja Didn't Want to Give Them Up:
The Religious Economy:
- Hindu pilgrimage sites = massive economic hubs
- Constant flow of visitors spending money
- Small businesses thriving around temples
- Huge donation revenues
- "The economy of these religious places was humongous"
The Tax Revenue:
- Subedar collected taxes from all this economic activity
- Enormous steady income stream
- "Finally it comes down to money"
Shuja's Dilemma:
- Wanted to be Wazir (needed Maratha support)
- But didn't want to give up his richest territories
- Procrastinated on this point
Punjab: The Five Rivers
Geographic Lesson
The Five Rivers of Punjab:
- Sutlej
- Beas
- Ravi
- Chenab
- Jhelum
All Five Meet:
- Flow into the Sindhu (Indus) River
- Sindhu = so huge it's called "Nod" (masculine), not "Nadi" (feminine)
- Creates incredibly fertile region
- "So much water that you can't imagine"
Just Like Doab:
- Doab = land between Ganga and Yamuna
- Very fertile region between two rivers
- Punjab = same concept but five rivers
The Chiefs Ignored Peshwa's Warnings
Malhar Rao's Interference (Again)
Why Najeeb Survived:
"The Peshwa recognized Najeeb Khan's potential for mischief, but his chiefs had let him be."
Which Chief?
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Deliberately ignored Najeeb's mischiefs
- Ignored his ambitions and treachery
- Protected him as adopted son
The Cynical Career Logic:
- "He is the reason we have a job"
- Keep the problem alive = keep your position
But Also Genuine:
- Mutual father-son feeling
- Honest about relationship (not hypocritical)
- Real emotional bond
Raghunath Rao's Experience
He Knew the Danger
Raghunath Rao Warned Dattaji:
- Wrote to protect the north from Abdali's invasion
- He had seen the devastation Abdali could wreak
- Met Abdali's divisions during first northern tour
- Tasted the fury of Abdali's army
His Regret:
"Raghunath Rao did understand the risk."
Why This Mattered:
- Raghunath Rao had EXPERIENCE with Abdali
- Knew firsthand how dangerous he was
- Tried to warn Dattaji
- But Dattaji had different priorities
Dattaji's Fatal Decision
Discarding the Peshwa's Warning
The Choice:
"In the circumstances, Dattaji discarded the Peshwa's warning to crush Najeeb Khan, deciding to use him instead."
Why:
- Focused on securing Punjab first
- Wanted to reach Patna before monsoons
- Plan: Secure Punjab → Cross Ganga → Reach Bihar/Bengal
- Needed to move FAST
The Overstretch:
- Marathas spreading themselves too thin
- Assumed Abdali would stay busy in Afghanistan
- But if Abdali finished his internal challenges?
- He'd come back to India and focus on Punjab first
The Distance Problem:
- If Dattaji is in Bihar/Bengal (far east)
- And Abdali attacks Punjab (far west)
- Dattaji is at least 3-4-5 days away, maybe a week
- No prominent commander left in Punjab itself
- Despite appointments, needed someone of Dattaji's caliber
The River-Crossing Problem
Why Dattaji Needed Najeeb
The Technical Challenge:
- To go east, must cross mighty rivers
- Marathas had NO technique to cross rivers with armies
- This was critical engineering capability they lacked
Najeeb's Expertise:
- Developed pontoon bridge technique
- Ties boats together one to another
- Creates bridge-like structure across river
- Army, horses, cannons can cross
The Snake's Promise:
- Najeeb kept promising: "Yes, I will do it. I will help you."
- But he was lying the whole time
- Knew if he taught Marathas this technique:
- Marathas become highly mobile
- Najeeb becomes unnecessary
- Marathas would eliminate him
Dattaji's Gullibility:
"The Dattaji was relatively gullible. He didn't understand that this guy can never be trusted."
The Trap:
- Najeeb promised help repeatedly
- Always had excuse: "I'm busy here, busy there"
- "No problem, I'm at your service"
- Dattaji believed him
- Couldn't read people properly
Following Malhar Rao's Bad Advice
Dattaji's Plan:
- Follow Malhar Rao's advice to cultivate friendship with Najeeb
- Use his help to cross the Ganga
- Pass towards Awadh
- From Awadh → Bihar → Bengal
The Geographic Necessity:
- Unless Ganga is crossed, cannot go to Awadh
- From Awadh must go to Bihar
- Then cross into Bengal (extreme east)
- Sequential progression required
The Choice:
- Instead of killing Najeeb (as Peshwa ordered)
- Decided to develop "workable relationship"
- Try to exploit his expertise
- Avoid "extreme step" of elimination
The Movement to Shukratal
May 1759: Returning from Sutlej
The Route:
- Returned from banks of Sutlej River (Punjab)
- Finished stabilizing Punjab (or tried to)
- Crossed Yamuna near Panipat
- Camped at Shamli
Geographic Context:
- Sutlej = major river in Punjab
- Starts from Himalayas
- Flows through India
- Empties into Sindhu
Panipat:
- Historic town (site of major battles)
- Today in Haryana state
- Yamuna crossing point
The Bridge at Shukratal
The Plan:
- Cross Ganga at Shukratal
- Use bridge of boats built by Najeeb
- Proceed on eastern conquest
- Najeeb promised "all the help"
What's Shukratal:
- Place on eastern banks of Ganga
- If Najeeb builds pontoon bridge here
- Dattaji can cross from west to east bank
- Army, horses, everything crosses on bridge
The Fatal Weakness Exposed
Marathas Never Mastered River Crossings
The Core Problem:
"Crossing rivers in North India in the monsoons was a task the Marathas never quite mastered and this neglect was to cost them dearly."
Why This Will Matter:
- "You're going to see that more and more as we go into the next year"
- Rivers must be crossed to wage war effectively
- "Unless you go where the enemy is, you can't fight a war"
- All these problems coming "very quickly"
The Engineering Gap
The Maratha Background:
- Originally farmers from Deccan
- Fought in dry season (winter months)
- Would farm during monsoon
- Return to military in dry season
- Never developed skills to wage war in monsoon
- Never developed river-crossing technology
Not in Their Toolbox:
- "That wasn't in their toolbox"
- Didn't evolve technologically
- Never had to cross major rivers in Deccan
Northern India Different:
- "Lots of rivers that they had to cross"
- Especially during monsoon = stuck
- "Very bad thing for your military campaign"
- Waste time, lose momentum
Abdali's Seasonal Pattern
Why Abdali Timed His Invasions
The Afghan Problem:
"Abdali didn't want to be in India during the summer months."
Why:
- Afghans don't like Indian heat
- Too hot and humid
- Afghanistan is much cooler (further north)
- Can't tolerate Indian summer
The Invasion Schedule:
- Start: October (after hot season)
- Stay in India through winter
- Do looting, massacres, campaigns
- Leave: April (before summer begins)
April-June:
- Extremely hot = Indian summer
- Abdali's forces can't handle it
June onwards:
- Monsoon begins
- Heavy rains, soggy earth
- Armies can't move easily
- Travel becomes very difficult
- Can get stuck
River Problem in Monsoon:
- Even with pontoon technique, difficult to cross
- Rivers that are normally half-mile wide
- Become three miles wide in monsoon
- Makes crossing nearly impossible
Abdali's Advantage:
- Despite problems, still more skilled than Marathas
- "Little better than Marathas"
- But Marathas completely dependent on locals
The Local Advantage
Gujars: The River Experts
Who Were Gujars:
- Local people who lived around rivers
- Had expertise to cross rivers
- Knew the fords (shallow crossing points)
- Even in monsoon, knew where depth wasn't too much
Their Service:
- Paid by armies passing through
- Provided critical intelligence
- Showed where to cross safely
- Made army movement possible
The Knowledge Gap:
"We are going to see how that made a huge difference. Tremendous difference."
The British Learn This Lesson
40 Years Later
General Wellington's Strategy (circa 1800):
"Even 40 years later, the English General Wellington laid down to his troops that a war against the Marathas should commence in June to take advantage of flooded rivers that the Marathas could not cross."
What This Shows:
- Maratha weakness persisted for HALF A CENTURY
- Never developed river-crossing capability
- British exploited this systematically
- Started campaigns during monsoon deliberately
- Knew Marathas would be immobilized by rivers
Dattaji's Letter to Peshwa (6 August 1759)
The Strategy Explained
What Dattaji Wrote:
"I hope to complete the job in Bengal soon. Najeeb Khan's agent has promised he will accompany me with his army. If he comes, it is good. If he does not, I will punish him and go to the east."
The Problem:
- "This will take time and delay the larger venture of going to Bengal"
- Can't afford delay
The Decision:
"I am therefore taking his help to cross the Ganga and go to Shuja's province."
The Priority:
"The debts the Swami [Peshwa] has incurred will be paid by the revenues of Bengal."
"Day and night I am seized of the matter of paying off these debts. I will labor to obtain the funds to repay these debts."
What This Reveals
Dattaji Knows:
- Peshwa's top priority = money
- Must get to Bengal to collect revenue
- Debt situation is critical
The Fatal Trade-off:
- Left Punjab on its own (undermanned)
- Priority is paying off loans = must reach Bengal
- But before Bengal, must cross Ganga
- Depending entirely on Najeeb Khan for bridge
- Ignored Peshwa's orders to eliminate Najeeb
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Key Actions/Traits |
|---|---|---|
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | Giving clear warnings about Najeeb, desperate for money |
| Dattaji Shinde | Commander in North | "God's Soldier," but gullible about Najeeb |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Enemy | Snake, liar, expert at pontoon bridges, stalling |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior Commander | Protecting Najeeb (adopted son), bad advice |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Experienced with Abdali, warned Dattaji |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Wants to be Wazir, won't give up holy cities |
| Abdali | Afghan ruler | Busy in Afghanistan, but if he comes... |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Pune - Maratha capital, Peshwa's base
- Punjab - Five rivers, needs securing, far northwest
- Sutlej River - One of Punjab's rivers, where Dattaji operated
- Panipat - Historic town, Yamuna crossing point
- Shamli - East of Yamuna, Dattaji's camp
- Shukratal - On Ganga, where bridge needed
- Ganga River - Major barrier to eastern expansion
- Awadh - Shuja's kingdom, contains holy cities
- Allahabad (Prayagraj) - Holy city, confluence of Ganga-Yamuna
- Kashi (Varanasi) - Holiest Hindu city
- Mathura - Krishna's birthplace, holy city
- Patna - Capital of Bihar, Dattaji's target
- Bengal - Far east, wealthy, debt solution
Timeline
- 21 March 1759 - Peshwa warns about Najeeb: "like Abdali being in Delhi"
- 2 May 1759 - Peshwa calls Najeeb "crook" and "half Abdali"
- March-May 1759 - Six months of repeated warnings to crush Najeeb
- May 1759 - Dattaji returns from Sutlej, crosses Yamuna at Panipat
- 6 August 1759 - Dattaji writes to Peshwa explaining strategy
- Late 1759 - Critical period approaching
Major Themes
1. The Fatal Assumption
Everything depends on Abdali staying in Afghanistan. If not...
2. Ignoring the Prophet
Peshwa warned repeatedly about Najeeb. Dattaji ignored him. Classic tragic flaw.
3. The Technical Gap
Lack of river-crossing ability = strategic weakness that persists for 50 years.
4. Religious vs. Economic
Holy cities matter religiously, but Shuja keeps them for economic reasons. Money wins.
5. The Snake's Game
Najeeb promises help, stalls, lies. Dattaji too gullible to see through it.
6. Overextension
Trying to hold Punjab AND reach Bengal = spreading too thin.
7. Local Knowledge Matters
Gujars' knowledge of fords = critical advantage. Outsiders at disadvantage.
The Ominous Setup
Late 1759:
- Dattaji camped at Shamli, waiting for bridge
- Dependent on Najeeb (who is lying)
- Punjab left undermanned
- Abdali potentially finishing Afghan civil war
- Peshwa's warnings ignored
- Rivers about to become barriers
- Monsoon season approaching
The Question:
"We are heading to the point where Peshwa is going to be very, very severely shocked."
The Awakening:
- Peshwa has been in a "slumber"
- About to be "awakened through his slumber"
- Will have to "take drastic steps"
Dattaji stands at the banks of the Ganga, depending on a snake to build him a bridge, having ignored his master's warnings for six months. Punjab sits undermanned behind him. Bengal beckons with its wealth ahead. And in Afghanistan, Abdali is finishing his civil war, preparing to notice that the Marathas have made a fatal mistake. The cobra is being fed milk, and it's about to strike.
Maratha River-Crossing Weakness & The Failed Meeting at Shamli (1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha Army's Fatal Weakness
Why Marathas Couldn't Cross Rivers
The Agricultural Origins:
- Maratha soldiers were primarily farmers
- Farming happens during monsoon season (June-September)
- Military campaigns during dry season (winter months)
- Back to farming when rains came
The Cycle:
- Farm during monsoon
- Fight during dry season for 6 months
- Return to farming
- Otherwise would be unemployed
- Never had reason to develop monsoon warfare skills
The Missing Skill:
"They never had any inkling or skills to wage war in the monsoon when it is soggy and wet and rainy."
The Technology Gap:
- Never had to cross major rivers in Deccan
- "That was not their expertise"
- "Technologically, they never developed, you know, they didn't evolve"
The Northern Problem:
- North India = "lots of rivers that they had to cross"
- Can't cross during monsoon = stuck
- "You waste time"
- Terrible for military campaigns
Abdali's Strategic Timing
The Afghan Invasion Schedule
Abdali's Pattern:
- Invasions begin: October
- Return home: April
Why This Schedule:
Avoiding Indian Summer:
"Abdali didn't want to be in India during the summer months. Afghans don't like the Indian heat."
The Climate Difference:
- Afghanistan: Much cooler (far north)
- India: Extremely hot and humid summers
- Afghans couldn't tolerate it
April-June:
- "Extremely hot" = Indian summer
- Too brutal for Afghan forces
- Time to retreat
June onwards:
- Monsoon begins
- Heavy rains, soggy earth
- "Armies don't move"
- Very difficult to travel
- Easy to get stuck
Even Abdali Struggled
River Crossing in Monsoon:
- Even knowing pontoon technique
- Rivers normally half-mile wide → become three miles wide
- Makes crossing difficult even for experts
Abdali's Advantage:
"Abdali was more well versed with that though. He was little better than Marathas."
Maratha Situation:
"Marathas were completely dependent."
The Gujar Advantage
Local Knowledge = Critical Resource
Who Were Gujars:
- Local people living around rivers
- Had expertise to cross rivers
- Knew the fords (shallow crossing points)
- Even in monsoon, knew safe passages
Their Service:
"These locals, often Gujars, were paid for these services by the armies passing through these areas."
What They Knew:
- Where river depth wasn't too much
- Best places to cross
- Safe routes even in monsoon
- Expert local knowledge
The Strategic Value:
"We are going to see how that made a huge difference. Tremendous difference."
British Learn the Lesson (40 Years Later)
General Wellington's Strategy
The Year: ~1799-1800 (40 years after 1759)
Wellington's Orders to His Troops:
"A war against the Marathas should commence in June to take advantage of flooded rivers that the Marathas could not cross."
What This Proves:
- Maratha weakness persisted for half a century
- Never corrected this fundamental flaw
- British systematically exploited it
- Started campaigns during monsoon deliberately
- Knew Marathas would be immobilized
The Long-Term Impact:
- This wasn't a temporary problem
- Became permanent strategic vulnerability
- Contributed to eventual British victory
Dattaji's August 1759 Letter
The Strategy Laid Out
To the Peshwa, 6 August 1759:
The Plan:
"I hope to complete the job in Bengal soon."
The Najeeb Gamble:
"Najeeb Khan's agent has promised he will accompany me with his army. If he comes, it is good. If he does not, I will punish him and go to the east."
The Time Problem:
"This will take time and delay the larger venture of going to Bengal."
The Decision:
"I am therefore taking his help to cross the Ganga and go to Shuja's province."
The Priority:
"The debts the Swami [the Peshwa] has incurred will be paid by the revenues of Bengal."
"Day and night I am seized of the matter of paying off these debts. I will labor to obtain the funds to repay these debts."
What Dattaji Has Done
The Trade-off:
- Left Punjab on its own
- Priority = paying off loans
- Must get to Bengal for that
- But must cross Ganga first
- Depending entirely on Najeeb for bridge
The Risk:
- Punjab undermanned
- No high-caliber commander there
- Vulnerable if Abdali comes
- All eggs in Bengal basket
The Failed Meeting at Shamli
The Setup
Dattaji's Position:
- Camped at Shamli
- East of Yamuna (has crossed it)
- West of Ganga (still needs to cross)
The Invitation:
- Dattaji invited Najeeb to meeting
- Supposed to discuss cooperation
The Hidden Agenda
What Dattaji's Aides Planned:
"Dattaji's aides decided to use the meeting as a ruse to capture the wily Rohila."
The Trap:
- Meeting was a pretext
- Real goal: kidnap/capture Najeeb
- Eliminate the problem once and for all
Najeeb's Escape
The Rohila's Instincts
What Happened:
"When Najeeb came for the meeting, his aides rushed him out of Dattaji's tent in a hurry, sensing a danger to his life."
Najeeb's Awareness:
- He was very careful
- Understood the invitation might be trap
- His aides sensed danger
- Told him: "You are not safe here. Get out."
- Escaped before capture attempt
Najeeb's Assessment:
"On his return, Najeeb remarked, 'These people don't look good. It is not safe to meet these people.'"
The Skill:
"So he was a good reader of men."
- Knew they were out to get him
- Trusted his instincts
- Refused future cooperation
The Botched Operation
Why This Was a Disaster
The Failed Meeting:
"The failed meeting was not a good omen for Dattaji's hopes of securing Najeeb's help to head eastwards across the Ganga."
What Went Wrong:
- Najeeb was now alerted
- He would never help Dattaji
- Relationship turned hostile
The Question of Blame
Was It Dattaji's Fault?
On One Hand:
- "His aides kind of decided to do this"
- Maybe they acted independently
On the Other Hand:
- Dattaji was "not a friend of Najeeb"
- Just wanted to use him
- Must have known about or approved the plan
The Screw-Up:
"But why sour the relations then? If he didn't actually kidnap him, he should have done one or the other. Why did he let him go then?"
The Analysis:
- Vibes were not good between two camps
- Someone (aides or Dattaji) set out to capture Najeeb
- But then Dattaji decided not to (or couldn't)
- Got nothing from this meeting
- Both soured relationship AND failed to capture
- "He screwed up one way or another"
The Cost:
"But it was a costly mistake."
- Could have gotten Najeeb's help
- Now that option is gone
- Relationship is hostile
- Bridge will never be built
Najeeb's Strategic Position
Geography is Destiny
Where Najeeb's Territory Was:
"Najeeb's territories lay predominantly on the left bank of the Ganga extending to the foothills of the Himalayas."
His Capital:
- Nazibabad - his capital
- Pathargarh - his strong fort
- Both safe beyond the Ganga (east side)
Why Location Mattered:
- Rohilkhand was east of Ganga
- If Najeeb helps Dattaji cross Ganga
- Dattaji enters Najeeb's territory
- "He's inviting him into his front yard"
The Self-Interest:
"So he's not going to want to help him for many reasons."
As Long As:
- Dattaji stays on west bank of Ganga
- Najeeb is safer
- River is natural barrier
- Protects his small kingdom
The Double-Cross Begins
Even While Promising Help
The Public Face:
"Even as Najeeb was promising Dattaji all possible help..."
The Reality:
"...he began recruiting the other Rohilas to his cause and went about fortifying his own position."
What Najeeb Was Doing:
- Lying to Dattaji's face
- Recruiting other Rohila commanders
- Building coalition against Marathas
- Fortifying defenses
- Preparing for conflict
Dattaji's Continued Delusion
Still Trusting the Snake
Dattaji's State of Mind:
"Dattaji, in the dark about Najeeb's moves, still felt he could use his help to get the bridge across the Ganga ready before the rains set in."
The Contradiction:
- On one hand: Didn't trust Najeeb
- Didn't like him
- Wanted to get rid of him
- But ALSO: Wanted to use him
The Desperation:
"Because he had no other idea how to cross the Ganga. Marathas didn't have the skill."
The Bind:
- Needed help desperately
- Torn between:
- Using Najeeb
- Killing Najeeb
- "Because he is no good"
Najeeb Builds His Own Bridge
The Strategic Move
By Monsoon Season:
"By the time rains set in, Najeeb had his own bridge across the Ganga at Shukratal. And he could get provisions for his camp at the western side of the Ganga."
What This Meant:
- Najeeb built bridge FOR HIMSELF
- His forces on western bank of Ganga
- Could get supplies from eastern side
- Using his own bridge for his logistics
The Question:
"I wonder if Dattaji will try and take this bridge from him."
Building the Anti-Maratha Coalition
Rallying the Rohillas
Message to Bareilly:
"He wrote to the Rohillas at Bareilly that if they did not support him against the Marathas, they would be the next victims of Maratha attack."
The Logic:
- Rohillas at Bareilly probably not as militant
- "Not as extremist as he was"
- Hadn't understood the Maratha threat
The Scaremongering:
"If you don't come on my side and we put up a united front, you will be destroyed by Marathas."
Why It Worked:
- All Rohillas were Afghan immigrants
- Shared ethnic/cultural identity
- Fear of Maratha expansion
- Better to fight together
Pulling in Shuja-ud-Daula
The Warning to Awadh
Najeeb's Message to Shuja:
"If the Marathas crossed the river, they would attack Awadh."
The Framing:
- Dattaji is coming YOUR way
- He wants to cross Ganga
- Once he does, you're in danger
- Better help me stop him now
The Religious Angle:
- Shuja was Shia
- Najeeb was Sunni
- Normally some lack of trust
The Unity:
"But both are Muslims at the end of the day."
The Priority:
"Rather than trusting Hindu, which is totally outside of their brotherhood, there may be more trust between them."
The Coalition:
"Slowly but surely, Najeeb forged an anti-Maratha coalition."
The Tactics:
- Calling Marathas outsiders
- Calling them kaffir (infidels)
- Employing religious rhetoric
- "Every tactic he can"
Najeeb's Weakness:
"Najeeb Khan himself could not resist Maratha force because he didn't have adequate forces. So he had to rally some other people in his cause."
The Call to Abdali
North Indian Princes Reach Out
Who Wrote to Abdali:
"The North Indian princes sent letters to Abdali calling him to India."
Who Were They:
- Madho Singh (Jaipur)
- Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
- Other Rajasthani princes
Why:
- Harassed by Marathas
- Succession wars
- Wanted Marathas gone
- Wanted them "south of Narmada"
The Maratha Problem
Initial Welcome:
- Initially princes invited Marathas
- To get upper hand in local conflicts
- For help temporarily
The Realization:
"But later on they started realizing that it is more trouble than it is worth."
Why Everyone Hated Marathas:
- "Overwhelming force"
- Creating their own power structure
- Supposed to be oppressive
- Filling power vacuum left by weak Mughals
The Misunderstanding:
- Northern princes didn't understand Shivaji's vision
- Hindu unity concept didn't resonate
- Rajasthani Hindus, Jat Hindus didn't see common cause
- Marathas looked like mercenaries
- "Just wanted to get money"
- Mercenary spirit ≠ Hindu nationalism
The Shivaji Standard They Failed
What Made Shivaji Different
Shivaji's Innovation:
- Created mindset: Muslims are outsiders, foreigners
- Need our own government, our own kingdom
- Unite Hindus under one banner
Before Shivaji:
- Maratha warriors (very good warriors)
- Working for different Muslim kings
- Killing each other
- No unity
The Northern Failure:
- North didn't adopt this mindset
- Hostility between different forces persisted
- Didn't understand value of Hindu kingdom concept
- Especially Rajasthanis (all Hindu)
- Suraj Mal Jat (also Hindu)
- But no unified Hindu identity
The Perception:
"Marathas were trying to work as a, they just wanted to get money. They were mercenary. That mercenary spirit did not create this single Hindu identity."
The Result:
"They were also looked upon as mercenaries who didn't have anybody's interest in mind."
Just chaos without regard:
- Sowing confusion
- No clear purpose
- No one's interests protected
- Just extraction and violence
The Emperor Writes to Peshwa
Multiple Fronts
Imad-ul-Mulk's Terror:
- Emperor felt "terrorized by Imad"
- Imad was supposed to be Vazir
- But acting like tyrant
The Irony:
- Emperor writing to Peshwa
- Emperor writing to Najeeb Khan
- Playing both sides
- "He's really" panicking
North India Becomes Friendless
The Isolation
Rajput Kings:
- Madho Singh (Jaipur)
- Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
- "Keen to see the end of Maratha attacks"
- Wrote to Abdali asking him to defeat Marathas
The Summary:
"North India had become a friendless place for the Marathas. Everyone hated them, either openly or secretly."
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Key Actions |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha Commander | Failed to capture Najeeb, still trusting him |
| Najeeb Khan Rohila | Enemy | Building coalition, lying, fortifying |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Senior Commander | Bad advice to befriend Najeeb |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Warned by Najeeb, joining coalition |
| Madho Singh | Raja of Jaipur | Writing to Abdali to come save them |
| Vijay Singh | Raja of Jodhpur | Also calling for Abdali |
| Gujars | Local guides | Critical knowledge of river fords |
| General Wellington | British (future) | Will exploit this weakness 40 years later |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Shamli - Dattaji's camp, east of Yamuna, west of Ganga
- Ganga River - Major barrier, must be crossed
- Shukratal - Where Najeeb built his bridge
- Nazibabad - Najeeb's capital (east of Ganga)
- Pathargarh - Najeeb's strong fort (east of Ganga)
- Rohilkhand - Najeeb's territory (east of Ganga)
- Bareilly - Town where other Rohillas based
- Awadh - Shuja-ud-Daula's kingdom
- Bengal - Dattaji's ultimate target (far east)
Timeline
- 6 August 1759 - Dattaji writes to Peshwa explaining strategy
- August-September 1759 - Meeting at Shamli fails
- By Monsoon (July-August) - Najeeb builds his own bridge
- Late 1759 - Coalition building accelerates
- Late 1759 - Letters to Abdali multiply
Major Themes
1. The Structural Weakness
Marathas' inability to cross rivers = permanent strategic flaw that lasts 50 years.
2. The Botched Kidnapping
Worst of both worlds: Failed to capture Najeeb AND made him hostile.
3. The Agricultural Curse
Being farmer-soldiers means never developing monsoon warfare capability.
4. The Snake's Skill
Najeeb building coalition while promising cooperation. Master manipulator.
5. The Hindu Disunity
Northern Hindus don't adopt Shivaji's vision. Marathas seen as mercenaries, not liberators.
6. The Isolation
Everyone hates Marathas. Zero real allies in North India.
7. Local Knowledge Advantage
Gujars' knowledge of fords = the difference between movement and paralysis.
The Ominous Pattern
What's Building:
- Failed meeting → hostile relationship
- Najeeb building coalition
- All northern princes calling Abdali
- Dattaji still deluded about using Najeeb
- River-crossing problem unsolved
- Monsoon coming or just passed
- No real allies
- Overextended
- Punjab undermanned
40 Years Later:
- British will systematically exploit same weakness
- Shows this isn't temporary problem
- Permanent flaw in Maratha military system
Dattaji just made an enemy out of the one man who could have helped him cross the Ganga. Najeeb is building a coalition while lying to his face. Every northern prince is writing to Abdali begging him to come. The Marathas have no friends. They can't cross rivers. Monsoon makes it worse. And in 40 years, the British will read this same playbook and use it to destroy them. The noose is tightening, and Dattaji doesn't even know it.
The Siege at Shukratal & Najeeb's Coalition (September-November 1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Najeeb Rallies the Rohillas
Building Unity Among Afghans
The Recruitment:
"Even as Najeeb was promising Dattaji all possible help, he began recruiting the other Rohilas to his cause and went about fortifying his own position."
Who Were the Rohillas:
- Afghan warriors/soldiers
- Came to India originally as mercenaries
- Became immigrants and stayed
- Had their own territories in Rohilkhand
Why They Stayed:
- Saw fertile land with rivers
- Much better than Afghanistan
- Settled permanently
- But never forgot Afghan loyalty
The Call to Abdali (Repeated)
The Desperate Appeals
Who Wrote to Abdali:
"The North Indian princes sent letters to Abdali calling him to India."
The Coalition:
- Madho Singh (Jaipur)
- Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
- Other Rajasthani princes
- All harassed by Marathas
- All wanting them gone
Why Northern Princes Hated Marathas
The Initial Welcome:
- First invited Marathas for help
- Needed assistance in succession wars
- Temporary alliance
The Souring:
"Later on they started realizing that it is more trouble than it is worth."
The Problem:
- Marathas were "overwhelming force"
- Creating their own power structures
- Oppressive behavior
- Filling Mughal power vacuum
- But nobody actually liked them
The Shivaji Vision Failed in the North
Why Hindu Unity Didn't Work
Shivaji's Legacy:
- Created concept: Muslims are foreign outsiders
- Need Hindu government/kingdom
- Unite under Hindu banner
Before Shivaji:
- Maratha warriors fought for different Muslim kings
- Killing each other
- No unity
The Northern Situation:
- Didn't understand Shivaji's vision
- Rajasthanis (Hindu) didn't unite with Marathas
- Suraj Mal Jat (Hindu) same problem
- Hostility between different forces continued
The Perception:
"Marathas just wanted to get money. They were mercenary. That mercenary spirit did not create this single Hindu identity."
The Result:
"They were also looked upon as mercenaries who didn't have anybody's interest in mind. Sowing chaos without any regard."
The Emperor's Desperation
Writing to Everyone
The Pattern:
- Emperor writing to Peshwa
- Emperor also writing to Najeeb
- "He's really" feeling terrorized
The Irony:
- Supposed to be ruler
- Actually powerless
- Playing both sides
- Desperate for protection
North India: A Friendless Place
Complete Isolation
The Summary:
"North India had become a friendless place for the Marathas. Everyone hated them, either openly or secretly."
The Rajput Kings:
- Madho Singh (Jaipur)
- Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
- "Keen to see the end of Maratha attacks"
- Writing to Abdali to defeat them
The Move to Shukratal
Waiting for the Bridge
Dattaji's Position:
- Went to Garmukhteshwar
- Expected bridge would be completed
- Najeeb never intended to build it
When Monsoon Came:
"Once the rains began, Najeeb pleaded that the work could not proceed."
The Timeline:
- July-August 1759 (monsoon months)
- Najeeb's excuse: "It's raining, I can't build the bridge"
The Reality:
"The river was a torrent many miles wide and the area around it full of swamps and slush."
The Consequence:
"This meant further delay for the Maratha thrust into Awadh and Bengal."
Moving to Miranpur
Getting Closer to Najeeb
Dattaji's Frustration:
"Dattaji, annoyed and alarmed at the delay, now moved his camp to Miranpur close to Shukratal where Najeeb Khan had already entrenched himself."
The Setup:
- Dattaji: Camp at Miranpur
- Najeeb: Entrenched at Shukratal
- "Najeeb was ready for him now"
Shukratal: The Natural Fortress
Geographic Advantages
Location:
- Just south of Haridwar (holy city)
- East of Muzaffarnagar
- On Ganga's right bank
- Ancient Hindu pilgrimage place
The Terrain:
"This sunken area lies with the Ganga behind it and is an area with plenty of ravines that offer places for an army to hide."
Najeeb's Strategy:
"It was a natural sunken fort and Najeeb used this topography to convert this place into a strong defensive fort against the numerically superior Marathas."
Perfect Defensive Position
Undulating Terrain:
"Shukratal's undulating terrain could hide Najeeb's army of several thousand foot soldiers armed with muskets and cannons."
The Comparison:
- "So now he was going to play Garimikawa"
- "Just like Shivaji"
- Guerrilla warfare
- But against the Marathas!
The Irony:
- Shivaji used terrain against larger enemies
- Now Najeeb using same tactics
- Against Shivaji's descendants
The Cavalry Problem
Marathas' Advantage Neutralized
The Soft Ground:
"Its soft terrain in the monsoons was not conducive to cavalry charges that the Marathas used."
Why This Mattered:
- "Marathas were primarily cavalry men"
- Horses are very heavy
- Soft monsoon ground = can't charge effectively
- Main Maratha tactic neutralized
Najeeb's Defensive Setup
Water Protection
The Rivers:
- Small tributary of Ganga at Shukratal
- Wide Ganga a few kilometers away on eastern side
- Huge central swampy area (now farmland)
The Trenches:
"Najeeb dug deep trenches on the remaining two fronts and launched a strong defense."
The Supply Line
Provisions:
"The army was assured of provisions from Najeeb's possessions on the east of the river."
The Bridge:
"Najeeb had erected a bridge of boats here that Dattaji once wanted to use, but which now helped Najeeb's communications."
The Irony:
- Dattaji wanted this bridge
- Now it's helping his enemy
- Najeeb using it for supplies
The Barha Sayyids Join Dattaji
Shia vs. Sunni
Who Were Barha Sayyids:
- Shia Muslims
- Opposed to Najeeb (Sunni)
- Joined Dattaji's side
The Religious Divide:
- Sometimes trumped Muslim unity
- Shia-Sunni tension real
- Worked in Marathas' favor here
The Siege Begins
Stalemate
Dattaji's Approach:
"Dattaji set his camp at Miranpur and tried to enforce a siege at Shukratal to force Najeeb to yield."
The Problem:
"The Maratha cavalry could not attack Najeeb's position and the skirmishes between the two armies yielded nothing."
The Waiting Game:
- Neither side could make progress
- Siege going on for months
- Stalemate situation
The Gamble on Abdali
Najeeb's Desperate Appeals
The Calculation:
- If Abdali doesn't come = steamrolled
- But Abdali wasn't close
- Might not arrive in time
The Repeated Entreaties:
"Najeeb was sending emissaries every month to Kandahar beseeching Abdali to come to his aid."
Why Other Rohillas Agreed:
- Initially reluctant
- Finally said: "Okay, you got it"
- Sent troops to help Najeeb
Imad-ul-Mulk Refuses to Help
The Maratha Ally Won't Comply
Dattaji's Order:
"Dattaji ordered Imad to join him with his troops but Imad did not comply."
Why This Mattered:
- Imad supposed to be Maratha ally
- Not showing up with troops
- Dattaji fighting alone
- Another sign of isolation
Shuja-ud-Daula's Decision
The Tipping Point
The Factors:
- Threat to his own kingdom (Awadh)
- Maratha alliance with his "arch enemy" Imad
- Finally forced his hand
The Decision:
"The threat to his own kingdom and the Maratha alliance with his arch enemy Imad finally helped him make up his mind in favor of Najeeb Khan."
The Logic:
- Not per se against Marathas
- But "dead opposed to Imad"
- Since Marathas allied with Imad
- Must oppose Marathas
The Sides:
"Basically the sides were drawn. They had to oppose Marathas because they were on the side of Imad-ul-Mulk."
Shuja Sends Hindu Troops
The Gosavi Chiefs
Who He Sent:
"Shuja sent his Gosavi chiefs Anup Gir and Umrao Gir to protect Najeeb's position."
Who Were Gosavis:
- Hindu warriors
- Clan of fighters
- Worked for Awadh's kingdom
The Irony:
- Hindu soldiers
- Fighting for Muslim Subedar
- Against Hindu Marathas
- Shows complexity of alliances
Shuja's Army:
- Had both Muslim and Hindu soldiers
- Didn't matter to him
- Just paid salaries
- They fought for him
The Failed Cavalry Charge (15 September 1759)
Dattaji's Impatience
The Setup:
"Impatient due to the enforced inactivity, Dattaji led his cavalry to Shukratal on 15th September 1759."
The Approach:
- Army split into two
- Approached from two directions
- Standard cavalry tactic
The Ambush
Najeeb's Trap:
"Najeeb hid his men in wait for the Maratha charge."
What Happened:
"Immediately the cavalry reached the ravines of Shukratal a deadly fire greeted them and several hundred were killed."
The Casualties:
- Several hundred Marathas killed
- Jankoji was injured
- Barha Sayyids sustained big loss
The Retreat:
- Dattaji had to hold back
- Cavalry charge failed
- Couldn't break Najeeb's position
The Northern Flanking Maneuver
Govind Panth Bundele
Who Was He:
- Administrator of Maratha-controlled Bundelkhand
- Civilian officer managing revenues
- Collecting taxes from farms
- Had small army (1,000-2,000 soldiers)
- Not meant for typical warfare
- But could do defensive/offensive if needed
His Background:
- Originally from Maharashtra
- Appointed by Bajirao I to manage Bundelkhand
- Bundelkhand = territory given to Bajirao by grateful king
- After Bajirao's death, continued managing affairs
- Fairly old (mid-late 50s)
Why "Bundele":
- Real name not Bundele
- Got title from being based in Bundelkhand
- Like "Peshwa" - becomes part of name
The Strategy
Why Send Bundele North
Dattaji's Plan:
"Dattaji decided to send an army under Govind Panth Bundele further north across the Ganga to invade Najeeb's own territory around Nazibabad."
The Logic:
Reason 1 - Geography:
- North of Shukratal = Haridwar area
- Ganga still smaller stream there
- Easier to cross
- Not yet widened into massive river
Reason 2 - Defenses:
- Nazibabad not so well defended
- Najeeb put all forces into Shukratal
- Capital vulnerable
Reason 3 - Squeeze Play:
- Attack from behind
- Force Najeeb to return to defend home
- Maybe take over Nazibabad
- Cut off his base
The Outflanking:
- Going around the strong position
- Hitting from unexpected direction
- Classic military maneuver
Govind Panth's Raid (Late October 1759)
Crossing the Ganga
Around Third Week of October 1759:
- Govind Panth crossed Ganga in the north
- Began attacking Najeeb's territory
- East of Ganga (Najeeb's homeland)
Najeeb's Reaction:
"Najeeb watched in dismay."
The Rohilla Response
Appealing to Rival Chiefs
The Call for Help:
"Appealing for help from Hafiz Rehmat Khan and Dunde Khan, the Rohilla chiefs who did not see eye to eye with Najeeb."
The Problem:
- These two Rohilla chiefs didn't like Najeeb
- Najeeb "was not the top Rohilla commander"
- He was ambitious, creative, deceptive
- But they didn't want to help him
The Disappointment:
- Could have helped save Nazibabad
- Said: "We are not going to come to your help"
- Najeeb disappointed
The Family Situation
Najeeb's Vulnerability
Where His Family Was:
"Najeeb's son Zabita Khan and his family were at his fort, Pathargarh."
The Eventual Response:
"Hafiz Rehmat and Dunde Khan finally came to confront Govind Panth a few miles from Nazibabad..."
The Outcome:
"...but Govind Panth defeated them and headed for the bridge that was Najeeb's supply line from his capital."
Cutting the Supply Line
The Strategic Target
What Govind Panth Did:
- Defeated the Rohilla chiefs
- Headed for Najeeb's bridge
- This bridge = supply line from Nazibabad
- Critical logistics link
The Effect:
"For a while, Govind Panth's raid created a shortage of food in Najeeb's camp."
Why:
- Bridge controlled by Govind Panth's force
- No food could come from the city
- Army at Shukratal being strangled
- "Supply line, once it cuts off, then it's tough"
Shuja's Gosavis Arrive
The Hindu vs. Hindu Battle
The Reinforcement:
"Meanwhile, the Hindu Gosavi army of Shuja-ud-Daula reached there and faced Govind Panth."
The Situation:
- Hindu Maratha force (Govind Panth)
- vs. Hindu Gosavi force (serving Shuja)
- Fighting each other
- While Muslims watch
The Complexity:
- Religion not determining alliances
- Political interests trump religious identity
- Shows failure of Hindu unity concept
Shuja-ud-Daula's Position
Why He Opposed Marathas
Shuja's Natural Inclination:
- Mother was pro-Maratha
- Father (Safdar Jang) worked with Marathas
- He was Shia (relatively moderate)
- "Normally would not be going" against Marathas
- Not an extremist
But:
- Suja was "dead opposed to Imad"
- Imad = his arch enemy
- Marathas allied with Imad
- Therefore must oppose Marathas
The Geography:
"Dattaji had no interest in getting into Shuja-ud-Daula's territory or raiding him at all. He wanted to go eastward."
Dattaji's Real Goal:
- Just wanted to pass through
- Get to Patna (Bihar)
- Then to Bengal
- Not interested in Awadh
The Trap:
"But because of the politics played by Mr. Najeeb Khan, now he was bogged down and Shuja-ud-Daula was into the fray. So it became difficult."
Meanwhile in the Deccan
Peshwa's Other Campaign
9 November 1759:
"In the Deccan, the Peshwa and Sadashiv Rao Bhau were planning a decisive move to reduce the Nizam and occupied the prestigious Ahmadnagar fort."
What's Ahmadnagar:
- Historical significance
- Original Nizam Shah's capital
- Where Shivaji's father worked
- Major fort in Maharashtra today
- Mughal army had conquered it centuries ago
- Sliced up kingdom between Adil Shah and Mughals
The Point:
- Marathas fighting on TWO fronts
- North: Dattaji vs. Najeeb/coalition
- South: Peshwa vs. Nizam
- Forces stretched impossibly thin
Abdali's Messenger Arrives (6 November 1759)
The Inquiry
The Letter:
"On 6th of November, 1759, Abdali's messenger came to Delhi with a letter inquiring about the situation there."
Five Days Later (11 November):
- Peshwa's agent wrote to Nana Saheb
- Reporting on Abdali's messenger
What the Agent Reported:
"Abdali's agent has brought orders for Madho Singh, Vijay Singh, Najeeb Khan, and Yakub Ali Khan."
Who Are These:
- All the guys who asked Abdali to come
- All endangered by Maratha army
- Madho Singh & Vijay Singh = Rajasthan
- Najeeb = life in danger
- They need Abdali or they're "going to be gone"
Abdali's Preparations
The Strategic Planning
Jahan Khan Sent Ahead:
"He has said he is ready to come to India and has dispatched Jahan Khan ahead with an army to Lahore."
Jahan Khan:
- One of Abdali's commanders
- Sent to Lahore (Punjab capital)
- Advance force
Abdali's Intelligence Gathering:
"Abdali has asked to be given a clear picture about the imperial court, the officers, Suraj Mal Jat, Shuja-ud-Daula, and the Srimanta's house."
What He Wants to Know:
- Imperial court situation
- All the officers
- Suraj Mal Jat's status
- Shuja-ud-Daula's situation
- Rich people ("Srimanta")
Why:
"He doesn't want to get surprises. He knows that unless he gets allies, he doesn't want to fight a losing battle on his own."
The Resource Question:
- His army massive
- Needs resources
- Animals need feeding
- People need eating
- Must pay salaries
- Has to loot and make money
The Tribute Question
Even Allies Must Pay
Abdali's Inquiry:
"He has also asked Najeeb Khan about the tributes from Hindustan."
The Money Issue:
- Wants to know who will give how much
- Even allies must pay tribute
The Service Fee:
"Driving up the Marathas is not a free service."
Abdali's Priorities:
- "He's all about money. He wants to loot."
- Wants to know each party's capacity
- Information from Najeeb critical
- Don't ask for $1M if they can pay $5M
The Letter Reaches Pune (Early December 1759)
Peshwa's Timing Problem
When News Arrived:
"This letter from Delhi would have reached the Peshwa in early December 1759 when the Maratha army was heading out to face the Nizam."
The Situation:
- December 1759
- Marathas heading SOUTH
- To fight Nizam
- Large force committed
The Overextension:
"Marathas are stretched thin. Fighting two big battles in two different geographies."
Abdali's Fifth Invasion Begins
The Final Piece Falls
The Decision:
"Meanwhile, Ahmad Shah Abdali, heeding appeals by Najeeb and other Indian kings, finally began his march into India for his fifth invasion, while Dattaji was still trying to enforce a siege at Shukratal."
Why Now:
- Najeeb desperate
- Cannot survive without distraction
- Needs anything to pull Maratha attention
- Abdali relatively secure in Afghanistan
The Afghan Internal Situation:
- Was fighting tribal wars
- Now concluded them
- Secure when he leaves
- Can spend 4-6 months in India
- No threats at home
December 1759:
- Abdali decides to come to India
- Beginning his march
- Fifth invasion
- Perfect timing for his allies
The Ominous Chapter Title
Chapter 15 Preview
Title: "Najeeb-ud-Daula Bakes a Plot"
The Quote:
- From Govind Panth Bundele
- November 1759
"A great disaster has befallen us."
The Cliffhanger:
- Najeeb creating new scheme
- "He's ahead of his time"
- Doing rumors and propaganda
- What he lacks on battlefield
- Makes up with scheming
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha Commander | Stuck at Shukratal siege |
| Najeeb Khan | Rohilla Leader | Entrenched, calling for Abdali |
| Jankoji Shinde | Young Commander | Injured in failed cavalry charge |
| Govind Panth Bundele | Administrator | Raiding Nazibabad from north |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Sent Hindu Gosavis to help Najeeb |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mughal Vazir | Refusing to help Dattaji |
| Madho Singh | Raja of Jaipur | Calling Abdali to India |
| Vijay Singh | Raja of Jodhpur | Also calling Abdali |
| Abdali | Afghan Ruler | Beginning 5th invasion |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Ruler in Pune | Fighting Nizam in south |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Shukratal - Natural fortress, siege location
- Miranpur - Dattaji's camp
- Garmukhteshwar - Earlier position
- Nazibabad - Najeeb's capital (under attack from north)
- Pathargarh - Najeeb's fort (family there)
- Haridwar - Holy city to the north
- Lahore - Punjab capital (Abdali's commander sent there)
- Ahmadnagar - Fort in Deccan (Peshwa capturing)
- Kandahar - Afghanistan (Abdali's base)
Timeline
- 15 September 1759 - Failed cavalry charge, Jankoji injured
- Late October 1759 - Govind Panth crosses Ganga, attacks Nazibabad
- 6 November 1759 - Abdali's messenger arrives in Delhi
- 9 November 1759 - Marathas take Ahmadnagar fort
- 11 November 1759 - Peshwa's agent reports on Abdali
- November 1759 - Govind Panth cuts supply line, "great disaster"
- Early December 1759 - News reaches Pune (army heading to fight Nizam)
- December 1759 - Abdali begins march to India (5th invasion)
Major Themes
1. The Natural Fortress
Shukratal's terrain = perfect defensive position. Najeeb using Shivaji's tactics against Marathas.
2. Hindu vs. Hindu
Gosavi warriors (Hindu) fighting for Muslim Shuja against Hindu Marathas. Identity complex.
3. The Failed Unity
Northern Hindus didn't unite under Maratha banner. Seen as mercenaries, not liberators.
4. The Two-Front War
Fighting Najeeb in north, Nizam in south. Stretched impossibly thin.
5. The Soft Ground
Monsoon terrain neutralizing Maratha cavalry advantage. Their strength = their weakness.
6. The Coalition Effect
One by one, everyone joining against Marathas. Complete isolation.
7. Abdali's Calculation
Gathering intelligence, ensuring allies, planning resource extraction. Professional invader.
The Trap Closes
The Situation by December 1759:
- Dattaji stuck in siege at Shukratal
- Failed cavalry charge
- Jankoji injured
- Govind Panth cut off supply line (temporary success)
- But Shuja's Gosavis arrived
- Imad won't send troops
- Everyone calling Abdali
- Abdali marching to India
- Peshwa fighting Nizam in south
- Forces stretched between two fronts
- No real allies
- "Great disaster has befallen us"
- Najeeb "baking a plot"
The noose has tightened into a chokehold. Dattaji is stuck at an unbreakable fortress. His cavalry - the Maratha's greatest weapon - neutralized by soggy ground. Hindu fights Hindu while Muslims coordinate. Every northern prince wants Abdali to come save them. And Abdali, the professional looter, is gathering his intelligence, securing his allies, calculating his tribute payments, and marching toward India with his massive army. Meanwhile, the Peshwa in Pune just committed a large force to fight the Nizam in the south. Two-front war. No friends. Abdali coming. "A great disaster has befallen us" indeed.
Govind Panth Bundele's Raid & Abdali's Fifth Invasion (October-December 1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Govind Panth Bundele: The Administrator-Warrior
The Origin Story
How Bundelkhand Came to Marathas:
The Rescue Mission:
- Bajirao I went to help Bundelkhand king
- King was old and under attack by Bangush
- Bajirao saved his life
The Reward:
"I will give you one third of my kingdom because you saved my life and I will give you my daughter Mastani in marriage."
What Bajirao Got:
- 1/3 of Bundelkhand kingdom
- His daughter Mastani (the famous love story)
- Maybe treasure
Geographic Reality:
- Bundelkhand = far north from Pune
- Hundreds of kilometers away
- Not very close to Delhi, but "kind of close"
- Bajirao had to appoint officials to manage it
Govind Panth's Role
The Civilian Administrator
Who He Was:
- Originally from Maharashtra
- Appointed by Bajirao I
- Managed day-to-day affairs of Maratha Bundelkhand
- Civilian officer, not primarily military
His Title:
"His real name is not Bundele [as a last name] but he inherited this Bundele because he was based in Bundelkhand."
How Titles Work:
- Like "Peshwa" - becomes part of name
- Based in Bundelkhand = called "Bundele"
- Title from territory/role
His Longevity:
- Continued working after Bajirao I died
- Managed affairs for decades
- Fairly old now (mid-late 50s)
His Job Description
Tax Collector
The Primary Function:
"Typically what he will do is he will go from farm to farm and collect the farm revenue from the farmers."
Why:
- Taxes were money
- Money was essential
- Had to be collected "on an orderly and accurate basis"
- Civilian officer role
His Army:
- Had small force: 1,000-2,000 soldiers
- NOT meant for typical warfare
- Could do defensive/offensive posture if needed
- But primarily for administration/security
The Northern Outflanking Maneuver
Dattaji's Strategy
The Map Shows:
- Outflanking maneuver
- Govind Panth's raid in the north
- Going through Haridwar area
Why North:
- Ganga comes from the north
- As it comes into flatland, gains width
- Gains "voluminous water"
- But at Haridwar = "still a smaller stream"
- Not too big yet
- Easier to cross
The Recap: Failed Cavalry Charge
15 September 1759
What Happened:
- Dattaji's army split into two
- Approached from two directions
- Najeeb hid his men in ravines
- Waiting for Maratha charge
The Ambush:
"Immediately the cavalry reached the ravines of Shukratal a deadly fire greeted them and several hundred were killed."
The Casualties:
- Jankoji injured
- Barha Sayyids sustained big loss
- Dattaji had to hold back
The Decision:
- Send Govind Panth Bundele north
- Cross Ganga there
- Invade Najeeb's territory (Nazibabad)
- On eastern side of Ganga
Nazibabad: Najeeb's Achievement
The Personal City
The Name:
- "Bad" = like "ville" in English (town, city)
- Similar to "Pur" in Hindi
- Just attach to name
- Becomes "town of X"
Examples:
- Nazibabad = Najeeb's town
- Ahmadabad = Ahmad's city
- Pattern of naming
The Pride:
"So-and-so really grew up so much that he called it Nazibabad."
- Named after himself
- Shows his power/achievement
- Center of his small kingdom
The Raid Begins (Third Week of October 1759)
Crossing the Ganga
The Attack:
"Around the third week of October 1759, [Govind Panth] began attacking Najeeb's territory on the east of the Ganga."
Two-Sided Attack:
- One from front (Dattaji at Shukratal)
- One from back (Govind Panth from north)
The Rohilla Chiefs' Reluctance
Internal Rohilla Politics
Najeeb Appeals for Help:
"Najeeb watched in dismay, appealing for help from Hafiz Rehmat Khan and Dunde Khan, the Rohilla chiefs who did not see eye to eye with Najeeb."
Why They Didn't Like Him:
- Najeeb "was not the top Rohilla commander"
- He was ambitious
- Very creative
- Very deceptive
Their Refusal:
- Didn't want to help him
- Could have helped save Nazibabad
- Said: "We are not going to come to your help"
- Najeeb disappointed
The Family at Risk
Zabita Khan and Pathargarh
The Vulnerability:
"Najeeb's son Zabita Khan and his family were at his fort, Pathargarh."
The Eventual Response:
- Hafiz Rehmat and Dunde Khan finally came
- Confronted Govind Panth "a few miles from Nazibabad"
The Battle:
"But Govind Panth defeated them and headed for the bridge that was Najeeb's supply line from his capital."
Cutting the Supply Line
The Strategic Strike
The Impact:
"For a while, Govind Panth's raid created a shortage of food in Najeeb's camp."
Why:
- Bridge controlled by Govind Panth's force
- No food could come from city (Nazibabad)
- Army at Shukratal being strangled
The Principle:
"Supply line, once it cuts off, then it's tough. His army will be strangled because they won't get fresh supplies through that bridge."
Shuja's Gosavis Arrive
The Hindu Reinforcements
The Response:
"Meanwhile, the Hindu Gosavi army of Shuja-ud-Daula reached there and faced Govind Panth."
The Battle:
- Hindu vs. Hindu
- Gosavis working for Shuja (Muslim)
- Fighting Marathas (Hindu)
- Shows complexity of alliances
Shuja's Position Explained
Why He Opposed Marathas
His Natural Inclination:
- Mother pro-Maratha
- Father (Safdar Jang) worked with Marathas sometimes
- He was Shia (relatively moderate)
- Not extremist like Rohillas
The Problem:
- "Dead opposed to Imad"
- Imad = arch enemy
- Marathas allied with Imad
- Therefore must oppose Marathas
Dattaji's Real Goal:
"Dattaji had no interest in getting into Shuja-ud-Daula's territory or raiding him at all. He wanted to go eastward."
The Target:
- Patna = staging ground
- Then Bengal = revenue source
The Trap:
"But because of the politics played by Mr. Najeeb Khan, now he was bogged down and Shuja-ud-Daula was into the fray. So it became difficult."
The River Problem (Again)
The Persistent Weakness
The Reality:
"And again, Marathas didn't know how to cross the rivers. Technology wise."
Meanwhile in the Deccan (9 November 1759)
The Two-Front War
The Southern Campaign:
"In the Deccan, the Peshwa and Sadashiv Rao Bhau were planning a decisive move to reduce the Nizam and occupied the prestigious Ahmadnagar fort on 9th of November 1759."
Ahmadnagar: The Historical Significance
The Original Nizam Shah
What Is Ahmadnagar:
- Capital of original Nizam Shah kingdom
- NOT the new Nizam (Mughal Subedar)
- Original Nizam from this region
The History:
- Shivaji's father worked for him
- Mughal army conquered completely
- Kingdom "totally liquidated"
- Divided between Adil Shah and Mughals
- Major forts still there
Today:
- Located in Maharashtra
- Still important historical site
Abdali's Messenger (6 November 1759)
The Intelligence Mission
The Arrival:
"On 6th of November, 1759, Abdali's messenger came to Delhi with a letter inquiring about the situation there."
Five Days Later (11 November):
- Peshwa's agent wrote to Nana Saheb
- Reported on Abdali's message
What the Agent Said:
"Abdali's agent has brought orders for Madho Singh, Vijay Singh, Najeeb Khan, and Yakub Ali Khan."
Who Asked Abdali to Come
The Coalition
The List:
- Madho Singh (Jaipur)
- Vijay Singh (Jodhpur)
- Najeeb Khan (Rohilla)
- Yakub Ali Khan
Why They Called Him:
- "All were endangered by the Maratha army"
- Especially fratricidal affairs in Rajasthan
- Marathas interfering in succession wars
Najeeb's Desperation:
- His life in danger
- "Existential risk for him"
- Not going to live long without help
- "Going to be gone"
His Only Ally:
- Had Malhar Rao Holkar
- But Malhar Rao in Pune now
- Can't protect him
- Has to deal with Dattaji
- Dattaji has "no soft corner for him"
The Savior:
- Only hope = Abdali in Afghanistan
- Trying "every which way" to lure him
- Otherwise knows "he is going to be gone"
Abdali's Response
The Advance Force
Jahan Khan Sent:
"He has said he is ready to come to India and has dispatched Jahan Khan ahead with an army to Lahore."
Who Is Jahan Khan:
- One of Abdali's commanders
- Sent to Punjab capital (Lahore)
- Advance force
Abdali's Intelligence Requirements
The Information Request
What Abdali Asked For:
"Abdali has asked to be given a clear picture about the imperial court, the officers, Suraj Mal Jat, Shuja-ud-Daula, and the Srimanta's house."
Breaking It Down:
- Imperial court - What's happening with Emperor
- The officers - All the power players
- Suraj Mal Jat - Status and position
- Shuja-ud-Daula - His situation
- Srimanta's house - The rich people
Why So Detailed:
"See, Abdali was strategic. Before coming to India, he wanted to get idea about what is happening."
The Calculation:
- "All the local players he wants to know about"
- "Doesn't want to get surprises"
- Must have allies
- "Doesn't want to fight a losing battle on his own"
The Resource Question
Why Abdali Needs Intelligence
The Army's Needs:
- His army = massive
- "Going to need resources"
- Animals have to be fed
- People have to eat
- Must pay salaries
The Solution:
"So he has to loot and make money."
The Strategic Approach:
- Must know terrain
- Must know allies
- Must know enemies
- Must know resource locations
- Very strategic in "rounding up allies"
The Enemy:
"And he knows that his only enemy is Marathas."
The Tribute Question
Extracting Money from Allies
Abdali's Request:
"He has also asked Najeeb Khan about the tributes from Hindustan."
The Money Details:
- Wants to know who will give how much
- Even allies must pay
The Parties:
- Madho Singh
- Vijay Singh
- Suraj Mal Jat
- Mughal Emperor
- Even the Rohillas
The Service:
"So driving up the Marathas is not a free service."
Abdali's Focus:
"Oh no, he's all about money. He wants to loot."
The Information Asymmetry
Why Details Matter
The Negotiation Advantage:
- If someone can pay $5 million
- Why ask for only $1 million?
- Need to know their capacity
- Maximize extraction
Getting the Intel:
"So that information he needs from Najeeb Khan. All the details."
The Letter Reaches Pune (Early December 1759)
Terrible Timing
When It Arrived:
"This letter from Delhi would have reached the Peshwa in early December 1759 when the Maratha army was heading out to face the Nizam."
The Situation:
- Peshwa in December 1759
- Heading SOUTH
- Large force committed to fighting Nizam
The Overstretch:
"No, Marathas are stretched thin. Fighting two big battles or in two different geographies."
Abdali's Fifth Invasion Begins
The March to India
The Decision:
"Meanwhile, Ahmad Shah Abdali, heeding appeals by Najeeb and other Indian kings, finally began his march into India for his fifth invasion, while Dattaji was still trying to enforce a siege at Shukratal."
Najeeb's Desperation:
- Cannot survive unless he distracts Maratha army
- Right at his doorstep (Shukratal)
- Needs "anything and everything" to convince Abdali
Abdali's Internal Situation
Why Now
The Afghan Security:
- Was fighting tribal wars in Afghanistan
- "Now he has concluded them"
- Knows he's secure in Afghanistan
The Calculation:
"When he goes to India, he's going to spend at least four to six months."
The Risk:
- In his absence, other tribes could attack
- "Then he'll be in trouble in Afghanistan itself"
- Doesn't want that
The Solution:
- "Wants to make sure that he's secure in Afghanistan"
- Now satisfied he is
December 1759:
- Decides: "I'm going to India now"
- Beginning his march
- Fifth invasion
- Perfect timing for allies
Chapter 15: Najeeb Bakes a Plot
The Ominous Title
The Quote:
- From Govind Panth Bundele
- November 1759
"A great disaster has befallen us."
Najeeb: The Schemer
Ahead of His Time
The Assessment:
"So Najeeb Khan is a schemer. He's ahead of his time. He's doing all this rumors and propaganda spreading. He's clever."
The Strategy:
"Because see what he lacks in battlefield, he's trying to make it up."
The Method:
- Through schemes
- Propaganda
- Rumors
- Political manipulation
- Coalition building
The New Plot:
- Now "baking a new plot"
- Something even more devious coming
- Cliffhanger for next session
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Current Status |
|---|---|---|
| Govind Panth Bundele | Administrator-warrior | Raiding Nazibabad, cut supply line |
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha Commander | Stuck at Shukratal siege |
| Najeeb Khan | Rohilla Leader | Entrenched, calling Abdali, scheming |
| Zabita Khan | Najeeb's son | At Pathargarh fort with family |
| Hafiz Rehmat Khan | Rohilla Chief | Reluctantly helping Najeeb |
| Dunde Khan | Rohilla Chief | Also reluctantly helping |
| Shuja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Sent Gosavi forces, opposing Marathas |
| Jankoji | Young Commander | Injured from failed cavalry charge |
| Abdali | Afghan Ruler | Marching to India, 5th invasion |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's Commander | Sent ahead to Lahore |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Ruler in Pune | Fighting Nizam in south, stretched thin |
| Madho Singh | Raja of Jaipur | Called Abdali, awaiting rescue |
| Vijay Singh | Raja of Jodhpur | Also called Abdali |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Bundelkhand - Territory given to Bajirao I, managed by Govind Panth
- Haridwar - Holy city in north, where Ganga still small
- Shukratal - Siege location, Najeeb entrenched
- Nazibabad - Najeeb's capital, under attack by Govind Panth
- Pathargarh - Najeeb's fort, family refuge
- Lahore - Punjab capital, where Jahan Khan sent
- Ahmadnagar - Deccan fort, taken by Peshwa
- Pune - Maratha capital, Peshwa's base
- Kandahar - Afghanistan, Abdali's base
- Patna - Bihar capital, Dattaji's intended destination
- Bengal - Far east, ultimate revenue target
Timeline
- 15 September 1759 - Failed cavalry charge, Jankoji injured
- Third week of October 1759 - Govind Panth crosses Ganga, attacks Nazibabad
- 6 November 1759 - Abdali's messenger arrives in Delhi
- 9 November 1759 - Peshwa takes Ahmadnagar fort
- 11 November 1759 - Peshwa's agent reports on Abdali's orders
- November 1759 - Govind Panth cuts supply line: "great disaster"
- Early December 1759 - News reaches Pune (army heading south to Nizam)
- December 1759 - Abdali begins march (5th invasion)
Major Themes
1. The Administrator Goes to War
Govind Panth = tax collector with small army, now executing critical military operation.
2. The Professional Invader
Abdali gathering intelligence, securing home front, calculating tribute. Methodical.
3. Reluctant Allies
Rohilla chiefs don't like Najeeb, but finally help. Coalition building works.
4. The Two-Front Trap
North vs. Najeeb/coalition, South vs. Nizam. Classic overextension disaster.
5. The Service Fee
Even "allies" must pay Abdali. Nothing is free. Professional looter.
6. Hindu vs. Hindu (Again)
Gosavi forces (Hindu) vs. Marathas (Hindu). Identity doesn't determine loyalty.
7. The Schemer's Advantage
Najeeb lacks battlefield strength, compensates with propaganda and plots.
The Strategic Picture (December 1759)
Maratha Position:
- Dattaji stuck at Shukratal siege
- Govind Panth cut supply line (temporarily successful)
- But Shuja's Gosavis arrived
- Two-front war: North (Najeeb) and South (Nizam)
- Forces stretched impossibly thin
- No real allies
Enemy Coalition:
- Najeeb entrenched at Shukratal
- All Rohillas unified (reluctantly)
- Shuja-ud-Daula committed forces
- All northern princes want Marathas gone
- Everyone calling for Abdali
Abdali's Preparations:
- Secured Afghanistan
- Gathered intelligence on all players
- Calculated tribute requirements
- Sent advance force (Jahan Khan to Lahore)
- Beginning march (5th invasion)
- Perfect timing
The Quote:
"A great disaster has befallen us."
The New Threat:
- Najeeb "baking a plot"
- Some new scheme brewing
- What he lacks in battle = makes up in manipulation
The Mastani Connection
Full Circle
The Origin:
- Bajirao I saved Bundelkhand king
- Received 1/3 kingdom + Mastani
- Famous love story
- Appointed Govind Panth to manage territory
Now (1759):
- That same territory's administrator
- Fighting to save Maratha position
- Territory secured 40+ years ago
- Now critical in northern war
The Irony:
- Romantic story → administrative appointment → military crisis
- Long-term consequence of short-term decisions
- Everything connected across decades
The Professional vs. The Amateur
Abdali's Approach
What He Does:
- Secure home front first
- Gather comprehensive intelligence
- Identify all players and their positions
- Calculate resource requirements
- Ensure allies committed
- Send advance force
- Begin methodical march
- Know exactly what tribute to extract
Why He Wins:
- Professional invader
- Done this multiple times
- Learns from each campaign
- Doesn't take unnecessary risks
- Maximizes profit, minimizes cost
Maratha Approach
What They Do:
- Overextend across vast territories
- Ignore warnings about enemies
- Trust people who shouldn't be trusted
- Fight on multiple fronts
- Leave critical positions undermanned
- Depend on technologies they don't have
- Make enemies of potential allies
Why They're Vulnerable:
- Expansion over consolidation
- Optimism over realism
- Assumption over intelligence
- Stretched resources over focused strength
Govind Panth Bundele - a 50+ year old tax collector with 1,000-2,000 soldiers - just executed a brilliant flanking maneuver, crossed the Ganga up north, defeated Rohilla chiefs, and cut Najeeb's supply line. This is the GOOD news. The bad news: Shuja's Hindu Gosavis arrived. Abdali is marching from Afghanistan with his massive professional army, having gathered perfect intelligence, secured his home front, calculated his tribute extraction, and timed his arrival perfectly. The Peshwa just committed a large force to fight the Nizam in the south. Dattaji is stuck at an unbreakable siege. And Najeeb - the schemer who makes up in manipulation what he lacks on the battlefield - is "baking a plot." "A great disaster has befallen us" is right.
Abdali's Fifth Invasion Begins (September-December 1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Setup: Maratha Control of Punjab
What Marathas Had Achieved
By late 1759:
- Marathas controlled all principal Punjab towns:
- Lahore (capital)
- Peshawar (extreme northwest, border with Afghanistan)
- Attaq (even further than Peshawar)
- Multan
- Sarhind
The Achievement:
- First time Hindu army had gone that far north and west
- Historic milestone
- Raghunath Rao had established Maratha supremacy earlier
- After Adina Beg died (September 1758), no able governor remained
The Problem:
- Marathas were good at conquering, terrible at securing
- Raghunath Rao got accolades for reaching Attaq
- But within one year it was all falling apart
- No defensive structure properly developed
The Commander Deployments
Sabaji Shinde at Peshawar
Who He Was:
- Part of the Shinde clan
- Younger brother of Jayapa Shinde
- Worked under Dattaji Shinde (the main commander)
His Position:
- Posted at Peshawar
- Most critical junction - Afghanistan's border
- If Abdali's army comes, they enter through here first
- Most difficult post
The Strategy:
- Dattaji had placed Maratha commanders throughout Punjab
- One in Lahore, one in Multan, one in various cities
- Covering all important strategic points
- Sabaji got Peshawar - the front line
Dattaji Shinde at Shukratal
His Situation:
- Stuck at Shukratal (on Ganga river, eastern bank)
- Entire monsoon season 1759 wasted there
- Locked in battle with Najib Khan
- Trying to cross Ganga, nothing working
- Four or five months stuck
What Changed:
- After monsoon ended (October)
- Shuja Uddaula's Naga troops reached Shukratal
- Gave Najib numerical advantage
- Najib's position strengthened
Abdali's Rebellion & Unification (1758-1759)
Why He Didn't Come in 1758-1759
The Afghan Tribal Problem:
- Afghan tribes always battling each other
- Don't want to be under any tribal leader's thumb
- Feel independent
Abdali's Task:
- Fighting rebellions in his own country
- Had to unify Afghanistan under his command
- Called "father of Afghanistan" for this reason
- Left mark of unification - more than ever done before
Result: Successfully emerged from rebellions, ready to invade India again
The Fifth Invasion Begins (September 1759)
The Recruitment Drive
Who Joined Abdali:
- Soldiers from all over Afghanistan
- Enthused by idea of loots
- That was their incentive
- No money in Afghanistan
- India = riches
- "Loot all you can, that's your pay"
The Two-Route Strategy
September 1759 departure from Kandahar:
Route 1 - Khyber Pass (North):
- General Jahan Khan
- 20,000 men
Route 2 - Bolan Pass:
- Abdali himself
- 40,000 soldiers
Why Two Routes:
- These are only ways to enter India from Afghanistan
- Westward = big desert (no water, too hot, not hospitable)
- Only camels could cross, but extremely difficult
- Mountain passes = only viable entry points
The June 1759 Defeat That Triggered Everything
What Happened at Rohutas
The Battle:
- Abdali's general Jahan Khan led army to Peshawar
- Took Peshawar, then attacked
- Faced combined Maratha-Sikh armies
- Major defeat at Rohutas (June 1759)
The Casualties:
- Jahan Khan wounded
- His son killed
- Afghans had to flee
The Result:
"This reverse in June 1759 convinced Abdali that he had to personally lead a campaign to India."
- Couldn't be entrusted to commanders
- Had to come himself
- One year to the day since Raghunath Rao's celebration at Shalimar Bagh in Lahore
The Afghan Advance (October-November 1759)
The Route
Abdali's path:
- Moving along right bank of Indus river (Sindhu)
- Indus comes from Kashmir, enters Afghanistan area, then into Pakistan (was India)
- Passed through Dera Ghazi Khan
Taking Multan
The Attack:
- Drove out Bappuji Trimbak's force
- Took Multan without much resistance
Sabaji Abandons Peshawar
The Situation:
- Facing Jahan Khan approaching with overwhelming force
- 60,000 strong Afghan army total (20k + 40k)
- Realized it was a losing battle
- Abandoned Peshawar
The Retreat:
- Short resistance at Attaq
- Marathas fell back on Lahore
- Then retreated east
The Disastrous Retreat
The Local Hostility
What Happened:
- Hostile peasants looted retreating Maratha stragglers
- These were local Punjabi farmers (not Afghans)
- Marathas lost:
- Horses
- Camels
- Clothes
- Money
Why Locals Hostile:
- Marathas were not locals
- Stretched themselves too thin
- Not properly reinforced
- Not well-strategized
The Final Count
Last week of November 1759:
- Entire Maratha army in Punjab reduced to:
- Barely a thousand half-naked stragglers
- No horses or weapons
- Reached Dattaji's camp at Shukratal
Govind Panth Bundele's Assessment:
"A great disaster has befallen us."
The Impact:
- Fear permeated entire Shinde camp
- These thousand survivors merged with Dattaji's forces
- Brought terror with them
Meanwhile: Sikhs Resist, Army Swells
Sikh Resistance at Lahore
What They Did:
- Offered resistance to Afghans at Lahore
- But couldn't make a difference
- Against 60,000 strong Afghan army
- Sikhs were becoming a power but not big time yet
- Light resistance
The Growing Afghan Force
Bundele's Description:
"The army of Abdali kept swelling in numbers, like a mighty river that has rivulets and streams joining it till it falls into the sea."
Why It Grew:
- Tribes along the way joined
- Baluchistan province - Baluchi tribal people
- Thought: "When he reaches India and loots, we'll get a portion"
- Like a popular parade getting new members
- Everyone wants a piece of the loot
Dattaji's Futile Siege & Belated Response
The Mistake
What He Did Wrong:
- Persisted with now-futile siege at Shukratal
- Wasted more time
- Didn't realize threat coming from west
- Called for help from:
- Ahmad Khan Bangush
- Some of Suraj Mal's troops
- Malhar Rao Holkar (near Jaipur)
The Problem:
- Asked Holkar to face Abdali
- But Holkar not up to the task
- Didn't have wherewithal to face Abdali's forces
- Especially 60,000 men
The Decision to Move
December 11, 1759:
- Finally moved towards Yamuna
- To face this new threat
- Was at Shukratal (Ganga's banks)
- Now going west towards Yamuna
- Plan: Get to eastern bank of Yamuna
- Then probably cross to western bank
The Reality:
- Understood big army coming from west
- No point dealing with Najib Khan anymore
- No point going to Bihar/Bengal
- Had to resist Abdali or leave Delhi wide open
Malhar Rao Holkar: The Ineffective Commander
Where He Was
1759 activities:
- Heading towards Jaipur to punish Madho Singh
- Spent all of 1759 around kingdom of Jaipur
- Not being effective
- Just wasting time trying to get more tribute from Madho Singh
- Madho Singh hadn't been paying up
The Distance:
- Was near Jaipur
- Could have easily joined Dattaji
- But kept wasting time
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Main Maratha commander | Shukratal → moving to Yamuna | Facing Abdali |
| Sabaji Shinde | Shinde clan member | Peshawar (abandoned) | Retreated to Dattaji |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Leading 40,000 through Bolan Pass | Advancing |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's general | Leading 20,000 through Khyber Pass | Advancing |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Shukratal area | Allied with Abdali |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Near Jaipur | Ineffective |
| Shuja Uddaula | Awadh ruler | Sent Naga troops to Najib | Supporting Najib |
| Raghunath Rao | Former commander | — | Got credit for Punjab |
| Adina Beg | Former governor | — | Died Sept 1758 |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Sept 1758 | Adina Beg dies - no able governor in Punjab |
| 1758-1759 | Abdali fighting rebellions in Afghanistan |
| June 1759 | Jahan Khan defeated at Rohutas (Maratha-Sikh forces) |
| Sept 1759 | Abdali begins march from Kandahar |
| Sept 1759 | Shuja Uddaula's Naga troops reach Shukratal |
| All of 1759 | Dattaji stuck at Shukratal, Holkar wasting time at Jaipur |
| Oct 1759 | After monsoon, Najib strengthened |
| Late Nov 1759 | ~1,000 Maratha stragglers reach Dattaji's camp |
| Dec 11, 1759 | Dattaji finally moves towards Yamuna |
Geographic Context
The Rivers:
- Indus (Sindhu): Comes from Kashmir → Afghanistan area → Pakistan
- Ganga: Eastern river, where Shukratal is located
- Yamuna: Western river, where Dattaji is heading
The Passes:
- Bolan Pass: Southern route from Afghanistan
- Khyber Pass: Northern route from Afghanistan
- Only two viable entry points to India
Key Cities:
- Lahore: Capital of Punjab
- Peshawar: Northwestern frontier, border with Afghanistan
- Attaq: Even further northwest than Peshawar
- Multan: Important Punjab city
- Shukratal: On Ganga, where Dattaji was stuck
Critical Insights
The Maratha Weakness: Conquering vs. Securing
The Pattern:
- Great at offense
- Terrible at defense
- Raghunath Rao reached Attaq - huge achievement
- But no defensive structure left behind
- Within one year, everything falls apart
Why:
- Didn't develop proper governance
- Didn't establish loyal local administrators
- Didn't fortify positions
- Didn't maintain supply lines
- Just conquered and left
The Loot Economy
Abdali's Business Model:
- Recruit soldiers with promise of loot
- "That's your pay"
- Afghanistan has nothing
- India has riches
- Everyone wants in
The Growing Army:
- Like a snowball rolling downhill
- Every tribe along the way joins
- Baluchi people join
- Everyone wants a piece
- Army keeps swelling
The Geography Problem
Why Two Passes Matter:
- Desert to the west = impassable
- Only Bolan Pass and Khyber Pass work
- Mountain passes = chokepoints
- Abdali split army to cover both
Implication:
- Marathas should have heavily fortified these passes
- Instead, they spread thin across cities
- Lost the critical entry points
The Peasant Hostility
The Retreat Disaster:
- Punjabi farmers looted retreating Marathas
- Why? Marathas were outsiders
- Never won local hearts
- Probably extracted heavy taxes
- No loyalty developed
The Lesson:
- Can't hold territory without local support
- Military conquest ≠ political control
- Alienating locals = disaster when retreating
Dattaji's Strategic Blindness
The Mistake:
- Continued siege at Shukratal for months
- While Abdali gathering 60,000 men
- While Punjab falling apart
- While only way to Delhi opening up
Why:
- Fixated on Najib Khan
- Didn't recognize changing situation
- No intelligence about Abdali's advance
- By the time he moved (Dec 11), too late
Holkar's Ineffectiveness
The Problem:
- Near enough to help (Jaipur area)
- But wasting time on tribute collection
- Not equipped to face Abdali anyway
- Old-school tactics
- No modern warfare expertise
Foreshadowing:
- This pattern will continue
- Holkar not committed to northern defense
- More interested in personal enrichment
The Monsoon Factor
Why 1759 was Lost:
- Dattaji stuck at Shukratal during entire monsoon
- 4-5 months wasted
- Couldn't cross Ganga
- By the time monsoon ended, Najib reinforced
- And Abdali already on the move
The Climate Weapon:
- Monsoons immobilize armies
- Abdali timed invasion for post-monsoon
- Marathas couldn't respond during monsoon
- Lost critical months
What's Coming
The Stage Is Set:
- Abdali has 60,000 men
- Dattaji has ~25,000 (after 1,000 stragglers joined)
- Dattaji moving to Yamuna
- Holkar still in Rajasthan
- Najib Khan waiting to join Abdali
- Punjab completely lost
The Math:
- Marathas outnumbered 2:1 or worse
- No heavy artillery (Dattaji left it behind)
- Winter approaching (Marathas not prepared)
- Political isolation (no allies)
- Abdali has momentum
November-December 1759: The Punjab dream is over. A thousand half-naked stragglers tell the story. Abdali's army swells like a river collecting tributaries - 60,000 strong and growing. Dattaji finally realizes the threat and turns to face it, but he's months too late. Holkar's still playing tribute-collection games near Jaipur. The Maratha army that reached Attaq in glory is now scattered, defeated, terrified. And Abdali hasn't even reached Delhi yet. The disaster has only just begun.
Political Warfare & Delhi Assassinations (November-December 1759)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Politics of Battle
Abdali's Strategic Genius
The Core Principle:
"Fighting, battling and killing and all that violence is only as important as the politics of battle."
What This Means:
- Battle is 10% of the final thing
- Politics is 90%
- If you do politics properly, battle just seals the deal
Abdali's Approach:
- Very, very good at political part
- Marathas are not good at it
- This difference will decide everything
Abdali's Letter Campaign to Madho Singh
The Long Correspondence
The History:
- First letter traced back to January 1757
- When Abdali took over Delhi and attacked Mathura
- Madho Singh solicited support from Prince Taimur (Abdali's son)
- Prolonged correspondence continued
November 1759: The Key Letter
Abdali's Message to Madho Singh:
"Taking advantage of his absence in Persia, the Marathas had thrown the whole of Hindustan into disorder."
The Request:
- Urged Madho Singh to join hands with Vijay Singh of Jodhpur
- Stop the passage of Marathas towards the Khan (Deccan)
Why This Is Critical:
- Abdali knows if Hindu powers unite, it's tough for him
- Doesn't want Rajputs + Marathas alliance
- Both Hindu
- Together = very difficult union to face
The Strategy:
"He wants Marathas to be sidelined into one camp and everybody else on his side."
The Flattery Letter
Abdali's False Praise
What He Wrote:
"I, the Kibla of the world and of its creatures, have got in view to show favors to you and have had from times of old a soft corner in my heart for the Rajput community and have regarded them all because of the old connection as sincerely attached to my God-given kingdom."
The Reality:
- He's lying
- Doesn't give a shit about Rajputs
- Considers them kafir (infidel)
- But needs to align them against Marathas
- Flattering them for political purposes
The Promise:
"If God so willeth, all will feel gratified by mine favors. Najib Uddawla has impressed upon me your sincerity, fidelity and devotion, and God willing, you will attain preeminence and distinction."
Why It Works
The Rajput Problem:
- Marathas getting into their internal affairs too much
- Asking for too many tributes
- They couldn't afford to pay
- Feeling violated, irate, angry, upset
- Happening too often, very frequently
- Couldn't be allowed to pass
The Desperation:
- Only power that could help = Abdali
- No single power in India could help them
- Abdali = their only option
- Exactly what Shivaji feared and never did
- Making alliance with foreigners against fellow Indians
Abdali's Intelligence Network
The Spy Request
What Abdali Wrote:
"You, the devoted one, should keep to your place, repel and chastise the body of the Marathas, and always send a report of everything correct."
The System:
- Get spies to tell him what's going on
- Keep him informed of Maratha movements
- Real-time intelligence
The Threat:
"The boisterous waves of my troops would be immediately turned towards that side."
- If you tell me where Marathas are
- I'll send forces there
- Coordination between forces
Najib Khan: The Boots on Ground
His Role:
- Abdali's biggest weapon
- Rohilla commander
- Sitting in and around Delhi
- Doing the work for Abdali
- Feet on the ground, boots on the ground
- Can be trusted
- Knows he'll do the job
The Delhi Bloodbath (November 30, 1759)
Imad-ul-Mulk's Power Play
The Setup:
- Returning to Delhi
- Coming back as Wazir again
- Back in power
The First Assassination: Emperor Alamgir II
The Plan:
- Called Emperor Alamgir II
- Ostensibly to meet a visiting saint
- On outskirts of Delhi
- Took the old man to a cave
The Murder:
- As emperor entered cave
- A salience stabbed him to death
- November 30, 1759
The Cover-Up:
- Emperor's son Mirza Baba disarmed
- Taken to Delhi
- False story given out of Emperor dying in a fall
- Corpse thrown on sands of Yamuna
The Second Assassination: Former Vizier Nizam
The Same Day:
- The former vizier Nizam
- Was strangled in prison
- Body drowned in Yamuna
Imad on a Rampage:
- Killing everyone who could challenge him
- Eliminating all opposition
- Absolute power play
The Puppet Emperor: Shah Jahan III
Installing a New Emperor
What Imad Did:
- Returned to palace
- Several score princes living in fort
- Mughal emperor had 20-30 wives
- Lots of children running around
- All royal blood
The Selection:
- Chose a prince
- Named him Shah Jahan III
- Installed him on throne
- Complete puppet
The Shock:
- Assassinations shocked the capital
- Already full of fear
- News of Abdali's attack spreading
The Competing Emperor: Shah Alam II
Ali Gauhar's Declaration
Who He Is:
- Dead Emperor's son
- Happened to be in Allahabad (Prayag Raj)
What He Did:
- Declared himself Emperor
- Took name Shah Alam II
- Competing claim to throne
About Allahabad (Prayag Raj)
The Location:
- South of Delhi
- In today's Uttar Pradesh
- About 200 kilometers/miles from Delhi
- Not as far as Deccan (much farther)
The Significance:
- Merger of three rivers
- Holy site
- Lots of temples
- Rivers taken as very holy in ancient civilization
- Three rivers meeting = big deal
The Result:
- Now two emperors claiming throne
- Shah Jahan III in Delhi (puppet)
- Shah Alam II in Allahabad (legitimate heir)
Dattaji's Belated Response
Abandoning Shukratal
December 8, 1759:
- Lifted his siege
- After five months of effort
- Finally realized fallacy of trying to deal with Najib
The Strategic Shift:
- Made deliberate moves
- To safeguard his army
- To protect Delhi
- Moved away from Ganga towards Yamuna
The Movements
December 8:
- Left Shukratal (Ganga)
December 18:
- Crossed Yamuna
- That's today - December 18
- Made good time - 70-80 miles in 10 days
- Now on western bank of Yamuna
Securing His Forces
What He Sent Back:
- Pregnant wife
- Dependents
- Heavy baggage → Delhi
Reserve Force:
- Some army + heavy artillery
- Sent back with Jankoji and Imaad (not Imad-ul-Mulk, different person)
- To Karnal as reserve
What He Kept:
- 25,000 light troops with himself
- Moved north to face Afghan army
- Near Thanesar
Dattaji's Strategic Thinking
The Underestimation
Why He Only Kept 25,000:
- Against Abdali's 60,000
- Still not enough
- Taking Abdali lightly
The Reason:
- Malhar Rao Holkar knew Abdali's might
- Had dealt with him before
- But Dattaji had not come one-on-one with Abdali
- Not completely aware of his capability
- May have had overconfidence
The Observation Strategy
Dattaji's Intention:
- Observe the battle before making plans
- Want to see Abdali in battlefield situation
- Then decide how to fight him
- Strategizing before engagement
The Problem:
- Abdali won't give him that chance
Abdali's Counter-Move: The Bypass
Avoiding Confrontation
Dattaji's Preparations:
- Set up at Thanesar
- Ready to face Abdali
Abdali's Response:
- Saw Dattaji's preparations
- Moved to Jagadri
- To cross Yamuna
- And join Najib
- Avoiding confrontation with Dattaji completely
The Tactic:
- Bypassed him entirely
- Didn't give Dattaji the battle he wanted
- Sent most luggage via Budhiya Ghat
- Stood waiting with artillery
The Battle of Taroari (December 20, 1759)
The First Engagement
Maratha Force:
- Under Jivaji Bhoite
- Advanced on December 20, 1759
- Encountered some Afghan troops at Taroari
- Pushed them back
The Ambush: Shah Pasand Khan
What Happened:
- Marathas and Imad's small contingent
- Came upon 5,000 soldiers
- Under Shah Pasand Khan (Abdali's commander)
Imad's Troops Flee:
- Seeing Shah Pasand Khan's flag
- Imad's troops fled the battlefield
- Abandoned Marathas
The Technological Massacre
What Killed Marathas:
- Afghan artillery fire
- Afghan muskets took deadly toll
- Against sword and spear wielding Marathas
The Difference in Strategies:
- Abdali: Artillery and muskets (technological advantage)
- Marathas: Swords and spears (old-fashioned)
- Cavalry force
- No answer for long-range weapons
The Result:
- Several hundred Marathas killed
- Men then beheaded
- Bodies left lying in the field
Dattaji's Regret
Seeing the Carnage
What He Found:
- Following the battle
- Saw decapitated bodies in the field
- Immediately regretted having left his artillery behind
The Mistake:
- Following Bajirao I's strategy
- Which was to be light and fast
- In this case = big mistake
The Problem:
- This is not battlefield of Deccan
- Not what Shivaji specialized in
- This is flat land
- Nowhere to hide from guns
- Can't hide anywhere
- Guerrilla warfare has limited scope
Abdali Crosses Yamuna
The Night Crossing
What He Did:
- Same night (after Taroari)
- Crossed Yamuna at Budhiya
- Headed for Shukratal
The Skill:
- Afghans had practice crossing rivers
- December = not as difficult (low water)
- But Yamuna is big river
- Still impressive
The Strategy:
- Not desiring to fight Dattaji before joining Najib
- Avoided main Maratha force
- Heading to link up with ally
- Then face Marathas with combined force
Dattaji's Call for Help
The Urgent Message
What He Did:
- Sent urgent messages to Malhar Rao Holkar
- Asking him to join
The Plan:
- Take on Afghans only after Holkar joined
- Understood his limitation
- Needs more forces
- Needs cannons
- Needs long-range cannons
The Reality:
- Finally understanding he's outmatched
- Can't face 60,000 with 25,000
- Can't face artillery with swords
- Needs serious reinforcements
Abdali's Propaganda Victory
The Letter to Madho Singh
Abdali's Boast:
"An army of 20,000 brave horsemen of Imad and Jankoji were dragged by their hair by death to oppose my victorious troops. A battle ensued. My troops fell upon them like tigers on a flock of sheep."
The Exaggeration:
- Actually only a few hundred killed
- Not 20,000
- But making it sound like total victory
The Message:
"Ghazi Uddin [Imad] and Jankoji have fled away like jackals. You should in perfect peace of mind turn to the chastisement of Malhar so that he too may not escape. Rewards are promised to you."
The Purpose:
- Morale boost to Madho Singh
- Saying: "I've started pushing them back"
- "You can do it too"
- "Fight back against Malhar"
- Trying to keep Holkar tied up in Rajasthan
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Bypassing Dattaji, crossing Yamuna, heading to join Najib |
| Dattaji Shinde | Main Maratha commander | At Thanesar, then following Abdali, realized needs artillery |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Abdali's boots on ground, coordinating |
| Madho Singh | Jaipur king | Receiving Abdali's letters, coordinating to keep Holkar busy |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Delhi wazir | Assassinated Emperor Alamgir II & former vizier, installed Shah Jahan III |
| Alamgir II | Mughal Emperor | Murdered Nov 30, 1759 |
| Shah Jahan III | New puppet emperor | Installed by Imad |
| Ali Gauhar / Shah Alam II | Legitimate heir | Declared himself emperor at Allahabad |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Still in Rajasthan, being kept busy |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's general | Leading 20,000 through Khyber Pass |
| Shah Pasand Khan | Abdali's commander | Led forces at Taroari, defeated Marathas |
| Jankoji | Maratha officer | With Dattaji, fled at Taroari |
| Jivaji Bhoite | Maratha commander | Led attack that became Taroari battle |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 1757 | First letter from Madho Singh to Abdali's son Taimur |
| Nov 1759 | Abdali writes to Madho Singh |
| Nov 30, 1759 | Imad murders Emperor Alamgir II and former vizier |
| Nov 30, 1759 | Shah Jahan III installed as puppet emperor |
| Nov 30, 1759 | Ali Gauhar declares himself Shah Alam II at Allahabad |
| Dec 8, 1759 | Dattaji lifts siege at Shukratal |
| Dec 18, 1759 | Dattaji crosses Yamuna |
| Dec 20, 1759 | Battle of Taroari - Marathas defeated |
| Dec 20, 1759 | Abdali crosses Yamuna at night |
| Late Dec 1759 | Dattaji sends urgent messages to Holkar |
Critical Insights
The Politics > Battle Equation
Abdali's Mastery:
- Writes letters to all potential enemies of Marathas
- Rajputs (Madho Singh, Vijay Singh)
- Will do same with Suraj Mal Jat
- Will do same with Shuja Uddaula
The Goal:
- Isolate Marathas
- If Hindu powers unite with Marathas = impossible for Abdali
- Must keep them divided
- Marathas in one camp, everyone else with him
Why It Works:
- Marathas alienated everyone
- Too many tribute demands
- Too intrusive in local affairs
- No allies left
- Easy for Abdali to turn them against Marathas
The Assassination Strategy
Imad's Power Consolidation:
- Killed legitimate emperor
- Killed former vizier who could challenge him
- Installed puppet emperor
- Now has absolute control in Delhi
Why This Matters:
- No legitimate authority left
- Just competing claimants
- Shah Jahan III (puppet in Delhi)
- Shah Alam II (legitimate but distant)
- Power vacuum
- Chaos
- Perfect for Abdali
The Technology Gap
The Taroari Lesson:
- Abdali: Artillery + muskets
- Marathas: Swords + spears + cavalry
- Technological advantage = massacre
Dattaji's Realization:
- Left artillery behind (following Bajirao I's tactics)
- Immediately regretted it
- Flat land = can't hide from guns
- Guerrilla warfare doesn't work here
- Need long-range cannons
The Problem:
- This isn't Deccan
- Not Shivaji's terrain
- Old tactics don't work
- Need to adapt
- But too late
The River-Crossing Skill
Why It Matters:
- Abdali can cross Yamuna at night
- Despite it being a big river
- Afghans have this skill
- Marathas struggled to cross rivers
Strategic Implication:
- Rivers aren't barriers for Abdali
- Can move forces quickly
- Can bypass defenses
- Marathas can't rely on rivers as protection
The Morale Warfare
Abdali's Letter Campaign:
- Exaggerating victories
- "20,000" killed (actually few hundred)
- "Fled like jackals"
- Building his reputation
- Destroying Maratha morale
The Effect:
- Madho Singh encouraged to fight Holkar
- Keeps Holkar tied up
- Prevents reinforcements
- All through propaganda
Dattaji's Underestimation
The Fatal Flaw:
- Only kept 25,000 troops
- Against 60,000
- Left artillery behind
- Wanted to "observe" before fighting
Why:
- Never faced Abdali personally
- Holkar knew Abdali's might
- But Dattaji didn't
- Overconfidence
The Result:
- Outmaneuvered
- Outgunned
- Calling for help
- But Holkar still 400km away
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Abdali bypassed Dattaji
- Crossing to join Najib at Shukratal
- Combined Afghan-Rohilla force coming
- Dattaji following, but without artillery
- Holkar finally leaving Jaipur (Jan 2, 1760)
- But still 375km away
- Abdali knows timing is perfect
The Race:
- Abdali needs to destroy Dattaji before Holkar arrives
- Dattaji needs to survive until Holkar arrives
- Madho Singh trying to delay Holkar
- Everything depends on timing
November-December 1759: The blood flows in Delhi as Imad murders his way to absolute power. Two emperors now claim the throne - one a puppet, one a distant challenger. Meanwhile, Abdali plays chess with the Rajputs, writing flattering letters while sharpening his knives. At Taroari, Maratha swords meet Afghan muskets, and hundreds of beheaded bodies teach Dattaji the lesson he should have learned months ago: this isn't his grandfather's war. The old tactics are dead. The artillery he left behind could have saved them. Now he's calling desperately for Holkar, 400 kilometers away, while Abdali crosses rivers in the night and consolidates forces. The politics have been won. The battle is just the formality now.
Winter Sets In & Holkar's Questionable Character (Late December 1759 - Early January 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Abdali Joins Najib (Late December 1759)
The Union of Forces
After Crossing Yamuna:
- Abdali went to Saharanpur
- Joined Najib Khan
- Rohila Khand location
Who Are the Rohilas:
- Najib Khan's allies
- Other Rohilla commanders
- Afghan ethnic group in India
- Based in Rohilakhand region
Combined Armies:
- Now moved towards Delhi
- On left bank of Yamuna
Holkar's Ideology: Old-School Warfare
His Belief About Abdali
What Holkar Thought:
"Abdali was overrated."
His Assessment:
- Didn't believe Abdali was that dangerous
- Thought people exaggerated his capability
- This was wrong assessment
What Holkar Used to Say:
- To Abdali: "You will be the first one to be shot if at all"
- "You are the celebrity, right?"
- Used to belittle Abdali
- Said Abdali "has no real guts to be leader of battle formation"
The Reality:
"Dattaji turned out to be wrong and Abdali turned out to be correct."
Foreshadowing:
- This will come back in future chapters
- Holkar's underestimation will matter
- We're just getting warmed up
- Actual battle is far away
- But something may be happening soon
The Winter Problem
Height of Winter in North India
The Climate Reality:
- December 1759 - peak winter
- North India = very cold
- Marathas not accustomed to cold
- Their flimsy clothes
The Maratha Disadvantage:
- Came from the Deccan (Khan)
- Much warmer and hotter place
- Not used to winter business
Why Their Clothes Were Flimsy:
- In Deccan, resist heat by wearing less
- Put as little clothes as possible
- Makes sense in hot climate
- Terrible in north India winter
The Fog Factor
North India Winter Conditions:
- Thick fog in morning hours
- Especially winter months (3 months)
- Until 11 or 12 o'clock
- Then sun disperses it
The Impact:
- Visibility affected
- Heavy thick fog cover
- Even today this happens
- Tactical disadvantage
Climate Notes:
- Very conducive for fog formation
- Consistent phenomenon
- Predictable but unavoidable
Afghan Climate Advantage
The Preparation
Why Afghans Were Ready:
- Coming from colder climate
- Usually carried protective clothing
- Used to cold weather
The Home Advantage:
- Afghanistan much colder than north India
- For them, north India winter = mild
- Their attire adjusted for Afghan weather
- Even colder than nearby areas
The Result:
- Not affected by cold
- No big deal for them
- Ready for conditions
- While Marathas suffered
The River Defense Strategy
Burari Ghat: The Critical Point
Who Was There:
- Sabaji Shinde held post
- Burari Ghat location
- Just north of Delhi
Why This Location:
- To prevent Abdali from crossing Yamuna
- The ghat = slope of Yamuna river
- Where Abdali could come up if crossing
The Strategy:
"If you catch him while he is crossing, then you can destroy his army when it is most vulnerable."
- Really take them out
- Best place to be situated
- Catch enemy at weakest moment
Dattaji's Position: Majnu Katila
Where He Was:
- Just south of Burari Ghat
- Also at a ghat (Majnu Katila)
- On Yamuna's west bank
The Coordination:
- Dattaji south of Sabaji
- Both covering Yamuna crossings
- Best guess: Abdali will cross river
- Come over to Burari Ghat
The Logic:
- Catch enemy where most vulnerable
- While crossing river
- Can't fight back effectively
- Destroy the army
- Guessing game though
Malhar Rao Holkar: Still in Rajasthan
The Tribute Business
What He Was Doing:
- Trying to close his affair in Rajasthan
- Getting pending tributes from Madho Singh
- Trying to capture Fort of Barwada
Barwada Location:
- Called south
- Between Tonk and Sawai Madhopur
- Southeast of Jaipur city
- Nearly 175 kilometers from Delhi
The Problem:
- Not far from where action was
- Hide and seek between Abdali and Dattaji
- If he had dropped tribute business
- Could have come just in time
Madho Singh's Secret Alliance
Working with Najib Khan
The Conspiracy:
- Madho Singh working in secret conjunction with Najib Khan
- Detained Holkar in Rajasthan
- By offering stiff resistance
The Strategy:
- Keeping Holkar busy
- Instead of letting him easily go north
- In cahoots with Abdali and Najib
- But no one knew it at the time
The Fort Siege
December 1759:
- Holkar brought his guns
- Forced fort to capitulate
- In mid-December 1759
Meanwhile:
- When Dattaji crossed Yamuna to face Abdali
- Holkar still busy with siege
- Getting some results
- But wasting time
The Holkar Problem: A Troublesome Figure
His Character Assessment
General View:
"Malhar Rao is also troublesome figure. You will see later on also."
The Accusation:
- A lot of people say
- He didn't play proper role in actual battle
- Let down the Marathas
Why:
- Had soft corner for Najib Khan
- Was an old timer
The Age Factor
His Age:
- At the time: 50 plus
- Not in his prime fighting age
What This Means:
- Less aggressive
- More cautious
- Not as capable physically
- Different priorities
Holkar's Warfare Ideology
Trained Under Bajirao I
His Background:
- Was aid to Bajirao I
- Went on northern campaigns with him
- Saw Bajirao in action
- Bajirao was his teacher
His Ideology Matured During Bajirao I's Time:
- That's when he learned warfare
- Formed his tactical beliefs
- Based on Bajirao's methods
The Old-Style Fighter
His Understanding:
"You never confront the enemy one-on-one in a flat land. Just don't do it."
What He Believed:
- Suddenly pounce on enemy
- Or use surprise tactics
- Never comfortable with flat land engagement
- Both armies engaged until battle ends
- Not used to that fighting style
His Preference:
- Cavalry man
- Didn't believe in heavy artillery
- Wanted old-style fighting
The Relevance Problem
Why His Style Didn't Work
The Geography:
- Northern plains of India
- All flat land
- Between Ganga and Yamuna = Doab
- Called "the hour" (between two rivers)
The Doab Characteristics:
- Extremely flat land
- Best agricultural land you can find
- Plenty of water (sweet water)
- Flat land
- Extremely good quality soil
The Strategic Problem:
- No hills
- No forts (or only regular forts, not mountain forts like Shivaji had)
- Those forts easily conquered
- Not mountain forts
- Can't use Shivaji's tactics
The Conclusion:
"The style of fighting he was used to or he wanted to fight it had little relevance in the northern plains of India."
The River Crossing (Late December 1759)
Why It's Possible Now
December = More Feasible:
- Winter month
- River levels lower
- If tried in monsoon = extremely difficult
The Memory:
- Same river where Dattaji needed Najib's help
- Just a few months ago (no, that was Ganga)
- Wait, different river - this is Yamuna
- But same principle applies
The Crossing:
- December conditions favorable
- Probably crossed at low lying land
- Different areas where can cross easily
- Month of December made it possible
Holkar's Belated Response
Getting the Message
December 27, 1759:
- Holkar got Dattaji's message
- Calling for help
- Began preparations to join Shinde
The Problem:
- Already too late
- Was 375 kilometers away
Finally Leaving Jaipur
January 2, 1760:
- Holkar finally left Jaipur
- Moved towards Delhi
- To join Dattaji
The Assessment:
"Perhaps he did not sense the urgency of Dattaji's situation."
But:
"Ahmad Shah Abdali did."
The Race Against Time
Abdali's Awareness
What He Knew:
- Holkar now coming
- Timing was perfect
- Needs to destroy Dattaji before Malhar Rao's army shows up
The Implication:
- Window of opportunity
- Dattaji isolated
- Holkar still days away
- Must strike now
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position/Action | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Joined Najib at Saharanpur, moving to Delhi | Knows timing is perfect |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Combined forces with Abdali | Abdali's key ally |
| Dattaji Shinde | Main Maratha commander | At Majnu Katila, south of Burari Ghat | Waiting for Abdali to cross |
| Sabaji Shinde | Shinde clan member | At Burari Ghat, guarding river crossing | North of Dattaji |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Left Jaipur Jan 2, 1760 | 375km away, old-timer |
| Madho Singh | Jaipur king | Secretly working with Najib/Abdali | Detained Holkar |
| Vijay Singh | Jodhpur king | Mentioned in Abdali's letters | Potential Abdali ally |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Late Dec 1759 | Abdali crosses Yamuna, goes to Saharanpur |
| Late Dec 1759 | Abdali joins Najib Khan |
| Late Dec 1759 | Combined armies move towards Delhi |
| Late Dec 1759 | Sabaji at Burari Ghat, Dattaji at Majnu Katila |
| Mid-Dec 1759 | Holkar captures Barwada fort |
| Dec 27, 1759 | Holkar receives Dattaji's message |
| Jan 2, 1760 | Holkar finally leaves Jaipur for Delhi |
Geographic Context
Key Locations:
- Saharanpur: Where Abdali joined Najib (Rohilakhand)
- Burari Ghat: River crossing point, just north of Delhi (Sabaji's position)
- Majnu Katila: South of Burari Ghat, on west bank of Yamuna (Dattaji's position)
- The Doab: Flat land between Ganga and Yamuna
- Barwada Fort: Between Tonk and Sawai Madhopur, 175km from Delhi
- Jaipur: Where Holkar was stuck, 375km from Delhi
Critical Insights
The Climate as Weapon
Winter's Impact:
- Marathas: Flimsy clothes, suffering in cold
- Afghans: Prepared, used to colder weather
- Fog: Reduced visibility, tactical disadvantage
- Not conducive for Marathas
Why It Matters:
- Physical discomfort = reduced effectiveness
- Can't see well in fog
- Morale impact
- Natural advantage to Afghans
- Timing of invasion deliberate
The Technology vs. Tradition Debate
Holkar's Problem:
- Trained under Bajirao I
- Believes in old tactics:
- Light and fast
- Cavalry-based
- Surprise attacks
- Never one-on-one in flat land
The Reality:
- Northern plains = all flat land
- No hills, no mountain forts
- Old tactics have little relevance
- Need heavy artillery
- But Holkar doesn't believe in it
The Generation Gap:
- Holkar represents old guard
- 50+ years old
- Set in his ways
- Can't adapt to new warfare
The Questionable Character
Evidence Against Holkar:
- Soft corner for Najib Khan - potential conflict of interest
- Wasted time in Rajasthan collecting tributes
- Didn't sense urgency of Dattaji's situation
- Old-fashioned tactics inappropriate for terrain
- Underestimated Abdali - thought he was overrated
- "Let down the Marathas" in the actual battle (foreshadowed)
The Implication:
- Not fully committed
- Personal interests > collective goal
- Will be a problem in coming battle
The Conspiracy Theory
Madho Singh's Role:
- Secret conjunction with Najib Khan
- Deliberately detained Holkar
- Offered stiff resistance to Barwada siege
- Kept Holkar busy in Rajasthan
Why:
- In cahoots with Abdali
- Part of Abdali's political warfare
- But no one knew it at the time
- Worked perfectly
The River Defense Strategy
The Logic:
- Yamuna = natural barrier
- Catch Abdali while crossing = most vulnerable
- Can destroy army then
- Both Sabaji and Dattaji positioned for this
The Problem:
- It's a guessing game
- Abdali already crossed
- Now joining Najib
- Strategy didn't work
- Abdali outmaneuvered them
The Timing Perfection
Abdali's Awareness:
- Knows Holkar is coming
- Knows Holkar is 375km away
- At least week to 10 days travel
- Window of opportunity
- Must strike before Holkar arrives
The Math:
- Dattaji: 25,000 troops
- Abdali + Najib: 60,000+ troops
- Ratio: 2.5:1 or worse
- Holkar: Still days away
- Perfect time to attack
The Ideological Divide
Bajirao I's Legacy:
- Taught: Never fight one-on-one in flat land
- Light and fast tactics
- Guerrilla warfare
- Cavalry supremacy
The New Reality:
- Must fight in flat land
- No choice
- Heavy artillery essential
- Old tactics don't work
The Conflict:
- Old guard (Holkar) vs. new needs
- Can't adapt in time
- Stuck in outdated ideology
- Will cost them dearly
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Abdali + Najib combined = massive force
- Dattaji isolated with 25,000
- Holkar finally coming but still ~10 days away
- Winter conditions favoring Afghans
- Dattaji positioned at river crossings
- But Abdali already crossed
- Perfect storm
The Race:
- Can Dattaji survive until Holkar arrives?
- Will Abdali strike before reinforcements?
- Will Holkar even fight properly when he gets there?
- Is Holkar secretly sympathetic to Najib?
The Foreshadowing:
- "We're just getting warmed up"
- "The actual battle is far away"
- "Something may be happening here"
- Holkar will "let down the Marathas"
- His underestimation of Abdali will matter
Late December 1759 - Early January 1760: The pieces are in position. Dattaji shivers in his flimsy Deccan clothes while thick fog rolls across the flat lands. Holkar, 375 kilometers away, finally leaves Jaipur - a week too late - still believing Abdali is overrated. Meanwhile, Abdali knows exactly what he's doing. He's joined Najib. He's got the numbers. He's got the weather. He's got the timing. And he knows Holkar is coming. But he also knows he's got about ten days to destroy Dattaji first. The window is open. The trap is set. And nobody in the Maratha camp understands just how perfectly Abdali has orchestrated all of this. The politics have been won. The geography favors him. The climate favors him. The timing favors him. All that's left is the violence.
Bhau's Nizam Campaign & The Cannon Regiment (October 1759 - January 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fog of War
The Information Gap
What Peshwa Didn't Know:
- A thousand miles between Pune and Shukratal
- Dattaji enforcing siege at Shukratal
- Unknown to Peshwa: Ahmad Shah Abdali beginning fifth invasion
The Timeline:
- September 1759: Abdali took off for Punjab
- But not known in the Deccan
- Nanasaheb Peshwa thought: "Everything going fine"
- Thought: "Abdali busy fighting tribal wars in Afghanistan"
The Reality:
- Situation rapidly changing in north
- Nobody had understanding of how serious it was
- Fog of war
Why Communication Was So Slow
The Problem:
- Even if people in north knew
- Would take two weeks to get message to Pune
Before Nanasaheb Gets Message:
- Two weeks minimum
- Way too long
- No instant messaging
- No WhatsApp
The Danger:
- By time you know = too late
- Can't respond quickly
- Strategic blindness
The Deccan Front: Campaign Against Nizam
Why Keep Forces at Pune
December 1759:
- Fighting contingent deliberately kept at Pune
- Even though:
- Malhar Rao Holkar in Jaipur
- Dattaji around Delhi
- Some force in Punjab
The Reason:
- Always watching out for Nizam
- Couldn't leave Pune fully unprotected
- Capital city
- Nizam was unpredictable
The Threat:
- Nizam may sneak up on Pune
- Had to have protective cover
- Constant danger
Sadashiv Rao Bhau: The Southern Commander
The Appointment
October 13, 1759:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau moved to war tents outside Pune
- Preparing to set out on campaign against Nizam
Who He Is:
- Cousin of Nanasaheb Peshwa
- Bajirao I = father of Nanasaheb
- Bajirao I's brother had a son
- That son = Bhau
- Called "Bhau" with affection (means brother)
Why Him:
- Nanasaheb not highly inclined to lead military campaigns himself
- Though he could
- Gave leadership of southern campaign to cousin
The English Observation
William Price (English envoy in Pune since August 1759):
"This morning, about four o'clock, Sado Bhau unexpectedly took the field, pitching his tent a little without the town. His sudden departure, it is thought, is occasioned by some advices received of the Mughals. Report says that Salavat Jung and Nizam Ali are likely to accommodate matters, and that the latter has a very powerful army."
The Cannon Regiment Problem
Two Artillery Chiefs: The Tension
Muzaffar Khan:
- Gardi artillery chief in Maratha army
- Never on good terms with Sadashiv Rao Bhau
Who Are the Gardis:
- Secular Maratha army recruited some Muslims
- From Telangana (southern province)
- These Muslims called Gardis
- Specialized in cannon regiment
The Bad Blood:
- Bhau had opposed Muzaffar Khan joining Marathas in first place
- Personality conflict
- Not about religion - Ibrahim Khan Gardi also Muslim
Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Prize Recruit
Who He Is
Background:
- Nephew of Muzaffar Khan
- Nizam's erstwhile artillery chief
- Also trained by Bussy (the French general)
Why Bhau Wanted Him:
- Superior to Muzaffar Khan
- Better trained
- Better reputation
- Personal preference
Why Marathas Needed Cannon Expertise
The Reality:
- Marathas did not have expertise within their hold
- Had to hire from outside
The Source:
- Muzaffar Khan: Trained by Bussy
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi: Trained by Bussy
- French general had trained several people
- From that particular area
- Happened to be Muslims
The Evolution:
- Never there during Shivaji's time or after
- Only recently understood importance
- First time recognizing cannon regiment necessity
Why Cannon Regiment Became Essential
The Strategic Shift
The Old Way (Shivaji's Era):
- Started with protective/defensive moves
- Guerrilla warfare (Ghanimikawa) very important
- Conquering lands:
- Depend on treachery
- Depend on Ghanimikawa
- Rarely engage in frontal battles
The New Reality:
- Marathas becoming established power like Mughals
- Had to fight one-on-one in open field
- Transformed from small army to huge army
- Had to fight battles old-fashioned way
The Geographic Problem:
- In the north = no mountains
- Can't do Ghanimikawa
- No Sahyadri mountains
- No mountain forts
- Had to fight in open, fertile plains
The Cannon Advantage
What It Does:
- Softens up enemy lines before cavalry charge
- Long-range strike capability
- Can reach enemy before they see you
- Makes huge difference in flat land
- Only thing that will win wars in north (they realized)
In Flat Land:
- Can't leave battle to chance
- Need ace up your sleeve
- Without advantage = 50-50 battle
- Cannon regiment = that ace
The Famous Cannon Incident: Bussy at Charminar
The Backstory
What Happened:
- Reminded them of when Sadashiv Rao Bhau heard about Bussy
- Bussy had cannon regiment in Hyderabad
- Could keep Nizam at bay in his own capital
- Demonstrated raw power of cannon technology
Why They Were Impressed:
- Such a good cannon regiment
- One man with cannons > entire Nizam army
- Technology = absolute power
The Realization:
- "We need long-range cannons"
- "We need a force trained in it"
- "This is the ace we need"
- Otherwise can't project Maratha power to north
- Otherwise stuck playing old Shivaji tactics
The Problem:
- Old way: Retreat to Raigarh, Rajagarh, Simhagarh when threatened
- New reality: In northern plains, nowhere to run
- "You are in front of each other"
Ibrahim Khan Agrees to Join (January 1760)
The Deal
What He Brought:
- With my thousand soldiers
- Will join Bhau
- 1,000 man cannon regiment
The Importance:
- These were best trained cannon force available
- Bussy was Frenchman
- Trained his guys for months
- Highly disciplined
- Long-range cannons (1-2 kilometers)
The Maratha Cannon Advantage vs. Afghan Cannons
What Afghans Had
Small Cannons:
- Regular small cannons
- Range: About 500 meters or less
Zamboorak (Camel Guns):
- Particular name: Zambak or Zumbak
- Small cannons mounted on camel backs
- People sitting on camels riding them
- Called Zumbak
How It Worked:
- Camels move around
- Moving cannons
- Wherever they see enemy in front
- Launch these small cannons
- Range: At most 200 feet, 100 feet
- Very creative
What Marathas Had (Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Regiment)
The Long-Range Cannons:
- Going up to one to two kilometers
- Can't escape them
- Reach you before you even see Marathas on battlefield
The Technological Gap:
- Afghan cannons: 100-500 meters
- Maratha cannons: 1,000-2,000 meters
- Massive advantage
The Fatal Flaw: Maratha Indiscipline
The Glory Problem
Why Cavalry/Foot Soldiers Opposed Cannons:
- Scared of these tactics
- Scared of this style of fighting
Why:
"Because they will no longer get the glory and the credits."
The Logic:
- Once cannons soften up enemy ranks
- Destroy them before cavalry charges
- Then Peshwa would say: "You guys are no good"
- "My cannon force is doing the job"
- "You're just wiping it off"
- "Just doing the final thing"
The Lack of Discipline
What They Wanted:
- Go up in front
- Show how brave they are
- Show how great soldiers and fighters they are
- With swords and spears
- Traditional glory
What This Meant:
"They didn't understand that it's not about credit. It's about winning the battle and being disciplined."
The Problem:
"That discipline had not still gotten into the Maratha ranks."
The Tactical Disaster
What Should Happen
Proper Sequence:
- Cannon force fires long-range
- Softens enemy ranks
- Destroys enemy formations
- Then cavalry charges
- Easy victory
What Actually Happened in Battle
The Fatal Error:
- Fighting force and cavalry got ahead of cannon force
- Jumped in front of cannons
The Consequence:
- Then what happens?
- They get shot by their own cannons
- Or artillery has to stop firing
- Thus other army can beat them
The Reality:
"That is exactly what happened on the real battlefield."
What Could Have Been:
- Cannon force was doing their job
- Really burning the enemies
- Afghans did not have these long-range cannons
- But weren't allowed to finish softening enemy lines
Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Hero's Story
In the Actual Battle
What He Did:
- His cannons going 1-2 kilometers
- So effective they almost made Abdali retreat
- Creating havoc on Afghan army
The Impact on Abdali's Army:
- At one point, they started fleeing battlefield
- Towards Afghanistan
- Before they realized not totally defeated
- Really created havoc
Abdali's Near-Retreat:
- Abdali was in rear guard (always in back)
- Never in front
- Had camels, horses, all that
- Also had 30-40 wives in very back
The Preparation to Flee:
- Gave orders to mount wives on horses
- Thought: "This is lost now"
- Said: "I have to save my wives and their honor"
- If captured by Peshwa, don't know what will happen
- Orders to leave: "We are leaving now"
The Afghan General's Desperation
What He Did:
- General in front lines
- Saw destruction being caused by cannons
- Got down from horse on battlefield
- Started eating the mud
Why:
- Looked at soldiers fleeing left and right
- Total chaos
- Started appealing to them:
- "Hey, where are you going?"
- "Afghanistan, Kabul is thousands of kilometers away"
- "You have to stand and fight"
- "That is your only alternative"
- "Please don't do this"
- Started weeping
The Desperation:
"It became so desperate for the Afghan army."
Ibrahim Khan's Capture & Death
The Injury
What Happened:
- Ibrahim Khan gets injured in battle
- Captured by Abdali's forces
- Brought in front of Abdali
Abdali's Offer
What Abdali Knew:
- The kind of leadership Ibrahim Khan had
- Tremendous expertise
- Made all the difference
The Offer:
"Join me. Join me as the chief of my cannon force. I will give you the topmost position in my army and all the honors that you want."
The Context:
- Ibrahim Khan was severely injured
The Refusal
Ibrahim Khan's Response:
"Never."
His Reasoning:
"Because I have eaten the salt of Peshwa and do as you wish with me, but I will never join you."
The Declaration:
"I am a Hindustani. I am the son of the soil and you are Afghan, you are Afghani and I will never, ever be joining you. Because I am a Hindustani, I am part of the family."
The Loyalty:
- Felt kinship with his Deccanites
- "I have eaten the salt of Peshwa"
- He's been good to me
- He is my employer
- Cannot betray him
The Execution
Abdali's Reaction:
- Got irate
- Immediately ordered capture
- Slaughtered right there and then
The Assessment:
"He was loyal to the last minute when he didn't have to. But he was."
His Personality:
- Did a fantastic job
- Loyal beyond necessity
- Refused when he could have saved himself
- Chose honor over life
The Professional vs. Unprofessional
The Problem with Maratha Army
The Assessment:
"Maratha army was unprofessional."
Why:
- Wanted individual glory
- Couldn't maintain discipline
- Jumped ahead of cannons
- Ruined tactical advantage
- About credit, not victory
The Contrast:
- Ibrahim Khan: Professional, disciplined
- Maratha cavalry: Undisciplined, glory-seeking
- One = winning strategy
- Other = self-defeating
Key Players
| Name | Role | Affiliation | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Southern commander | Marathas (Pune) | Cousin of Nanasaheb, leading Nizam campaign |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Pune | Not inclined to lead campaigns himself |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery chief | Joined Marathas | 1,000 soldiers, trained by Bussy, hero |
| Muzaffar Khan | Artillery chief | Marathas | Not on good terms with Bhau |
| Bussy | French general | Formerly with Nizam | Trained the Gardi commanders |
| William Price | English envoy | Pune | Observing and reporting |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | — | Target of Bhau's campaign |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Aug 1759 | William Price arrives in Pune |
| Sept 1759 | Abdali begins invasion (unknown in Pune) |
| Oct 13, 1759 | Sadashiv Rao Bhau moves to war tents |
| Late 1759 | Bhau recruits Ibrahim Khan Gardi |
| Jan 1760 | Ibrahim Khan agrees with 1,000 soldiers |
| Later (Battle) | Ibrahim Khan's cannons almost defeat Abdali |
| Later (Battle) | Ibrahim Khan captured, refuses Abdali, killed |
Critical Insights
The Information Warfare Problem
The Two-Week Gap:
- Takes 2 weeks for message Pune → Delhi
- By time Peshwa knows = too late
- Can't coordinate strategy
- Can't send reinforcements in time
The Consequence:
- Northern and southern fronts disconnected
- Can't respond to Abdali invasion
- Strategic paralysis
- "Fog of war" literal and figurative
The Technology Revolution
Why Cannons Changed Everything:
- Shivaji era: No cannons, guerrilla warfare worked
- Northern era: Flat land, need cannons
- 1-2 km range vs. 100-500m range = dominance
- Can't fight modern war with old weapons
The Adaptation:
- Marathas finally understood this
- Hired foreign-trained experts
- Muslims from Telangana
- Secular army = pragmatic
- Religion < expertise
The Discipline Gap
The Cultural Problem:
- Maratha culture = individual heroism
- Glory in personal combat
- Sword and spear warriors
- Face-to-face honor
The Modern Warfare:
- Artillery = impersonal
- Long-range killing
- No individual glory
- Team coordination essential
The Conflict:
- Old warriors can't adapt
- Want credit for victory
- Jump ahead of cannons
- Ruin tactical advantage
- Professional discipline hadn't entered Maratha ranks
Ibrahim Khan's Hindustani Identity
The Powerful Moment:
- Muslim man
- Trained by French general
- Working for Hindu Peshwa
- Refuses to betray employer
- Declares himself "Hindustani"
What It Represents:
- Secular Indian identity
- Loyalty to land > religion
- "Son of the soil"
- Afghan = foreigner
- "I am part of the family"
The Irony:
- Most loyal Maratha soldier = Muslim
- Most treacherous = Hindu kings (Madho Singh, etc.)
- Identity > religion
The Near-Victory That Never Was
What Almost Happened:
- Ibrahim Khan's cannons devastating Abdali
- Afghans fleeing battlefield
- Abdali preparing to retreat
- His general eating mud and weeping
- Marathas were winning
What Went Wrong:
- Own cavalry jumped ahead
- Couldn't use cannons anymore
- Lost tactical advantage
- Indiscipline = defeat
The Tragedy:
- Victory was in their hands
- Technology advantage was there
- Leadership was there (Ibrahim Khan)
- But cultural indiscipline lost it
The Glory vs. Victory Problem
The Mathematics:
- With cannons softening enemy: 80% victory chance
- Cavalry gets no glory but victory certain
- Cavalry jumps ahead: 50-50 chance
- Cavalry gets glory if they win
- But much more likely to lose
The Choice:
- Certain victory with no personal glory
- OR uncertain victory with personal glory
- Marathas chose personal glory
- Lost the battle
The Professionalism Gap
Ibrahim Khan:
- Trained for months by Bussy
- Disciplined regiment
- Followed orders
- Coordinated tactics
- Professional soldier
Maratha Cavalry:
- Individual warriors
- Personal honor code
- Ignored overall strategy
- Wanted individual credit
- Unprofessional army
The Lesson:
"This is not about credit. It's about winning the battle and being disciplined."
The Wasted Advantage
What Marathas Had:
- 1-2 km range cannons (best in India)
- Trained artillery chief (Ibrahim Khan)
- 1,000 disciplined soldiers
- Technological superiority
- Winning strategy
What They Threw Away:
- Let cavalry ruin cannon advantage
- Lost coordination
- Turned dominance into defeat
- Snatched defeat from jaws of victory
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Bhau preparing Nizam campaign (October 1759)
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi recruited with 1,000 soldiers
- Best cannon force in India now with Marathas
- But Abdali already invading in north (unknown to them)
- Two-week information gap
The Tragedy:
- This amazing artillery chief
- With the best cannons
- Almost defeated Abdali
- But Maratha indiscipline ruined it
- He'll be captured and killed
- Loyal to the end
- "I am a Hindustani"
The Lesson Not Learned:
- Professionalism > personal glory
- Discipline > individual heroism
- Modern warfare ≠ traditional combat
- But Marathas won't learn in time
October 1759 - January 1760: While Bhau recruits the best artillery commander in India, while Ibrahim Khan brings 1,000 trained soldiers and French long-range cannons, while technological superiority is finally in Maratha hands - nobody in Pune knows Abdali is already in Punjab. The fog of war is literal (northern winter) and figurative (two-week message delay). And when battle finally comes, when Ibrahim Khan's cannons are winning, when Abdali himself is preparing to flee with his 40 wives, when Afghan generals are eating mud and weeping in desperation - Maratha cavalry will jump ahead for personal glory, ruin the cannon advantage, and turn certain victory into catastrophic defeat. Ibrahim Khan will be captured, will refuse to betray the Peshwa even to save his life, will declare "I am a Hindustani," and will be slaughtered for his loyalty. The best soldier in the Maratha army was a Muslim. The most treacherous were the Hindu kings. Identity over religion. Loyalty over life. But glory over victory? That's what cost them everything.
The Assassination Attempt & Nizam's Defeat (October 1759 - February 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Ibrahim Khan Gardi Joins (November 1759)
The Recruitment
Who He Is:
- Nephew of Muzaffar Khan
- Had close relations with Nizam
- Nizam forcing him out
- Marathas welcomed him with open arms
What He Brought:
- 1,000 musketeers
- French-trained artillery expertise
- Joined Peshwa's army in November 1759
The Assassination Plot (October 28, 1759)
Muzaffar Khan's Revenge
The Problem:
- Muzaffar Khan decided to do away with Bhau
- Didn't like the deal bringing Ibrahim Khan
- His nephew = his rival
The Plan:
- At Bhau's camp at Wano-ri
- Sent his son-in-law Haider Khan to assassinate Bhau
The Attack
Evening of October 28, 1759:
- Unguarded moment
- Haider attacked
- Stabbed Bhau in his back
The Near-Miss
Version 1 (Bhau Saheb an Cheek Kaifiyat):
- Bhau moved towards ink pot slightly in front
- Assassin missed (didn't hit heart)
Version 2 (Grant Duff):
- Nagoji Gujar - soldier in attendance
- Caught assassin's hand
- Deflected it
The Result:
- Bhau severely stabbed in back
- But not killed
The Confession & Execution
What Haider Revealed
The Admission:
- Muzaffar Khan instructed him to assassinate Bhau
- The Nizam was behind it
- Big confession
The Trial
The Next Day:
- Matter inquired into in court
- Both disarmed and caught
- Muzaffar Khan initially denied it
The Verdict:
- Muzaffar Khan hanged
- Haider executed near Dhal palace where flag was hoisted
Additional Punishment:
- Families imprisoned
- Their army of 2,000 men disbanded
The Nizam's Role
What He Did:
- Blamed Muzaffar Khan for it
- Threw him under the bus in court
- Even though he was behind it truly
- Classic betrayal
November 1759: The Crucial Month
Multiple Crises Simultaneously
What Was Happening:
- Abdali threatening Dattaji and had joined Najib
- Bhau escaped assassination attempt
- Marathas opening second war front against Nizam
The Situation:
- Very consequential month
- Lots of fast-moving things
- Army stretched
- Breath in on two ends
The Reception
Bhau's Escape & Muzaffar's Death:
- Widely welcomed by entire Maratha courts and chiefs
- Seen as stroke of good luck
Nizam Makes Peace with English (1759)
The Treaty
What Happened:
- Nizam Salabat Jung and his brother Nizam Ali
- Concluded peace treaty with English in Orissa
- 1759
What They Gave Up:
- Seeding some districts to English
The Result:
- English got foothold on Nizam territories
The Fort of Ahmadnagar Falls (November 9, 1759)
The Prestigious Conquest
What Happened:
- Marathas took Fort of Ahmadnagar
- November 9, 1759
- Without firing a single shot
How:
- Offered bribe to Kavi Jung
- Keeper of the fort
- He surrendered it
The Significance
What Ahmadnagar Was:
- Old seat of Nizam Shahi power
- NOT the same Nizam in Hyderabad
- Old Nizam Shahi from 1645-1646 era
The History:
- Initially Malik Ambar's fort
- Like the gateway to the Deccan
The Impact:
- Caused much heartburn to Nizam Ali
The Nizam's Response
Marching to War
Who Came:
- Nizam Ali
- Along with Salavat Jung
- Began march at head of army
- 40,000 to 50,000 troops
- From Vidar
Bhau's Strategy
What He Asked:
- Peshwa to proceed to Ahmadnagar
- With reserve army
Where Bhau Went:
- Headed for town of Udgir
- To intercept the Nizam
Bhau's Recovery (December 16, 1759)
The Injury Report
Bhau to Peshwa:
"My health is better. I have a meal every second or third day. I have to eat carefully. The skin over the wound is still not strong. The wound over a nerve is causing aches all over. I am still feeling weak and I'm unable to do push-ups and namaskars due to the injury on my back."
The Assessment:
- Stabbed very severely in his back
- Just not killed
- Still recovering
The Maratha Forces Assemble
Who Marched to Udgir
The Commanders:
- Raghunath Rao - Brother of Nanasaheb Peshwa
- Vishwas Rao - Eldest son of Peshwa (barely 19 years old)
- Balwant Rao Mehendale - Maratha commander (Brahmin)
- Visaji Krishna Bini Wale - Another commander (Brahmin)
- Gopal Rao Patwardhan - Commander
Note on Brahmins in Army:
- Mehendale and Bini Wale both Brahmins
- At the time no such restriction
- If proper training and liking → could be in fighting force
- Could be in any function
The Relationships
Raghunath Rao:
- Cousin of Bhau
- His father = Bajirao I's brother
- So first cousin to Nanasaheb
Vishwas Rao:
- Son of Nanasaheb Peshwa
- The true next Peshwa (designated heir)
- Very young - 19 years old
- Also accompanying
The Battle Preparations
Bhau Takes Bahadurgarh
What He Did:
- Took Fort of Bahadurgarh
- On the river Bhima
Nizam's Strategy
The Split:
- Sent main army ahead to Fort of Bahadur
- Stayed with slow-moving artillery
- Part of army moved ahead
- They were with artillery force following up
The Siege of Udgir
The Encirclement
What Happened:
- Nizam camped at Udgir
- Besieged by Maratha armies
The Artillery Deployment
First Move:
- Ibrahim Khan sent to confront Nizam
- With his powerful French artillery
Maratha Cavalry:
- Stood fast
- Prevented anybody escaping their cordon
The Hollow Square Formation
The European Tactic
What Nizam Did:
- Formed a square or circle
- Moving towards safe haven
- This was Nizam Ali's only hope
How It Works:
- Army inside the square
- Artillery guns all around on square's sides
- Manned by musketeers
- Providing cover
- Whole square marches forward
The Protection:
- Artillery defending troops inside square
- Square everywhere = artillery guns on sides
- Whole unit moving forward
- Under protection of artillery
The Goal:
- Move towards Fort of Bahadur (safety)
- Guns protected his army
- Began to march slowly
The Battle (January 19-20, 1760)
The Maratha Attack
What They Did:
- Began harassing Nizam from all sides
- Nizam stuck to formation
- Moved towards Dharur and safety
Bhau's Strategy:
- Sent army to Nizam's rear
- Began attack on weak part of hollow square
Major Battle
January 19-20, 1760:
- Major battle occurred
- Nizam's right wing cut down
The Result:
- Night found Nizam still 40 miles short of Dharur fort
- Besieged by Maratha armies
- Short of supplies
Why They Couldn't Run:
- If they ran for fort
- Marathas would really fire at them
- Had to go slowly
The Capitulation (February 3, 1760)
At Ausa
The Location:
- Town of Ausa
- South of Latur town
- Surrounded and immobilized by Marathas
The Surrender
February 3, 1760:
- Nizam finally capitulated
- Sent his seal
- Symbol of complete acceptance of terms
The Treaty of Udgir
What Nizam Lost
Territory & Cities:
- Became subsidiary to Peshwa
- Surrendered imperial cities:
- Bijapur (old Adil Shahi power seat)
- Aurangabad (established by Aurangzeb)
- Besides:
- Asirgad
- Burhanpur
- Malhar forts
- Territory worth nearly 60 lakhs
- Effectively half his kingdom
60 Lakhs:
- Income from taxes
- Annualized basis
The Immediate Seizure
Daulatabad:
- Strong fort of Daulatabad
- Immediately taken charge of
The Trio Rises to Prominence
The Three Leaders
Who Gained Fame:
- Bhau (Sadashiv Rao)
- Raghunath Rao
- Vishwas Rao
The Result:
- Came into prominence in this war
- Brought Nizam to his knees
Bhau's Leadership
The Credit:
- Sadashiv Rao's stewardship
- Brought him morals from all
- Under his guidance and leadership
- Got all the credit
The Artillery Revelation
Ibrahim Khan's Impact
What Happened:
"The artillery of Ibrahim Khan made its mark and impressed Bhau by its efficacy."
This Is Important:
- Bhau understood importance of artillery force
- In winning battle on flat land
Before:
- Not necessarily discounted artillery
- But now saw demonstration in actual practice
The Realization:
- Undeniable now
- This was the future
- Said: "This is something that is extreme"
- Very impressed
The Analysis:
- Now artillery fire from Ibrahim Khan
- Without it, battle very difficult to win
- Just based on cavalry and foot soldiers = not enough
- Said: "This is something that is going to make the difference"
The Divided Opinion
Bhau vs. Other Chiefs
Bhau's View:
- Very much impressed
- Only one ahead of his time
- Said: "If we want to win wars of future"
- "Artillery guns with long range power = must"
- "Without which we cannot do"
- Convinced
- Said: "This is it, going forward this is my main stake"
- Thinking of future battles
- Sticking with artillery
Other Maratha Chiefs:
- Not with him
- Did not see it that way
- Did not understand power of artillery
- Why it's necessary
The Problem:
- Not necessarily resentment
- But not really completely convinced
- Maybe just lack of discipline
- Wouldn't believe they could trust artillery
The Context:
- This happening for first time
- Sadashiv really impressed
The Zenith of Maratha Power
The New Reality
Mughals in Deccan:
- Very little territory now
- Only because of Nizam
- Now almost totally gone
- Well, almost totally
The Foothold:
- Nizam was city of Mughal
- Their foothold in Deccan
- Now Marathas calling the shots
- Were the boss
- In their homeland
The National Pride
Nana Saheb Peshwa:
- At zenith of his reign
- Kingdom at its most powerful
Grant Duff's Assessment:
- Southernmost rivers in Indian peninsula (Bhima)
- Deccan horse quenched thirst from waters of Indus (north)
- Maratha people felt pride in conquests of countrymen
The Context:
- Abdali was foreigner
- Would come and go
- Not part of Indian landscape
- Basically no parallel to Maratha power
- In entire Indian subcontinent
- Outsider but big threat
The Reality:
- Entire Indian landmass
- No other parallel for Marathas
- Now the preeminent power
The Celebration (8 Days)
The Rejoicing
Where:
- In Maratha camp at Udgir
- Udgir = town close to northern Maharashtra
Who:
- Camp of Sadashiv Rao
- All other warriors
How Long:
- Lasted all of eight days
- Only eight days
Why So Short:
- Now comes the kick
- Some bad news comes
The Disturbing News (February 13, 1760)
The Crisis Arrives
February 13, 1760:
- Disturbing news came from the north
The Situation:
"At the zenith of his power, Nana Saheb Peshwa was faced with a crisis of massive proportions."
The Emergency Meeting
What Peshwa Did:
- Summoned victorious commanders to Pathdur
- Near Aurangabad
- To plan Maratha response
Why Pathdur:
- Closer to Udgir
- Wanted people from:
- Udgir
- Pune
- All over
- Whoever can come assemble there
- Weighty decisions had to be taken
The Realization
Nanasaheb's State:
- Shocked beyond belief
- Realized he was underestimating the situation
- Now has to come up with course of action
- Counter the news from north
What Changed:
- So far = underestimating
- Now = time for action
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action/Status |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Southern commander | Survived assassination, led campaign, impressed by artillery |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery chief | 1,000 musketeers, impressed Bhau with performance |
| Muzaffar Khan | Former artillery chief | Ordered assassination of Bhau, hanged |
| Haider Khan | Assassin | Muzaffar's son-in-law, executed |
| Nizam Ali | Hyderabad ruler | Defeated, lost half kingdom |
| Salavat Jung | Nizam's brother | Fought alongside Nizam Ali |
| Raghunath Rao | Veteran commander | Cousin of Nanasaheb, prominent in victory |
| Vishwas Rao | Peshwa's son | 19 years old, gaining prominence |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | At zenith, now facing crisis |
| Balwant Rao Mehendale | Commander | Marched to Udgir |
| Visaji Krishna Bini Wale | Commander | Marched to Udgir |
| Gopal Rao Patwardhan | Commander | Marched to Udgir |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 28, 1759 | Assassination attempt on Bhau at Wano-ri |
| Oct 29, 1759 | Trial - Muzaffar Khan hanged, Haider executed |
| Nov 1759 | Crucial month - multiple crises |
| Nov 9, 1759 | Marathas take Fort of Ahmadnagar |
| Nov 1759 | Ibrahim Khan Gardi joins with 1,000 soldiers |
| Dec 16, 1759 | Bhau reports recovery from injury |
| Jan 19-20, 1760 | Major battle against Nizam |
| Feb 3, 1760 | Nizam capitulates at Ausa |
| Feb 3-11, 1760 | Celebration in Maratha camp (8 days) |
| Feb 13, 1760 | Disturbing news from north arrives |
| Feb 1760 | Emergency meeting summoned at Pathdur |
Critical Insights
The Assassination as Nizam's Desperation
Why It Matters:
- Nizam so threatened by Bhau
- Willing to assassinate through proxy
- Shows how dangerous Bhau was
- But also shows Nizam's weakness
The Betrayal:
- Muzaffar Khan takes the fall
- Nizam throws him under bus
- Even though Nizam ordered it
- Classic political murder
The Hollow Square Tactic
European Warfare:
- Nizam using European tactics
- Learned from colonial powers
- Square formation with artillery
- Very effective defensive formation
Why It Worked (Temporarily):
- Protected retreat
- Artillery covering all sides
- Moving fortress essentially
- Prevented Maratha cavalry charges
Why It Failed:
- Marathas had better artillery (Ibrahim Khan)
- Could break the formation
- Bhau attacked weak part
- Cut off supplies
- 40 miles from safety = too far
The Artillery Awakening
Bhau's Revelation:
- First commander to fully understand
- Artillery = future of warfare
- Ahead of his time
- Saw it in actual practice
- Completely convinced
The Problem:
- Other chiefs not convinced
- This will cause issues later
- Cultural resistance to new warfare
- Glory-seeking vs. tactical advantage
- Indiscipline will be fatal
The Irony:
- Bhau learned lesson perfectly
- But army won't follow his vision
- He'll have the artillery
- But won't be able to use it properly
- Because of cavalry indiscipline
The Two-Front War
November 1759 Reality:
- North: Abdali threatening Dattaji
- South: Nizam campaign
- Army stretched breath in on two ends
The Danger:
- Can't focus full strength anywhere
- Resources divided
- If one front collapses, other threatened
- This is unsustainable
The Zenith Before the Fall
The Peak:
- Nana Saheb at zenith of power
- Kingdom most powerful
- No parallel in India
- Just defeated Nizam
- Took half his kingdom
- National pride
The Timing:
"At the zenith of his power, Nana Saheb Peshwa was faced with a crisis of massive proportions."
The Pattern:
- Classic hubris before nemesis
- Highest point = moment before fall
- Celebrating victory
- While disaster brewing in north
- 8 days of celebration
- Then the bad news
The February 13 News
What Must Have Happened:
- Dattaji's death (January 10)
- News takes ~1 month to reach Pune
- Arrives February 13
- During celebration
- Ends celebration immediately
The Impact:
- Nanasaheb shocked beyond belief
- Realized underestimating situation
- Everything changes
- Must respond comprehensively
- No more half-measures
The Geographic Nightmare
The Problem:
- 1,000 miles between Pune and Dattaji's position
- 2 weeks for any message
- Can't coordinate
- Can't respond quickly
- Fog of war literal
The Result:
- By time they know = too late
- Dattaji already dead
- Army already routed
- Can only react, not prevent
Bhau's Character Revealed
The Recovery:
- Stabbed in back
- Still recovering in December
- Can't do push-ups
- Wound causing aches
The Determination:
- Still leads campaign
- Still fights
- Still wins
- Toughness
The Intelligence:
- Only one who understood artillery
- Ahead of his time
- Strategic thinker
- But also hot-tempered (foreshadowed earlier)
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Bhau impressed by artillery
- Other chiefs not convinced
- Nanasaheb shocked by northern disaster
- Calls meeting at Pathdur
- Must decide response to Abdali
- Someone must go north
- Comprehensively, not half-measures
The Question:
- Who will lead the campaign?
- Raghunath Rao? (experienced but financially risky)
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau? (just proved himself, understands artillery)
- Someone else?
The Foreshadowing:
- Bhau understands artillery importance
- But other chiefs don't
- This gap in understanding will matter
- Cavalry indiscipline will persist
- Bhau hot-tempered (problem in politics)
- Doesn't know northern politics
October 1759 - February 1760: Bhau survives a knife in the back. Muzaffar Khan doesn't. The Nizam tries the European hollow square formation, but Ibrahim Khan's French cannons tear it apart. Bhau watches and learns: artillery is the future. The other chiefs watch and don't learn. Half the Nizam's kingdom falls. The Marathas celebrate for eight days. On day nine, a messenger arrives from the north. Dattaji is dead. The celebration ends. Nanasaheb, at the absolute zenith of his power, realizes he's been underestimating everything. He calls everyone to Pathdur. Someone has to go north. Someone has to face Abdali. Comprehensively. No more half-measures. The question is: who? And the answer will determine everything that follows.
The Awakening: Choosing Bhau for the North (February 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Eight Days of Rejoicing End
The Celebration
Where & Who:
- Rejoicing in Maratha camp
- Lasted all of eight days
When:
- After victory over Nizam
- At Udgir
February 13, 1760: The News Arrives
The Disturbing Message
What Happened:
"On 13th of February, disturbing news came from the North."
The Context:
"At the zenith of his power, Nana Saheb Peshwa was faced with a crisis of massive proportions."
The Emergency Summit at Pathdur
The Summons
What Peshwa Did:
- Summoned his victorious commanders
- To Pathdur near Aurangabad
- To plan the Maratha response
Why Pathdur:
- Talking about Maratha response to Abdali
- Abdali now in Delhi area
- On East coast of Yamuna
- Wanted to consult all important commanders
- How to counter this invasion
The Reality Check
Why This Matters:
- Invasion happening too many times
- Abdali = complete outright foreigner
- Ransacking India every single time
- Can't continue like this
The Battle at Burari Ghat (January 10, 1760)
What Actually Happened
The Setup:
- 5,000 Marathas under Dattaji
- At Burari Ghat
- Trying to rout Najib's army
The Attack:
- Dattaji charged with spear
- Into enemy ranks
- Najib's men fired
The Result:
- Dattaji struck down
- Fell from horse
- Mortally wounded
The Iconic Last Stand
Qutub Shah's Question
Who He Is:
- Qutub Shah Rohila
- Najib Khan's teacher
- The propaganda guy
- Jihadi teacher of Najib
What He Did:
- Got out of his horse back
- Put sword on lying Dattaji
- Dattaji not dead
- But dying
The Question:
- "Patel, how will you fight?"
- They used to call him Patel somehow
Dattaji's Reply
The Response:
"If I survive, I will fight even more."
In Hindi:
"Bachenge to aur bhi ladenge."
The Legacy:
- If you go anywhere in India
- People will instantly recognize this
- Iconic statement
- Everyone knows it
The Character:
- That was the man that he was
- Unafraid of death
The Beheading
What Happened:
- Qutub Shah cut off dying Dattaji's head
- Presented it to Najib
- Who sent it to Abdali
The Army's Collapse
The 20,000 Who Fled
The Reality:
"The entire Shinde army of 20,000 demoralized men did not participate in the fight at Burari Ghat."
What Happened:
- After fall of their leader
- Fled with injured Jankoji
- Until reached Qutputli
- Overtaking dependents
- That Dattaji had sent ahead
Abdali's Reaction to the Victory
The Complete Collapse
What It Meant to Abdali:
- Complete collapse of Maratha army in north
- Dattaji was head of Maratha army
- Had the responsibility
- Heavily trusted by Nanasaheb Peshwa
- Now dead in battle
The News Reaches Pune (February 13, 1760)
The Shock
When:
- News took about one month to reach
- January 10 death → February 13 news arrives
Nanasaheb's Reaction:
- Completely collapses
- Meaning psychologically
Why:
- First and foremost: Totally depended on Dattaji
- Had great confidence in Dattaji
- Here is Dattaji who is dead
- Maratha army is routed
The Awakening
The Realization:
"He never ever imagined this situation and that awakened him, you know, drastically."
What Changed:
- Now realized what he was up against
- So far he underestimated the situation
- Thought: "Oh, these pesky Afghans are not a big deal"
Why He Underestimated:
- Had never faced Afghan onslaught
- Basically from Abdali himself
- Was listening to news
- Messengers describing
- Letters coming
- But now he was in deep slumber
- Suddenly awakens
The New Understanding
The Conclusion:
"This cannot be handled by one or two commanders sending to the north. This has to be dealt in a comprehensive manner."
The Scale:
- Much bigger than he ever thought
- As a menace
- As a challenge
- Beyond what he was expecting
The Event:
"This aroused him from his slumber. And this was the event that led to the battle that is now going to take place. So here, the story really begins."
The Crucial Moment:
"This is what causes the third battle of Panipat."
Understanding the Responsibility
Why It Falls to Marathas
The Treaty Obligation:
- Remember the truce with Mughal emperor
- Were sworn to protect the Mughals
- Even by that contract/treaty
- They were responsible
The Practical Reality:
- Nobody else could do it
- No other army in North India
- Entire responsibility fell upon Marathas
The National View:
- Looked at it as invasion from foreign power
- Abdali not part of Indian landmass
- Came from Afghanistan
- Considered separate country
- Different culture
The Pattern
The History:
- Abdali ransacking areas at will
- Done it three or four times before
- Nobody to revert his charges
- Huge deal
The Decision:
- Nanasaheb knew something big had to be done
- Or this will come back again and again
- Calls all commanders
- In the Deccan and everywhere
- Come and meet in Pathdur
Dattaji's Fatal Error
The Underestimation
What He Thought:
- Abdali was weak
- He's namard (coward/unmanly)
- Because would lead army from rear guard
- Will not be in front
The Charge:
- So Dattaji just charged in there with his spear
- Thought could take him
- Too much for him
- Wasn't planning properly
The Better General
The Reality:
"Abdali was strategic and tactical about his moves. So this was all about who was a better general."
Dattaji's Mistakes:
- Didn't bring the guns needed
- Sent away his artillery
- Wanted to move quickly from place to place
- Following Bajirao I's tactics
Why It Failed:
- Thought Abdali weak and namard
- But Abdali led from rear = smart tactics
- Not cowardice = strategy
- Like how Dattaji died because of this
The War Council at Pathdur
The Question
The Issue:
"Who will lead this campaign against Abdali? Because the campaign has to be done. And who is going to lead it? Because that's the million dollar question."
Who's Up to the Challenge?
Considering Raghunath Rao
The Pros & Cons
Against Sending Him:
- When he went north twice
- Came back with even bigger loans
- Financial risk
- Didn't want that
In Favor of Him:
- Knew the politics of the North
- Had gone there twice
- Knew all the players in North
- How they acted
- How they behaved
- What was their weak point
- What was strong point
- What is the geography
- They also were aware of Raghunath Rao
The Assessment:
- Could have done better job
- But financial risk too high
The Choice: Sadashiv Rao Bhau
Why Bhau Was Chosen
The Impression:
- Nanasaheb so impressed by Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- That he won this battle with Nizam
- Just proved himself
The Artillery Factor:
- Also impressed by role played by artillery
- Sadashiv Rao understood role of artillery
- Said: "Without long range artillery"
- "That he had at disposal during that battle"
- "We could not have won this war"
- "That is the only way going forward"
- "We are going to fight the battles"
The Commander:
- Knew exactly the man he could employ
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi
- So responsibility fell upon Sadashiv Rao
Bhau's Character: The Problems
Problem 1: Hot Tempered
The First Issue:
"He was extremely hot tempered."
What This Means:
- Once he got upset and angry
- No way for him to think rationally
- Would just be taken over by anger
- And upset
- That was big, big point
The Consequence:
- Didn't see anything
- Didn't think calmly and quietly
- The way rationally decisions have to be made
Problem 2: Northern Politics
The Second Issue:
"He did not understand the politics of the North."
Why:
- Never dealt with Rajputs
- Didn't deal with Jats
- Never dealt with Mughals or Rohillas
- Abdali: Of course never fought him
- Never seen him in battlefield
Bhau's Strengths
The Positive Side
What He Had:
- Very skilled fighter and commander
- Would not play games
- Simply come to point
- Say: "Hey, deliver results right now"
The Problem:
"He was not a good politician."
The Balance:
- Negative: Hot-tempered, no political skills
- Positive: Brave commander, direct, skilled fighter
Key Players
| Name | Role | Action/Status |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha commander | Died Jan 10 at Burari Ghat |
| Qutub Shah Rohila | Najib's teacher | Beheaded Dattaji |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Awakened from slumber, calls war council |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Cousin of Peshwa | Chosen to lead northern campaign |
| Raghunath Rao | Brother of Peshwa | Considered but rejected (financial risk) |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | In Delhi area, won at Burari Ghat |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Allied with Abdali |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 10, 1760 | Dattaji killed at Burari Ghat |
| Jan 10, 1760 | Shinde army of 20,000 flees |
| Feb 13, 1760 | News reaches Pune (one month later) |
| Feb 13, 1760 | Eight days of celebration end |
| Feb 1760 | Emergency meeting at Pathdur |
| Feb 1760 | Decision: Bhau will lead campaign |
Critical Insights
The Awakening Metaphor
The Language:
- "Deep slumber"
- "Suddenly awakens"
- "Aroused from his slumber"
What It Means:
- Nanasaheb was sleepwalking
- Complacent about northern threat
- Thought commanders could handle it
- Reality finally hits
The Moment:
- This is THE turning point
- "The story really begins here"
- "This causes third battle of Panipat"
- Everything before = prologue
- Everything after = consequences
The One-Month Information Gap
The Math:
- January 10: Dattaji dies
- February 13: News arrives
- ~34 days for message
The Problem:
- Can't respond in real-time
- Can't prevent disaster
- Can only react
- Always behind
The Implication:
- By time Pune responds
- Situation will have changed again
- Always playing catch-up
- Fog of war literal
The Underestimation Theme
The Pattern:
- Dattaji underestimated Abdali
- Nanasaheb underestimated situation
- "Pesky Afghans not a big deal"
- Learning through catastrophic failure
Why They Underestimated:
- Never faced him directly
- Listened to reports/letters
- Thought they understood
- But reports ≠ reality
- Like being told about fire
- vs. being burned
Raghunath Rao: The Road Not Taken
What We Learn:
- He knew northern politics
- Knew all the players
- Knew geography
- Had relationships
- Political skill
Why Not Chosen:
- Financial liability
- Came back with loans twice
- Can't afford that again
The Irony:
- Choose military skill over political skill
- But this war will be decided by politics
- The better general militarily may not win
- Because politics > battle
Bhau's Fatal Flaw #1: Hot Temper
Why This Matters:
- Northern politics requires patience
- Requires negotiations
- Requires swallowing pride
- Requires tactical retreat
Bhau's Nature:
- Gets angry
- Can't think rationally
- Taken over by emotion
- No calm decision-making
The Consequence:
- In crucial moments
- When diplomacy needed
- He'll lose his temper
- Make emotional decisions
- Alienate allies
Bhau's Fatal Flaw #2: No Northern Experience
What He Doesn't Know:
- Rajput politics
- Jat politics
- Mughal court intrigue
- Rohilla motivations
- Abdali's tactics
Why This Matters:
- Will have to learn on the job
- During existential crisis
- With no margin for error
- While Abdali knows all this
The Comparison:
- Abdali: Expert in northern politics
- Spent years cultivating allies
- Knows every player
- Bhau: Complete novice
The Artillery Understanding Gap
What Bhau Knows:
- Artillery = key to victory
- Only way forward
- Must use it properly
- Proved it against Nizam
What He'll Face:
- Cavalry that doesn't believe in artillery
- Chiefs not convinced
- Cultural resistance
- Indiscipline
The Problem:
- Bhau understands
- Army doesn't
- Gap in understanding
- Will be fatal
The Direct Commander Style
Bhau's Approach:
- "Deliver results right now"
- No games
- Come to point
- Direct
Why This Could Work:
- Clear command
- No ambiguity
- Decisive
Why This Will Fail:
- Northern politics = indirect
- Need to play games
- Need patience
- Need subtlety
- Bhau has none of this
The Comprehensive Response
The Shift:
- Before: "Send a commander or two"
- Now: "Comprehensive manner"
- Recognize it's much bigger
- Can't be half-measures
What This Means:
- Massive army going north
- Full commitment
- All-in strategy
- If this fails = catastrophic
The "Really Begins" Moment
The Significance:
"So here, the story really begins."
What This Tells Us:
- Everything before = setup
- All the invasions
- All the politics
- All the battles
- Were just prelude
The Reality:
- Panipat is coming
- Inevitable now
- Dattaji's death = catalyst
- Bhau's appointment = trigger
- No turning back
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Bhau chosen to lead
- Hot-tempered
- Doesn't know northern politics
- Understands artillery
- But army doesn't
- Direct style in indirect world
The Army:
- Will be massive
- Comprehensive response
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi
- Best artillery in India
- But indisciplined cavalry
The Opposition:
- Abdali in Delhi
- Knows northern politics perfectly
- Strategic genius
- Has momentum
- Has allies
The Question:
- Can Bhau adapt?
- Will hot temper doom him?
- Can he learn politics fast enough?
- Will artillery advantage matter?
- If cavalry indisciplined?
February 13, 1760: The celebration ends. The messenger arrives. Dattaji is dead. "Bachenge to aur bhi ladenge" - if I survive, I will fight even more - those were his last words before Qutub Shah beheaded him. Twenty thousand men fled without fighting. Nanasaheb collapses psychologically. He was in deep slumber. This news awakens him. Drastically. He finally understands what he's up against. Not pesky Afghans. An existential threat. This cannot be handled by sending a commander or two. This requires a comprehensive response. He considers Raghunath Rao - knows the politics, but financial liability. He chooses Sadashiv Rao Bhau - proved himself against Nizam, understands artillery, brave commander. But: hot-tempered, doesn't know northern politics, not a good politician. The wrong choice? The right choice? We'll find out. Because here, the story really begins. Everything before was prologue. What comes next will determine the fate of India.
Dattaji's Death & Holkar's Response (January 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fate of Dattaji
The Uncertainty
What Marathas Knew:
- Dattaji's fate not clear to Marathas then
- Possible he died instantly
The Iconic Final Scene
Qutub Shah Rohila's Mockery
Who He Is:
- Najib Khan's teacher
- The jihadi teacher of Najib Khan
- Propaganda guy
What Happened:
- Chroniclers describe rousing scene
- Qutub Shah Rohila accosted the dying Dattaji
The Confrontation:
- Qutub Shah got out of his horse back
- Put his sword on lying Dattaji
- Dattaji not dead yet
- But dying
The Question:
- Asked derisively: "Patel, how will you fight?"
- They used to call him Patel somehow
- (Doesn't make sense but that's what they said)
Dattaji's Last Words
The Response:
"If I survive, I will fight even more."
In Hindi:
"Bachenge to aur bhi ladenge."
The Meaning:
- Literally: "If I survive, I will fight even more"
- Almost sure of dying
- But hadn't given up the spirit
- Had the guts to say it
The Legacy:
"If you go anywhere in India today, people will realize that it's an iconic statement."
- Very famous
- Go anywhere and ask any Indian
- They will know instantly what you're talking about
- That was the man that he was
- Unafraid of death
- Very brave
The Beheading
What Qutub Shah Did:
- At that point
- Cut off dying Dattaji's head
- Presented it to Najib
- Najib sent it to Abdali
The Significance:
- To Abdali = complete collapse of Maratha army in north
- Dattaji was head of Maratha army
- Had the responsibility
- Heavily trusted by Nanasaheb Peshwa
- Now dead in battle
The Route of the Shinde Army
The Numbers
The Force:
- Entire Shinde army of 20,000 demoralized men
- Did not participate in fight at Burari Ghat
- After fall of their leader
- Fled with injured Jankoji
Where They Went:
- Until reached near Qutpuli or Qutputli
- Overtaking the dependents
- That Dattaji had prudently sent ahead few days earlier
- So caught up with all the entourage
- Could be dangerous
Malhar Rao Holkar Arrives (January 14, 1760)
Learning the News
January 14, 1760:
- Malhar Rao Holkar reached Qutputli
- Learnt of Dattaji's death
Purushottam Hingani's Report (January 15, 1760)
The Letter from Qutputli
Who He Is:
- Also injured at Burari
What He Wrote:
"Dattaji was killed and a bullet hit Jankoji in his arm. Ten or twelve soldiers died. The armies did not meet each other. The dense grass on the Yamuna made things difficult."
The Reality:
- Full armies never came in contact
- Dense grass on Yamuna = problem
The Retreat:
"We came 70 coasts which is 140 miles. The Pathans chased us for 20 coasts or 40 miles."
The Maratha Recovery
At Qutputli
What They Did:
- Stopped here for few days
- Taking stock of situation
- Sending Dattaji's pregnant wife
- Across river Chambar to Sabalgarh
- Along with baggage
- Under Govindpant Bundele
The Responsibility Falls to Holkar
The New Reality
The Situation:
"It was now up to the veteran Holkar to take on Abdali."
Holkar's Letter to Peshwa (End of January 1760)
Explaining His Difficulties
About End of January 1760:
- Malhar Rao writes long letter to Peshwa
- Explaining difficulties in reaching Dattaji
The Timeline From Holkar's Perspective
First Message:
"I received Jankoji's letter that he was going to invade the Gilcha [Afghans] and I should come quickly to his aid."
His Response:
- Left Jaipur
- Sent away his heavy guns
The Problem:
- Ruffians rose in revolts
- (This was actually thanks to Abdali instructing Madho Singh)
Second Message:
"From Jankoji's second letter it appeared the threat of Abdali had abated and he was fighting Najib Khan."
So:
- It seemed like Jankoji fighting Najib
- Which they were
What Holkar Did:
"I had to return to suppress the ruffians, presumably in Jaipur, and had to teach them a lesson at Balwara."
- Had to deal with revolts
- Didn't know it was Abdali's political maneuvering
- Madho Singh keeping him busy
December 28, 1759:
"I received a letter from Jankoji Shinde urging me to hurry, saying he has crossed the Yamuna near Kunjpura and is facing the Gilcha."
January 3, 1760:
"I left on 3rd of January 1760, disposed of my heavy guns and moved out."
What He Found:
"The Gilcha came to Thanesar and there was a battle near Budhiya. At night the Gilcha crossed the Yamuna and went into the Doab. Shuja is on his border. Najib Khan at Shukratal. Madho Singh has cooled down due to my efforts. Abdali has been called here by Najib Khan and Madho Singh."
- So he's explaining all this to Peshwa
- The political situation
- Who called Abdali
- Where everyone is positioned
Abdali Enters Delhi
The Appointment
Meanwhile:
- Abdali moved to Delhi
What He Did:
- Appointed his vizier Shah Wali Khan's cousin
- Yakub Ali Khan
- As governor of Delhi
The Significance:
- His own vizier
- Vizier's cousin
- They were able to just reach the capital
Why Didn't They Defend Delhi?
The Question
The Confusion:
- Whole point to defend Delhi
- Why camped out on river?
- When Abdali just walked into Delhi?
The Explanation
The Problem:
- Not sure how to proceed
- Abdali's reputation had grown over time
- Extremely difficult opponent
- Holkar was there
- But Holkar in action
Holkar's Reluctance:
- Did not want to take on Abdali
- With insufficient troops
- With insufficient army
The Strategic Reason:
- Holkar was old-fashioned commander
- Would also maybe suffer same fate (as Dattaji)
- Saw what it did to Dattaji
- Had to think before sacrificing army
His Fighting Style:
- Plus never believed in frontal attacks
- Believed in surgical strikes
- That kind of stuff
- Not comfortable with one-on-one frontal attacks
- Win or lose situation
- Didn't believe in that
The Age Factor
The Reality:
- Holkar was older gentleman
- Little bit older
- Abdali by this time like 30 years old
- Holkar in his 50s
- Wasn't ready to take on Abdali one-on-one
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha commander | Killed at Burari Ghat Jan 10, beheaded |
| Qutub Shah Rohila | Najib's teacher | Beheaded Dattaji, gave head to Najib |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Received Dattaji's head, sent to Abdali |
| Jankoji | Maratha officer | Injured (bullet in arm), fled with army |
| Purushottam Hingani | Maratha officer | Injured at Burari, wrote report |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Veteran commander | Arrived Jan 14, now responsible for facing Abdali |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Moved to Delhi, appointed governor |
| Yakub Ali Khan | Abdali's man | Appointed governor of Delhi |
| Govindpant Bundele | Maratha officer | Escorted Dattaji's pregnant wife to safety |
| Madho Singh | Jaipur king | Stirred up revolts to delay Holkar |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 10, 1760 | Dattaji killed at Burari Ghat |
| Jan 10, 1760 | Qutub Shah beheads Dattaji |
| Jan 10, 1760 | 20,000 Shinde army flees |
| Jan 14, 1760 | Holkar reaches Qutputli, learns of death |
| Jan 15, 1760 | Purushottam Hingani writes report |
| Late Jan 1760 | Holkar writes long letter to Peshwa |
| Late Jan 1760 | Abdali moves to Delhi |
| Late Jan 1760 | Yakub Ali Khan appointed governor of Delhi |
Critical Insights
The Iconic Last Words
Why It Matters:
"Bachenge to aur bhi ladenge" (If I survive, I will fight even more)
The Cultural Impact:
- Known across India today
- Instantly recognizable
- Symbol of defiance
- Spirit unbroken even in death
What It Represents:
- Maratha fighting spirit
- Never surrender mentality
- Courage in face of certain death
- Defiant to the last
The Irony:
- He was right about his death
- "If I survive" = knew he wouldn't
- But wrong about underestimating Abdali
- That underestimation = why he's dying
- The courage was there
- The judgment was not
Qutub Shah: The Ideological Warrior
Who He Really Was:
- Not just any commander
- Najib's teacher
- Jihadi teacher specifically
- Propaganda specialist
Why This Matters:
- This wasn't just military
- It was ideological warfare
- Religious dimension
- Not just conquest = conversion/destruction
The Beheading:
- Presenting head to Najib → Abdali
- Trophy of war
- Symbol of victory
- Demoralization tactic
- Sends message: This is what happens
The 20,000 Who Didn't Fight
The Stunning Detail:
"The entire Shinde army of 20,000 demoralized men did not participate in the fight at Burari Ghat."
What This Means:
- Only Dattaji's 5,000 actually fought
- 20,000 others just watched
- After leader fell = fled
- No discipline
- No backup plan
- No command structure without Dattaji
The Implication:
- If those 20,000 had fought
- Could have overwhelmed enemy
- But morale broke instantly
- Loss of leader = total collapse
- Psychological defeat
The Dense Grass Detail
Hingani's Report:
"The dense grass on the Yamuna made things difficult."
Why This Matters:
- Visibility problem
- Can't see enemy formations
- Can't coordinate movements
- Perfect for ambush
- Dattaji charged in blind
The Tactical Error:
- Attacking in terrain that favors defenders
- Can't use cavalry effectively
- Can't see where going
- Plays to Afghan strengths (ambush, missile fire)
The Chase: 40 Miles
The Pursuit:
- Marathas ran 140 miles total
- Afghans chased for 40 miles
- That's significant pursuit
What It Shows:
- Afghans wanted to maximize damage
- Not just winning = destroying
- Kill as many as possible
- Capture baggage and treasure
- Total route, not just victory
The Cost:
- Lost horses, treasure, dignity
- Half-naked when arrived
- Psychological devastation
- Not just military defeat
Holkar's Excuses
The Letter:
- Very detailed explanation
- Why he was late
- All the obstacles
The Reality:
- Some legitimate (ruffians = Madho Singh's work)
- Some questionable (second letter saying threat abated)
- Disposed of heavy guns = big mistake
- Could have used those
The Pattern:
- Always an excuse
- Never quite commits
- Surgical strikes, not frontal battles
- Self-preservation > victory
The Age Issue:
- He's in his 50s
- Abdali is 30
- Not prime fighting age
- Tired commander
- Old tactics, old body
The Political Dimension
Holkar Identifies:
- Madho Singh called Abdali
- Najib Khan called Abdali
- This was coordinated
- Political conspiracy against Marathas
The Insight:
- Understands the politics
- But can't do anything about it
- Outnumbered
- Outmaneuvered
- Outplayed
Abdali Walks Into Delhi
The Stunning Reality:
- Just walks in
- Appoints his own governor
- No resistance
Why:
- Imad fled to Suraj Mal
- No one to defend
- Holkar won't fight
- City undefended
What It Means:
- Capital has fallen
- Symbolic center lost
- Abdali can claim victory
- Psychological blow to all India
The Underestimation Pattern
Dattaji's Error:
- Thought Abdali was "namard" (coward)
- Because led from rear
- Underestimated him
- Died for it
Holkar's Wisdom:
- Doesn't underestimate Abdali
- Knows his reputation
- Seen him in action
- Heard first-hand accounts
- Won't fight without overwhelming force
The Contrast:
- Youth vs. experience
- Courage vs. caution
- Glory vs. survival
- Dattaji = dead hero
- Holkar = live coward (or smart tactician?)
The Pregnant Wife Detail
Why Include This:
- Shows Dattaji's foresight
- Sent dependents ahead
- Knew battle could go wrong
- Protected family
The Tragedy:
- Caught up to them anyway in retreat
- Could have been captured
- Now widow with unborn child
- Escorted to safety after his death
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Dattaji dead
- 20,000 man army routed
- Holkar now responsible
- But won't fight frontally
- Abdali in Delhi
- Appointed his own governor
- Total control of capital
The Question:
- How will Holkar respond?
- Can't fight head-on
- Too outnumbered
- Surgical strikes only
- Will it be enough?
The Bigger Question:
- News reaching Pune (~Feb 13)
- Nanasaheb will be shocked
- Will have to send major force
- Can't be half-measures anymore
- Comprehensive response needed
January 1760: "Bachenge to aur bhi ladenge." If I survive, I will fight even more. Those are the last words of a dying man who was right about his death and wrong about everything else. Dattaji charged with his spear against artillery and muskets, certain that Abdali was a coward who led from the rear. He was brave. He was wrong. Qutub Shah, Najib's jihadi teacher, beheaded him and sent his head as a trophy to Abdali. Twenty thousand Maratha soldiers stood by and watched. Then they ran for 140 miles, chased for 40 miles, arriving half-naked and broken. Holkar shows up a few days later. He's 50 years old. He knows Abdali's reputation. He won't fight frontally. He'll do surgical strikes. He'll preserve his army. Is he a coward or the only smart one left? Meanwhile, Abdali just walks into Delhi and appoints his own governor. No resistance. The capital has fallen. And a messenger is riding south to Pune with news that will end eight days of celebration and wake up a Peshwa who's been asleep at the wheel. Everything changes on February 13.
Abdali Stays & The Decision to Send Vishwas Rao (February-March 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Abdali Appoints Governor (Late January 1760)
Taking Control of Delhi
What Happened:
- Abdali moved to Delhi
- Appointed his wazir Shah Wali Khan's cousin
- Yakub Ali Khan
- As governor of Delhi
The Significance:
- His own vizier
- Vizier's cousin now governor
- Complete control of capital
Imad Flees to Bharatpur
The Power Vacuum
What Happened:
- Imad (Imad-ul-Mulk) already fled the capital
- On hearing of Shinde's reverse (Dattaji's defeat)
- Taken refuge with Suraj Mal at Bharatpur
Where:
- Bharatpur = capital of Suraj Mal's kingdom
- Suraj Mal = the Jat king
Abdali's Money Demands
Letters to Northern Chiefs
What He Did:
- Abdali sent letters to all northern chiefs
- Asking them to send him money
Suraj Mal's Defiant Response
What He Wrote Back:
"Abdali first needs to drive away the Marathas and show he was the master before they could accept being his vassals."
The Message:
- Show you're actually in charge
- Defeat the Marathas first
- Then we'll pay
- Not before
Why Abdali Considers Leaving
The Economic Reality
The Problem:
- Delhi had been looted just two years earlier
- Nothing to interest Abdali there
- His instincts told him to return to Afghanistan
Najib Khan Convinces Him to Stay
The Persuasion
What Najib Said:
- Urged him to stay
- Marathas would return as they had in 1757
- If you leave now = they come back
- All this for nothing
The Result:
- Abdali decides to stay
The Unprecedented Decision
Staying Through Summer (First Time Since 1748)
The Historic Choice:
"For the first time since he invaded India in 1748, Abdali decided to stay in India in the summer months."
Why This Is Big:
- Afghan army not going to be happy
- First and foremost: Don't want to stay in India too long
- Come basically to loot
- Abdali allows them some looting for personal purpose
- Most loot he keeps for himself
Problem #1: Nothing to Loot
The Reality:
- That is number one: Nothing to loot now
- Delhi already looted
- Not much left
Problem #2: The Heat
The Most Important Reason:
"In the summer months, India gets very hot. The northern plains and Afghan troops are not used to those temperatures."
The Afghan Reaction:
- Very unhappy
- Want to: Come, loot, take money, go back
- Nothing to be had in India in summer for them
Why Stay Then:
- Less to loot this time
- Just been looted
- Not like last time (lots to take)
- But Najib Khan stopped him from going back
- Saying: "Don't go unless you have tangled with Maratha army"
- "Finish them off so that I am safe here"
Otherwise:
- Nothing accomplished
- He's at mercy of Marathas again
Hingani's Report (February 1, 1760)
The Letter from the North
What He Wrote:
"God has been kind. We ran for 20 coasts and reached Patawadi. Left all our treasure in baggage and traveling day and night reached Kotputli. Malhar Ji Holkar has come and was stunned seeing the state of the army of Shinde."
The Assessment:
"Now he is planning his moves. Abdali is moving against the Jat. He has an army of 80,000. The army over here is trembling like a cane."
Holkar's Force:
"Holkar has 7 or 8,000 good troops with him. Nobody dares to confront Abdali openly. Wherever they [Marathas] run, Abdali follows."
Abdali's Plan:
"Abdali's plan is to unite Madho Singh, Awadh's ruler and the Jat and cross the Chambar and come to Ujjain."
Geography Note:
- Ujjain = just south of Chambar river
Why Holkar Won't Fight
The Reasons Explained
Problem #1: Outnumbered:
- Holkar has 7-8,000
- Abdali has 80,000
- Outnumbered 10 to 1
Problem #2: Fighting Style:
- Doesn't believe in frontal warfare
- Doesn't want to do it open that way
Problem #3: Knows Abdali's Strength:
- Seen it in action
- At least heard first-hand accounts
- Knows needs much bigger army
Malhar Rao Holkar: Now the Tallest Leader
The New Reality
His Position:
"Malhar Rao Holkar, now the tallest Maratha leader in the north, had to restore the confidence of the armies at Kutli."
The Situation:
- Shinde army was panic stricken
- After short battle at Burari Ghat
- Death of Dattaji
- Jankoji injured (bullet wound in arm)
Holkar's Counter-Attack Plans (Late January 1760)
Planning the Response
Who Plans:
- Malhar Rao
- Gangadhar Tatya (his chief aide)
- Planned counter attack with their smaller army
The Movement
January 23, 1760:
- Malhar Rao started from Kutli
- Two weeks after Dattaji's death
- Moved to Kanaud (present day Mahendragarh)
- In Mewat Territory southwest of Delhi
The Strategy:
- Lay in wait
- Looking for which way Afghans moved
Abdali Moves Against the Jats (January 27, 1760)
The Campaign
January 27, 1760:
- Abdali moved from outskirts of Delhi
- Against the Jats
- Left for Shergarh near Mathura
February 4, 1760:
- Laid siege to Surajmal's fort at Dig
The Plan:
- Then planned to head for Jaipur
- To obtain funds from Madho Singh
The Change:
- But on hearing Malhar Rao in Mewat Territory near Delhi
- Headed in that direction
Holkar's Movements (February 1760)
The Cat and Mouse Game
February 22:
- Malhar Rao moved to Bahadurgarh west of Delhi
- Then to outskirts of Delhi
- At Kalka Devi temple
February 28:
- From here crossed the Yamuna
- Headed for Sikandarabad
The Direction:
- Crossed from west bank to east bank
- Exactly what Dattaji had done month and half earlier
- And died in battle
- Except now crossed with no one there
Clarification:
- Dattaji died at Burarighat on western coast of Yamuna
- In middle (island formed)
- Not necessarily crossing
- Just fighting from western direction
Abdali Sends Jahan Khan (Late February 1760)
The Pursuit
What Happened:
- Abdali hearing of Holkar's proximity to Delhi
- Headed for capital
- Sent his general Jahan Khan
- Across Yamuna after Holkar
- With large army
- Chased him
The Reports to Peshwa (March 1, 1760)
Gangadhar Tatya's Letter
March 1:
"We will go to the Rohila territory soon. The Gilcha's move will be known soon. By some measure we have to instill fear in Gilcha. So our troops become like lions."
Note:
- Gilcha = Afghan troops with Abdali
- Rohilas = Afghan soldiers who settled in India (under Najib)
Raja Keshav Rao's Letter
March 1, 1760:
"Holkar and Jankoji are in Narnal district and Abdali, Najib Khan and Dunde Khan Rohila with a large force and heavy baggage in Alawar district."
The Economic Warfare:
"Holkar is cutting off supplies to Abdali's army and prices are high in his camp."
The Demands:
"Abdali has demanded payment from Madho Singh and Surajmal and promised to expel the Marathas to the south."
The Responses:
"However, Surajmal has replied that he should first take the throne, properly deal with the Marathas and then he will pay. Madho Singh has given a like reply."
The Strategy:
- Both saying: "We'll pay you later"
- Will assess which is stronger side
- Before extending support
- Smart
Why:
- If Marathas come back after they paid
- Marathas will finish off the other troops
- They'll have lost everything
- So: "You deal with Marathas"
The Benefit:
- If they fight each other
- Come out weaker
- Benefits smaller parties (Rajputs, Suraj Mal Jat)
- Good if they stay out of big conflicts
The Other Demands:
"Abdali has called the absentee emperor Shah Alam II and Shuja Uddawla and asked them for money. Let us see whether they come."
Holkar's Strategy (March 1760)
Over a Month of Maneuvering
The Reality:
"Over a month had passed since both Abdali and Malhar Rao had been moving in the vicinity of Delhi."
Holkar's Approach:
- Intent on avoiding open conflict
- With his smaller force
- Relied on quick movements
The Plan:
- Confident of being able to attack Rohila homeland
- Creating diversion for Abdali's allies
- By attacking Najib's land where Rohilas live
- Can maybe break up their coalition
The Sikandarabad Action (March 1760)
The Raid
What Holkar Did:
- At Sikandarabad
- Thoroughly looted the city
- Left his army with Diwan Gangadhar Tatya
- Moved on towards Anupshah
The Goal:
- To cross the Ganga
- Enter the Rohila territory
The Result:
- He did cross
The Decision: Who Goes North?
The Three Commanders Discussed
The Options:
- Raghunath Rao - Brother of Peshwa
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau - Cousin of Peshwa
- Vishwas Rao - Son of Peshwa
Raghunath Rao: The Experienced One
His Advantages
What He Knows:
- Knows the lay of the land
- What is what
- Politics of north
- Been there before
- Knows players
Unlike Bhau:
- Bhau had never been to the north
- This would be big reason (for problems later)
- Not just that they lost battle
- This would be major factor
Vishwas Rao: The Young Heir
Who He Is
The Basics:
- Son of Nana Saheb Peshwa
- 19 years old
- Young and inexperienced
Why Send Him: Official Reason
The Purpose:
- To maintain prestige of Peshwa
- Not just prestige
The Real Reason:
"Vishwas Rao in the eyes of his father, Nana Saheb, he will be the next Peshwa."
The Training:
- Has to gain experience of actual warfare
- In those days, Peshwa or people who would be kings
- Had to have actual warfare experience
- Otherwise unqualified
The Decision:
- Vishwas Rao going
- Has to gain experience
- Under leadership of Sadashiv
- Because Sadashiv Rao was experienced commander
The Hidden Motive: Nanasaheb's Self-Preservation
The Real Question
What Nanasaheb Thought:
"If you are Nana Saheb, what would you have in your mind?"
The Answer:
- "I wouldn't want my cousin to get all the credit"
Exactly:
"Nana Saheb has this thought in his mind of self preservation."
The Fear:
- If Bhau is big hero
- He comes back having won
- He can say: "I am the Peshwa"
- He will be
Why:
- This was biggest ever invasion
- If he defeats Abdali = tremendous accomplishment
- Since maybe Aurangzeb, no one such a big threat
- Fight of their lives
The Threat:
"Then Sadashiv Rao would be at the very top of the list to be [Peshwa]."
The Solution: Shared Credit
The Arrangement
What Nanasaheb Wants:
- That credit to be shared with Vishwas Rao
- And by extension himself kind of
The Structure:
- When force goes north (huge force)
- Head of campaign was Vishwas Rao
- Officially
The Reality:
- Actual strategies and implementation
- To be done by Sadashiv
The Result:
- Credit will definitely go to Vishwas Rao
- Because he's the Senapati
- Representative in north
The Claim:
- Can claim: "My son got experience"
- "Plus he won the campaign"
- "He's the big boss"
The Army's Confidence (Departure)
High Spirits
When They Left:
- Confidence extremely high
- Pumped up
- "We're going to smash these people"
Why:
- Had best of warriors
- Had artillery
- French trained people
- Thousand of them
- Ibrahim Khan chief of artillery
- Leading them
The Technology:
- Tremendous confidence we'll win
- Artillery able to deliver shells
- One to two miles
- Depending on how you send them
- Extremely high spirits
The Ages of Key Players
Young Commanders
Sadashiv Rao Bhau:
- 29 years old
- Real head of campaign
Vishwas Rao:
- 19 years old (Satra)
- Titular head
Ahmad Shah Abdali:
- About 35 years old
Nana Saheb Peshwa:
- Little older
- Not too old
- Maybe around 45
The Reality:
- Generally they were all young people
- Those who were involved
- In their prime
Key Players
| Name | Role | Age | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | ~35 | In Delhi, appointed governor, staying summer |
| Yakub Ali Khan | Governor | — | Abdali appointee in Delhi |
| Suraj Mal | Jat king | — | Defiant response to Abdali, sheltering Imad |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Former wazir | — | Fled to Bharatpur |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | — | Convinced Abdali to stay |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Veteran commander | ~50s | Maneuvering, avoiding open battle |
| Gangadhar Tatya | Holkar's aide | — | Planning counter-attacks |
| Jahan Khan | Afghan general | — | Chasing Holkar |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Real commander | 29 | Chosen to lead, experienced |
| Vishwas Rao | Titular head | 19 | Official leader, gaining experience |
| Raghunath Rao | Veteran | — | Not chosen despite experience |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | ~45 | Orchestrating response |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Late Jan 1760 | Abdali appoints governor in Delhi |
| Late Jan 1760 | Imad flees to Suraj Mal |
| Jan 23, 1760 | Holkar leaves Kutli |
| Jan 27, 1760 | Abdali moves against Jats |
| Feb 1, 1760 | Hingani writes report |
| Feb 4, 1760 | Abdali besieges Dig |
| Feb 22, 1760 | Holkar at Bahadurgarh |
| Feb 28, 1760 | Holkar crosses Yamuna |
| Late Feb 1760 | Abdali sends Jahan Khan after Holkar |
| Mar 1, 1760 | Multiple reports to Peshwa |
| Mar 1760 | Holkar raids Sikandarabad |
| Mar 1760 | Decision made: Bhau + Vishwas Rao go north |
Critical Insights
The Summer Decision: Unprecedented
Why It Matters:
- First time in 12 years
- Since 1748 first invasion
- Always left before summer
- Afghan army hates Indian heat
The Implications:
- Shows commitment to destroying Marathas
- Not just raiding anymore
- Strategic shift
- Willing to suffer for goal
The Risk:
- Army unhappy
- Nothing to loot
- Heat unbearable
- Morale problems coming
Najib's Influence
The Power:
- Convinced Abdali to stay
- Against his instincts
- Against economic sense
- Against Afghan army's wishes
Why It Worked:
- Najib's local perspective
- If Abdali leaves = Marathas return
- Najib at their mercy
- All this for nothing
- Must finish the job
The Relationship:
- Abdali trusts Najib
- Relies on his local knowledge
- Najib = boots on ground
- Symbiotic relationship
The Economic Stalemate
Nobody Paying:
- Suraj Mal: "Win first, then I'll pay"
- Madho Singh: Same response
- Shah Alam II: Called but may not come
- Shuja Uddawla: Called but may not come
The Strategy:
- Sitting on fence
- See who wins
- Then support winner
- Smart politics
The Problem for Abdali:
- Came for money
- Not getting money
- Staying costs money
- Running out of funds
- Summer = expensive
Holkar's Guerrilla Campaign
The Tactics:
- Avoiding open battle
- Quick movements
- Cutting supply lines
- Raiding cities
- Attacking Rohila homeland
Why It Works:
- Can't catch him
- Smaller, more mobile
- Knows terrain
- Frustrating Abdali
The Limit:
- Can harass but not defeat
- Can't drive them out
- Just buying time
- Until main army arrives
The Vishwas Rao Decision: Politics Over Strategy
The Military Logic:
- Send Raghunath Rao (experienced)
- Or send Bhau (proved himself)
- Don't send 19-year-old
The Political Logic:
- Must send heir
- For experience
- For legitimacy
- For credit
The Hidden Logic:
- Self-preservation
- Can't let cousin get all glory
- Must share credit
- Protect succession
The Structure:
- Vishwas Rao = official head
- Bhau = actual commander
- Confused command structure
- Who's really in charge?
The Self-Preservation Instinct
Nanasaheb's Fear:
- Bhau defeats Abdali alone
- Biggest accomplishment in generation
- Can claim Peshwa-ship
- Threatens Nanasaheb's son
The Solution:
- Send son along with cousin
- Son gets official credit
- Even if Bhau does work
- Secures succession
The Problem:
- Divided command
- Confused authority
- Political consideration > military necessity
- Will cause issues
The Confidence Gap
The Maratha Army:
- Extremely high spirits
- Best warriors
- French artillery
- Ibrahim Khan
- "Going to smash them"
The Reality Check:
- Abdali has 80,000
- Abdali has experience
- Abdali has allies
- Abdali has political skill
- Abdali staying through summer (committed)
The Disconnect:
- Confidence ≠ readiness
- Technology ≠ victory
- Overconfidence dangerous
The Age Dynamic
All Young:
- Abdali: 35
- Bhau: 29
- Vishwas Rao: 19
What This Means:
- Pride matters more
- Honor over pragmatism
- Less patience in negotiations
- More likely to fight than compromise
- Ego clashes likely
The Exception:
- Holkar: 50s
- More cautious
- Won't fight openly
- Survival over glory
- But sidelined
The Two-Month Stalemate
February-March:
- Holkar and Abdali circling
- Near Delhi
- Neither engaging
- Just maneuvering
What It Shows:
- Waiting for main Maratha army
- Real battle not yet
- This is preliminaries
- Buying time
The Stakes:
- Every day Abdali stays = costs money
- Every day Holkar survives = preserves force
- Every day = main army getting closer
What's Coming
The Setup:
- Abdali committed (staying summer)
- Holkar maneuvering (can't engage)
- Bhau + Vishwas Rao coming north
- Divided command structure
- High confidence
- French artillery
The Problems:
- Vishwas Rao = inexperienced
- Bhau = doesn't know northern politics
- Nanasaheb = more concerned with credit than victory
- Cavalry = still indisciplined
- Political considerations > military strategy
The Opposition:
- Abdali = committed
- Not leaving
- Will finish the job
- Has political allies
- Strategic genius
The Question:
- Will divided command work?
- Can they coordinate?
- Will politics doom them?
- Is confidence justified?
February-March 1760: For the first time in twelve years, Abdali decides to stay through the Indian summer. His army hates it. There's nothing left to loot. The heat is unbearable. But Najib convinces him: if you leave, the Marathas return. Finish the job. Meanwhile, Suraj Mal and Madho Singh tell him the same thing: win first, then we'll pay. Not before. Everyone's hedging their bets. Holkar's playing cat and mouse near Delhi, raiding cities, cutting supply lines, but he can't actually fight. He's outnumbered 10 to 1. He's just buying time. And in Pune, the decision is made: Sadashiv Rao Bhau will lead the campaign. But so will Vishwas Rao. Officially. Because Nanasaheb can't let his cousin take all the credit. Can't let him become the hero who defeated Abdali. So his 19-year-old son must share the glory. Divided command. Political considerations over military necessity. But the army is pumped. They have French cannons. They have Ibrahim Khan. They're going to smash these people. Right? Confidence is extremely high. As they march north toward a confrontation that will determine the fate of India.
Sadashiv Rao Bhau's Army: Artillery, Splendor & The Udgir Aftermath (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha War Rocket
James Forbes' Description (1770s)
Who Was James Forbes:
- British visitor to India in the 1770s
- Wrote extensively about the Maratha army
- Documented their military technology
The War Rocket Design:
Physical Specifications:
- Iron tube: 8-10 inches long, nearly 2 inches in diameter
- Mounting options:
- Iron rod
- Straight two-edged sword
- Strong bamboo cane (4-5 feet long) - most common
- Iron spike projecting beyond the tube
How It Worked:
- Tube filled with combustible materials
- Lighted match sets fire to the fuse
- Projected with great velocity
- If well-directed (uncertain operation) → causes confusion and dismay
Effectiveness:
"Causes much confusion and dismay among the enemy from the difficulty of avoiding its terrifying and destructive effects"
Historical Note: A replica exists in a museum in London
The Magnificent Army: Grant Duff's Account
The Most Splendid Maratha Force Ever
Source: Grant Duff, quoting an eyewitness named Abhaji Gondeo
Who Was Abhaji Gondeo:
- From Sangam Neer (a city/town)
- Employed at Satara in the 1820s
- Witnessed Sadashiv Rao Bhau's army firsthand
The Eyewitness Description
Abhaji Gondeo's Quote:
"The equipment of this army was more splendid in appearance than any Maratha force that had ever taken the field."
The Camp Equipment
What Made It Special:
- Camp equipage brought back from Hindustan by Raghunath Rao in earlier expeditions
- This was from a previous expensive campaign
- Now being reused for Bhau's northern march
The Tents:
- Lofty and spacious
- Lined with silks and broadcloths
- Surmounted by large gilded ornaments
- Conspicuous at great distance
The Enclosures:
- Immense colored walls of canvas
- Enclosed each suite of tents
- For principal officers
The Military Display
What They Had:
- Vast numbers of elephants
- Flags of all descriptions
- The finest horses - magnificently caparisoned (decorated)
- All accompaniments giving an imposing effect
The Officers:
- Dressed in cloth of gold
- All competing in profuse and gorgeous display
- "Characteristic of wealth lightly acquired"
The Style:
"An imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the magnificent Mughals in the zenith of their glory"
The Criticism & Defense
Why Europeans Criticized the Display
The Critique:
- Many writers called Bhau's splendid army "ostentatious"
- Seen as excessive show-off behavior
- Appeared wasteful
The Defense: It Was Free!
The Reality:
- Material used in the camp was obtained as war booty
- Therefore did not cost the Marathas anything
- Not a wasteful expense - it was all plunder from previous victories
The Misconception:
- European writers believed Marathas spent money on this
- They didn't understand it was all looted from enemies
- Free decorations from conquered territories
Timeline Context
When Was This Description From?
The European Visitors:
- Descriptions written in 1757
- About the Maratha army at that time
Continuity to 1760:
- These characteristics couldn't have changed much in the short time between 1757 and 1760
- When Bhau was heading north to Panipat
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi joined Bhau only in 1759
Conclusion: This description was largely representative of the army that went north to Panipat (1760)
The Udgir Victory & Artillery Revolution
What Happened at Udgir
The Battle:
- Fought between Nizam and Bhau-led Maratha army
- Took place at Udgir (a town)
- Marathas won decisively
The Game-Changer: Artillery
Why Udgir Mattered:
"The success at Udgir led to the artillery gaining in prominence"
What Bhau Learned:
- Artillery prominently showed its effect at Udgir
- Bhau saw the importance of artillery in winning wars
- This would become the hallmark of the Maratha army
The Problem:
- They only had ONE YEAR to incorporate artillery properly
- Not enough time to integrate it fully
The Integration Problem
Why Artillery Wasn't Fully Integrated
The Old Army:
- Rest of the army was not used to fighting with artillery
- Couldn't fight "in a disciplined manner" with it
- Old-fashioned Maratha army up until that point
What Was Missing:
- No teamwork between artillery and infantry
- No proper integration of artillery into tactics
- Army didn't understand what artillery was supposed to do
- Artillery was just "added" - not properly incorporated
The Result:
- The Maratha army was still adjusting to the new method of warfare
- This would be perfected later by Mahadji Shinde
The Future: Mahadji Shinde's Perfection
The Shinde Clan Leadership Succession
The Lineage:
- Jayappa Shinde (elder brother, died early)
- Dattaji Shinde (took over after Jayappa)
- Jankoji Shinde (son of Jayappa, about 20-22 years old)
- Mahadji Shinde (after Panipat battle)
Mahadji's Role at Panipat
He Was There:
- Present at the Third Battle of Panipat (1760)
- Got severely wounded
- Somehow made it back alive
- His leg was permanently damaged
But It Didn't Matter:
- Leg injury didn't stop him
- Went on to become the greatest Shinde commander
- Perfected the artillery-infantry integration that Bhau started
The Shinde Clan's Mission
Permanent Northern Presence
The Strategic Role:
- Shinde family force always in northern plains of India
- On behalf of the Peshwas
- Stationed in the north along with Holkar army
Why This Mattered:
- Constant Maratha presence in the north
- Ready to respond to threats
- Could protect Maratha interests
- Collect taxes and maintain order
Govindapant Bundele: The Forgotten Tax Collector
The Original Northern Administrator
Who Was Govindapant Bundele:
- Appointed by Bajirao I (the first)
- Originally Maharashtrian (not actually named "Bundele")
- Got the name "Bundele" because always based in Bundelkhand
His Routine:
- Came to Pune only once a year
- Would do one-on-one with Peshwa
- Give annual account in person
- Then return to the north
His Operation
The Setup:
- Had a small army of 1,000-2,000 people
- Collected taxes in Bundelkhand
- If taxes didn't come easily → he'd use force
His Role:
- Tax collector/enforcer
- Small skirmishes or enforcement actions
- Based permanently in northern plains
By 1760:
- Elderly gentleman, about 55 years old
- Still doing his job
Bundelkhand: The Strategic Location
Where It Is
Geographic Position:
- South of Delhi by about 100 miles
- Deep into the northern plains
- Very strategic location
The Unfulfilled Promise
Govindapant's Request:
- Kept asking Nana Saheb Peshwa for a bigger force
- Wanted 20,000 troops permanently based there
- Argued it was a strategic area needing protection
- Could send troops to Delhi or anywhere in north as needed
Peshwa's Response:
- Kept promising "Okay, okay, I will look into it"
- But never delivered
- Why? It cost a lot of money - salaries for 20,000 people
- Required great justification to incur that cost
- Kept postponing the promise
The Realization:
- When the time came (1760), Peshwa understood the importance
- But by then it was too late
Govindapant's Character
- Fairly honest personality
- Reliable administrator
- But under-resourced for the task
Sadashiv Rao Bhau: The Finance Warrior
The Rare Two-in-One Leader
What Made Bhau Special:
- As much a warrior as a finance man
- Good accountant himself
- Could manage finance as well as battle
His Financial Skills:
- In his spare time in Pune: in charge of finance department
- Well-versed in accounting
- Kept very good tabs on where money was coming from and going
- Would account for every penny
- Nobody could fool him
The Discipline:
- Highly disciplined personality
- Understood accounts payable, accounts receivable
- Very good with math and basic accounting
Comparison to Raghunath Rao
Raghunath Rao:
- Pure warrior
- Didn't handle finance or administration
- Would depend on his staff
Sadashiv Rao Bhau:
- Expert financier himself
- Plus warrior
- Two-in-one - very rare and valuable
Bhau's Personal Regimen
The Physical Discipline
Morning Routine:
- After taking bath
- All kinds of exercises for 1.5 to 2 hours
- Very well-built body
- Impressive physique
The Weakness
His Temper:
- Very hot temper
- Could be fiery
- This was his only weak point
The Revenue Crisis
The Tax Collection Problem
The Original Plan:
- Elderly Govindapant Bundele would collect taxes
- Remit half of revenues to Pune
- Hand over only half to Bhau
What Actually Happened:
"This did not quite happen as planned"
Why It Failed:
- War-ravaged conditions in the north
- Unsettled situation
- The pie had shrunk
The Math Problem
Before:
- Could collect $1,000 per month
- Half to Pune, half to Bhau = $500 each
Now:
- Could only collect $500 total
- Half to Pune, half to Bhau = $250 each
- Huge drop in revenue
The Crisis:
- Everyone gets much less
- But still have to maintain huge army
- Salaries must be paid
- Weapons must be bought
- Animals must be fed
Result: Bhau was under tremendous financial stress
The Supply Problem
Ahmadnagar Armory
The Solution:
- The forts at Ahmadnagar had armory
- Used to supply necessary ammunition
- For muskets, cannons, rockets, etc.
- At least they had weapons
The Udgir Aftermath: No Rest for the Weary
The Immediate Problem
After Udgir Battle:
- Soldiers who fought Nizam needed rest
- Should ideally have time to recuperate
- Needed to restock supplies
- Take inventory of losses
- Compensate losses in arms or horses (steed)
What Actually Happened:
"The soldiers had no respite after the Udgir campaign and little time to compensate the losses in arms or steed, and had to leave for the north immediately"
Why the Urgency?
The Wake-Up Call:
- Nana Saheb Peshwa and military leaders in Pune were almost sleeping
- Completely unaware of the situation in the north
- Underestimated the threat from Abdali
- Thought Taji Shinde could handle it
The Reality Check:
- The threat was beyond Taji
- Much bigger than he could handle alone
- The ferocity and size of Abdali's force was massive
The News That Changed Everything
Taji Shinde's Death
When They Heard:
- News came of Taji's death
- They immediately woke up
- Realized this was much bigger than imagined
The Realization:
"This cannot be continued like this. If Taji cannot handle it, then we have to send a big army and we have to send it right now."
Why Abdali Was Different
The Track Record:
- They knew from previous experience how barbaric Abdali was
- What he did in Mathura:
- Killed hundreds and thousands of innocent people
- Just to collect money and loot
- To "teach a lesson to these kafirs"
His Only Goals:
- Collect money/loot
- Teach kafirs a lesson
- That's it
The Fear:
- "We can't handle this again"
- This level of barbarity was unprecedented
- Required immediate response
The Strategic Miscalculation
Nana Saheb's Error
What He Thought:
- Taji Shinde is enough to handle northern threats
- No need for massive intervention
- Can manage with existing forces
The Reality:
- Never knew what kind of ferocious and huge threat it was
- Didn't understand the scale of Abdali's invasion
- "Almost sleeping at the wheel"
The Correction:
- Taji's death really woke him up
- Understood it would take a huge army
- Cannot be done by Holkar or Shinde alone
- Not enough forces
The Forced March: No Time to Prepare
The Immediate Order
What Should Have Happened:
- Rest after Udgir battle
- Refurbish weaponry and arms
- Restock supplies
- Replace horses
- Let soldiers recover
What Actually Happened:
- No respite
- No refurbishing of weapons
- No rest
- Whatever they had, they just took it
- March immediately
The Urgency:
"Now the army goes right now. There is no respite. No nothing. No refurbishing of arms or nothing. Nobody gets any rest. You just immediately get going."
Why So Rushed?
The Timing:
- Abdali was already there in the north
- Every day of delay = more destruction
- More innocent people killed
- More territory lost
The Surprise Factor:
- Taken completely by surprise
- Didn't see it coming
- Untimely death of Taji they never expected
- Had to react instantly
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Key Trait |
|---|---|---|
| James Forbes | British visitor (1770s) | Documented Maratha rockets |
| Grant Duff | Historian | Described army's splendor |
| Abhaji Gondeo | Eyewitness (1820s at Satara) | Witnessed Bhau's army |
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's brother | Brought back camp equipment from earlier campaigns |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Finance expert + warrior, hot temper |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery expert | Joined 1759, brought artillery expertise |
| Jayappa Shinde | Shinde clan head | Died, succeeded by Dattaji |
| Dattaji Shinde | Shinde clan head | Led family after Jayappa |
| Jankoji Shinde | Young commander | Son of Jayappa, 20-22 years old |
| Mahadji Shinde | Future great commander | Wounded at Panipat, perfected artillery tactics |
| Govindapant Bundele | Tax collector | Based in Bundelkhand, 55 years old in 1760 |
| Nana Saheb Peshwa | Peshwa in Pune | "Sleeping at the wheel" until Taji died |
| Taji Shinde | Northern commander | Killed by Abdali, his death woke up Peshwa |
| Bajirao I | Former Peshwa | Appointed Govindapant Bundele |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | European descriptions of magnificent Maratha army |
| 1759 | Ibrahim Khan Gardi joins Bhau |
| 1759-1760 | Udgir victory against Nizam - artillery proves crucial |
| 1760 | Taji Shinde killed in north |
| 1760 | News reaches Pune - Peshwa "wakes up" |
| 1760 | Army given no rest, must march north immediately |
| 1760 | Third Battle of Panipat (coming up) |
| 1770s | James Forbes visits India, documents Maratha technology |
| 1820s | Abhaji Gondeo employed at Satara, recounts witnessing Bhau's army |
Geographic Context
Bundelkhand:
- South of Delhi by ~100 miles
- Deep in northern plains
- Strategic location
- Where Govindapant Bundele operated
Ahmadnagar:
- Had major armory
- Supplied ammunition for the northern campaign
Udgir:
- Town where battle against Nizam took place
- Where artillery proved decisive
The Northern Plains:
- Where Abdali was operating
- Where Taji Shinde was killed
- Where Bhau would have to go
Major Themes
1. Artillery Revolution
Udgir victory showed artillery's importance, but only one year to integrate it properly before Panipat.
2. The Splendor Paradox
Most magnificent Maratha army ever assembled, but it was all free (war booty) - not wasteful spending.
3. Strategic Miscalculation
Peshwa "sleeping at the wheel" - underestimated Abdali threat until too late.
4. No Time to Prepare
Army forced to march immediately after exhausting Udgir campaign - no rest, no resupply, no preparation.
5. Financial Genius Warrior
Bhau was rare combination of financial expert and military commander - could handle both money and battles.
6. The Warning Signs Ignored
Govindapant Bundele requested 20,000 troops for years - Peshwa kept promising but never delivered. When crisis came, it was too late.
7. The Wake-Up Call
Taji Shinde's death was the moment Pune leadership realized the true scale of the threat.
Key Contrasts
Old vs. New Warfare
- Old: Traditional Maratha cavalry tactics
- New: Artillery-based warfare (just starting to learn)
- Problem: Only one year to integrate
Raghunath Rao vs. Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Raghunath Rao: Pure warrior, depends on staff for admin
- Bhau: Warrior + finance expert = two-in-one leader
What Should Have Happened vs. What Did
- Should: Rest after Udgir, restock, prepare
- Did: Immediate forced march north with whatever they had
Perception vs. Reality (European Critiques)
- Perception: Ostentatious waste of money
- Reality: All war booty - didn't cost anything
The Irony
The Greatest Army:
- Most splendid Maratha force ever assembled
- Best equipment, finest horses, magnificent display
- But rushed into battle without proper rest or integration
- Forced march immediately after exhausting campaign
The Financial Expert:
- Bhau was the perfect person to manage this campaign
- Finance genius who could track every penny
- But faced severe revenue shortfalls
- War-ravaged north couldn't provide expected funds
The Warning:
- Govindapant Bundele warned for years about needing more troops
- Peshwa kept promising but never delivered
- When crisis came, Peshwa finally understood
- But by then it was too late
What's Coming
The Immediate Challenge:
- Exhausted army marching north
- No rest or resupply
- Facing barbaric Abdali
- Insufficient funds
- Artillery not fully integrated
- Against the clock
The Stakes:
- Abdali already in northern plains
- Massacring innocents
- Looting territory
- Must be stopped immediately
- No time for proper preparation
The most magnificent Maratha army ever assembled was being rushed into the most critical battle in Maratha history - exhausted, under-supplied, with revolutionary artillery tactics not yet fully integrated. Bhau, the rare finance-warrior genius, would have to make it work somehow. But they were out of time, out of money, and Abdali was already there.
Chapter 17: The Hunt for Allies & Setting the Stage (March 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Opening: Modern Politics Interlude
The Indian-American Congressional Coalition
The Photo:
- Six Indian-American congresspeople
- Shree at the center of the photo
- Posted by an Indian congressman
The Statement:
"When I first joined, I was the only Indian congressman and now there are six, so I look forward to welcoming more Indian Americans."
The Twitter Backlash:
- Already upset about H-1B visa issues
- "Why are they explicitly saying the goal is more Indian American congressmen?"
- "Why not just good for America policies?"
- People are sensitive right now
The Original Congressman: Ami Bera
Who He Is:
- Ami Bera, MD
- Representing California's 6th District
- Sacramento County
- The original Indian-American congressman
- Before him, there were none
The Tweet Response:
- People don't like the fact there's an Indian-American coalition in Congress
- Comparison made: "But there's a Black coalition, so why can't there be an Indian coalition?"
Weather Context: Delhi Fog
The Conditions:
- Delhi becomes extremely foggy
- Very cold for local people (though not by our standards)
- No central heating in India
- Houses have targeted heating only
- Moment you get away from the heater → feels cold
Why This Mattered Historically
The Marathas:
- Especially from Southern India (like Maharashtra)
- Wore very light clothing
- Not used to the cold
- Northern winter was a huge challenge
The Struggle:
- Clothing inadequate for northern winters
- Not adapted to cold climate
- This would be a factor in their campaigns
The Army Departs: March 14, 1760
Final Preparations
The Armory:
- Fort at Ahmadnagar supplied necessary ammunition
- For muskets, cannons, rockets, etc.
The Timing:
- Soldiers had no respite after Udgir campaign
- Little time to compensate losses in arms or horses (steed)
- Had to leave for the north immediately
The Reserve Strategy
What Was Left Behind:
"The army provided to Bhau was the best that could be provided at short notice after keeping enough reserves in the Dakkan to protect the territories from a fresh invasion by the Nizam."
Why Reserves Mattered:
- Nizam was already raiding scattered Maratha outposts
- Before the ink was dry on the Udgir treaty
- He was immediately going back on the treaty
- Despite being defeated at Udgir
The Solution:
- Visaji Krishna sent to Karnataka
- To ensure no disturbance from that sphere
- Keep southern territories secure
Bhau's First Time in Hindustan
The Learning Curve
The Reality:
"This was the first time Bhau would cross the Narmada and enter Hindustan, and his knowledge of its people, its potentates, and its politics was to be a learning process for him."
What This Meant:
- Never crossed the Narmada River before
- Never been to northern part of India
- Didn't know the people
- Didn't know the rulers (potentates)
- Didn't understand the politics
- Would have to learn on the job
The Departure
Leaving Patadur: March 14, 1760
The Timing:
- Left at the start of a hot summer
- On a turbulent campaign
- To a distant land
The Mission:
"The conflict drew them into a face-to-face confrontation against a deadly foe in a region where the Marathas had very few friends."
The Reality:
- Had created a lot of enemies
- Many people sitting on the fence
- Very few reliable allies
- Heading into hostile territory
Chapter 17: Prakaran 17 - Mitran Chiyashodhat (The Hunt for Allies)
The Strategic Understanding
Why Allies Were Critical:
- Marathas knew they needed allies
- Can't successfully fight this battle alone
- Must secure support before confrontation
Who They Would Target:
- Suraj Mal (the Jat)
- The Rajasthanis
- Suja-ud-Daula (Subedar of Awadh)
Suja-ud-Daula: The Fence-Sitter
Why He Was a Potential Ally
His Religious Position:
- Not a Sunni Muslim
- Therefore not allied with Abdali
- Not allied with Najib Khan (Abdali's patron in India)
- Not completely in sync with them
The Opportunity:
- Sitting on the fence
- Could be convinced to join Marathas
- His interests didn't align with Abdali
- Potential for alliance
The Letter: Bappuji Ballar (June 27, 1760)
Who Was Bappuji Ballar?
Probably:
- Stationed in Delhi on behalf of Marathas
- Sending intelligence reports
- Tracking enemy movements
The Intelligence Report
What He Reported:
- Najib Khan and Jahan Khan have gone to visit Suja-ud-Daula
- Marathas' letters have also been sent to Suja
- Planning to send capable men to meet with him
The Timing Issue:
"Yamuna River has water, maybe because of monsoon or whatever."
- Letter written in June
- During the monsoon season
- River full of water - harder to cross
Afghanistan & Abdali's Recruiting Strategy
How Abdali Built His Army
The Promise:
- Told his countrymen in Afghanistan:
- "If you accompany me in the invasion of India..."
- "You will get women and slaves"
Why This Worked:
- That's how he could recruit soldiers
- They had to be promised something
- Loot and plunder were the incentives
The Afghan Army's Nature
Primary Objective:
"The Afghan army under Abdali, under the command of Abdali, their primary objective was to wage war."
Why:
- Only way they could make funds
- Only way to get resources
- Nothing in their own country
- Battle was their business
The Result:
- Battle-hardened army
- Only skill they had
- Only way they could make money
Internal Tribal Warfare
Even Among Themselves:
- Tribes constantly warring with each other
- Fighting for resources
- Used to battling all the time
- External battles were just an extension
The Advantage:
- Always in combat mode
- Always ready for war
- Experienced fighters
Abdali's Background & Experience
The Nadir Shah Connection (1739)
Abdali's First Visit to India:
- Came in 1739 with Nadir Shah
- Just a foot soldier at the time
- Not a high-ranking officer
- Not anyone special
What He Learned:
- Understood the situation in northern India
- Saw how things worked
- Learned about the geography
- Studied the rulers and their weaknesses
His Track Record
By 1759-1760:
- This was his sixth time invading India
- As of now, he's in Delhi area
- Stayed the winter (or summer)
- Sitting pretty
- Not traveling
- Waiting
The Climate Problem
Afghans vs. Indian Summer
The Afghan Weakness:
"The Afghan army was used to the cold winters, but not to the summer heat."
The Opposite Problem:
- Marathas struggled with northern cold
- Afghans struggled with Indian heat
- Each army had climate disadvantages
Abdali's Advantages
Knowledge & Experience
What He Knew:
- Done so many campaigns in India
- Knew the weaknesses of Indian armies
- Knew the weaknesses of Indian royals
- Had dealt with them multiple times
The Pattern:
"What to expect and how they will speak tall but not deliver in terms of their actions."
- Indian rulers would make big promises
- But wouldn't follow through
- Abdali knew this from experience
Geographic Knowledge
What He Understood:
- Rivers, mountains, valleys
- All the geographical details
- Not a total foreigner
His Network:
- Had people to help him like Najib Khan
- Mughal emperor would sometimes talk to both sides
- Aware of happenings in northern plains
- "Proximity awareness"
The Critical Skill: River Crossings
The Decisive Difference
Abdali's Advantage:
"He knew the art and had the skill of crossing rivers. That was very critical."
The Maratha Disadvantage:
"And the Marathas didn't have it really. They didn't have the skill nor did they understand how to do it."
The Impact:
- This was a major difference
- Made a huge difference in the outcome
- There will be one particular incident that was extremely key
- Coming up later in the story
Remember This Point: This river-crossing skill gap will be crucial
The Rohillas: Natural Allies
Bareli & Rohilkhand
What Is Rohilkhand:
- Region settled by Afghan soldiers of fortune
- Came to India and settled there
- Bareli is a town there (exists even today)
Who Are the Rohillas:
- Afghan origin
- Cultural affinity with Abdali
- Linguistic affinity with Abdali
- Natural allies
The Advantage:
- They were local
- Already in Hindustan
- Would always stand with Abdali
- Gave him local support base
Najib Khan Rohila: The Key Player
His Relationship with Abdali
Status:
- Rohilla himself
- Abdali's friend or trusted ally
- Close relationship
His Personal Qualities
What Made Him Special:
1. Adventurousness:
- Would take calculated risks
- Not afraid to make bold moves
2. Sense of Timing:
"He had the sense of time, how the wind is blowing at any given time."
- Could read the political situation
- Understood when to act
- When to hold back
- When to switch sides
Very Important Qualities: These were the key traits that made Najib Khan successful
Najib Khan's Limitations
The Army Problem
What He Lacked:
- Didn't have a whole lot of army on his side
- Neither did all the Rohillas in India combined
- Limited military power
The Background Problem
His Origin:
- Najib Khan was an upstart
- Very modest background
- Not born of royal lineage
- Worked his way up
The Consequence:
"In the eyes of others, he was discounted."
Why This Mattered:
- If you're born of royal parentage → you get a leg up
- He didn't have that
- Others didn't give him credit
- Didn't want him to be too powerful
Najib Khan's Strengths Despite Disadvantages
His Unique Leadership
What He Had:
- Very adventurous
- Very shrewd
- Knew how the wind was blowing with respect to time
His Political Skill:
- Could make the right moves at the right time
- Could bring people along
- Even when other Rohilla commanders disagreed with him
- Could band them to his side
How He Did It:
"He could present the situation in certain ways"
- Persuasive speaker
- Strategic framing
- Got people to see things his way
The Assessment
"So he was really kind of a unique leader. He had some unique qualities, even though he wasn't born with the advantages that some other people may have been."
The Compensation:
- Made up for lack of royal birth
- Through his other qualities
- Through his political acumen
- Through his timing and shrewdness
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Key Trait |
|---|---|---|
| Ami Bera, MD | First Indian-American Congressman | California's 6th District, Sacramento |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | First time crossing Narmada, learning on the job |
| Visaji Krishna | Commander | Sent to Karnataka to secure south |
| Bappuji Ballar | Intelligence officer | Stationed in Delhi, tracking enemy movements |
| Suraj Mal | Jat ruler | Potential ally for Marathas |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Sitting on fence, not Sunni, potential ally |
| Najib Khan Rohila | Afghan commander | Upstart with great timing, Abdali's ally |
| Jahan Khan | Afghan commander | Visiting Suja-ud-Daula with Najib |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | 6th invasion, expert on India, knows river crossings |
| Nadir Shah | Persian conqueror (1739) | Abdali came as foot soldier with him |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Abdali's first visit to India (as foot soldier with Nadir Shah) |
| 1739-1760 | Abdali invades India 6 times |
| March 14, 1760 | Bhau's army leaves Patadur for the north |
| Spring 1760 | Start of hot summer - hard on Afghans |
| Post-Udgir 1760 | Nizam already raiding Maratha outposts despite treaty |
| June 27, 1760 | Bappuji Ballar's letter - Yamuna full from monsoon |
| 1760 | Najib Khan and Jahan Khan visit Suja-ud-Daula |
Geographic Context
The Journey:
- Patadur → Northern plains
- Crossing the Narmada River (Bhau's first time)
Rohilkhand Region:
- Bareli - Rohilla stronghold
- Settled by Afghan soldiers of fortune
- Natural Abdali allies
Strategic Rivers:
- Narmada - Traditional boundary between north and south India
- Yamuna - Full in June (monsoon), hard to cross
Awadh:
- Ruled by Suja-ud-Daula
- Key territory
- Both sides courting him
The Doab:
- Between Ganga and Yamuna
- Very fertile flat land
- Where Abdali camped
Major Themes
1. The Learning Curve
Bhau crossing Narmada for the first time - doesn't know the people, politics, or rulers of the north. Learning on the job.
2. Climate as Weapon
Marathas weak in cold, Afghans weak in heat. Each side has environmental disadvantages.
3. River Crossings = Game Changer
Abdali's mastery of river crossings vs. Marathas' lack of this skill. Will prove decisive.
4. The Alliance Race
Both sides hunting for allies. Winner of alliance race may win the war.
5. Experience vs. Inexperience
Abdali's 6th invasion, knows India well. Bhau's first time in the north, knows nothing.
6. Upstart Leadership
Najib Khan - no royal blood, but shrewd timing and political skill made him a key player.
7. The Afghan Business Model
War is their only way to make money. Promise of loot and slaves = recruitment strategy.
Critical Disadvantages
For the Marathas:
- No cold weather experience - light clothing, not adapted
- No river-crossing skills - will prove fatal
- Bhau's inexperience - never been to north before
- Few friends - many enemies or fence-sitters
- Just fought Udgir - exhausted, no rest
For the Afghans:
- Summer heat - not adapted to Indian summers
- Foreign force - need local allies badly
- Supply lines - far from home base
The Coming Storm
What's Set Up:
- Both armies hunting for allies
- Suja-ud-Daula being courted by both sides
- Najib Khan working hard for Abdali
- River crossings will matter
- Climate will matter
- Alliances will matter
The Question:
- Who will secure more allies?
- Who will adapt better to climate?
- Who will control the river crossings?
The Ironic Contrast
Marathas:
- Most magnificent army ever assembled
- But inexperienced in the north
- Don't know the terrain
- Don't know how to cross rivers
- First time for their commander
Abdali:
- Battle-hardened force
- 6th invasion - knows India intimately
- Knows all the tricks
- Knows river crossings
- But also a foreigner needing local help
Where we are: March 1760. The armies are moving. The alliance race has begun. Bhau is learning on the job. Abdali is waiting. The monsoon is coming. And somewhere in all of this, a river crossing will decide everything.
The hunt for allies begins - both sides sending messengers, making promises, trying to secure support. Suja-ud-Daula sits on the fence. Najib Khan works his political magic. And Bhau, crossing the Narmada for the first time in his life, has to navigate a world he doesn't know. The clock is ticking.
Abdali's Alliance Campaign: Wooing Ahmad Khan Bangash (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Najib Khan's Background: From Foot Soldier to Minor King
The Rise of an Upstart
His Origin:
- Started as a foot soldier
- Very modest beginnings
- No royal lineage
His Achievement:
- Became Shasta - ruler of a small kingdom
- Worked his way up from nothing
- "From foot soldier to minor king"
Abdali's Profile at This Time
Age & Experience
His Stats:
- About 40 years old
- On his 6th invasion of India
- Extensive knowledge of the region
His Network:
- Knew all the major players in northern India
- Had people already in power who would help him
- They would give him "lay of the land"
- Assistance with local politics
The Strategic Position: Doab Encampment
Where Abdali Camped
The Location:
"With his huge army he had camped out in the Doab - the region between Ganga and Yamuna"
Why This Location:
- Very fertile flat land
- Between two major rivers
- Strategic position
- Control of the heartland
His Resource Situation
Financial Backing:
- Access to funds secured
- Allies made sure he was fully satisfied
- "Raring to go"
Who Provided Support:
- Najib Khan - just one of several Rohilla commanders
- Other Rohilla commanders supporting him
- The Mughal Emperor himself - Abdali could extract tribute from him
The Power Dynamic:
"He could make him pay up"
- Mughal Emperor forced to fund Abdali
- No choice but to comply
The Alliance Race Begins
Why Everyone Needed Allies
Abdali's Awareness:
- Knew he'd get resistance from Marathas coming from south
- Started making new allies proactively
- "Everybody was hunting for new allies"
- Only way they could win
Why This Contest Was Inevitable
The Clash of Interests:
Abdali's Motivation:
- India has wealth and supplies
- He needs them to rule his own country
- Finds prosperity in India
Maratha Motivation:
- Want to overlord northern parts of India
- That's where the prosperity is
- Can't tolerate Abdali's presence
- Already made Mughal Emperor a namesake personality
- Were the real power behind the throne
The Contest:
"That was the contest that was now going to take place"
Why Allies Were Critical: The Logistics
The Massive Armies
The Scale:
- When Sadashiv Rao started from Patadur
- Army plus civilians = like a small town on the move
- At least 100,000+ people
- Some say 150,000 people
The Breakdown:
- Army size: 60,000-70,000 when starting
- Started at 50,000-60,000 from Patadur
- As he went north, others joined
- Army kept swelling
Same for Abdali:
- He also had massive forces
- Also like a small town constantly moving
The Resource Requirements
What Massive Armies Need:
- Supplies for animals - horses, elephants, etc.
- Food for men - hundreds of thousands of meals daily
- Salaries - men must be paid
- Ammunition - cannonballs, musket balls, gunpowder
- Continuous resupply - can't carry everything
The Solution:
"You need allies because... it's a huge requirement"
- Allies provide local supplies
- Allies provide local funds
- Allies provide local intelligence
- Can't sustain these armies without local support
Abdali's Messenger Strategy
The Diplomatic Campaign
What He Did:
- Sent messengers to different kingdoms
- To their rulers
- Making the case for funds
The Religious Appeal (to Muslim Rulers)
The Argument to Rohillas/Mughals:
"Islam is in danger! Marathas are going to take over northern India and for that you need me."
The Ideological Plea:
- Made it about religion
- About protecting Muslim interests
- "You need to pay up"
- "Otherwise how am I going to win this battle?"
- "Send me resources"
The Rajput Strategy
Why Rajputs Would Listen
Their Frustration:
- Tired of Maratha harassment
- Constant tribute demands
- Being bossed around by Marathas
- "They didn't have much to lose"
Their Position:
"Marathas are good but they should stay well south of Narmada. They shouldn't come into Rajasthan."
- Don't want Marathas in their territory
- Tired of being threatened with tributes
- Open to alternatives
The Fence-Sitters
Why They Hesitated
The Dilemma:
- All these powers were sitting on the fence
- Didn't want to back the loser
- Didn't know how this battle would go
The Calculation:
If they back Abdali and Marathas win:
- Marathas will be the victors
- Won't look favorably upon them
- Will face Maratha revenge
If they back Marathas and Abdali wins:
- Abdali will create trouble for them
- Will face Afghan revenge
The Problem:
"They were in a troublesome situation"
The Weakness of Rajputs & Others
Why They Had Limited Options
The Rajputs:
- By this time had lost their relevance
- Divided into smaller kingdoms in Rajasthan
- No longer a unified power
- Can't stand alone
Suraj Mal:
- Also a small-time player
- Afraid of Maratha power
- Didn't want Marathas dabbling in northern politics
- "His domain as he saw it"
- But not strong enough to enforce this alone
Najib Khan's Desperation
Why He Couldn't Let Abdali Leave
The Reality:
"Najib Khan and all that they knew that either way they will be in trouble with Marathas."
Whether They Win or Lose:
- Already in trouble with Marathas
- But if Marathas win with Abdali → in big trouble
- Then stuck with "800 pound gorilla"
The Plea:
"Don't ever think of going back unless you deal with Marathas and basically get rid of this threat for us. Otherwise we won't let you go."
Why:
"If you go, what will happen to us? That was the biggest issue."
Najib Khan's Personal Stakes
His Ambitions:
- Wanted to be the Wazir himself
- In Delhi
- Most prestigious position
His Problem:
- Rohilla army not that big
- Can't threaten Mughal Emperor alone
- As long as Marathas around, they'd never let him be Wazir
His Solution:
- Ask Abdali to plead his case to Mughal Emperor
- Maybe that would be honored
- Because "you can't say no to Abdali that easily"
- "He will extract a high price"
- Abdali can negotiate on Najib's behalf
The Stakes:
"If Abdali goes without resolving this Maratha power, he may lose his kingdom. Not only that, he will lose his life and the whole Rohillas would be in deep trouble."
Why:
- They were basically opportunists
- No legitimate claim to power
- Dependent on force and Abdali's backing
The First Target: Ahmad Khan Bangash
Who Was Ahmad Khan Bangash?
His Position:
- Farukhabad - sultan/nawab
- Small-time ruler
- Allied with the Mughals
The Changing Dynamic:
- In the past, under powerful emperors like Aurangzeb
- These rulers reported directly to emperor
- Were vasal kings
The New Reality:
- Mughal Emperor now weak
- These vassals started behaving semi-independently
- "Testing the waters"
- Trying to be separate from Mughal Emperor
- "New found freedom"
Bangash's Background & Allegiance Switches
His Ethnicity
Who He Was:
- Pathan - a tribe in Afghanistan
- Proper Afghan
- Pashtun = Pathan (same thing)
- "Very proud Afghan people"
Tribal Context:
- Pashtun is one tribe among several in Afghanistan
- One of the dominant tribes
- Sense of ethnic identity and pride
His Physical Condition
The Injury:
- Had hurt his leg in some battle
- Walked with a limp
- "Kind of crippled"
- Wouldn't walk properly
His Position at This Time
Current Title:
- Mir Bakshi at the time
- Got rewarded with this position
His Previous Alliance:
- Had switched to Mughal side earlier
- But now Abdali is here
- Time to switch back
- "His loyalty was based on his ethnicity to a certain extent"
The Pattern:
"Switching alliance depending on the situation - whoever is strong at the time"
The Ethnic Bond:
- Considered himself Pathan
- Abdali also belonged to Pashtun tribe
- Some sub-tribal connection
- "Semblance of similarity"
- Would consider each other based on nationality and tribe
Bangash's Ambitions
What He Wanted
The Allahabad Prize:
"He desired very much to take Allahabad or nearby areas under his control from Suja-ud-Daula"
What Is Allahabad/Prayagraj:
- Confluence of three rivers: Ganga, Yamuna, and Saraswati
- Saraswati now underground
- Also called Prayagraj
Why Allahabad Was Valuable
The Holy Site Factor:
- Considered holy place for Hindus
- Where three rivers meet
- Sweet water abundant
- Provided for agriculture
- Sustained life
The Economics:
"In the olden times if they considered something to be more valuable and life-sustaining, they called it holy."
Why "Holy":
- Not necessarily magical power
- But sustains life
- Without water, what do you do?
- Sweet water = agriculture = prosperity
Example:
- Cow is holy animal because it sustained life
- In days when agriculture was weak
- Cow would graze and give milk
- That's your food
- Don't kill the animal that gives you food
- Give it status of holiness → nobody kills it
- Don't need laws or regulations
- Just make it holy
The Commercial Value
Why Bangash Wanted It:
- Several temples there
- Lots of Hindus visit
- Lots of commerce
- Rich traders
- Farmers are rich (fertile land with sweet water)
- Economy was very good
- Can tax people - they'll pay because well-off
- "That is always attraction for a ruler"
Current Control:
- Part of Suja-ud-Daula's Awadh territory
- Bangash wanted to snatch it away
The Letter-Writing Strategy
Abdali's Wazir: Shah Wali Khan
Who He Was:
- Wazir = Prime Minister
- Like Mughals had important wazir
- Abdali also had one
His Suggestion:
"Abdali himself should write a letter"
Why:
- Carries more weight
- Even if messenger carries the letter
- "It's from Abdali" → more weight
- Difficult to say no to the all-powerful man
The Letters: Two for One
Letter #1: Abdali's Personal Letter
The Praise Strategy:
"Once you praise him, it is likely that you can bring him on your side. That's why he was praising him very generously in his letter."
The Metaphor:
"It's like if you were to take flowers and throw it on somebody - the guy feels good, right?"
- Spread flowers of praise via letter
- Lots of good, praiseworthy words
- Toward Mr. Bangash
The Content of Abdali's Letter
The Praise:
"My wazir told me that you are very trustworthy and you are utilitarian - you are very useful and we value that trait in you."
- Very good at accomplishing big goals
- That's your capacity
- That's why I'm signing this letter myself
- A big man like you should trust me
- I'm in awe of your capability
The Afghan Pride Appeal:
"My kingdom in Afghanistan - my empire - should be a proud thing for every Afghan personality."
- Reminding Bangash: you are also Afghan
- You should be proud of what I've accomplished
- Unifying Afghanistan
The Trust Declaration:
"You are one of my prime commanders and we have tremendous trust in you."
- Trying to butter him up
- Support me
The Promises:
- "We will always hold you in high esteem"
- "We'll place you in a great position"
- Buttering him up as much as possible
The Assurance:
- Anyone who visits Abdali gets honors
- Given lots of pomp and circumstance
- "If you come and visit, good things will follow"
The Enticement:
"If you come to meet with Abdali, you will profit or benefit like nobody else in Hindustan."
The Political Alliance:
- Whatever areas you control - that's fine
- But you should also add new areas to your kingdom
- "The politics of India - you will be able to decide"
- "Whoever is your enemy is also our enemy"
- "Our armies will be one"
"Your enemy is my enemy. I will fight for you or make sure your enemies are weakened."
Letter #2: The Wazir's Letter
Shah Wali Khan Also Wrote:
- Abdali wasn't the only one writing
- Wazir wrote too
- Two letters for one person
- "Two for one"
The Strategy:
- Double the pressure
- Double the flattery
- Show how seriously they take Bangash
- Both the king and the prime minister writing
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Key Trait |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | 40 years old, 6th invasion, master strategist |
| Shah Wali Khan | Abdali's Wazir | Suggested personal letter strategy |
| Najib Khan Rohila | Afghan commander in India | Foot soldier → minor king, desperate for Abdali's help |
| Ahmad Khan Bangash | Nawab of Farukhabad | Pathan/Afghan, crippled leg, ambitious for Allahabad |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh | Controls Allahabad, being courted by both sides |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Leading 100,000+ people north |
| Suraj Mal | Jat ruler | Small-time player, afraid of Maratha power |
Geographic Context
The Doab:
- Between Ganga and Yamuna
- Very fertile
- Where Abdali camped
Allahabad/Prayagraj:
- Confluence of Ganga, Yamuna, Saraswati
- Part of Awadh (Suja-ud-Daula's territory)
- Bangash wants it
- Very prosperous due to agriculture and pilgrimage
Farukhabad:
- Bangash's small kingdom
- In northern India
Awadh:
- Suja-ud-Daula's territory
- Includes Allahabad
- Key strategic region
Timeline
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 1760 | Abdali's 6th invasion of India |
| 1760 | Abdali camps in the Doab with huge army |
| 1760 | Sadashiv Rao marching north with 100,000+ people |
| 1760 | Abdali sends messengers to various rulers |
| 1760 | Abdali and Shah Wali Khan write letters to Bangash |
Major Themes
1. The Alliance Race
Both sides desperately seeking allies. Abdali proactively courting local rulers before Marathas can secure them.
2. The Flattery Offensive
"Throw flowers on somebody and they feel good" - Abdali using lavish praise as a weapon.
3. Ethnic/Religious Bonds
Appeals to shared Afghan identity (Pathan/Pashtun), shared Muslim faith. Bonds that transcend immediate political interests.
4. The Fence-Sitter's Dilemma
Small rulers caught between two superpowers. Don't want to back the loser. Paralyzed by fear of choosing wrong side.
5. Logistics = Everything
Massive armies need local allies for supplies, funds, food. Can't sustain 100,000+ people without local support.
6. The Ideological Card
To Muslims: "Islam is in danger." To Afghans: "Afghan pride." To Rajputs: "Get rid of Maratha harassment." Tailored messages.
7. Opportunism & Survival
Najib Khan, Bangash, and others switching sides based on who's stronger. No deep loyalty - just survival.
Strategic Analysis
Why Abdali Was Ahead in Alliance Race
His Advantages:
- Personal touch - Wrote letters himself (rare for a king)
- Double pressure - King + Wazir both writing
- Concrete promises - "We'll make you powerful"
- Enemy identification - "Your enemy is my enemy"
- Ethnic bonds - Afghan to Afghan appeal
- Religious appeal - Islam in danger narrative
- Already powerful - Can extract tribute from Mughal Emperor himself
Why Marathas Were Behind
Their Disadvantages:
- Seen as outsiders - From the Deccan
- Reputation as tax collectors - Constant tribute demands
- Just harassment - No concrete benefits offered
- Bhau inexperienced - First time in north, doesn't know politics
- Fighting uphill - Have to overcome years of resentment
The Desperation Hierarchy
Most Desperate: Najib Khan
- Will lose life and kingdom if Abdali leaves
- Absolutely cannot let Abdali go back
- "Won't let you go"
- His entire survival depends on Abdali destroying Marathas
Very Desperate: Ahmad Khan Bangash
- Wants Allahabad badly
- Sees opportunity with Abdali here
- His threat has "waned" - no longer as powerful
- Needs external help to achieve ambitions
Somewhat Desperate: Rajputs
- Lost their relevance
- Divided into small kingdoms
- Tired of Maratha harassment
- But afraid to commit to either side
Least Desperate: Suja-ud-Daula
- Actually has significant power (controls Awadh)
- Sitting on fence because he can
- Both sides courting him
- Can afford to wait and see
The Economics of Holiness
Fascinating Insight:
"In the olden times if they considered something to be more valuable and life-sustaining, they called it holy."
Examples:
The Cow:
- Grazes → gives milk → sustains human life
- Don't kill your food source
- Make it "holy" → nobody kills it
- No need for laws or regulations
- Just make it holy
Three Rivers Meeting:
- Sweet water = agriculture = prosperity = life
- Becomes "holy" site
- Not magical, but practical
- Sustains life
The Strategy:
- Call it holy → people protect it naturally
- More effective than laws
- Deep cultural programming
The Letters' Effectiveness
Why They Might Work on Bangash
- Personal from the King - Shows respect
- Flattery - Everyone likes praise
- Ethnic bond - Afghan to Afghan
- Concrete promises - Position, power, help against enemies
- United armies - "Our armies will be one"
- Benefit pitch - "Profit like nobody else in Hindustan"
- Pride appeal - Afghan empire to be proud of
The Risk for Bangash
If he joins Abdali and Marathas win:
- Face Maratha revenge
- Lose everything
But if he doesn't join and Abdali wins:
- Miss the opportunity
- Someone else will get the benefits
- Might face Abdali's displeasure
What's Coming
Immediate:
- Will Bangash accept?
- What will Suja-ud-Daula do?
- Can Marathas counter Abdali's alliance offensive?
The Stakes:
- Whoever wins the alliance race has huge advantage
- Locals provide supplies, intelligence, safe passage
- Without allies, can't sustain massive armies
- The battle might be decided before armies even meet
Where we left off: Abdali and his wazir have sent flattering letters to Bangash. The "flowers of praise" have been thrown. The promises made. The ethnic bonds invoked. Now the question: Will it work?
Abdali isn't just bringing an army - he's bringing a diplomatic offensive. Letters, flattery, promises, ethnic appeals, religious appeals, concrete benefits. He's playing the alliance game at the highest level. Meanwhile, Bhau is still learning the basics of northern politics. The race is on.
Bangash Visits Abdali's Camp & The Alliance Race Heats Up (March 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Letters Work: Bangash Travels to Abdali
The Success of the Diplomatic Offensive
What Happened:
- Both Abdali and his wazir sent letters to Ahmad Khan Bangash
- The letters were effective
- They wanted to "woo him to their side"
The Result:
"On 31st of March 1760, he reached Abdali's tent or his camp."
Bangash's Roots:
"Because Mr. Bangash had come originally from Afghanistan, he understood the importance of staying in alliance with a powerful king from Afghanistan because he thought it would help him."
The Bond:
- His affinity was with his own clan/tribe
- That's what Abdali represented
- Ethnic and cultural ties mattered
The Intelligence Network
Madhav Singh's Spy Reports
Who Madhav Singh Was:
- Ruler in Jaipur (Rajasthan)
- To the very west of where Abdali was camped
The Intelligence Chain:
- Madhav Singh's representative was in Bangash's court
- This representative communicated news to Madhav Singh in Jaipur
- He knew Bangash had gone to see Abdali
- Sent intelligence report back to his boss
The Geography:
- Jaipur is far west
- Abdali was camped between Yamuna and Ganga rivers
- But Madhav Singh's rep was at Bangash's court
- So he came to know and communicated it
The Grand Entry: Pomp and Circumstance
The Report from Madhav Singh's Representative
The Scene:
"Nabab Bangash got on top of the elephant in terms of with a lot of fanfare."
What "Nabab" Means:
- Another way of saying he was a powerful royal
- From his small principality/kingdom
- Title of respect
The Celebration
The Display:
- Musical instruments playing
- Cannons fired (or fireworks)
- Marking the occasion
- Either when he left his own city
- Or when he reached Abdali's camp (more likely)
The Departure:
- Left before sunrise
- Traveled from his elephant all the way to Abdali's camp
The Red Carpet Treatment
Preparing the Path
The Cleanup:
"From his elephant all the way to Abdali's camp - meaning his tent - they had cleaned it up and made it nice so that it will appear like a VIP is coming to Abdali's tent."
Water on the Path:
- Put water on the way
- Made it smooth and nice
- Not dusty
- More pleasant
The Honor Guard
The Display:
- On both sides of the path
- Soldiers stood
- Giving salute
- Or something like that
- Creating a ceremonial corridor
The Message:
- This is how important you are
- This is how much we respect you
- You are a VIP
The Welcome Ceremony
The Formal Reception
What the Letter Said:
- This is the way he was welcomed
- Then they exchanged gifts
Why Gift Exchange:
- Just a token
- Way of getting started
- Way of initiating discussions
- Happens even in today's age
The Honor:
- Shah (Abdali) honored him
- Prime Minister Shah Wali Khan was there
The Political Messaging
Shah Wali Khan's Statement
What He Said:
"Now according to Shah Nawab's order, the time for India's business will be set."
Translation:
- Abdali (the Shah) will now set the agenda
- The order/structure of India will be determined
- New political reality about to be established
The Marathas Are Defeated Claim
What Shah Wali Khan Told Bangash:
- Marathas had been defeated
- Partially true:
- Taji Shinde was killed
- Holkar was defeated
- Existing Marathas in the north were not ready to take on Abdali
- Kind of defeated already
The Implication:
- Marathas are weak
- Now is the time to act
- Join the winning side
The New Order Promise
What "India's Business" Meant
The Setup:
"Now we have to set up a new order in the Mughal Empire."
What This Meant for Bangash:
- There may be a role for Bangash
- If Abdali is able to take control
How It Would Work:
- Abdali would compel the Mughal Emperor
- To make certain appointments
- "This guy becomes blah, blah, blah"
- Court positions, governorships, etc.
Bangash's Benefit:
- That's where Bangash would benefit
- Get appointed to powerful position
- By Abdali's influence over the Mughal Emperor
Abdali's Strategic Alliance-Building
The Proactive Approach
Why He Was Doing This:
- Abdali knew that Maratha army will come to the north
- It was certain
- Even inevitable
His Strategy:
"He wanted to make sure that he will basically sign up allies ahead of Marathas coming to the north."
The Advantage:
- Once they're signed up with him
- Marathas will have no chance of getting these people on their side
- Game over as he sees it
The Math:
- His side will be stronger (much stronger)
- The battle will be much easier for him to fight
The Rajput Situation
Why They Were Receptive to Abdali
The Province:
- Rajasthan - westernmost province
- Madhav Singh in Jaipur
- Vijay Singh in Jodhpur
Their Frustration:
"These guys were very tired of Maratha harassment and asking for tributes all the time."
What They Did:
- Had invited Mr. Abdali
- Sent letters
- Wanted him to come
The "Show Me" Attitude
Abdali's Response:
- Sent them: "Hey, pay up. I want money."
Their Response:
"First show us that you can win with these Marathas. Because if you don't win, then we will be cannon fodder. And this will all be for nothing."
The Status Quo:
- They're waiting to see results
- Not committing until Abdali proves himself
- Don't want to be on the losing side
Abdali's Next Move:
- Sent his messengers to meet with these Rajasthan Rajput royals
- Trying to convince them
- Trying to secure their support
The Rajput Dilemma
Why They Hesitated
The Religious Factor:
- Abdali was Islamic/Muslim
- Not in their interest to openly align with him
The Maratha Problem:
- But they had reached their patience
- Fed up with Maratha demands
- Desperate for relief
Better to Not Take a Side:
- Safest option might be neutrality
- But pressure from both sides
Suraj Mal Jat: The Clearest Conditions
The Throne Requirement
Suraj Mal's Communication to Abdali:
"Unless you defeat Marathas and sit on the throne of Delhi, then you will not have my respect or support. Until then, I won't support you."
What This Meant:
- Not enough to just beat Marathas back
- Had to truly declare intent to be ruler
- Had to be the new emperor in Delhi
Why So Strict:
- Otherwise Marathas will keep coming back
- Keep doing things
- Need permanent solution
The Term:
- "Takhta Aaseen" = Sit on the royal seat
- Aaseen = sit
- Takhta = throne/royal seat
- Must be sitting on the throne
The Standard:
"Unless you do that, I won't be able to support you."
- Much more clear cut
- More strict about that condition
- No half measures
The Rohilla Commanders' Natural Alliance
Hafiz Rehmat Khan and Dunde Khan
Who They Were:
- Rohilla commanders
- Just like Najib Khan
- But a little more established
- Not exactly upstarts
Their Position:
"It's in our interest to align with Abdali."
Why:
- They were themselves soldiers of fortune from Afghanistan
- Had come to India and settled there
- Maybe 10-15 years ago
- Natural for them to support Abdali
- Ethnic and cultural ties
The Decision:
- They aligned with Abdali
- Supported their Afghan brother
- Natural alliance
Key Figures
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Ahmad Khan Bangash | Nawab of Farukhabad | Visited Abdali March 31, 1760 |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Received Bangash with honors |
| Shah Wali Khan | Abdali's Wazir | Told Bangash about "new order" |
| Madhav Singh | Ruler of Jaipur | His spy reported on Bangash |
| Vijay Singh | Ruler of Jodhpur | Frustrated with Marathas |
| Suraj Mal Jat | Jat ruler | Demanded Abdali take Delhi throne |
| Hafiz Rehmat Khan | Rohilla commander | Naturally allied with Abdali |
| Dunde Khan | Rohilla commander | Naturally allied with Abdali |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Fellow Rohilla, Abdali's ally |
| Taji Shinde | Maratha commander | Killed (weakened Maratha position) |
| Holkar | Maratha commander | Defeated in north |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| March 31, 1760 | Ahmad Khan Bangash reaches Abdali's camp |
| March 31, 1760 | Grand reception with elephants, cannons, honor guard |
| March 31, 1760 | Gift exchange ceremony |
| March 31, 1760 | Shah Wali Khan discusses "new order" |
| 1760 | Abdali sends messengers to Rajput rulers |
| 1760 | Suraj Mal demands Abdali take Delhi throne |
| 1760 | Rohilla commanders align with Abdali |
Geographic Context
Abdali's Camp:
- Between Yamuna and Ganga rivers
- The Doab region
Rajasthan (Western India):
- Jaipur - Madhav Singh's territory
- Jodhpur - Vijay Singh's territory
- Very west of Abdali's position
- But had intelligence network
Delhi:
- The throne Suraj Mal wants Abdali to take
- Seat of Mughal power
- The prize
Major Themes
1. Spectacle as Diplomacy
The elephant procession, cannons firing, honor guard, water on the path - all theater to make Bangash feel important.
2. Intelligence Networks
Madhav Singh's representative in Bangash's court shows how rulers kept tabs on each other. Information was power.
3. The Gift Exchange Ritual
Universal diplomatic practice - gifts to initiate discussions, show respect, establish relationship.
4. Ethnic Bonds Trump Politics
Afghan commanders naturally gravitating toward Abdali despite being settled in India for years.
5. The Conditional Alliance
Suraj Mal's demand that Abdali take the throne shows strategic thinking - no half measures, need permanent solution.
6. The "Marathas Are Defeated" Spin
Partially true (Taji killed, Holkar defeated) but exaggerated to convince fence-sitters to pick Abdali's side.
7. Race Against Time
Abdali signing up allies before Marathas arrive - whoever wins the alliance race has huge advantage.
The Alliance Scorecard (So Far)
Firmly with Abdali:
- ✅ Ahmad Khan Bangash - Just committed (March 31)
- ✅ Najib Khan Rohila - Desperately committed
- ✅ Hafiz Rehmat Khan - Natural ally (Afghan)
- ✅ Dunde Khan - Natural ally (Afghan)
Sitting on Fence:
- ⏸️ Madhav Singh (Jaipur) - Watching, waiting
- ⏸️ Vijay Singh (Jodhpur) - Frustrated with Marathas but hesitant
- ⏸️ Suja-ud-Daula (Awadh) - Being courted by both sides
Conditional Support:
- ⚠️ Suraj Mal Jat - Will only support if Abdali takes Delhi throne
With Marathas:
- ❌ Mughal Emperor - Forced to pay Abdali but theoretically Maratha-aligned
- ❌ No strong local allies yet (this is their problem)
Strategic Analysis
Abdali's Advantages
What He's Doing Right:
- Personal diplomacy - Grand receptions, making people feel important
- Promise of new order - Concrete benefits (positions, power)
- Ethnic appeals - Afghan-to-Afghan bonds working
- Momentum narrative - "Marathas already defeated"
- Proactive recruitment - Getting allies before Marathas arrive
- Clear victory conditions - "Join me and we'll restructure India"
Marathas' Disadvantages
Their Problems:
- Not there yet - Still marching north
- Reputation - Known for tribute demands, harassment
- Recent losses - Taji killed, Holkar defeated
- No local network - Don't have established relationships
- Bhau inexperienced - First time in the north
- Defensive posture - Responding to Abdali rather than leading
The Rajput Psychology
Why They're So Frustrated
The Maratha Treatment:
- Constant tribute demands
- Harassment
- Bossing them around
- "They should stay south of Narmada"
- "They shouldn't come into Rajasthan"
Their Ideal:
"Marathas are good but they should stay well south of Narmada."
- Accept Maratha power exists
- But want them far away
- Don't want them in their territory
Why They're Still Hesitant
The Religious Factor:
- Abdali is Muslim
- They're Hindu
- Not natural allies
- Uncomfortable openly aligning
The Risk Factor:
- What if Abdali loses?
- Then face Maratha revenge
- What if Abdali wins but then turns on them?
- Better to wait and see
Suraj Mal's Strategic Brilliance
Why His Condition Was Smart
The Demand:
"Sit on the throne of Delhi or no support from me."
Why This Was Brilliant:
The Problem with Half Measures:
- If Abdali just defeats Marathas and leaves
- Marathas will come back
- Nothing permanently solved
- Jats still stuck with Maratha problem
The Full Solution:
- If Abdali takes the throne
- Becomes new emperor
- Permanent presence
- Marathas can't just come back
- Long-term protection
The Leverage:
- Suraj Mal making demands (not begging)
- Shows his own power
- Not desperate like Najib Khan
- Can afford to set conditions
The "New Order" Promise
What Shah Wali Khan Was Offering
The Pitch:
- "Now we have to set up a new order in the Mughal Empire"
- Abdali will compel Mughal Emperor to make appointments
- You (Bangash) will benefit
What This Actually Meant:
For Bangash:
- Could get Wazir position
- Could get Allahabad (his goal)
- Could get other territories
- Would be elevated
For Others:
- Similar promises likely made
- Everyone gets something in the "new order"
- But only if Abdali wins
The Risk:
- It's all promises
- What if Abdali loses?
- What if he wins but doesn't follow through?
- What if Marathas win?
The Rohilla Situation
Why They Had No Choice
Their Reality:
- Soldiers of fortune from Afghanistan
- Settled in India 10-15 years ago
- Not long-established
- Not from royal lineages
- Seen as opportunists
Their Vulnerability:
- If Marathas dominate → they're finished
- Can't survive Maratha hegemony
- Need external Afghan power
- Absolutely dependent on Abdali
The Natural Alliance:
"It was natural for them to support Abdali."
- Same ethnic background
- Same cultural ties
- Same language
- Same region of origin
- Not even a choice really
The Theater of Power
Why the Grand Reception Mattered
The Elements:
- Elephant - Symbol of royalty and power
- Cannons/Fireworks - Military might on display
- Musical instruments - Joy, celebration, importance
- Water on path - Luxury, care, attention to detail
- Honor guard - Military respect, security
- Gift exchange - Diplomatic respect, reciprocity
The Message:
- You are important
- We value you
- You made the right choice
- You are treated as an equal
- This is what winners do
The Psychology:
- Makes Bangash feel significant
- Makes the alliance feel prestigious
- Makes backing Abdali feel like backing a winner
- Hard to walk away after such treatment
What This Means for the Coming Battle
Abdali's Accumulating Advantages
Local Support:
- Bangash committed
- Rohillas fully committed
- Rajputs leaning toward him
- Even if fence-sitting, they're not helping Marathas
Supplies:
- Local allies provide food, fodder
- Can sustain his massive army
- Don't need to carry everything
- Have local knowledge
Intelligence:
- Like Madhav Singh's spy network
- Knows what's happening everywhere
- Can track Maratha movements
- Information advantage
Morale:
- Momentum narrative working
- "Marathas already defeated"
- Allies joining
- Looks like winning side
Marathas' Mounting Problems
Isolation:
- Few friends in the north
- Many enemies
- Fence-sitters not helping them
Supply Issues:
- No local allies to provide supplies
- Must carry everything
- Harder to sustain army
- More vulnerable
Information Gap:
- Don't have intelligence network
- Don't know local politics well
- Bhau learning on the job
- At disadvantage
Morale:
- Already lost Taji Shinde
- Holkar defeated
- Narrative of defeat spreading
- Have to overcome pessimism
The Critical Moment
March 31, 1760:
- Bangash commits to Abdali
- Another piece falls into place
- Alliance race continuing
- Clock ticking
What's Coming:
- More rulers will have to choose
- Suja-ud-Daula's decision crucial
- Suraj Mal's conditions interesting
- Rajputs still undecided
The Stakes:
- Battle might be decided before armies meet
- Whichever side has more local support
- Can better sustain their forces
- Has better intelligence
- Has more morale
- Likely wins
Where we left off: Bangash has committed. The elephant procession is done. The gifts exchanged. The promises made. Abdali's alliance-building is working. The Marathas are still marching north, still isolated, still learning. The race continues.
One by one, Abdali is securing allies. The theater of power is working - elephants, cannons, honor guards, promises of the "new order." Meanwhile, the Marathas are still trying to figure out who their friends are. The alliance race is tilting heavily toward Abdali, and the actual battle hasn't even started yet.
The Battle for Suja-ud-Daula: The Ultimate Prize (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Critical Factor: Suja's Decision Changes Everything
The Stakes:
"Suja was the key because if he stays neutral or on the Maratha side, they don't get the communal color, Hindu versus Muslim."
If Suja Joins Marathas or Stays Neutral:
- Remains: Afghans vs Indians
- Foreign invaders vs local powers
If Suja Joins Abdali:
- Becomes: Hindus vs Muslims
- Polarizes all Muslims to fight Marathas
Why Suja Was THE Prize
His Assets:
- Awadh kingdom (between Ganga-Yamuna, enormous revenue)
- Substantial fighting force
- Substantial treasury
- 7,000 Kizilbash (Iranian suicide soldiers from Nadir Shah)
- Naga warriors (Hindu fighters)
Bhau's Dual Strategy
Part 1: Shakti Pradarshan (Exhibition of Power)
- Show you're going to win
- "I am too strong to fail"
- Demonstrate invincibility
Part 2: Mutsaddegiri (Statesmanship)
- Promise rewards after war
- Pamper his ego
- Use diplomacy
Why Both Needed:
"Even if he knows you're invincible, if you treat him bad or don't give him reason to join, he won't come. You need both."
Suja's Background: Positive Factors for Marathas
His Father - Safdar Jung:
- Former Wazir who fought WITH Marathas
- Created the 1752 alliance against Abdali
- Good history to build on
His Mother - Sadrunisa Begum:
- Favored Marathas
- Shrewd woman
- Some influence on Suja
- But male-dominated power structure
His Identity:
- Shia Muslim (not Sunni)
- Iranian ancestry (not Afghan)
- No natural bond with Abdali
- "Up for grabs"
The Sources of Suja's Wealth
Agriculture:
- Extremely fertile Doab land
- Sweet water abundant
Religious Tourism:
- Allahabad/Prayagraj (three rivers confluence)
- Massive Hindu pilgrimage site
- Rich commerce from religious visitors
The Political Reality
Abdali's Advantage:
- Already close to Awadh
- Bhau hundreds of miles away
- Abdali's letters carry more weight
- "He was right there"
The Mission: Govindapant Bundele
Orders from Bhau:
- Best case: Bring Suja to Maratha side
- Minimum: Keep him neutral
Why Neutral Was Acceptable:
"If neutral, that army and treasury doesn't go to anybody. More even playing field."
Key Figures
| Name | Role |
|---|---|
| Suja-ud-Daula | Subedar of Awadh, THE prize |
| Sadrunisa Begum | His mother, favored Marathas |
| Safdar Jung | His father (deceased), created 1752 alliance |
| Govindapant Bundele | Envoy, 55 years old |
The Stakes
For Marathas: MUST keep Suja neutral or win him - if he joins Abdali, becomes Hindu-Muslim war
For Abdali: WANTS Suja badly - changes narrative to religious war, easier to rally Muslims
For Suja: His decision determines the nature of the war itself
One man's decision could transform this from a national defense against foreign invaders into a religious war. Suja sits at the center, courted by both sides, his mother favoring Marathas, geography favoring Abdali.
Bhau's Boat Bridge Plan & The Unfair Blame (April-June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Boat Bridge Strategy
The Order to Govindapant:
"Find out how you can build a bridge out of boats."
Why:
- Bhau's army traveling to Doab
- Must cross Yamuna river
- To meet Suja-ud-Daula
- Fight Abdali in the Doab
The Timing Problem:
- Left Patadur March 14, 1760
- Takes 2-3 months to reach Yamuna
- By then: Monsoon starts (June-July)
- River will be full
- Must prepare bridge in advance
Why the Whole Army Had to Move
The Threat:
"Abdali was waiting in the north. He was actually in Doab himself. So that would just be an opportunity for him to strike."
The Lesson:
- Learned from Taji Shinde's fate
- Learned from Holkar's defeats
- Can't risk small contingent
- Must be properly protected
Abdali's Timing Advantage
The Critical Detail:
"Before Sadashiv Rao Bhau was chosen as leader, Abdali was already in Anupshahar."
Anupshahar:
- In the Doab itself
- In Suja's territory
- Abdali camped there before Bhau even selected
The Sequence:
- Abdali arrives → camps in Suja's land
- Taji dies → news reaches Pune
- Meeting at Udgir → Bhau chosen
- Result: Abdali has huge head start
The Unfair Blame on Bhau
Why He Gets Blamed:
"Sadashiv Rao Bhau is blamed for the fall of Panipat battle."
- 100,000+ killed
- Prestige lost
- Enormous damage
Why It's Unfair:
"That was not entirely his fault. Over the years, Shinde and Holkar armies had created that environment."
What They Created:
- Harassed Rajputs constantly
- Harassed Suraj Mal Jat
- Only wanted tributes, money
- Made natural allies into enemies
Bhau's Innocence:
- Had nothing to do with it
- First time crossing Narmada
- First time in north
- Inheriting the whole mess
- Politics of north already poisoned
Bajirao I: The Strategic Genius
Why Shahu Chose Him:
"Shinde and Holkar were good fighters. But they had no brains."
Their Mistakes:
- Only looked at tactical advantages
- Harassed Rajasthan princes for money
- Made them mad
- Lost natural allies
Bajirao I's Difference:
- Not just fighter - had brains
- Great warrior AND great statesman
- Strategic thinker
His Principle:
"You cannot make enemies out of our natural allies."
The Tree Analogy
Shahu's Test:
- "Who is biggest enemy of Marathas?"
- "How would you deal with Mughals?"
Bajirao's Answer:
"You can go after branches of big tree. But if you cut the trunk, entire tree comes down. You don't have to go after each and every branch."
The Strategy:
- Trunk = Mughal Empire
- Branches = Small kingdoms they spawned
- Go after the trunk, not branches
- Strategic over tactical thinking
Why This Mattered:
- Shahu chose 19-year-old Bajirao
- Over experienced commanders
- Because he had strategic vision
- "That turned out to be correct decision"
Bhau's Reconciliation Attempts
Messengers Sent (Late April 1760):
- To Madhav Singh of Jaipur
- To Vijay Singh of Jodhpur
What He Asked:
- Send troops
- Send funds
- Send supplies
His Pitch:
"We are all Indians. We live in India. Abdali is outright foreigner and has no business here. We should all be on same side."
The Vision:
- Unite all Indian powers
- Fight foreign army together
- Even tried to include Rohilas
- But difficult to convince after years of harassment
Why Govindapant Failed
The Assignment:
- Build bridge out of boats
- Meet Suja-ud-Daula
- Convince him to join
Why It Failed:
"Could not accomplish the task given to him."
The Problems:
- Couldn't reach Suja to convince
- Couldn't build bridge across Yamuna
Why:
- Abdali's forces lurking around Itawa
- 10,000-20,000 Afghan soldiers moving
- Govindapant only had 4,000-5,000 soldiers
- Didn't want to start skirmish (would lose)
- Bridge takes weeks to build
- Too vulnerable during construction
Key Figures
| Name | Role |
|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Gets unfair blame, inherited mess |
| Bajirao I | Strategic genius, chose trunk over branches |
| Shahu | King with foresight, chose Bajirao at 19 |
| Shinde/Holkar | "No brains," harassed natural allies |
| Govindapant Bundele | Failed mission (not his fault) |
Major Themes
1. The Inherited Mess
Bhau inherits years of bad diplomacy. Rajputs angry, Suraj Mal angry, natural allies driven away.
2. Strategic vs Tactical
Bajirao I understood strategy (trunk). Shinde/Holkar only understood tactics (grab money now).
3. Politics > Military
"Politics is biggest part of battle. Physical battle is just fighting in different way to resolve differences."
4. Timing is Everything
Abdali in Anupshahar before Bhau even chosen. Head start is massive.
5. The Bridge Problem
Can't build bridge with enemy around. Maratha weakness at river crossings apparent.
Geographic Context
- Anupshahar: In Doab, Suja's territory, where Abdali camped
- Itawa: Only Maratha-held city in Doab, surrounded by Afghan forces
- Yamuna: Major river crossing needed
Where we left off: Bhau trying to undo years of damage. Sent messengers to Rajputs. Ordered bridge built. But Govindapant can't accomplish either - Afghan forces everywhere. Abdali already in position. Bhau still hundreds of miles away. The political damage may be irreversible.
"If only Bajirao had no brains" successors. Now Bhau, capable but inexperienced in north, inherits their mess. Trying to fix it, but Abdali's timing advantage and river-crossing weakness may prove fatal.
Suja Goes Neutral & The River Crossing Crisis (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The River Crossing: Critical Geographic Reality
The FaceTime Map Discussion:
- Ganga and Yamuna rivers shown
- Delhi and Agra on WEST bank of Yamuna
- They're NOT in the Doab (between rivers)
- Doab is the area between Ganga and Yamuna
Abdali's Position:
- Between Ganga and Yamuna (in the Doab)
- Across river from Delhi
Bhau's Route:
- Coming from western side of Yamuna
- Coming from Delhi side
- Must cross Yamuna to get to Abdali
Bhau's Original Plan
The Strategy:
"His plan was to cross Yamuna and fight Abdali in the Doab where Abdali was located."
What Actually Happened:
- When Bhau reached crossing point (near Agra)
- Already monsoon season
- Yamuna was extremely wide
- Tough to cross
The Result:
"So he continued to Delhi. And from Delhi, he went all the way to Kurukshetra, which is north of Delhi. All along, he was on western bank of Yamuna. He never crossed."
The Game-Changing River Crossing
What Changed Everything:
- Sometime in September-October
- Abdali crosses Yamuna from Doab
- Gets onto western bank (same side as Bhau)
Bhau's Surprise:
"That was a huge surprise for Sadashiv Rao Bhau."
- Bhau had gone to Kurukshetra
- Thought he was safe
- Didn't expect Abdali to cross
Why Abdali Could Cross:
"Afghans had good skills to cross rivers."
- After monsoon (Sept 25th crossed with most army)
- Marvelous river-crossing ability
The Consequence:
"That was a game changer, because now war was upon them. Nothing blocking their stuff."
The Chambar River: One Month to Cross
When:
- June 1760 - Bhau crossed Chambar river
The Problem:
- Chambar is a small-time river
- "River by any stretch of imagination"
- Took one month to cross
The Implication:
"If he takes a month to cross Chambar, how long to cross Yamuna? Yamuna is huge river."
The Reality:
"Marathas did not master the technique of crossing rivers."
The Contrast:
- Abdali crossed many rivers from Afghanistan to Doab
- Somehow mastered technique
- With elephants, camels, horses, cannons, thousands of people
Bundeli Couldn't Build the Bridge
Why It Failed:
- Couldn't reach Suja physically
- Or maybe sent letter/messengers
- But couldn't build the bridge out of boats
The Threat:
- Abdali's army (20,000 soldiers) around Itawa area
- Govindapant only had small force
- Constant threat lurking
- Bridge takes several weeks
- "Can be ambushed or something"
The Conclusion:
"It's easier for us to conclude sitting now here. But if you're in situation..." - Much harder in reality.
Suja's Conditions: The Shah Alam Deal
What Suja Wanted:
"If you make Shah Alam as next emperor, and if you make me wazir, then I would come on your side."
Who Was Shah Alam:
- Previous emperor had been blinded
- Fled for hiding and protection
- Shah Alam was his name
- Imad-ul-Mulk had killed another emperor
Suja's Calculation:
- Can't trust Abdali (foreigner who'll leave)
- Can't trust Najib Khan (wants to be wazir himself)
- Once Abdali leaves, who protects Suja?
- No security guarantees
The Feeler:
- Sent through Shyamji Ranganath (Bhau's representative)
Bhau's Response:
"Yeah, no issue. I will do it."
- Immediately approved
- Willing to make Shah Alam emperor
- Make Suja wazir
The Proximity Problem
The Reality:
"Even with that, Abdali was close to Awadh and Bhau was hundreds of miles away. So that was the problem."
Why Abdali's Letters Carried More Weight:
- Right there in front of Suja
- 800 pound gorilla sitting nearby
- Bhau far away
- "Not easy to say I'm going with Sadashiv Rao"
Suja's Capital: Lucknow
The Situation:
- Capital city was Lucknow
- 100 kilometers north: town of Bithur
- Abdali's army camped at Bithur
The Decision:
"Because of that, Mr. Suja-ud-Daula changed his decision and said, I'm going to be neutral. Not taking part in any of this. I am your friend as well as everybody's friend."
Why He Changed Plans:
- Originally wanted to go to Patna (east)
- But Abdali only 100km away
- Too close for comfort
- If he goes to Patna and Abdali comes to Lucknow → robbed
- Whole thing becomes messy
His New Plan:
- Go to western border instead
- That's where Abdali is
- Need to make sure it's safe
- Can't leave Lucknow unguarded
The Afghan Alliance Solidifies
The Rohillas Join:
- Dunde Khan
- Hafiz Rehmat Khan
- Najib Khan
Why:
- Afghan soldiers of fortune
- Settled in India
- "That's where their loyalty lied"
- No questions asked
- Natural alliance
The Battle Lines:
"Because they now were on Abdali side, it was clearly the battle line spectrum."
The Indian vs Afghan Framework
The Reality:
"No matter how you look at it, whether Suja, whether Suraj Mal Jat, whether Rajputs or any others, Bangash - these guys were Indians. They had kingdoms in India. They were not in Afghanistan."
Afghan Camp:
- Rohilas
- Abdali (Afghan proper)
Indian Side:
- All sitting on sidelines
- Suraj Mal: "Don't want involved, on sideline"
- Bangash: Made Afghan affinity known (forefathers from Afghanistan)
The Framework:
"Indian power brokers vs Afghans - that is kind of clash that is going to take place."
The Communal Color Problem
Why Suja Mattered:
"If it were just between Afghans and Indians, that is good. Can rally Rajputs as Hindu war. But Suja was key because he was Muslim, Shia Muslim."
If Suja Stays Neutral or Maratha Side:
- No communal color
- Doesn't become Hindu vs Muslim
- Remains Afghan vs Indians
- No religious justification
If Suja Goes Afghan Side:
"Then it becomes Hindu battle. Hindu versus Muslim."
The Stakes:
- Suja had funds
- Suja had good-sized army
- If he goes there: gives them funds AND army
- Plus it becomes Hindu-Muslim battle
Key Figures
| Name | Role |
|---|---|
| Suja-ud-Daula | Chose neutrality (Abdali 100km away) |
| Shah Alam | Blinded emperor Bhau promised to restore |
| Shyamji Ranganath | Bhau's representative |
| Dunde Khan, Hafiz Rehmat Khan, Najib Khan | Rohillas who joined Abdali |
Geographic Details
Lucknow:
- Suja's capital
- 100km from Bithur
Bithur:
- 100km north of Lucknow
- Where Abdali's army camped
- Way too close
Patna:
- To the east
- Where Suja wanted to go
- Had to cancel (Abdali too close)
Kurukshetra:
- North of Delhi
- Where Bhau went
- Thought he was safe there
- Wrong
Major Themes
1. Geography is Destiny
Abdali 100km from Lucknow = Suja goes neutral. If he'd been 500km away, different outcome.
2. River Crossings Decide Wars
One month to cross small Chambar. Couldn't cross Yamuna at all. Abdali's mastery = game changer.
3. The Communal vs National Frame
If Suja neutral → Afghan vs Indian. If Suja joins Abdali → Hindu vs Muslim. Everything changes.
4. Proximity Trumps Promises
Bhau agreed to all Suja's conditions. But Abdali was RIGHT THERE. 800 pound gorilla wins.
5. The Surprise Factor
Bhau went to Kurukshetra thinking safe. Abdali's September crossing shocked everyone. War suddenly upon them.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 1760 | Bhau crosses Chambar (takes 1 month!) |
| June-August 1760 | Bhau reaches Yamuna, can't cross (monsoon) |
| August 1760 | Bhau continues to Delhi, then Kurukshetra |
| September 25, 1760 | Abdali crosses Yamuna - game changer! |
| 1760 | Suja changes decision, goes neutral (Abdali 100km away) |
Where we left off: Suja went neutral because Abdali camped 100km from Lucknow. Bhau approved all his conditions but was too far away. Rohillas joined Abdali openly. Battle lines drawn: Afghan vs Indian. But if Suja had joined Abdali, would've been Hindu vs Muslim. Bhau never crossed Yamuna (Maratha weakness). Then Abdali shocked everyone by crossing Yamuna in September. Game changed. War suddenly real.
The river crossing was everything. Marathas couldn't do it. Abdali could. One month to cross tiny Chambar. Impossible to cross huge Yamuna during monsoon. So Bhau stayed on western bank. Thought he was safe at Kurukshetra. Then Abdali's Afghan river-crossing expertise shattered that illusion. September 25th, 1760: Abdali crosses. Bhau's safe distance evaporates. War is upon them.
Abdali's Final Diplomatic Push & Bhau's River Struggles (June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Nature of the Conflict: Afghan vs Indian
The Setup:
"Because Dunde Khan, Hafiz Rehmat Khan and Najib Khan allied openly with Abdali, nature of conflict became: Afghans versus powers within Hindustan."
Why It Hinged on Suja:
- If Suja stays on Maratha side → Afghans vs Hindustani power
- If Suja goes on Afghan side → Muslims vs Hindus
Why This Mattered:
"It's not advisable or desirable for Marathas to have that kind of conflict, Muslim versus Hindu. Because it then polarizes all Muslims to fight against them."
Suja's Situation:
- In two minds, confused
- Would rather go on Maratha side
- Had reservations about Abdali
- But Abdali at his doorstep - had to be careful
Bhau's Logical Argument
The Pitch:
"We are the protectors of Mughal Empire and Mughal seat of power in Delhi. Abdali is not."
Why:
- Abdali is outsider
- Lives far away
- Will come once every 2-4 years
- Not there being 24/7 like Marathas can be
- Not long-term ally
- Won't protect you
The Offer:
- You want to be wazir?
- Mughal Empire has to be protected
- We're here to protect it
- Join our side
The Minimum:
"If you cannot be openly on my side or Maratha side, then at minimum, stay neutral."
The Last Ditch Effort: Sadrunisa Begum
Bhau's Final Move:
"To make last ditch effort, he sent Govindapant to meet with Sadrunisa (Suja's mother)."
Why:
- Bhau knew she has influence on policymaking in Suja's kingdom
- She was shrewd woman
- Wife of Safdar Jung
Her Position:
- Already leaned towards Maratha side
- Preferred Suja go with Marathas rather than Abdali
The Limitation:
"She could convince Suja, but royal and sovereign was Suja. Whole power structure was male dominated. She had some influence but didn't have complete power."
The Result:
"Even after doing all that, there was no promise or acknowledgement. He didn't come up with anything that could be relied upon."
- No aswasan (assurance)
- Nothing that could be trusted
- Troublesome situation
Abdali's Counter-Move: The Childhood Friend
The Genius Strategy:
"Abdali was able to find a childhood friend of Safdar Jung or of Sadrunisa Begum."
Who She Was:
- Not an ordinary woman
- Royal queen of Muhammad Shah (now dead)
- He was killed by Imad-ul-Mulk
- Now widow
- Was the first lady at the time
- Political personality, shrewd woman
- Well versed in diplomacy and policymaking
Why This Worked:
- Childhood friends with Sadrunisa
- Sent by Abdali to turn her
The Grudge:
- Her entourage (200 women) had been looted by Maratha army
- "So she must not have good opinion of Marathas"
What She Did:
- Met with both Sadrunisa (Suja's mother) AND Suja
- Insisted they go to Abdali side
The Tilting Scale: Suja's Confusion
The Marathi Proverb:
"You don't know which way you want to lean. You are confused."
Suja's State:
- Sometimes leaning this way
- Sometimes leaning that way
- Wasn't sure what was right decision
The Diplomatic Escalation: Jahan Khan's Turn
After the Lady's Diplomacy:
"Now it was turn of Jahan Khan."
Who Was Jahan Khan:
- Abdali's commander
- Now trying to convince Suja
What He Accomplished:
"Jahan Khan had taken control of every major post other than Itawa."
The Situation:
- Marathas kept control of Itawa only
- Everything else: Jahan Khan controlled
The Ultimate Move: Najib Khan Sent
Why Send Najib:
"He rolled dice of sending Najib Khan to Suja, because even Jahan Khan could not do the job. Suja needed further convincing."
What Abdali Told Najib:
"Suja-ud-Daula's influence and capability are great. He is as good as Wazir of Hindustan."
The Stakes:
- He has good military power
- If he joins Marathas → drastically negative impact on us
Why Najib Specifically:
- Not just any diplomat or professional lawyer
- Personal confidant of Abdali
- Everyone knew: Najib Khan is as good as Abdali
Their Relationship:
"Abdali and Najib Khan's relationship was solid. Not only that, they were like one. Najib Khan totally trusted and looked at Abdali as his savior."
Why Abdali Didn't Go Himself:
- Considered himself on par with emperor
- Suja was small-time personality
- If Abdali goes → lowering his value
- "Not some small fish who he's stooping down to beg favor"
- Must send important emissary instead
- Najib is not ordinary emissary - one-time deal
- Important personality, everybody knows works for Abdali
The Bad Blood: Safdar Jung vs Abdali
The History:
"In few years back, Safdar Jung had big role to play in defeating Abdali. So there was bad blood."
The Challenge:
"Najib Khan has to do lot of hard work to change Suja's mind because he was predisposed to not joining Abdali because of prior background of father fighting Abdali. There was bad blood and Abdali was defeated in that thing."
The Mental Block:
"To reverse that mental block that Suja had, Najib Khan has to work very hard to change that mentality."
The Delicate Negotiations
Abdali's Understanding:
"These negotiations are so delicate. It cannot be dealt with by sending professional lawyers or diplomats, messengers or via letter."
Why In-Person Mattered:
- Mental block can't be removed by letter
- Can't send professional diplomats
- Has to be one-on-one heart-to-heart conversation in person
- Or else no deal
- Somebody of important stature
- Otherwise Suja won't move from mental position "I don't trust this guy"
Why This Was Critical:
"That's why it was critical that Najib Khan along with some people goes to visit Suja-ud-Daula."
Bhau Crosses Chambar (Month of June 1760)
The Event:
"In month of June 1760, Bhau had crossed Chambar river."
The Problem:
- Chambar is small-time river
- "River by any stretch of imagination"
- Took him about a month to cross
The Implications:
"If he takes month to cross Chambar, how long will it take to cross Yamuna? Yamuna is huge river."
The Reality:
"Marathas did not master technique of crossing rivers."
The Contrast:
- Abdali crossed many rivers from Afghanistan to Doab
- With elephants, camels, horses, donkeys, cannons, people
- Thousands and thousands
- "How do you take elephant across river? That's special case, tough one, camel even."
- Somehow found a way out
- But Marathas did not
The Monsoon Problem
The Timing:
"By mid or end of June, he crossed Chambar finally. Monsoon had begun."
Why This Mattered:
- Early June: monsoon begins
- Whole earth is soggy
- Not meant for armies to be on march
- All rivers have flooded
The Historical Pattern:
"Nobody did that in India ever because generally armies went to battle probably by November."
The Situation:
- Very difficult
- Soggy earth
- Animals can't walk properly
- Bullock carts - how do you drive when earth is soggy?
- Huge army: 80,000+ people
- Plus 50-60,000 civilians
- Like big village moving from one place to another
Bhau Hadn't Met Holkar Yet
The Problem:
- Malhar Rao Holkar stationed on outskirts of Delhi
- Got "zapped" by Abdali's forces
- Didn't want to be in thick of things
- Staying a little bit outside main areas
What Bhau Missed:
"Had he met with Holkar, he would be even more in know of how things were in north."
Why:
- Holkar had met Abdali's forces in battlefield
- Not Abdali personally, but Afghan army units
- Could tell things to Bhau
- But they hadn't met due to physical distance
The Distance:
- Chambar crossing means Bhau still 400-500 kilometers away
Bhau's Plan: Get to Doab
The Strategy:
"Bhau wanted to get into Doab. That means he has to cross Yamuna. There is no other way."
Why Itawa:
- Only Maratha-held city in Doab
- If he goes to Itawa, wants to meet Suja
- His plan was to do battle in Doab itself
The Urgency:
"Immediately without waiting several months. Because that's why they were going to north. There was no other purpose but to fight this battle."
The Follow-Up:
- Then go to Delhi
- Settle issues in Delhi
- Reinstall previous blinded personality as emperor
- Make Suja-ud-Daula new wazir
After Chambar Crossing
What Bhau Did:
- Crossed Chambar (north of it now)
- Chambar goes east-west
- Now on other side
- Camped out
- Waited for commanders to join him
- To decide how to go forward
- What strategies to apply
Key Figures
| Name | Role |
|---|---|
| Suja-ud-Daula | Confused, tilting both ways |
| Sadrunisa Begum | His mother, favored Marathas |
| Muhammad Shah's widow | Childhood friend of Sadrunisa, sent by Abdali |
| Najib Khan | Abdali's personal emissary, "as good as Abdali" |
| Jahan Khan | Abdali's commander, couldn't convince Suja alone |
| Govindapant Bundele | Sent to Sadrunisa, got no assurances |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | On Delhi outskirts, hadn't met Bhau yet |
Major Themes
1. The Diplomatic Arms Race
Each side escalating who they send. Started with letters, messengers, then important commanders, finally Najib Khan (Abdali's right hand).
2. The Power of Personal Relationships
Childhood friend > professional diplomat. Heart-to-heart > letter writing. Personal touch matters.
3. The River Crossing Disaster
One month for tiny Chambar. Impossible for huge Yamuna. Maratha fatal weakness exposed.
4. The Bad Blood Factor
Safdar Jung defeated Abdali in past. Creates mental block for Suja. Hard to overcome.
5. The Timing Catastrophe
Monsoon makes everything worse. Soggy earth, flooded rivers, can't move properly. "Nobody did that in India ever."
6. The Male Power Structure
Sadrunisa favors Marathas but can't force decision. Male-dominated system limits her influence.
Timeline
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Pre-1760 | Safdar Jung defeated Abdali - bad blood created |
| June 1760 | Bhau crosses Chambar (takes ONE MONTH) |
| June 1760 | Monsoon begins - everything soggy |
| June 1760 | Govindapant meets Sadrunisa - gets no assurances |
| June 1760 | Abdali sends Muhammad Shah's widow |
| June 1760 | Jahan Khan can't convince Suja |
| June 1760 | Najib Khan sent as final diplomatic weapon |
Geographic Context
- Chambar River: Small river, took month to cross
- Yamuna River: Huge river, need to cross for Doab
- Itawa: Only Maratha city in Doab
- Doab: Target - where battle should happen
- Delhi Outskirts: Where Holkar stationed
Where we left off: Diplomatic escalation at fever pitch. Bhau sent Govindapant to Sadrunisa (got nothing). Abdali sent childhood friend (worked better). Then Jahan Khan. Still not enough. Finally Abdali sends Najib Khan - his personal confidant, "as good as Abdali himself" - for heart-to-heart talk with Suja. Meanwhile Bhau struggling with rivers: took MONTH to cross tiny Chambar. Monsoon making everything worse. Still 400-500km away. Hadn't even met Holkar yet. And Yamuna crossing looming - the big one. Bad blood between Safdar Jung and Abdali making Suja suspicious. But Najib Khan coming for ultimate diplomatic push.
The diplomatic war intensifies while Bhau crawls north through monsoon floods. One month for Chambar. Yamuna still ahead. Abdali's final weapon: Najib Khan, the personal emissary who is "like one" with Abdali. Heart-to-heart diplomacy vs distant promises. Childhood friends vs mother's advice. Proximity vs logic. Geography vs history. And somewhere in all this, Suja must decide: Afghan vs Indian? Or Hindu vs Muslim?
Najib Khan's "Islam in Danger" Argument (June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Geographic Situation
June 1760:
- Bhau crossed Chambar River
- Already monsoon season had begun
- Rivers were flooded
The Problem:
- Chambar is relatively small river
- Goes east-west, meets Narmada
- Even small river was flooded
- Armies traditionally don't fight during monsoon
Why Bhau Couldn't Wait:
- No option to postpone
- Had to get there now
- Action was immediate
- Couldn't relax or delay
Bhau's Plan
The Strategy:
- Cross Yamuna River
- Get into the Doab (between Ganga and Yamuna)
- Reach town of Etawa
- Etawa was Maratha stronghold in Doab
- Only one they controlled
- That's where battle would likely happen
The Challenge:
"But nature has to cooperate."
Bhau Waits for Commanders
Why He Stopped:
- Camped on northern banks of Chambal
- Waiting for commanders to join him
- Started with big army from Patadur
- But other Maratha armies supposed to join along the way
Who He's Waiting For:
- Important commanders with knowledge of the area
- People who fought with Abdali's armies before
- Would understand situation better
- Would add to his strength
Bhau's Disadvantage:
- Spent most career in the south (the Dakan)
- Relatively unaware of northern politics
- Knew generally who was who
- But hadn't dealt with these players for any length of time
- Malharrao Holkar still hadn't joined him
- Malharrao was still near Delhi outskirts
Why Malharrao Was Important:
- Had fought with Abdali's army
- Could give feedback on their tactics
- Knew politics of north extremely well
- Had been based there
- His knowledge was crucial
Najib Khan Arrives at Kanauj
The Race:
- While Bhau was crossing Chambal
- Najib Khan had arrived in town of Kanauj
- That's where Suja-ud-Daula had camped
Bhau's Problem:
"Bahu was running behind because already Suja Udola was being met by Najeeb Khan. And he's still hundreds of miles away, presumably."
Najib Khan's Offer to Suja
What Abdali Promised (in writing):
- Wazir position for Suja-ud-Daula
- Bring Shah Alam II back to throne as reigning Mughal monarch
Who Was Brought:
"Suja Udola was brought by Abdali with the permission of the Prime Minister and Shah Alam II to Delhi."
Why Suja Would Care:
- Shah Alam II might be more favorable
- More cooperative with Suja's goals
- More "kinder, gentler" to him
- Current guy on Mughal throne was not preferred
- Wanted Shah Alam II instead
Suja's Response: Unimpressed
What Suja Did:
"Suja was not affected by any of this. On the contrary, he showed the letter of the brother to Nazim."
Suja's Argument:
- So what?
- Bahu also promising exact same thing
- What's new?
- Showed Najib Khan Bahu's letter
- Why would I go with you?
The Reality:
- Both sides fighting for him
- Both promising whatever he wanted
- Suja was very important
- Both knew it
Najib Khan's Devastating Counter-Argument
The Accusation
Najib Khan's Response:
"This is all fake promises. It has no fracture. Their real intention of the Marathas is to make sure they keep in control the Muslims of the North."
The Historical Context
The Reality:
- Northern India effectively in control of Muslim power for long time
- Muslims were the ruling class
- Vested interest in maintaining this
- 400-500 years of Islamic control
Najib's Framing:
"This is not the fight between Afghans and non-Afghans, not between Afghans and indigenous powers within India. This is about Muslims versus non-Muslims."
The Core Argument
What Najib Said:
- This is about preserving Islamic control of Northern India
- Been there for 400-500 years
- Marathas want to destroy Muslim influence
- Their real objective: root out Islam from Northern India
- What they're promising is "just pure theatre"
- Has no content, no reality
The Challenge:
"If you do side with Sadashiv Rao Baud, then you are helping to root out Islam from Northern India. And then you will be blamed for that."
Suja's Previous Thinking vs. New Frame
What Suja Thought Before:
- "I'm a Shia"
- "This guy (Abdali) is Sunni"
- "My father and Abdali had fights"
- "This guy is outsider"
- "How do I trust him?"
Najib's Reframe:
"Islam khatre me hai" (Islam is in danger)
The New Frame:
- This isn't about Shia vs Sunni
- This isn't about trusting outsiders
- This is about Muslims being evicted
- Muslims have been in power 4-5-6 hundred years
- Marathas (upstarts) want to completely root out Muslim power
- Do you want to be part of that?
Why This Argument Worked
The Evidence Was Real
Maratha Expansion:
- Marathas were making inroads in northern India
- Holkar and Shinde armies positioned there
- Mughal Empire had steadily weakened
Who Weakened the Mughals:
- Partly Afghans and Iranians
- Nadir Shah (1739)
- Abdali himself
- Been looting and raiding Delhi
- Raiding prosperous areas
- Partly Marathas
- Outside powers equally important in routing out Mughals
The Decline:
- Aurangzeb's time: everyone afraid of Mughal armies
- They controlled every facet of life
- Now: with another Maratha leader or two, might just get rid of Mughals entirely
- Take over completely
The Cultural Threat
Islam Itself Being Rooted Out:
- Not just about Mughal Empire (that was already gone)
- Mughal Emperor's power only felt in Delhi
- Near Red Fort where he lived
- Outside Delhi: nobody cared about him
- Couldn't exercise power
- Not feared anymore
The Deeper Fear:
- Not allowed to practice religion
- Muslim clergy declining
- Muslim schools declining
- Islamic culture on decline overall
The Funding Problem
Why It Mattered:
- Mughal Emperor traditionally provided funds to:
- Islamic schools
- Mosques (building)
- Islamic priests (salaries)
- Without money: their numbers dwindle
- Can't provide protection either
- Can be attacked by Holkar, Shinde, whoever
The Cow Slaughter Example
The Raghunath Rao Incident
What Happened:
- When Raghunath Rao was there
- Right in front of his camp
- They were slaughtering a cow
- Raghunath Rao tried to stop it
Najib's Interpretation:
"We have our God-given right to slaughter cows. Who are you to tell us not to?"
The Implication:
- If Raghunath Rao or Maratha power exercises control
- Will say "we are Hindus, cannot allow cow slaughter"
- To Najib Khan: "Islam is in danger"
- "This is our birthright to slaughter cow on the street"
- Why would we be told not to?
The Logic:
"That is the way our religion, our way of life is in danger."
Their Mindset:
- Thought it was their birthright to do whatever they wanted
- So far had been doing it
- Now being told not to
- Therefore: Islam in danger
Why Suja Couldn't Deny It
The Truth:
"That statement Suja could not deny because it was true."
What He'd Seen:
- Mughal Empire itself weakening
- Previous decades: couldn't reinforce Muslim clergy
- Couldn't reinforce Muslim schools
- General Islamic culture in decline
- Not just military power (definitely had declined)
- But along with that: Muslim cultural infrastructure crumbling
Suja's Position:
- Could not say "you are talking rubbish"
- Had seen it himself
- That was generally what was happening anyway
The Stakes
What This Meant:
- Najib appealing to Suja-ud-Daula as fellow Muslim
- Using religious identity over political interests
- Suja had to decide:
- Muslim side?
- Hindu side?
- Or stay neutral?
The Framing Success:
- Changed from political calculation
- To religious/civilizational conflict
- From "who offers better deal"
- To "which civilization will you defend"
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Crossing Chambar, waiting for commanders |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Being courted by both sides |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander, Abdali's agent | Making "Islam in danger" argument |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Promising wazir position to Suja |
| Shah Alam II | Deposed Mughal emperor | Both sides promising to restore him |
| Malharrao Holkar | Maratha commander | Still near Delhi, hasn't joined Bhau yet |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha leader | Referenced in cow slaughter incident |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 1760 | Bhau crosses Chambar River (takes one month!) |
| June 1760 | Monsoon season begins, rivers flooding |
| June 1760 | Najib Khan arrives at Kanauj to meet Suja |
| June 1760 | Bhau camped on northern banks of Chambal, waiting |
| June 1760 | "Islam khatre me hai" argument deployed |
Geographic Details
Chambar River:
- Goes east-west
- Meets Narmada
- Narmada goes to Gujarat
- Then to Arabian Ocean
- Even small river was flooded in monsoon
The Doab:
- Area between Ganga and Yamuna
- Where Abdali was positioned
- Where battle would likely happen
Etawa:
- Town in the Doab
- Maratha stronghold
- Only one they controlled
- Bhau's destination
Kanauj:
- Town where Suja-ud-Daula camped
- Where Najib Khan met him
- Hundreds of miles from Bhau's position
Major Themes
1. The Race Against Time
Bhau's Disadvantage:
- Stuck crossing flooded rivers
- Waiting for commanders
- Hundreds of miles away
- While Najib already there with Suja
The Implication:
- Proximity matters
- Being there in person > letters
- Najib had the advantage
2. The Power of Reframing
Political Frame (didn't work):
- Who offers better deal?
- Who can deliver promises?
- Suja: both promising same thing, so what?
Religious Frame (worked):
- Islam itself in danger
- 500 years of Muslim rule ending
- Civilizational stakes
- Can't deny the evidence
3. The Shia-Sunni Divide (Overcome)
Suja's Original Objection:
- I'm Shia, Abdali's Sunni
- Can't trust him
- My father fought him
Najib's Answer:
- Not about Shia vs Sunni
- About Muslim vs non-Muslim
- About Islam's survival
- Bigger than sectarian differences
4. The Historical Reality
Why Argument Worked:
- Based on observable facts
- Mughal power was declining
- Muslim institutions were weakening
- Maratha power was expanding
- Cultural changes were happening
The Evidence:
- Mughal Emperor powerless outside Delhi
- Muslim schools/clergy declining
- No funding for Islamic institutions
- Marathas restricting practices (cow slaughter)
5. The Short-Sighted Weakening
Who Weakened Mughals:
- Abdali himself (raids, looting)
- Nadir Shah (1739 devastation)
- Other Afghans and Iranians
- Also Marathas
- Irony: Abdali now claiming to defend what he helped destroy
The Political Calculation:
- Abdali partly responsible for Mughal weakness
- Now using that weakness as reason for Suja to join him
- Classic political manipulation
6. The Birthright Mentality
The Cow Slaughter Issue:
- Not just about practice
- About who has right to decide
- Muslims: "God-given right"
- Marathas: "We're Hindu, no cows"
- Really about: who rules?
The Deeper Question:
- If Marathas can stop cow slaughter
- What else can they control?
- Way of life itself at stake
- Not just political power = cultural dominance
7. Bhau's Southern Background (Weakness)
The Problem:
- Spent career in the south (Dakan)
- Didn't know northern politics
- Didn't know these players
- Needed Malharrao (who wasn't there yet)
The Disadvantage:
- Fighting on unfamiliar terrain
- Against someone (Najib) who knew everyone
- Who understood local dynamics
- Who could deploy local arguments
8. The Timing of Nature
Monsoon Season:
- Armies don't traditionally fight then
- Soil soggy
- Rivers block movement
- Can't easily cross
- Not good time for war
But Bhau Had No Choice:
- Had to move now
- Couldn't wait for better weather
- Action was urgent
- "The action was now"
The Fighting Season:
- Typically started after monsoon
- Late October or mid-October
- After Sankrant festival
- But Bhau couldn't wait that long
Critical Insights
The "Islam in Danger" Formula
Why It's Powerful:
- Appeals to identity over interests
- Makes conflict existential
- Not about money or power
- About survival itself
- Can't be negotiated away
How Najib Deployed It:
- Started with political promises (didn't work)
- Shifted to religious frame
- Pointed to real evidence
- Made it about civilization
- Put burden on Suja: "Which side?"
Why Suja Couldn't Refute:
- The evidence was real
- He'd seen the decline
- Couldn't call it rubbish
- Had to take it seriously
The Propaganda Technique
Najib's Method:
- Mix of truth and exaggeration
- Real decline (true)
-
- Maratha intentions (assumed)
-
- Religious framing (strategic)
- = Powerful argument
The Omissions:
- Doesn't mention Abdali's own role in weakening Mughals
- Doesn't mention his raids and looting
- Doesn't mention Afghan outsider status
- Just frames as defender of Islam
The Cultural Control Question
What Was Really at Stake:
- Not just military power
- Not just political control
- But cultural dominance
- Who decides:
- What practices are allowed?
- What gets funded?
- Who gets protected?
- What religion dominates public space?
The Schools and Clergy:
- Needed imperial funding
- Without it: decline inevitable
- This was already happening
- Najib just made it explicit
The Proximity Advantage
Why Najib Won This Round:
- Right there with Suja
- Could make argument in person
- Could gauge reactions
- Could adjust approach
- Bhau: hundreds of miles away
- His letters: just paper
The 800 Pound Gorilla:
- Abdali's army nearby
- Physical presence matters
- Hard to say no to someone right there
- Especially with army backing him
Bhau's Structural Disadvantages
Geographic:
- Stuck crossing rivers
- Monsoon flooding
- Far from action
- Can't get there fast enough
Informational:
- Doesn't know northern politics
- Waiting for commanders who do
- Malharrao still not there
- Fighting blind essentially
Temporal:
- Najib got there first
- Already making his case
- Bhau playing catch-up
- Time working against him
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Najib made his argument
- Suja heard it
- Can't deny the evidence
- But also has Bhau's promises
- Both offering same political deal
- But Najib offering civilizational frame
The Questions:
- Will Suja join Abdali?
- Stay neutral?
- Join Marathas despite "Islam in danger"?
- Can Bhau counter this argument?
- Will Malharrao arrive in time?
- How long to cross Yamuna when they get there?
The Stakes:
- If Suja joins Abdali: becomes Hindu vs Muslim
- If stays neutral or joins Marathas: remains Afghan vs Indian
- The framing itself matters as much as the outcome
June 1760: While Bhau struggles to cross a flooded Chambar River during monsoon season, hundreds of miles away Najib Khan sits with Suja-ud-Daula and deploys the nuclear argument: "Islam khatre me hai" — Islam is in danger. It's not about Shia vs Sunni. It's not about trusting Afghans. It's about 500 years of Muslim rule ending. It's about Marathas controlling whether you can slaughter a cow on your own street. It's about schools closing, clergy disappearing, culture dying. And Suja can't say he's wrong, because he's seen it happening. The evidence is everywhere. Mughal power gone. Muslim institutions crumbling. Maratha influence rising. Both sides promise the same political deal. But only one side offers to save your civilization. And that side is right there, 100km away with an army, while the other side is stuck crossing a flooded river in the rain, waiting for commanders who haven't arrived yet. The race isn't even close.
Suja Joins Abdali: The Dramatic Persuasion (July 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Najib Khan's Opening Argument
The Accusation:
"So he basically said this is pure deceit, this letter of Sadashiro Bhau to Mr. Sujaut Dola. And their real plan, Maratha plan, is to control the entire India and end the rule of Islamic rule in India."
The Framing:
- Not between Afghans and rest of India
- Not between Afghans and indigenous powers
- About protecting Muslims in India
- Choosing either Muslim side or Kafir side
The Challenge:
"So you have to choose whichever you want."
- Very black and white to Najib
- No middle ground
- No neutrality possible (in his view)
Suja's Initial Response: Neutrality
The Reality Check:
"Even after all this commentary, Suja decided to remain neutral."
Why Suja Couldn't Deny:
"Suja could not say that Islam is not in danger."
- The argument had merit
- Evidence was real
- But still chose neutrality initially
Suja's Concerns About Abdali
The Historical Grudge:
- Suja thought Abdali will take revenge for defeat at Manipur
- His father had fought that battle
- Defeated Abdali
The Sectarian Divide:
- Their sects were different
- Suja: Shia
- Abdali: Sunni
- He still had that difference in mind
The Conclusion:
"So even though he really shared his heartfelt feelings and emotions by Najib, it was of limited significance."
Najib Khan's DRAMATIC Escalation
The Personal Guarantee
What Najib Said About Abdali:
"What is the interest that Suja has in Abdali's army? So Shah means he's referring to Abdali."
The Threat Protection:
"If Abdali were to look at you in a hostile manner, I will take out his eyes. And if I didn't do that, I would not basically have my father's name attached to me. I would be totally destroyed. I will renounce my family and everything."
The Message:
- Don't be worried about bad blood
- Between Abdali and you
- I personally guarantee your safety
- With my own life and honor
The Ultimate Pressure
The Dagger Offer:
"If somebody else were to have come from Abdali as a messenger, it would have been okay if you didn't agree. But now that I have come, here is my dagger."
The Gesture:
- Gives Suja his dagger
- Says: "Here is my neck"
- "You can simply behead me"
- "I can't return unsuccessfully"
The Written Promise:
"If you were to slit my throat, I would give you in writing that you are not responsible for killing me."
The Implication:
- Going all out to convince Suja
- Putting his life on the line
- Can't go back to Abdali empty-handed
- Ultimate pressure tactic
The Deciding Factor: Fear of Being Belittled
The Real Reason Suja Joined
What Changed His Mind:
"Mr. Suja Uddula became restless."
The Deliberation:
- He deliberated with advisors for few days
- Finally, July 1760
- Decided to join side of Abdali
The Snide Remarks Problem
The Explanation:
"So he finally came to the conclusion that instead of listening to Abdali's when somebody kind of is talking about you in a very negative manner, instead of listening to these kind of very bad commentary about himself, he said, it's better to fight with Marathas than listening to Abdali's slight comments."
What Are "Slight Comments":
- Snide remarks
- Targeting someone
- But not said in direct way
- Example: "Some people always delayed in doing things so they cannot be trusted"
- Indirect insult
Suja's Fear:
- If he remained neutral
- Abdali would comment in way that makes him look weak
- Someone who doesn't stand up for Muslims
- Constant belittling
- Indirect accusations
The Choice:
"Instead of putting up with that, it's better to fight with Marathas."
The Psychology:
"So he didn't want to be morally inferior to Abdali. Or belittled."
Kashi Raj Pandit's Analysis
Who He Was:
- Employed by Suja-ud-Daula
- Had commentary on Suja's decision
His Assessment
The Conclusion:
"To join Maratha alliance is very risky. And not the right thing to do."
The Risks:
- Risky business to go on that side
- Wrong decision
The Reasoning
The Arrogance Problem:
"It will be arrogant to reject the hand of friendship extended by Abdali by sending such a very high, high standing person like Najib Khan be taken as arrogance."
The Rohilla Problem:
- Abdali is one thing
- But the Rohillas also will take it as insult
- Najib Khan was a Rohilla
- Other Rohilla warriors and people
- They also would take it as insult
The Asymmetry:
- Najib Khan was high standing officer sent by Abdali
- Marathas did not have high powered person visiting him
- Lopsided
- One side sent top emissary
- Other side: nothing comparable
The Danger Either Way
The Risk:
"But if anybody wins one of the parties, that danger was there because if Abdali wins, the Marathas will take revenge one day or the other and vice versa."
The Calculation:
- Has to be careful even in joining Abdali
- Whichever side loses
- Will want revenge later
- No safe choice
But:
"He decided to listen to Najib Khan and he made plans to meet with Abdali."
Kashi Raj Pandit: The Hindu Advisor
The Note:
- Kashi Raj Pandit was likely Hindu
- But had some role in Suja's fold
- Employed by Muslim ruler
- Shows diversity of advisors
The Meeting with Abdali
The Journey
What Suja Did:
- Left behind most of his army back in kingdom
- For defense in case something goes wrong
- But took 4,000 military soldiers
- Came into Abdali's tent
The Location:
- Anupshar
- 100 kilometers away from where he was
The Welcome
Who Welcomed Him:
- Shah Wali Khan welcomed him
- Shah Wali Khan was Wazir of Afghanistan
The Announcement:
- Abdali announced that Mr. Suja-ud-Daula is Wazir of the Mughal Empire
- As promised
- Didn't even worry about anybody else
The Timing:
- Declaring it ahead of time
- Assuming they would win
- Before even conquering Delhi
Suja's Response: This Is Theatre
The Objection
What Suja Said:
"There is nobody occupying the seat of power in Delhi. So don't make me ashamed by announcing me Wazir ahead of time because there is no emperor in Delhi."
The Implication:
- Or: no legitimate emperor
- Someone is sitting there
- But Suja doesn't recognize him
Suja's Point:
"This announcement has no meaning, sir."
The Reality:
"So Abdali is playing a theatre in front of him."
Suja's Counter-Proposal
What He Said:
"In fact Abdali should be sitting on the throne of Delhi, then he will accept the Wazir position."
The Parallel:
- Which is what Suraj Mal Jat also had said
- "You must sit on the throne in Delhi"
- Most people saying same thing
The Muharram Crisis: One Month Later
The Real Test
The Timing:
"After a month, that was the real test of Abdali's promise."
What Is Muharram?
The Background:
- Commemoration of sufferings of Prophet Muhammad's relatives
- His grandchildren
- After Muhammad died
- There was question of succession
- Who represents worldwide Muslims?
The Succession Crisis:
- One group wanted Muhammad's family members to be leaders
- Another group said: "We are the leaders"
- Family members were captured
- In Syria (or somewhere)
- By people in charge of Muslim throne
- They were subjected to lot of suffering
- Finally killed
The Commemoration:
- That day and suffering is commemorated in Shia world
- They don't like how these people suffered
- How they were killed in brutal manner
- So they commemorate
The Ritual
What Happens:
- They relive that suffering
- Shia young people: bare chested
- Nothing on body
- Take different knives
- Put it on their body everywhere
- Slash themselves repeatedly
- Procession goes through street
- Bodies full of blood
- Looks like they're torturing themselves
- Thousands of young men like that
The Nature:
"So that is the celebration of the suffering."
The Sectarian Divide
Why This Matters:
- This is not a Sunni thing
- Sunnis don't believe in it
- Sunnis represent the other group of leaders
- Who came after Muhammad's death
- Who didn't believe in family members being leaders
The Split:
- One sect: offsprings of Muhammad should be leaders
- Other sect: "We are the ones who are leaders"
- Battle happened between two groups
- Forever separated
- This is why Shia vs Sunni exists
The 200 Troublemakers Incident
What Happened
The Problem:
"Some people started some funny business in Shuja's tent."
Who:
- 200 troublemakers from Abdali soldiers
- Giving trouble to Shia soldiers of Suja-ud-Daula
- During Muharram celebration
Abdali's Response
The Punishment:
- Suja asked them to be captured
- Said: "I'm going to push through a kind of stick through your nose"
- Each one of the 200 people
- As punishment for creating trouble
Why Abdali Allowed This:
"Because Abdali would have none of this. He wanted Shuja on his side, no matter what."
The Message:
- Sending message to his troops
- Don't even think about upsetting this guy
- Normally wouldn't do it
- But this time he was angry
The Cultural Incompatibility Problem
The Hindu Soldiers Issue
The Situation:
"So that was a trouble for Abdali. Because, you know, I mean, these are, first of all, Hindu soldiers in Shuja's army."
What They Did:
- Sometimes used to be bare minimum clothes
- Used to go around like that
- Naga soldiers (a specific group)
The Cultural Difference:
- Creates friction with Abdali's army
- Cultural difference
- They despise each other
- Another thing to get mad about
The Compromise
What Happened:
"He took exception to these naked Nag soldiers in Shuja's army. And that was implemented."
The Meaning:
- Suja immediately told his Naga troops
- You have to put some clothes on
- So Afghan troops are not offended
Suja's Willingness:
- Willing to compromise
- Accommodate Afghan sensibilities
- To keep alliance together
The Wobbly Unity
The Result:
"Because Mr. Shuja Udhola took steps to stop this, the kind of really wobbly unity between Shuja Udhola and Abdali somehow stayed put. It didn't collapse."
What It Shows:
- They managed to get along
- But barely
- Unity was wobbly
- Constant friction
- Required active management
Suja Feels Trapped
Can't Leave Abdali's Camp
The Control:
"Abdali had kept good control over his troops. But Shuja Udhola thought it was unsafe to get out of Abdali's tent city."
The Situation:
- After he came to meet Abdali
- Stayed put in that campus
- Had 4,000 troops
- Didn't go anywhere else
- Just staying in same area
Why:
- Even though there were disturbances
- Two armies had some struggles
- Thought it was risky to quit that campus
- Go somewhere else
The Reason:
"Because then Abdali would say, what is happening with this guy? Why is he going away? He wants him within his eyesight."
Can't Go Back
The Other Reason:
"One another reason he didn't want to go back is because he had come voluntarily and he didn't want to show that he is going back on his word."
The Trap:
- Now he was stuck
- What he saw: culture incompatible
- Shia troops vs Afghan troops
- Naga troops vs Afghan troops
- Deficit of trust
- But now in too deep
- Cannot go anywhere
Suja's Hope: Peace Without War
The Best Outcome
What He Believed:
"He basically came around to believe that if this whole issue can be resolved without any warfare but by some kind of a truce or some kind of exchange of ideas and non-violently if this issue can be resolved between Marathas and Afghans, then that will be the best outcome for him."
Why:
- He was not on the Afghan side at all
- Didn't want to bet his little empire/kingdom on their victory
- He was on neither side
- Didn't want to take any side
- But was forced to take Abdali's side
The Reasoning:
- Had no other way
- Had to go there
- Otherwise would fare very badly
- Both options were bad
- Chose less bad option
The Realization
After Several Weeks:
- In that campus
- Realized: "This is looking bad"
- Now trying to see how he can survive this
The Only Good Outcome:
- No war happens between two sides
- Peace treaty
- Resolve differences non-violently
- Everybody goes home
- That's the only way he's feeling better
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Suja-ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Joined Abdali July 1760 (reluctantly) |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Made dramatic persuasion with dagger offer |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Declared Suja as Wazir, protected him from his own troops |
| Shah Wali Khan | Abdali's Wazir | Welcomed Suja to camp |
| Kashi Raj Pandit | Suja's advisor | Hindu, analyzed the decision |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | His letter dismissed as "pure deceit" |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Before July 1760 | Najib Khan makes "Islam in danger" argument |
| Before July 1760 | Suja initially chooses neutrality |
| July 1760 | Najib makes dramatic dagger offer |
| July 1760 | Suja deliberates with advisors |
| July 1760 | Suja decides to join Abdali |
| July 1760 | Suja travels 100km to Anupshar |
| July 1760 | Abdali declares him Wazir (ahead of time) |
| August 1760 | One month later: Muharram crisis |
| August 1760 | 200 troublemakers threatened with punishment |
| August 1760 | Naga soldiers ordered to wear clothes |
| Ongoing | Suja feels trapped, hopes for peace |
Geographic Context
Suja's Kingdom:
- Awadh region
- Capital: Lucknow
Anupshar:
- Where Abdali's camp was
- 100 kilometers from Suja's location
- Where Suja went with 4,000 troops
Delhi:
- Still had someone sitting on throne
- But Suja didn't recognize as legitimate
- Both sides planning to control
Major Themes
1. The Dagger Diplomacy
Najib's Escalation:
- Started with arguments (didn't work)
- Escalated to personal guarantee
- Finally: dagger offer
- "Here's my neck, behead me"
- "I can't return unsuccessfully"
The Pressure:
- Not just persuasion
- Coercion through guilt
- Put Suja in impossible position
- How can you refuse when someone offers their life?
The Message:
- This is that important
- I'm putting everything on line
- You must say yes
- No middle ground
2. The Belittlement Fear
The Real Motivation:
"Instead of putting up with that, it's better to fight with Marathas."
What This Shows:
- Not convinced by "Islam in danger" alone
- Not won over by promises
- Fear of being mocked tipped scales
- Indirect insults
- Snide remarks about not being man enough
- About not defending Muslims
The Psychology:
- Pride
- Honor
- Public perception
- Can't be seen as weak
- Can't be belittled by Abdali
3. The Theatre of Power
Abdali's Tactics:
- Declares Suja Wazir immediately
- Before even winning
- "Playing theatre"
- Shows others: I keep my promises
- Propaganda value
Suja's Response:
- Calls it meaningless
- "No emperor in Delhi"
- Sees through it
- But can't refuse
4. The Sectarian Tinderbox
The Muharram Crisis:
- Shia celebration
- Sunnis offended
- 200 troublemakers
- Nearly breaks alliance
Why It Matters:
- Shows how fragile unity is
- Built on shaky foundation
- Sectarian divide real
- Can explode any moment
Abdali's Threat:
- Stick through nose
- All 200 people
- Extreme measure
- Shows desperation to keep Suja
5. The Cultural Incompatibility
The Issues:
- Shia vs Sunni rituals
- Naga soldiers (barely clothed)
- Afghan sensibilities offended
- Constant friction
- Despise each other
The Compromise:
- Naga soldiers must wear clothes
- Suja willing to accommodate
- But shows underlying tension
- "Wobbly unity"
6. The Trapped Ally
Suja's Situation:
- Came voluntarily
- But can't leave
- Under Abdali's watchful eye
- "Wants him within his eyesight"
- Stuck in camp
- Can't go back (would show weakness)
The Realization:
- Made mistake
- Both options bad
- Chose less bad
- Now realizes even this is bad
- No way out
7. The Peace Fantasy
Suja's Hope:
- Non-violent resolution
- Peace treaty
- Everybody goes home
- No war
The Reality:
- Completely unrealistic
- Both sides committed
- Too much at stake
- Can't back down now
- But Suja desperately hoping
The Desperation:
- Only good outcome for him
- Knows war means disaster
- Whichever side loses = his ruin
- Winner might not protect him later
- Lose-lose
8. The Hindu Advisor
Kashi Raj Pandit:
- Hindu
- Advising Muslim ruler
- On whether to join Muslim coalition
- Against Hindu power
What It Shows:
- Not purely religious
- Political calculations
- Advisors diverse
- Religion not only factor
His Analysis:
- Coldly political
- Weighing risks
- Considering insults
- Practical, not ideological
9. The Asymmetric Courtship
What Najib Pointed Out:
- Abdali sent Najib Khan (high-ranking)
- Marathas sent... nothing comparable
- Lopsided attention
- Shows who wants you more
The Message:
- Abdali values you
- Marathas don't
- Clear difference in effort
- Should matter in decision
10. The Promise Test
Abdali's Punishments:
- 200 troublemakers threatened
- Protecting Suja from own troops
- Showing: I keep my promises
- You're safe with me
The Message:
- When I guarantee safety
- I mean it
- Will turn on my own people
- To protect you
But:
- Also shows how much he needs Suja
- Desperate to keep him
- Willing to go to extremes
- Suja sees this too
Critical Insights
The Dagger as Ultimate Pressure
What Najib Did:
- Not just persuasion
- Emotional blackmail
- Put his life on line
- Made it personal
- "If you refuse, you kill me"
Why It Worked:
- Suja couldn't just say no
- Would be rejecting sacred bond
- Would be killing messenger
- Makes him guilty
- No graceful way out
The Genius:
- Turned political calculation
- Into personal obligation
- From "what's best for me"
- To "can't let this man die"
The Snide Remarks Calculation
The Fear:
- Not about actual danger
- About reputation damage
- Abdali making indirect comments
- About cowardice
- About not defending Muslims
- Constant belittlement
Why This Tipped It:
- Could handle threats
- Could handle risks
- Couldn't handle mockery
- Pride > safety
- Honor > calculation
The Insight:
- Najib understood this
- Used "Islam in danger" to set up
- Then pushed pride button
- Perfect two-punch
The Theatre That Backfires
Abdali's Mistake:
- Declares Suja Wazir immediately
- Thinks it shows trust
- Thinks it's impressive
Suja's Reaction:
- Sees through it
- "This is meaningless"
- "No emperor to be wazir of"
- Doesn't fall for it
What It Shows:
- Suja is shrewd
- Not easily fooled
- Sees propaganda for what it is
- But trapped anyway
The Muharram Time Bomb
Why This Crisis Matters:
- One month into alliance
- Already nearly collapsed
- Over religious ritual
- Shows underlying incompatibility
The Implications:
- This alliance is fragile
- Any moment could break
- Built on necessity, not compatibility
- Abdali knows it
- Had to be extremely harsh
- To keep it together
The Cultural Horror Show
The Naga Soldiers:
- Barely clothed
- Normal for them
- Offensive to Afghans
- Source of constant friction
The Compromise:
- Suja orders them to dress
- Accommodating Afghan sensibilities
- Giving up own culture
- To keep peace
What It Reveals:
- Suja already compromising
- Giving ground
- Losing autonomy
- This is how it starts
The Trapped Ally Psychology
The Progression:
- Come voluntarily (sort of - under pressure)
- Can't leave (Abdali watching)
- Can't go back (would show weakness)
- Realize you're trapped
- Hope for miracle (peace)
The Desperation:
- Only hope: war doesn't happen
- Completely unrealistic
- But clinging to it
- Because all other outcomes = disaster
The Losing Game
Suja's Calculation:
- If Abdali wins: Marathas revenge later
- If Marathas win: Abdali's forces revenge
- If stays neutral: both sides angry
- If joins Marathas: too risky
- If joins Abdali: currently stuck
The Reality:
- No good options
- Every choice has costs
- Chose least bad
- Now suffering consequences
- Hoping for impossibility (peace)
The Wobbly Unity
What "Wobbly" Means:
- Constant crises
- Barely held together
- Required active management
- Could fall apart any time
- Built on weak foundation
The Components:
- Sectarian divide (Shia-Sunni)
- Cultural incompatibility
- Mutual distrust
- Forced alliance
- Neither wants it
- Both need it
The Survival:
- Only survives because
- Abdali desperate to keep Suja
- Willing to punish own troops
- Willing to make extreme threats
- Without that: would collapse
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Suja joined Abdali (July 1760)
- Feeling trapped
- Hoping for peace (won't happen)
- Cultural tensions constant
- Alliance fragile
- But he's stuck
The Questions:
- Will this alliance hold?
- How long can Suja stay trapped?
- Will cultural tensions explode?
- Can he escape if things go bad?
- What happens when war actually starts?
The Stakes:
- Committed now
- Can't back out
- Whichever side loses = his ruin
- Even if his side wins
- Other side wants revenge
- No good outcome
- Just hoping it doesn't come to war
- But it will
July 1760: Najib Khan puts a dagger in Suja's hands and offers his neck. "If you refuse, behead me. I can't return to Abdali empty-handed." After days of deliberation, Suja joins not because he believes "Islam is in danger" - he joins because he can't stand the thought of Abdali making snide remarks about him, indirect insults about not being man enough to defend Muslims, being belittled at every gathering. Pride tips the scales. He travels 100km with 4,000 troops. Abdali declares him Wazir immediately - pure theatre, since there's no real emperor to be wazir of. One month later, during Muharram, 200 Sunni troublemakers harass Suja's Shia soldiers. Abdali threatens to push sticks through all their noses. The message: I'll turn on my own people to protect you. But Suja sees the truth. His bare-chested Naga soldiers offend the Afghans. Constant cultural friction. He can't leave Abdali's camp - too risky. He can't go back - would show weakness. He's trapped. And he's desperately clinging to one fantasy: maybe this can all be resolved peacefully, without war, and everyone can just go home. It won't happen. But it's the only hope he has left.
Surajmal Jat: The Shrewd Survivor (July 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Suja's Continuing Hope for Peace
His Viewpoint:
"If this issue of the friction between Afghans and Marathas, if that can be resolved by some kind of a give and take and no battle, no violence, then that will be the best outcome."
Why:
- Now feeling uneasy even having joined Abdali
- With Marathas also: feels uneasy
- Neither here nor there
- Stuck in middle
- No good position
Surajmal Jat: The Most Shrewd Politician
The Unofficial Title
The Reputation:
"There is a reason why Surajmal Jat was called as the most shrewd politician of his era."
The Clarification:
- Not official title
- But consensus at the time
- Very shrewd
- Well conversed with diplomacy
- How to get things with giving minimal stuff
- That was the general understanding
Why He Survived: Geography and Diplomacy
The Location
Where His Kingdom Was:
- South of Delhi
- But not too far away
- Strategic position
- In the thick of things
The Survival Story
The Challenge:
"During many, many frictions, wars, battles, this kingdom had survived because Surajmal Jat or his predecessors were well versed with the art of diplomacy and trying to not get involved in battles of other people."
Why This Was Hard:
- Not far away from lots of clashes
- Area full of all kinds of issues
- Battles
- Violence
- Stuff like that
How They Did It:
- Art of diplomacy
- Not getting involved in others' battles
- Survival strategy
- Playing politics well
The Formula
What Made It Possible:
"It was all possible because Mr. Jat, his statesmanship and his shrewdness along with his power."
The Result:
- Kept kingdom away from lots of bloodshed
- Through combination of:
- Statesmanship
- Shrewdness
- Power (military capability)
The Test of His Shrewdness
Why Now Was Critical
The Situation:
"Now was the time for Surajmal Jat's, how do you deal with different parties and apply the kind of logic to get what you want but not give in too much."
The Challenge:
- Both armies going to get into his territory
- Had to side with one or the other
- No way he could stand neutral
- That's why it was a test
The Risk:
- Neither could he join with Abdali (risky)
- Had to toe the line
- So far had stayed away
- But now: what happens?
Surajmal's History with Abdali
The Previous Siege
What Happened:
"Before the previous attack by Abdali, Surajmal had turned it to be fruitless."
The Details:
- Abdali had attacked Surajmal himself before
- Laid siege to his fort
- Soldiers falling prey to cholera or something
- Already summer
- Finally gave up on siege
- Had to get out of it
The Result:
- Nishfar = unfruitful, didn't succeed
- Abdali couldn't really do damage to Surajmal
- In previous invasions
The Other Siege (Different Incident)
Another Time:
- During Raghunath Rao's time
- Marathas got out through tunnel
- Afghan army got in
- Took possession
- But that was before this
The Pattern:
- Last time: fruitless
- Afghan soldiers were tired
- Especially when summertime came
- Not used to summer season in India
- Too hot for them
Why Afghans Wanted to Leave
The Reasons:
- Too hot (not used to it)
- Missing families
- Missing lifestyle
- Stuff like that
Their Intention:
- Never to settle in India
- Didn't like it there
- Loot and go back
- Not for too long
Maratha Soldiers: Same Problem
The Parallel:
"Marathas also had the same problem. Maratha soldiers, unless it was Shinde and Hawker, otherwise they wanted to go there, do their job and come back."
The Difference:
- Didn't want to stick around
- Unless you are Shinde or Holkar armies
- Those were based in north
- Others wanted to go home
Abdali Wants Surajmal Too
The Need
Why Abdali Needed Him:
"Abdali needed Surajmal to be on his side to oppose Sudarshi Rao Bahu's strong army."
The Reasoning:
- Already has Suja-ud-Daula on his side (done)
- But still: to make sure victorious position
- Wanted also Surajmal Jat on his side
- Can't afford to lose him now
The Strategy:
- Build up alliances
- Maximize forces
- Ensure victory
- Surajmal was powerful
- Would help take on Bhau without too much trouble
Surajmal's Response: Hard No
The Rejection
What Abdali Did:
- Sent his request
- Sent his demands
- "Join me"
Surajmal's Response:
- Figure of speech: he just totally rejected it
- Said: "None of that is going to happen"
- "I'm not joining your side"
- Hard no
Why Surajmal Wasn't Conflicted Like Suja
The Difference
The Contrast:
"He was not in so much of a dilemma as Suja Udola was."
Why:
- He wasn't Muslim
- It wasn't holy war (for him)
- Different considerations
The Camaraderie Factor
His Feelings:
- Probably had little bit of sympathy
- Not sympathy exactly
- Kind of camaraderie with Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Because both Hindu
The Eyewitness Advantage
What Surajmal Had Seen
The Critical Difference:
"Mr. Jat had seen a lot of these atrocities up close. He knew exactly what these people are capable of and how they have handled in the previous..."
The Contrast:
- Bhau and Nana Sahib were deep in the south
- Ignorant to how savage Abdali and comrades were
- Depending on:
- Eyewitness accounts
- Hearsay
- This and that
Surajmal's Knowledge:
- Had seen exactly what happens
- With his own eyes
- Close to the action
- First-hand experience
The Impact of Proximity
Why It Mattered:
- He knew
- Wasn't messing around
- Wasn't wishy washy
- Had survived these brutal invasions
- Had seen Abdali's way of dealing
- Saw the route (carnage)
- What happens
The Location Factor:
- Not too far away
- Little bit south of Delhi
- Maybe within 150 kilometers
- That's it
- Pretty close by
The Geographic Context
Under the Thumb
The Reality:
- Under thumb of all the Mughals
- And now Abdali
- Very close to all the action
- Can't escape it
The Vassal History
During Mughal Strength:
- Were basically kind of vassal of Mughals
- When they were strong
- But after Aurangzeb's death
- About 30-40 years later
- Whole Mughal empire started collapsing
The Liberation Process:
- People within kingdoms who were vassals
- Started feeling more liberated
- Were only namesake in Mughal empire
- Started saying: "We will do whatever we want"
- As Mughals became weaker
- "Screw you, we will do whatever we want"
The Independence Feeling:
- Started growing with time
- But Aurangzeb's time: no way
- He was so strong
- Would simply crush you
The Jat People
Who They Are
The Characteristics:
- Surajmal had forefather during Aurangzeb's time
- Was his vassal, loyally
- Jat people: fairly battle-hardened
- Very (tough)
Martial People:
- Kind of martial people
- Even today: in Indian army in large numbers
Not Sikhs
The Clarification:
- They are not Sikhs at all
- Nothing to do with Sikhism
- They are Hindu
The Turban:
- Don't wear Sikh turban
- But turban is worn in India in variety of cultures
- Especially lot of farmers
- But not Sikh type turban
The Tradition:
- Turban wearing: tradition in northern India
- Even in Maharashtra: lot of farmers wear turban
- But it's not the Sikh turban
- Sikh turban is different
- You can spot it
Surajmal Rejects Abdali (Again)
The Clear Position
What He Said:
"Ato Abdali, screw you. I'm not coming on your side."
The Previous Condition:
- Remember earlier he told him:
- "You sit on throne of Delhi"
- "Then I will join you as a result"
- Several pages ago
The Rejection:
- Now rejected the proposal of alliance with Abdali
- Clear and final
Waiting for Bhau's Protection
The New Situation
What Surajmal Was Doing:
"Now Suraj Mal was waiting for Bahu to come into his province or into his kingdom because he had already declined Abdali's alliance offer."
The Danger:
- Now he was in danger
- Since said no
- Abdali could attack him
- Attack his forces
- Needed now Bhau's protection
Why Bhau's Arrival Matters
The Expectation:
- Expecting Bhau would come
- Secure his territory
- At least the area around there
The Logic:
"The moment Bahu comes closer then Abdali won't try to get in there because then that will lead to battle right then and there."
The Strategy:
- If Bhau's camp is nearby
- Abdali won't venture in that area
- Battle won't be pretty
- Everybody knew: battle going to be extremely violent
- Lots and lots of people going to die
- Everybody was very careful
The Delayed Battle
Why No Immediate Fight:
- Weren't messing around
- Won't start it immediately
- Just like that
- Had very potent weapons
- Going to be very messy
The Prerequisites:
"It had to be well thought of, well prepared and all politics has to be taken care of before they actually begin shooting at each other."
The Process:
- Signing up alliances
- Two alliances
- Signing up people on their side
- Before starting any hostile activity
- That's the politics
The Timeline:
- Until that is over
- No way they will go back
- We know eventually takes until next year
- January or February
The Only Northern Ally
The Distinction
The Unique Position:
"So now that is the distinction of Surajmal. He was the only king in the northern India who was willing to get into the Maratha alliance."
The Commitment:
- Willing to explicitly
- Enter their coalition
- Not just talk
- Actually join
The Past Friction
What He Remembered:
- He had gotten into some trouble during Holkar
- Holkar's son was killed (at his fort)
- Then Holkar got angry
- Laid a siege
- All that happened
But:
"Still the relationship was fairly friendly between Marathas and Surajmal Jat. They were still getting along."
The Decision:
- He said: "Okay, fine"
- "I will go on the Maratha side"
Still Hedging: Contact with Suja
The Multiple Connections
The Reality:
"And even though he was thinking about Maratha alliance, he was still in touch with Suja Udawala."
Why:
- Everybody was angling
- See which side is going to win
- That was critically important
- Whichever side wins
- They wanted to throw their lot on that side
- Everyone's looking around
- Seeing what moves is everyone else making
The Alliance with Holkar and Imad-ul-Mulk
Starting in 1760
The Welcome:
"Starting in 1760, Surajmal Jat had welcomed both Holkar and Imad Hurmult, who was the wazir of the Mughal Empire."
The Timing:
- Getting along with both those parties
- Holkar probably given up previous anger
- Given up enmity
- One year prior he had welcomed them
- (Actually same year - July 1760)
Surajmal's Real Ambition: Rule Delhi
The Self-Interest
The Reality:
"So you have to understand now, Mr. Surajmal Jat's also intention is to get something for himself, not because Hindu that was there."
What He Wanted:
- To get something in the Mughal Empire
- Some position
- Some power
- Self-interested
The Plan with Imad-ul-Mulk
The Conspiracy:
"Imad Hurmult and Surajmal Jat were thinking of kicking out the emperor and basically running the whole show in Delhi."
The Details:
- Ending the Mughal Empire as they know it
- May have some "stupid guy" as emperor
- Just for the heck of it
- But basically: "Both of us will manage the Mughal Empire"
Surajmal's Ambitions:
- Even though kingdom was fairly small
- His ambitions were tall
- Trying to conspire
- Take down whole Mughal Empire
- Or be in charge of it
- Along with Imad-ul-Mulk
The Goal:
"I want to be the henchman of the Mughal Empire along with Imad Hurmult."
Using Marathas, Not Being Used by Them
The Strategy
The Calculation:
- If Marathas can help me: so be it
- But would not allow Marathas to control Mughal Empire
- "I'm sitting here"
- "I want to be the guy"
- "A powerful guy"
- "I'm in the north"
- "You guys are not from here"
The Regional Resentment
The Pattern:
"So both Rajputs and Surajmal Jat, they considered Marathas to be kind of coming in between, you know, your southern power."
The Message:
- Stay in your place
- We want to handle northern politics
- Northern power structure
- You can help us
- But beyond that
- Don't try to control us
The Limited Alliance
Surajmal's Thinking:
- Split loyalties
- But decided: supporting Marathas is best chess move
- For now
- Wanted to get rid of emperor
- With help of Marathas
- Form alliance with Imad-ul-Mulk
- Marathas go back
- That's his thought
The Usage:
"So make use of Marathas. To whichever degree possible."
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Surajmal Jat | Jat king | Only northern ally willing to join Marathas |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Wants Surajmal but rejected |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Surajmal waiting for his protection |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Joined Abdali, still in contact with Surajmal |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | Past enmity with Surajmal but reconciled |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mughal wazir | Conspiring with Surajmal to rule Delhi |
| Raghunath Rao | Maratha leader | Referenced in past siege |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Aurangzeb era | Jats were vassals to strong Mughal empire |
| Post-Aurangzeb | 30-40 years: Mughal collapse, Jats more independent |
| Previous years | Abdali's siege of Surajmal's fort (failed - cholera, summer) |
| Previous years | Holkar's son killed at Surajmal's fort, siege |
| 1760 | Surajmal welcomes Holkar and Imad-ul-Mulk |
| July 1760 | Abdali requests Surajmal join him |
| July 1760 | Surajmal rejects Abdali completely |
| July 1760 | Surajmal waiting for Bhau to come protect him |
| July 1760 | Still in contact with Suja (hedging bets) |
| Ongoing | Conspiring with Imad-ul-Mulk to rule Delhi |
Geographic Context
Surajmal's Kingdom:
- South of Delhi
- About 150 kilometers away
- Not far from action
- Strategic location
The Position:
- Close to all the conflicts
- Under thumb of Mughals (when strong)
- Under threat from Abdali
- In the thick of things
- Can't stay neutral
The Hot Climate:
- Major factor
- Afghans not used to it
- Want to leave in summer
- Same with some Maratha soldiers
- Only Shinde/Holkar armies stay
Major Themes
1. Shrewdness Through Survival
The Reputation:
- Most shrewd politician of era
- Not official title = consensus
- Earned through decades of survival
How He Did It:
- Geography (close but not too close)
- Diplomacy (avoiding others' battles)
- Power (military capability)
- Statesmanship (knowing when to act)
The Formula:
- Not just strength
- Not just diplomacy
- Both together
- Plus timing
- Plus knowing when to stay out
2. The Eyewitness Advantage
Surajmal vs. Bhau/Nana Sahib:
- Surajmal: seen it first-hand
- Bhau/Nana: heard stories
- Huge difference
What He'd Seen:
- Abdali's atrocities
- Up close
- How they handle things
- What they're capable of
- The route (carnage)
- The brutality
The Impact:
- Wasn't conflicted like Suja
- Knew exactly what he was dealing with
- Not wishy washy
- Hard no to Abdali
- Based on knowledge, not ideology
3. The Climate Weapon
Why Abdali Failed Before:
- Summer too hot
- Afghans not used to it
- Soldiers getting sick (cholera)
- Missing families
- Want to go home
- Never intended to settle
The Pattern:
- Come in winter
- Raid, loot
- Leave before summer
- Can't sustain long campaigns
- Climate defeats them
Surajmal's Knowledge:
- He knew this
- Seen it happen
- Could wait them out
- Geography + time = defense
4. The Only Northern Ally
The Uniqueness:
"He was the ONLY king in the northern India who was willing to get into the Maratha alliance."
What This Shows:
- How isolated Marathas were
- How hostile north was
- Surajmal's pragmatism
- His risk-taking
- His strategic thinking
The Contrast:
- Rajputs: hostile or neutral
- Suja: forced to join Abdali
- Other Muslims: with Abdali
- Surajmal: only one willing
5. The Forgiveness Factor
What Happened:
- Holkar's son killed at Surajmal's fort
- Holkar got angry
- Laid siege
- Big conflict
But Now:
- Relationship fairly friendly
- Getting along
- Past enmity: set aside
- Welcomed Holkar in 1760
What It Shows:
- Pragmatism over grudges
- Strategic alliances
- Can forgive when necessary
- Politics > personal feelings
6. The Hedging Strategy
The Reality:
- Committed to Maratha alliance
- But still in contact with Suja
- Watching both sides
- Seeing who's winning
- Everyone angling
The Logic:
- Critically important which side wins
- Want to be on winning side
- Keep options open
- Don't burn bridges completely
- Until absolutely necessary
7. The Real Ambition: Delhi
The Conspiracy:
- With Imad-ul-Mulk
- Kick out emperor
- Both rule Delhi together
- Use Marathas to help
- Then send Marathas back south
The Irony:
- Kingdom fairly small
- But ambitions tall
- Wants to control Mughal Empire
- Not content with what he has
- Reaching for much more
The Calculation:
- Marathas can help
- But won't control
- Use them, don't be used
- "I'm in the north, you're from south"
- "Stay in your place"
8. The Regional Resentment
Northern Powers' View:
- Marathas: southern power
- "Coming in between"
- Want to handle own politics
- Own power structure
- You can help
- But don't control us
The Pattern:
- Rajputs feel this
- Surajmal feels this
- Common northern sentiment
- Marathas as outsiders
- Even when helping
9. The Vassal to Independent Arc
The History:
- During Aurangzeb: total vassals
- Would be crushed if resisted
- No independence possible
The Transition:
- After his death (30-40 years)
- Mughal empire collapsing
- Former vassals feeling liberated
- Only namesake in empire
- "Screw you, do whatever we want"
Surajmal's Position:
- Part of this liberation
- No longer true vassal
- Independent actor
- But still close to Delhi
- Can't fully escape orbit
10. The Martial Heritage
Jat People:
- Battle-hardened
- Martial people
- Even today: large numbers in army
- Not Sikhs (Hindu)
- Different turban tradition
The Survival:
- This heritage helped
- Could defend themselves
- Not pushovers
- Respected for military capability
- Essential to survival strategy
Critical Insights
The Geography-Diplomacy Formula
Why He Survived:
- Close enough to matter (150km from Delhi)
- Far enough to have buffer
- Strong enough to defend
- Smart enough to avoid fights
- Diplomatic enough to negotiate
The Balance:
- Not too weak (would be crushed)
- Not too strong (would threaten others)
- Not too far (would be irrelevant)
- Not too close (would be absorbed)
- Just right for survival
The Eyewitness Effect
Why Surajmal Chose Differently Than Suja:
Suja:
- Muslim
- Far from action (Lucknow)
- Heard stories
- Religious pressure
- Conflicted
- Eventually caved
Surajmal:
- Hindu (no religious pressure)
- Close to action (150km from Delhi)
- Saw it first-hand
- Knew exactly what Abdali capable of
- Not conflicted
- Hard no
The Variable:
- Proximity to horror
- Seeing vs. hearing
- Direct knowledge
- Makes all the difference
The Climate as Alliance-Breaker
Why Abdali Failed:
- Previous siege of Surajmal
- Summer came
- Too hot
- Soldiers sick (cholera)
- Want to go home
- Had to leave
The Lesson:
- Afghans can't sustain in India
- Climate defeats them
- They know it
- Must raid and leave
- Can't stay long-term
Surajmal's Knowledge:
- Seen this pattern
- Knows they'll leave
- Just has to survive
- Until summer
- Or until they get homesick
The Ambition Paradox
The Reality:
- Small kingdom
- Tall ambitions
- Wants to rule Delhi
- Conspiring with Imad-ul-Mulk
The Strategy:
- Use Marathas to kick out emperor
- Then rule jointly with Imad-ul-Mulk
- Send Marathas back south
- "Don't control us"
The Contradiction:
- Needs Marathas
- But resents them
- Wants their help
- But not their influence
- Alliance of convenience
- Not conviction
The Only Ally Problem
For Marathas:
- One northern ally
- Out of many kingdoms
- Everyone else: hostile or neutral
- Shows isolation
- Shows vulnerability
For Surajmal:
- Taking huge risk
- Standing alone
- Against northern consensus
- Could be punished
- If Marathas lose
The Stakes:
- If wrong: ruined
- If right: rewards
- But incredibly risky
- Most others playing safe
The Forgiveness Calculus
What Happened:
- Holkar's son killed (at his fort)
- Major incident
- Siege in response
- Should be permanent enmity
But:
- Forgave
- Reconciled
- Now allies
- Working together
Why:
- Politics > emotions
- Strategic necessity
- Bigger threats exist
- Can't afford grudges
- Pragmatism wins
The Lesson:
- In politics: forgive when useful
- Don't let personal feelings
- Override strategic calculation
- Grudges are luxury
- Survival demands flexibility
The Hedging as Weakness
The Strategy:
- Committed to Marathas
- But still talking to Suja
- Watching both sides
- Keeping options open
The Problem:
- Shows uncertainty
- Lack of full commitment
- Others can see this
- Weakens alliance
- Neither side fully trusts
The Necessity:
- Can't afford to be wrong
- Stakes too high
- Need insurance
- But insurance costs trust
The Regional Identity
The North-South Divide:
- Northerners see Marathas as southerners
- "Stay in your place"
- "Don't control us"
- Regional resentment
- Even from allies
The Implication:
- Even if Marathas win
- Northern powers won't accept rule easily
- Will resist
- Will conspire
- Unity fragile
For Marathas:
- Winning battle not enough
- Must win acceptance
- Very difficult
- Regional identities strong
- "You're not from here"
The Tall Ambitions
The Irony:
- Smallest player
- Biggest ambitions
- Wants to rule Delhi
- Mughal Empire itself
The Logic:
- Sees weakness
- Sees opportunity
- Why not reach?
- Power vacuum exists
- Someone will fill it
- Why not him?
The Reality:
- Probably unrealistic
- But not impossible
- Stranger things happened
- Mughal Empire really collapsing
- Maybe he could
- With right allies
- At right moment
The Make-Use-Of Strategy
Surajmal's Thinking:
"Make use of Marathas. To whichever degree possible."
The Attitude:
- Instrumental
- Transactional
- Use them
- Don't be used
- Get what you need
- Then...?
The Problem for Marathas:
- Their "ally" using them
- Not true partnership
- Will dump them
- Once gets what he wants
- Know this going in?
- Probably
- What choice do they have?
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Surajmal rejected Abdali
- Only northern ally for Marathas
- Waiting for Bhau's protection
- Still talking to Suja (hedging)
- Conspiring with Imad-ul-Mulk
- To rule Delhi jointly
- Planning to use Marathas
- Then send them back south
The Questions:
- Will Bhau arrive in time?
- Will Abdali attack before that?
- Can Surajmal's hedging work?
- Will conspiracy with Imad-ul-Mulk succeed?
- Can Marathas trust their "only ally"?
- Will regional resentment undermine alliance?
The Stakes:
- Surajmal took huge risk
- Standing alone among northern powers
- If Marathas lose: he's ruined
- If Marathas win: he wants Delhi
- But Marathas might not give it
- Complex game
- Many ways to lose
- Few ways to win
July 1760: There's a reason Surajmal Jat is called the most shrewd politician of his era. For decades his small kingdom survived 150 kilometers south of Delhi by perfect balance of power and diplomacy, strength and timing. He's seen Abdali's atrocities first-hand - not stories, not hearsay, but with his own eyes. When Abdali asks him to join, he doesn't hesitate like Suja. He says: screw you, I'm not coming. He's the ONLY northern king willing to join the Marathas. Everyone else is hostile or neutral or forced into Abdali's camp. But here's what the Marathas don't know: Surajmal's conspiring with Imad-ul-Mulk to kick out the Mughal emperor and rule Delhi themselves. His plan? Use the Marathas to help, then send them back south. "I'm in the north, you guys are not from here. Stay in your place." His kingdom is small but his ambitions are tall. And he's still talking to Suja, hedging his bets, watching to see which side wins. He forgave Holkar for his son's death because politics matters more than grudges. He's playing chess while everyone else plays checkers. But he's taking a massive risk. Standing alone. If he's wrong, he's ruined. If he's right, he wants Delhi. The only question is: will Bhau get there in time to protect him? Because now that he's rejected Abdali, he's a target.
Suraj Mal's Alliance & Rajput Betrayals (June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Anniversary
January 14, 1760:
- The Battle of Panipat happened on this date
- (Conversation taking place January 16, 2025 - two days after anniversary)
Suraj Mal: The Exception
The Only One Willing to Talk
Suraj Mal's Unique Position:
- Premier strategist of his time
- Survived as small kingdom through skill
- Of all the kingdoms and kings in northern India
- Only one willing to get into Maratha alliance
- Or at least willing to talk and negotiate
The Qualification:
"Willing to doesn't mean he was going to."
What It Meant:
- Even just entertaining the possibility was huge
- Willing to have the discussion
- Open to negotiation
- Not automatically hostile
His Connections:
- Was in contact with Suja-ud-Daula as well
- Playing multiple sides
- Keeping options open
Suraj Mal's Past Alliances (Since 1760)
The Power-Sharing Plan
Who He Welcomed:
- Imad-ul-Mulk
- Malhar Rao Holkar
Their Plan:
- Rule over Delhi
- Rule over Mughal Empire consequently
- By conquering Delhi
- Emperor would be out of the picture
- No deal with Marathas any longer
The Hope:
- Marathas would be in alliance
- But Marathas stay in the Dakhan (Deccan)
- "Let us do our job"
- "You just be our guardian"
- Hoping for better deal essentially
- Regional autonomy under Maratha protection
Bhau Enters Suraj Mal's Territory (June 1760)
The Strict Orders
When:
- June 1760
- Bhau entered Suraj Mal's area
The Orders to All Commanders:
"Tomorrow on we are entering or getting into Suraj Mal's areas. Do not burn any villages or any paddies or agricultural land and don't do any destruction so that you keep Suraj Mal on the good side."
In Marathi:
"Upasarga yekandar karu naye aise ahe."
- Upasarga = don't create problems
- That is our strategy
The Command Structure:
- Every commander has troops he's responsible for
- Depending on rank
- Make sure your regiment understands
- Your soldiers know: no trouble in this area
The Consequences:
"Paripatya kele nzayil" - If you were to start burning farmland or homes of people, then you would be dealt with in a strict fashion.
The Implication:
"His territory is under my protection, basically."
Madhav Singh: From Maratha Ally to Abdali's Friend
How He Got Power
The Irony:
- Madhav Singh got the kingdom because of Maratha intervention
- They helped him come to power
- Now: become a dead set enemy of Marathas
- Complete reversal
His Actions:
"And written letters to Abdali and come and destroy Marathas."
His Relationship with Abdali:
- Lot of friendship between them
- Got along well
- Been having lot of correspondence
Why He Turned
The Reason:
- Marathas tried to get lot of tributes from him
- On this or that excuse
- Even after helping him get power
- He got irate and angry
- Short-term Maratha greed = long-term enemy
The Mathura Atrocities (1757)
What Happened
1757:
- Between Mathura and Abdali
- Abdali's forces created lot of mayhem
- Lot of violence
- All kinds of atrocities in Mathura
Why It Mattered:
- Mathura is a holy place (Krishna's birthplace)
- Major Hindu pilgrimage site
The Rajput Failure
What They Didn't Do:
"The Rajput princes and kings had not lifted their finger and that is important."
Their Responsibility:
- Rajputs considered themselves protectors of Hindu faith
- Or so they like to think
- It was incumbent upon them to do something
- Send forces
- Resist Abdali
What Actually Happened:
- They didn't do a thing
- Even though tremendous atrocities
- Didn't lift a finger
- Failed their supposed role
Keshav Rai's Letter to Peshwa (1757)
The Report
What Keshav Rai Wrote:
"Ambed and Jodhpur kings have written to Abdali that please rescue us from the Marathas."
The Deal Offered:
- In Marathi: "Tum cheet sakri karit jau?"
- "If you rescue us from Marathas, we will be in your employment"
- "We will obey you"
The Translation Note:
- Old translation or old style Marathi
- Weird phrasing
- But meaning clear
The Forts
Context:
- Amber Fort (outside Jaipur)
- Seen on trips to Rajasthan
- These Rajput kingdoms
Their Weakness:
"They can't fight with Abdali, they just are too weak and submissive."
The Intermediary: Najib Khan
Why Through Najib?
The System:
"Because Rajputs never trusted Abdali, so they used to correspond with Abdali through Najeeb Khan."
Najib's Role:
- Agent of Abdali in India
- Intermediary between Abdali and Indian powers
- Rajputs would write to Najib
- Or send emissaries to Najib
- Najib would communicate with Abdali
Why Not Direct?
The Explanation:
- Abdali was Muslim based in Afghanistan
- Rajputs probably didn't have relationship with him
- Maybe haven't met him
- No direct connection
Their Strategy:
"Their enemy's enemy is our friend. That's their strategy."
But:
- Thought Najib would communicate on their behalf
- More comfortable with Indian intermediary
- Even if that intermediary was Afghan
Najib's Intelligence Network (1760)
Watching Madhav Singh
What Najib Did:
- Kept eye on Madhav Singh's correspondence
- Watching who he was writing to
- Specifically: his letters to Nanasaheb Peshwa
What Najib Told Madhav Singh:
- When Abdali comes in 1760
- He will go to Dakhan
- Put permanent end to Maratha campaigns in north
- "Smash them"
Najib's Suspicion:
"He kind of thought that maybe some doubles were going on."
- Watching for double-dealing
- Making sure Madhav Singh wasn't playing both sides
The Dattaji Shinde Victory
One Month Before Dattaji's Death
Madhav Singh's Letter to Abdali:
- They (Marathas) will forever not be able to do anything
- Against other powers
- Just give them such a smash
- That they will be totally finished
- Won't even think about expansion or influence again
Abdali's Reports to Madhav Singh
What Abdali Told Him:
- How he gave good fight
- Destroyed both Dattaji Shinde's army and Holkar's army
- Dattaji's army really badly mauled
- Holkar also got good lesson from Abdali
The Instructions:
"If Holkar comes in your area, don't allow him to get out alive."
The Implication:
- Active coordination
- Intelligence sharing
- Strategic cooperation
- Kill orders given
Why Rajputs Wouldn't Join Marathas
The Distance Created
The Reality:
"Because of the Maratha intervention in Rajput politics, the Rajput princess had, they were distanced from Marathas and they were not going to join Maratha alliance. That was not going to happen."
How Determined:
- It was determined (decided, inevitable)
- Too much distance between camps
- Too much bad blood
- Based on how things developed in past
Who Created the Distance
The Blame:
"And it was all created by the short-sighted behavior of Shinde and Holkar."
What They Did:
- Short-term limited gain
- Peshwa constantly harassing them (Shinde and Holkar)
- So they said: "Let's try to get more money from these people"
- This kind of behavior
- Without thinking about what will it do in the future
The Consequences:
- That's why they were short-sighted
- Didn't consider long-term consequences
- Created enemies for short-term profit
- Now paying the price
Rajput Neutrality in the Coming Battle
The Decision
What They Decided:
"In addition, they were not going to take part in the upcoming battle."
Everyone Sensed:
- Battle was going to happen
- Everybody knew it
Rajput Position:
- Not taking part
- Either on Abdali side
- Or on Maratha side
- Just going to stay put
Why Neutrality?
The Practical Reason:
- Rajput kings/princes: small kingdoms
- None of them was a big power
- Together they could be (significant)
- But they weren't unified
Their Attitude:
- Looking at own affairs
- "We are not going to take part in any such thing"
- "You fight it out"
- Didn't have huge armies to send
But:
"They sympathized with the Abdali."
The Loss:
"But their lack of joining the Marathas would be felt."
- Would have been helpful
- But wasn't going to happen
Their Philosophy:
"Our enemy's enemy is our friend, but that's about it. I'm not going to help my enemy's enemy because he's still untrustworthy in their eyes."
The Sikh Situation in Punjab
The Nascent Power
The Status:
- Sikh power had now arrived
- Something to be considered
- But still nascent (emerging, not fully developed)
- Not a full-blown power yet
- But coming up
The Relationship:
"But there was no connection between the Sikh and the Marathas yet."
The Real Winner of Panipat
The Observation
What Was Said:
"In some reading I'd done online a few weeks ago, they said really the real winner of the Battle of Panipat was the Sikhs."
The Agreement:
"Yeah, that's true."
Why:
- Abdali may have won
- But still badly hurt
- At least his army was
- On the way back
- Harassed by Sikhs
- Looted by Sikhs
Sikh-Maratha Relations: Transactional Only
Not Alliance - Just Trade
What Actually Happened:
"Actually Sikhs benefited, but they helped Marathas to a certain extent, but that was purely on give and take."
Not Even Strategic:
- Just transactional
- Not alliance
- Not strategic cooperation
- Pure business
The Situation: 4-5 Months Holed Up
The Crisis:
- Marathas holed up in Panipat area
- For about 4-5 months
- Abdali was there also
- Marathas hurting for supplies
- For army and animals
- Eatables, water, that kind of stuff
The Scale:
"We are talking about 125,000 people there. Wow. So it was like a village."
The Need:
- Needed lots of supplies
- Had to scavenge and find sources
The Barter System
How It Worked:
- Marathas would approach Sikhs
- Sikhs would say: "Okay, pay up"
- Marathas would give them ornaments
- Or every valuable that they had
- Had to give it to Sikhs
The Nature:
"So it was a barter. You know what I mean? So they would trade with them for necessities."
But:
"It was not alliance. It was like, okay, you give us this, we'll give you that."
Just:
- Tit for tat
- Pure transaction
- No loyalty
- No strategic cooperation
The Siege of Panipat
Abdali's Strategy
What Abdali Did:
- Put a siege on Maratha force in Panipat
- Seized/surrounded them
- Cut off supply lines
The Asymmetry:
- Marathas had trouble getting supplies
- Abdali's force was getting supplies
- He had lot of allies
- No trouble getting all supplies for his army
Maratha Suffering:
"But Marathas were really hurting."
- Animals wouldn't have anything to eat
- People didn't have enough food supplies
- Became very tough
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Suraj Mal Jat | King | Only northern power willing to talk with Marathas |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Entering Suraj Mal's territory with strict orders |
| Madhav Singh | Jaipur king | Former Maratha ally turned Abdali's friend |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Coordinating with Rajputs against Marathas |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla commander | Intermediary between Abdali and Rajputs |
| Imad-ul-Mulk | Mughal wazir | Allied with Suraj Mal and Holkar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | In alliance with Suraj Mal |
| Keshav Rai | Maratha officer | Wrote report to Peshwa about Rajput betrayals |
| Dattaji Shinde | Maratha commander | His army destroyed by Abdali (reference to past) |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Receiving reports in Pune |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | Mathura atrocities by Abdali, Rajputs don't help |
| 1757 | Keshav Rai writes to Peshwa about Rajput betrayals |
| 1760 | Suraj Mal welcoming Imad-ul-Mulk and Holkar since this time |
| June 1760 | Bhau enters Suraj Mal's territory with strict orders |
| 1760 | Madhav Singh writing to Abdali to destroy Marathas |
| 1760 | Abdali reports to Madhav Singh about defeating Dattaji |
| Later 1760 | 4-5 month siege at Panipat area |
| January 14, 1761 | Battle of Panipat actually happens |
Geographic Context
Mathura:
- Holy city (Krishna's birthplace)
- Scene of 1757 atrocities
- Rajputs failed to defend
Jaipur Area:
- Amber Fort
- Madhav Singh's territory
- Used to stir revolts to delay Holkar
Suraj Mal's Territory:
- Where Bhau entered June 1760
- Protected from destruction
- Strategic location
Panipat:
- Where 125,000 Marathas were holed up
- Under siege by Abdali
- For 4-5 months before battle
Punjab:
- Where Sikh power emerging
- Not yet major player
- But helped Marathas (for payment)
- And harassed Abdali (after battle)
Major Themes
1. The Only One Willing to Talk
Suraj Mal's Uniqueness:
- Out of all northern kingdoms
- Only one even willing to negotiate
- Not committing, just talking
- That alone was extraordinary
What It Shows:
- How isolated Marathas were
- How hostile northern powers were
- Suraj Mal's pragmatism stood out
- Even entertaining the idea = unusual
2. Short-Term Greed = Long-Term Enemies
The Pattern:
- Marathas help Madhav Singh get power
- Then demand excessive tributes
- He gets angry
- Becomes their enemy
- Writes to Abdali to destroy them
The Pattern with Rajputs:
- Shinde and Holkar intervene in Rajput politics
- Extract money, tributes
- For short-term gain
- Create permanent enemies
- Now Rajputs won't help in crisis
The Lesson:
"Short-sighted behavior... without thinking about what will it do in the future."
3. Protectors Who Don't Protect
The Rajput Contradiction:
- Consider themselves protectors of Hindu faith
- "Or so they like to think"
- Mathura (holy city) attacked in 1757
- Tremendous atrocities
- Rajputs: didn't lift a finger
The Reality:
- Failed their supposed role
- When actually needed = absent
- The claim vs. the reality
- Talk vs. action
4. The Intermediary System
Why Through Najib:
- Rajputs don't trust Abdali (foreign)
- But need to communicate
- Use Najib as intermediary
- More comfortable with Indian-based agent
What It Shows:
- Even collaborators don't trust
- Need intermediary
- Transactional, not trusting
- "Enemy's enemy" logic
5. The Intelligence Network
Najib's Role:
- Watching Madhav Singh's correspondence
- Keeping eye on who writes to whom
- Suspecting "doubles"
- Active intelligence gathering
Abdali's Network:
- Getting reports from multiple sources
- Coordinating with local powers
- Sharing intelligence
- Strategic information advantage
6. The Respect Through Protection
Bhau's Orders:
- Strict: no burning villages
- No destroying farmland
- No creating problems
- Severe punishment if violated
The Strategy:
"His territory is under my protection, basically."
What It Shows:
- Trying to win Suraj Mal over
- Showing respect through action
- Not just promises
- Actual protection of his interests
The Contrast:
- With how Shinde/Holkar treated others
- Demanding tributes, causing trouble
- Bhau learning from their mistakes
- But maybe too late
7. Together Strong, Apart Weak
The Rajput Problem:
"None of them was a big power. Together they can be, but..."
The Reality:
- Small kingdoms
- Individually weak
- Together could matter
- But not unified
- Looking at own affairs
The Pattern:
- Could make difference
- If worked together
- But won't
- So collectively irrelevant
8. The Siege Economics
The Asymmetry:
- 125,000 Marathas = like a village
- Need massive supplies
- Under siege = can't get them
- Abdali has allies = gets supplies easily
The Sikh Transaction:
- Marathas desperate
- Give away valuables
- Just to get food
- Not alliance = business
- "You give us this, we'll give you that"
The Desperation:
- Animals starving
- People hungry
- Trading ornaments for food
- 4-5 months of this
- Before the actual battle
9. The Real Winner
The Irony:
"The real winner of the Battle of Panipat was the Sikhs."
Why:
- Didn't fight in the battle
- But profited from both sides
- Marathas paid them for supplies
- Then looted Abdali on way back
- Both sides weakened
- Sikhs emerged stronger
The Strategy:
- Stay out of the fight
- Let them destroy each other
- Profit from both
- Emerge when they're weak
- Smart long-term play
10. The Sympathy vs. Help Gap
Rajput Position:
"They sympathized with the Abdali. But their lack of joining the Marathas would be felt."
The Calculation:
- Sympathize with one side
- But help neither
- Stay neutral
- Preserve own forces
- "You fight it out"
What It Meant:
- Could have helped Marathas
- Would have made difference
- But chose not to
- Their neutrality = effectively helping Abdali
- By not helping Marathas
Critical Insights
The Betrayal Cycle
Step 1: Marathas help local power
- Madhav Singh gets kingdom through Maratha help
Step 2: Marathas demand payment
- Excessive tributes
- Various excuses
- Constant harassment
Step 3: Local power gets angry
- Irate
- Resentful
- Feels exploited
Step 4: Local power becomes enemy
- Writes to Abdali
- "Come destroy Marathas"
- Active collaboration with enemy
The Pattern:
- Created own enemies
- Through greed
- Could have had allies
- Instead have active opponents
The Protection vs. Talk Gap
Rajput Claims:
- "Protectors of Hindu faith"
- Sacred duty
- Traditional role
Rajput Actions:
- Mathura attacked (holy city)
- Tremendous atrocities
- Didn't lift a finger
- Failed completely
What It Reveals:
- Claims are propaganda
- Reality is self-interest
- When tested = fail
- The myth vs. the reality
The "Islam in Danger" Gets Real Support
Why Rajputs Invited Abdali:
- Not because they trust him
- Not because they like him
- But because: "Please rescue us from Marathas"
- "We will be in your employment"
The Implication:
- Najib's "Islam in danger" argument
- Wasn't just rhetoric
- Had real support base
- Rajput Muslims actively collaborating
- Choosing Afghan Muslim over Maratha Hindu
The Coordination:
- Abdali called by Najib Khan
- And called by Madho Singh
- Multiple sources calling him
- Coordinated effort
- Not just one agent
The Intermediate Trust Problem
The System:
- Rajputs → Najib → Abdali
- Won't go direct to Abdali
- Don't trust him
- But will trust Najib (sort of)
What It Shows:
- Even allies don't trust
- Need layers of intermediation
- Transactional relationships
- No real trust anywhere
The Irony:
- Collaborating with foreign invader
- But won't talk to him directly
- Need Indian intermediary
- To collaborate with foreigner
The Intelligence Advantage
Najib's Network:
- Watching correspondence
- Knowing who writes to whom
- Suspecting double-dealing
- Active monitoring
Abdali's Information:
- Multiple sources reporting
- Madhav Singh giving updates
- Najib gathering intelligence
- Coordinated information sharing
Maratha Disadvantage:
- Don't know this coordination
- Think they're dealing with separate parties
- Don't realize level of cooperation
- Information asymmetry
The Suraj Mal Exception
Why He Stood Out:
- Only one willing to talk
- Out of all northern powers
- Not committing, just talking
- But that alone was huge
What Made Him Different:
- Strategic pragmatist
- Not ruled by emotion
- Looking at interests
- Willing to negotiate
The Contrast:
- Everyone else: automatic hostility
- Suraj Mal: "Let's talk"
- Everyone else: already decided
- Suraj Mal: keeping options open
The Implication:
- If more were like him
- Outcome could be different
- But he's the exception
- Not the rule
The Order vs. Practice Gap
Bhau's Orders:
- Very strict
- Very specific
- Severe consequences
- Shows awareness of problem
The Question:
- Why give these orders?
- Because his army would otherwise...
- ...burn villages
- ...destroy farmland
- ...create problems
The Implication:
- This is normal Maratha army behavior
- That's why strict orders needed
- That's why severe punishment threatened
- They have a reputation to overcome
The Siege Reality
The Numbers:
- 125,000 people
- For 4-5 months
- Imagine supplying that
- "Like a village"
The Desperation:
- Trading valuables for food
- Ornaments for supplies
- With Sikhs who charged
- Animals starving
- People hungry
Before the Battle:
- This is BEFORE the battle
- Already weakened
- Already desperate
- Already depleted
- Then had to fight
The Setup:
- No wonder they lost
- Abdali had supplies
- Marathas starving
- Siege worked
- Battle was aftermath
The Winner Who Didn't Fight
Sikh Strategy:
- Stay out of battle
- Charge both sides
- Let them weaken each other
- Loot the survivors
- Emerge strongest
The Wisdom:
- Didn't have to win battle
- Just had to survive it
- While others destroyed each other
- Smart long-term thinking
- Patience paid off
The Contrast:
- Marathas: seeking glory in battle
- Abdali: seeking victory
- Sikhs: seeking survival and profit
- Guess who won long-term?
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Bhau in Suraj Mal's territory
- Trying to win him over with protection
- But Rajputs all hostile
- Actively collaborating with Abdali
- Sikhs neutral (but transactional)
- Madhav Singh giving intelligence to Abdali
The Setup:
- 125,000 Marathas will be under siege
- For 4-5 months
- Starving
- Trading valuables for food
- Animals dying
- Then have to fight
The Questions:
- Will Suraj Mal join Marathas?
- Or stay neutral like Rajputs?
- Can Bhau overcome all the coordination against him?
- Can starving army win battle?
- Will Sikh opportunism pay off?
The Stakes:
- Already practically surrounded
- Intelligence network against them
- Supply lines threatened
- Local powers hostile or neutral
- And they don't even know it yet
June 1760: Bhau enters Suraj Mal's territory with the strictest orders his army has ever received: don't burn a single village, don't touch a single field, don't create any problems. Why? Because Suraj Mal is the ONLY northern power even willing to talk. Everyone else? Already decided. Madhav Singh, who got his kingdom through Maratha help, is now writing love letters to Abdali: "Come destroy them please, I'll be your servant." The Rajputs, who call themselves protectors of Hindu faith, stood by and did nothing when Abdali massacred Mathura in 1757. Now they're writing to Abdali through Najib Khan: "Rescue us from the Marathas, we'll obey you." Najib is watching everyone's correspondence, reporting everything to Abdali. And 125,000 Marathas are about to be under siege for 4-5 months, trading their jewelry to Sikhs just to get food for their starving horses. The Sikhs? They're the smart ones. Stay out of the battle, charge both sides, loot the survivors. They're the real winners of Panipat. They just had to wait.
The Sikhs & The Battle Over Punjab (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Real Winners: Sikhs After Panipat
The Long-Term Victory
What Happened After Panipat:
- Sikhs harassed both Mughals and Afghans
- Eventually completely controlled Punjab
- Took about 50-60 years for full control
Why They Won:
- Mughals and Afghans fighting over Punjab control
- For several decades this fight continued
- After Panipat: Sikhs became bigger, better
- Army became bigger and bigger
- More trained
The Process:
"This was kind of their foot in the door. They were getting powerful slowly but surely."
Sikh Position During Battle Preparations (1760-1761)
Fighting in Self-Interest
Their Motivation:
- Enemies with Abdali
- But fighting in self-interest and self-defense
- No such concept of forming alliance with Marathas
- No loyalty to Marathas
- No common Hindu cause (at the time)
Sikhism and Hinduism: The 1760 Relationship
Considered Part of Hinduism
At That Time (1760-1761):
"Sikhism was considered to be part of Hinduism because the relationship between Hindus and Sikhs were very tight."
The Practice:
- No such thing as separate religion (at the time)
- Every Hindu family: eldest son would become Sikh
- Hindus would go to Sikh temples
- Sikhs would go to Hindu temples
- Vice versa
- Very congenial and very friendly
The Later Split (150 Years Later)
Why They Separated:
- Slowly after 150 years
- Sikhs became insecure
- Lot of Sikhs started getting rid of their turban
- Cutting their hair
- Just like any other person
The Fear:
"Then the Sikh just overall as a Sikh society they started feeling if that is what happens slowly and surely then what is the difference between us and Hindus?"
The Response:
- Needed to reinforce their identity
- Said: "We are different"
- "We are not you"
- That train started about 150 years later
But at the time (1760):
- No such concept
- Basically the same
- Considered: "We are basically same"
Why No Sikh-Maratha Alliance
The Trust Problem
The Reality:
"Right now they were fighting for themselves. Marathas as outsiders. So there was no trust."
Why No Trust:
- Thought: if Marathas got hold of Punjab
- These are outsiders
- Why should we allow them to take control?
- "This is our part"
- They live there day in and day out
- "These are outsiders"
The Past Alliance (Before Panipat)
What Had Happened:
- Before the Panipat battle
- They had worked together
- Had developed some alliance
But:
"It had not meaning they still were wary of Maratha power because Marathas were not there for sunshine and fellowship in Punjab."
The Reality:
- Marathas wanted to control Punjab province
- Get the resources for themselves
- Difficult for both of them
The Conclusion:
"That alliance feeling had not developed fully."
Bhau's Failure: No Sikh Alliance
The Missed Opportunity
The Assessment:
"And that is part of Bahu's failure that he could not develop the alliance with the Sikhs. Had he developed it then it would have been a different conclusion of the battle."
What Could Have Been:
- If alliance developed
- Different conclusion of battle
- Major strategic failure
The Core Issue: Punjab Itself
What the Battle Was Really About
The Central Negotiation:
- Negotiations happening between Marathas and Abdali
- Were all about Punjab
- Sikhs were not involved with it
Bhau's Position:
"Punjab is part of India."
Abdali's Position:
- "No, Punjab is part of my Afghan nation or Afghan Empire"
- "The boundary between India and Afghanistan should be such that Punjab is within Afghanistan"
Bhau's Counter:
"We always have Punjab as part of India. We are not gonna give up on that. That is the sticking point between the two armies."
The Alternative: No Battle
The Key Point:
"Had Bahu said okay keep Punjab there would not be any battle at all. So it all hinged on the ownership of Punjab."
Where Is the Boundary:
- Tussle: where is boundary between India and Afghanistan?
- Abdali said: "Punjab is mine"
- "If you agree to that then there is no battle"
- "I will go home and you go home"
Why Abdali Wasn't Fighting for Delhi
The Real Objective
What Abdali Wanted:
- Not fighting to loot Delhi again
- Already done that
- Nothing remaining in Delhi now
- Just wanted Punjab as his province
Bhau's Dilemma:
"Bahu could not agree to that because Mughals always had Punjab as a province. So now it would be an insult to lose it to Afghanistan."
The Honor Problem:
- Maratha force came to north to do battle
- Cannot go home
- Show face to Nana Sahib
- People will say: "What did you do?"
- "We sent you to do the battle"
- "You came back without doing the battle"
- "And gave away Punjab"
The Consequences:
"So he will be completely looked down upon. In those days he will be totally, I mean, he will be done with. He will not be leading any big armies or have any importance. People will just totally shun him because that was the honor that you lost because you wanted to save yourself."
The Reality:
"In those days cowardice is you're finished, you're done."
The Irony: Sikhs Excluded from Punjab Negotiations
The Situation
What Was Happening:
- Entire Punjab province Abdali wanted
- Marathas not even willing to give one inch of Punjab
- It dealt with Punjab
- Sikhs were powering Punjab
- Punjab was their thing
But:
"They were not part of this negotiation at all."
Sikh Response to Outsiders
Their Strategy:
"The Sikhs wanted to protect Punjab from outsiders and whenever they were confronted with foreigners, outsiders, that wanted to control Punjab, they went to battle with them no matter who that power was."
The Principle:
- Even if it is Abdali (Afghan)
- Even if Marathas wanted to take control
- Would go to battle
- Would resist it
- Considered themselves sons of soil
- Would drive anyone out
The Ironic Situation
The Reality:
"And it was ironic that the whole fight was about Punjab, who gets to have Punjab and they were not party to that battle at all."
Their Status:
- Just kind of bystanders
- By this time: not become big power anyway
- But coming up now
- Slowly but surely
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Sikhs | Emerging power in Punjab | Fighting both sides, protecting Punjab |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Wanted Punjab as part of Afghanistan |
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Could not agree to give up Punjab |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Would judge Bhau based on Punjab outcome |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1760-1761 | Battle preparations, Punjab negotiations |
| 1761 | Battle of Panipat (Sikhs not involved) |
| After 1761 | Sikhs harass Mughals and Afghans |
| 50-60 years later | Sikhs completely control Punjab |
| 150 years later | Sikhism becomes distinct from Hinduism |
Geographic Context
Punjab:
- Contested territory
- Between India and Afghanistan
- Sikh homeland
- What the battle was really about
The Boundary Question:
- Where does India end?
- Where does Afghanistan begin?
- Punjab in the middle
- Both sides claiming it
Major Themes
1. The Real Winners Don't Fight
The Pattern:
- Marathas and Abdali destroy each other at Panipat
- Sikhs stay out of it
- Watch from sidelines
- Then harass the weakened survivors
- Eventually take over completely
The Timeline:
- Takes 50-60 years
- But they win in the end
- By not fighting the big battle
- By surviving while others destroy themselves
2. The Outsider Problem
Sikh Perspective:
- Marathas: outsiders (from south)
- Abdali: outsiders (from Afghanistan)
- Sikhs: sons of soil (live there day in and day out)
- Will fight anyone who tries to control Punjab
- Doesn't matter who
The Irony:
- Both armies fighting over Punjab
- Neither asking Sikhs
- Sikhs would fight both
- Yet excluded from negotiations
3. The Alliance That Never Was
What Existed:
- Some past cooperation
- Had worked together before
- Developed some alliance
But:
- Never fully developed
- Still wary of each other
- No trust
- Marathas wanted control
- Sikhs wanted independence
Bhau's Failure:
- Could not develop this alliance
- Major strategic error
- Could have changed battle outcome
- Missed opportunity
4. The Hindu-Sikh Unity (At That Time)
The 1760 Reality:
- Considered same religion
- Very congenial
- Very friendly
- Every Hindu family: eldest son becomes Sikh
- Shared temples
- No separation
The Later Split:
- 150 years later
- Identity crisis
- Sikhs losing distinctiveness
- Needed to reinforce identity
- Created separation
- "We are different"
The Point:
- At time of Panipat
- No religious divide
- Could have united
- Based on cultural similarity
- But didn't
5. Punjab as the Sticking Point
The Core Issue:
"It all hinged on the ownership of Punjab."
Abdali's Offer:
- Keep Punjab
- No battle necessary
- Go home peacefully
Why Bhau Couldn't Accept:
- Punjab always part of India
- Would be insult to lose it
- Mughals always had it
- Can't go home without fighting
- Would be called coward
- Would be shunned
- Career over
The Honor Trap:
- Not about military necessity
- About honor
- About reputation
- Can't back down
- Even if strategically smart
- Would be "done with"
6. The Cowardice = Death equation
The Cultural Reality:
"In those days cowardice is you're finished, you're done."
What It Meant:
- Going home without fighting
- After being sent to fight
- Giving away territory
- "You wanted to save yourself"
- Would be looked down upon
- Totally shunned
- No importance
- No leadership positions
- Social death
The Pressure:
- Forces unnecessary battles
- Can't make pragmatic choices
- Honor > life
- Reputation > survival
- Cultural imperative
7. Abdali's Limited Goals
What He Wanted:
- Punjab only
- Not Delhi again (already looted)
- Not more territory
- Just clear boundary
- Afghanistan includes Punjab
What He Didn't Want:
- Occupation of India
- Long campaign
- Extended stay
- More battles than necessary
The Offer:
- Simple deal
- Give Punjab
- Everyone goes home
- No bloodshed
But:
- Bhau couldn't accept
- Not because bad deal
- Because of honor
8. The Bystander Status
The Irony:
"The whole fight was about Punjab, who gets to have Punjab and they were not party to that battle at all."
Sikh Position:
- Their homeland
- Their territory
- Their future
- Being decided by others
- Without their input
- Just bystanders
Why:
- Not yet big power
- Still emerging
- "Coming up now"
- But not there yet
- Slowly but surely
The Future:
- They'll take it anyway
- Once Marathas and Abdali gone
- Patient approach
- Long-term thinking
- They win in the end
9. The Sons of Soil vs. Outsiders
Sikh Identity:
- Live there day in and day out
- Sons of soil
- This is our part
- Will fight any outsider
Who Are Outsiders:
- Marathas (from south/Deccan)
- Afghans (from Afghanistan)
- Mughals (weakening)
- Anyone not Punjabi
The Pattern:
- Fight whoever comes
- No matter who
- Doesn't matter if Hindu or Muslim
- Matters if outsider
- Protect homeland
10. The 50-60 Year Plan
The Strategy:
- Don't fight big battle (1761)
- Stay out of Panipat
- Let them destroy each other
- Then harass survivors
- Gradually take control
- Takes 50-60 years
- But complete victory
The Patience:
- Not seeking immediate glory
- Long-term thinking
- Survival > heroism
- Gradual expansion
- Eventual domination
The Contrast:
- Marathas: seeking immediate victory
- Abdali: seeking immediate control
- Sikhs: playing long game
- Who wins ultimately?
Critical Insights
The Negotiation That Could Have Prevented Everything
Abdali's Offer:
- Extremely simple
- Extremely clear
- Keep Punjab = no battle
- Go home = no casualties
Why It Failed:
- Not military reasons
- Not strategic reasons
- Honor reasons
- Cultural pressure
- Fear of shame
- "Cowardice is you're finished"
The Cost:
- Tens of thousands dead
- Maratha power broken
- Delhi vulnerable
- North destabilized
- All for honor
- All avoidable
Bhau's Impossible Position
The Calculation:
- Accept deal: shamed, career over, shunned
- Fight and lose: honorable death, remembered as hero
- Fight and win: glory, vindication, career secure
The Pressure:
- From culture
- From peers
- From Peshwa
- From history
- Can't choose #1
- Even if wisest choice
The Trap:
- Honor culture
- Means pragmatism impossible
- Means flexibility impossible
- Means compromise impossible
- Forces unnecessary wars
The Sikh Master Plan
The Genius:
- Don't fight the battle everyone's obsessed with
- Stay alive while they destroy each other
- Harass the weakened survivors
- Gradually expand
- Take 50-60 years
- Win completely
Why It Worked:
- No glory-seeking
- No honor culture trap
- Pure pragmatism
- Long-term thinking
- Patience
- Survival first
The Lesson:
- Winners of big battles ≠ ultimate winners
- Those who survive longest win
- Patience > courage
- Strategy > heroism
The Alliance Failure
Bhau's Strategic Error:
- Could not develop Sikh alliance
- Even though:
- Both Hindu (at the time)
- Common enemy (Abdali)
- Geographic proximity
- Shared interests
Why It Failed:
- Trust deficit
- Marathas seen as outsiders
- Wanting to control Punjab
- Not just protect it
- Sikhs wary
- "Not for sunshine and fellowship"
The Cost:
- No Sikh reinforcements
- No local knowledge
- No guerrilla support
- Fighting alone
- Against Afghan + Rohilla + Suja
- Major disadvantage
The Hindu-Sikh Unity Missed
What Could Have Been:
- United Hindu-Sikh front
- Against Muslim invaders
- Cultural unity
- Religious solidarity
- Overwhelming force
Why It Didn't Happen:
- Marathas wanted control
- Sikhs wanted independence
- Control > unity
- Empire-building > alliance
- Short-term power > long-term cooperation
The Irony:
- 150 years later
- Sikhs create separate identity
- Because losing distinctiveness
- But in 1760: still united
- Could have leveraged
- Didn't
The Punjab Paradox
The Situation:
- Fight is entirely about Punjab
- Who controls it?
- India or Afghanistan?
- Marathas or Abdali?
The Excluded Party:
- Sikhs
- Actual Punjabis
- Sons of soil
- Not consulted
- Not involved
- Just watching
The Ultimate Irony:
- Neither Marathas nor Abdali get it
- Sikhs get it
- By not fighting
- By waiting
- By surviving
The Boundary Question
What's Really Being Decided:
- Not just territory
- Not just resources
- But: where does India end?
- Where does Afghanistan begin?
- Identity question
- National question
For Bhau:
- Can't give up Punjab
- Means giving up part of India
- Means retreating boundary
- Means Afghanistan advances
- Unacceptable
- Would rather die
For Abdali:
- Natural boundary
- Punjab traditionally contested
- Afghanistan should include it
- Clear border
- Reasonable request (to him)
The Outsider Perspective
Who Is Insider:
- Sikhs: we live here
- Day in and day out
- For generations
- This is our land
Who Are Outsiders:
- Marathas: from Deccan (south)
- "You guys are not from here"
- Abdali: from Afghanistan
- Obviously foreign
The Principle:
- Will fight any outsider
- Doesn't matter Hindu/Muslim
- Matters our land vs their control
- Nationalism > religion
- Local > imperial
The 50-60 Year Horizon
The Timeframe:
- Not 5 years
- Not 10 years
- 50-60 years
- To complete control
- To total victory
What It Required:
- Patience
- Consistency
- Survival
- Harassment
- Gradual expansion
- No rushing
The Result:
- While others sought immediate victory
- Sikhs played infinite game
- While others sought glory
- Sikhs sought survival
- Survival won
What's Coming
The Situation (1760-1761):
- Punjab is the sticking point
- Abdali offers: keep it, no battle
- Bhau can't accept (honor reasons)
- Battle becomes inevitable
- Sikhs watching from sidelines
- No Sikh-Maratha alliance
- Bhau's strategic failure
The Outcome:
- Battle will devastate both sides
- Sikhs will survive
- Will harass weakened powers
- Will gradually take Punjab
- Will completely control it
- In 50-60 years
- Proving: patience wins
1760: The entire battle is about Punjab. Abdali says: keep it and there's no battle, we all go home. But Bhau can't accept. Why? Not military reasons. Honor. In those days, cowardice is you're finished, you're done. If he goes back without fighting, gives away Punjab, he'll be shunned, mocked, finished. His career over. So he chooses battle over compromise, death over shame. Meanwhile, the Sikhs - the actual Punjabis, the sons of soil - they're just watching. Not included in negotiations about their own homeland. Both sides want to control Punjab. Sikhs want to drive out ANY outsider - Maratha or Afghan, doesn't matter. Bhau failed to develop Sikh alliance even though both Hindu at the time, could have changed everything. But Sikhs were wary. Marathas not there for "sunshine and fellowship" - they wanted control. So Sikhs stay out. Watch the outsiders destroy each other. Then spend 50-60 years gradually taking over. No glory. No heroism. Just patience. Just survival. Just victory. The real winners of Panipat didn't fight at Panipat. They just waited.
Bhau's March North: The River Crossing Crisis (March-April 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The New Chapter: From Udgir to Delhi
The Starting Point
Where:
- Started from Patador (close to Aurangabad)
- Also referenced: Udgir (where battle with Nizam happened)
Why Patador:
- Closer to Aurangabad
- Nana Sahib Peshwa invited everybody there
- Major commanders got together
- Make decisions about campaign shape
- Who should lead
- All that stuff
The Journey:
- Essentially started from Udgir
- How his travel towards Delhi was
- That's what they're going to describe
Bhau's Quote (June 10, 1760)
From Govind Pant's Letter
What Bhau Said:
- 50 miles away from Agra
- Now will cross the Gambhir river
- "Now you will see the problems"
About Gambhir:
- Not a major river
- Just a tributary that merges into Narmada
- But remember: this is monsoon
The River Crossing Disaster: One Month for Small River
The Shocking Reality
The Timeline:
"Gambhir river to cross it, it took him a month."
The Scale:
- With his force
- Everyone
- Entourage
- One month
- For a not major river
The Implication
What It Showed:
"Imagine how inept they were, Maratha army, to cross rivers."
The Contrast with Abdali:
- Abdali had crossed how many rivers?
- To come into Delhi
- Past Delhi
- Already in the Doab (between Ganga and Yamuna)
- Already crossed Yamuna
- Got into Doab
Abdali's River Crossings:
- Had to cross Sindhu
- Had to cross Jhelum
- Bunch of five rivers actually
- Did it during winter months probably
- But somehow had the technique
The Difference:
"That was one reason."
- Abdali: mastered river crossing
- Marathas: completely inept at it
The Campaign Planning at Patador
The Strategy Session
What Happened:
- Deliberations with major commanders
- How campaign should take shape
- Who will do what
- What are strategies
- What alliances to form
- With which powers
- All that stuff
Then:
- He left Patador
- Beginning point
- Left from his own domain (the Khan/Deccan)
The Nizam Problem: Unfulfilled Treaty
After Winning at Udgir
The Situation:
- Bhau won war with Nizam at Udgir
- Came to Patadur because Nana Sahib wanted to consult
- Immediately after: didn't get any respite
- Had to get to north
- It was urgent
Nizam's Betrayal
What Happened:
- Whatever truce treaty Nizam agreed to
- Because he lost that battle
- He just did not fulfill all the treaties
- All the articles he agreed to
Bhau's Frustration:
- Had no time to waste to enforce treaties
- Felt bad
- Couldn't fully enforce treaty articles
- No time to waste
- Priority: huge calamity on northern frontier
- Had to leave quickly
Nizam Saw the Opportunity:
"Now Nizam saw the opportunity because these guys are now going to be gone. They have no option. He said, why should I fulfill my remaining things?"
The Reversion:
- Going to go back to old ways
- Going to be disloyal again
- "You guys are in a hurry"
- "You have a big thing to enforce"
- "I'm not gonna live up to my remaining [obligations]"
- New deal sucks for him
- "Screw you, what are you gonna do?"
Bhau's Feeling:
- Chosen commanders going north
- Weapons going north
- Nanasaheb Peshwa doesn't have time to enforce
- Very dejected
- On one hand: can't do anything
- Thought: "This is not right"
- "This has to be done"
- "But I can't do anything about it"
- Upset, frustrated, angry, disappointed
Raghunath Rao Stays Back
Why He Didn't Go North
The Reason:
- To keep eye on Nizam and Karnataka
- Raghunath Rao didn't get to lead campaign
- He asked for preposterous resources
- Nanasaheb said: "You are no good"
- "You only increase my loan"
- "You're not going anywhere"
Raghunath Rao's Response:
- "If I'm not going, I'm not going to north at all"
- "If I go, I will go as the leader of the army"
- Or not at all
- Won't be second fiddle to Sadashiv Bhau
The Result:
- He just didn't go
- Nanasaheb said: "Okay, fine, stay back"
- "But we have this challenge with Nizam"
- "What he's doing in Karnataka"
- "You need to stay anyway"
- "Marathas need to have some punch"
- Need you
- Can't completely forget about Nizam
- He was capable of making lot of bad stuff
Vishwas Rao: The 19-Year-Old Commander
Who He Was
The Background:
- Nanasaheb Peshwa's son
- Eldest son
- Hardly 19 years old
His Training:
- Experienced battle under Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- In Karnataka
- Under his tutelage
- How to lead battle
- What kind of moves to make
His Destiny:
- Being groomed as Nanasaheb Peshwa's replacement
- Once Nanasaheb out of picture
- Being trained under Sadashiv Rao Bhau
His Role in the Campaign
The Title:
- Nanasaheb made him namesake commander in chief
- Overall head of the campaign
- But everybody understood:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau was the acting and real chief
- That was for sure
The Purpose:
- Nanasaheb wanted to give message
- Vishwas Rao is the sovereign for all practical purposes
- Because: no system where every decision comes to Nanasaheb
- From wherever the army is in north
- No time for that
The Reality:
- Decision making power rested with Vishwas Rao
- But Vishwas Rao obviously would defer to Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Didn't have enough experience
- Idea: he will get experience
- Be ready when time comes to take over Nanasaheb's job
The Most Handsome Man in India
Vishwas Rao's Appearance
The Reputation:
"In those days, Vishwas Rao was supposed to be the most handsome man in entire India."
After His Death
What Happened:
- Vishwas Rao was killed
- Body fell into hands of Afghans
- They said: he was so handsome
- So young (barely 19 years old)
- No damage on body except bullet pierced his head
The Afghan Plan:
"We need to freeze his body with stuff like that and preserve him in Kabul. Kind of embalming like the Egyptians would do. We want to put him on display or something like that."
That's How Handsome:
- They wanted to preserve him
- Display him in Kabul
- Like a trophy
Kashi Raj Pandit's Intervention
Who Intervened:
- After battle was over
- Both bodies (Vishwas Rao and presumably Bhau) fell into Abdali's hands
- Suja-ud-Daula sent his administrator
- That Kashi Raj Pandit guy (Hindu administrative personality)
What He Said to Abdali:
- "You are king of kings"
- "It doesn't look good on you"
- "To play with bodies of your so-called enemies"
- "But they are no more enemies of yours"
- "They're dead"
- "You should let it go"
- "Give these bodies to Kashi Raj Pandit"
- "Let them be given proper honor"
- "Whatever rituals Hinduism demands or wants"
- "Proper burial" (not burial, but proper things)
- "You should have the generous heart"
What Happened:
- Didn't preserve Vishwas Rao
- Probably didn't have time
- Or listened to Kashi Raj Pandit
The Jat Community
Who They Are
The Background:
- Jats are old community in India
Jat Sikhs:
- When some Jats converted to Sikhism
- They are called Jat Sikhs
- Still remember forefathers used to be Jat
- Take pride in that
Their Reputation:
- Very, very good fighters
- In Indian army: very well known
- Even to this day
- Really the battle-hardening part of the army
Bhau's Letter to Northern Powers
The Appeal
The Argument:
"We should not allow Abdali to take roots in India."
About the Mughals:
- Chakateyachi or Chugtai Gharane (original Mughal name)
- Referring to Timur lineage
- "By then Mughals were almost Indian"
- Even though ancestors came from outside of India
- From central India (Central Asia)
- But at least were considered kind of to belong
The Message:
"Now we have to get together and protect the Mughal empire. Because they are no Indian, we don't consider them as outsiders. They are one of us, so we have to protect them and keep them in place."
The Promise
What Bhau Pledged:
- None of you should make alliance with Abdali
- If we gain victory
- We will give the rule in hands of Mughal emperor
- We'll resurrect Mughal emperor
- Raise him again
The Subtext:
"Don't worry, I'm not going to take the throne."
Why Resurrecting the Mughals Mattered
The Comfort Factor
The Reality:
- In India: all these kingdoms, everybody
- Were comfortable with Mughal emperor
- Been there for 300 years
- "The devil you know"
The Alternative Problem:
- Moment you get rid of Mughal emperor
- Who else?
- Suraj Mal says: "I want to be that man"
- Jaudwila (Suja?) says: "I want to be new power in Delhi"
- "It's going to be a mess"
- Marathas will say: "We want to be the power"
- Then infighting will begin
The Strategy
What Marathas Wanted:
- Some namesake emperor
- Nobody will oppose Mughals
- Been there forever
- Just admit they will be resurrected
- Keeps peace
- Prevents power vacuum
The Summer Question
When Bhau Started
The Timeline:
- By 15th of March or end of March
- Bhau was on the march
- Nobody was sure: will Abdali stay in India during summer?
- That was the mystery
Why It Mattered:
- By end of March: summer begins in Indian subcontinent
- By time Bhau gets there (2-3 months)
- Will be by May
- May is peak summer
Abdali's Pattern
The History:
- So far: Abdali had come to India 4-5 times
- But never stayed in summer months
- His army did not like it
- Not used to intense summer heat
- Not their typical weather
- Found it very uneasy
The Uncertainty:
"That is why nobody was sure whether he will stay put in India by the time Sadashivrao reaches the northern frontier."
Holkar's Guerrilla Tactics
His Situation
What Happened:
- Holkar had lost the kind of battle (reference to Dattaji's death)
- But was in and around Delhi
His Strategy:
- Knew: cannot take Abdali's forces on frontal warfare
- One-on-one front
- Was doing the Dhanmikawa (guerrilla tactics)
- Surgical strike
- Go attack and come back
- That kind of stuff
Why:
- Didn't have the courage
- Neither does he have wherewithal
- To take him on frontal
- Too much to ask
What He Was Doing:
- Harassing Abdali
The Realization: Abdali Will Stay
At Mawa
The Location:
- Closer to Narmada
- Come a little distance away from the Khan (Deccan)
- Going towards north
The Intel:
- When got into Mawa
- Understood that Abdali not going to go away
- In summer month
- Not going back to Afghanistan
- Going to be some clash or friction
The Reason:
"Because he's not going anywhere and I'm going to catch up with him. What is going to happen?"
The Conclusion:
- Got the intel
- This guy is going to stay put
- There is going to be a battle
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Leading march north, struggling with rivers |
| Vishwas Rao | Namesake commander, 19 years old | Most handsome man in India, being trained |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Staying in Pune, made strategic decisions |
| Raghunath Rao | Senior Maratha leader | Stayed back to watch Nizam |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Breaking treaty, back to old ways |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | In Delhi area, doing guerrilla tactics |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Staying for summer (breaking pattern) |
| Govind Pant Bundele | Maratha officer | In north, receiving letters |
| Kashi Raj Pandit | Suja's administrator | Later intervenes to save Vishwas Rao's body |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Early 1760 | Bhau wins at Udgir against Nizam |
| Early 1760 | Nizam breaks treaty (Marathas leaving) |
| March 14-15, 1760 | Bhau starts march from Patador |
| June 10, 1760 | Bhau 50 miles from Agra, about to cross Gambhir |
| June-July 1760 | Takes one month to cross Gambhir river |
| March-May 1760 | Uncertainty: will Abdali stay for summer? |
| At Mawa | Bhau gets intel: Abdali will stay |
| Ongoing | Holkar doing guerrilla tactics near Delhi |
Geographic Context
The Route:
- Patador (near Aurangabad) → starting point
- Udgir → where Nizam battle was
- Gambhir River → took one month to cross
- Agra → 50 miles from Gambhir
- Mawa → where Bhau learned Abdali staying
- Narmada → closer to this area
- Delhi → ultimate destination
The Rivers:
- Gambhir → not major, tributary of Narmada
- Narmada → fairly broad and big
- Yamuna → Abdali already crossed
- Ganga → Abdali between this and Yamuna (Doab)
- Sindhu, Jhelum, five rivers → Abdali crossed all these
Major Themes
1. The River Crossing Incompetence
The Shocking Reality:
- One month to cross Gambhir
- Not even a major river
- Just a tributary
- During monsoon (flooded)
The Contrast:
- Abdali crossed: Sindhu, Jhelum, five rivers, Yamuna
- Somehow mastered the technique
- Marathas: completely inept
The Implication:
- Major strategic weakness
- Would matter later
- Can't maneuver
- Geography constrains them
- Abdali has advantage
2. The Nizam Betrayal
The Pattern:
- Lose battle → agree to treaty
- Marathas leave → break treaty
- "What are you gonna do?"
Why It Works:
- Marathas in hurry
- Bigger priority (north)
- Can't enforce
- Nizam knows it
- Takes advantage
The Frustration:
- Bhau feels bad
- Knows it's wrong
- But can't do anything
- Priorities force choice
- Northern crisis > Nizam treaty
3. Raghunath Rao's Pride
The Demand:
- Lead or don't go
- Won't be second fiddle
- All or nothing
The Reality:
- Nanasaheb says no
- So he stays back
- But useful anyway
- Watching Nizam
- Keeping Karnataka secure
The Subtext:
- Ego prevents participation
- Major commander absent
- Because of pride
- Weakens northern campaign
- But someone needs to watch south
4. The 19-Year-Old Commander
The Theory:
- Vishwas Rao is namesake leader
- Gets experience
- Being groomed
- For future
The Reality:
- Bhau is real leader
- Everyone knows it
- Vishwas Rao defers to him
- Doesn't have experience
The Purpose:
- Training
- Succession planning
- Shows authority
- Decision-making practice
The Tragedy:
- Most handsome man in India
- 19 years old
- Will die at Panipat
- Afghans want to preserve him
- Display in Kabul
- Lost potential
5. The Mughal Resurrection Promise
The Strategy:
- Promise to resurrect Mughals
- Keep as namesake emperor
- Everyone comfortable with them
- Been there 300 years
Why It Matters:
- Prevents power vacuum
- Prevents infighting
- "Devil you know"
- Suraj Mal won't claim throne
- Suja won't claim throne
- Marathas won't claim throne
- Mughals acceptable to all
The Reality:
- Mughals "almost Indian" now
- Originally outsiders
- But 300 years = belong
- One of us
- Should protect them
6. The Summer Gamble
The Hope:
- Maybe Abdali will leave
- Like he always does
- Can't stand the heat
- Army not used to it
- Will go home
The Reality:
- This time: staying
- Breaking his pattern
- Willing to endure summer
- Shows: serious commitment
- Not just raid
- Real campaign
The Implication:
- Battle inevitable
- Can't wait him out
- Will have to fight
- In worst conditions
- Peak summer
7. Holkar's Guerrilla Wisdom
What He's Doing:
- Surgical strikes
- Hit and run
- Harassment
- Not frontal battle
Why:
- Doesn't have courage for frontal
- Doesn't have resources
- Too much to ask
- But can still be useful
The Pattern:
- Smart tactics
- Recognizes limits
- Doesn't seek glory
- Just does damage
- Stays alive
8. The Time Pressure
The Constant:
- No time to enforce Nizam treaty
- No time to wait for Abdali to leave
- No time for deliberation
- Urgent, urgent, urgent
The Cost:
- Makes worse decisions
- Can't address problems
- Can't build alliances properly
- Rushing
- Mistakes accumulate
9. The Afghan Technique Advantage
What Abdali Has:
- River crossing technique
- Mastered it
- Can cross:
- Sindhu
- Jhelum
- Five rivers
- Yamuna
- With elephants, camels, horses, cannons, thousands of people
What Marathas Don't Have:
- Takes one month to cross tributary
- Completely inept
- No technique
- No training
- Major handicap
Why It Matters:
- Mobility
- Flexibility
- Strategic advantage
- Can maneuver
- Marathas can't
10. The Namesake vs. Real Power
The Official Structure:
- Vishwas Rao: commander in chief
- Has decision-making power
- Sovereign
The Real Structure:
- Bhau: actual leader
- Makes decisions
- Vishwas Rao defers to him
- Everyone knows it
Why the Pretense:
- Training Vishwas Rao
- Shows authority structure
- Political messaging
- Succession planning
- But doesn't fool anyone
Critical Insights
The One Month River Crossing
The Numbers:
- 30 days
- For tributary
- Not major river
- During monsoon (worst time)
What It Shows:
- Complete lack of preparation
- No training
- No technique
- No equipment
- Fundamental weakness
The Comparison:
- Abdali: crossed 5+ major rivers
- Easily
- With massive force
- Marathas: can't cross tributary
- In one month
The Implication:
- Not ready for northern campaign
- Geography will defeat them
- Before enemy does
- Fundamental incompetence
The Abdali Stays Decision
Why It Changes Everything:
- Pattern: Abdali always leaves for summer
- This time: staying
- Shows: committed
- Not just raid
- Real war
- Willing to suffer
The Impact:
- Hope collapses
- Battle inevitable
- Can't wait him out
- Must fight
- Peak summer
- Worst conditions
The Money:
- Moneylenders won't lend
- If Abdali leaving: safe bet
- If Abdali staying: 50-50
- Too risky
- Wait and see
- Marathas starved of funds
The Training vs. Reality Gap
The Plan:
- Vishwas Rao gets experience
- Under Bhau's tutelage
- Learn leadership
- Make decisions
- Ready to succeed Nanasaheb
The Reality:
- 19 years old
- Not enough experience
- Will defer to Bhau
- In crisis: Bhau decides
The Problem:
- If Bhau dies
- Who leads?
- 19-year-old with limited experience
- In middle of battle
- Recipe for disaster
What Happens:
- Both die at Panipat
- Army collapses
- No leadership
- Total rout
- Training incomplete
The Nizam Lesson
The Pattern:
- Fight Nizam
- Win
- Make treaty
- Leave (urgently)
- Nizam breaks treaty
- Can't enforce
The Lesson:
- Treaties without enforcement = worthless
- Nizam knows they'll leave
- Waits them out
- Returns to old ways
- They can't do anything
The Application:
- Same will happen with everyone
- Make promises
- Can't enforce
- When leave north
- Promises meaningless
- Need permanent presence
The Raghunath Rao Absence
What He Brings:
- Experience
- Senior leadership
- Northern knowledge (some)
- Major commander
Why He's Not There:
- Pride
- Won't be second fiddle
- All or nothing
The Cost:
- Major commander absent
- Bhau alone at top
- Less experience in north
- Weaker leadership team
The Irony:
- Staying to watch Nizam
- But Nizam breaking treaty anyway
- So his presence doesn't matter much
- Could be more useful in north
The Handsome Trophy Plan
The Afghan Thinking:
- Vishwas Rao so handsome
- So young
- Preserve body
- Display in Kabul
- Like trophy
What It Shows:
- Dehumanization
- Trophy warfare
- Display of victory
- Intimidation tactic
- Cultural difference
The Intervention:
- Kashi Raj Pandit's plea
- Appeal to honor
- "King of kings"
- "Doesn't look good on you"
- Give proper burial
- Generous heart
The Success:
- Apparently worked
- Didn't preserve/display
- Shows: some honor code exists
- Can appeal to it
- Suja's influence helped
The Mughal Comfort Blanket
Why Keep Mughals:
- Familiar
- 300 years
- Everyone comfortable
- No infighting
The Logic:
- Get rid of Mughals → power vacuum
- Everyone wants throne
- Suraj Mal, Suja, Marathas, etc.
- Infighting begins
- Chaos
The Solution:
- Keep Mughals (namesake)
- No one threatens others
- Acceptable to all
- Peace maintained
The Irony:
- Fighting to "protect" Mughals
- Actually fighting for Punjab
- Mughals are excuse
- Real issue: territory
- But useful fiction
The Jat Fighting Heritage
The Reputation:
- Old community
- Battle-hardened
- Very good fighters
- Even today
The Jat Sikhs:
- Jats who converted
- Still proud of Jat heritage
- In Indian army
- Very well known
- Really the battle-hardening part
The Application:
- Suraj Mal Jat
- Comes from this tradition
- Explains his capability
- His survival
- His shrewdness
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Bhau marching north
- Took one month to cross tributary
- Nizam breaking treaty behind him
- Raghunath Rao not with him (pride)
- 19-year-old Vishwas Rao as namesake leader
- Abdali staying for summer (breaking pattern)
- Battle inevitable
- Money problems looming
- Holkar doing guerrilla tactics
The Questions:
- Can Bhau improve river crossing ability?
- Will money shortage cripple campaign?
- Can 19-year-old Vishwas Rao lead if needed?
- Will Nizam cause problems from south?
- Will Holkar's tactics help?
- How will summer affect battle?
The Trajectory:
- Heading toward Panipat
- More river crossings ahead
- More financial problems
- More political problems
- Battle in peak summer
- Against well-supplied enemy
- Everything pointing toward disaster
March-April 1760: It takes Bhau ONE MONTH to cross the Gambhir River. Not the Yamuna. Not the Narmada. Not even a major river. Just a tributary. One month. Meanwhile, Abdali has crossed the Sindhu, the Jhelum, five rivers in Punjab, the Yamuna, and made it into the Doab between Ganga and Yamuna. The Marathas are completely inept at river crossings. This is a fundamental weakness that will matter. Behind him, the Nizam is already breaking the treaty. "What are you gonna do? You're in a hurry, you have a big thing up north, screw you." Raghunath Rao refused to come because his pride wouldn't let him be second fiddle. So he's staying back to watch the Nizam, who's breaking treaties anyway. The 19-year-old Vishwas Rao is namesake commander in chief - most handsome man in entire India - but everyone knows Bhau is really in charge. And then at Mawa, the intel comes in: Abdali is staying for summer. Breaking his pattern. This time it's real. The battle is inevitable. The hope collapses. One month to cross a tributary. And they're heading north to fight the man who can cross five rivers with elephants and cannons.
The Financial Crisis: Moving a Town (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Army as a Moving Town
The Scale
The Numbers:
- Almost 120,000-130,000 people total
- Take out civilians going to holy places
- You have 70,000-80,000 army sites
What It Meant:
- Every day: take them out
- Have to feed them
- Have to pay their salaries
- Animals have to get fed
- All that cost money
The Reality:
"He was losing money every day."
The Supply System
How It Worked
The Problem:
- In those days: would not take all supplies needed
- Impossible to carry all that stuff
- Things like water: just can't
The Solution:
"As you go, you fill up your supplies."
- Get more food
- Resupply along the way
- Can't carry everything
The Dependence:
- Maratha army was dependent
- On local areas
- For supplies
The Tribute System
How They Resupplied
The Method:
- They will give you some offering or tribute
- But it is given under force
- Specific word for that: _____ (pay up or else)
How It Worked:
"That is how they were replenishing their supplies, paying up salaries, because along the way they will get these people."
From Whom:
- Smaller kingdoms
- Whoever they meet
- As they travel
The Treasury Crisis
What Nana Sahib Expected
The Plan:
- Nana Sahib had a treasury
- Was expecting some money to come from Nizam
- After war was won
- That was still old (owed)
But:
- Nizam kind of misbehaving now
- Because they were gone
- Money wasn't coming
The Bleeding Treasury
The Expenses:
- Every day going to north
- Incurring costs
- Money was owed
- It wasn't there in treasury
- This was costing money every day
The Situation:
"So his treasury had become very delicate to make sure that you have some surplus money in the treasury. So it was now looking a little shaky."
The Problem:
- Money not coming in
- Money going out
- At same time
- Can't continue doing that for long time
Bhau's Limited Resources
The Checks He Had
What Was Available:
- Bhau had checks to cash
- In Ujjain and in Daur
- Worth good amount
- 188,000 rupees (one lakh eighty-eight thousand)
- At the time: meant lot of money
How It Worked:
- Somebody (moneylender or kingdom) owed that money to Peshwa
- Kind of like check balance
- Could draw upon it
The Monthly Expense: 500,000-600,000 Rupees
The Campaign Cost
The Scale:
"During the campaign that Sadashivrao Bahu was leading, the monthly expense for the whole, it was a town that he was moving, so it was incurring 500,000 to 600,000 rupees a month."
The Math:
- Bhau had 188,000 available
- One third of total amount
- For just one month of expenses
Nanasaheb's Message:
"This is the best I could do. And then you're on your own."
The Reality:
"So they are in dire straits already and they haven't even gotten to the north in money terms."
What It Meant
The Situation:
- Basically have to look for own provisions
- Take care of monetary situation themselves
- On their own
- From here on out
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Condition
The Non-Negotiable Requirement
Who He Was:
- Had 10,000 musketeers with him
- They were his musketeers
His Terms:
"You have to pay their salaries every month in a very, very, like you have to pay them on that given date. That is my only requirement. I will do whatever you want."
The Difference:
- Other soldiers: maybe could go few months without getting paid
- But these 10,000: had to be paid
- No exceptions
- On time
- Every month
What Had to Be Fed and Paid
The Full Count
The Challenge:
- Huge army: at least 70,000-75,000
- Lot of Ashrit (refugees/those seeking protection)
Ashrit Explained:
- Ashrit = to be under somebody's protection
- Noun: somebody who seeks your protection to be safe
- People who said: "Please take care of us"
- "We just want to go to holy places"
- Under his protection
The Animals:
- Thousands upon thousands
- Camels
- Elephants
- Donkeys
- Horses
- You name it
- All had to be fed
The Costs:
- People have to be fed
- Have to be paid (salaries)
- Of course: water
- Need lots of water
Govind Pant Bundele: The Reliable Man
Who He Was
His Real Name:
- Actually Kher
- But had been placed in Bundelkhand for long time
- Came to be known as Bundele
His Position:
- Somebody on whom Sadashiv could rely upon
- A revenue officer
His Characteristics
Age:
- Beyond 60 years of age
- Senior man
- Not in his prime time age
Not a Fighter:
- Not a renowned fighter
- First and foremost responsibility: collect revenue
- Was not fighter or warrior
What He Could Do:
- Could do battle
- But wasn't renowned for it
- Just take care of getting revenue
- From people who owe/won't pay
- There he could use force
- But with good army: not that good in fighting business
His Job:
"Primarily, he would look after revenue collection. That was his job."
The Other Revenue Man: Antaji Manteshwar
His Background
His Base:
- Used to be in Delhi all the time
- Based in Delhi
Why He Joined:
- For some revenue, accounting
- To talk to Peshwa
- Give him accounting details
- He happened to be in Pune
- So he joined Sadashiv Rao
- In the northern campaign
The Geography: Chambar Zone
About Chambar
What It Is:
- Chambar is a river
- Chambar is also a zone
- Kind of a foresty zone
- Through which Chambar river goes
- Kind of hidden in forest/trees a bit
Beyond Chambar:
- The area of Marwa
- Once he crosses Chambar
- Will be in Marwa
The Expected Reinforcements
Who Would Join
The Plan:
- Supposed to meet up with Jankoji Shinde
- And Holkar
The Numbers:
- Jankoji typically would have 15,000-20,000 troops
- Holkar would have similar number
- He will be joined by 20,000-25,000 troops
Bhau's Northern Ignorance
What He Didn't Know
The Reality:
"Bhau personally does not know about geographical details, rivers, people, areas in the north. Not at all. Because he never gone to north."
His Experience:
- All his life: stayed in Dakhan (Deccan)
- Fighting experience: with Nizam and southern powers
- Hadn't really gone to north ever before
What He Lacked:
- Didn't know politics of geographical nature
- The intricacies
- The details
- Didn't know about it
Bhau's Personality
The Can-Do Attitude
His Character:
"But Bhau was not the man who would retreat based on uncertainties or difficulties. So he was a can-do personality."
What This Meant:
- Wouldn't be easily discouraged
- Would take no for an answer
- Would say: "Okay, I will take it on"
- Very enthusiastic
Key Players
| Name | Role | Characteristics |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Losing money daily, can-do personality, doesn't know north |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Treasury problems, gave 188k rupees, "you're on your own" |
| Govind Pant Bundele | Revenue officer | 60+ years old, reliable, not great fighter, main money man |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Musketeer commander | 10,000 musketeers, must be paid on time, non-negotiable |
| Antaji Manteshwar | Revenue/accounting officer | Usually in Delhi, happened to be in Pune, joined campaign |
| Jankoji Shinde | Maratha commander | In north, 15-20k troops, will join Bhau |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Maratha commander | In north, 15-20k troops, will join Bhau |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Owed money, misbehaving, not paying |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Before march | Nana Sahib gives Bhau 188,000 rupees |
| March 1760 | Campaign begins |
| Ongoing | Losing money every day |
| Ongoing | Monthly expenses: 500,000-600,000 rupees |
| Ongoing | Treasury "very delicate," looking "shaky" |
| Expected | Will meet Jankoji and Holkar after crossing Chambar |
| Ongoing | Nizam not paying what he owes |
Financial Details
Available:
- 188,000 rupees (checks to cash)
- From Ujjain and Daur
Monthly Cost:
- 500,000-600,000 rupees per month
The Math:
- Available = 1/3 of one month's expenses
- After that: "on your own"
Revenue Sources:
- Tribute from smaller kingdoms (forced)
- Resupply along the way
- Govind Pant Bundele collecting revenue
- Antaji Manteshwar helping with accounts
Outstanding:
- Money owed from Nizam (not coming)
- Other debts people owe Peshwa
Major Themes
1. The Moving Town
The Scale:
- 120,000-130,000 people
- 70,000-80,000 army
- Thousands of animals
- Like a village moving
- Massive logistics
The Cost:
- Feed everyone daily
- Pay salaries
- Water for all
- Animals need food
- Losing money every day
The Comparison:
- Not just army
- Entire ecosystem
- Ashrit (refugees)
- Holy pilgrims
- Support staff
- Families
- Complete society moving
2. The Supply Chain Dependency
The System:
- Can't carry everything
- Must resupply along way
- Dependent on local areas
The Method:
- Tribute (forced)
- "Pay up or else"
- Smaller kingdoms
- Whoever they meet
The Vulnerability:
- If areas hostile: starve
- If can't extract tribute: starve
- Completely dependent
- No self-sufficiency
3. The Treasury Crisis
The Bleeding:
- Money not coming in
- Money going out
- Every single day
- Can't sustain
The Expectation vs Reality:
- Expected: Nizam money
- Reality: Nizam misbehaving
- Not paying
- Because Marathas left
The Condition:
- Treasury "very delicate"
- Looking "shaky"
- Not sustainable
- Dire straits
- Haven't even reached north yet
4. The One Month's Budget
What Bhau Got:
- 188,000 rupees
- Checks to cash
- From Ujjain and Daur
What It Covered:
- One third of one month
- Out of 500,000-600,000 monthly
The Message:
"This is the best I could do. You're on your own."
The Implication:
- After ~10 days: broke
- Must find own money
- From beginning
- Already in crisis
5. The Non-Negotiable Contract
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Terms:
- 10,000 musketeers
- Must be paid on time
- On given date
- Every month
- No exceptions
The Difference:
- Other soldiers: flexible
- Can wait few months
- These: absolutely not
- Professional troops
- Professional terms
The Pressure:
- No matter what
- Must find money
- For these 10,000
- Every month
- On schedule
- Or lose them
6. The 60-Year-Old Revenue Man
Govind Pant Bundele:
- Over 60 years old
- Not prime fighting age
- Not renowned fighter
- But: reliable
- Revenue expert
His Value:
- Knows how to collect
- Can use force if needed
- But against armies: not great
- Revenue, not warfare
- That's his skill
The Dependence:
- Bhau relies on him
- Main money man
- Must solve money problem
- Along with boat bridge
- Critical role
7. The 70,000 Mouths to Feed
The Count:
- 70,000-75,000 army
- Plus Ashrit (refugees)
- Plus holy pilgrims
- Plus animals (thousands)
- All need food, water, salaries
The Daily Cost:
- Every single day
- Must feed everyone
- Must pay everyone
- Must water animals
- Must feed animals
- Massive daily burn
The Math:
- If 500,000-600,000 per month
- That's ~17,000-20,000 per day
- Every day
- No breaks
- No holidays
8. The Ashrit Burden
Who They Are:
- Seek protection
- Want to go holy places
- Not fighters
- Just pilgrims
- Refugees
The Cost:
- Must protect them
- Must feed them
- Must water them
- Don't contribute militarily
- Pure burden
Why Take Them:
- Cultural obligation
- Honor requirement
- Can't refuse protection
- Part of dharma
- But costs money
9. The Northern Ignorance
What Bhau Doesn't Know:
- Geography of north
- Rivers
- People
- Areas
- Politics
- Intricacies
- Details
Why:
- Never been there
- All life in Deccan
- Fought Nizam
- Southern powers only
- First time north
The Problem:
- Fighting on unfamiliar terrain
- Against enemies who know it
- Geographic disadvantage
- Political disadvantage
- Learning as he goes
10. The Can-Do Personality
Bhau's Character:
- Won't retreat
- Based on uncertainties
- Based on difficulties
- Can-do personality
What This Means:
- Not easily discouraged
- Will take challenges on
- Very enthusiastic
- Confident
The Double Edge:
- Good: pushes through obstacles
- Bad: ignores real problems
- Optimism > realism
- Confidence > caution
- Might not see dangers
Critical Insights
The Mathematics of Disaster
The Numbers:
- Have: 188,000 rupees (1/3 of one month)
- Need: 500,000-600,000 per month
- Monthly shortfall: ~400,000 rupees
- After 10 days: completely broke
The Reality:
- Already in financial crisis
- Before even reaching north
- Before even fighting
- Haven't spent on battle yet
- Just logistics
- Already failing
The Trajectory:
- Can't sustain
- Must extract tribute
- From every area
- Make enemies
- Burn bridges
- For survival
The Tribute System as Strategic Weakness
How It Works:
- Force smaller kingdoms
- Pay up or else
- Extract resources
- Resupply this way
The Problems:
- Makes enemies - everyone you extract from hates you
- Dependent - if they refuse, you starve
- Slow - takes time to extract
- Uncertain - don't know what you'll get
- Reputation - word spreads, allies disappear
The Contrast:
- Abdali: supplied through allies
- Willingly giving
- Marathas: forcing tribute
- Creating resentment
The 10,000 Non-Negotiables
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Leverage:
- Must be paid
- On time
- Every month
- No flexibility
What It Means:
- ~17,000-20,000 rupees/month just for them
- Out of 188,000 total
- ~10% of budget
- For ~13% of army (10k of 75k)
- Disproportionate
- But non-negotiable
The Implication:
- Professional troops cost more
- But are more effective
- Worth it in battle
- But strain finances
- Can't afford to lose them
- Can't afford to keep them
The Reliable 60-Year-Old
Why Govind Pant Matters:
- Not young
- Not great fighter
- But: reliable
- Revenue expert
- Bhau can depend on him
The Role:
- Solve money problem
- Build boat bridge
- Two critical tasks
- Both must succeed
- Or campaign fails
The Limitation:
- 60+ years old
- Not in prime
- Limited energy
- Not battlefield commander
- Just administrator
- That's all Bhau has
The Ashrit Anchor
The Burden:
- Thousands of non-combatants
- Need food
- Need water
- Need protection
- Give nothing back
Why:
- Cultural obligation
- Can't refuse protection
- Honor demands it
- Dharma requires it
The Cost:
- Slow movement
- More supplies needed
- More vulnerable
- More logistics
- For no military gain
The Dilemma:
- Can't abandon them (dishonorable)
- Can't afford them (financially)
- Stuck with burden
- Weakens campaign
The Moving Town Vulnerability
The Reality:
- 120,000-130,000 people
- Thousands of animals
- Massive logistics
- Slow movement
- Vulnerable supply chain
The Problem:
- Can't move fast
- Can't maneuver easily
- Can't live off land
- Must extract tribute
- Predictable route
- Easy to ambush
The Contrast:
- Abdali: mobile, flexible, supplied
- Marathas: slow, inflexible, desperate
- Strategic disadvantage
- Before battle even starts
The Northern Ignorance Multiplier
What Bhau Doesn't Know:
- Geography
- Rivers
- Politics
- People
- Details
How It Multiplies Problems:
- Can't judge distances
- Can't predict obstacles (rivers)
- Can't leverage local support
- Can't understand motivations
- Making blind decisions
With Money Problems:
- Don't know who to extract from
- Don't know who has wealth
- Don't know political costs
- Every mistake expensive
- Learning curve costs money
The Can-Do Trap
The Personality:
- Won't retreat
- Based on difficulties
- Can-do attitude
- Very enthusiastic
The Danger:
- Ignores real obstacles
- Optimism > realism
- Pushes forward despite
- Financial crisis
- Geographic ignorance
- Supply problems
The Result:
- Confidence gets to north
- But problems accumulate
- Doesn't address fundamentals
- Just pushes through
- Until can't anymore
The One-Third Budget
The Starting Point:
- Month 1: have 1/3 of budget
- Month 2: $0
- Month 3: $0
- Etc.
The Plan:
- Extract tribute
- Collect revenue (Govind Pant)
- Cash checks (188k)
- Hope for more
The Reality:
- Nizam not paying
- Treasury shaky
- No reserves
- Living hand to mouth
- From day one
The Comparison:
- Campaign needs 6+ months
- Have funding for 10 days
- Math doesn't work
- Disaster guaranteed
The Reliability vs Capability Gap
What Bhau Needs:
- Young, energetic commanders
- Great fighters
- Northern experience
- Financial genius
- Military brilliance
What Bhau Has:
- 60-year-old revenue officer (reliable)
- 19-year-old namesake commander (inexperienced)
- Himself (southern experience only)
- Holkar (won't fight frontally)
- Shinde (will join but limited)
The Gap:
- Reliability ≠ capability
- Govind Pant reliable but old
- Vishwas Rao young but inexperienced
- No one has full package
- Making do with what available
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Treasury "very delicate" and "shaky"
- Money for 10 days only
- Losing money every day
- 70,000-75,000 to feed and pay
- Thousands of animals to feed
- 10,000 musketeers must be paid on time
- Nizam not paying what he owes
- Must rely on Govind Pant (60+ years old)
- Bhau doesn't know the north at all
- Can-do personality pushing forward anyway
The Questions:
- Where will money come from?
- Can Govind Pant collect enough revenue?
- Will Ibrahim Khan Gardi's musketeers get paid?
- What happens when money runs out?
- Will tribute extraction make more enemies?
- Can they sustain 6+ month campaign?
The Trajectory:
- Financial crisis from day one
- Will only get worse
- Must extract more tribute
- Make more enemies
- Weaken alliances
- All while fighting
- Math doesn't work
- Heading toward disaster
1760: It's a town moving north. 120,000-130,000 people. 70,000-80,000 soldiers. Thousands of animals. It costs 500,000-600,000 rupees per month just to keep everyone fed, watered, and paid. Bhau has 188,000 rupees - one third of one month's expenses. "This is the best I could do. You're on your own." The treasury is "very delicate," looking "shaky." Money's not coming in. Money's going out. Every single day. Nizam owes money but he's misbehaving, not paying because they left. They're in dire straits and they haven't even gotten to the north yet. Ibrahim Khan Gardi's 10,000 musketeers must be paid on time, on the given date, every month, no exceptions. The main man to solve this? Govind Pant Bundele. He's over 60 years old. Not a renowned fighter. But reliable. A revenue officer. That's who Bhau is relying on. To collect money, build a boat bridge, save the campaign. And Bhau himself? Doesn't know the north. Never been there. All his life in the Deccan. Doesn't know the geography, the rivers, the people, the politics. First time north. But he's got a can-do personality. Won't retreat based on difficulties. Will push forward. 10 days of funding for a 6+ month campaign. The math doesn't work. But he's going anyway.
The Ally Crisis & Loan Refusals (April-May 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Challenge of Finding Allies
The Situation
The Reality:
"It was not easy to find allies in the north."
Why:
- Lot of parties agreed not because of his intervention
- Or his reasons
- But people earlier had created those situations
- Because: this was his first time in north
How Bhau Dealt with the Challenges
His Strategy
The Approach:
"He dealt with this challenge of signing up allies, shortage of manpower and shortage of funds in the sense that he told his people in the north to create conditions and situations where how these issues can be solved."
What He Did:
- Asked for possible solutions
- Gave directions
- Delegated problem-solving
- To people who knew north better
The Double Demand on Govind Pant Bundele
Both Money and Bridge
The Money Shortage Issue:
- Because of money shortage
- Asked Bundeli
- Demanded him to provide:
- Boats or boat bridge (along Yamuna River) - already asked
- Money - make provision for the money
The Clarification:
- Building bridge: one thing
- But just to take care of all finances too
- Along with boats/boat bridge
- Also: "I need money funds"
- "Just work on it generally"
Why Him:
- He was his main man
- He was a revenue officer
- His job
Nana Sahib's Support Letters
The Directive
What Nana Sahib Did:
- Sent letters to:
- Govind Pant
- All the Subhidars (provincial administrators)
- Help Bahu in every way possible
- In addition to money issues
- Meaning: providing him funds as well
- But also just other support
The Nizam Request: Join the Campaign
The Logic
What Nana Sahib Did:
- Insisted with Nizam
- To go with Bahu to the north
The Reasoning:
"Here is the crux. Nizam was the kind of Mughal emperor's ally or his henchman in the south."
Nizam's Claim:
- Telling other people: "I'm the protector of Mughal empire in the south"
- Even though: by then becoming more independent
- During Aurangzeb or right after
- Nizam said: "I'm your vassal, I'm part of you"
- But slowly: as Mughal emperor weakening
- Started asserting independence from Mughal Emperor
But Still:
- Still allied with Mughal emperor by definition
- Kind of created out of extension of him
The Argument
Nana Sahib's Logic:
- Marathas going to north technically
- Because of 1752 treaty with Mughal emperor
- To support and protect Mughal empire
- That is why going north
- Not because they thought [other reasons]
Therefore:
"Technically, Nizam should accompany because he also was working towards as an ally of, you know, like Vasaal of the Mughal emperor. So his job was to support Mughal emperor."
The Honor Question:
"This was just a question of honor, you have to support your Mughal."
Nizam's Refusal
The Real Reason
Why He Wouldn't Go:
"Basically, Nizam worked on the principle of, Marathas are Hindus, so I'm not going to help them. I'm going to work. I mean, he was a Muslim Jihadi."
His Calculation:
- Not going to help Marathas
- If Marathas defeated or destroyed by Abdali
- So much better
- Wasn't going to fight for their sake
The Response:
- Politely declined
- Said: "No, I have blah, blah, blah to do"
- But would not have gone
- It was in his interest that Marathas are destroyed
- If at all possible
- Not going to help
- No way
The Ghoshla of Nagpur: Didn't Happen
The Possibility
Who He Was:
- From Nagpur
- Had his own little independent kingdom
- Worked with the Peshwa
- Part of Maratha Empire actually
- Like a separate wing
The Connection:
- Shivaji's last name also was Ghoshla
- So they were kind of still allied
The Outcome:
- He possibly could have joined
- But ultimately it didn't happen
- Were maybe busy
- Or didn't have enough resources
The Loan Crisis: When Abdali Stays
The Turning Point
When It Became Apparent:
"When it became apparent to the moneylenders and all those people that Abdali is likely to stay in India over the summer."
The Refusal
What Happened:
"So they declined to give big loans to the Maratha army or Nalasaheb Peshwa."
Why:
- Didn't want to be potentially backing the loser
- Or if Abdali comes to them
- Says "give me the money"
- And they gave it all to Marathas
- Problem
The Math of the Loans
If Abdali Left
The Calculation:
- If Abdali was not going to stay
- Then Maratha army under Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Winning over [opponents]
- Success rate goes high up
Why:
- If Abdali going to go back
- Marathas going to go to north
- Get rid of Rohilas
- Get rid of every single opponent
- Every Jihadi force out there
- More likely to get return on investment
- No big opposition
The Size Factor:
- Maratha force was very, very big
- Any Rohilas would have been murdered in few days
- Finished
- Over
- They just didn't stand a chance
If Abdali Stays
The New Calculation:
- But if Abdali going to be principal opponent
- Then you don't know what will happen
- Maybe Marathas will win
- Or maybe they will lose
- Then it becomes 50-50
The Risk:
- Don't want to lose money on that gamble
The Realization:
"Once they realized that Abdali is staying for this monsoon or summer, they didn't want no part in funding the Marathas."
The Wait-and-See Strategy
What Moneylenders Did
The Decision:
"So they rather decided to wait on the fence and see who wins this battle because this was going to be a big battle."
The Calculation:
- No risk (wait)
- Too risky (lend now)
The Pattern:
- Like Rajputs saying same thing
- Like Suraj Mal saying
- "Sit on throne in Delhi" (first)
- They were all saying
- "I need to know which side is going to win"
The Reality:
"And nobody knew for sure unless until the war takes place or the battle takes place."
The Victor Problem
The Strategy
What They Decided:
"Because they were going to go on the side of the victor, the shortage of money problem was never solved in the Maratha camp."
The Terms:
- Jeta = the victor
- Jinkne = to win
- Going to go with Jeta (victor)
The Problem:
- Now don't know who victor will be
- Very close
- Who could tell
- Knew it was epic battle
- Whatever happens: not going to be small
- Enormous violence
- Enormous bloodshed
The March Timeline
The Progress
April 14:
- Started from Udgir (or Patadur)
March 18:
- Reached Sindhakaid
- Just four days later
April 4:
- Passes Burhanpur (or Barhanpur)
April 12:
- Crosses Narmada
- Eight days later from Burhanpur
April 18:
- Passes [location]
April 24:
- Goes to Sehore
April 28:
- Goes to Bedsia
The Burhanpur Gateway
The Importance
Historical Significance:
- Before Aurangzeb came to Dakhan
- Burhanpur was the area up to which
- Mughals could keep coming
- Without any issue at all
Why:
- Then there was Malik south of there
- Then on they had to be careful
Aurangzeb's Change:
- Because very determined personality
- Came all the way to Aurangabad
- Which is south of Burhanpur
- So he kind of broke through for first time
- Made Aurangabad capital of Mughal empire in south
After Aurangzeb:
- During his reign
- Aurangabad (quite south of Burhanpur)
- Became center of Mughal power
- Burhanpur was not a problem
- But originally: Burhanpur was gateway to Dakhan
- Aurangzeb basically broke through
The Narmada Crossing: Easy in Summer
The Question
The Point to Understand:
- Narmada crossed just within matter of weeks
- Narmada is fairly broad and big river
- So how did he do it?
The Answer
The Timing:
"Remember, this was the middle of summer. So the water was kind of lying low. If it was Mansoon, it would be another story."
Why It Worked:
- Right time of year
- His army was massive
- But because summertime
- Probably water very shallow
- Not a problem to cross it
The Implication:
"But now see what is happening to him once Mansoon hit."
The Contrast:
- How Mansoon and summer river crossings are different
- Summer: easy
- Monsoon: disaster
The Loan Collection
At Srirang
What He Collected:
- Cashed four lakhs (400,000) worth of loans
- Vathavne = to cash
- Basically a loan you can collect
Nana Fadnavis: The Survivor
Who He Was
His Role:
- Administrative personality
- Not a fighter per se
- Can call: accountant come diplomat come lawyer
- Something like that
His Fate:
"By the way, Nana Fadnavis came back from Panipat battle. He survived."
The Miracle:
- He somehow could come back
- That was a miracle in itself
- Very few people came back alive
- Because even if [survived battle]
- Have to come all the way south
- Very impressive
Nana Fadnavis's Letter from Srirang
The Contact Report
What He Wrote:
"He wrote back to Peshwa that we have a contact at Suja Uddhavla."
What This Meant:
- There is a way
- Or a medium
- Through which we can start conversation with Suja-ud-Daula
Why It Matters:
- If you want to talk to somebody
- Who is relatively unknown to you
- You need a middle man
- Suja is not super close with them
- Need an intermediary
- And he says: "We have somebody like that"
The Abdali Leaving Rumor
The False Hope
What Nana Fadnavis Said:
- Pathan = referring to Abdali
- Pathan is a tribe in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan is tribal society even today
- Vadanta = a rumor
The Message:
"There is a rumor that Abdali who belongs to the Pathan tribe, there is a rumor that he is going to go back in the summer months."
The Intent:
- Painting a positive picture
- Saying: maybe there won't be any battle at all
The Reality:
"But that was wrong. He just probably got the wrong information or he just, I don't know. But it was not what Abdali was planning anyway."
The Persistent Rumor
The Pattern
What Kept Happening:
"So this kind of references were coming again and again in the correspondence."
The Reality:
- Nobody really knew
- What is intention of Abdali
- Whether he wanted to stick around in summer months
- Or going to go back
The Hope:
- Kind of depending on rumors
- That he's going to go back
- In summer months
The Truth:
"That was not really happening. They weren't going to get that lucky."
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Maratha commander | Struggling to find allies, money, first time in north |
| Govind Pant Bundele | Revenue officer | Asked to provide both bridge AND money |
| Nanasaheb Peshwa | Peshwa | Sending support letters, asking Nizam to join |
| Nizam | Hyderabad ruler | Refused to join (Muslim Jihadi, wants Marathas destroyed) |
| Ghoshla of Nagpur | Maratha ally | Could have joined but didn't |
| Moneylenders | Financial backers | Refused loans once Abdali staying |
| Ahmad Shah Abdali | Afghan invader | Staying for summer (changes everything) |
| Nana Fadnavis | Administrator/diplomat | Sent letter, later survives Panipat |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Nawab of Awadh | Marathas have contact/intermediary with him |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| March 14, 1760 | Bhau starts from Udgir/Patadur |
| March 18, 1760 | Reaches Sindhakaid (4 days later) |
| April 4, 1760 | Passes Burhanpur |
| April 12, 1760 | Crosses Narmada (summer, easy) |
| April 18, 1760 | Passes [location] |
| April 24, 1760 | Goes to Sehore |
| April 28, 1760 | Goes to Bedsia |
| At Srirang | Cashes 400,000 rupees in loans |
| Spring 1760 | Becomes apparent Abdali staying |
| Spring 1760 | Moneylenders refuse big loans |
| Ongoing | Rumors persist that Abdali will leave (false) |
Geographic Context
The Route:
- Udgir/Patadur → starting point
- Sindhakaid → 4 days away
- Burhanpur → gateway to Dakhan historically
- Narmada River → crossed in summer (easy)
- Sehore → continuing north
- Bedsia → continuing north
- Srirang → where cashed 400k loans
Historical Geography:
- Burhanpur → originally Mughal limit
- Aurangabad → Aurangzeb broke through, made capital
- Dakhan/Deccan → south of Burhanpur
Financial Details
Loans Cashed:
- 400,000 rupees at Srirang
- Vathavne = to cash
Loans Refused:
- Moneylenders declined "big loans"
- Once Abdali staying became apparent
- Too risky
- 50-50 chance
- Would rather wait and see
The Math:
- If Abdali left: Marathas sure win (would lend)
- If Abdali stays: 50-50 (won't lend)
- Will go with victor after battle
- No risk strategy
Major Themes
1. The First-Timer Disadvantage
The Reality:
"This was his first time in north."
The Problems:
- Not easy to find allies
- Situations created by others earlier
- Not because of his intervention
- Inherited problems
- No relationships
- No knowledge
The Delegation:
- Told people in north
- Create solutions
- Because they know better
- He doesn't
2. The Double Burden on Govind Pant
What He's Asked:
- Build boat bridge (major engineering)
- Solve money problem (major finance)
The Reality:
- Two critical tasks
- Both must succeed
- Campaign depends on both
- All on one 60+ year old man
- Revenue officer
- Not miracle worker
The Pressure:
- Bhau's "main man"
- Everything depends on him
- Bridge or no advance
- Money or no campaign
- Too much on one person
3. The Nizam Honor Trap
The Logic:
- Nizam is Mughal vassal
- Marathas protecting Mughal empire
- Therefore: Nizam should join
- Question of honor
The Reality:
- Nizam is Muslim Jihadi
- Marathas are Hindu
- Not going to help
- Wants them destroyed
- Politely declines
- Never going
The Contrast:
- What should happen (honor)
- What actually happens (religion)
- Honor < ideology
- Logic doesn't matter
- Religious identity wins
4. The 50-50 Calculation
Before Abdali Stays:
- Marathas vs Rohilas only
- Marathas huge force
- Would murder them in days
- Sure win
- Safe to lend
After Abdali Stays:
- Marathas vs Abdali
- Don't know what happens
- 50-50
- Too risky
- Won't lend
The Impact:
- Money dries up
- Shortage never solved
- Because of uncertainty
- Because of Abdali
- Financial strategy collapses
5. The Wait-and-See Conspiracy
Who's Doing It:
- Moneylenders
- Rajputs
- Suraj Mal (kind of)
- Everyone
The Strategy:
- Wait on fence
- See who wins
- Then join victor
- No risk
The Problem for Marathas:
- No allies now
- No money now
- When need it most
- Before battle
- Everyone waiting
- To see outcome
The Irony:
- Waiting to see who wins
- But their waiting affects who wins
- By not supporting
- They make Maratha loss more likely
- Self-fulfilling prophecy
6. The Summer Window
The Advantage:
- Narmada crossed easily
- Matter of weeks
- Water low
- Shallow
- No problem
The Timing:
- Middle of summer
- Right time of year
- If monsoon: disaster
- But summer: easy
The Foreshadowing:
"But now see what is happening to him once Mansoon hit."
The Pattern:
- Summer crossings: easy
- Monsoon crossings: impossible
- Took one month for Gambhir (monsoon)
- Took weeks for Narmada (summer)
- Season matters hugely
7. The Epic Battle Everyone Knows
The Consensus:
- Everyone knew
- Epic battle coming
- Enormous violence
- Enormous bloodshed
- Not going to be small
The Preparation:
- Moneylenders: wait
- Allies: wait
- Everyone: wait
- See who survives
- Then decide
The Inevitability:
- Can't avoid it
- Can't negotiate it
- Going to happen
- Going to be massive
- Everyone preparing
- By staying out
8. The Rumor Dependency
The Pattern:
- References coming again and again
- In correspondence
- Abdali might leave
- Maybe no battle
- False hope
The Reality:
- Wrong information
- Or wishful thinking
- Not Abdali's plan
- He's staying
- But rumors persist
The Danger:
- Planning based on rumors
- Not reality
- Hoping for miracle
- Instead of preparing for war
- Dangerous optimism
9. The Contact with Suja
What Nana Fadnavis Reports:
- Have contact/intermediary
- With Suja-ud-Daula
- Can start conversation
- Through middle man
Why It Matters:
- Suja already joined Abdali
- But not super close with him
- Maybe can be flipped
- Or at least negotiated with
- Through back channel
The Hope:
- Not all lost
- Still possibilities
- Still diplomatic options
- Before battle
- Maybe can change outcome
10. The Survivor's Report
Nana Fadnavis:
- Survived Panipat
- Miracle
- Very few came back
- Had to make it all way south
- Very impressive
His Role:
- Administrator
- Not fighter
- Accountant/diplomat/lawyer type
- Sent this letter
The Implication:
- Administrative types survive
- By not being in thick of battle
- By being smart
- By escaping when needed
- Fighters die
- Administrators live
Critical Insights
The Ally Desert
The Reality:
"It was not easy to find allies in the north."
Why:
- First time there
- No relationships
- Inherited bad situations
- Created by Shinde/Holkar
- Rajputs alienated
- Muslims hostile
- Everyone waiting
The Delegation:
- Bhau doesn't know north
- So tells northerners
- "Create solutions"
- "How to solve these issues"
- Because he can't
The Problem:
- But they don't have solutions either
- No one wants to commit
- Until battle decided
- Catch-22
- Need allies to win
- But get allies only if win
The Govind Pant Impossibility
The Tasks:
- Build boat bridge over Yamuna
- Major engineering
- Need boats
- Need construction
- Need time
- Under threat
- Solve money problem
- Need to collect revenue
- From hostile areas
- Under time pressure
- While moving
The Man:
- 60+ years old
- Revenue officer
- Not engineer
- Not magician
- Just administrator
The Math:
- Two impossible tasks
- One person
- Both critical
- Both must succeed
- Or campaign fails
- Unrealistic expectations
The Honor vs Reality Schism
The Honor Argument:
- Nizam is Mughal vassal
- Marathas protecting Mughals
- 1752 treaty
- Therefore: Nizam should join
- Matter of honor
- Support your emperor
The Reality Check:
- Nizam is Muslim
- Marathas are Hindu
- He's a Jihadi
- Wants them destroyed
- Religion > treaties
- Ideology > honor
The Pattern:
- Appealing to honor
- When religion matters more
- Appealing to treaties
- When identity matters more
- Logic fails
- Because wrong framework
The Loan Mathematics
The Calculation Before:
- Marathas vs Rohilas
- Rohilas: weak
- Marathas: 70,000+ soldiers
- Would be "murdered in days"
- "Finished"
- "Over"
- Safe bet
- Would lend
The Calculation After:
- Marathas vs Abdali
- Abdali: proven force
- Marathas: uncertain
- 50-50 outcome
- "Don't want to lose money on that gamble"
- Too risky
- Won't lend
The Swing:
- From sure thing
- To coin flip
- Just by Abdali staying
- Changes entire financial picture
- No more loans
- Shortage permanent
The Fence-Sitting Strategy
Everyone Doing It:
- Moneylenders: "wait and see"
- Rajputs: "wait and see"
- Suraj Mal: "sit on throne first"
- Pattern
The Logic:
- Why risk now?
- Battle decides everything
- Join victor after
- No risk
- Maximum gain
For Marathas:
- Need support now
- Before battle
- That's when it matters
- After battle: too late
The Irony:
- Everyone waiting for outcome
- But their waiting affects outcome
- By not supporting Marathas
- Make Maratha defeat more likely
- Then join Abdali after
- Self-fulfilling
The Summer Mirage
The Easy Crossing:
- Narmada: "matter of weeks"
- Summer: water low
- Shallow
- No problem
The False Confidence:
- Looks easy
- Because right season
- But Gambhir took one month (monsoon)
- Seasonal
- Not permanent
The Foreshadowing:
"But now see what is happening to him once Mansoon hit."
The Reality:
- Summer advantage temporary
- Monsoon coming
- Will reverse everything
- Rivers will flood
- Crossing impossible
- Temporary success
The Epic Battle Consensus
What Everyone Knew:
- Going to be epic
- Enormous violence
- Enormous bloodshed
- Not small skirmish
- Decisive battle
The Response:
- Moneylenders: wait
- Allies: wait
- Everyone: stay out
- Watch from distance
- Join winner after
The Implication:
- Battle so big
- So decisive
- So violent
- Better to avoid
- Better to wait
- Let them destroy each other
- Pick up pieces after
The Rumor Addiction
The Pattern:
- "Again and again"
- In correspondence
- Abdali might leave
- Maybe no battle
- Hope springs eternal
The Psychology:
- Wanting it to be true
- So believing rumors
- Despite evidence
- Despite pattern change
- Wishful thinking
The Danger:
- Planning based on hope
- Not reality
- Not preparing for actual war
- Preparing for hoped-for peace
- Setting up for shock
- When battle comes
The Intermediary Hope
The Contact:
- With Suja-ud-Daula
- Through middleman
- Can start conversation
- Diplomatic channel
The Dream:
- Maybe flip him
- Back to Maratha side
- Or at least neutralize
- Reduce Abdali's force
- Change balance
The Reality:
- Suja already committed
- Under Abdali's eye
- Trapped in his camp
- Can't leave
- Too late
- But hope persists
The Administrator Survives
The Pattern:
- Nana Fadnavis: survives
- Administrative type
- Not fighter
- Accountant/diplomat
- Lives through Panipat
The Lesson:
- Fighters die
- Heroes die
- Commanders die
- Administrators survive
- By not being in front
- By escaping smartly
- Survival > glory
The Application:
- Those who survive tell story
- Those who die don't
- History written by survivors
- Usually not the heroes
What's Coming
The Situation:
- Can't find allies (first time in north)
- Govind Pant given two impossible tasks
- Nizam refused (wants Marathas destroyed)
- Ghoshla didn't join
- Moneylenders refuse loans (Abdali staying)
- Everyone waiting to see who wins
- Money shortage never solved
- Rumors persist (false hope)
- Contact with Suja (too late?)
- Epic battle everyone knows is coming
The Questions:
- Can Govind Pant do the impossible?
- Will any allies materialize?
- Will moneylenders change their minds?
- Can they flip Suja?
- Where will money come from?
- How to fight without allies or funds?
The Trajectory:
- Allies: none materializing
- Money: drying up
- Support: everyone waiting
- Hope: based on rumors
- Reality: heading to massive battle
- Without resources
- Without allies
- Without funds
- Disaster looming
Spring 1760: It's not easy to find allies in the north. This is his first time. People earlier created these situations - Shinde, Holkar alienating everyone. So Bhau tells his people: create solutions, I don't know this place. Govind Pant Bundele gets hit with both impossible tasks: build the boat bridge AND solve the money problem. He's 60+ years old. Nana Sahib tries to get Nizam to join: "You're Mughal vassal, we're protecting Mughals, matter of honor." Nizam's response: polite decline. Why? "He was a Muslim Jihadi." Wants Marathas destroyed. Not helping. No way. Then the loan crisis: when it became apparent Abdali is staying, moneylenders declined to give big loans. The math changed. Before: Marathas vs Rohilas = sure win = safe to lend. After: Marathas vs Abdali = 50-50 = too risky. "Don't want to lose money on that gamble." Everyone waiting on the fence. Moneylenders, Rajputs, everyone. Wait and see who wins. Then join the victor. No risk. But for Marathas? The shortage of money problem was never solved. Narmada crossed easily - summer, water low, no problem. But rumors keep coming: maybe Abdali will leave, maybe no battle. Wrong. "They weren't going to get that lucky." Nana Fadnavis sends letter: we have contact with Suja. Maybe there's hope. But everyone knows: epic battle coming. Enormous violence. Enormous bloodshed. Better wait. See who survives. Then decide.
Bhau's Northern March & The Holkar-Najib Relationship (April-June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The False Rumors: Abdali Leaving?
April 18, 1760 - From Barhampur
Bhau's Movements:
- Moving from Barhampur
- Going further north toward Narmada
- April 18: dealing with loans/debts of 4 lakh rupees at Ronj
The Propaganda Campaign
The Rumor Mill
What Was Being Said:
"Abdali won't stay here during the summer months. By probably May or early June he'll be gone."
The Reality:
"This turns out to be incorrect. It was basically rumor - a false rumor."
The Purpose:
"There was constant talk of Abdali going back to his motherland or mother country. That may have been to pump up the morale and make good feeling for everybody."
Who Was Spreading It:
- Maratha sources
- Nana Fadnavis (clerk/official)
- Maybe others trying to boost morale
- Create optimism
The Rohilla Panic: Why Abdali Can't Leave
Najib Khan & The Rohillas
Their Desperation:
"Najib Khan and the Rohillas - it wasn't good for them that Abdali goes back. So they were constantly telling him that you cannot go back unless you get this Maratha problem solved."
Why They Were Terrified:
"Rohillas were terribly afraid because if Abdali is gone then they will be wiped out by Sadashiv Rao [Bhau] and his force."
The Reality:
"They stand no chance without Abdali's backing."
The Pressure:
- Abdali didn't want to stay that much
- But under constant pressure from Rohillas
- Can't leave them to face Marathas alone
- "No going back" until problem solved
Why Marathas Would Be Vengeful
The Grudges
Reason #1: Dattaji's Death
"They led directly to the killing of Dattaji Shinde."
- Major reason for vengeance
- Direct responsibility
- Blood debt
Reason #2: Najib Khan's Character
"Najib Khan was singled out as a treacherous and very wild personality."
- Known traitor
- Brutal reputation
- Dangerous man
The Holkar Connection: Mercy & Paternal Bond
Why Najib Khan Survived
The Relationship:
"He still survived because of Holkar. He'd been shown mercy by Holkar before because Holkar considered him as his son."
The Bond:
"They both respected each other in that capacity. He looked up to Holkar as a kind of father figure and the other way around."
The Dynamic:
- Holkar = father figure
- Najib Khan = son figure
- Mutual respect
- Protection relationship
Would This Ever Change? The Question
The Future Uncertainty
The Question:
- Will this relationship ever change?
- Does Holkar survive the Battle of Panipat?
- What does he think of Najib Khan after?
The Day Before Battle: January 14, 1760
Sadashiv Rao's Instructions to Holkar
The Meeting:
"Before one day before the battle - 14th of January - it began a couple days earlier. Sadashiv Rao Bhau kind of senses what things can happen adversely, takes Holkar aside."
The Responsibility Given:
"If things were to go south then I give you the responsibility to save as many women and children as you can and especially my wife."
Who Came:
- Bhau's wife came with him
- Many other commanders' wives
- Women and children in camp
The Plan:
"Find a safe passage for them and take them to Suraj Mal Jat's court. His area - they could temporarily seek asylum or something like that."
Why Suraj Mal:
- Safe territory
- Then they could go south to safety from there
- Better than anywhere in Mughal Empire
- Mughals playing double game
The Mughal Double Game:
- On one hand: wanted Marathas (because of contract)
- On other hand: wanted Maratha power to diminish
- Can't trust them for safety
The Battle Turns Bad: Holkar's Escape
Afternoon of January 14, 1760
When Things Went South:
"When the battle started turning bad for Marathas after one or two o'clock in the afternoon, Holkar makes - he is looking for a safe passage."
What He Did:
"He sent word to Najib Khan because Najib Khan is in the front."
The Deal:
- Najib Khan gets the message from Holkar
- Gives a safe passage to Holkar and whoever was with him
- Deliberate arrangement
Who Escaped:
"Holkar comes out of the whole battle alive along with Sadashiv Rao's wife."
How It Happened:
"There was a safe passage given deliberately by Najib Khan because of their relationship."
The Escape Route: To Suraj Mal's Territory
The Journey
The Meeting:
"They meet and [Najib Khan] says: 'If you go this way nobody will bother you. You can get out of this place.'"
The Carrier:
- One guy carried Bhau's wife on his back
- All the way to Delhi
- Out of Delhi heading south
The Destination:
"That's where Jaat Suraj Mal Jat kingdom begins. He brought [her] there and she stays there for a few weeks because she is in a safe zone."
The Final Return:
"Then she goes back to Pune. That's what the story is."
Holkar's Role in Battle: Did He Fight?
The Account
His Participation:
"Holkar comes out alive and he says that he didn't fight - he fought only for the first few hours maybe."
His Priority:
"Then he basically said okay now things are looking bad I'm gonna save this lady and some other people also and he gets out."
The Caveat:
"But it may be totally true that there is no witness to this."
- No one can verify
- Holkar's own account
- May or may not be accurate
- "Nobody knows, nobody has [proof] or anything"
Holkar's Philosophy: Against Frontal War
His Beliefs
The Core Philosophy:
"Holkar never believed in the frontal war. He never ever believed in it - like two armies fighting each other like they did in Panipat because it was calamity."
What He Believed In:
"He believed in surgical strikes and Ghanimi kawa (guerrilla warfare) and all that stuff. And this [frontal battle] he didn't like at all."
His Style:
- Hit and run
- Surgical strikes
- Guerrilla tactics
- Shivaji's methods
- Not massive pitched battles
The Personality Conflict: Bhau vs Holkar
The Tension
The Dynamic:
"There was a dynamics between [Bhau] and Holkar. Bhau kind of looked down upon Holkar - just a little bit - for whatever reason. And Holkar resented that."
The Issue:
- Bhau's arrogance
- Dismissive attitude
- Holkar felt disrespected
- Resentment building
The Diplomatic Language: "The Rich One"
How They Referred to Peshwa
The Term:
- People used to refer to Peshwas as "the rich"
- Not in material sense
- "Somebody who is a man of means, a man of honor"
- Honorable personality
The Usage:
"An honorable personality is going - making progress step by step."
Meeting Suraj Mal Jat: The Confluence
Getting Close to Agra
Where They Met:
"Now because [Bhau] was getting close to Agra - and that's where Suraj Mal Jat's area begins - so that's where they met along with Holkar and some other northern Maratha troops."
Holkar's Position:
"Holkar was already in and around Delhi basically harassing Abdali's forces by doing surgical strikes but he didn't have the wherewithal to have a frontal battle anyway."
Why He Was Careful:
- Had taken a beating weeks or months ago
- Very careful not to confront them directly
- "Whatever he can do but anyway..."
- Preserving his forces
The Merger:
"They met and they kind of merged and started making plans how to fight this fight."
The Geographic Context: The Doab
Where Everyone Was
The Fertile Strip:
"[Doab] is another name for the fertile area between Yamuna and Ganga."
Abdali's Position:
- At Anupshara (in the Doab)
Jahan Khan & Najib Khan:
- Crossed rivers (not clear which direction)
- Moving in the Doab area
Madho Singh: The Secret Ally
Playing Both Sides
His Position:
"Madho Singh is internally on the side of Abdali, though he hasn't joined him per se. He's just scheming and conspiring with Abdali."
What He Was Doing:
- Not joining openly
- Helping with information
- "Whatever" support
- On Abdali's alliance
- Won't fight directly
With Whom:
- Has "good books" with someone (text unclear)
- Good equation with certain parties
Nana Purandare's Reports
The Intelligence
Who Was Writing:
- Nana Purandare writing to Nana Saheb Peshwa
- Providing updates on northern situation
- May 22, 1760 letter mentioned
Suja-ud-Daula: The Shia-Sunni Problem
The Complicated Alliance
The Positive Meeting:
"Suja talked to Abdali and that created a lot of positive environment."
But:
"That does not mean he wants to fight on Abdali's side."
Why:
- He went and stayed with Abdali
- But there was cultural conflict between forces
- Suja = Shia
- Abdali = Sunni
The Differences:
"Their customs, their culture, festivals - everything is different. And they had conflicts."
Who Will Float, Who Will Sink?
The Waiting Game
The Powers in North India:
"The rest of the powers in northern India are trying to see who will float and who will sink."
The Calculation:
- Trying to guess who's going to win this battle
- Want to go to that side
- Hedging their bets
- Waiting to see
The Reality: Abdali's Real Intentions
The Truth Behind the Rumors
The False Hope:
"Abdali is preparing to go back to his own country. Basically these guys are creating false rumors for Nanasaheb Peshwa to feel more optimistic that Abdali is going back before summertime."
The Logic:
- Maybe no big battle
- Rest of problems in north easy for Bhau
- Rohillas not that big of a problem
- No real opposition without Abdali
But Here's the Crux:
"Abdali wants to go back but Najib Khan won't allow him to go back because Najib was dead scared what will happen in that case. He will be surely killed."
The Reality:
"He was scared - without Abdali he's dead man walking."
The Historical Echo: Shivaji's Route
Narwar Valley (June 2, 1760)
The Location:
"It rings a bell but I've forgotten - when Shivaji was crossing the valley in Narwar coming back from Agra."
The Story:
- Crossing Narwar valley
- Mughal police station there
- When crossing with his colleagues
- Says "I am Shivaji" or something like that
- Famous moment
The Geography:
"Narwar there is a kind of a mountain pass or something like that."
Now (June 2, 1760):
"He [Bhau] on the second of June - where is he? Gwalior."
Gwalior:
- Has entered Gwalior
- There was like a kingdom there
- Vassal kingdom basically
- Mughal emperor had become weak
- People becoming semi-detached
The Distance Problem: 300 Kilometers
Gwalior to Anupshara
The Challenge:
"The distance wasn't too bad - 300 kilometers."
But:
"Within those two locations Gwalior to Anupshara there were two big rivers and a small river. So that was the problem."
The Issue:
"It was not the distance but the terrain and the rivers."
The Plan vs Reality: Direct Battle
What Should Have Happened
The Original Plan:
"The plan was that he will directly go to battle with Abdali. That was the plan - no waiting around."
Why It Didn't Happen:
"But it didn't happen like that because of the rivers. He could [not] cross rivers - no way."
The Monsoon Timing: The Fatal Problem
June 2nd = Too Late
The Situation:
"Now second of June - what is happening on second of July? It's monsoon season. So within a week monsoon will begin - big time. River expands."
If Only...
"Had he reached there maybe two months ago then it was possible."
Why:
"In summer time the rivers become very shallow and they are not a big problem."
The Military Problem: Cavalry Can't Function
Why Monsoon = Disaster
The Wet Ground:
"The monsoon was just on the verge of unleashing and it was going to be tough to cross all those rivers. Especially the cavalry cannot function."
Why:
"Because the horses cannot go on a soil that is totally wet and it becomes messy for the horses to traverse."
The Infantry:
"Maybe the foot soldiers can fight but not the horses. It's just too muddy and horses cannot [function]."
The Distance Problem:
"You can't traverse the distance without horses. You're not going to walk all the way - 300 kilometers to walk will take several - two, three months maybe - without horses."
The Scale:
"We are talking about 120,000-100,000 people. It's a huge logistical challenge. It's not a joke."
1760: The Early Monsoon
That Year Was Worse
The Timing:
"In that year 1760 the monsoon started a little early and it was just humongous rain."
Normal Pattern:
"Generally that time it used to start by sixth or seventh of June."
What Happened:
"But it started a little early. Now second of June he's in Gwalior. So it started around second, third of June."
The Deluge:
"Once it starts, the whole three, four days are full of rains. It just - everything becomes soggy and wet and it just is horrible."
Indian Monsoon:
"Monsoon in India is not like anywhere else."
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position/Action |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Commander | Moving north, gave Holkar escape responsibility |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | Father figure to Najib, escaped with Bhau's wife |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Chief | Son figure to Holkar, gave safe passage |
| Bhau's Wife | Civilian | Escaped on someone's back, stayed with Suraj Mal |
| Suraj Mal Jat | Jat King | Provided safe haven, met with Bhau near Agra |
| Nana Purandare | Intelligence officer | Writing reports to Peshwa |
| Suja-ud-Daula | Awadh ruler | Met Abdali but cultural conflict (Shia vs Sunni) |
| Madho Singh | Regional ruler | Secretly helping Abdali with info |
| Abdali | Afghan King | Wants to leave but Rohillas won't let him |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| April 18, 1760 | Bhau at Barhampur, moving north, dealing with loans at Ronj |
| April-May 1760 | Rumors spreading: Abdali leaving by May/June (false) |
| May 22, 1760 | Nana Purandare's letter to Peshwa |
| June 2, 1760 | Bhau enters Gwalior |
| June 2-3, 1760 | Monsoon starts early (normally June 6-7) |
| Late June 1760 | Bhau meets Suraj Mal Jat near Agra |
| Late June 1760 | Holkar, Shinde merge with Bhau's forces |
| January 14, 1760 | Battle of Panipat - Holkar escapes with Bhau's wife |
Critical Insights
1. The False Hope Strategy
Why Spread Rumors:
- Boost Maratha morale
- Make troops feel optimistic
- "Abdali leaving soon anyway"
- No big battle needed
The Reality:
- Rohillas won't let Abdali leave
- They're "dead men walking" without him
- Abdali under pressure to stay
- Big battle inevitable
2. The Holkar-Najib Relationship
The Paternal Bond:
- Unusual relationship across enemy lines
- Father-son dynamic
- Mutual respect
- Previous mercy shown
Why It Mattered:
- Saved Holkar's life at Panipat
- Saved Bhau's wife's life
- Allowed escape from total disaster
- Personal relationship > political alliance
The Questions:
- Was this planned beforehand?
- Did Bhau know about this relationship?
- Was Holkar's "responsibility" a cover for escape plan?
- Did he really fight at all?
3. The Witness Problem
No Verification:
- Holkar says he fought for first few hours
- Then focused on saving women
- But "no witness to this"
- Only his account
The Suspicion:
- Maybe he left earlier?
- Maybe never really fought?
- Used "responsibility" as excuse?
- Preserved his forces deliberately?
4. The Philosophical Split
Holkar's Beliefs:
- Never believed in frontal warfare
- Surgical strikes only
- Guerrilla tactics (Ghanimi kawa)
- Shivaji's methods
- Panipat-style battle = "calamity"
Why This Matters:
- Fundamental disagreement with Bhau's plan
- Never bought into the strategy
- Left first chance he got?
- Or genuinely trying to save civilians?
5. The Personality Conflict
Bhau's Arrogance:
- Looked down on Holkar
- "Just a little bit"
- Dismissive attitude
Holkar's Resentment:
- Felt disrespected
- Built up anger
- Less likely to cooperate?
- More likely to abandon him?
6. The Monsoon Trap
The Fatal Timing:
- June 2: reaches Gwalior
- June 2-3: monsoon starts (early!)
- 300 km to go
- 2 big rivers + 1 small river
- All flooding now
The Cavalry Problem:
- Can't use horses in mud
- But can't move 100,000+ people on foot
- Takes 2-3 months walking
- Stuck
The Plan Derailed:
- Was supposed to go directly to battle
- No waiting around
- But rivers made it impossible
- Forced to wait out monsoon?
7. The "If Only" Scenario
Two Months Earlier:
- Rivers shallow in summer
- Could cross easily
- Reach Abdali quickly
- Fight before monsoon
But:
- Situation not critical enough in March-April
- By time it was urgent = too late
- Forced into bad timing
- Timing doomed the campaign
8. The Cultural Conflicts
Suja-ud-Daula's Problem:
- Met with Abdali
- "Positive environment"
- But Shia vs Sunni = cultural conflicts
- Different customs, festivals
- Can't really unite
The Alliance Problem:
- Even potential allies have issues
- Religious divisions
- Cultural incompatibility
- Weak commitment
9. The Hedging Behavior
Northern Powers:
- Waiting to see who wins
- "Who will float, who will sink"
- Not committing
- Playing both sides
- Madho Singh secretly helping Abdali
The Problem:
- No solid allies
- Everyone hedging bets
- Can't trust anyone
- Isolated
10. The Rohilla Desperation
Why They Won't Let Abdali Leave:
- "Dead men walking" without him
- Marathas will wipe them out
- Led to Dattaji's killing = vengeance coming
- Najib Khan = treacherous reputation
- No chance alone
The Pressure:
- Constantly begging Abdali to stay
- "Can't go back until problem solved"
- Won't let him leave
- Abdali trapped too
Geographic Context
The Route:
- Barhampur (April)
- Ronj (April 18)
- Narmada area
- Narwar valley (historic Shivaji connection)
- Gwalior (June 2)
- 300 km to Anupshara (in Doab)
- 2 big rivers + 1 small river in between
The Doab:
- Between Yamuna and Ganga
- Fertile area
- Where Abdali positioned
- Where battle will happen
Delhi Area:
- Holkar operating around Delhi
- Doing surgical strikes
- Harassing Abdali's forces
- Not strong enough for frontal battle
Where We Left Off
The Situation:
- Bhau at Gwalior (June 2)
- Monsoon just started (early!)
- 300 km to go, multiple rivers to cross
- Can't use cavalry in mud
- 100,000+ people stuck
- Holkar already operating near Delhi
- Suraj Mal will meet Bhau near Agra
- Abdali wants to leave but Rohillas won't let him
- Najib Khan = "dead man walking" without Abdali
- Everyone waiting to see who wins
The Questions:
- How long stuck by monsoon?
- When can they cross the rivers?
- Will they reach Abdali before he leaves?
- Is Holkar reliable given his resentment?
- Will the father-son relationship between Holkar and Najib matter?
- Can they trust any of these northern allies?
The race against time was already lost. June 2nd and the monsoon arrives early - right on schedule to destroy any hope of a quick campaign. Bhau is 300 kilometers away with multiple swollen rivers in between and 100,000 people who can't move through the mud. Meanwhile, false rumors are being spread that Abdali is leaving - but the truth is darker: Najib Khan has Abdali in a death grip. "You can't leave until the Maratha problem is solved." And the Maratha problem is stuck in the monsoon, watching the rivers rise, wondering how they'll ever cross. The father-son bond between Holkar and Najib Khan will matter later - when Holkar uses it to escape with Bhau's wife on someone's back while the battle is lost. But that's months away. Right now, in June, with the rain pouring down, the only question is: can they even reach the battlefield?
Bhau's March Speed: Defending Against the Critics (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The March from Sindakhed: Why Leave in March?
The Dilemma
When Bhau Left:
- Departed from Sindakhed in March 1760
- Three months before monsoon begins (early June)
Why This Was Problematic:
- Three months = not enough time for large army
- Had to cross multiple rivers
- Cover enormous distance (850 miles)
- Would get stuck when monsoon hits
The Calculation:
"June 5th or 7th, monsoon begins. Everybody knows that."
What Happens:
- Leave in March
- Travel for 3 months
- End up reaching target around mid-June
- Right when monsoon floods everything
- "Then you're grounded. You have to be grounded."
Why Leave So Late Then?
The Urgency
The Problem:
- Shinde and Holkar armies in the north
- "Totally ineffective"
- Getting beaten up
- Losing control of the situation
The Necessity:
"Something had to be done."
The Trade-off:
- Bad to leave in March (monsoon timing)
- Worse to stay in Pune (lose the north)
- No good options
- Had to respond
The Reality:
- They couldn't defend themselves
- "Nobody will take them seriously"
- Tax collection would stop
- Tribute collection would stop
- Everything would collapse without reinforcement
The Critics' Argument
What People Say
The Common Criticism:
"Bhau's army was going too slow. Why did it take so long to get to the north?"
The Logic:
- Had he reached Delhi before June 5-7 (before monsoon)
- Would have been "a different matter"
- Could have created favorable conditions
- Everything would have been reversed
The Claim:
"Had Bhau been there earlier, then he would have created a very tough situation for Abdali."
The Counterfactual:
- Get there earlier = defeat Abdali
- Win the battle with Abdali
- Change the whole situation in his favor
- Victory instead of disaster
The Defense: Army Speed in the 18th Century
The Author's Rebuttal
The Core Argument:
"At that time the army used to travel at a very slow pace."
Why This Matters:
- This wasn't Bhau being slow
- This was normal for 18th century armies
- Criticism doesn't make sense
- "It wasn't feasible" to go faster
Historical Army Speed Comparisons
Example 1: Farrukhsiyar (1722)
Who He Was:
- Mughal Emperor
- From the book "Army of the Mughals" by Irwin (1713)
His March:
- September 23, 1722: Left Patna
- January 4, 1723: Reached Agra (Sarai Begum)
The Math:
- Took ~4-5 months
- That's the pace of Mughal armies
- "That was kind of a given"
Example 2: 1723 March (Also from Irwin)
The Statistics:
- 106 days to cover 585 miles
- Works out to ~5 miles per day
The Significance:
"That's a very slow pace."
Comparing to Bhau:
- Bhau did 850 miles in 120 days
- Works out to ~7-8 miles per day
- Actually better than the Mughals
The Verdict:
"So he wasn't as bad, you know, he was competitive. Better than that."
Example 3: Bajirao Vishwanath & Hussain Ali (1718)
Who They Were:
- Bajirao Vishwanath = Peshwa at the time
- Bajirao I also went with him (as his son)
- Hussain Ali = one of the Sayyid Brothers
The Mission:
- Went from Aurangabad to Delhi
- 98 days to complete the journey
Why They Went:
- Rescue people taken hostage by Aurangzeb
- Shahru, his mother, stepbrothers, others
- They were taken to Delhi
- Went with small army to get them back
The Other Goal:
- Secure the Chaut (one-fourth tax) from Mughal Emperor
- Get Subhas (provinces) in their name
- This was when they secured those rights (1718)
The Distance:
"Aurangabad to Delhi is a much shorter distance than from Pune to Delhi."
Yet:
- Still took 98 days
- With a small army
- Much lighter than Bhau's force
Bhau's Special Handicap: The Artillery
Why Bhau Was Even Slower
What He Carried:
- Heavy artillery
- Long-distance French cannons
- Massive guns
The Problem:
"Someone literally had to be pushing or these horses had to be pulling these cannons."
The Reality:
- Not horses - bulls pulled the cannons
- "Horses don't do it. It's the bulls."
- Bulls had to be very strong
- "They could only walk at a certain pace"
Why He Brought Them:
- Believed in the artillery
- Had seen it work at Udgir battle against Nizam
- Long-distance artillery was his ace
- "He was a believer"
The Calculation:
"Nobody knew who would win [without the artillery]. It would be a toss-up."
His Confidence:
"He believed that [artillery] will give him the win."
The Dholpur Stop: One Month Camp
What Happened
At Dholpur:
- Bhau "just camped and stayed there for a month"
- Not moving, just waiting
Even With That:
"So even with that, his overall speed wasn't too slow."
The Calculation:
- Including the one-month Dholpur stop
- His average speed still competitive with historical armies
- Still did ~7-8 miles per day overall
The Bottom Line
The Verdict on Bhau's Speed
The Conclusion:
"In the 18th century, when armies travelled long distance, that is how it was. So he was not doing anything below par."
Even Accounting For:
- One month stopped at Dholpur
- Heavy artillery slowing him down
- Massive army (80,000+ soldiers + 50-60,000 civilians)
- Terrible timing (monsoon)
Still:
- Competitive with historical examples
- Actually faster than Farrukhsiyar
- Only slightly slower than Bajirao/Hussain Ali (who had small, light force)
Key Comparisons Table
| Army | Year | Distance | Time | Speed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farrukhsiyar | 1722 | Patna â†' Agra | 4-5 months | ~4-5 mi/day | Mughal emperor, typical pace |
| Irwin Example | 1723 | 585 miles | 106 days | ~5 mi/day | Standard Mughal army |
| Bajirao & Hussain Ali | 1718 | Aurangabad â†' Delhi | 98 days | ~6-7 mi/day | Small army, shorter distance |
| Bhau | 1760 | Pune â†' Delhi | 120 days | ~7-8 mi/day | Heavy artillery, huge army, stopped 1 month |
The Monsoon Problem Revisited
Why It Mattered So Much
The Timing:
- March departure = arrives mid-June
- Monsoon begins early June
- Soggy earth, flooded rivers
- "Not meant for armies to be on march"
- Animals can't walk properly
- Bullock carts stuck
The Historical Pattern:
"Nobody did that in India ever because generally armies went to battle probably by November."
The Scale:
- 80,000+ soldiers
- 50-60,000 civilians
- "Like big village moving" from place to place
Why Critics Miss the Point
The Constraints Were Real
What Critics Ignore:
- 18th century armies were slow - that's just how it was
- Heavy artillery - bulls can only move so fast
- Massive scale - 130,000+ people total
- Rivers to cross - took month just for Chambar (small river!)
- No better alternatives - had to leave in March (Shinde/Holkar losing)
What Would Have Worked:
- Leave in November or December (previous year)
- Arrive by March/April (before monsoon)
- Plenty of time to position forces
- Cross rivers when they're low (pre-monsoon)
- Fight in favorable conditions
Why That Didn't Happen:
- Situation in north wasn't critical yet in late 1759
- By time it became urgent (Jan/Feb 1760)
- Too late to arrive before monsoon
- Forced into bad timing
The Artillery Question
Why Not Leave It Behind?
Holkar Later Says:
- Store heavy guns at Gwalior fort
- Use cavalry for quick movements
- Do surgical strikes instead
- Gherao (surround) tactics, not frontal battle
Why Bhau Disagreed:
- Seen artillery work at Udgir
- Confident it would win the battle
- "Only thing he could believe in"
- Without it = total toss-up
- "Nobody knew who would win"
The Trade-off:
- Artillery = confidence in victory
- Artillery = slow march = bad timing
- But without it = maybe no chance at all?
Critical Themes
1. The Impossible Choice
Leave early with incomplete preparation, or leave late and get caught by monsoon. There was no good option by March 1760.
2. The Technology Paradox
Artillery might win the battle, but it guarantees you'll arrive at the wrong time. Faster march might mean better timing, but losing the battle anyway.
3. The Historical Context
Criticism of Bhau's speed ignores that no 18th century army moved faster with that kind of scale and equipment. He actually beat historical averages.
4. The Constraints Compound
- Heavy artillery (slow)
- Huge army (slow)
- Multiple rivers (slow)
- One-month stop (slow)
- Monsoon approaching (time pressure)
- Still faster than Mughal armies
5. The Counterfactual Problem
"If only he'd gotten there earlier" assumes he could have gotten there earlier. The historical evidence suggests: no, he couldn't.
Where We Left Off
The Situation:
- Bhau's speed was competitive with 18th century standards
- Actually better than Mughal armies
- But still arrived right as monsoon hit
- The timing was forced by March departure (responding to crisis)
- The critics have a point about timing
- But miss the constraints that made faster march impossible
The Question:
- Could anyone have done it faster?
- Or was the disaster baked in once they left in March?
- The historical evidence suggests: once you leave in March with heavy artillery and a massive army, you're screwed by monsoon no matter what you do.
The critics say Bhau was too slow. The historical record says he was actually pretty fast for an 18th century army carrying heavy artillery. But both miss the real point: the disaster wasn't the slow march - it was the impossible choice between abandoning the north or marching into monsoon. By March 1760, there were no good options left.
Army Speed Debate & The Contradictory Letters (June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The 18th Century Army Speed Defense
Marg Akraman - The Rate of March
What It Means:
- Marg = path
- Akraman = traversing on the path
- Talking about "the time it took to cover x miles"
The Author's Point:
"Basically in the 18th century the army used to travel at the rates that he already mentioned. That was the normal practice. That's what he is saying."
The Comparison:
- On par with 17th century armies
- On par with 18th century armies
- This was just how armies moved
The Dholpur Stop: One Month Explained
Why He Stopped
The Duration:
"Even if we consider his rate or speed, or considering the fact that he stayed or camped at Dholpur for one month..."
Why One Month?
"He was waiting for certain factions or some contingents to come there so that he can decide upon his diplomatic reach, the kingdom, how to go."
The Purpose:
- Deliberations
- Strategic planning
- Waiting for different groups to arrive
- Diplomatic coordination
- "Now I recall" - this was mentioned before
The Verdict:
"But even considering that one month, he still was on par with what armies used to travel in the 18th century in terms of their speed."
The Conclusion:
"He wasn't so far behind on that front."
Nana Fadnavis's Report from Sirhonj
Writing to His Uncle
Who Wrote:
- Nana Fadnavis (or Fadni)
- From Sirhonj
- To his uncle
- About "what was happening there"
The Pathan Moves: Ramgad Taken
The Report
What Happened:
"Pathan came to Ramgad, which they took away from Jat - so that is Sureshwar Jat."
- Pathans (Afghans) took Ramgad
- It was previously controlled by Sureshwar Jat
- Now in Afghan hands
The Siege of Itawa
Maratha Stronghold Under Pressure
Itawa:
- A city
- Maratha stronghold
- Had Maratha presence there
What Happened:
"Najib Khan and Jahan Khan basically laid a siege (morche) so that Marathas won't be able to reinforce their troops or do any such thing."
The Strategy:
- Cut off reinforcements
- Isolate the Maratha garrison
- Prevent supply lines
- Trap them inside
Hafiz Rahimat Khan: The Peace Offering?
The Rohilla Overture
Who He Was:
- Another Rohilla commander
- Different from Najib Khan
- Senior Rohilla figure
What He Did:
"He may have come to see if he can switch Sureshwar Jat from his new priority position towards Abdali."
Salukha:
- Means reconciliation
- "But reconciliation with whom?"
- Speculating: with Abdali
- Trying to negotiate
The Mission:
- Came to Sureshwar Jat
- On behalf of Abdali
- Saying "let's negotiate and find a way out"
- Peace overture
The Two-Faced Game
The Contradiction
On One Hand:
- Hafiz Rahimat Khan offering reconciliation
- "Let's talk, let's negotiate"
- Peace feelers
On The Other Hand:
- Najib Khan and Jahan Khan planning to attack
- Maratha presence in Itawa under siege
- Active military operations
The Assessment:
"So he's saying that their actions don't jive. They're playing a two-faced game. They cannot be believable or they cannot be trusted."
The Conclusion:
- Afghans/Rohillas not acting in good faith
- Peace talks = stalling tactic?
- Or genuine split between Rohilla commanders?
- Can't trust them
Nana's Strategic Advice
Waiting for Bhau
The Letter Closes:
"Proper action or deliberations will be done once Bhau gets into Mathura."
The Plan:
- Wait for Bhau to reach Mathura
- Mathura on the banks of Yamuna
- Take appropriate actions then
- Coordinate strategy once he arrives
June 4, 1760: Departing Gwalior
The March Continues
The Location:
"4th of June 1760, Bhau started off from Gwalior. Today it is in Madhya Pradesh."
The Route:
- Left Gwalior
- Crossed a small river on 4th of June
- Came to the banks of Chambar river
The Chambar River: Tributary to Yamuna
Why This Matters
Upanadi:
- Means tributary
- Chambar = tributary to the Yamuna
The Situation:
"He now is on the banks of Chambar river. And he has to cross it in order to get to Yamuna or to Mathura."
The Chambar Crossing Problem
Multiple Issues
Problem #1: Monsoon
"The problem with crossing Chambar is first and foremost now the monsoon is coming or is already there."
The Timing:
"4th of June is not too far away from 7th of June" (when monsoon typically begins)
Problem #2: Ravines on Both Banks
"Chambar river, both the banks were not horizontal. There are ravines all over the banks - it's not a flat land."
What This Means:
- Can't just walk up onto the bank from the river
- Ravines = steep gullies and cliffs
- "Small ravines and stuff"
- Difficult terrain
Problem #3: The Cannons
"So you can't really bring these huge cannons through there."
The Challenge:
"It was difficult because he has to carry all the cannons and elephants. Everything has to go across the river. And that's where he got bogged down."
How Long It Took: 8-10 Days
The Struggle
The Duration:
"It took him like 8-10 days to cross Chambar."
By June 8, 1760:
- Finally crossed Chambar
- Came south of Dholpur
- Entered Jat territory
Dholpur:
- Part of Jat territory
- Sureshwar Jat's domain
The Shivaji Connection
The Same Road
Historical Echo:
"Dholpur also was - Shivaji also passed through Dholpur on his way back [from Agra]. That's where he said 'I am Shivaji.'"
Narvar Gati:
- Little bit south of Dholpur
- Where the famous declaration happened
The Route:
"So the road was the same road actually. When you are going from south to north or north to south, there were not too many roads you can take."
The Infrastructure:
- Only one main route
- "One of one"
- "Rough roads - not really concrete or anything"
- "Not quality"
Now in Jat Territory
Meeting Sureshwar Jat
The Location:
"Now he is in Jat territory. Sureshwar Jat - that is his territory now. So he may meet with him or talk to him."
Forces Converging: End of June
The Merger Begins
South of Dholpur:
- Bhau got together with [someone from] Dholpur
End of June:
"Jankoji Shinde and the Shinde army joined him."
The Result:
"So now it's all coming together - into one big group."
Understanding Maratha Confederacy
The Political Structure
What It Was:
"You have to understand, Maratha rule was a confederacy. Confederacy means the Marathas, they were split into different factions."
The Geographic Distribution:
- One faction in Indore
- One in Gwalior
- One around Delhi
- One in Gujarat
The Command Structure:
"All these, they have their own separate commanders. But they all reported to Nanasaheb Peshwa."
The Freedom:
"In their own areas they had some amount of freedom."
Why:
"The acreage or the geographical extent was so big that Peshwa could not say that all of them is my rule. It just wouldn't work."
The Parallel:
"Even Mughals were the same way - they had their own vassal kings and stuff like that."
The Intelligence Exchange
What Holkar and Shinde Knew
The Information:
"Now Holkar and Shinde, they were aware of what negotiations were taking place between Hafiz Rehman Khan and Mr. Jat."
What They Did:
"They informed Bhau of what those negotiations were, how they were going on."
Why It Mattered:
"Because it was important - if there was something that Bhau can pick up on, if Abdali is willing to compromise or there is something that they can agree upon, then it would turn into a different mission."
The Hope:
- Maybe avoid battle
- Find diplomatic solution
- If Abdali willing to negotiate
- Change the whole mission
The Kaifiyat: Bhau's Personal Record
What It Is
Kaifiyat:
"It's kind of Bhau is talking. His story. Somebody wrote up his story or as though he is telling what he was going through each and every day of the campaign."
Like An Autobiography:
"Kaifiyat is actually his own daily diary, you can say."
Who Wrote It:
"Somebody was writing because basically he was not writing at all because he has so many things to look after. But somebody observed him throughout the campaign, talking about what he was going through each and every day."
The Record:
- Daily account
- From Bhau's perspective
- Observer writing it down
- Personal thoughts and experiences
The First Contradictory Letter: "Don't Come"
From Holkar & Shinde in the Doab
Their Location:
"Raja Sri Malharji Holkar and Jankoji Shinde were in the Antarvedi."
Antarvedi/Doab:
"The same thing as what we call it: Doab. The area between Yamuna and Ganga."
What They Wrote:
"From there they sent letters that: 'Saheb (meaning Bhau), do not come forward.'"
Why They Said This:
- "Don't hurry up coming in the Doab"
- "Because situation is not favorable to us"
- "It may be unstable"
- Just speculating about reasons
Their Alternative Proposal
Send Reinforcements, Not Yourself
What They Asked:
"Send forces to augment our force. Send backup, reinforcements. But don't come yourself - that's what I understand."
Their Claim:
"They are saying if you send us backup, then we ourselves will defeat Abdali's forces in the Doab."
The Implication:
"So you don't have to bring your army across Yamuna River. We will do it for you."
Their Attitude:
"They were just trying to be showing that we are in control and everything is good. We're handling it."
The Reality:
"But that's probably an ego."
The Status Argument
Why Bhau Shouldn't Come
Their Reasoning:
"If you yourself come into the Doab to fight with Abdali and his forces, then your respect (Ahab) will go down."
The Logic:
"For you to come here it shows that Abdali is your equal rival. But it doesn't dignify the Peshwa or his family member coming."
What They're Saying:
- You don't have to come
- We will take care of it
- Should not be giving Abdali too much respect
- Or too much status
- Doesn't deserve Bhau coming to the Doab
- Beneath his dignity
The Second Contradictory Letter: "We Need You!"
The Complete Opposite
Now They're Saying:
"But [then] we are no longer... [different message]. Or this is some commentary on the letter."
The Real Assessment:
"The Gilche (Afghans) - Afghan army is too strong. And unless both of us get together, unify, we won't be able to defeat them."
Tolna:
- Means to balance
- Need to balance against them
- Can't match them alone
The New Narrative:
"So this is a kind of the other narrative. They are basically saying, Gilche means Afghan army is too strong. So we have to come together as all factions of the Maratha contingent. Then only we will be able to balance them. And then we can effectively give them befitting reply."
The Contradiction Analysis
Two Opposite Messages
Message #1:
- Don't come yourself
- Send reinforcements
- We got this
- Would lower your status
- We're in control
Message #2:
- Afghan army too strong
- Need everyone together
- Can't defeat them alone
- Must unify all factions
- Please come
The Question:
- Which one is true?
- Are these from different times?
- Different people?
- Changed assessment?
- "I don't know what exactly is happening here"
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Supreme Commander | Moving from Gwalior, crossed Chambar |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Commander | In Doab, sending contradictory messages |
| Jankoji Shinde | Commander | In Doab, joined Bhau end of June |
| Nana Fadnavis | Clerk/Intelligence | Writing reports from Sirhonj |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla Chief | Besieging Itawa |
| Jahan Khan | Afghan Commander | Besieging Itawa with Najib |
| Hafiz Rahimat Khan | Rohilla Commander | Offering reconciliation to Sureshwar Jat |
| Sureshwar Jat | Jat King | Territory entered by Bhau, being courted by both sides |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| June 4, 1760 | Bhau leaves Gwalior, crosses small river |
| June 4, 1760 | Reaches banks of Chambar River |
| June 4-13, 1760 | Struggles to cross Chambar (8-10 days) |
| June 8, 1760 | Finally crosses Chambar |
| June 8, 1760 | Arrives south of Dholpur, enters Jat territory |
| End of June 1760 | Jankoji Shinde and army join Bhau |
| End of June 1760 | Forces beginning to converge |
Geographic Context
The Route:
- Gwalior (June 4 departure)
- Small river crossing
- Chambar River (8-10 days to cross)
- South of Dholpur (same road Shivaji used)
- Jat territory
- Headed toward Mathura (on Yamuna)
The Doab:
- Between Yamuna and Ganga
- Where Holkar and Shinde already are
- Where letters coming from
- Target destination
Itawa:
- City in the region
- Maratha stronghold
- Under siege by Najib Khan and Jahan Khan
Critical Insights
1. The 18th Century Speed Defense
The Argument:
- This was normal speed for armies
- Even with one month stop at Dholpur
- On par with historical examples
- Can't criticize for being slow
- That's just how armies moved
The Implication:
- Critics are anachronistic
- Expecting modern speeds
- Ignoring historical context
- Bhau wasn't unusually slow
2. The Chambar Disaster
The Small River Problem:
- Took 8-10 days to cross
- Ravines on both banks
- Monsoon starting
- Cannons extremely difficult
- Elephants struggling
The Warning Sign:
- If small tributary takes 10 days
- How long for Yamuna? (much bigger)
- Foreshadowing the river crossing disaster
- Geography defeating them
3. The Confederacy Problem
The Structure:
- Multiple independent factions
- Own commanders
- Own territories
- Loose coordination
- Report to Peshwa but have freedom
The Challenge:
- Hard to unify command
- Different priorities
- Ego conflicts
- Communication delays
- Not a unified army
4. The Contradictory Messages Mystery
Possibility #1: Ego Then Reality
- First: proud, think they can handle it
- Then: realize they can't, need help
- Pride before reality check
Possibility #2: Different Sources
- Different commanders
- Different assessments
- Not coordinated
- Confusion
Possibility #3: Deliberate Confusion
- Trying to keep options open
- Hedging their bets
- Not committing
- Playing politics
Possibility #4: Time Gap
- Situation changed between letters
- First: before seeing full Afghan strength
- Second: after engagements, now scared
5. The Status Game
The Argument:
- If Bhau comes = elevates Abdali
- Makes him equal rival
- Lowers Bhau's dignity
- Should send subordinates
The Problem With This:
- Abdali is serious threat
- Not acknowledging reality
- Ego over tactics
- Status concerns vs survival
The Irony:
- They want reinforcements
- But claim they're winning
- Can't have both
- Contradiction reveals truth
6. The Diplomatic Chaos
Multiple Simultaneous Tracks:
- Hafiz Rahimat Khan offering reconciliation
- Najib Khan & Jahan Khan besieging Itawa
- Sureshwar Jat being courted by both sides
- No coordinated Afghan strategy?
- Or deliberate confusion tactic?
The Assessment:
"Their actions don't jive. Playing two-faced game. Cannot be trusted."
The Question:
- Is this Afghan confusion?
- Or strategic ambiguity?
- Keep opponents guessing?
- Genuine split between commanders?
7. The Siege Strategy
Itawa Under Siege:
- Cut off Maratha stronghold
- Prevent reinforcements
- Isolate garrison
- Systematic approach
The Pattern:
- While offering peace talks
- Also conducting siege warfare
- Talk and fight simultaneously
- Keep all options open
8. The Kaifiyat Record
Why It Matters:
- Personal perspective
- Day-by-day account
- Bhau's thoughts and experiences
- Primary source for understanding decisions
The Problem:
- Written by observer, not Bhau
- How accurate?
- Filtered through someone else
- Possibly self-serving account
9. The Monsoon Timing Disaster
The Math:
- June 4: at Chambar
- June 4-13: crossing Chambar (10 days)
- June 7: normal monsoon start
- Already too late
- And this is just a small tributary!
The Implication:
- If tributary takes 10 days in monsoon
- Yamuna impossible
- Stuck until monsoon ends
- Campaign timeline destroyed
10. The Historical Road
The Route:
- Same road Shivaji used
- Only main route north-south
- Rough, unpaved
- No alternatives
- Predictable movements
The Problem:
- Enemy knows where you're going
- Can't surprise them
- Limited options
- Terrain dictates strategy
The Two Narratives
Narrative #1: We're Winning
From Holkar & Shinde:
- Don't come, send reinforcements
- We got this under control
- Would lower your status to come
- Abdali not that serious
- We're handling it
The Subtext:
- Keep credit for ourselves
- Don't want Bhau taking over
- Ego and territory protection
- "We're in control"
Narrative #2: We're Desperate
Also From Holkar & Shinde:
- Afghan army too strong
- Need everyone together
- Can't defeat them alone
- Must unify all factions
- Please help us
The Subtext:
- Actually scared
- Overwhelmed by Afghan strength
- Need backup desperately
- Reality setting in
Where We Left Off
The Situation:
- Bhau crossed Chambar (took 10 days!)
- South of Dholpur, in Jat territory
- Jankoji Shinde joining him (end of June)
- Headed toward Mathura (on Yamuna)
- Holkar and Shinde already in Doab
- Sending contradictory messages
- First: don't come, we got this
- Second: Afghan army too strong, need everyone
The Questions:
- Which message is true?
- Are Holkar and Shinde reliable?
- Why the contradiction?
- Can they actually hold Doab without Bhau?
- How long will Yamuna crossing take (if Chambar = 10 days)?
- Is Abdali offering genuine peace talks?
- Or stalling while besieging Itawa?
- Will forces unify properly?
- Or maintain separate commands?
The Chambar crossing took 10 days for a small tributary. The letters from the Doab say two opposite things in the same breath: "Don't come, we're handling it" and "Afghan army too strong, need everyone." One of these is true. One is pride. The monsoon has started. The Yamuna still ahead. And somewhere in the contradiction between those two letters is the truth about how desperate the situation really is.
The Strategic Split: Bhau vs Holkar & The Caste Insult (June 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Bhau's Financial Crisis: The Letter to Pune
June 26, 1760
Who He Wrote To:
- Nanasaheb Peshwa (through Nana Fadnavis)
- Nana Fadnavis = clerk/administrator, handled correspondence
The Main Message:
"We are planning to destroy or get rid of the enemy (Abdali's force). And when that happens, everything will be set right."
The Revenue Problem
The Strategy
What Bhau Was Doing:
"Wherever we go, we try to get revenue from that area so that we are not putting too much strain on the treasury."
The System:
- Move through territory
- Extract tributes
- Get revenue from local areas
- "Taking care of our expenses as much as possible"
The Leadership Vacuum: Dattaji's Death
The Crisis
What Happened After Dattaji Fell:
"Since Dattaji Shinde has fallen, there are a lot of conflicts happening within our camp."
Why This Mattered:
- Dattaji = handled the northern front for Marathas
- Since he's dead = no clear leadership
- Conflicts between different commanders
- "It's becoming difficult to manage"
The Strife:
- Internal disputes
- Power struggles
- Chain of command unclear
- Unity fractured
The Revenue Ultimatum
Until Dasara (Festival Date)
The Question:
"Where would I get our revenues to support our force?"
The Order:
- Send letters to Mamlidars (revenue officers in different areas)
- They should provide enough revenue to support the army
- "This is a little bit older Marathi" (hard to translate precisely)
The Moral Dilemma: Looting vs. Reputation
The Conflict
The Option:
"We could rob and put pressure on the locals to get our money or revenues, but that will not look good."
The Concern:
- If they harass local people
- If they pressure local societies
- If they pressure local kingdoms
- "We will not be perceived nicely"
The Reputation Problem:
"We won't look like the good guys."
The Grim Reality
The Conclusion:
"But we don't have any alternative. That's why I have written this letter."
What This Means:
- Will have to loot
- Will have to pressure locals
- "Wherever we go, we have to get money"
- Only way = force locals to pay up
- Not stealing, but forced extraction
The Letter's Purpose:
- Asking for alternative revenue sources
- But if none = will loot anyway
- Just giving Peshwa a heads-up
Suraj Mal Jat Joins the Cause
The Meeting
What Happened:
- Suraj Mal Jat came to see Bhau
- Showed willingness to join Maratha camp
- Against Abdali's forces
The Welcome:
"Bhau went out of his camp to welcome Suraj Mal Jat into their midst."
- Big ceremonial greeting
- Sign of respect
- Important alliance
The Unlikely Alliance: Former Enemies Unite
The Reconciliation
The History:
"Once upon a time, Suraj Mal Jat and Imad-ul-Mulk were enemies."
Now:
- They've come together
- Joined Maratha force
- United against Abdali
Why:
"Abdali was such a force that people knew they cannot stay on the fence unless they have a reason to be."
The Calculation:
- Both knew they had to pick a side
- Staying neutral = getting destroyed by Abdali
- Maratha side suited them better
- Former enemies = now allies
Holkar's Hospitality: Three Months at Bharatpur
Where They Stayed
The Arrangement:
"For the last three months, Holkar and his army had taken the hospitality of Suraj Mal Jat at Bharatpur."
What "Hospitality" Meant:
- 15,000-20,000 soldiers had to be fed
- Had to be given salary
- Had to be protected (from Abdali's vicious forces)
- Bharatpur = well within Suraj Mal Jat's territory
The Demoralized Northern Forces
Why They Were Hiding
The Situation:
- Holkar's force lost morale
- Shinde's force lost morale
- "Both armies were beaten by Abdali forces"
What They Were Doing:
- Staying away from Abdali's wrath
- Doing surgical strikes here and there
- But not dealing with them face-to-face
- "Not going toe-to-toe"
Why:
"They had seen the power of Abdali's force."
The Strategy:
- Saving their strength
- Waiting for Bhau to arrive
- Preserving forces
- Playing it safe
Suraj Mal: The Political Expert
Why He Was Valuable
His Background:
- Friends with Shuja-ud-Daula from way back
- "Friends for some long time"
His Knowledge:
"Suraj Mal was very well versed in the conspiracies and politics of the North."
Why This Mattered:
- He was at stone's throw from Delhi
- More or less around Agra
- Agra = not far from Delhi
- Understood who was on whose side
- Knew all the conspiracy and intrigue
For Bhau:
- "He was very important"
- Could understand what's going on
- Could help form strategies
- Insider knowledge of northern politics
The War Council: First Meeting Goes Badly
The Setup
When It Happened:
"On this occasion, the discussion about the war took place on the first day of the meeting."
Who Was There:
- Suraj Mal Jat
- Holkar
- Shinde
- Bhau
The Significance:
"Main players from the Maratha side had gotten together."
The Purpose:
- Figure out how to counter Abdali's force
- Coordinate strategy
- Unite the different factions
The Disagreement Emerges
The Problem
What Happened:
"When these meetings were taking place for the first time, there was some disagreements coming to the surface between the main players."
The Core Issue:
- Not on the same page
- Different views on how to fight
- "Disagreements about how to go to battle with Abdali and how to defeat his force"
The Old Guard Position: Surgical Strikes
Holkar & Suraj Mal's View
Their Strategy:
"We should not have a frontal battle with Abdali. We should apply pressure on him by doing various surgical strikes and bringing him to his knees."
What This Means:
- No frontal confrontation
- Hit-and-run tactics
- Surgical strikes (Shivaji style)
- Wear them down
- Make enemy "dilapidated and losing morale"
The Philosophy:
"Hack away at their ankles."
The Tradition:
"So far, Maratha forces had never done frontal warfare."
When Did Marathas Do Frontal Battles?
The Exceptions
Who Did Frontal Battles:
- Shinde forces
- Malhar Rao Holkar forces
Against Whom:
- Weaker enemies only
- Rajputs
- Suraj Mal Jat (in the past)
- Small players
- Rohillas
Against Nizam:
- Yes, they did frontal battle
- In the south (Bhau's experience)
- With heavy artillery (Udgir)
But:
"This was a different matter. This is a whole different ballgame and scale and enemy as well."
The Experience Gap
Who Knew Abdali?
Bhau's Inexperience:
"Bhau had not had any experience of dealing with Abdali's force."
Holkar & Shinde's Experience:
"Malhar Rao Holkar and Shinde army, they had dealt with these guys and they knew how ferocious these people were."
The Knowledge:
- They knew firsthand
- "Not any standard army"
- This was a different animal
- More dangerous than anyone else
Their Advice:
"Instead of frontal attack and frontal battle, let's do a variety of peripheral surgical strikes and bring them to their knees."
Bhau's Counter-Argument: The Artillery Solution
Why He Disagreed
His Belief:
"Bhau came to believe in the long-distance artillery."
His Experience:
- Used it against the Nizam
- "With a lot of deadly force"
- Saw how effective it was
His Strategy:
"I know how to deal with it and let's not worry about surgical strikes because it will take time."
The Problem with Surgical Strikes:
- "We will have to do a cat and mouse game"
- Takes too long
- Abdali might leave
- Not decisive
His Preference:
"Instead, I believe we should go to battle, just frontal battle."
Holkar's Specific Advice: Store the Guns
The Old Timer's Wisdom
Who Holkar Was:
- "An old timer"
- "A little older man also"
- Never done frontal battles
- Didn't believe in them
His Recommendation:
"Keep the heavy guns in the Gwalior fort along with some other heavy artillery, heavy pieces, elephants and stuff."
Why:
- They'll be safe at Gwalior
- Fort can protect them
- Gwalior = to the south (behind them)
- Fort already there
What to Bring Instead:
- Take the cavalry force
- "Quick moving"
- Use them for surgical strikes
- Do Gherao (surrounding) tactics
What to Leave Behind:
- Cannons (too slow, too vulnerable)
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi's 10,000 musketeer force
- Heavy artillery
- Elephants
His Reasoning:
"Holkar did not believe in it. He said just keep them there and let them not get into the battle. We don't need them."
Holkar's Expertise: Master of Cavalry
His Style
What He Was Good At:
"Malhar Rao Holkar was expert in using the cavalry force in a very effective manner and quick movements."
His Teacher:
- Previous mentor = Bajirao I
- Learned cavalry tactics from the master
- Hit-and-run, quick strikes
His Objection:
"This is not the way we fight battles in the north, because it's all flatland and it's not going to be good for us."
His Inexperience:
- Never seen big cannons in action
- "He has never been confronted with big guns"
- No evidence for himself that they work
- Can't believe in them
The Fundamental Divide
Two Philosophies Clash
Bhau's View:
- From the south
- Came with intention of frontal battle
- Big guns are the key
- Long-distance French cannons
- Ibrahim Khan's training and technology
- "Deep trust" in this approach
Holkar's View:
- Northern warfare expert
- Not comfortable with cannon strategy
- Flatland = different tactics needed
- Never seen it work
- Doesn't sit right with him
The Caste Weapon: Bhau's Arrogance
The Insult
What Bhau Said:
"I will not listen to a Zamindar (landowner) and a shepherder."
What This Meant:
- Zamindar = just a landowner (Suraj Mal Jat)
- Shepherder = shepherd boy with few hundred sheep
The Aurangzeb Echo:
- Aurangzeb used to call Shivaji "Zamindar"
- Dismissive term
- Means: you're just a local nobody
About Holkar Specifically:
"He's a shepherd man, you know, who has this few sheep, like few hundred sheep in charge of him."
Why This Was Devastating:
- Holkar came from a caste that looked after sheep
- Not warrior caste
- Not Brahmin caste
- Lower caste
The Brahmin Superiority
The Caste Hierarchy
Bhau's Status:
- Brahmin = high caste
- "Superior, so-called superior caste"
- Intellectual class
- Religious authority
Holkar's Status:
- Shepherd caste
- Lower caste
- "Lowly caste, you know, shepherd boy type"
Why Bhau Weaponized This:
"He basically is looking down upon him as someone who doesn't understand the art of warfare as much as he does."
The Dismissal:
- You're not educated enough
- You're not smart enough
- You're not high-born enough
- I won't listen to you
The Reaction: Holkar's Fury
Who Was Insulted
Malhar Rao:
- Took it as an insult
- Deeply offended
Suraj Mal Jat:
- Also insulted (called "Zamindar")
- Also offended
Holkar's Reported Response
What He Said:
"This arrogant Brahmin is going to learn some, learn it the hard way. And that is only right."
The Translation:
- You're going to get what's coming to you
- You deserve to fail
- Reality will humble you
- And I'm not going to help you
The Resentment:
- Not just tactical disagreement anymore
- Now it's personal
- Now it's about respect
- Now it's about caste hierarchy
Key Players
| Name | Role | Position | Caste/Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sadashiv Rao Bhau | Supreme Commander | Frontal battle, artillery | Brahmin (high caste) |
| Malhar Rao Holkar | Veteran Commander | Surgical strikes, cavalry | Shepherd caste (lower) |
| Suraj Mal Jat | Jat King | Surgical strikes, local expert | Landowner/"Zamindar" |
| Jankoji Shinde | Commander | Demoralized, at Bharatpur | - |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery Chief | 10,000 musketeers, French guns | - |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| March-June 1760 | Holkar & Shinde sheltering at Bharatpur (3 months) |
| June 26, 1760 | Bhau writes to Nanasaheb Peshwa about financial difficulties |
| Late June 1760 | Suraj Mal Jat joins Maratha camp |
| Late June 1760 | Main players gather for war council |
| Late June 1760 | Strategic disagreement emerges |
| Late June 1760 | Bhau insults Holkar using caste-based dismissal |
Strategic Disagreements Matrix
On Tactics
| Issue | Holkar/Suraj Mal | Bhau |
|---|---|---|
| Battle Type | Surgical strikes, Gherao | Frontal battle |
| Weapons | Cavalry (quick movement) | Heavy artillery (long-range) |
| Heavy Guns | Store at Gwalior fort | Bring to battle |
| Musketeers | Leave behind | Bring (Ibrahim Khan's 10K) |
| Philosophy | Hit-and-run (Shivaji/Bajirao) | Stand and fight (Nizam tactics) |
| Terrain | Use north India flatland cleverly | Doesn't matter with cannons |
| Time | Slow, wear them down | Fast, decisive battle |
Critical Insights
1. The Financial Strain
The Reality:
- Army is expensive
- No reliable revenue source
- Must loot or get local revenue
- But looting = bad reputation
- Catch-22 situation
The Scale:
- Need revenue until Dasara (festival months away)
- Massive army to feed and pay
- No treasury support from Pune
- Living off the land
2. The Leadership Vacuum
Dattaji's Death:
- Created power struggle
- Multiple commanders, no clear leader
- Conflicts within camp
- Unity breaking down
The Problem:
- Who's in charge in the north?
- Bhau is coming but not there yet
- Holkar? Shinde? Suraj Mal?
- Confusion and strife
3. The Experience vs. Confidence Divide
Holkar & Shinde:
- Fought Abdali's forces
- Got beaten
- Scared of them
- Know how dangerous they are
- Want caution
Bhau:
- Never fought Abdali
- Confident in artillery
- Saw it work against Nizam
- Doesn't understand the fear
- Thinks northern generals are cowards
4. The Philosophical Split
Two Ways of War:
- Shivaji's doctrine (hit-and-run)
- European doctrine (line battles)
Maratha Identity:
- Built on guerrilla warfare
- Never done massive frontal battles
- This is new and uncomfortable
Bhau's Innovation:
- Trying to modernize
- Adopt European tactics
- Use advanced weapons
- But army not trained for it
5. The Caste Poison
What Should Have Been:
- Tactical disagreement
- Debate the merits
- Find compromise
- Unite for common enemy
What It Became:
- Caste-based insult
- Personal attack
- Resentment and anger
- Division and mistrust
The Consequences:
- Holkar won't forgive this
- Suraj Mal also insulted
- Unity destroyed
- Cooperation impossible
6. The Reputation vs. Survival Trade-off
The Moral Dilemma:
- Need money desperately
- But looting makes you the bad guy
- Can't protect people if you're robbing them
- Can't win war if you're broke
The Choice:
- Loot and lose legitimacy
- Or don't loot and lose the war
- No good options
7. The Old Guard vs. New Guard
Generational Gap:
- Holkar = old school, experienced, cautious
- Bhau = new generation, confident, aggressive
- Neither will listen to the other
- Age and experience dismissed by youth
- Innovation dismissed by tradition
8. The Expertise Paradox
Who Should Lead?
- Holkar has northern experience
- Knows Abdali's capabilities
- But hasn't won against him
- Maybe his caution is why he's still alive?
Bhau's Position:
- Has won battles with artillery
- But never fought Afghans
- Confidence based on different enemy
- Will it translate?
The Warning Signs
Why This Meeting Was Ominous
Red Flags:
- Financial crisis - looting for revenue
- Leadership vacuum - Dattaji's death causing conflicts
- Demoralized forces - Holkar & Shinde beaten, scared
- Strategic split - fundamental disagreement on tactics
- Inexperience - Bhau never fought Afghans
- Arrogance - Bhau dismissing experienced advice
- Caste insult - personal resentment poisoning cooperation
- Disunity - everyone pulling different directions
The Pattern:
- Internal division
- External threat (Abdali)
- Financial pressure
- Tactical confusion
- Personal animosity
- Recipe for disaster
The Two Paths Not Taken
Path 1: Holkar's Way
What If They'd Listened:
- Store heavy guns at Gwalior
- Use cavalry for quick strikes
- Avoid frontal battle
- Play to Maratha strengths
- Wear Abdali down over time
Problems:
- Takes months (monsoon already here)
- Abdali might leave
- No decisive victory
- Continued financial drain
- But: might avoid total defeat
Path 2: Compromise
What If They'd United:
- Bhau brings artillery as backup
- Holkar leads cavalry strikes
- Combined strategy
- Use both approaches
- Respect each other's expertise
Why It Didn't Happen:
- Bhau's arrogance
- Caste-based dismissal
- "Won't listen to shepherder"
- Personal insult destroyed trust
- Unity impossible after that
Where We Left Off
The Situation:
- Main commanders finally together
- Immediate strategic disagreement
- Holkar/Suraj Mal: surgical strikes, store the guns
- Bhau: frontal battle, bring the artillery
- Bhau insults Holkar using caste weapon
- "Arrogant Brahmin" vs. "Shepherd boy"
- Holkar furious, resentful
- Unity destroyed before battle even starts
The Question:
- Can they repair this rift?
- Will Holkar cooperate?
- Or has the caste insult doomed them?
- What happens when personal pride meets military necessity?
The war council should have been where they united against Abdali. Instead, it became where Bhau called Holkar a lowly shepherd and destroyed any chance of cooperation. The enemy wasn't just outside the camp anymore - it was inside too. Arrogance, caste prejudice, and clashing egos were about to kill more Marathas than Abdali's guns ever would.
Bahu's Arrogance & Leadership Divisions Before Panipat
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fatal Confidence Problem
Bahu's Conviction:
- Absolutely certain in his artillery and long-range cannons
- Dismissive of northern commanders' advice to use traditional tactics
- Looked down on Shinde and Holkar clans for suggesting cavalry harassment (gunny mikawa)
- Wanted frontal, artillery-heavy battle instead
Why He Was Confident:
- Had used artillery successfully against the Nizam earlier
- Brought Ibrahim Khan Gardi specifically for cannon expertise
- Believed artillery = guaranteed victory
The Fatal Flaw:
- His experience was limited to southern Indian warfare (Deccan)
- Didn't understand northern plains warfare
- His overconfidence would prove to be the battle's undoing
- Abdali was a veteran with decades of war experience; Bahu was relatively inexperienced
The Northern Commanders Withdraw
Suraj Mal Jat:
- Zamindari class (landowner/administrator)
- Proposed using traditional surgical strike tactics (cavalry-based harassment)
- Insulted by Bahu's dismissal of his advice
- Eventually refused to fight despite initially coming with 10,000 soldiers
Holkar:
- Called "Mendha Paar" (sheep herder caste - source of tension)
- Also advocated for traditional surgical strike methods
- Joined battle but abandoned it early
- Had relationship with Najib Khan Rohila (Afghans' side)
- Najib gave him safe passage to escape when battle turned disastrous
- Never wanted this head-on battle in the first place
Why This Mattered:
- Lost two crucial commanders who knew northern warfare tactics
- Bahu's ego alienated the very men who could have saved him
- Northern plains ≠ Deccan mountains (no retreat option)
Why Bahu Rejected Holkar's Advice
Guru Ramchandra Baba Factor:
- Bahu's teacher/guru was Ramchandra Pant Baba
- Baba had worked for the Shinde army in previous career
- Shinde and Holkar clans had long-standing rivalry
- Baba was anti-Holkar, taking Shinde's side
- Bahu inherited this prejudice from his guru
The Consequence:
- Let personal grievances override tactical wisdom
- Ramchandra Baba had poisoned him against Holkar
- Ignored sound military advice because of clan politics
Dattaji Shinde vs. Holkar: Different Philosophies
Dattaji Shinde:
- Loyal to the death for the Peshwa
- Willing to take fatal risks for duty
- True soldier/warrior mentality
Holkar:
- Life philosophy: "Sheer salamat, pagdi pachas"
- Translation: "If your head is intact, you can have 50 headdresses"
- Meaning: Save yourself first; everything else can be regained
- Not a warrior mentality but a survival/merchant mentality
- Wouldn't sacrifice his life even for Peshwa
The Difference:
- Shinde = warrior class commitment
- Holkar = administrator/survivor mentality
- Both had merit, but clash in existential war
The Najib Khan Factor
Holkar's Debt:
- Saved Najib Khan's life in 1757
- Najib was forever grateful (debtor to Holkar)
- Called Holkar his "godfather"
Strategic Implication:
- When war turned against Marathas, Najib gave Holkar safe passage
- Holkar survived when others didn't
- His "sheer salamat" philosophy proved useful
- But his early exit hurt the Maratha cause
The Irony:
- Holkar's mercy toward enemies (like Najib) came back to help him escape
- But his absence meant fewer leaders when battle was critical
The Red Fort Revenge
The Background:
- Dattaji Shinde was killed by Afghans (Kutub Shah was blamed)
- Kutub Shah: Afghan general who taught in the fort
- Precious Maratha war elephant was taken as war booty
The Vengeance:
- When Marathas finally took the Red Fort
- Found Kutub Shah hiding inside
- Took him prisoner and beheaded him publicly
- Recovered the precious elephant
- Lesson taught to other Afghan defenders
Historical Justice:
- Marathas got partial revenge for Dattaji's death
- But couldn't get Dattaji back
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1757 | Holkar saves Najib Khan's life |
| Before Panipat | Bahu dismisses northern commanders |
| Early battle | Suraj Mal refuses to fight |
| Battle in progress | Holkar abandons Marathas, escapes with Najib's help |
| Later | Red Fort captured, Kutub Shah beheaded |
Critical Analysis
Why the Withdrawals Mattered:
- Bahu lost ~10,000 (Suraj Mal) + experienced Holkar
- Forces reduced at crucial moment
- Lost access to traditional tactics that might have worked
- Artillery alone wasn't enough on open plains
The Leadership Problem:
- Ego > Strategy
- Prejudice (inherited from guru) > Tactical wisdom
- Class resentment (treating landowners as inferior) > Pragmatism
- Arrogance about limited experience > Respect for veterans
The Human Element:
- Holkar's philosophy of survival actually made him more tactical (avoid frontal war)
- But his philosophy also meant he left when things got difficult
- Pragmatism vs. heroism tension that would define Maratha weakness
Key Phrase
"Sheer salamat, pagdi pachas" = "If your head is intact, you can have 50 headdresses" = Survive first, everything else follows
This encapsulates Holkar's approach: Live to fight another day. Not dishonorable, but when everyone fights to the last man, this becomes a liability.
Where We Left Off: Before Panipat's final battle, Bahu had already lost his two best allies through his own arrogance and inherited prejudices. He faced Abdali with fewer commanders, no traditional warfare strategies, and an unwavering commitment to an artillery strategy that would fail on the northern plains.
Bahu's mistake was not in choosing artillery—it was in thinking artillery was enough. The Marathas had always won through a combination of tactics: hit-and-run, terrain knowledge, surgical strikes. Now he wanted to copy European warfare on plains where the Europeans hadn't even arrived yet. And he did it while actively driving away the men who could have told him why this would fail. Ego destroyed what ability might have built.
The Road to Panipat: Logistics, Rivers & Strategic Gambles
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Monsoon Problem
The Geographic Trap:
- Yamuna swollen from monsoon (4-5 km wide, impossible currents)
- No armies could cross during monsoon in pre-modern India
- Marathas came too late in summer (June/July arrival)
- Monsoon conditions: 3-4 days nonstop rain, then respite, then rain again
- Absolutely no historical precedent for monsoon warfare
The Time Pressure:
- Marathas couldn't wait for monsoon to pass (September-December)
- Food supplies and troop salaries unsustainable
- Money was scarce—couldn't afford extended campaign
- Had to fight or go home
The Dilemma:
- Geographic condition (monsoon) made fast movement impossible
- Financial condition (lack of funds) made slow waiting impossible
- Solution: Get to Delhi, get resources, then engage Abdali
The Delhi Campaign (July-August)
The Initial Success:
- Sent forces ahead with heavy artillery
- Red Fort was heavily defended but guns broke it open
- Fort walls pulverized by Maratha cannons
- Yakub Khan (defender) sought negotiated exit
Dattaji's Revenge:
- Kutub Shah (Afghan general who killed Dattaji Shinde) was found hiding in Red Fort
- Kutub Shah was beheaded publicly as revenge
- Precious war elephant (taken by Afghans earlier) was recovered
- Justice delivered but bitter
The Strategic Achievement:
- Controlled Delhi and the fort
- This was major victory politically
- BUT treasury was empty—Delhi had been looted already
- Morale boosted but finances not
The Game-Changer: Abdali Crosses Yamuna
The Setup:
- Marathas thought monsoon + Yamuna = Abdali stuck on east bank
- Bahu sent spies to watch crossing points
- Confident Abdali couldn't/wouldn't cross
August 25th Shock:
- Abdali successfully crossed Yamuna with full army
- Now on same side as Marathas
- Massive strategic surprise—game changer
Why It Mattered:
- Eliminated Yamuna as barrier
- Made direct confrontation inevitable
- Shifted from siege warfare to open battle
- Reduced Maratha tactical options to zero
The Gambhir River Obstacle
A Tributary That Almost Broke Them:
- Even crossing Gambhir River (tributary to Yamuna) took 1 month
- Ghod Pachad = "Horse-Taker" (currents swept away mounted soldiers)
- Vortexes and swirling currents made crossing impossible
- Monsoon swelling made every water crossing nightmarish
The Meaning:
- If small tributary took a month, Yamuna crossing would be months
- Delayed Marathas' southern movement significantly
- Lost precious time
The March to Panipat
The Sequence:
- Crossed Gambhir after 1 month of delays
- Moved quickly toward Agra (south of Delhi)
- Agra was empty and looted (no resources)
- Moved further south toward Panipat
- Found Abdali camped south of Panipat
The Standoff:
- Both armies ~10 km apart near Panipat
- Neither could advance without blocking the other
- Abdali wanted to go back to Afghanistan (tired, army exhausted)
- Marathas wanted to go back home (money running out)
- But neither could bypass the other peacefully
The Inevitable:
- Both understood battle would be "humongously violent"
- Both wanted to avoid it
- But paths were completely blocked
- Only option: Fight
The Delhi Conquest
Bahu's Strategy:
- Once Yamuna crossing impossible, redirected to Delhi
- Sent Shinde, Holkar, Suraj Mal, Imad-ul-Mulk with forces
- Planned to capture fort and extract resources
The Reception Problem:
- Mughal emperor wanted Maratha help
- BUT was terrified of 80,000-90,000 Maratha soldiers
- Dilemma: Need them but don't trust them
- Worried Marathas would put own person on throne or demand tribute
Why This Mattered:
- Couldn't trust Delhi to cooperate openly
- Had to use artillery to force the issue
- Destroyed Red Fort somewhat in the process
- Got victory but hollow (empty treasury)
The Politics of Ambition
Suraj Mal's Gambit:
- Wanted to be emperor/caretaker in Delhi
- Proposed himself to Marathas as replacement
- Marathas refused (wanted Peshwa or Peshwa's son Vishwas Rao)
- Never actually fought despite being there
The Real Plan (Secret):
- Marathas wanted Vishwas Rao (Peshwa's son) as figurehead in Delhi
- Peshwa would rule from distance (proxy)
- Problem: Delhi society expected Muslim/Mughal on throne
- Hindu or Maratha king would destroy political legitimacy
- So kept it secret to avoid dissension
Why Suraj Mal Left:
- His proposal was rejected by Marathas
- Didn't want to fight for someone else's victory
- Took his 10,000 soldiers home (or at least didn't fully participate)
The Financial Crisis
The Numbers:
- Daily expenses: Over 100,000 (currency units)
- Mouths to feed: Soldiers + pilgrims + religious seekers + emperor's family
- Income from Delhi: Zero (treasury was empty)
- Couldn't pay Gardi's gun commanders (critical bargain)
The Constraint:
- Could delay soldiers' salaries somewhat
- Could NOT delay Gardi payment (contractual obligation)
- 9,000-10,000 artillery men had to be paid
- This was the #1 commitment
Historical Debate: Sardesai's Interpretation
Different Historian's Take:
- Bahu originally wanted to cross Yamuna in July and fight Abdali there
- When that proved impossible, switched to Delhi plan
- Eventually realized Delhi offer no escape from Abdali
- Had to commit to fight near Panipat by default (no other choice)
This Changes the Narrative:
- Wasn't strategic brilliance to go to Delhi
- Was desperation and tactical adjustment
- Hoped quick Delhi victory would give resources for real battle
- Instead, got reputation boost but empty pockets
Geography as Destiny
The Terrain Trap:
- North Indian plains: Open, flat, no mountains
- Opposite of Deccan (Marathas' home)
- Monsoon swells all rivers to impassable levels
- No good defensive positions
- Have to fight in open
Why This Matters:
- Marathas evolved for hill warfare (Shivaji's legacy)
- Required full adaptation for plains warfare
- Artillery worked but wasn't total solution
- Needed different army composition, different tactics, different mindset
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Late June | Marathas reach Yamuna, too swollen to cross |
| July | Attempt to capture Delhi regions |
| July-August | Red Fort attack and capture |
| August 25 | Abdali crosses Yamuna (game changer) |
| August-September | Gambhir River crossing delays (1 month) |
| September-October | Move toward Panipat |
| Late October | Both armies camped near Panipat, 10 km apart |
| January 1761 | Battle of Panipat (finally) |
Key Strategic Failures
- Timing: Arrived too late in season (monsoon not over)
- Logistics: Insufficient funds for extended campaign
- Trust: Couldn't work openly with Delhi authorities
- Geography: Stuck in open plains (worst terrain for Marathas)
- Coordination: Lost Suraj Mal's active participation
The Fundamental Problem
Why They Had to Fight:
- Can't retreat (financial situation unbearable)
- Can't wait (monsoon conditions unsuitable)
- Can't bypass Abdali (physical paths blocked)
- Can't negotiate satisfactorily (too many demands)
Solution: Fight and hope artillery wins. But hope is not strategy.
Where We Left Off: Both armies positioned near Panipat, separated by ~10 km. Financial pressure, monsoon conditions, and blocked paths have made battle inevitable. Bahu has lost Suraj Mal's support, sustained heavy expense with no financial return, and faces a veteran commander (Abdali) on terrain where traditional Maratha tactics don't work. The clock is ticking—supplies are running out, soldiers are unpaid, morale is uncertain.
The monsoon that should have been their ally became their enemy. The rivers that should have blocked Abdali couldn't block him. The time that should have given them options had run out. Every choice they made—going to Delhi, waiting for Yamuna to cross, staying committed to the campaign—seemed right at the time but collectively created a trap with only one exit: battle.
The Delhi Conquest & The Three-Way Power Struggle
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Nana Purandare's Opening Statement
The Historical Record:
- Nana Purandare was a key contemporary chronicler
- Made a statement assessing the situation before major battle
- Key observations:
- Marathas took Delhi and its riches
- Abdali moved his horses across Yamuna
- Yamuna is bottomless/not shallow (payab nahi) = impassable
- Chances for battle are increasing
- Peace only comes when you totally destroy the enemy
The Prophecy:
- Understood that this was heading toward decisive confrontation
- Neither side could back down without losing face
- Victory would require complete annihilation of opposition
The Red Fort Siege: Three Days to Conquest
The Advanced Force:
- Bahu sent advance detachments before arriving himself
- They breached Asad Burj (tower/section) where defenses were weak
- Witthal Shivadev (prominent Maratha commander) led penetration
- His soldiers entered and began looting inside
The Defense Collapses:
- Yakub Khan defended the fort for only 10 days
- When looting started inside, defenders panicked and fired
- Killed many Marathas but couldn't stop the assault
- Main gate stayed locked—full Maratha army couldn't get in easily
Bahu Arrives July 29:
- Advanced forces made progress but weren't enough alone
- Took 3 days of active battle after Bahu's arrival to finish
- Full conquest achieved by early August
The Artillery Breakthrough:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi deployed cannons
- Focused on outer lookout points (burus)
- Bombarded buildings and structures inside
- Created havoc but forced surrender rather than destruction
The Surrender Negotiation
Yakub Khan's Predicament:
- Was hoping Abdali's forces would rescue him
- Realized rescue wasn't coming
- Called for negotiations
His Demand:
- Wanted safe passage for his soldiers to leave fort
- Wanted: "Let my forces exit with safety and security"
- Basically a right of escape/safe corridor
What He Got:
- Bahu granted safe passage
- Yakub Khan left the fort with his men on Ashawin Miralia (date in text)
- Fort surrendered without complete destruction
The Three-Way Fight for Delhi Control
Immediately After Surrender:
Imad-ul-Mulk's Demand:
- Wanted complete control of the Red Fort itself
- Wanted reinstatement as Wazir (Prime Minister) of Mughal Empire
- Had fled earlier after blinding/killing the emperor
- Wanted to use Maratha victory to reclaim his old position
Suraj Mal Jat's Demand:
- Wanted control of entire Delhi town (not just fort)
- Wanted to be political kingmaker/power broker in Delhi
- Had ambition of sitting on throne himself (or having surrogate there)
- Represented Jat interests in north India
Bahu's Position:
- Refused both demands
- Wouldn't give Imad control of fort (didn't trust him)
- Wouldn't give Suraj Mal control of Delhi (not acceptable to Marathas)
- Basically said: "This doesn't fit our plan"
The Bribe & The Backroom Deal
The Kumbher Incident:
- Shinde Horkar managers took bribes from Imad
- Amount: 1-1.5 lakhs (large sum)
- In exchange: Promised Imad the Wazir position
- This was done at Kumbher
The Problem:
- Bahu's refusal to accept Imad destroyed the deal
- Managers who took bribes now faced angry creditor (Imad)
- Promised something (Wazir position) they couldn't deliver
- Created enemies among Maratha officers
The Agra Exchange Scheme
The 1752 Contract Background:
- Marathas had contract with Mughal emperor
- Controlled Agra and Ajmer districts for tax collection
- Revenue source for Maratha war effort
Suraj Mal's Proposal to Imad:
- "Give me Agra's tax rights"
- "I'll give you Delhi fort + Wazir position"
- Basically: Remove Marathas from Agra, put Jat in control
- Would have been major wealth transfer to Suraj Mal
Why Bahu Blocked It:
- Couldn't afford to lose Agra revenue
- Would cripple Maratha finances
- Suraj Mal would benefit at Maratha expense
- All three parties (Imad, Suraj Mal, Gangadhar/Ramaji) were trying to exploit the situation
The Rohila-Jat Connection: Hafiz Rehmat Khan
The Outside Pressure:
- Hafiz Rehmat Khan (Rohila commander) visited Suraj Mal
- Suggested Marathas shouldn't cross Chambar River (boundary)
- Meant: "Keep out of the north"
The Strategy:
- Hafiz Rehmat is a Rohila (Afghan-origin)
- Different from Najib Khan (they have Afghan affinity but no camaraderie)
- His pitch to Suraj Mal: "We're all northerners"
- "Why welcome Marathas? They'll usurp power forever and make us servants"
- Proposed: "Let's ensure they don't come north"
Suraj Mal's Interest:
- Agreed with Hafiz's logic
- Wanted to be king or kingmaker in Delhi
- Threatened by Maratha dominance
- Preferred Afghan competition to Maratha occupation
The Conspiracy Logic:
- All three (Imad, Suraj Mal, Hafiz) saw Marathas as threat
- Each had own ambition for Delhi
- Better to keep Marathas out than submit to them
- Planned to exploit Maratha military power, then eject them
Bahu's Response: The September 27 Letter
What Bahu Wrote:
- Refused to hand over fort to Imad (coward who abandoned fort twice)
- Yakub Khan demanded guarantees from Shinde, Holkar, Jat, and Imad before surrendering
- Bahu offered: Safe passage from him + two chiefs, or else attack continues
- Refused to give Imad any guarantee (didn't trust him)
The Implication:
- Bahu understood the corruption (bribes to managers)
- Knew Imad was unreliable (had fled before)
- Wasn't going to let this opportunity be exploited
- Took direct control of fort himself
The Power Vacuum Problem
What Bahu Did:
- Took control of Delhi fort
- Gave administrative control to: Suraj Mal, Imad-ul-Mulk, Gangadhar Tatya, Ramaji Anant
- This was supposed to be temporary/administrative
What Started Happening:
- Inter-rivalry between the factions developed
- Each trying to strengthen own position
- Each trying to exploit victory for own gain
- Bahu soon discovered the machinations
The Exploitation Plan
How They Saw It:
- Suraj Mal, Imad, and others needed Maratha military power
- Couldn't break Red Fort without Ibrahim Khan's cannons
- Used Marathas to achieve military objective
- Then planned to exploit victory for own political gain
Their Logic:
- "Use Maratha artillery to win"
- "Then renegotiate terms"
- "Remove them from power structure"
- "Install ourselves"
Bahu's Rejection:
- Said clearly: "This is not going to work"
- "This is not going to fly"
- "You're trying to play me for a fool"
- "I didn't come here to be exploited"
The Inter-Maratha Tension
The Shinde-Holkar Complication:
- Shinde Horkar managers took Imad's bribes
- Created obligation to support Imad
- But Bahu's guru (Ramchandra Pant) was anti-Holkar
- Shinde clan was more loyal to Peshwa
- These internal Maratha divisions weakened negotiating position
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Early August | Advance forces breach Asad Burj |
| July 29 | Bahu arrives at Delhi |
| August 1-3 | Full assault on Red Fort |
| August 3-4 | Red Fort surrenders |
| After surrender | Three-way power struggle begins |
| Kumbher incident | Managers take bribes from Imad (timing unclear) |
| Late August/September | Bahu discovers machinations |
| September 27 | Bahu writes his refusal statement |
Key Insights
The Military Reality:
- Marathas had military power (artillery, organization)
- Others had local knowledge, legitimacy, resources
- All needed each other but wanted to exploit
The Trust Problem:
- Imad was untrustworthy (had fled, had blinded emperor)
- Suraj Mal was ambitious (wanted whole Delhi)
- Managers were corruptible (took bribes)
- Bahu was isolated (couldn't trust any of them fully)
The Delhi Trap:
- Military victory ≠ Political victory
- Could take fort but couldn't hold it politically
- Every local player wanted to exploit the situation
- Bahu had to prevent others from using Maratha power against Marathas
The Northern Politics:
- Everything was negotiable except power itself
- Everyone willing to take bribes
- Everyone claiming legitimacy (Mughal, Jat, Afghan)
- No shared vision of what Delhi should be
The Central Paradox
Bahu's Victory:
- Conquered Delhi fort (military success)
- Prevented exploitation (political success)
- But created enemies (Imad, Suraj Mal, potentially Hafiz Rehmat)
- Left himself managing hostile city with unstable allies
The Cost:
- Couldn't trust local allies
- Couldn't depend on promises
- Had to maintain direct control (resource-intensive)
- Created rivals who would later undermine him
Where We Left Off: Bahu has secured Delhi militarily but failed to secure a stable political settlement. Every local actor (Imad, Suraj Mal, Hafiz Rehmat) sees Marathas as exploitable or threatening. The fort is under Maratha guns but the city remains politically fragmented. Bahu suspects conspiracy between Hafiz Rehmat, Suraj Mal, and others to eventually eject Marathas from north. Trust has collapsed and he's about to face Abdali while managing a hostile Delhi.
Bahu won the battle for Delhi but was losing the battle for Delhi. Conquest was easy—the cannons did that. But keeping what he conquered while preventing others from using his own power against him? That was the real war. And he was fighting it alone, without trustworthy allies. That's when you know victory is hollow.
Delhi Under Maratha Control: The Political Standoff at Yamuna
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Machinations Behind Delhi's Fall
The Secret Deal:
- Suraj Mal & Imad-ul-Mulk made a proposal to each other
- Suraj Mal promised to give Imad the Delhi fort + Wazir position
- In exchange, Imad would give Suraj Mal the Agra province
- Plan was to take Agra's taxes away from Marathas (who controlled it)
Why Bahu Rejected It:
- Bahu learned of the machinations
- Refused to allow this rearrangement
- Had his own plans for Delhi
The Fallout:
- Suraj Mal became disturbed (his plan blocked)
- Gangadhar Tatya & Ramaji Anand (Suraj Mal's advisors) even more upset
- They had taken bribes from Imad for promising his wazir position
- Now faced angry creditors with no delivery on promise
- This is why Suraj Mal abandoned the fight (when he realized Bahu's true intention)
Bahu's Victory, But At What Cost?
The Reputational Gains:
- Taking Delhi fort = huge boost to prestige
- Everyone in India now knew Marathas controlled Delhi seat of power
- Proof of Maratha dominance over Mughal structure
- Massive psychological impact
The Financial Disaster:
- Delhi treasury was empty
- Previous rulers had looted everything
- Mughal empire had extracted all wealth
- No money to pay army, no money to feed campaign
The New Burden:
- Emperor's family now seeking protection in fort
- Religious pilgrims and seekers expecting Maratha protection
- Elderly people depending on Maratha resources
- Bahu responsible for all of them
The Daily Cost:
- Over 100,000 daily expense (currency units)
- Had to feed soldiers AND civilians AND dependents
- Had to pay salaries (especially artillery)
- Couldn't use Delhi's resources because there were none
The Gardi Payment Problem
The Critical Obligation:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi commanded ~9,000-10,000 artillery men
- This was Maratha's most critical military asset
- Contract: Must be paid regularly, no exceptions
- Could defer soldier salaries somewhat
- Could NOT defer Gardi payment
Why This Mattered:
- Artillery was Bahu's entire strategy
- Gardi men were hand-picked, trained, essential
- If unpaid, would defect or refuse to fight
- This was the #1 bargain Bahu made to get Gardi's expertise
- Non-negotiable commitment
The Abdali Camp's Reaction
When News of Delhi Conquest Reached Them:
- Abdali's camp fell into depression
- Realized Marathas now controlled seat of power
- Delhi = symbol of imperial authority
- This looked like Maratha empire taking over Mughal empire
The Psychological Impact:
- Afghans saw their Mughal allies now serving Marathas
- All vassal kingdoms across India now under Maratha shadow
- Tremendous boost to Maratha self-confidence
- Created urgency for Abdali to act decisively
Letters of Praise:
- Nana Fadnis (scribe) wrote to Peshwa praising Bahu
- Referenced Bahu's wisdom, bravery, strategic brilliance
- Everyone lavishing praise for this accomplishment
- Reputation boost was real (even if finances weren't)
The Yamuna Standoff: Geography as Politics
The Setup:
- Delhi on west bank of Yamuna
- Shahadara encampment on east bank (Suja's forces)
- Abdali & Najib Khan camped further east (Anupshar)
- Marathas took possession of all boats
- Couldn't build boat bridge without boats
Abdali's Humiliation:
- Yakub Khan (Red Fort defender) was looking to Abdali for rescue
- Abdali could do nothing—separated by Yamuna
- Was powerless to save his ally
- Point of honor—seen as weak and ineffectual
- This insulted Abdali and forced his hand
The Maratha Strategy:
- Set up small military camps at all possible crossing points
- Purpose: Spy, not defend (camps were token forces)
- Alert Bahu if Abdali attempts crossing
- Try to catch Abdali in most vulnerable moment (mid-crossing)
The Cat & Mouse Game:
- Abdali wanted to keep crossing location secret
- Marathas trying to discover where he'd cross
- Both armies could see each other but couldn't engage
- Occasional long-range cannon fire (inaccurate, ineffective)
Why Cannon Duels Failed:
- Guns of era were extremely imprecise
- Distance: 2-3 km (beyond effective range)
- If someone got hit, it was by accident, not design
- Couldn't pin down enemy at that distance
- So artillery was useless for Yamuna standoff
The Peace Emissaries
Who Wanted War:
- Abdali had to act (honor compromised by inaction)
- Marathas committed to campaign (spent resources, reputational)
Who Wanted Peace:
- Suja wanted desperately to avoid war
- Realized if Marathas won: loss of power to them
- Realized if Abdali won: loss of power to him
- Either way, Suja had nothing to gain, everything to lose
- Sent diplomats constantly between camps
The Peace Negotiations:
- Lawyers/diplomats going back and forth
- Trying to find middle ground
- Suja was central party to peace efforts
- Offered to broker deals (you get this, I get that)
Why Peace Failed:
- Abdali's honor required action
- Marathas' investment required results
- Suja's offers couldn't satisfy both sides simultaneously
- Geographic situation (armies facing each other) was unsustainable
The Elephant Recovery
The Historical Grievance:
- Precious Maratha war elephant taken by Afghans as booty earlier
- Found it in Red Fort when captured
- Emotional victory—reclaimed cultural/military asset
- Symbolic of Maratha restoration
But Hollow Victory:
- Trophy elephant ≠ payment for troops
- Doesn't solve financial crisis
- Doesn't feed 100,000+ people daily
- Doesn't substitute for Delhi's empty treasury
Delhi: The Empty Prize
Why Delhi Mattered:
- Seat of Mughal power
- Center of all imperial authority
- Symbol of control over India
- Proof that Marathas could conquer anything
Why Delhi Disappointed:
- Treasury looted by previous rulers
- No immediate revenue
- Came with dependents and defense obligations
- Created costs without offsetting income
The Political vs. Financial Reality:
- Politically: Huge success
- Financially: Massive drain
- Reputationally: Incredible boost
- Practically: Disaster for campaign logistics
Why War Became Inevitable
Geographic Factors:
- Two armies facing each other at Yamuna
- Can't bypass without fighting
- Can't ignore without losing face
- Paths completely blocked
Political Factors:
- Abdali's honor demanded action
- Marathas' investment demanded results
- Suja's survival required someone to win decisively
- Too many ambitions, not enough room
Economic Factors:
- Marathas had no more resources
- Couldn't wait indefinitely
- Couldn't advance without Abdali moving
- Couldn't retreat without humiliation
The Conclusion:
- War wasn't chosen—it was inevitable consequence of circumstances
- Both commanders knew it would be devastating
- Both wanted to avoid it
- Neither could do anything but fight
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| July | Marathas control Delhi, fort captured |
| August | Abdali crosses Yamuna (east of Marathas) |
| August-September | Standoff at Yamuna—boats controlled by Marathas |
| September onwards | Peace emissaries trying to negotiate |
| Ongoing | Cat-and-mouse game at crossing points |
| Waiting period | Both armies growing impatient |
The Political Complexity
On Yamuna's Western Bank:
- Marathas with artillery, full force
- Daily expense: 100,000+
- Controlling Delhi, fort, symbolism
- But: Empty treasury, unpaid soldiers, growing desperation
On Yamuna's Eastern Bank:
- Abdali with full Afghan army
- Wanting to go home (tired, supplies running out)
- Honor compromised by inaction
- But: Can't cross without losing soldiers, can't stay indefinitely
Between the Banks:
- Suja trying to negotiate peace
- Diplomats going back and forth
- Everyone seeking middle ground that doesn't exist
- Geography makes war inevitable
Key Insight
The Yamuna as Symbol:
- Represents everything dividing the two armies
- Represents the political/cultural divide (Hindu vs. Afghan)
- Represents the geographic reality that force must decide
- Boats controlled by Marathas = Maratha advantage that Abdali will negate by crossing
When Abdali Crosses:
- Advantage shifts
- Standoff becomes confrontation
- Negotiation becomes violence
- Everything changes
Where We Left Off: Marathas have captured Delhi (reputation enhanced, treasury empty, new dependents added) and are controlling Yamuna crossing points. Abdali is stuck on east side but desperate to act. Suja is trying to negotiate peace but failing. Everyone knows war is coming—the only question is when Abdali will make his move and break the Yamuna standoff.
Delhi was supposed to be the prize that gave Marathas the resources to fight Abdali. Instead, it became the prize that consumed their remaining resources. They got the symbol but not the substance. And now they're trapped on the western bank of Yamuna, controlling all the boats but watching an enemy army that won't be contained by water forever. The standoff can't last. When Abdali moves, everything changes.
The Boundary Dispute & The Holkar Rejection
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Two Competing Visions for India's Future
Bahu's Core Philosophy:
- Internal Indian problems should be solved by Indian powers
- Abdali (an external foreign power) has no business interfering in Hindustan's affairs
- Marathas will decide who rules Delhi and Mughal policy
- This was the reason Bahu came north in the first place
Abdali's Demands: Completely unacceptable on all fronts:
-
Boundary at Sir Hind (not Sindhu River)
- Would give Abdali control of Punjab
- Would give Abdali control of Multan
- Essentially demanding all fertile northern territory
-
Control of Mughal succession
- Shah Alam becomes Mughal emperor (Abdali's choice)
- Shuja becomes Wazir (Abdali's choice)
- Najib Khan becomes Mirabakshi (Abdali's choice)
- Abdali dictating internal Indian politics
-
Marathas restricted to south of Chambal River
- No Maratha say in Delhi affairs
- No Maratha influence on emperor
- Undo 40 years of Maratha expansion (back to 1720 status quo)
The Logic Problem:
- Abdali wanted Marathas to give up everything gained since Bajirao I (1720)
- But Bahu came north specifically to cement Maratha control of Delhi
- These demands were mutually exclusive
- No common ground whatsoever
The Geographic/Geopolitical Breakdown
Bahu's Counter-Position: Sindhu River as Boundary
- West of Sindhu = Afghanistan
- East of Sindhu = India (includes Mughal territory)
- This line includes western Baluchistan today
- Baluchistan is barren, desert, no irrigable land
- But it marks clear separation between Afghan and Indian territories
Why Sindhu vs. Sir Hind Matters:
- Sir Hind = too far south, loses Punjab entirely
- Sindhu = maintains Maratha access to Punjab and northern territories
- Difference: Hundreds of kilometers of fertile territory
The Historical Precedent:
- During Aurangzeb era: Mughal control extended even beyond Attaq (far north/west)
- By Bajirao I (1720): Marathas started expanding north
- Now (1760): Marathas control regions north of Narmada
- Abdali wants to erase this entire expansion = impossible for Peshwa to accept
Najib Khan's "Compromise" Proposal
The Offer:
- Attaq and west of Attaq = Abdali's territory
- Marathas confined to south of Narmada
- Middle region = Mughal emperor's control (includes Punjab)
- More palatable than Abdali's demands but still unacceptable to Marathas
Why Marathas Couldn't Accept It:
- Holkar and Shinde operate north of Narmada
- This proposal would compress their operating space to near zero
- Would eliminate their power base
- Would mean giving up 40 years of conquest
Holkar's Dramatic Response:
- Was personally fond of Najib Khan
- BUT insulted by the proposal itself
- Kicked out Najib's messenger in anger
- Said: "This is not acceptable because I operate here"
- Willing to let Bahu's stricter demands stand rather than accept this compromise
- His anger showed personal relationships couldn't override territorial interests
The Strategic Reality
What Bahu Was Defending:
- Maratha control of Mughal structure
- Maratha say in choosing emperor and wazirs
- Maratha presence in northern plains
- All territorial gains since first Bajirao
What Abdali Was Demanding:
- Return to pre-Maratha status quo (1720)
- Complete withdrawal from northern affairs
- Afghan control of wealth-producing regions (Punjab)
- Abdali as kingmaker instead of Marathas
Why No Negotiation Was Possible:
- Both had incompatible end-states
- Compromise meant someone giving up core interests
- Bahu couldn't retreat without losing the campaign's purpose
- Abdali couldn't compromise without losing face/legitimacy
The Ideological Divide
Bahu's View:
- Marathas = Indian power defending Hindustan's interests
- Abdali = outsider with no legitimate claim
- Indians should decide Indian affairs
Abdali's View:
- I defeated you militarily
- I will decide the terms
- You will accept my boundary and my choice of rulers
- This is the new reality
The Gap:
- Neither could accept what the other was offering
- Neither could see legitimate authority in the other
- Both willing to fight to the death for their vision
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1720 | Bajirao I begins northern expansion |
| 1720-1760 | 40 years of Maratha growth in north |
| September 1760 | Abdali makes his three demands |
| Response period | Najib proposes compromise, Holkar rejects it |
| Throughout | Bahu insists on Sindhu River boundary |
Key Concepts
"Payab Nahi" (No Bottom/No Shallow)
- Yamuna is bottomless—can't be crossed
- Metaphor: These disputes have no bottom; can't find resolution
- Geography = political destiny
Status Quo Ante (1720)
- Abdali wants to return to this
- Marathas refuse to erase 40 years of progress
- This refusal makes war inevitable
The Compromise Trap:
- Najib's proposal looked like splitting the difference
- Actually just meant everyone lost something
- Holkar understood: better to fight for what you want than settle for less
- Sometimes compromise is worse than conflict
Why Holkar's Rejection Mattered
Symbolic Importance:
- Even friendly overtures from the other side are rejected
- Shows Marathas unwilling to negotiate fundamentals
- Demonstrates commitment to current territorial position
Strategic Importance:
- Holkar & Shinde must maintain northern operating space
- Any shrinkage threatens their power base
- They'd rather risk everything in battle than lose territory gradually
Personal Dimension:
- Holkar respected Najib Khan personally
- But could not accept offer that benefited Najib at his expense
- Personal relationships secondary to institutional interests
- Shows loyalty to Maratha confederation > individual friendships
The Fundamental Problem
No Half-Measures Possible:
- Either Marathas control Delhi politics or Abdali does
- Either Punjab is in Indian or Afghan sphere
- Either Chambal is boundary or Sindhu is
- Either Marathas have northern say or they don't
The Stakes:
- For Marathas: 40 years of expansion, empire-building, prestige
- For Abdali: Proving he's supreme in Central/South Asia
- For the region: Who will be dominant power going forward
The Dilemma:
- Can't negotiate when positions are mutually exclusive
- Can't war when both are exhausted
- Can't wait because resources running out
- Must fight, though no one wants to
Where We Left Off: Boundary negotiations have completely collapsed. Abdali has made unacceptable demands. Najib's compromise has been rejected by Holkar. Both sides are firmly committed to incompatible visions. The only remaining question is: who blinks first? Who breaks ranks and makes a concession? Answer: Neither can afford to.
The boundaries they were arguing about were never really about lines on a map. They were about power, legitimacy, and who gets to decide the future of India. Abdali wanted to impose an external order. Marathas wanted to build an internal one. You can't split the difference between those two things. You have to fight to the finish. And that's what they were about to do.
Suraj Mal's Extortion & Bahu's Diplomatic Failures
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Suraj Mal's "Puzzle" (Pets): The Catch-22
The Demand:
- Cancel all tributes Suraj Mal owes to Nana Sahib Peshwa
- Instead of paying, give one diplomat a salary/jagir of 60,000 rupees per year
- This is in "exchange" for joining Maratha forces against Abdali
Why It's Called a "Puzzle":
- Pets = puzzle or something difficult to solve
- It's a catch-22 / lose-lose situation
- If Bahu agrees: Maratha treasury loses enormous revenue
- If Bahu refuses: Suraj Mal might withdraw from alliance (at critical moment)
- Either way, Marathas are screwed
The Leverage Play:
- Suraj Mal knows Bahu desperately needs him
- Knows Bahu is short on money and allies
- Using precarious situation as negotiating tool
- Essentially extorting concessions with threat of withdrawal
Why Peshwa Can't Afford to Lose Revenue:
- Peshwa is obsessed with money and tributes
- Can't spare 60,000 rupees annually
- Can't afford to lose tribute income from Suraj Mal
- These are survival resources for empire
Imad-ul-Mulk's Betrayal: The Wazir Broken Promise
The History:
- Raghunath Rao (earlier Peshwa campaign) promised Imad the Wazir position
- Now Bahu and Nana Sahib Peshwa have gone back on that promise
- They decided Imad is too dangerous/untrustworthy
Why the Reversal:
- Imad is a "rogue character" and "audacious"
- He blinded and imprisoned previous emperors
- He acted like the emperor himself
- These were unpopular and destabilizing actions
- Abdali himself is trying to "right this wrong" by freeing the emperor
The Problem:
- Imad is furious about being cut out
- Knows Bahu promised Wazir position to Shuja instead
- Shuja is his enemy (#1)
- Now Imad is angry and uncooperative
The Core Issue:
- Imad was unreliable even before
- Making him Wazir would give bad image to Marathas
- Would threaten Mughal system stability
- Bahu decided: No way, not happening
- But didn't handle the reversal diplomatically
Bahu's Diplomatic Problem: Harsh Character
The Character Assessment:
- Bahu is NOT a diplomat
- He's a straightforward, harsh disciplinarian
- When he decides something is right, he does it without concern for feelings
- Doesn't care what people think or what X, Y, Z feel
- If you cross him, he becomes "extremely angry"
- He's an angry personality, not a negotiator
The Imad Decision:
- He decided: Imad can't be Wazir (correct decision)
- He implemented it harshly without softening approach
- Could have been done diplomatically
- Instead: "Hell with you, this is what's happening"
- Didn't prepare ground or manage expectations
The Collateral Damage:
- Disturbed Holkar (who suggested traditional tactics)
- Disturbed Suraj Mal (demanding impossible terms)
- Disturbed Imad (promised position now denied)
- Basically: Ruffled feathers in entire Maratha camp and allies
- People felt disrespected and responded with demands/anger
Shuja: The Double Agent Strategy
The Situation:
- Shuja physically in Abdali's camp (forced proximity)
- But promised to look after Maratha interests
- Essentially a spy/double agent for Marathas
Why He Joined Abdali:
- Had no choice when Bahu was distant
- Abdali was there, Marathas weren't
- Abdali would have taken revenge if Shuja refused
- Had to join for own survival
Why He Still Helps Marathas:
- Previous loyalty and past relationships
- Attracted to Maratha side ideologically
- Offered Wazir position by Bahu (incentive)
- Can serve as informant/liaison
The Risk:
- If discovered, will be killed by Abdali
- If exposed, Wazir position would be revoked
- Playing both sides is inherently unstable
- One slip and everything collapses
The Silver Plating Incident
What Happened:
- Marathas found silver plating in Red Fort ceilings
- Used silver plating to mint coins
- Needed money to pay soldiers and buy supplies
- Silver minting was practical survival measure
Suraj Mal's Protest:
- Said this insults the Mughal emperor
- Said they're "stripping his opulence"
- Making big noise about it
The Hypocrisy:
- Suraj Mal's companion Imad murdered TWO emperors
- Delhi was looted three separate times
- Suraj Mal said nothing about those atrocities
- Now complaining about silver plating removal?
- Has zero moral high ground
The Rot of Northern Politics:
- No principle, only opportunism
- Everyone doing whatever serves their interests
- Nobody concerned about consistency or morality
- Suraj Mal: "I want control of Delhi"
- Also Suraj Mal: "Don't melt down the emperor's decorations"
- Complete hypocrisy and rottenness
The Web of Betrayals
Holkar's Secret Relationship:
- Has internal relations with Najib Khan (arch-enemy)
- While officially fighting for Marathas
- Hidden from Bahu
Shinde/Holkar Separate Deals:
- Their lawyers and messengers negotiating independently
- Making separate understandings with Suraj Mal, Imad, Suja
- Acting unbeknownst to Bahu
- Doing it because they have longstanding northern connections
- But completely undermining Bahu's authority
The Information Problem:
- Bahu doesn't know what's happening at his back
- His own commanders making separate deals
- Alliance with Holkar is compromised by his friendship with Najib
- Shinde/Holkar pursuing their own interests
Bahu's Precarious Position
The Situation:
- Surrounded by leeches and sharks
- Being asked for things he can't give (Wazir, tribute cancellation, control of Delhi)
- His own people making side deals
- Running out of money, running out of options
- Running out of allies
Why He Can't Act Against Them:
- Abdali is the primary threat
- If Marathas fight among themselves, Abdali wins
- Can't afford to lose any ally no matter how problematic
- If he alienates Holkar/Suraj Mal, they might join Abdali
- Must keep everyone (barely) on side
The Impossible Calculus:
- Can't give Suraj Mal what he demands (treasury can't afford it)
- Can't deny him without risk of defection
- Can't punish Holkar for Najib relationship (need his army)
- Can't trust Imad but need to keep him neutral
- Can't move without allies but allies are unreliable
The Personality Clash
What Bahu Should Have Done:
- Diplomatic approach to Imad reversal
- Careful negotiation with Suraj Mal
- Managed expectations and hurt feelings
- Built consensus
What Bahu Actually Did:
- Announced decision harshly
- Didn't soften blow for affected parties
- Expected people to just accept it
- Got angry when they objected
- Treated as subordinates rather than equals/partners
The Result:
- Damaged relationships with everyone
- Created resentment in allied camps
- Made people feel disrespected
- Motivated them to extract compensation/conditions
- Turned allies into bargainers
The Core Tragedy
Bahu's Strengths:
- Excellent accountant and administrator
- Good at financial decision-making
- Straightforward, no corruption
- Committed to Maratha interests
- Decisive
Bahu's Weaknesses:
- Not a diplomat
- Too harsh with subordinates
- Not familiar with northern politics
- Angry personality if crossed
- Can't negotiate subtle compromises
The Problem:
- Sent straightforward military administrator to solve diplomatic crisis
- Crisis required subtlety, negotiation, relationship management
- Bahu approached it like administrative problem: "This is wrong, fix it"
- Northern politics required: "How do we achieve this while keeping everyone happy?"
- He did neither
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Earlier campaign | Raghunath Rao promises Imad Wazir position |
| Bahu's campaign | Bahu reverses that promise (Imad still doesn't know) |
| September 1760 | Imad learns Bahu promised Wazir to Shuja instead |
| Same period | Suraj Mal makes "puzzle" demand |
| Simultaneously | Holkar negotiating with Najib Khan (secret) |
| Ongoing | Shinde/Holkar making separate deals with various parties |
Key Insight
The Real Enemy:
- Not Abdali (though he's the military threat)
- But the rottenness of northern politics
- Everyone looking out for themselves
- Nobody understanding bigger picture
- Can't unify against external threat
What Should Have Happened:
- All Indian powers unified against Abdali
- External threat recognized as common enemy
- Internal differences deferred until after victory
- Clear hierarchy and clear orders
- Everyone committed to shared objective
What Actually Happened:
- Everyone trying to get something out of chaos
- Using Maratha army's might for personal gain
- Making separate deals with potential enemies
- Playing multiple sides simultaneously
- No unified purpose
Where We Left Off: Bahu realizes he's dealing with a web of corruption, betrayal, and opportunism. His own commanders making secret deals. His allies making impossible demands. His reversals of previous promises coming back to haunt him. He can't discipline them (needs them), can't trust them (they're untrustworthy), can't unite them (they have separate agendas). He's basically trapped.
Bahu came north to decide India's future. Instead he found that India wasn't ready to be decided. Everyone had their own agenda. Everyone was playing both sides. Everyone wanted payment for cooperation. And he, being a straightforward man in a crooked world, made it worse by being harsh about it. He should have been a politician. Instead he was a soldier. And soldiers don't survive in politics.
The Supply Crisis: From Victory to Desperation
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Why Marathas Came North (The Bigger Picture)
Their Rationale:
- Defending Hindustan's sovereignty against foreign invasion
- Preventing Abdali's hegemony over India
- Sacred duty to stop external aggression (not selfish)
- No one else could negotiate/resist (Mughal too weak)
- Needed to act even though it wasn't strictly their problem
The Problem:
- Most northern allies didn't understand this motivation
- They saw: "Marathas here for their own expansion"
- Thought: "When this is done, Marathas will dominate us"
- Result: Everyone opportunistic, no unified Indian response
The Reality:
- Marathas had no business being there (not their territory)
- But they went anyway because someone had to
- Thought they alone could defend Hindustan's interests
- Everyone else too weak, too divided, or too selfish
The Logistics Problem: Feeding 100,000+ People
The Numbers:
- Bahu's force: 65,000-70,000 soldiers
- Additional noncombatants: 25,000-30,000 (pilgrims, old people, dependents)
- Total: ~95,000-100,000 people
- PLUS: Camels, elephants, bulls, horses, countless animals
- Mobile city traveling through hostile territory
Why This Was Impossible:
- Not modern era: No planes, trains, trucks for supply runs
- Had to source food locally
- Delhi area: Limited food supply
- Need to feed so many mouths daily
- Animals also needed massive food quantities
The Practical Problem:
- Moving this many people = moving a town
- Where do supplies come from in unsupportive territory?
- Citizens in Delhi didn't support Marathas
- No local allies to provide supplies
- No supply chain infrastructure
The Morale Shift: August to September
August 1760: Maratha High Point
- Captured Delhi (symbolic victory)
- Red Fort broken (military victory)
- Abdali's camp in depression/frustration
- Maratha soldiers hopeful
- Afghan soldiers angry at Abdali for keeping them in India
- Marathas looked like winners
Why Afghan Morale Was Low:
- Came to India for loot and quick victory
- Expected 3-4 months max, then go home
- Instead: Now staying 8-9 months (twice expected time)
- Away from families, own lands
- Some had businesses waiting
- Missing important duties back home
- Patience completely worn out
Afghan Army Expectations:
- Abdali shares loot with army (incentive system)
- Soldiers expect: Fight, loot, go home
- Promised: Quick campaign, big treasure
- Reality: Long siege, slow war, no treasure found
- Soldiers losing faith in leadership
August 25: Abdali Crosses Yamuna (The Game Changer)
The Situation:
- Yamuna was monsoon-swollen (supposedly impassable)
- Marathas thought: Abdali can't cross with full army
- Bahu thought: Safe as long as Yamuna separates them
Abdali's Move:
- Found crossing point (spies didn't detect it)
- Successfully moved army to west bank
- Now on same side as Marathas
- Everything changed
The Impact on Afghans:
- After Abdali crossed, morale shifted
- Showed Abdali was decisive/capable
- Meant: Actual battle was coming
- Meant: Maybe quick victory possible
- Restored some hope to demoralized army
The Meaning:
- Abdali went from "stuck on wrong side" to "here to fight"
- His action showed: "I'm committed, ready for battle"
- Army realized: "Okay, we're doing this"
- Psychologically restored some faith
The Resource Comparison
Abdali's Advantages:
- Located in Doab (between Yamuna and Ganga)
- Local rulers supported him (Najib Khan, Rohilas)
- Power elite allied with him
- Could requisition supplies easily
- Had fewer noncombatants to feed
- Full local support network
Maratha Disadvantages:
- Located in Delhi (but no local support)
- Citizens hostile/unwelcoming to Marathas
- Mughal emperor absent (treasury empty)
- No allied rulers in area
- Had massive noncombatant burden
- Zero local support network
The Reality:
- Abdali sitting pretty with supplies flowing in
- Marathas struggling to feed themselves
- Abdali could wait indefinitely
- Marathas running out of time/resources
The Army Composition Problem
Bahu's Army Structure:
- Core force (25,000): Well-trained, disciplined
- Shinde contingent: 15,000-20,000 (from his territory)
- Holkar contingent: 15,000-20,000 (from his territory)
- Misc. hired groups: Various sizes
- Heterogeneous, not unified
The Artillery Problem:
- Bahu's core forces trained in long-range cannon warfare
- Other contingents had NOT seen this style
- Most soldiers grew up with traditional Indian warfare
- Expected: "Two armies face, we advance, hand-to-hand combat"
- Reality: "Cannon fire from 2+ km away, then advance"
- Fundamental mismatch between expectations and tactics
The Skepticism:
- Other contingents skeptical of cannon effectiveness
- Hadn't seen artillery used at scale
- Didn't understand new warfare mechanics
- Weren't trained for this style
- Could cause coordination problems in actual battle
Bahu's Letter to Govind Pan Bundela (August)
Key Message:
- "I have broken the back of the enemy"
- Why? Because Abdali was promising things to Najib Khan
- Now Abdali looks weak (stuck on wrong side of Yamuna)
- Abdali losing credibility with allies
- Abdali considering negotiations over fighting
What Bahu Believed:
- Taking Delhi = took away Abdali's objective
- Abdali came to control Delhi
- Now Marathas control it
- Abdali's mission compromised
- Maybe Abdali will just negotiate and leave
The Reality:
- Bahu was being too optimistic
- Abdali hadn't given up
- Would recover from this setback
- Crossing Yamuna restored his position
- Bahu's confidence in August would be shattered in September
The Shift: Letters Show Desperation
June 26, 1760 (Chambar):
- Spending too much on replacing dead horses
- Can't feed people = can't take care of animals
- Delhi has no government/administration
- No one has resources to help
- This is relatively early—still hopeful tone
September 1, 1760:
- Getting no loans from anyone
- Can't pay soldier salaries
- People going hungry
- Situation worsening fast
September 15, 1760:
- Animals starving (nothing to eat)
- People starving (even high-placed officials going hungry)
- Still no loans available
- Situation "really looking bad"
- Total despair in two weeks
The Money Situation
Where Funds Came From:
- Peshwa allocation (already used)
- Expected tribute/revenue collections
- Expected loans from moneylenders
- Plunder from Red Fort
Where Funds Went:
- Soldier salaries (non-negotiable)
- Cannon crew payments (critical)
- Food for 100,000 people (unsustainable)
- Animal fodder (essential)
- Equipment maintenance
- Daily expenses: Over 100,000
The Income Problem:
- No tributes actually flowing in
- Moneylenders refusing loans (too risky)
- Delhi treasury: Empty (already looted)
- Red Fort: Yielded some silver, but limited
- No consistent income stream
The Pontoon Bridge Mentioned
Govind Pan Bundela's Task:
- Build pontoon bridge across Yamuna
- Would allow easier crossing
- Would enable better supply lines
- Would connect to Doab region
Why It Matters:
- If Marathas could cross Yamuna at will
- Could forage in Doab
- Could coordinate with Govind Pan Bundela
- Could relieve supply pressure
The Problem:
- Bundela didn't have forces to build and defend it
- Bundela was old (60 years old, very old for the time)
- Bundela had only 8,000-10,000 troops
- Not sufficient for major engineering project
- Plus he also couldn't secure Shuja as ally (second task)
The Bundela Situation
What Bundela Was Supposed To Do:
- Build pontoon bridge across Yamuna
- Bring Shuja to Maratha side (alliance)
- Provide funds/supplies
Why He Couldn't:
- Too old (60 years = ancient for the era)
- Too few troops (8,000-10,000)
- Not battle-ready forces (meant for tax collection, not warfare)
- Never got the resources Peshwa could have sent
- Asked Peshwa for 25,000-30,000 soldier force earlier
- Peshwa couldn't spare them
The Irony:
- If Peshwa had sent Bundela the force he requested
- Bundela could have done these tasks
- Would have relieved supply crisis
- Might have changed outcome
- But Peshwa didn't have resources to spare
The Perception Shift
August: In Maratha Camp
- "We've won Delhi"
- "Abdali is scared"
- "Afghan army morale is broken"
- "We're the winners"
August: In Abdali's Camp
- "Marathas got Delhi"
- "We're stuck on wrong side"
- "This campaign is going wrong"
- "Maybe we should negotiate and go home"
September: In Maratha Camp
- "We're running out of food"
- "No money coming in"
- "People starving"
- "How long can we sustain this?"
September: In Abdali's Camp
- "We crossed Yamuna"
- "We're on same side now"
- "Now we can fight"
- "Momentum is returning"
The Core Problem
Maratha Strategic Error:
- Won the battle (taking Delhi)
- But lost the campaign (supply collapse)
- Military victory ≠ Strategic victory
- Controlling territory without resources = hollow victory
The Timing Curse:
- Came in wrong season (monsoon)
- Had wrong supply infrastructure
- Had wrong local support
- Had massive noncombatant burden
- Couldn't afford to wait, couldn't afford to fight
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| August 1 | Red Fort captured, morale high |
| August 11 | Moved north to Shalimar Bagh |
| August 25 | Abdali crosses Yamuna |
| August/September | Supply crisis becomes apparent |
| September 1 | "Can't get loans, people hungry" |
| September 15 | "Situation really looking bad" |
| Late September | Crisis worsening daily |
Where We Left Off: Marathas are facing existential supply crisis. Went from August confidence ("We've won") to September desperation ("We're starving"). Meanwhile, Abdali has crossed Yamuna and is moving toward confrontation. Time is running out. Money is gone. Supplies are nearly exhausted. And the monsoon that should have protected them is making everything worse (rivers impassable, roads impassable, nowhere to get supplies).
They had won the battle for Delhi but were losing the battle for survival. Every day in Delhi cost more than they had. Every day without battle meant more starvation. And they couldn't fight until monsoon ended. So they were trapped: can't feed themselves, can't cross the river, can't stay in place, can't leave. This is what victory looked like when your supply lines break down. You win the battle and starve in the victory.
The Final Collapse: Negotiations Breakdown & Starvation Crisis
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The September 16 Letter: What Enemies Are Saying
What Bahu Reports to Peshwa:
- Najib Khan and Suja Uddhavla negotiating terms
- Proposed boundary: Sirhind (not Sindhu)
- Marathas should stay away from Delhi
- These are Abdali's/Rohila's demands being communicated
The Border Problem:
- Sirhind is too far south
- Sirhind = Baluchistan region (barren desert)
- Loses all of Punjab
- Loses all fertile northern territory
Suja's Role:
- Middleman between camps
- Not 100% in Abdali's camp
- Trying to negotiate compromise
- But his proposals still favor Abdali/Rohilas
Bahu's Counter-Position: Attaq as Boundary
Bahu's Demand:
- Boundary should be at Attaq (far to the north/west)
- Marathas should have right to protect Mughal emperor
- This is more lenient than some previous positions
Why Attaq?
- Raghunath Rao (earlier Peshwa) reached Attaq
- Aurangzeb went even further (toward Kabul)
- So Attaq is actually a concession from historical precedent
- Shows Marathas willing to compromise somewhat
What He's Saying:
- "I will take Attaq as boundary"
- "But I must have say in protecting Delhi"
- "No dictation of terms from outside powers"
- "These are internal Indian affairs"
The Unity Message
"Sardar Doghe Hi Bahut Saaf Aahe"
- Rough translation: Both commanders (Shinde/Holkar) are loyal and content
- There is perfect harmony in councils
- We are united in our command structure
What This Really Means:
- Trying to project image of unity
- Claiming internal solidarity
- "Don't try to divide us"
- But the reality is quite different (separate deals happening)
- This is propaganda for consumption by enemy/mediators
The Starvation Crisis: "Sarva Peech Potaatsa"
The Core Problem:
- "The problem we are facing is of stomach"
- Literally: No food to eat
- Broadly: Resource shortage
- This is the existential crisis
Why Money Won't Solve It:
- Even if they had money, where to buy food?
- Citizens around them are hostile
- Not enough food available in region
- Have to source from far away
- Transportation takes time and logistics
- Money is useless without supply chains
The Animal Problem:
- Animals need food too
- Don't have enough fodder
- Animals starving alongside soldiers
- This weakens cavalry and transport
- Losing military capacity as supplies shrink
The Loan Situation: "Savkari Bandha"
Bahu's Desperate Request:
- Moneylenders won't give loans
- No access to credit
- Even offering attractive terms, no takers
- Why? Too risky to lend to army in field
- Financial system has broken down
What Happened to Expected Revenue:
- Tributes not arriving
- Collections delayed or non-existent
- Tax collectors not cooperating
- Government structure collapsed
- Money promised is not materializing
The Bundela Failure
Govind Pan Bundela's Three Tasks:
- Build pontoon bridge across Yamuna
- Bring Shuja to Maratha side (alliance)
- Provide funds and supplies
Reality:
- Bundela couldn't do ANY of these
- Bundela is old (60 years old—very old for era)
- Bundela has only 8,000-10,000 troops
- These are NOT battle forces (meant for tax collection)
- Not trained/equipped for major operations
The Historical Note:
- Few years earlier, Bundela asked Peshwa for 25,000-30,000 fighters
- Said: "I need real army because I'm in critical position"
- Peshwa couldn't spare them
- Now that war came, Bundela can't handle it
The Tragedy:
- If Peshwa had invested in Bundela's force
- Bundela could have done his tasks
- Would have relieved supply crisis
- Might have changed entire campaign outcome
- But strategic reserves didn't exist
The Search for Hidden Treasure
The Hope:
- Mughal Treasury must have hidden wealth somewhere
- Maybe underground, in bunkers, secret chambers
- If found: Could fund entire campaign
- Would solve money crisis instantly
The Effort:
- Searched everywhere possible
- Looked in palaces, forts, buildings
- Even searched emperor's personal spaces
- Except bedrooms (line they wouldn't cross)
- Chose restraint over sacrilege
The Result:
- Found some silver plating
- Melted it down for coins
- Yielded limited cash
- Not the massive treasure hoped for
- Emperor's treasure was already long gone (previous rulers looted it)
The Imad-ul-Mulk Silver Protest
What Happened:
- Silver plating melted to mint coins
- Suraj Mal protested this desecration
- Said: "You're insulting the emperor!"
- Made big noise about it
The Hypocrisy:
- Suraj Mal's companion Imad murdered TWO emperors
- Delhi was looted THREE times
- Imad had caused massive instability
- Now Suraj Mal complaining about silver plating?
- Zero moral credibility
What This Shows:
- Northern politics completely rotten
- No principles, pure opportunism
- Using "respect for emperor" as excuse for political maneuvering
- Everyone complicit, everyone hypocritical
Bahu's Financial Accounting (September 12)
What He's Trying:
- Detailed accounting of money spent vs. received
- List of loans taken
- Daily expense breakdown
- Asking Peshwa: "How should I plan if this drags on?"
The Core Question:
- If battle resolves quickly: No problem
- If campaign drags on: How do I sustain it?
- Where will money come from?
- What should I do with existing treasury?
His Proposal:
- Take collections meant for Peshwa
- Use half for campaign
- Later repay with loans
- Essentially: Borrow from Peshwa's future revenue to fund present
Why This Matters:
- Shows he's run out of normal funding options
- Asking to raid Peshwa's revenue streams
- Desperate measures for desperate situation
- Campaign is bleeding money unsustainably
The Letter Pattern
First Phase (June/July):
- Angry at overall situation
- Blaming others for not doing enough
- Hard tone, not diplomatic
Second Phase (August):
- Trying to placate/explain position
- Softer tone, more explanatory
Third Phase (September):
- Showing stress and difficulty
- Almost breakdown tone
- Request for help and guidance
- "I don't know what to do, please advise"
The Trajectory:
- Moves from anger → attempt at diplomacy → desperation
- Psychological breaking down
- Recognizing situation beyond his control
The Manpower Situation
What Bahu Had:
- ~65,000 trained soldiers (core force)
- ~35,000 additional (Shinde/Holkar contingents, hired groups)
- ~25,000 noncombatants (pilgrims, old people, women, children)
- Total: ~125,000 people
- Plus uncounted animals
Fitness for Battle:
- Many troops never seen long-range artillery
- Many skeptical of new tactics
- Not unified command structure (multiple clan leaders)
- Morale deteriorating from hunger
- Army degrading in combat effectiveness
The Noncombatant Problem:
- They eat but don't fight
- They consume supplies
- They slow movement
- They require protection
- Dead weight in combat situation
The Bigger Question: Why Came North?
The Stated Reason:
- To defend Hindustan against foreign invader
- To prevent Abdali hegemony
- Sacred duty (not selfish ambition)
- No other power could do it
The Northern Powers' View:
- See Marathas as exploitative
- Worry about Maratha domination
- Think Marathas will never leave
- Don't believe it's about principle
- Think it's about expansion
The Reality:
- Both are true and false simultaneously
- Marathas are defending principle
- Marathas are also expanding power
- Northern rulers are right to be cautious
- But they're also selfish and unhelpful
The Fundamental Problem
Bahu's Dilemma:
- Can't fight without supplies
- Can't get supplies without money
- Can't get money without winning
- Can't win without army in good condition
- Circular dependency with no way out
The Timing Curse:
- Came in monsoon season (worst for war)
- Yamuna impassable for months
- Supply lines completely broken
- Couldn't source food locally (hostile territory)
- Couldn't wait (money running out)
- Couldn't retreat (honor and commitment)
- Trapped by season and circumstances
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| September 16 | Bahu reports enemy boundary proposals |
| September 16 | Proposes Attaq as boundary counter-proposal |
| September 12 | Writes detailed accounting letter |
| August/September | Bundela fails to accomplish tasks |
| Ongoing | Search for hidden treasure (unsuccessful) |
| August-September | Financial situation deteriorates daily |
| Late September | Desperate for solutions |
Key Phrases
"Sarva Peech Potaatsa" = "The problem is of stomach"
- Literally: Food shortage
- Metaphorically: Survival crisis
- Existential challenge that dominates everything
"Savkari Bandha" = "Moneylenders closed"
- Credit has dried up
- Financial system broken
- Normal economic functioning ceased
"Sardar Doghe Hi Bahut Saaf Aahe" = "The two commanders are perfectly clear/loyal"
- Propaganda message
- Intended for enemy consumption
- But reality is more complicated
Bahu's Psychological State
The Stress Indicators:
- Anger at situation (early letters)
- Attempts at explanation (middle letters)
- Breakdown into desperation (late letters)
- Asking for guidance (losing confidence)
- Expressing health concerns (asking about Peshwa's health)
What He's Realizing:
- Campaign is unsustainable
- Normal solutions not working
- External help needed (from Peshwa)
- Personal limitations becoming clear
- Can't control situation through force of will
Where We Left Off: September 16, 1760. Negotiations have completely collapsed. Bundela can't deliver on any of three tasks. Supply crisis is acute and worsening daily. Treasures can't be found. Loans won't materialize. Soldiers are starving. Money is gone. And monsoon is keeping everyone trapped. Bahu has done everything possible within normal parameters. Now he's grasping for solutions. The entire campaign is approaching a crisis point. Something has to give—either they fight immediately despite conditions, or they begin slow collapse.
By September, Bahu had learned the hard way that military victory isn't the same as strategic victory. Taking Delhi was easy compared to holding it. Keeping an army of 100,000+ people fed while waiting for monsoon to end proved impossible. Every day cost more than he had. Every day of waiting meant more starvation. He was trapped by geography (monsoon), trapped by logistics (no supplies), trapped by politics (can't negotiate with unreliable allies), trapped by timing (came at wrong season). He won the battle for the fort. But he was losing the war of attrition. And time was running out.
Abdali's Strength & The Kunjapura Gamble
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fundamental Difference: Supply Lines
Abdali's Situation (Anupshara):
- Stationed in own territory (Rohila territory + Suja's territory)
- Rohilas allied and supportive
- Alliance partners willing to provide anything needed
- Sending Rohilas home to rest and refresh
- They'll return regenerated and ready
- Lost 10,000 animals but easily replaceable
- Can requisition supplies freely from allied territories
- Fewer noncombatants to feed (compared to Marathas)
Abdali's Advantage:
- Rohilas/Suja terrified of Maratha power
- Want Abdali to defeat Marathas (self-interest)
- Will provide: Animals, supplies, money, anything
- Why? Because if Marathas win, Rohilas/Suja are doomed
- Better to fully support Abdali than risk being powerless to Marathas
Marathas' Situation (Delhi):
- No solid allies in territory
- Even Suraj Mal puts conditions: "If you do this, I'll do that"
- Not a real ally, sitting on fence
- Suja also fence-sitting
- Doesn't want Afghan hegemony but also doesn't want Maratha hegemony
- No one fully committed to Maratha success
The Suja Problem: Fence-Sitter Strategy
His Logic:
- Don't want Afghans to dominate (threatened by them historically)
- Don't want Marathas to dominate (threatened by them locally)
- Best outcome: Both fight each other, weakening each
- His role: Keep pressure on both sides
- Result: No reliable support for either
His Background:
- Shia (not Sunni) - different from Rohila Afghans
- Had father who faced Abdali - knows the threat
- Would naturally prefer Marathas (Hindu is less threatening than Afghan)
- But Marathas represent unwanted expansion into his territory
- Genuinely impossible position: Either way, loses power
Religious Dimension:
- Shia-Sunni divide is deep and structural
- Suja being Shia means different worldview from Abdali/Rohilas (Sunni)
- This explains why he wouldn't fully ally with either
- Yet economically/politically trapped between them
Abdali's Demands on Allies
The Suja Demand:
- Ordered Suja to pay 20 million rupees to maintain army's needs
- Still demanding huge tribute FROM ally while getting his support
- Shows: Abdali not just accepting help, but extracting payment
- Suja paying because alternative is worse (Maratha domination)
The Rohila Advantage:
- Rohilas have no choice but to support him fully
- If Marathas win: Rohilas will be eliminated (they're Afghan)
- So 100% commitment is self-preservation, not choice
- This creates reliable, dedicated support base
Bahu's Campaign Decision: Kunjapura
The Opportunity:
- Fort at Kunjapura (120 km north of Delhi, on Yamuna's west bank)
- Owned by Najib Khan (Rohila commander)
- Stocked with supplies and money
- Stored there for Abdali's return journey (contingency supplies)
- This is the supply windfall Marathas desperately need
Bahu's Logic:
- Go capture Kunjapura
- Loot supplies and money (solve immediate crisis)
- Eliminate 15,000 Afghan troops there (weaken Abdali)
- Get back to Yamuna before Abdali can cross (maintain advantage)
- Then catch Abdali while he's vulnerable crossing river
The Timeline Assumption:
- Bahu thinks Yamuna needs 1 month minimum to become crossable
- So he has roughly 1 month to:
- Travel to Kunjapura
- Capture fort
- Loot supplies
- Return to Yamuna
- Position for battle
- All assumes Yamuna will take a month
The Critical Mistake:
- Abdali crosses Yamuna on October 25th
- But Bahu thought it would take until November (1 month)
- So Abdali is 10 days faster than expected
- This timing miscalculation will be catastrophic
Kunjapura: The Fort
The Description:
- Built 30 years ago by Najib Khan
- Called Nazibat Nagar (after Najib Khan)
- Fort commander: Nazib Khan (Najib's subordinate)
- Garrison: ~15,000 troops
- Strategic location: Western bank of Yamuna, north of Delhi
Its Criminal History:
- Soldiers dressed as Abdali's forces
- Robbed travelers on nearby roads
- Looted pedestrians passing by
- Historian Yadunath Sarkar called it "Lutarus" (Looter's Fort)
- Basically a criminal base, not legitimate military post
- Everything taken from robberies stored in fort
The Supplies Stored:
- Grains of all kinds
- Animal fodder
- Money and funds
- War materials
- Everything needed for Abdali's return journey to Afghanistan
The Synchronization Problem
What Bahu Expected:
- October 14/15: Start moving north to Kunjapura
- October 15-24: Assault and capture fort (~8-10 days estimated)
- October 24: Get back to Yamuna, reposition
- Late October/November: Abdali crosses, Marathas catch him vulnerable
- All planned around 1-month monsoon timeline
What Actually Happened:
- Bahu started moving north
- But Abdali crossed Yamuna on October 25 (day 10, not day 30+)
- This meant: Abdali was now on same side as Marathas
- Kunjapura fort became liability, not asset
- Bahu had to quickly capture it before Abdali could reinforce
- Timeline collapsed by ~20 days
The Fort Battle
The Setup:
- Abdus Samad Khan & Qutub Shah (Afghan commanders)
- With 15,000 troops in Kunjapura
- Waiting for Yamuna to become crossable
- Plan: Cross and join Abdali across river
The Afghan Dilemma:
- When Marathas attacked with artillery
- Fortifications started collapsing
- Escape plan no longer viable
- So they retreated INTO fort (mistake)
The Gate Mistake:
- Nazib Khan (fort protector) initially wouldn't open gate
- But finally opened to let his own forces (Abdus Samad, Qutub) back in
- Problem: Once opened for few hours, Marathas also got in
- Had to keep gate open for 15,000 men to enter
- Marathas took advantage of open gate
- Thousands of Afghans massacred as they tried to get inside
The Qutub Shah Question
The Prisoner:
- Captured during fort assault
- Same Qutub Shah who beheaded Dattaji Shinde
- Brought before Bahu on elephant (symbol of respect/royalty)
Bahu's Insult:
- "Why bring a lowly character with such prestige?"
- Putting on elephant = royal treatment
- Said: "Kick him from the elephant"
- Qutub realized: He was not going to be spared
Qutub's Desperation:
- Offered three things to save his life:
- "Let me negotiate peace between camps"
- "Take 50 million rupees ransom from me"
- "Give me 15 days and I'll bring 25,000 troops to your side"
- (All probably impossible or false promises)
The Revenge
Bahu's Key Question:
- "Are you the one who beheaded Dattaji Shinde?"
Qutub's Answer (Religious Justification):
- "I did according to my religion"
- "Quran says: Behead enemies and put heads on spears"
- "This is Islamic religious duty, not personal choice"
Bahu's Reaction:
- Extreme anger ("from bottom of body to head")
- Rejected excuse completely
- Said: "Take him outside and behead him"
The Intervention:
- Jankoji Shinde & Holkar tried to save him
- "Use him as negotiator for peace"
- "Killing him won't bring Dattaji back"
- "He has value as intermediary"
- But Bahu refused to listen
The Execution:
- Took him outside camp
- Beheaded him while he was cursing/abusing them
- Revenge satisfied—but at cost of losing negotiator
The Dattaji Elephant: Full Circle
The Lost Symbol:
- Dattaji Shinde had war elephant named "Javahar"
- Was good omen for Shinde army
- When Qutub killed Dattaji at Guradi Ghat on Yamuna
- Afghan forces captured the elephant
- Took it to Kunjapura fort
The Recovery:
- Marathas captured Kunjapura
- Found Javahar elephant in the fort
- Huge symbolic victory: Got back sacred war elephant
- Shinde army satisfied by revenge (Qutub beheaded + elephant recovered)
- Came full circle: What was lost is returned
The Escape
Dilir Khan:
- Najib Khan's son
- Only one who escaped from Kunjapura fort
- Name echoes historical figure from Shivaji era
- Managed to get away and survive
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 10 | Navratri starts (auspicious time for new projects) |
| October 14 | Bahu writes letter to Govind Pan Bundela |
| October 14 | Bahu begins moving toward Kunjapura |
| October 15-24 | Bahu expected: 8-10 days to capture fort |
| October 25 | Abdali actually crosses Yamuna (unexpected early) |
| During campaign | Fort battle, Qutub captured and beheaded |
| Result | Marathas capture supplies but lose negotiator |
Critical Error: The Timing Assumption
Why It Matters:
- Entire campaign predicated on Yamuna taking 1 month
- Bahu built plan assuming slow enemy movement
- Abdali crossed 20 days earlier than expected
- This turned Kunjapura from "bonus campaign" into "must-win battle"
- Changed the whole dynamic of the campaign
The Consequence:
- Abdali now on same side of Yamuna
- Can reinforce other forces
- Can't be caught mid-crossing anymore
- Bahu loses main tactical advantage
- From now on: Head-to-head confrontation inevitable
Where We Left Off: Marathas captured Kunjapura fort, got supplies they desperately needed, recovered Dattaji's sacred elephant, avenged his death by beheading Qutub, but lost 15,000 enemy troops that could have been integrated. Most importantly: Abdali crossed Yamuna 10 days earlier than expected, eliminating Maratha tactical advantage of catching him mid-crossing. The campaign is now entering its final phase: Open battle on the northern plains, both armies on same side of Yamuna, no more river barriers, monsoon ending.
Bahu gambled on time. He thought Yamuna would protect him for another month. He thought he could capture Kunjapura, get supplies, revenge Dattaji, and still position himself perfectly. But Abdali didn't wait. He crossed 10 days early. Suddenly the gamble looked stupid. The supplies they captured at Kunjapura were essential to survive, but they came at cost of losing the element of surprise. Bahu won the fort but lost the campaign's margin for error.
Kunjapura Victory & The False Reassurance Campaign
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Najib Khan's Rumor Campaign
The Devastating Claim:
- Spreading rumor that Bahu wants to install Vishwas Rao on Mughal throne
- Claims Marathas want to destroy Mughal Empire entirely
- Says Marathas want to make it a Hindu Empire instead
- This taps into deepest fear of entire northern establishment
Why This Works:
- Entire Delhi ecosystem is Muslim-appeasers or Muslims
- All power structures designed around Mughal legitimacy
- People's livelihoods depend on Mughal system existing
- Fear: If Hindu kingdom installed, everything changes
- Raj pUts (Hindu) also benefited from Mughal arrangement
- So both Muslim AND Hindu elite terrified by this prospect
The Political Reality:
- Raj puts themselves are vassals of Mughal system
- They didn't mind Hindu identity IF Mughal structure remained
- But direct Maratha rule + Hindu empire = loss of privileges
- So Rajputs also join Muslims in opposing Marathas
- Najib turned Hindu/Muslim divide irrelevant—everyone threatened
Why This Rumor So Powerful:
- Not baseless—Marathas DID show interest in Delhi politics
- Bahu DID want influence on who rules
- Could plausibly want to put Maratha-aligned person on throne
- So rumor had grain of truth, making it believable
- Fear-mongering with kernel of reality = most dangerous
Bahu's Damage Control Campaign
The Problem:
- Rumor spreading rapidly through Delhi establishment
- Everyone assuming worst about Maratha intentions
- Muslim elite panicking
- Hindu elite (Rajputs) also panicking
- Political coalition forming against Marathas
Bahu's Response:
- Had to waste energy reassuring people
- Brought Muslim elites and Mughal family into confidence
- Essentially said: "Don't worry, we're not kicking you out"
- "Vishwas Rao on throne? No, that's not our plan"
- "You're safe and secure under our protection"
- Had to spend political capital just to maintain neutrality
The Cost:
- Time and energy spent on damage control
- Credibility test: Did anyone believe him?
- Couldn't just deny—had to prove it with actions
- Made him vulnerable in other areas while busy reassuring
The Fort Assault: Military Success
The Strategic Achievement:
- Captured Kunjapura fort
- Eliminated 15,000 Afghan troops (or scattered them)
- Got supplies desperately needed
- Got money to sustain army
- Gave Marathas breathing room
But At What Cost:
- Had to behead Qutub Shah (who offered to negotiate)
- Lost opportunity for peace talks
- Showed ruthlessness that confirmed fears
- Made it harder to convince Muslims he wasn't anti-Islamic
- Military win but political loss
The Emperor Situation
The Current Situation:
- No emperor in Delhi (the real one had been blinded/imprisoned)
- Abdali had put in a puppet
- Marathas replaced with different arrangement
- But nobody wants a Maratha choice
The Crown Prince Solution:
- Since no full emperor available
- Marathas designated a "Crown Prince"
- Crown prince can act with authority
- But can't be emperor (which would be controversial)
- Probably young son of someone, temporary solution
- Reassurance: We're not installing permanent ruler
The Reason for Crown Prince:
- Proves Marathas respect Mughal system
- Shows willingness to let system continue
- Young crown prince = less threatening than adult ruler
- When real emperor ready to return, he can
- Political signal: We're custodians, not conquerors
Suja's Political Maneuvering
His Situation After Fort Capture:
- Suja appointed as Wazir (by Marathas)
- Also guaranteed as Wazir by Abdali (if Abdali wins)
- Hedged his bets perfectly
Why He's Happy:
- If Marathas win: He's Wazir under them
- If Abdali wins: He's Wazir under Abdali
- Either way: Position secured
His Logic:
- Marathas are local power (staying no matter what)
- Abdali is external (will go back to Afghanistan)
- So Marathas more reliable ally long-term
- But doesn't want to provoke Abdali unnecessarily
- Best outcome: Both sides respect his Wazir position
The Six Thousand Troops:
- Marathas sent 6,000 troops to protect him
- Shows commitment to his authority
- Shows they're taking it seriously
- Makes his position credible in eyes of Delhi establishment
- Military backing + political position = real power
The Religious Reassurance Problem
What's Actually Happening:
- Marathas denying they'll destroy Mughal system
- Denying they'll convert to Hinduism empire
- Denying anti-Islamic bias
- But... they just beheaded Qutub Shah
The Contradiction:
- Religious/cultural reassurance is hollow
- Actions (brutal killing of Islamic commander) contradict words
- Bahu's harsh personality undermines diplomatic message
- Can't kill religious authority and then say "we respect Islam"
The Political Difficulty:
- Bahu needed to execute Qutub (personal honor, Dattaji revenge)
- But every execution confirms Muslim fears
- Creates impossible situation:
- If merciful: Seems weak, loses credibility
- If harsh: Confirms anti-Islamic bias rumors
- Either way: Political damage
The Ecosystem Reality
Who Controls Delhi:
- Mughal Emperor (nominal)
- Administrative elites (mostly Muslim)
- Military commanders (mix of Muslim/Hindu)
- Rajputs (Hindu but Mughal-aligned)
- Merchants/traders (affected by stability)
Why They Fear Marathas:
- Marathas are Deccan outsiders
- Represent new power center
- Don't respect established Delhi etiquette
- Harsh and military-minded (not diplomatic)
- Will break existing relationships
- Might restructure entire system
Why They Fear Abdali:
- Outsider from Afghanistan
- Temporary (will leave eventually)
- Doesn't understand Delhi system deeply
- Brutal reputation
- Might loot everything on way out
The Paradox:
- Everyone wants both to fail
- But can't openly help either without risk
- So they fence-sit, cooperate minimally
- This is why Marathas have no solid allies
The Narrative Battle
Najib's Narrative:
- Marathas want to destroy Mughal system
- Marathas are anti-Islamic
- Marathas will create Hindu empire
- Result: Everyone loses their positions
- Action item: Support Abdali to prevent this
Bahu's Counter-Narrative:
- Marathas are protecting Mughal system
- Marathas are respecting Islamic traditions
- Marathas just defending against external threat
- Result: Stability maintained
- Action item: Accept Maratha protection
The Problem:
- Bahu's narrative requires trust
- Trust requires consistent actions
- Bahu's harsh personality + military killings undermine trust
- Najib's narrative exploits this gap
- Najib wins the narrative war even if he loses the military war
Timing of Religious Festival
Navratri (October 10):
- Marks end of monsoon
- Traditionally auspicious for new projects/military campaigns
- Indicates warfare becoming possible again
- Symbolically important for Hindu forces
- Shows: Marathas ready to move to offense
What This Means:
- No more waiting for monsoon
- Military operations accelerating
- Battle coming very soon
- This is the "start" of campaign season
- Both sides know monsoon ended, action begins
The Crown Prince Arrangement
What It Really Is:
- Political theater to reassure Delhi establishment
- Says: "Look, we're respecting Mughal system"
- But it's temporary, everyone knows it
- Crown prince has no real legitimacy
- Just holding position until real emperor returns
Why Even Do It:
- Shows Marathas understand Mughal legitimacy matters
- Shows willingness to respect established order
- Buys credibility with establishment
- Costs them nothing (crown prince has no real power anyway)
- Cheap political gesture with strategic value
The Real Emperor:
- Blinded by Imad ul Mulk (traumatized)
- Refused to return while Abdali on horizon
- Said: "Not coming if my life in danger"
- So Marathas had to find stand-in
- Crown prince = temporary placeholder
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 10 | Navratri begins, monsoon season over |
| October 14-25 | Kunjapura campaign |
| During campaign | Bahu fighting Najib's rumor campaign |
| After capture | Maratha forces placed to protect Suja |
| Crown prince installed | Political theater to reassure Muslims |
| Suja appointed Wazir | Guaranteed position under both sides |
Key Concepts
"Khodi Word" = Bad ideas/naughty theory
- Najib's rumor campaign
- Anti-Islamic narrative
- Fear-mongering theory
Ecosystem Opposition:
- Not just Abdali vs. Marathas
- But entire establishment vs. Marathas
- System designed around Mughal legitimacy
- Everyone profits from that system
- So everyone opposes fundamental change
The Narrative Problem:
- Bahu lost narrative war while winning military battles
- Couldn't convince Delhi establishment of true intentions
- Couldn't separate military necessities from anti-Islamic bias
- Political legitimacy matters as much as military force
Where We Left Off: Marathas won Kunjapura militarily, getting supplies they needed. But they lost the narrative war—Najib's rumors about installing Hindu empire spread widely. Bahu had to spend energy reassuring Muslim elite. To counter rumors, Marathas installed crown prince and guaranteed Suja as Wazir. But military ruthlessness (killing Qutub) undermined diplomatic message. Delhi establishment remains hostile/neutral. Marathas have supplies but lack political legitimacy. Abdali is coming with monsoon-free weather. Battle imminent with entire establishment hoping neither side wins.
You can win battles with swords but lose wars with narratives. Bahu won Kunjapura militarily but couldn't convince Delhi he wasn't anti-Islamic. Every ruthless military decision confirmed the rumors. By the time they captured supplies, they'd lost the establishment's trust. And in Delhi politics, you need more than soldiers and supplies—you need the system's blessing. They never got it.
Suja's Wazir Dream & Bahu's Strategic Letter
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Suja's Long Dream Fulfilled
The Achievement:
- Suja's lifetime dream was to become Wazir
- Now appointed as Wazir (by Marathas)
- Also guaranteed as Wazir by Abdali (double insurance)
- His position is now politically secure regardless of battle outcome
Why He's Satisfied:
- Given 6,000 Maratha troops for protection
- Shows Marathas are serious about his position
- Military backing + political title = real power
- Can now rule Delhi with confidence
- Win-win scenario: Wazir under whoever wins
Bahu's Strategic Letter (October 14)
The Recipient:
- Govind Pan Bundela (Maratha commander in Bundelkhand)
- Letters serve as strategic instructions
- Reveal Bahu's thinking and plans
Letter Content: The Kunjapura Decision
Why Go to Kunjapura?
- "No point waiting for Yamuna to cross"
- "Crossing won't happen quickly"
- "Better to go to Kunjapura and destroy Abdul Samad Khan there"
- Pre-emptive strike before enemy can consolidate
The Strategic Logic:
- Abdul Samad Khan waiting in Kunjapura to cross Yamuna
- If he crosses and joins Abdali: Becomes more threat
- If attacked now in fort: Easier to eliminate
- Destroy enemy before they strengthen
The Timeline:
- "Will be back from Kunjapura in 8-15 days"
- Expected quick campaign
- Get supplies and troops
- Return to Delhi area
- Wait for Yamuna to recede
- Then engage Abdali in battle
Political Reassurance Campaign in Delhi
Installing the Emperor:
- Sent Nana Purandare and Jadhav to Delhi
- Mission: Install new crown prince
- Mission: Declare return of real emperor
- Create legitimacy for Maratha-backed rule
Coins as Political Statement:
- "Fabricated coins in the name of this blinded emperor"
- Coins had Shah Alam's name (the blinded emperor)
- Striking coins = official recognition of legitimacy
- Says: "This is our emperor, we back him"
Public Announcement:
- "People went around Delhi announcing his return"
- "Everybody is happy with announcement"
- Propaganda campaign for political legitimacy
- Trying to prove Marathas respect Mughal system
The Yamuna Problem: Timing Assumption
Bahu's Prediction:
- "Yamuna water will take about a month to recede"
- This is mid-October estimate
- So roughly end of October/early November for crossing
- All planning based on this 1-month assumption
The Reality:
- Hastanakshatra (celestial period) = heavy rains
- "Tremendous rain" causing rivers to flood
- "Rivers flooded beyond imagination"
- "Water not receding" despite some clear days
- Monsoon dynamics uncertain and unpredictable
The Difference of Opinion:
- Mehendale (another commander) thought differently
- "Different take on when Yamuna would recede"
- Unknown if they discussed it
- But Bahu sticking with 1-month estimate
- Later Mehendale will prove right, Bahu wrong
The Money Crisis (Still Ongoing)
From October 14 Letter:
- "We are not getting any loan"
- Same money problems as before
- Still need to pay salaries
- Still need to buy groceries
- Supply crisis unresolved despite Delhi capture
Why Kunjapura Matters:
- "Kunjapura is flush with supplies and money"
- News of stored wealth reached Bahu
- Running short himself
- This is desperation + opportunity meeting
The Boundary Negotiations: Complete Deadlock
The Fundamental Problem:
- No common ground between sides
- "No agreeing, no common point"
- "Bridge so big there was no way for compromise"
- Negotiations are theater, not genuine
The Greedy Afghans:
- "Patans are not sincere, they have become greedy"
- Asking boundary at Sirhind (too far south)
- Want to meddle in Delhi affairs
- Can't satisfy their demands
Why Battle is Inevitable:
- No negotiated settlement possible
- No compromise point exists
- Both sides have incompatible demands
- War is the only remaining option
Maratha Morale & Confidence
The Assessment:
- "If battle happens, we're in good condition"
- "We are pretty strong"
- "Confident we'll destroy enemy quickly"
- Despite hunger problems, morale is high
The Problems:
- Hunger issues (both animals and humans)
- Not enough food to eat
- But confidence in victory regardless
- Emotional/psychological strength despite material weakness
The Kunjapura Campaign Plan
The Sequence:
- October 14: Bahu writes letter announcing plan
- October 16: Bahu arrives at Kunjapura with full army
- Raiding parties (Shinde, Holkar) sent ahead for siege
- Ibrahim Khan following with cannon units
Abdali's Response:
- After learning about Bahu's move
- Sends army units to cross Yamuna near Kunjapura
- Trying to reinforce/protect Kunjapura
- Trying to find crossing point
The Race:
- Both sides moving toward Kunjapura
- Both trying to control it
- First one there dominates
- Bahu gets there first (October 16)
Ibrahim Khan's Logistics Challenge
The Problem:
- Cannons are heavy
- Can't move fast with entire force
- Following behind main army
- Bahu reaches October 16, cannons still coming
Bahu's Message:
- "Hurry up, come here quickly"
- Recognizes artillery will be needed
- Battle coming sooner than expected
- Can't win without cannons
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 10 | Hastanakshatra begins (heavy rains) |
| October 14 | Bahu writes letter to Bundela |
| October 14 | Plans Kunjapura campaign |
| October 14 | Nana Purandare/Jadhav sent to Delhi |
| October 16 | Bahu reaches Kunjapura with army |
| October 16+ | Ibrahim Khan/cannons following |
| October 16+ | Abdali sends units to cross Yamuna |
Key Strategic Points
The 1-Month Assumption:
- Everything planned around Yamuna taking month to cross
- Campaign: 8-15 days at Kunjapura
- Return to Delhi
- Wait for water to recede
- THEN engage Abdali
- Timing critical to entire strategy
The Supply Crisis:
- Still major problem despite Delhi capture
- Kunjapura supplies are essential lifeline
- Can't sustain 100,000+ people much longer
- Kunjapura = desperation, not luxury
The Political Theater:
- Coins in emperor's name = legitimacy claim
- Public announcements = propaganda
- Crown prince installation = reassurance
- But real power is still Maratha guns
Where We Left Off: October 16, 1760. Bahu reaches Kunjapura with main army, begins siege. Sends urgent message for Ibrahim Khan and cannons to hurry. Abdali's forces trying to cross Yamuna near Kunjapura to relieve garrison. Race is on to control the fort. Bahu confident about victory but still dealing with hunger/supply problems. Money crisis unresolved. Yamuna expected to take ~1 month to become crossable.
Bahu was betting everything on time. He thought he had a month. He thought Kunjapura would take 8-15 days. He thought Yamuna would be impassable for weeks. He thought he'd get back to Delhi, resupply, and position perfectly for battle. He was betting on the calendar. But the calendar would betray him.
The Gunjapura Assault: Massacre, Revenge & Strategic Collapse
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Chapter: Gunjapura (Chapter 20)
Location & Significance:
- 120 km north of Delhi on western bank of Yamuna
- Strategic stronghold for Afghan forces
- Named "Gunjapura" (also spelled Kunjapura)
- Fort built 30 years ago by Najib Khan
- Called "Lutarus" (Looter's Fort) by historians
- Criminal base masquerading as legitimate military post
The Fort Commander:
- Najib Khan's subordinate (same name, different person)
- Had 15,000 troops garrisoned
- Holding supplies and money for Abdali's return journey
- Waiting for Yamuna to become crossable
- Plan: Cross and join Abdali in Shahadara
The Maratha Tactical Error
Bahu's Assumption:
- Yamuna would take at least 1 month to become safely crossable
- So he had roughly 1 month window
- Go north to Kunjapura
- Capture and loot it (8-10 days estimated)
- Return to Yamuna
- Position for catching Abdali mid-crossing
The Fatal Miscalculation:
- Abdali crossed Yamuna on October 25th
- But Bahu thought it would be November (1 month away)
- Abdali 10 days faster than expected
- This destroyed entire tactical plan
- Changed campaign from "opportunistic" to "desperate"
Why This Matters:
- Bahu counted on catching Abdali vulnerable mid-river
- With Abdali across, no vulnerability window
- Now it's open battlefield confrontation
- No more river barriers
- No more tactical advantage of position
- Pure force-on-force battle becomes inevitable
The Assault on Fort
The Setup:
- Abdus Samad Khan & Qutub Shah (Afghan commanders)
- 15,000 Afghan troops inside
- Fortifications along fort walls
- Initial plan: Escape and cross Yamuna to join Abdali
The Artillery Bombardment:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi's cannons open fire
- Fortifications start collapsing
- Escape plan becomes untenable
- Afghan commanders realize: Can't fight artillery, can't escape
- Decision: Retreat inside fort for better defense
The Gate Mistake:
- Nazib Khan (fort protector) initially refusing to open gate
- Wants to keep gates locked
- But his own forces (Abdus Samad, Qutub with 15,000 men) outside
- Finally opens gate to let them in
- Critical error: Once opened for 15,000 men, takes hours
- Marathas watching nearby
- Exploit open gate
- Thousands pour through before it closes
- Mass massacre inside fort of trapped Afghans
Qutub Shah: The Captured Spiritual Leader
Who Was He:
- Spiritual leader of Rohila/Afghan forces
- Also military commander
- The SAME Qutub Shah who beheaded Dattaji Shinde at Guradi Ghat on Yamuna
- Captured during the fort assault
- Brought before Bahu
The Elephant Insult:
- Maratha commander placed him on elephant
- Meant as sign of respect/prestige
- But Bahu was insulted by this
- "Why put lowly character on elephant?"
- Elephant = royal treatment
- "Only royalty gets elephant treatment"
- "Kick him down from elephant"
Qutub's Realization:
- Understood from Bahu's tone: Not going to be spared
- No clemency expected
- Death likely coming
- Didn't even beg for mercy (knew futile)
Qutub's Desperate Offers
Option 1: Peace Negotiation
- "Let me negotiate peace between your camp and Rohila/Abdali camp"
- "I can serve as emissary"
- "I will broker understanding"
- Thinking: If useful alive, might spare me
Option 2: Ransom
- "Take 50 million rupees from me"
- "I will pay tribute to secure my freedom"
- Problem: Where would he get money from?
- Probably false/desperate promise
- But worth trying
Option 3: Military Alliance
- "Give me 15 days"
- "I will bring 25,000 troops to your side"
- "We'll fight together against Abdali"
- Also probably false—he's captured, can't mobilize
- But trying anything to survive
The Dattaji Question: Moral Judgment
Bahu's Accusation:
- "Are you the one who beheaded Dattaji Shinde?"
- Dattaji was Maratha commander
- Had been killed at Guradi Ghat by Qutub Shah
- Dattaji was helpless when killed
- This is the charge Bahu is making
Qutub's Defense:
- "I did according to my religion"
- "Quran says: Behead enemies and put heads on spears"
- "This is religious duty, not personal choice"
- "This is Islamic practice"
- "I was fulfilling my religious obligations"
The Problem With This Defense:
- Sounds like: "Religion made me do it"
- As if Islamic religion requires beheading prisoners
- Bahu doesn't accept religious relativism here
- Some acts are beyond religious justification
- Killing helpless commander = murder, not warfare
Bahu's Fury & The Execution
The Emotional Reaction:
- "Bahu's anger got extremely elevated"
- "From bottom of his body to his head"
- Completely enraged
- Not satisfied with religious explanation
- Not interested in negotiation
- Not interested in ransom
- Not interested in military alliance
- Pure anger overrides tactical thinking
The Order:
- "Take him outside the tent and behead him"
- Clear, direct command
- No ambiguity
- No room for negotiation
The Intervention:
- Jankoji Shinde and Mallar Rao Holkar tried to save him
- "Save his life"
- "Get important things done from him"
- "Use him for developing peace"
- "Avoid the war"
- Both commanders tried to talk sense
Their Argument:
- "Even if you kill him, Dattaji cannot come back"
- "Revenge won't restore the dead"
- "Use him as negotiator instead"
- "Practical value > emotional satisfaction"
Why Bahu Rejected The Mercy
The Psychological Reality:
- This wasn't about military calculation
- This was about personal honor
- Dattaji was loyal commander
- Killed brutally and dishonored
- His death cries out for revenge
- Religious excuse pushed Bahu over the edge
The Political Reality:
- Holkar and Shinde's troops needed revenge
- Dattaji's death had been festering
- Shinde army wanted blood
- Couldn't deny them closure
- Military morale required this execution
The Failure of Diplomacy:
- Holkar/Shinde made logical argument
- But Bahu wasn't in logical mode
- He was in warrior mode
- Emotion overcame strategy
- Exemplifies Bahu's weakness: Can't control anger
- Can't play diplomat when personal honor at stake
The Execution & Curse
What Happened:
- Took Qutub outside camp
- Beheaded him
- Qutub was cursing at them as he died
- "When he was using abusive words, they beheaded him"
- Died cursing the Marathas
The Meaning:
- Qutub's death = revenge for Dattaji
- Shinde army satisfied
- Got their revenge
- But lost negotiator
- But lost potential informant
- Military satisfaction, strategic cost
The Pattern:
- Shows Bahu's repeated flaw
- Gets angry, makes harsh decisions
- Decisions satisfy immediate honor
- But cost him strategically
- This pattern throughout campaign
- Holkar/Shinde always trying to soften him
- He never listens
The Dattaji Elephant: Symbolic Recovery
The Sacred Symbol:
- Dattaji had war elephant named "Javahar"
- This elephant led the campaign from Pune
- Was good omen for Shinde army
- Symbol of Dattaji's presence/legacy
When It Was Lost:
- Qutub Shah killed Dattaji at Guradi Ghat on Yamuna
- Afghan forces captured the elephant
- Took it to Kunjapura fort
- Symbol of Maratha loss and humiliation
The Recovery:
- Marathas captured Kunjapura fort
- Found Javahar elephant inside
- Recovered sacred war elephant
- Shinde army extremely satisfied
- Full circle: What was lost is returned
- This emotional victory matches Dattaji's revenge
The Meaning:
- Losing Javahar = Losing Dattaji's protection
- Recovering Javahar = Restoring Dattaji's legacy
- Shinde army now feels complete
- Revenge taken, symbol recovered
- Emotional closure achieved
The Escape: Dilir Khan
The Survivor:
- Najib Khan's son (Dilir Khan)
- Only one to escape from Kunjapura fort
- Name echoes Shivaji era figure (Dilir Khan was nemesis then too)
- History repeating: Dilir Khan escapes again
The Strategic Collapse
What Was Supposed to Happen:
- Yamuna safe barrier for 1 month
- Marathas could maneuver freely
- Could capture Kunjapura without interference
- Could reposition at Yamuna
- Could catch Abdali crossing
What Actually Happened:
- Abdali crossed 10 days early
- Marathas caught in middle of Kunjapura assault
- Had to hurry to finish
- Had to sacrifice negotiator (Qutub)
- Lost strategic advantage completely
- Now face open battle with no positional advantage
The Maratha Problem: Emotion Over Strategy
Bahu's Pattern:
- Makes harsh decision (reverse Imad's wazir promise)
- Gets angry at challenges
- Executes person who could be useful (Qutub)
- Satisfies personal honor
- Loses strategic advantage
- Repeats this pattern throughout campaign
Why This Matters:
- In warfare, emotion must serve strategy
- Not strategy serving emotion
- Bahu has it backwards
- Makes him effective in individual battles
- But poor at overall campaign
- Good tactician, bad strategist
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 14-25 | Kunjapura assault campaign |
| October 25 | Abdali crosses Yamuna (unexpected) |
| During assault | Qutub Shah captured |
| After capture | Bahu learns Qutub killed Dattaji |
| Decision | Bahu orders execution despite protests |
| Result | Qutub beheaded, Maratha honor satisfied, strategy damaged |
Key Emotional Moments
Qutub Climbing Down from Elephant:
- Realizes his fate is sealed
- Demonstrates humility in face of death
- Accepts doom
Bahu's Anger:
- "From bottom of his body to his head"
- Complete loss of control
- Emotional override of tactical thinking
- Personal honor demands satisfaction
The Beheading During Cursing:
- Qutub dies defiant, cursing Marathas
- Doesn't go quietly
- Maintains dignity by refusing submission
- At least gets last word (curse)
The Elephant Recovery:
- Emotional completion for Shinde army
- Symbol restored
- Dattaji's memory honored
- The only real victory of the operation
Where We Left Off: Marathas captured Kunjapura fort in bloody assault. Got supplies they desperately needed. Executed Qutub Shah despite offers of negotiation/ransom, satisfying Dattaji's revenge. Recovered Dattaji's sacred war elephant. But in the process: Lost negotiator, angered Delhi establishment further, and discovered Abdali crossed Yamuna 10 days earlier than expected. Tactical disaster masked by military victory. Strategic collapse hidden behind emotional satisfaction.
They won the fort but lost the campaign. The supplies were essential, the revenge was necessary, the elephant was symbolic. But they gave up a chance at negotiated peace and learned their timeline was completely wrong. Abdali wasn't where they thought he was. The river wasn't where it was supposed to be. And Bahu's anger had made them all prisoners of emotion instead of executors of strategy. The slaughter at Kunjapura felt like victory. But it was the beginning of the end.
The Battle of Kunjapura & Strategic Victory (October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Context: Recovering Morale
The Situation:
- Shinde and Holkar armies had been beaten by Abdali's forces
- Morale was severely damaged
- Marathas needed a significant win to restore confidence
The Opportunity:
- Abdali's forces had established garrison at Kunjapura fort (near Delhi)
- Fort held by Kutub Shah (Abdali's commander) and Abdul Samad Khan
- Significant treasure was stored inside
- Represented vulnerable target for Maratha counterattack
The Battle: Kutub Shah's Last Stand
Kutub Shah's Fate:
- He expected no mercy from the Marathas
- Knew capture meant death
- Made no attempt to surrender
- Was beheaded at the flagstaff during the fighting
Abdul Samad Khan:
- Also killed in the battle
- Approximately 10,000 Afghan troops slain
- Major loss for Abdali's occupation force
Maratha Casualties:
- 500-700 of their own forces injured/killed
- Acceptable loss given victory achieved
The Massive Plunder
The Treasure Found:
- Najib Khan's hidden wealth had been stored in the fort
- His son-in-law and father were in the camp; tortured to reveal treasure locations
- Disclosed a cache worth 15 lakhs (1.5 million rupees)
- Entire fort was dug up searching for more hidden treasure
The War Booty:
- 7 lakh rupees in cash taken home
- 2 lakh mounds of wheat and grain
- Thousands of horses
- Several elephants (including Dattaji's prized war elephant)
- Camels
- Guns, ammunition, gunpowder
- Miscellaneous war goods
The Distribution:
- Horses: 4,000-5,000 seized
- Most army paid in kind with grain rather than cash (grain was plentiful)
- Morale boost from both victory AND wealth recovery was enormous
The Artillery Advantage
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Role:
- His European-style artillery was decisive
- Fort's walls couldn't withstand modern cannon fire
- Otherwise would have been slow, bloody siege
Strategic Insights:
- Battle reinforced Bhau's confidence in artillery
- First time Shinde and Holkar saw this style of warfare in action
- Previously they preferred "ganimikawa" (surgical strikes) tactics
- They hadn't been with Bhau at the Udgir battle where artillery proved effective
- Seeing it work up close changed their perspective
Strategic Mistakes: The Delay
The Decision to Stay:
- Marathas remained at fort for a week
- Used Dassera festival (Oct 19) as celebration point
- Celebrated victory with army morale restored
The Cost:
- Wasted precious time at critical moment
- Abdali was crossing Yamuna on October 25
- Marathas were getting farther from Delhi by delaying
- Time lost = inability to press advantage or pursue Abdali
The Miscalculation:
- Staying to consolidate/celebrate felt right in moment
- But strategically opened window for Abdali to escape/regroup
- Demonstrated occasional tactical blindness to larger strategic situation
Key Themes
- Morale Recovery Through Victory - Single decisive win restores army confidence after defeats
- Plunder as Economics - War treasure solved immediate supply problems (grain for army)
- Technology Advantage - European artillery proved war-changing factor
- Learning Curve - Shinde/Holkar learning effectiveness of modern warfare from Bhau
- Tactical vs. Strategic - Good tactical decisions (winning battle) undermined by poor strategic timing (wasting time when enemy vulnerable)
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 19, 1760 | Dassera festival celebrated at Kunjapura |
| October 20, 1760 | Letter sent describing battle and plunder |
| October 21, 1760 | Marathas still at fort, consolidating |
| October 25, 1760 | Abdali crosses Yamuna (while Marathas delayed) |
Where This Fits: After defeats at Panipat, Marathas needed to rebuild. Kunjapura showed they could still win decisively. The plunder restored supplies and pay. But the strategic mistake of lingering too long—celebrating victory instead of pursuing advantage—would haunt them as Abdali slipped away and regrouped.
Victory is sweet, but it can also be a trap. The Marathas won Kunjapura completely. They got the treasure, the morale boost, the artillery validation. But they stayed to celebrate. And while they celebrated, the enemy escaped. In war, winning yesterday's battle is only useful if you're positioned to win tomorrow's.
Internal Maratha Conflict: Bhau vs. Holkar Strategic Clash (Pre-Panipat)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Source Problem: Bakhar Reliability
Author Bias Alert:
- Multiple Bakhar (historical chronicles) authors wrote about internal Maratha conflicts
- Same stories appear repeatedly but some are imaginative or unreliable
- Fact from fiction needs careful separation
- These tensions were real but details may be exaggerated
The Strategic Divide: Two Opposing Visions
Holkar's Strategy: Guerrilla Approach
Holkar's Core Advice:
- Don't engage in frontal confrontation with Abdali's army
- Use "ganimikawa" (surgical strikes) tactics instead
- Harass and weaken enemy without direct battle
- Use mobility to make his life difficult
- Secure civilians and supplies at Gwalior fort, then move freely
- Let Abdali exhaust himself and return home
The Rationale:
- Marathas had used this successfully 1756-1758 (without Abdali present)
- Shinde and Holkar had established northern dominance during Abdali's absence
- Same formula could work again if they had patience
- No need to fight Abdali directly; just wait him out
Bhau's Strategy: European Warfare Approach
Bhau's Vision:
- Use long-range artillery fire as the dominant force
- European-style tactics with disciplined coordination
- Frontal warfare with overwhelming firepower
- Won Kunjapura in record time using this method
- Proved artillery's effectiveness firsthand
His Confidence:
- Had seen European warfare training firsthand
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi trained Maratha artillery forces
- Witnessed artillery devastate the Kunjapura fort
- Convinced this was the path to victory
The Organizational Problem: Discipline vs. Valor
The Critical Issue:
- European tactics ONLY work with strict military discipline
- Maratha army was built on individual valor and heroics
- Everyone wanted to show maximum bravery and personal valor
- No culture of coordination or unified command structure
- Each soldier wanted personal glory over collective success
The Result:
- Maratha forces later mastered combined cavalry-artillery tactics (but not at Panipat)
- In 1760, they had the tools but not the training
- System incompatibility: Revolutionary tactics + traditional warrior culture = friction
The Personal Tensions: More Than Just Strategy
Bhavantrao Mehendare: Bhau's Advisor
His Role:
- Bhau's closest confidant and major advisor
- Experienced military commander
- Came from Shinde family/clan background
- Had inherited prejudice against Holkar
His Warning:
- Told Bhau: "Don't listen to Holkar's advice"
- Distrusted Holkar's motivations
Bhau's Internal Bias
The Dismissal of Holkar:
- Called him "shepherd boy" (reference to humble origins)
- Thought Holkar was old-fashioned, raised in Bajirao I's era
- Didn't respect him despite military achievements
- Not purely caste-based (Brahmin supremacy) but influenced by it
The Real Problem:
- Bhau's advisor Mehendare came from Shinde camp
- Shinde and Holkar had always been rivals
- That rivalry poisoned Bhau's view of Holkar
- Inherited factional prejudice blocked objective evaluation
The Succession Question
Old Guard vs. New:
- Taji (Shinde leader) was dead—highly respected, loyal to Peshwa
- Jankoji (nephew, young successor) lacked battle experience and respect
- Holkar was 55-60 years old, at peak of power and influence
- Bhau was only 29 (considerable youth and impetuousness)
The Dynamic:
- Young, ambitious Bhau vs. experienced older commanders
- Bhau wanted freedom from previous generation's thinking
- But Bhau hadn't faced Abdali's actual military power
- Holkar had—and knew the danger firsthand
The Confrontation After Kunjapura
Mehendare's Accusation
The Direct Attack:
- After Kunjapura victory, Holkar urged return to Delhi
- Mehendare burst out: "Why are you speaking on behalf of the Durani (Abdali)?"
- Essentially: "Why are you parroting the enemy's talking points?"
- Accused Holkar of cowardice and fear
The Suspicion:
- Holkar had fled from Abdali's forces in earlier engagements
- They suspected his caution came from fear, not strategy
- Implied he was protecting himself rather than serving Peshwa interests
Holkar's Response
The Hurt:
- Became deeply disappointed and disillusioned
- This was a serious accusation in warrior culture
- Questioning someone's courage could lead to violence/duels
- Showed fundamental lack of trust
Holkar's Counter-Attack:
- "You Brahmins didn't come to earth by shattering the sky"
- "You haven't descended from heaven"
- "Stop telling me this bullshit"
- "You've never faced Abdali's forces—I have"
- "If you meet him on the battlefield, you'll understand what you're facing"
The Trust Problem: Structural Issues
Why Holkar Couldn't Be Trusted (In Peshwa's Mind)
The Reality:
- Holkar had become semi-independent, almost a vassal king
- Operated in the north autonomously
- Had his own interests and didn't fully align with Peshwa
- Carryover suspicion from Bajirao I's era
The Comparison:
- Taji (deceased Shinde leader) had been called "Ishwarath Sepai" (Soldier of God)
- Fiercely loyal to Narasimha Peshwa
- Holkar was a different story—more independent operator
- If Taji were alive, even same strategies might have been trusted
The Autonomy Problem
Holkar's Position:
- Always in the north
- Had substantial land and territorial control
- Made decisions independently
- Peshwa couldn't fully control him even if wanted to
The Age Differential:
- Holkar: 55-60 years old, experienced, powerful
- Bhau: 29 years old, less battle-tested, more idealistic
- Youth wanted to assert dominance over experience
- Experience wanted respect for hard-won knowledge
The Historical Hindsight: What Should Have Happened
Holkar's Strategy Evaluated:
- Wait for Abdali to exhaust himself and leave
- Re-establish northern supremacy without direct confrontation
- This had worked 1756-1758 when Abdali wasn't there
- Would likely have worked again with patience
What Actually Happened:
- Bhau's pride and youth overruled Holkar's experience
- Direct battle at Panipat (January 1761)
- Massive Maratha losses—entire generation of warriors killed
- 15-20 year recovery period for Maratha power
- British filled the vacuum created by Maratha collapse
- If Panipat hadn't happened, British rule might never have come
The Strategic Error:
- Bhau was right that European artillery was revolutionary
- Bhau was right that it could be decisive
- But he was wrong about when and where to use it
- And wrong about accepting unnecessary battle for honor/pride
The Chanakya Principle
What Shivaji Would Have Done:
- Shivaji was extremely strategic
- Would have put pride aside to avoid unnecessary open warfare
- Understood that some victories come from avoiding battles, not fighting them
- Never made such catastrophic mistakes in his lifetime
Bhau's Failure:
- Even basic Chanakya principles say: avoid unnecessary warfare
- But he sent word he would fight Abdali
- Couldn't let that word go unmet without appearing coward
- His pride locked him into the battle
Why Abdali Came Back (The Najib Khan Factor)
The Unexpected Return:
- Marathas thought Abdali's threat had waned after 1758
- Actually, Abdali was content to stay in Afghanistan
- But Najib Khan kept pressuring him to return
- Used religious language: "Islam is in danger in India"
Why Najib Khan Insisted:
- His own survival depended on Abdali's presence
- Without external Afghan support, Marathas would eliminate him
- Had to keep his external patron engaged
- Essentially engineered Abdali's return for self-preservation
Alternative Scenario:
- Without Najib Khan's pressure, Abdali might never have returned
- Marathas would have dominated north unopposed
- No Panipat, no British opportunity
Key Themes
- Pride as Military Strategy - Bhau's honor requirements forced unwanted battle
- Institutional Distrust - Young new leader couldn't trust older experienced commanders
- Factional Carryover - Old Shinde-Holkar rivalry poisoned objective decision-making
- Tool Without Training - Had revolutionary artillery but lacked disciplined army to use it
- Experience Dismissed - Holkar's firsthand knowledge ignored due to age/rank tensions
- Hindsight Tragedy - One different decision changes 200+ years of history
Timeline of Tensions
| Event | Date | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Kunjapura Victory | October 1760 | Confidence in artillery confirmed |
| Return Debate | October 1760 | Holkar vs. Bhau strategy clash |
| Mehendare Accusation | October 1760 | Direct challenge to Holkar's loyalty |
| Holkar's Response | October 1760 | Defensive, mentions battlefield experience |
| Growing Divide | Nov-Dec 1760 | Trust eroding as Panipat approaches |
| Final Confrontation | January 1761 | Panipat battle happens despite warnings |
The Players and Their Positions
| Person | Age | Position | Strategy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bhau | 29 | Commander-in-Chief | Direct battle with artillery |
| Holkar | 55-60 | Army Commander | Guerrilla harassment, wait him out |
| Mehendare | ?? | Bhau's Advisor | Support Bhau, distrust Holkar |
| Jankoji Shinde | Young | Shinde Heir | Inexperienced, less influential |
| Najib Khan | ?? | Afghan Wazir | Pressuring Abdali to stay in India |
Where This Leads: By October 1760, the cracks in Maratha command are visible. Bhau is convinced that European-style artillery warfare is the answer. Holkar is convinced that patience and mobility are key. Mehendare and Bhau's team don't trust Holkar's motives. Holkar is feeling dismissed and disrespected. The younger generation (Bhau) is overruling the older generation (Holkar) based on ideology and pride rather than strategic analysis. Meanwhile, Abdali is on his way south. The Marathas are marching into history's most consequential battle while their command structure is fractured.
Strategy meeting, but the commanders don't trust each other. One has pride, one has experience. One believes in technology, one believes in time. One is young enough to change the world, one is old enough to have seen empires fall. They disagree about everything except that Abdali is coming. And when he arrives, they'll have to fight together despite the fractures. That's the real tragedy—not the defeat itself, but the division that made defeat possible.
Irrationality and Wasted Advantage: The Kurukshetra Detour (Late 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Strategic Situation: A Fleeting Advantage
Where Bhau Is:
- At Kunjapura (130 km north of Delhi)
- Recently victorious over Abdali's forces
- Scouts positioned along western bank of Yamuna
- Abdali is south of Delhi, preparing to cross the river
The Critical Window:
- Abdali must cross Yamuna to bring his army into Doab region
- A massive army (70,000-80,000 soldiers) cannot cross unnoticed
- Crossing the river = moment of maximum vulnerability
- If caught mid-crossing: Marathas would have overwhelming advantage
The Marathi Plan:
- Scouts at 100 different locations along Yamuna's west bank
- Orders: Spot any crossing attempt immediately
- Quick communication back to Bhau
- Respond with full force while enemy is vulnerable
- Cannot be surprised if vigilant
The Irrational Decision: Kurukshetra Pilgrimage
The Setup: Historical and Religious Significance
Kurukshetra Location:
- 50 km north of Kunjapura (even further north, 180 km from Delhi)
- Site of Mahabharata battle between Pandavas and Kauravas
- Both sides: Kuru tribe/clan (civil war within same family)
- Central to Indian mythology and spirituality
- Enormous religious significance
Why It Mattered to Marathas:
- Large entourage with army: civilians, families, refugees
- Non-combatants wanted to visit this legendary site while in region
- Pilgrimage traditions: important spiritual ceremonies and rituals
- Won the last battle: opportunity to seek blessings before next battle
The Reasoning: Andhashraddha (Blind Devotion)
The Belief System:
- Going to Kurukshetra = good omen for battle victory
- Religious blessings would help them defeat Abdali
- Celestial positions determined auspicious days
- Thursday, Friday, Saturday designated "good for battles"
- Superstitions and folk beliefs overrode rational planning
The Rational Problem:
- No scientific basis for these beliefs
- Victory comes from positioning, timing, discipline—not divine blessing
- Visiting religious sites won't help if tactically displaced
- Spiritual rituals matter less than military advantage
Historical Context: Even Shivaji Did This
The Comparison:
- Shivaji would perform prayers and rituals
- But he'd do them at the right time
- Never at expense of exploiting enemy weakness
- He understood prioritization: military advantage > religious ceremony
Bhau's Failure:
- Allowed ceremonies to override strategy
- In a critical moment, chose wrong priorities
- Time was running out; choices had consequences
The Strategic Disaster: Losing the Vulnerable Window
The Math of Delay
The Timing Problem:
- From Kurukshetra back to Delhi: ~180 km away
- Army movement rate: ~2 weeks to cover that distance
- Scouts bring news, but from 100+ km away
- By the time Bhau mobilizes and marches: Already too late
The Vulnerability Window:
- Abdali crossing Yamuna = most critical moment
- Takes days for 70,000+ soldiers to cross river
- Marathas could catch them mid-crossing if nearby
- But from Kurukshetra, they're too far away
The Consequence:
- Scouts spot crossing (yes, system works)
- News reaches Bhau (yes, scouts work)
- But 100-200 km away = cannot respond in time
- Abdali safely crosses before Marathas arrive
- Game changes from Marathi advantage to neutral
Richard Owen Cambridge's Observation
British Historical Analysis:
- "Andhashraddha and Shubha Ashubha" (blind devotion to good/bad days)
- Decisions based on celestial positions, not strategy
- Failed to exploit enemy weakness due to irrational thinking
- Religious considerations overrode military logic
The Assessment:
- Good and bad days don't determine battle outcomes
- Warrior discipline and positioning do
- Decisions should be rational, not superstitious
The Pattern: Recurring Irrationality
Pre-Kunjapura (January 1760)
Raghunath Rao's Letter:
- Consulted astrologers for "auspicious days"
- Said: "Thursday, Friday, Saturday are good for battle"
- Decided on celestial positions when to fight Nizam
- Battle succeeded (but not because of auspicious days)
Post-Kunjapura (October 1760)
Kurukshetra Pilgrimage:
- Again chose based on religious/spiritual thinking
- Same pattern of celestial consultation
- Different context; same irrationality
Marching Orders (June 1760)
The Ceremony Obsession:
- Left Sindakhed on Padwa festival day
- 13th June: Stopped for holy bathing ritual (Pavitra Snana)
- Decided important military movements by celestial positions
- All major decisions: When to move? When to fight? Based on astrological timing
The Refugee Problem
Why Non-Combatants Came:
The Maratha army wasn't just soldiers:
- Families of commanders and soldiers
- Elderly people
- Women and children
- Refugees from contested areas
- All traveled with the army for safety and support
Why They Wanted Kurukshetra:
- Dangerous to travel independently in northern India
- Hostile territory (Muslim kingdoms, Afghan forces, danger)
- Safe only with army protection
- Once army decided to go: Everyone wanted to participate
- Religious experience couldn't be missed
The Drag on Speed:
- Non-combatants slow down army movement
- Can't move fast with families, elderly, children
- Large entourage = logistics nightmare
- 180 km journey takes even longer
Why Shivaji Would Never Make This Mistake
Shivaji's Strategic Approach:
- Rituals Second: Performed prayers and ceremonies but at right time
- Exploitation First: Identified enemy weakness and struck immediately
- Prioritization: Military advantage >> religious ceremony
- Patience: Would wait for enemy to leave rather than fight unnecessarily
- Risk Calculation: Never put entire empire at risk for superstition
The Contrast:
- Bhau: Young (29), idealistic, increasingly frustrated
- Shivaji: Strategic genius, understood long-term consequences
- Bhau: Allowed irrationality to override experience
- Shivaji: Never made such catastrophic strategic errors
The Cascading Consequences
Immediate (January 1761)
Abdali's Crossing:
- Safely crosses Yamuna with entire army
- Now on Maratha side of river
- Positions himself for battle on terms of his choosing
- Marathas no longer have advantage
Medium Term (1761-1765)
Panipat Disaster:
- Battle happens, Marathas lose decisively
- Entire generation of warriors killed
- Massive loss of prestige and power
- 15-20 year recovery period for Maratha empire
Long Term (1761-1857)
British Opportunity:
- While Marathas recovering, British consolidate power
- Fill the vacuum left by Maratha collapse
- Establish foundations of 200 years of British rule
- By time Marathas recover, British too strong to defeat
Timeline: The Decision Chain
| Date | Location | Decision | Rationale | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| June 13, 1760 | Sindakhed | Leave on Padwa festival | Auspicious day | Delay start |
| October 11, 1760 | Delhi | Move toward Kunjapura | Celestial timing | Follow schedule |
| October 20, 1760 | Kunjapura | Win battle decisively | Military execution | Victory achieved |
| October 21, 1760 | Kunjapura | Decide to go to Kurukshetra | Blind devotion | Fatal decision |
| October 21-Nov | En route to Kurukshetra | Move 50 km north, then back | Religious pilgrimage | Lose strategic position |
| Late November | West of Yamuna | Scouts report Abdali crossing | Too late to respond | Game over |
| January 1761 | Panipat | Battle occurs | No choice left | Disaster |
Key Players and Their Positions at This Time
| Person | Role | Decision on Kurukshetra |
|---|---|---|
| Bhau | Supreme Commander | Approved/ordered the detour |
| Holkar | Army Commander | Likely opposed (wanted strategic movement) |
| Raghunath Rao | Back in Pune | Wrote advice letters (too late) |
| Nana Sahib Peshwa | In Pune | Unaware of escalating situation |
| Scouts along Yamuna | Surveillance | Successfully spotted crossing (but too late) |
The Core Problem: Decision-Making Framework
What Bhau Used:
- Spiritual/religious considerations
- Astrological consulting
- Troop morale/civilian desires
- Personal pride and honor
- Irrational superstition
What Bhau Should Have Used:
- Enemy vulnerability assessment
- Own positioning advantage
- Speed and surprise value
- Geographic advantage (Yamuna crossing)
- Rational risk calculation
The Disconnect:
- Had correct system (scouts, communication)
- Lost advantage through location choice
- No amount of scouting helps if 200 km away
- Information speed < travel speed
The Bigger Pattern: Andhashraddha in Command
Throughout the Campaign:
- Major decisions made by celestial timing
- Religious duty overrode military necessity
- Superstition presented as strategic thinking
- Irrationality normalized in command structure
Who Benefited:
- Religious priests/astrologers (consulted constantly)
- Civilian morale (religious ceremonies provided)
- No one (strategically speaking)
Who Suffered:
- Military operations (delayed, distracted)
- Maratha army (lost advantage)
- Maratha empire (lost war)
- Indian independence (British filled vacuum for 200 years)
The Tragedy: Right System, Wrong Execution
What They Got Right:
- Scout system along Yamuna
- Communication network
- Military discipline for battle
- Artillery advantage
- Numerical strength
What They Got Wrong:
- Positioning of scouts
- Strategic location of army
- Timing of major moves
- Decision-making framework
- Willingness to subordinate ritual to necessity
The Irony:
- They had superior position
- They had warning system
- They lost advantage through location
- They knew they should be watching Yamuna crossing
- They went to religious pilgrimage instead
- By the time they realized: Too late
Where This Leads: By late October 1760, the Marathas have all the tactical pieces: scouts, communications, artillery, numbers, and recent victory. But Bhau's decision to visit Kurukshetra puts them 180 km from the critical crossing point. When Abdali moves to cross Yamuna, the scouts report it, but the army is too far away to respond. The window of vulnerability closes. Abdali's army crosses intact. The strategic advantage evaporates. And six weeks later, they meet on the plains of Panipat—this time on equal terms instead of Marathi advantage.
It seems like a small detour. Just 50 km north to see a holy site. The civilians want it. The soldiers would appreciate the blessing. The priests say the timing is good. What's the harm? Except that 50 km north then 180 km back south takes weeks. And in those weeks, the enemy moves. The scouts see it coming but they're 200 km away. By the time they march back, he's already across. And that changed everything. Shivaji would have known this. But Bhau was young, confident, and surrounded by people telling him that gods prefer Thursday and Saturday battles. So he went to Kurukshetra. And in doing so, he lost the war.
Abdali's Crossing: Desperation and Local Help (Late October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Strategic Setup: Bhau's Control Points
Maratha Tactical Advantages
Boat and Ghat Control:
- From Agra all the way to Kunjapura: all boats controlled by Marathas
- Every landing point (ghat) on western bank under Maratha watch
- Abdali stuck on eastern bank with no way to cross
Scout Network:
- Scouts positioned throughout region
- Looking for any crossing attempts
- Tactical advantage should be decisive
Bhau's Critical Miscalculation
The False Confidence:
- Yamuna running at full capacity (monsoon/post-monsoon floods)
- Bloated with water, massive flow
- Bhau assumed: "No army can cross this with horses, elephants, artillery"
- Believed it was physically impossible for Abdali's massive force
The Reasoning:
- Heavy equipment (artillery, supplies) impossible to transport
- 70,000+ soldiers would need extended time
- Animals would be swept away by current
- Logistically seemed unachievable
The Problem:
- Assumption made Bhau risk-tolerant about distance
- Decided distance from river didn't matter if crossing impossible
- But he gave "this possibility" not enough respect
- Went to Kurukshetra 180 km away from critical point
The Civilian Factor: Popular Demand for Pilgrimage
Who Came North:
- Maratha army had massive entourage
- Holy pilgrims wanting to visit sacred sites
- Tourists and religious seekers
- Families, non-combatants, refugees
- All traveling under army protection
Why They Wanted Kurukshetra:
- One of most sacred sites in Hindu tradition
- Mahabharata battle site (religious significance)
- While in region: popular demand to visit
- Not dangerous if with army
The Pressure:
- Civilian demand for pilgrimage
- Bhau's willingness to accommodate
- Thought they had time (Yamuna flooding)
- Why not visit while nearby and relatively safe?
The Sikh Opportunity: A Missed Alliance?
The Sikh Military Structure
How They Organized:
- Divided into autonomous groups (~1,000-2,000 per unit)
- 6-7 separate units roving around
- Each with own leader
- NOT under unified command structure
Their Culture:
- Had understanding with each other despite autonomy
- Didn't bicker internally like Afghans did
- Bound together by shared Sikh identity
- Harsh pressure created cohesion
The Persecution Context
Under Mughal Rule:
- Subedar (governor) brutal to Sikhs
- Killed them on sight
- Viewed them as even more threatening than Hindus
- Systematic persecution
Under Abdali:
- Even more brutal than Mughal governors
- Sikhs went through trials and tribulations
- Hardened by constant pressure
- Made them resilient warrior people
Bhau's Potential Strategy
The Idea:
- Visit Kurukshetra = visit Sikh territory
- Try to recruit or ally with Sikh warriors
- Frame battle as: Indians vs. Foreigners
- Get Sikh help against Abdali's forces
- Forget internal differences and unite
The Uncertainty:
- Not clear if this was actually Bhau's goal
- May have been secondary consideration
- Primarily went for religious pilgrimage
- Strategic opportunity may have been coincidental
Abdali's Crisis: The Kunjapura Aftermath
The Devastating News
What Happened:
- Kunjapura fell to Marathas in humiliating manner
- Afghans trapped in fort, couldn't escape
- Thousands massacred by artillery and Maratha force
- Kutub Shah (key commander) killed and beheaded
- Head placed on spear as trophy
Who Was Lost:
- Qutub Shah: Spiritual/strategic leader, had helped recruit Afghans to India
- Mundaka Bhalya: Battle-hardened commander
- Thousands of soldiers
- All supplies and equipment at fort
The Emotional Impact:
- Qutub Shah was Nazib Khan's spiritual leader
- His death especially resonant
- He had recruited these Afghans to come to India
- His death made Abdali look helpless and weak
The Reputation Crisis
Abdali's Rage:
- Fire metaphor: "Fire went from his feet to his head"
- Couldn't bear the insult
- Couldn't stay on eastern bank anymore
- People would call him coward if he stayed
The Imperative:
- "This is beyond my patience"
- "The destruction of my people and resources"
- "I can't take this, you know"
- "This will destroy my reputation"
- "It will demoralize my own army"
The Decision
Abdali's Order:
- "Do whatever it takes but find a place to cross"
- "I have to cross this river along with my army"
- "With minimal loss if possible"
- Non-negotiable: Must cross Yamuna immediately
The Impossible Crossing: Environmental Obstacles
The Physical Challenge
The Yamuna's State:
- Running at full force
- Bloated with water
- Monsoon rains had swollen it massively
- Much larger than normal
- Strong current everywhere
The River Geography:
- Becomes bigger going south (more tributaries join)
- Near Agra: almost emptying into Ganga
- Only feasible crossing: north of Agra, north of Delhi
- But even there, it was bloated and dangerous
Abdali's Spy Units Fail
The Mission:
- Abdali's spies tasked with finding crossing point
- Searched eastern bank extensively
- Four days of searching and scouting
- Result: Couldn't find suitable crossing point
The Problem:
- Full flow river = soldiers drown
- Can't force a crossing through impossible current
- Army would be swept away by flow
- Seemed genuinely impossible
Frustration and Blame
Abdali's Complaint:
- To his allies: "You are from here and you don't know where to cross?"
- Very frustrated
- Couldn't find a solution through his own resources
- Four days of searching yielded nothing
The Gujars: Local Knowledge as Decisive Factor
Who Were the Gujars?
Their Role:
- Wanderers and pastoralists
- Lived off the land in the region
- Intimate knowledge of geography
- Knew where rivers were shallow vs. deep
- Understood seasonal variations
Their Expertise:
- Summer = river becomes very dry
- Knew the shallow areas that could be crossed
- Understood the geological features
- Native knowledge that invaders lacked
Why Both Armies Needed Them
The Problem for Both Sides:
- Both armies foreign to the land
- Couldn't read the terrain
- Didn't know the geography
- Had maps but not practical knowledge
- Needed native guides
The Dependency:
- Couldn't cross without local help
- Gujars were the only ones who knew
- Held the key information
- Critical bottleneck for both armies
The Gujar Decision: Profit or Fear?
The Historical Record (Povada): Three Gujar leaders helped Abdali:
-
Gulab Singh: Showed Abdali the ghat at Gauripur
- Identified shallow bed where crossing possible
- Critical information for crossing decision
-
Himmat Singh Jat: Helped show crossing point
- Jat background (different from Gujar but same region)
- Either scared of Abdali or wanted reward
-
Bole Khan: Third helper
- Likely Rajput or Muslim from region
- Either motivated by fear or profit
Their Motivation:
- Fear of Abdali's reputation
- Desire for reward/payment
- Mix of coercion and incentive
- Practical calculation: Help or die
The Fateful Information
Gauripur Ghat:
- Identified as crossing point
- Shallow enough to cross
- Likely noticed in summer months
- Critical logistics information
The Consequences:
- Changed entire battle dynamics
- What seemed impossible became possible
- Abdali's army could cross
- Marathi advantage evaporated
The Role of Povadas: Historical Memory
What Are Povadas:
- Songs about historical events
- Poetic form with musical elements
- Used to preserve important history
- Similar to other balladic traditions
- Spread through oral tradition
Examples in History:
- Tanaji Malusare's cliff climb (Fort taking at night)
- How he scaled the steep cliff
- Took the fort with surprise
- Remembered through Povada
The Abdali Crossing Povada:
- Important enough for Povada
- Recorded three Gujar leaders who helped
- Described the critical crossing information
- Preserved for historical memory
- Shows this was seen as pivotal moment
The Final Phase: Preparations Complete
Abdali's Position:
- Has found crossing point
- Has local guides
- Has motivation (reputation, rage)
- Has desperation (can't stay on east bank)
Marathi Position:
- Scouts are far away (in Kurukshetra region)
- Army is 180+ km from Yamuna crossing
- Cannot respond in time even with warning
- Window closing rapidly
The Inevitable:
- Abdali will cross
- Marathas will get news too late
- By time army arrives: Abdali safely across
- Strategic advantage gone
- Equal battle conditions become reality
Key Themes
- False Confidence from Environment - Bhau underestimated because river seemed impassable
- Local Knowledge as Military Asset - Gujars held the key to crossing
- Mixed Motivation - Fear and profit both drive local collaboration
- Reputation Imperative - Abdali's need to respond to insult forces action
- Desperation Overcomes Obstacles - Rage and honor drive impossible crossing
- History Preserved in Song - Povadas remember critical moments
- Geography as Character - River becomes character in this drama
Timeline: The Crisis and Crossing
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 20, 1760 | Kunjapura victory; Qutub Shah beheaded |
| October 20-22, 1760 | News reaches Abdali; Rage and desperation set in |
| October 23-27, 1760 | Abdali's spies search (4+ days) for crossing point |
| October 25, 1760 | Bhau leaves Kunjapura for Kurukshetra |
| Late October, 1760 | Gujars provide crossing information at Gauripur |
| Late October, 1760 | Abdali prepares massive crossing operation |
| Early November, 1760 | Abdali likely crosses (exact date uncertain from transcript) |
The Gujar Leaders and Their Roles
| Name | Background | Information Provided | Motivation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gulab Singh | Gujar | Gauripur ghat (shallow crossing) | Fear or Reward |
| Himmat Singh Jat | Jat | Crossing point location | Fear or Reward |
| Bole Khan | Likely Rajput/Muslim | Crossing assistance | Fear or Reward |
The Irony
What Should Have Happened:
- Marathas stay near Delhi
- Catch Abdali mid-crossing
- Destroy vulnerable army
- War over, Marathi victory
- No Panipat needed
What Actually Happened:
- Marathas go 180 km north
- Abdali finds crossing point
- Crosses unmolested
- Equal armies on equal terms
- Panipat battle inevitable
The Difference:
- Pilgrimage vs. strategy
- Spiritual blessing vs. military advantage
- Religious duty vs. war necessity
- 50 km detour = 200 years of British rule
Where This Leads: By late October 1760, Abdali has found his crossing point (Gauripur ghat) with Gujar help. He's preparing to bring his entire force across Yamuna. Marathas are 180 km away on a pilgrimage. Scouts will report the crossing, but by the time the army marches back, Abdali will be safely across on the western bank. The vulnerability window closes. Equal armies will meet. And all the artillery advantage, all the tactical planning, all the initial success at Kunjapura—none of it will matter anymore. The decision to visit Kurukshetra will cost them everything.
It's a small moment in history. Three Gujars leading Abdali's scouts to a shallow place where a river can be crossed. They could have refused. They had nothing to gain and everything to lose. But fear is persuasive. Reward is persuasive. And Abdali's reputation is terrifying. So they showed him the way. And in showing him the way to cross one river, they opened the way to 200 years of foreign rule. That's how empires fall—not with a bang, but with three locals pointing to a shallow ghat and saying 'you can cross here.'
Abdali's Crossing Operation: Logistics and Strategic Movement (Late October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Crossing Operation: Technique and Challenges
The Method: Bamboo Stakes and Marked Paths
How They Crossed:
- Placed long bamboo shoots/stakes into the river bed
- Created marked pathway through the water
- Showed where it was shallow vs. deep
- Army followed this marked path across Yamuna
The Difficulty:
- Current was extremely strong (monsoon/post-monsoon flow)
- People and animals swept away by swirling current
- Horses, camels, elephants lost to the water
- Gunpowder critically vulnerable if wet
- Had to be carefully transported
The Losses:
- Not a smooth operation despite planning
- Some soldiers and animals drowned
- Equipment lost to currents
- Managed to cross most of army but with casualties
The Legends and Historical Record
Myth vs. Reality:
- Persian sources: "God parted the river for Abdali" (like Biblical miracle)
- Legend: Abdali tried crossing on elephant, failed due to depth
- Legend: Threw silver dish with religious writing into water
- Legend: Shot arrow into river to mark path
- Reality: Used practical bamboo stakes to mark safe crossing
Who Documented It:
- Ayarvin (possibly Erwin): British historian who researched crossing method
- Marathas had used same bamboo stake method previously
- British historians documented what Indians didn't preserve
- Shows importance of systematic record-keeping
The Western Bank Problem
Logistics Challenge:
- Western bank was mushy, soft, waterlogged soil
- Full of water from monsoon flooding
- Difficult for army to land and organize
- Had to clear paths and improve ground conditions
- Abdali personally involved in problem-solving
Abdali's Leadership: Hands-On Involvement
The Crisis Management
The Situation:
- Stuck on eastern bank while reputation damaged
- Army getting demoralized
- Kunjapura fort destroyed, supplies lost
- People saying he was useless ("sitting duck")
- Everything depended on successful crossing
His Response:
- Personally directed the operation
- Not just ordering from distance
- Actively involved in solving problems
- Made decisions as issues arose
- Army saw him engaged and followed his lead
Shahawali Khan: The Critical Wazir
His Role:
- Abdali's wazir (prime minister/chief of staff)
- Understood this crossing was non-negotiable
- Realized "whatever it takes" approach needed
- Became actively involved in operations
- Not just bureaucrat—operational leader
Why He Stepped In:
- If army got swept away in current: disaster
- If operation failed: Abdali finished
- No room for half-measures or doubt
- Material and personnel constantly at risk
- Highest priority work requiring personal involvement
The Danger Timeline
October 26:
- Marathas leaving Kunjapura toward Kurukshetra (45 km north)
- Completely unaware of crossing operation
- Abdali's spies located crossing point (Gauripur ghat)
- Preparation phase beginning
October 27:
- Cannons tied to elephants for transport
- Army beginning main crossing operation
- Artillery pieces carefully moved across
- Most soldiers starting to cross
- Massive logistical operation in progress
The Strategic Mistake: Abdali's Scouts vs. Maratha Scouts
What Should Have Happened
Maratha Advantage:
- Had scouts positioned along Yamuna west bank
- Scouts spotted Marathas leaving (wrong direction)
- Should have caught crossing mid-operation
- Could have destroyed vulnerable army
What Did Happen:
- Marathas 150+ km away in Kurukshetra area
- Army massive with artillery (slow movement)
- By time news reached them: too late
- By time they could march: Abdali safely across
- Strategic window completely lost
The Information Problem
Scout Communication Issue:
- Scouts could spot the crossing
- But 150 km is 2 weeks march with full army
- Information travels fast (few days)
- Army movement is slow (weeks)
- Gap between knowing and being able to respond
Abdali's Strategic Vision
The Sikh Opportunity (Abandoned)
Bhau's Plan:
- Visit Kurukshetra = near Sikh territory
- Recruit Sikh warriors to join Maratha cause
- Frame as: Indian powers vs. Afghan outsiders
- Unite all Indians against foreign invader
- Would have been powerful psychological move
Why It Didn't Work:
- Time ran out
- Would need weeks of negotiation
- Army had to respond to Abdali's crossing
- Could have worked with more time
- Showed Bhau's strategic thinking
Abdali's Crossing Strategy
The Tactical Approach:
- Sent half army across first
- Waited until half safely across
- Only then crossed himself
- Didn't want to be trapped mid-crossing
- Ensured majority of force on western bank before risking himself
Why This Mattered:
- If Marathas attacked during his crossing: disastrous
- With half army on each side: vulnerable
- Waited for majority to be established
- Artillery had to cross first (critical resource)
- Shows careful general, not reckless warrior
Comparison to Bhau: Two Different Command Styles
Abdali:
- Strategic planner, not front-line warrior
- Stays in background, directs operations
- Never takes sword in hand
- Uses chess-like thinking about war
- Modern approach to military command
Bhau:
- Warrior general, fights alongside troops
- Believes general must be in front
- Gets personally involved in battles
- Follows older warrior tradition
- More like Dattaji (who called Abdali "coward")
The Evolution:
- Dattaji called Abdali "Na Mardh" (not a real man)
- Meant: not fighting in front
- But modern warfare evolves past this model
- Abdali's method more effective (survives to command)
- Bhau's method more traditional (but costly)
The Immediate Aftermath: Controlling Information
The Critical Decision
Abdali's Orders:
- After crossing: "Find the Maratha scouts"
- Commanded Shahpasand Khan (chief commander)
- Purpose: Stop news reaching Bhau
- If scouts can't report: Marathas stay in dark
- Surprise attack becomes possible
The Scout Locations:
- Scouts positioned along western Yamuna coast
- Nearby to Gauripur crossing point
- Didn't realize crossing had happened
- No messenger alert sent yet
- Time window still open
The Massacre at Sonipat
The First Armed Encounter
What Happened:
- October 27: Abdali's advance force attacked Marathas at Sonipat
- Led by Najib Khan's 4,000 soldiers
- Maratha scouts/force positioned there
- Surprise attack caught them unprepared
- Massacre ensued
The Casualties:
- ~1,000 Afghans killed
- ~1,500 Marathas killed
- Maratha scouts/forward elements destroyed
- Information line cut before it could report
- Abdali achieved his objective: information blackout
The Strategic Success:
- Marathas didn't know crossing complete
- Didn't know Abdali was now on western bank
- Continued thinking he was stuck on eastern bank
- Continued heading toward Kurukshetra
- Moving away from the threat
The Chase Begins: Repositioning
Abdali's Movement South
October 27-31:
- After massacre at Sonipat
- Moved south toward Panipat
- Took 3-day respite at Sambhalka
- Recovering from crossing ordeal
- Reconnoitering Maratha positions
The Maratha Response:
- Still heading north initially
- News eventually reaches them (5-6 days)
- Realize Abdali has crossed
- Turn around toward Panipat
- Race now underway
The Geography Advantage
Panipat as Convergence Point:
- Grand Trunk Road: Delhi to Lahore
- Abdali must use this road to return to Afghanistan
- Marathas trying to intercept him
- Both armies heading toward same town
- Neither can avoid confrontation
Key Themes
- Logistics as Warfare - Crossing river more challenging than battle itself
- Information Control - Killing scouts was as important as crossing
- Leadership Styles - Abdali's planning vs. Bhau's warrior tradition
- Risk Management - Cautious crossing despite desperation
- Strategic Convergence - Both armies pushed toward Panipat
- Lost Opportunity - Marathas could have destroyed army mid-crossing if positioned correctly
Timeline: The Crossing Operation
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 26 | Marathas leave Kunjapura; Abdali prepares crossing |
| October 27 (dawn) | Abdali's army begins main crossing operation |
| October 27 (mid-day) | Cannons tied to elephants; artillery starts crossing |
| October 27 (afternoon) | Massacre at Sonipat; Maratha scouts killed/routed |
| October 27 (evening) | Most of Abdali's army across to western bank |
| October 28-30 | Consolidation at Sambhalka; 3-day rest |
| October 31 | Abdali reaches Sambhalka (6-7 days after crossing began) |
| Early November | Both armies converging toward Panipat |
The Gujars' Historical Role
Why They Mattered:
- Showed Abdali where to cross at Gauripur ghat
- Identified shallow point in river
- Made impossible crossing possible
- Enabled entire operation
- Changed course of history
Their Motivation:
- Fear of Abdali's reputation
- Desire for reward/payment
- Mix of coercion and incentive
- Practical survival calculation
- Historical consequence disproportionate to individual decision
Command Comparison: Two Leaders, Two Philosophies
| Aspect | Abdali | Bhau |
|---|---|---|
| Command Style | Strategic/planning | Warrior/hands-on |
| Position | Behind lines, directing | Front lines, fighting |
| Decision-Making | Calculated, patient | Bold, confident |
| Risk Tolerance | Cautious despite desperation | Aggressive despite warnings |
| Combat Role | Organizer, not fighter | Combatant, not organizer |
| Modern Relevance | Evolved military thinking | Traditional warrior code |
The Lost Ambush Opportunity
What Could Have Happened:
- Marathas positioned near Delhi
- Caught Abdali mid-crossing (October 27)
- Even 5,000 soldiers could have harassed him
- Would have been in vulnerable position
- Thousands more could have been killed
Why It Didn't Happen:
- Bhau went to Kurukshetra
- 180 km from crossing point
- Too far to respond
- Scouts killed before reporting
- Information warfare succeeded
The Lesson:
- One decision (pilgrimage) had military consequences
- Distance compounds the problem
- Information control is as important as force
- Strategic thinking beats brave warrior code
Where This Leads: By October 27, Abdali has successfully crossed the Yamuna. His scouts have been destroyed at Sonipat, cutting off information to the Marathas. The army is consolidating on the western bank. Meanwhile, Marathas are still turning around in Kurukshetra, days away from the action. The window for ambush has closed. Within days, both armies will be converging on Panipat. The stage is set for the decisive battle.
The crossing almost killed Abdali. Swirling currents, muddy banks, animals drowning, gunpowder at risk. But he stayed involved. He didn't sit in a tent ordering people around—he was there, making decisions, solving problems. And when the scouts came to kill him, he moved first. By October 27, he was safely across. And the Marathas were still in Kurukshetra, wondering what happened. That's how you turn desperation into victory.
Scout Encounters and Pre-Battle Positioning (Late October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The First Major Skirmish: Sonipat Encounter
The Setup: Advanced Forces Meet
Maratha Scouts in Forest:
- Dense forest between Sonipat and Panipat
- Baji Hari's Maratha scouts sent ahead
- Shinde troops (experienced with Abdali's forces) ready
- Baji Hari's troops more relaxed/unprepared
- Horses sent out to graze (standard practice)
Abdali's Advance Force:
- 4,000 troops under Najib Khan
- Leading element of larger crossing operation
- Swift, agile attack force
- Exploiting element of surprise
- Aimed at destroying Maratha scouts
The Violent Encounter
The Attack:
- Afghan forces swept in suddenly
- Maratha forces caught off-guard
- Baji Hari's troops especially vulnerable
- No time to gather grazing horses
- Intense, violent skirmish in forest
The Casualties:
- ~1,000 Afghans killed
- ~1,500 Marathas killed
- Heavy losses for both sides
- Disproportionate Maratha casualties
- Scout force largely destroyed
Strategic Significance:
- Not the main armies, just advance elements
- But destroyed Maratha scouting capability
- Prevented information reaching Bhau
- First blood of eventual confrontation
- Showed Afghan offensive capability
The Difference: Shinde vs. Baji Hari Troops
Experience Matters
Shinde Troops:
- Had fought Afghans before
- Knew Afghan tactics and vigor
- Ready for the encounter
- Experienced and prepared
- Better positioned despite surprise
Baji Hari's Troops:
- Less battle experience with Afghans
- Relaxed, horses grazing in area
- Couldn't mobilize quickly
- More casualties in fighting
- Not ready for sudden engagement
The Lesson:
- Veteran troops perform better under pressure
- Experience of knowing enemy = advantage
- Preparation crucial in surprise situations
- Fresh troops more vulnerable to sudden attack
The Movement Toward Convergence
Abdali's Progress South
October 27-31 Timeline:
- October 27: Massacre at Sonipat
- October 28-30: Consolidation period
- October 31: Reached Sambhalka
- 6-7 days from crossing at Gauripur
- Moved ~40 km south toward Panipat
Why the Pause:
- Recovery from river crossing ordeal
- Reorganizing after scattered operation
- Reconnaissance of Maratha positions
- Allowing main force to consolidate
- Testing Maratha reaction/readiness
Bhau's Repositioning
The Turnaround:
- Marathas in Kurukshetra initially
- Got news of Abdali crossing (5-6 days delayed)
- Realized mistake of going north
- Turned around heading south
- Racing to intercept before Abdali escapes
The Distance Factor:
- Marathas ~150 km away
- Takes 2 weeks to move with full army + artillery
- Abdali ~40-50 km from Panipat
- Marathas have to cover much more ground
- Race now in Abdali's favor
Geographic Context: Why Panipat
The Road System
Grand Trunk Road:
- Delhi to Lahore main route
- Best road in region for large armies
- Abdali must use to return to Afghanistan
- Only practical route north from Delhi
- Built for trunk commerce and military movement
Panipat's Strategic Location:
- On or near Grand Trunk Road
- Linking Delhi and Lahore
- Town on elevated ground (small hill)
- Has small fort (Bhui Kot = ground fort)
- Controls major transportation corridor
The Canal Resource:
- Sweet water canal near Panipat
- Built by someone in past
- Critical for 100,000+ soldiers
- Need constant water supply
- Not available elsewhere in area
The Forest Barrier:
- Dense forest to west of Panipat
- Also small villages scattered around
- Affects movement and positioning
- Can hide forces or limit visibility
- Strategic terrain advantage possible
The Historical Pattern: Three Battles of Panipat
Why Panipat Became Battleground:
- First Battle (1526): Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodhi
- Second Battle (1556): Akbar defeated Hemu
- Third Battle (1761): Marathas vs. Afghans
The Strategic Reason:
- Gateway location on Grand Trunk Road
- Forces converging from different directions must meet there
- Controls access to Delhi from north
- Whoever wins Panipat controls Delhi access
- Road junction makes it natural battleground
The Mughal Pattern:
- Babur and Akbar both won decisive victories here
- Established Mughal dominance
- Route to power through Panipat
- Historical precedent for decisive battles
- Geography made it inevitable
The Standoff Begins: Wait and Watch
Both Armies Taking Measure
Cautious Approach:
- Both armies now ~5 miles apart
- Early November 1760
- Neither immediately attacking
- Both taking time to assess other
- Understanding this won't be easy
What They Were Evaluating:
- Troop strength and composition
- Artillery pieces and capabilities
- Supply lines and logistics
- Command structure and discipline
- Cavalry vs. infantry balance
- Morale and organization
Why No Immediate Battle:
- Both matched in size (~100,000-120,000 each)
- Both realize consequences enormous
- Both know this could be decisive battle
- Both recognize no easy victory possible
- Both want to maximize advantage before engaging
The Calculation
Abdali's Thinking:
- Impressed by Maratha force
- Need to understand their strengths
- Need to exploit their weaknesses
- Desperately wants to return home
- But not at cost of army destruction
Bhau's Thinking:
- Wants to stop Abdali going home
- Need to understand Afghan capabilities
- Artillery gives advantage but not decisive
- Must use terrain and positioning
- Cannot afford another loss like Dattaji
The Pre-Battle Analysis: Identifying Weaknesses
Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Artillery Ace
His Strategy:
- Advised Bhau to position ahead of Panipat town
- Panipat would be "in back" (secure retreat)
- Build massive camp fortifications
- Dig trenches around entire camp
- Use terrain for defense
The Defense System:
- Trenches 2-3 feet deep minimum
- Prevent cavalry from entering camp easily
- Line of defense against assault
- Protects supply and artillery
- Creates controlled battle space
Why This Matters:
- Artillery needs protected position
- Afghans mobile/agile (surgical strikes)
- Trenches slow down rapid movement
- Allows artillery better targeting
- Gives Marathas positional advantage
The Mutual Understanding
What Both Forces Realized:
- This isn't like previous battles
- Previous encounters were skirmishes
- Raghunath Rao fought Abdali's son (not Abdali)
- This is first direct confrontation
- Both are facing unknown opponent
The Recognition:
- Neither side is weak
- Neither side can be overrun easily
- Consequences will be immense
- Casualties on both sides certain
- Only one victor can emerge
- No quick victory possible
The Philosophical Dimension: Ram vs. Krishna
The Historical Parallel:
- Mahabharata happened in Kurukshetra (nearby)
- 3,000 years ago same general area
- Two sides fought over principle
- Similar to current situation
- History repeating itself
Ram's Approach (Straight, Righteous):
- Followed dharma (duty) precisely
- No corners cut
- Straight like an arrow
- Operated in Satya Yuga (age of truth)
- Society was mostly truthful
Krishna's Approach (Flexible, Pragmatic):
- Operated in Kali Yuga (age of degeneration)
- Bent rules to achieve results
- Cut corners but achieved same goal
- Deception permitted against wicked
- Adapts to reality of his time
The Application:
- Abdali = Krishna approach (flexible, deceptive, pragmatic)
- Bhau = Ram approach (direct, warrior code, principled)
- Different philosophies about warfare
- Different methods, same objective
- Evolution of military thinking
Hindu Philosophy on Dharma
Key Distinction:
- Hinduism doesn't prescribe exact rules
- Tells followers to use logic and reasoning
- Adapt approach to circumstances
- Consider context and time period
- Preserve good, destroy bad (principles)
The Mahabharata Model:
- Pandavas and Kauravas both Kuru clan
- Same family fighting each other
- But Kauravas abandoned truth/goodness
- Therefore had to be destroyed
- Even internal fight acceptable if principle at stake
Modern Application:
- Not "family loyalty over morality"
- But "universal principles over particularism"
- Good behavior > religious/family identity
- Truth > tribal loyalty
- This distinguishes Hindu ethics
The Blocking Problem: Mutual Obstacle
The Geographic Trap
Abdali's Perspective:
- Needs to return via Grand Trunk Road
- Road goes through Panipat area
- Marathas block his return path
- Can't go around (geography prevents it)
- Must fight his way through
Bhau's Perspective:
- Wants to prevent Abdali's return
- Wants to push him back across Yamuna
- Positioned to block Grand Trunk Road
- Abdali blocks his southern movement
- Can't go around easily either
The Impasse:
- Even if both wanted to avoid battle
- Geographic reality prevents it
- Both armies blocking each other's path
- Must move past each other
- Only way is through military confrontation
The Bad Blood:
- Dattaji killed (Marathas want revenge)
- Kunjapura destroyed (Afghans want revenge)
- Mathura massacred (Marathas outraged)
- Hundreds killed in skirmishes
- Too much blood spilled for negotiation
The Waiting Game: 2.5-3 Month Standoff
Timeline: Late October to January
The Duration:
- Left Pune: March 1760 (7.5 months ago)
- Now: Early November 1760
- Will wait: Until January 1761
- Additional: 2.5-3 month delay
- Total: 10 months from start
Why Wait So Long:
- Assess weaknesses/strengths
- Exploit terrain advantages
- Wait for better conditions
- Avoid rash decisions
- Both armies too evenly matched
The Stalemate Period:
- Both armies camped near Panipat
- Probing and reconnaissance
- Small skirmishes
- Gathering intelligence
- Preparing for decisive engagement
Key Players in Position
| Leader | Role | Age | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abdali | Commander-in-Chief | 40s | Afghan side |
| Bhau | Maratha Commander | 29 | Maratha side |
| Shahpasand Khan | Afghan Chief Commander | ? | Operational command |
| Ibrahim Khan Gardi | Artillery Master | ? | Strategic advisor |
| Holkar | Army Commander | 67 | Experienced voice (sidelined) |
| Baji Hari | Scout/Advance Force | ? | Reconnaissance |
| Shinde Troops | Veterans | Various | Battle-hardened units |
| Vishwas Rao | Nominal Commander | 19 | Ceremonial rank |
| Jankoji | Young Commander | 19 | Inexperienced |
The Waiting Period: What They're Doing
Intelligence Gathering:
- Sending spies into opposite camp
- Observing force composition
- Testing defensive positions
- Understanding supply lines
- Identifying weak points
Preparation:
- Fortifying camp positions
- Improving water supply
- Organizing troops
- Training and discipline
- Building morale
Diplomatic Probes:
- Possibly sending envoys
- Testing willingness to negotiate
- Exploring surrender options
- Understanding other side's resolve
- Looking for advantage
Key Themes
- Convergence is Inevitable - Geography makes battle unavoidable
- Information War - Scouts critical; controlling information crucial
- Measured Approach - Both sides avoid rash decisions
- Philosophical Divide - Different approaches to warfare
- Even Matching - No side has clear advantage
- Time as Weapon - Waiting allows preparation and assessment
Where This Leads: By early November 1760, both armies are positioned near Panipat. They've come 1,400 km and 7.5 months for this encounter. Neither is eager to fight immediately, despite the bad blood. They'll spend the next 2.5 months assessing each other, probing defenses, and preparing. The waiting period allows both sides to finalize plans. By January 1761, they'll be ready. The Third Battle of Panipat—one of history's most consequential battles—is now inevitable.
They're close enough to see each other now. 100,000 Marathas. 100,000 Afghans. Neither certain of victory. Both aware that this battle will be catastrophic for someone. So they wait. They watch. They probe. They gather intelligence. And through the winter months, both armies prepare for the moment when all these months of struggle, all this distance traveled, all this blood spilled—will come down to a single day. A single battle. At a place called Panipat.
The Geography and Atmosphere of Panipat: Facing the Unknown (November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Battlefield Geography
The Physical Terrain
The Panipat Region:
- Sandy ground with scattered villages
- Desert-like landscape (not forested plains)
- Elevated terrain (small hill formation)
- Fort in middle of town (Bhui Kot = ground fort)
- Multiple landing ghats on Yamuna (10 km away)
The Forest Barrier:
- Very dense, deep forest to the west
- Impenetrable woodland
- Limits movement and visibility
- Creates defensive positions
- Changes how armies can position
The Water Resources:
- Yamuna river 10 km away
- Ancient canal carrying sweet water
- Built in past for civilian use
- Now critical for massive army supply
- Most valuable strategic resource
Movement and Positioning
The Armies Jostle for Position:
- Both seeking advantageous locations
- Trying to access water resources
- Seeking higher ground if possible
- Avoiding forest entrapment
- Positioning for eventual battle
Why Position Matters:
- Forest limits retreat routes
- Elevated ground helps defense
- Water access essential for supply
- Sandy ground affects cavalry movement
- Terrain determines tactics available
The Climate: Winter Conditions
Khanda-Teen Shishir (Winter Affliction)
The Season:
- Shishir = winter
- Far north of Maratha homeland
- Intense cold for southern army
- Soldiers unprepared for weather
- Northern climate harsh and unfamiliar
The Maratha Problem:
- Marathas from Deccan (warm region)
- Not accustomed to northern winter
- Not properly clothed for cold
- 1,500 km from home = different climate
- Physical suffering begins
The Afghan Advantage:
- Afghans from mountain regions (cold climate)
- Accustomed to winter conditions
- Better clothing and preparation
- Better tolerance for harsh weather
- One more edge against Marathas
The Human Dimension: Civilians and Uncertainty
The Massive Entourage
Who Came to War:
- 100,000+ soldiers
- Families of commanders
- Servants and support personnel
- Holy pilgrims (religious tourists)
- Thousands of non-combatants
- All needed to be fed and protected
The Tourism Problem:
- Originally thought: "Picnic in the park"
- Planned pilgrimage to religious sites
- Expected quick military victory
- Expected to return home safely
- Reality: Now trapped in battle zone
The Realization of Danger
The Mood Shift:
- Started as religious expedition + military campaign
- Now facing existential threat
- Realized battle will be massive and deadly
- Understood people will die
- Grim awareness replacing optimism
The Civilian Fear:
- Many believed they would die
- Some contemplated suicide (desperation)
- Thousands stranded with army
- Can't leave, can't go home
- Complete dependence on military success
The Helplessness:
- Non-combatants cannot fight
- Cannot defend themselves
- Only outcome is victory or death
- No third option
- Forced into all-or-nothing situation
The Historical Echo: Mahabharata Parallel
The Ancient Battle Connection
Kurukshetra Precedent:
- 3,000 years ago: Mahabharata battle here
- Between Pandavas and Kauravas
- Same general region (Kurukshetra, now Panipat area)
- Same level of forces and stakes
- Same kind of civil/internal conflict
The Martial Resonance:
- Similar armies facing each other
- Similar uncertainty about outcome
- Similar level of consequences
- Similar need for bravery/valor
- Historical echo creating psychological weight
The Difference:
- Mahabharata: fought for principle (dharma)
- Panipat: fought for territory and power
- Both: Indian internal conflicts
- Both: massive casualties
- Both: changed history
The Sutradhar Perspective: Narrating History
The Literary Device
What is Sutradhar:
- "Puppet master" or narrative voice
- Person dictating the script
- Imaginary character narrating story
- Not literal puppeteer, but narrative voice
- Literary technique for presenting history
The Perspective:
- Looking at two armies from outside
- Observing movements and preparations
- Holding breath, uncertain of outcome
- Watching history unfold
- Neither side assured of victory
The Helplessness of Observer:
- "I was holding my breath"
- Not knowing what will happen
- Both warriors experienced
- Both armies formidable
- Only outcome unknown
The Uncertainty and Apprehension
Both Camps Feel the Weight
The Reality:
- Two enormous armies
- Both experienced in warfare
- Both fearsome opponents
- Neither has clear advantage
- Outcome truly uncertain
The Shared Knowledge:
- Whoever fights will suffer terribly
- Costs of battle will be enormous
- Consequences will be lasting
- People will die
- Entire country watching
The Non-Combatant Perspective:
- Citizens of Panipat under house arrest
- Locked in homes voluntarily
- Afraid of what's coming
- Population: ~20,000
- Cannot feed/support 200,000+ soldiers
- Burden entirely unsustainable
The Strategic Dilemma
Both Sides Hesitant:
- Apprehension in both camps
- Not rushing into battle
- Taking time to assess
- Hoping for negotiation still possible
- Aware this could go either way
The Third Option:
- Maybe minor skirmishes instead
- Maybe negotiated peace possible
- Maybe they'll avoid big battle
- But most suspect: not possible
- Only outcome: "do or die"
The Spirit of the Times
"Do or Die"
The Mentality:
- Either victory or death
- No third way around
- Complete commitment required
- Either return home victorious
- Or die on the battlefield
The Possession:
- Armies taken over by spirit of commitment
- Complete dedication to outcome
- No hesitation remaining
- No wavering allowed
- Either/or mindset now dominant
The Historical Significance:
- More than just battle
- Question of Indian sovereignty
- Question of who controls north India
- Question of Indian culture
- Outside force vs. Indian powers
The Bigger Picture: What's Really at Stake
Beyond Territory
The Fundamental Question:
- Should external powers dictate Indian politics?
- Is Afghanistan allowed to impose rule here?
- Do Indian powers have right to resist?
- Can foreign invader take over?
- Issue of Indian sovereignty and independence
The Cultural Dimension:
- Hindu culture vs. Afghan/Islamic expansion
- Indian way of life vs. foreign rule
- Traditional order vs. external power
- Preservation of Indian identity
- Long-term consequences for all India
The Civilization Question:
- Whether Indian powers can resist
- Whether ancient land remains independent
- Whether outside force dominates
- Future 100+ years determined here
- Everything riding on this battle
The Psychological Preparation
Individual and Collective
The Warriors:
- Both sides experienced fighters
- Know what battle brings
- Understand death is likely
- Accept consequences
- Still willing to fight
The Country:
- Entire nation watching
- Outcome affects generations
- Victory = Indian independence
- Defeat = Foreign domination
- Waiting with collective breath held
The Moment:
- November 1760
- Armies 5 miles apart
- Intelligence gathering ongoing
- Preparations underway
- Inevitable confrontation approaching
The Geographic Advantage Debate
Panipat's Strategic Benefits
For Marathas:
- Fort in middle (defensive position)
- Elevated ground available
- Trenches can be dug around camp
- Artillery positioned advantageously
- Retreat route toward Deccan possible
For Afghans:
- More open ground suits cavalry
- Less restrictive terrain
- Agility becomes advantage
- Surgical strikes still possible
- Route back north toward homeland
The Stalemate:
- No clear advantage to either
- Geography favors neither
- Both have good positions
- Both have vulnerabilities
- Battle will be decided by tactics/skill
The Winter Factor
Environmental Hardship
The Marathas Suffer:
- 1,500 km from warm homeland
- Dressed for Deccan weather
- Winter harsh and unfamiliar
- Cold affects morale and health
- Reduced effectiveness possible
The Afghans Manage:
- From cold mountain regions
- Better prepared for winter
- Better clothing and experience
- Climate less of handicap
- One more small advantage
The Mutual Strain:
- Both armies in harsh conditions
- Both dealing with logistics
- Both managing supply lines
- Both trying to feed 100,000+
- Environment is enemy to both
Key Themes
- Geography as Destiny - Terrain determines how battle will be fought
- Human Cost - Civilians and soldiers alike facing death
- Sovereignty at Stake - More than military victory; about Indian independence
- Psychological Toll - Armies and civilians under tremendous stress
- Historical Echo - Connection to Mahabharata adds weight
- Uncertainty is Universal - No one knows what's coming
- The Wait - Both armies taking time before final confrontation
The Players and Their Thoughts
Maratha Side:
- Bhau (29): Confident but cautious
- Holkar (67): Experienced, sidelined
- Officers: Experienced in battle
- Soldiers: Brave but cold and far from home
- Civilians: Terrified, stranded
Afghan Side:
- Abdali (40s): Determined, patient
- Shahpasand Khan: Operational commander
- Officers: Battle-hardened from years of warfare
- Soldiers: Accustomed to hardship
- Cavalry: Ready for mobile warfare
The Sacred and Profane
The Religious Dimension:
- Mahabharata association (spiritual weight)
- Kurukshetra nearby (sacred ground)
- Hindu and Islamic perspectives different
- Prayer and ritual from both sides
- Seeking divine favor
The Practical Reality:
- What matters: tactics, strength, positioning
- What matters: leadership and discipline
- What matters: logistics and supplies
- What matters: morale and courage
- Divine favor secondary to skill
Where This Leads: By November 1760, the armies are positioned near Panipat. The weather is cold. The stakes are uncertain but clearly enormous. Both sides are gathering information. Both sides are aware this cannot be postponed much longer. The international dimension looms: if India loses this battle, foreign rule becomes possible. Both sides know it. Both sides feel the weight. The wait for January battle has begun—a waiting period of 2+ months during which everything changes and nothing changes. Armies prepare. Individuals contemplate their mortality. And history holds its breath.
Two armies facing each other on sandy ground near an ancient town. Forests to the west. River to the east. Winter biting at the Marathas. Smoke from camps rising into cold air. 100,000 soldiers on each side. 20,000 citizens locked in their homes. And everyone knows: when this breaks, it will be catastrophic. No one knows who wins. No one knows who dies. But everyone knows this isn't about one battle anymore. This is about whether India remains free. That's what's really at stake here. Not territory. Not power. Freedom.
Pre-Battle Strategies and Command Philosophy (Late November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Historical Context: Panipat's Strategic Significance
Previous Battles at Panipat
First Battle (1526): Babur vs. Ibrahim Lodhi
- Mughal invader defeats Delhi Sultanate
- Babur wins decisive victory
- Establishes Mughal dynasty foundation
- Mughal rule becomes dominant
Second Battle (1556): Akbar vs. Hemu
- Akbar defeats regional challenger
- Consolidates Mughal power
- Hemu led resistance (described as powerful)
- Akbar's victory secures Mughal dominance
Third Battle (1761): Abdali vs. Marathas
- Decisive confrontation between Afghan and Maratha power
- Will determine northern India dominance
- Whoever wins controls Delhi access
- Consequences will reverberate for centuries
Why Panipat Repeatedly?
The Geographic Reality:
- Controls Grand Trunk Road (Delhi-Lahore)
- Major transportation artery for armies
- Any major force moving north-south must pass here
- Gates the access to Delhi
- Strategic chokepoint in Indian geography
The Pattern:
- All three battles involve:
- Large invading/defending armies
- Control of northern India at stake
- Decisive outcomes
- Long-term consequences
- Multiple powers competing
The 1760 Specific Context:
- This is third major battle at same location
- 235 years after Babur
- 204 years after Akbar
- Shows importance of geography
- Shows how history repeats
The Road System and Troop Movement
The Grand Trunk Road Network
What It Connects:
- Grand Trunk Road: Delhi to Lahore
- Major highway for armies and commerce
- Only road suitable for 100,000+ soldiers
- Passes through Panipat town
- Critical for logistics and movement
Why Abdali Must Use It:
- Needs to return to Afghanistan
- Cannot cross deserts with large force
- Needs supply line back north
- Only practical route is Grand Trunk Road
- Must go through Panipat area
Why Marathas Intercept There:
- Trying to prevent his escape
- Want to keep him south of Panipat
- Want to destroy him before he leaves
- Panipat is natural interception point
- Geography forces the battle
Alternate Routes Don't Exist
The Water Canal:
- Ancient canal carrying sweet water near Panipat
- Built in past (unclear when)
- Named in Marathi sources
- Flows near village (Asandha)
- Critical for supplying armies
Modern Development:
- Grand Trunk Road built later (during British era)
- Two modern canals now exist
- Railway line added later
- In 1760: only traditional routes existed
- Geography more limiting then
The Muslim Population Context
Panipat's Religious Composition
The Demographics:
- 1760: Majority Muslim population in Panipat
- This situation continued until 1947
- Muslim majority for entire 187-year period
- Independence partition changed this
- 1947: Situation transformed dramatically
The Significance:
- Muslim-majority town
- But ruled by Delhi/Mughal/Afghan powers
- Local population affected by all battles
- Town strategically important regardless of demographics
- Religion of population doesn't change strategy
The Civil Dimension:
- Defensive walls around city
- Fort in middle (Bhui Kot)
- Dargas (Muslim saint memorials) present
- Multiple entry/exit gates
- Traditional fortified city structure
The Strategic Fortifications
Maratha Defensive Planning
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Strategy:
- Position camp ahead of Panipat town (north of it)
- Keep town in back (potential retreat/refuge)
- Build massive camp fortifications
- Dig protective trenches around entire camp
- Create defensive line against assault
The Trench System:
- Dug 2-3 feet deep minimum
- Encircles entire Maratha camp
- Prevents cavalry from rapid entry
- Slows down assault forces
- Creates controlled defensive space
Why This Formation:
- Artillery needs protected position
- Afghans known for rapid cavalry strikes
- Surgical strikes (ganimikawa) their specialty
- Trenches force them to slow approach
- Allows artillery to prepare targeting
- Protects supply lines and equipment
The Panipat Town Advantage:
- Can retreat into town if necessary
- Elevated position (small hill)
- Defensive walls still intact
- Alternative defensive position
- Multiple fallback options available
The Command Structure and Factional Tensions
The Maratha Leadership Problem
The Nominal Commander:
- Vishwas Rao (age 19)
- Title: Commander-in-Chief
- Actual experience: Minimal
- Authority: Limited
- Role: Ceremonial mostly
The Young Officers:
- Jankoji Shinde (age 19)
- Young and inexperienced
- No serious battle background
- Considered too young for major decisions
- Limited respect from veterans
The Old Warriors:
- Holkar (age 67)
- Decades of fighting experience
- Defeated repeatedly by Afghans
- Surgical strike specialist
- Sidelined due to age and politics
The Middle Generation:
- Vintsoor (age 56)
- Experienced commander
- Didn't come to northern campaign
- With main Maratha forces
- Respected but not primary decision-maker
The Real Authority:
- Bhau effectively controls decisions
- Age 29 (too young for absolute authority)
- But politically more powerful
- Overrides older commanders' advice
- Creates internal tension and friction
The Strategic Divide: Holkar vs. Bhau
The Fundamental Disagreement
Holkar's Lifetime Philosophy:
- 40+ years fighting career
- Primarily relied on cavalry
- Never had access to modern artillery
- Developed ganimikawa tactics (surgical strikes)
- Evolved strategy around what he had
The Ganimikawa Approach:
- Small rapid strikes against enemy
- Avoid large frontal battles
- Use mobility for advantage
- Hit and run tactics
- Strategic retreats when needed
- Fight another day philosophy
Bhau's Artillery Focus:
- Modern European-style warfare
- Long-range cannon fire dominance
- Frontal assaults with support
- Disciplined coordination
- Different tactical approach
- More direct confrontation
Why Holkar Lost Against Afghans
The Problem:
- Afghans more agile than him
- Caught him by surprise
- Even ganimikawa didn't save him
- They defeated him despite his tactics
- Speed and adaptability > his experience
The Learning:
- Even experienced Holkar lost
- Shows Afghans formidable
- His methods not adequate
- Need new approach
- Bhau's artillery solution might work
The Political Dynamic
Holkar's Position:
- Sidelined due to Bhau's authority
- Advice ignored or dismissed
- Young commander overruling veteran
- Creates resentment and tension
- Reduces effectiveness of his contributions
Why Bhau Trusted Others:
- Holkar came from Shinde clan
- Bhau's advisor (Mehendare) distrusted Holkar
- Generational prejudice against Holkar
- Young leaders distrust old methods
- Political factors override merit
The Operational Reality
Holkar's Strategic Vision
His Recommendation:
- Avoid direct battle with Abdali
- Use ganimikawa tactics instead
- Look for opportune moments
- Know when to retreat strategically
- Fight when conditions favorable
His Calculation:
- Abdali wants to go home
- Won't stay indefinitely
- Can harass, pressure, avoid big battle
- Eventually he'll leave
- Then Marathas win without fighting
His Experience:
- 1756-1758: Maratha dominance when Abdali absent
- Same strategy worked then
- Could work again with patience
- Previous success proves concept
- Holkar has done this before
The Timing Problem
The Distance Issue:
- Marathas were in Kurukshetra
- 150+ km from river crossing
- By time they reacted: Abdali already across
- By time they could catch up: escape was prepared
- Timing made his strategy impossible
The Opportunity Lost:
- Should have stayed near Delhi
- Could have stopped crossing
- Could have destroyed vulnerable army
- Kurukshetra detour cost them this
- One decision (pilgrimage) changed everything
Bhau's Military Innovation
The Modern Approach
Artillery as Centerpiece:
- Bhau saw artillery's potential
- Kunjapura victory proved effectiveness
- Changed his strategic thinking
- Now convinced it's the answer
- Willing to fight directly
The Discipline Requirement:
- European-style warfare needs coordination
- Maratha army culture emphasizes individual valor
- Tension between old (individualism) and new (coordination)
- Bhau pushing for disciplined execution
- Not all soldiers naturally adapted
The Cavalry Integration:
- Later Marathas mastered combined arms
- Cavalry working with artillery
- At Panipat: Still learning this
- Not fully effective yet
- Evolution in progress
The Competitive Philosophies
Command Style Comparison
Abdali's Approach:
- Strategic, not hands-on warrior
- Directs from back, not from front
- Uses chess-like thinking
- Calculates long-term consequences
- Modern command model
Bhau's Approach:
- Warrior first, strategist second
- Believes in front-line leadership
- Direct engagement with enemies
- More traditional warrior code
- Old command model
The Dattaji Factor:
- Called Abdali "Na Mardh" (not a real man)
- Believed general must fight in front
- Got killed fighting in front
- His approach traditional but costly
- Abdali's approach: unconventional but effective
The Evolution of Warfare
The Old Way (Dattaji):
- General in the front
- Personal combat and valor
- Directly leads troops
- Dies with his soldiers
- Heroic but dangerous
The New Way (Abdali):
- General in command center
- Directing operations
- Using intelligence and strategy
- Survives to fight again
- More effective long-term
The Hybrid (Bhau):
- Wants to be both
- Strategic thinker and warrior
- Wants to show personal valor
- Gets involved in fighting
- Risk of losing commander in battle
The Assessment Phase
What Both Sides Are Doing
Maratha Evaluation:
- Assessing Afghan cavalry capability
- Testing defensive formations
- Observing Abdali's methodology
- Identifying strengths/weaknesses
- Preparing counter-strategies
Afghan Evaluation:
- Assessing Maratha artillery effectiveness
- Testing formation resilience
- Observing Maratha command structure
- Identifying vulnerabilities
- Preparing tactical responses
The Mutual Understanding:
- Both are formidable opponents
- Neither can be easily defeated
- Both have significant advantages
- Both have potential weaknesses
- Battle will be closely matched
The Stalemate and Waiting
Why No Immediate Battle
The Rational Calculation:
- Too much risk in hasty attack
- Both armies equally strong
- Consequences too great
- Better to assess first
- Wait for optimal conditions
The Emotional Restraint:
- Both experienced generals
- Know when to hold back
- Know destructiveness of battle
- Know stakes are enormous
- Willing to wait for proper moment
The Physical Factors:
- Winter weather ongoing
- Supply lines being consolidated
- Fortifications being built
- Troop morale being assessed
- Waiting helps all preparations
Key Players and Their Philosophies
| Leader | Age | Philosophy | Strength | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abdali | 40s | Strategic, patient, calculating | Plans long-term, adapts well | Can be slow to act |
| Bhau | 29 | Aggressive, confident, innovative | Bold decisions, modern tactics | May be rash, too confident |
| Holkar | 67 | Experiential, mobile, flexible | Decades of combat experience | Outdated methods, sidelined |
| Ibrahim Khan | ? | Technical, artillery-focused | Weaponry expertise | Limited strategic vision |
The Underlying Tensions
The Generational Conflict
Young vs. Old:
- Bhau (29) overriding Holkar (67)
- New methods vs. proven experience
- Innovation vs. tradition
- Modern warfare vs. classical warfare
- Different trust in technology
The Authority Question:
- Bhau has political power despite age
- Holkar has military experience but no authority
- Advice is ignored or dismissed
- Creates resentment and tension
- Reduces military effectiveness
The Outcome Risk:
- If Bhau wins: validates his approach
- If Holkar's caution was right: too late to change
- If battle goes wrong: Bhau gets blamed
- If Holkar vindicated posthumously: no help
- Institutional tension affects performance
Where This Leads: By late November 1760, both armies are settled in their positions. Maratha defenses are being built. Afghan reconnaissance is ongoing. The wait-and-see period will continue through December and into January. During this time, intelligence will be gathered, weaknesses identified, and strategies refined. Both commanders understand the stakes. Both understand the opponent's capability. Neither is rushing into battle. But both know it's coming. And both are preparing mentally, physically, and strategically for the clash that will determine the future of India.
Two generals, two philosophies. Abdali waiting in camp, calculating, directing. Bhau eager to fight, confident in his artillery, dismissing the old man's caution. Holkar watching from the sidelines, knowing what he knows, unable to make anyone listen. And winter deepens. And the armies wait. And everyone wonders: when the time comes, which philosophy will be right? The cautious patience of the old man who's seen empires rise and fall? Or the aggressive confidence of the young innovator with his big guns? Nobody knows yet. But January is coming. And then everyone will know.
The Panipat Standoff: Starvation, Cold, and Nightly Skirmishes (November-December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fundamental Problem: Can't Retreat, Can't Advance
The Geometric Trap
The Reality:
- Two massive armies blocking each other's path
- Marathas can't go north (Abdali blocks them)
- Abdali can't go north (Marathas block him)
- Neither can retreat effectively
- If one retreats: the other attacks their exposed back
The Holkar Dilemma:
- Holkar's entire career built on strategic retreat
- Always fought ganimikawa (surgical strikes + withdrawal)
- Never experienced forced frontal battle
- Deeply uncomfortable with current situation
- No escape route from battle he doesn't want
The Locked Position:
- Both armies facing each other ~3-5 miles apart
- Must go past each other eventually
- Can't avoid it geographically
- Can't negotiate their way out
- Can't retreat safely
- Battle is now inevitable, just timing uncertain
The Assessment Period: Slow Motion Toward Conflict
Why No Immediate Battle?
The Mutual Understanding:
- Both sides need to evaluate strength/weakness
- Both realize consequences will be devastating
- Both recognize outcome unpredictable
- Rushing into battle = strategic mistake
- Better to spend months preparing
The Time Investment:
- Takes 3-4 months of assessment
- Constant probing and reconnaissance
- Small skirmishes to test defenses
- Gathering intelligence on composition
- Evaluating morale and discipline
The Human Cost During Waiting:
- Even though no full battle yet: thousands dying
- Major nightly skirmishes (3-4,000 deaths per night not unusual)
- Raids on each other's camps
- Testing defensive positions violently
- Constant low-level warfare
The Starvation Reality
The Logistics Nightmare
The Scale of Need:
- 120,000-150,000 people total (Maratha side)
- Plus 70,000-100,000 (Afghan side)
- Massive herds of animals (horses, camels, elephants)
- Animals require constant feeding and water
- Single day's food requirement = enormous
The Supply Problem:
- No local allies in Panipat (Muslim majority, see invaders)
- Surrounding area can't support 200,000+ people
- Can't "stumble into" extra food
- Must actively forage/buy/take food
- Food sources limited and disputed
The Daily Reality:
- Soldiers constantly foraging for grain
- Can only go north (south is Abdali's army)
- Afghans send raiding parties to intercept foragers
- Marathas send 3,000-5,000 soldiers as protective escort
- Food acquisition becomes military operation
The Economic Collapse
The Currency Problem:
- No money to buy food from locals
- Start selling valuables for food
- Gold, jewelry, valuables traded for grain
- How long can this continue?
- Eventually: nothing valuable left to trade
The Morale Impact:
- Started with high morale (recent victories)
- 3-4 months of starvation erodes confidence
- Hungry soldiers = demoralized soldiers
- No way to reverse this during stalemate
- Morale keeps declining: "down and down and down"
The Climate Factor: Environmental Warfare
The Cold Advantage
Maratha Suffering:
- From Deccan region (warm climate)
- Not accustomed to north Indian winter
- Clothing inadequate for cold
- Temperature: 12-24 degrees (well below freezing)
- Physical suffering from weather
Afghan Advantage:
- From Afghanistan (mountain regions, cold climate)
- Experienced with winter conditions
- Better clothing and preparation
- Cold doesn't bother them
- Natural environmental advantage
The Compounding Problem:
- Starvation + cold = double suffering
- Hunger harder to bear when freezing
- Morale damage accelerates
- Physical health deteriorates faster
- Marathas at environmental disadvantage
The Nightly Skirmishes: Testing and Raiding
The Pattern of Night Warfare
How It Happens:
- Armies camped 3-4 kilometers apart (very close)
- Sudden raids at night by 5,000-10,000 soldiers
- Unexpected attacks on unprepared positions
- Skirmish lasts 6-8 hours
- Then attackers retreat at dawn
The Purpose:
- Test defensive positions
- Evaluate enemy morale/readiness
- Judge combat effectiveness
- Harass and deplete enemy
- Gather intelligence on tactics
The Casualty Toll:
- 3,000-4,000 dying per night not unusual
- Major skirmishes, not minor raids
- Deadly encounters despite being "tests"
- Cumulative damage over months
- Both sides losing manpower constantly
The Strategic Dilemma: Artillery vs. Traditional Warfare
Holkar's Philosophy vs. Bhau's Innovation
Holkar's 40-Year Approach:
- Ganimikawa (surgical strikes)
- Attack when you choose time/place
- Give thrashing then withdraw
- Terrorize on your own terms
- Strategic mobility (cover distance quickly)
The Bajirao I Legacy:
- Cover 100 km in half day (enemy expects 2 days)
- Surprise before enemy prepared
- Strike swiftly and withdraw
- Cavalry-based strategy
- Never before had artillery
Holkar's Problem:
- Never seen effective artillery
- Trained entire career without guns
- Deeply uncomfortable with this style
- Can't fall back on experience
- Fighting a new kind of war
Bhau's Modern Approach
The Artillery Belief:
- Seen it work at Kunjapura
- Convinced it's war-winning technology
- French-trained system under Ibrahim Khan Gardi
- Long-range cannon fire dominates
- Frontal assault with support
The Technology:
- 10,000-person artillery regiment
- French-taught techniques
- Most advanced guns in India
- Abdali lacks equivalent artillery
- Should give Marathas advantage
The Problem:
- Artillery needs discipline (Marathas lack this)
- Needs coordination (breaks down in chaos)
- Maratha culture emphasizes individual valor
- Artillery requires unified command structure
- Eventually they "broke the line"
The Ibrahim Khan Gardi Problem: Trustworthiness
The Red Flag
Who He Is:
- Muslim general
- Previously served Nizam of Hyderabad
- Captured/convinced to switch sides after Maratha victory
- Brought 10,000 troops with him
- Teaches French artillery techniques
Why Holkar Suspects Him:
- Only joined Marathas 1-2 years ago
- Loyalty not tested in actual battle
- Was on opposite side recently
- Muslim working for Hindu empire
- Could switch sides mid-battle
The Risk:
- If he stops artillery fire in middle of battle: catastrophic
- If he switches to Abdali: Marathas lose major advantage
- Dependency on untested commander
- No long-term relationship with Marathas
- All eggs in his basket
How He Got Hired
The Recruitment:
- Bhau attacking Nizam's forces
- Saw Ibrahim's artillery in action against him
- Impressed by effectiveness
- After Nizam lost: demanded Ibrahim as part of peace terms
- Nizam forced to hand him over
His Conditions:
- "I'm fine with switch BUT pay my 10,000 soldiers monthly"
- Not Maratha style (they pay at end of campaign)
- Had to be paid first regardless of Maratha debt
- Unusual demand but he was essential
- Financial burden added to Maratha stress
His Proven Track Record:
- Delivered at Kunjapura (devastating effect)
- Showed he could execute
- But Holkar still doubts his long-term loyalty
- One success ≠ permanent allegiance
- Suspicion remains valid
The Competing Strategies: Assessment
Neither Strategy Optimal
Holkar's Limitation:
- Ganimikawa can't work in forced frontal battle
- Experienced repeated losses even with his strategy
- Afghan cavalry too agile for his tactics
- Doesn't work against disciplined enemy
- No one-size-fits-all solution
Bhau's Limitation:
- Artillery powerful but requires discipline
- Maratha army isn't disciplined enough yet
- Not mastered European-style warfare
- Still learning coordination
- Will break under pressure
The Northern Plains Problem:
- Completely flat terrain
- No mountains for 100s of kilometers
- No natural defensive positions
- Cavalry can move freely
- Ganimikawa and artillery both needed
The Real Issue
The Immature Implementation:
- Bhau confident but inexperienced with artillery
- Thinks they've "mastered" European warfare (they haven't)
- Maratha army still learning coordination
- Discipline not yet internalized
- Confidence exceeds actual capability
The Observer's Assessment:
- Both strategies have merit
- Neither fully addresses terrain challenges
- Neither fully supports the other
- Bhau overconfident in artillery alone
- Holkar right about needing other approach but wrong about exclusivity
Key Themes
- Starvation as Warfare - Cold and hunger eroding morale more than combat
- Environmental Disadvantage - Climate favors Afghans, hurts Marathas
- Nightly Raiding - Constant low-level warfare during "peaceful" standoff
- Trust Issues - Dependence on untested foreign general
- Philosophical Clash - Old methods vs. new technology
- Strategic Impatience - Both sides need time to prepare but can't afford it
- No Good Options - Every choice has major downsides
The Cumulative Damage
Physical Toll
Casualties During Standoff:
- Nightly skirmishes: 3,000-4,000 killed regularly
- 3-4 months of this: 270,000-480,000 potential casualties
- But armies smaller than that, so constant regeneration impossible
- Rotating who goes on raids
- Everyone experiencing losses
Health Deterioration:
- Starvation affecting combat readiness
- Cold weakening physical strength
- Disease spreading in crowded camps
- Forced constant vigilance (no rest)
- Morale destruction worse than physical damage
The Moral Toll
Responsibility of Command:
- Bhau and Abdali aware thousands will die
- Thousands of women, children in Maratha camp
- All vulnerable to being killed
- Both commanders deeply conscious of responsibility
- Not light decision to enter battle
The Civilian Vulnerability:
- Non-combatants with army (religious pilgrims, families)
- "Sitting ducks" if things go wrong
- No way to protect them in battle
- Adds weight to every decision
- Commanders feel this burden
The Timeline of Decline
Late October-Early November:
- Armies arrive at Panipat
- Morale high (recent victories)
- Confidence dominant
November-December:
- Assessment period begins
- Nightly skirmishes start
- Food becomes problem
- Morale starts declining
December-January:
- Starvation worsening
- Cold increasing
- Morale eroding further
- Casualties accumulating
- Preparation continuing
Where This Leads: By December 1760, both armies are experiencing the real costs of prolonged standoff. Marathas are starving and freezing. Afghans are patient but also suffering logistics strain. The nightly skirmishes are costing thousands. Morale is fragmenting. Everyone knows the big battle is coming, but the waiting is destroying the army before it even happens. In January, they'll be ready because they have to be—they can't continue like this much longer.
The battlefield isn't always the place where wars are lost. Sometimes it's the waiting ground. The Marathas came from the warm south with high morale and recent victories. Three months later, they're starving, freezing, and demoralized. Meanwhile, the Afghans who can handle the cold are sending raiders at night to steal their food. And every commander knows: thousands more will die in the battle itself. But they have no choice. They're locked in. They have to fight. And everyone—soldier and civilian alike—is counting down the days until it happens.
The First Battle of Panipat: Babur's Artillery Innovation (May 12, 1526)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Historical Context: Looking Back to 1526
Why Compare?
The Pattern:
- First Battle of Panipat: 1526 (Babur vs. Ibrahim Lodi)
- Third Battle of Panipat: 1761 (Marathas vs. Abdali)
- 235 years apart
- Same location
- Both decisive battles
- Both changed Indian history
The Parallel:
- Both about who controls northern India
- Both involve invaders vs. local powers
- Both about military innovation
- Both involve massive armies
- Bhau studying first battle to understand current one
Babur: The Outsider with a Dream
The Background
Who He Was:
- Royal blood from Samarkand (Uzbekistan)
- Dethroned in his own country
- Young prince with no future at home
- Unemployed royalty seeking opportunity
- Decided: "Let's go to India"
His Desperation:
- Nothing left for him in Uzbekistan
- Couldn't reclaim his lost throne
- Too weak to fight his way back
- Successors had no interest in returning
- Better prospects existed elsewhere
The Indian Option:
- Heard about India's wealth and resources
- Much richer than Uzbekistan
- Room for ambitious newcomers
- Opportunity for empire-building
- Perfect place for displaced royal
His Reluctant Choice
His True Feelings:
- Never actually liked India
- Always wanted to return to Uzbekistan
- Homesick for his mountain homeland
- But couldn't because: nothing left there
- Resigned himself to Indian empire-building
His Successors' Different View:
- They embraced India immediately
- Found it far better than home
- Resources abundant
- Room to grow exponentially
- Never looked back or dreamed of returning
The Comparison:
- Babur: "I'm stuck here but I miss home"
- His descendants: "Why would we ever leave?"
- India was indeed "golden goose"
- 100 times richer than Uzbekistan
- They never questioned this choice
Babur Arrives at Panipat: May 12, 1526
The Opposition
Ibrahim Khan Lodi:
- King of Delhi (but not large empire)
- Controlled territory mainly around Delhi
- Smaller kingdom compared to Babur's ambitions
- Defending his throne against invasion
- Fighting for survival
The Comparison:
- Babur: Military innovator, experienced
- Lodi: Traditional defender, conventional
- Babur: Had fought Uzbeks (tested against quality opponents)
- Lodi: Defending territory he inherited
- Skill differential unclear but real
Babur's Strategy: Artillery + Cart Defenses
The Innovative Setup
Babur's Description (from his writings):
- "On our right hand side was the town of Panipat and neighboring villages"
- "With us were our carts and whatever defensive mechanisms we had"
- "On the left hand side was a trench and many plants and trees"
- "Within arrow's reach (about 75-100 meters) were 100-200 cavalry forces"
The Defensive System:
- Carts placed in front as physical barrier
- Trench dug on left flank
- Cavalry positioned strategically
- Artillery units integrated with formation
- Gaps left for cavalry to advance through
The Revolutionary Concept
The Innovation:
- Artillery pieces positioned FIRST
- Foot soldiers positioned BETWEEN artillery units
- Cavalry positioned to advance THROUGH the gaps
- Artillery leading attack (unusual for time)
- Coordinated multi-unit assault
Why This Mattered:
- Usually cavalry leads, infantry supports
- Babur reversed it: artillery leads, then cavalry
- "Guns blazing" approach (literally)
- Enemy unprepared for this tactic
- Novel military strategy
The Psychological Warfare: Baiting Lodi
Babur's Calculation
His Assumption:
- Lodi less mature as military commander than Uzbek foes
- If Uzbeks wouldn't attack his prepared position, Lodi couldn't either
- Referenced 1514 battle in Uzbekistan where Uzbeks retreated
- Thought: "Lodi is clearly inferior to Uzbeks"
- Conclusion: "He will foolishly attack"
The Taunt:
- 7-8 days of positioning in front of Lodi's army
- Shooting arrows at Lodi's camp
- Beheading Lodi's soldiers as spectacle
- Clearly provoking him
- Deliberately baiting him into attack
The Bait Works:
- Lodi takes the bait (as predicted)
- Attacks Babur's fortified position
- Exactly what Babur wanted
- 8th day of battle: Lodi finally charges
- Babur prepared for exact moment
The Battle: May 12, 1527 (possibly date confusion in sources)
Lodi's Mistake
The Attack:
- Charged at Babur's prepared fortifications
- Ran into artillery + cart defenses
- Attacked at disadvantage
- No time to adapt strategy
- Momentum wasted on defenses
The Casualties:
- 1,000+ Lodi's forces killed
- Artillery devastating infantry charge
- Cart defenses slowing advance
- Cavalry counter-attacks from gaps
- Coordinated assault too much to handle
The Decisive Moment
The Outcome:
- By noon (12 o'clock), battle decided
- Lodi killed in fighting
- His army routed
- Total defeat in single day
- Complete victory for Babur
The Significance:
- First invader successfully took Delhi
- New dynasty established (Mughal)
- Changed Indian power structure
- Artillery proved decisive
- Military innovation won the day
The Lesson for 1761
Babur's Success Factors
What Worked:
- Defensive position: Fortified, prepared, controlled
- Artillery innovation: Guns blazing first, then cavalry
- Psychological understanding: Knowing enemy psychology
- Preparation advantage: Choosing time/place of battle
- Courage of conviction: Confidence in strategy
What Lodi Lacked:
- No artillery: Relied on traditional cavalry
- Inferior strategy: Frontal cavalry charge against prepared position
- Inexperience: Hadn't faced artillery before
- Desperation: Feeling baited, lost judgment
- No innovation: Fighting with conventional tactics
The 1761 Connection
For Bhau Studying This:
- Babur won with artillery + fortifications
- Lodi lost with cavalry-only approach
- Parallel: Bhau has artillery, Abdali doesn't
- Parallel: Marathas should fortify, Afghans attack
- Should work same way?
The Problem:
- Babur was master strategist
- Bhau is innovator but less experienced
- Babur faced cavalry-only opponent
- Abdali has proven battlefield experience
- Confidence doesn't guarantee success
The Weapons Analysis
Babur's Artillery
What He Had:
- Cannons (described as "guns")
- Artillery regiment
- Integration with other forces
- Effective range and impact
- Devastating against cavalry charge
Why It Was Decisive:
- Lodi had no counter
- Couldn't defend against cannon fire
- Traditional cavalry tactics useless
- Training of troops didn't matter
- Technology overwhelmed tactics
Lodi's Elephant-Based Forces
The Traditional Approach:
- Elephants as centerpiece
- Cavalry support
- Foot soldiers
- No artillery equivalent
- 40 years of tradition
The Obsolescence:
- Elephants vulnerable to cannon fire
- Cavalry doesn't counter artillery
- Tactics irrelevant against new tech
- Experience means nothing
- Old way obsolete
The Geography Lesson
Panipat's Strategic Value
Then (1526):
- Key position on route Delhi-Lahore
- Controls access to Delhi
- Town provides resources
- Natural assembly point for armies
- Gateway location
Now (1761):
- Same strategic importance
- Same Grand Trunk Road
- Same geographical logic
- Same armies being drawn there
- History repeating
The Consistency:
- 235 years later
- Same location chosen
- Same strategic reasoning
- Same outcome (decisive battle)
- Geography shapes history
The Key Differences to Consider
Babur vs. Bhau Situations
| Aspect | Babur (1526) | Bhau (1761) |
|---|---|---|
| Experience | Veteran, tested | Young (29), less tested |
| Enemy | Conventional, no artillery | Experienced, adaptive |
| Confidence | Justified by experience | Based on hope |
| Artillery Role | Primary weapon, total novelty | Strong but not total novelty |
| Fortifications | Prepared, optimal | Being prepared, somewhat suboptimal |
| Psychological Edge | Clear (baited enemy successfully) | Unclear (mutual respect) |
| Troop Discipline | Well-organized | Still developing |
The Sambhaji Connection
The Movie Context
Why This Matters:
- Just watched Sambhaji movie (Bollywood film)
- About Maratha resistance to Aurangzeb
- Sambhaji son of Shivaji
- 1680-1689 (9 years of rule)
- Tortured and killed by Aurangzeb
The Timeline Connection:
- Shivaji founded empire (1674)
- Sambhaji continued resistance (1680-1689)
- Aurangzeb attacked relentlessly
- Marathas survived under different rule
- 72 years later: Third Panipat battle
The Historical Arc:
- Shivaji: Created resistance
- Sambhaji: Continued resistance
- Aurangzeb era: Constant fighting
- Post-Aurangzeb: Maratha revival
- 1761: Ultimate test of empire
The Broader Pattern
Why Panipat Repeatedly?
The Geographic Logic:
- Only major battle site that made sense
- Controls all northern movement
- Grand Trunk Road passes through
- Gateway to Delhi repeatedly
- Armies naturally drawn here
The Stakes:
- Control Delhi = control north India
- Control north India = dominance
- Therefore: Battles must happen here
- History repeated because geography remained constant
- Same logic applies 235 years later
Where This Leads: By studying Babur's victory, Bhau might think artillery equals guaranteed success. He might believe Lodi's fate proves his strategy. But Babur faced a conventional opponent with no counter-technology. Abdali is far more adaptable. Bhau's confidence in artillery parallels Babur's confidence in innovation—justified but not sufficient. The location is the same. The strategic logic is the same. But the opponent is far more formidable than a traditional king defending his throne.
Two invaders. Two battles. Two hundred thirty-five years apart. Babur came from Uzbekistan with guns nobody in India had seen. He set up his fortifications, invited the enemy to attack, and when they did—his artillery turned them into dust. He won decisively with innovation. Bhau studied that battle. He thought: "That's my blueprint. I have artillery. I'll fortify like Babur. I'll win like Babur." But he forgot something crucial. Babur faced a conventional opponent. Abdali is no conventional opponent. And wanting to win like Babur doesn't mean you will.
Babur's Military History: The Uzbek Wars and Ibrahim Lodi's Downfall (1514-1526)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Uzbek Connection: Why Babur Left
The 1514 Battle: Babur vs. Uzbeks
The Previous Engagement:
- 12 years before Panipat (1526)
- Babur fought against Uzbek forces
- In Uzbekistan itself (his homeland)
- Babur had prepared fortified position
- Uzbeks assessed and retreated
Why Uzbeks Retreated:
- Saw Babur's protective flank was very strong
- Realized attacking would be costly
- Made tactical decision: don't attack
- Withdrew rather than lose soldiers
- Demonstrated military caution
Babur's Interpretation:
- Uzbeks = superior fighters to Lodi
- Uzbeks = experienced and disciplined
- Uzbeks = wouldn't take unnecessary risks
- Therefore: Lodi is obviously inferior
- Logic: If Uzbeks wouldn't attack, Lodi certainly can't
The Flawed Conclusion:
- Babur comparing Lodi to Uzbeks
- Assuming Lodi = less mature fighter
- Calculating: "Lodi will foolishly attack"
- Convinced he could bait Lodi like Uzbeks
- Psychology wrong about Lodi
Why Lodi Actually Attacked
The Provocation Strategy
Babur's Taunts:
- Positioned army visibly in front of Lodi
- Shot arrows into Lodi's camp daily
- Beheaded some Lodi's soldiers publicly
- Left bodies visible as intimidation
- Clearly inviting/insulting Lodi
Lodi's Psychology:
- King of Delhi (has reputation to defend)
- Can't let invader mock him publicly
- Soldiers watching: what does he do?
- Army's morale depends on response
- Personal honor at stake
The Different Context:
- Uzbeks: foreign power evaluating risk
- Lodi: defending king's own throne
- Uzbeks: no reputation to defend
- Lodi: everything riding on this response
- Different psychology, different decision
The Calculation Error:
- Babur thought like military tactician
- Didn't account for honor/reputation factor
- Didn't understand Lodi's internal pressure
- Psychology of defending home different
- Taunting works when bait jumps
The Attack
When It Happened:
- 8th day of taunting
- Lodi could take it no longer
- Charged at Babur's fortifications
- Exactly what Babur anticipated
- But wrong reason (honor vs. tactical)
The Mistake:
- Attacking prepared position = suicide
- Charged into fortified defenses
- Met artillery fire
- No way to counter cannon fire
- Lost decisively
The Battle Details: May 12, 1526/1527
The Fortifications
Babur's Setup:
- Carts used as physical barrier
- Trenches dug for protection
- Artillery integrated into formation
- Infantry positioned between gun units
- Cavalry positioned to exploit gaps
The Advantage:
- Prepared defensive position
- Enemy attacking = exhausted from charge
- Artillery advantage: kills before close combat
- Multiple layers of defense
- Cavalry reserves for counter-attack
Lodi's Approach
The Attack:
- Traditional cavalry charge
- Frontal assault directly at fortifications
- No reconnaissance or adaptation
- Using old tactics against new warfare
- Doomed from the start
The Casualties:
- Massive losses in opening moments
- Artillery fire decimating charges
- Infantry support ineffective
- Cavalry couldn't break through
- Rout occurred quickly
The Outcome
The Timeline:
- Battle started at dawn
- By noon (12 hours): decided
- Lodi killed in fighting (or shortly after)
- His forces completely routed
- Total victory for Babur
The Significance:
- First major victory in India
- Demonstrated artillery advantage
- Established Mughal dynasty
- Changed Indian power structure
- New era of warfare introduced
The Weapons Revolution
Artillery as Game-Changer
Why It Mattered:
- Lodi had no cannon equivalent
- Relied solely on elephants + cavalry
- Traditional Indian warfare model
- No counter-technology available
- Completely outmatched
The Effectiveness:
- Long-range killing before melee
- Soldiers can't defend against guns
- Training and courage irrelevant
- Technology overwhelms tactics
- Experience means nothing against new weapon
The Precedent:
- Showed artillery could win battles
- Proved firepower > traditional cavalry
- Established new military standard
- Babur brought innovation
- Changed everything going forward
The Comparison to Current Battle
Bhau's Thinking
The Parallels Bhau Sees:
- Babur had artillery, Lodi didn't
- Bhau has artillery, Abdali doesn't (or less)
- Babur fortified and won
- Bhau fortifying at Panipat
- Same strategy should work
The Confidence:
- Babur proved artillery decisive
- 235 years is irrelevant to technology
- Guns still effective
- Fortifications still matter
- Baiting enemy still works?
The Problems with the Analogy
The Differences:
- Lodi was conventional, not adaptive
- Abdali is experienced and innovative
- Lodi had no artillery counter
- Abdali has some defensive capability
- Situation not as clear-cut
The Discipline Issue:
- Babur had organized, trained forces
- Maratha army still learning artillery
- Coordination not yet perfected
- Discipline breaking under pressure
- Will they hold formation in battle?
The Unknown Factor:
- Babur was master strategist
- Bhau is talented but less experienced
- Babur faced Lodi (known quantity)
- Bhau faces Abdali (proven general)
- Outcome less predictable
The Historical Perspective
What Babur Established
The Mughal Dynasty:
- Started with this victory
- Built empire over centuries
- Lasted 300+ years
- Controlled most of India
- Changed Indian civilization
The Legacy:
- New military methods
- Artillery became standard
- Cavalry adapted to new tactics
- Infantry learned new role
- Warfare fundamentally transformed
The Current Significance
Why This Matters to 1761:
- Marathas inheriting Mughal territory
- Mughal power now declining
- Marathas challenging for supremacy
- Third Panipat will determine succession
- Babur's innovation still relevant
The Full Circle:
- Babur: invader with new technology
- Marathas: empire defending territory
- Abdali: invader with experience
- New generation facing old pattern
- History repeating with variations
The Technology Gap: Then vs. Now
1526: Artillery as Magic
Why It Worked:
- Nobody in India had seen cannon fire
- Psychological shock as much as physical
- No counter-tactics available
- Traditional army structure couldn't adapt
- Babur's advantage: complete
The Surprise Factor:
- Lodi literally didn't know what hit him
- Elephants vulnerable to cannon
- Infantry vulnerable to cannon
- Cavalry vulnerable to cannon
- No defense possible
1761: Artillery as Known Quantity
The Situation:
- Afghans have seen artillery (French forces)
- Know it's powerful but not invincible
- Have some counter-tactics
- Can adapt and respond
- Surprise factor gone
The Effectiveness:
- Still very powerful weapon
- But not the decisive magic it was
- Enemy knows what to expect
- Can prepare defenses
- Will be much closer battle
The Psychological Dimension
Babur's Confidence
His Conviction:
- Knew Uzbeks were superior to Lodi
- Felt certain Lodi would foolishly attack
- Prepared fortifications specifically for this
- Completely confident in outcome
- Never doubted the plan
His Accuracy:
- Prediction exactly right
- Lodi attacked on schedule
- Fortifications held perfectly
- Artillery worked flawlessly
- Victory absolute
Bhau's Confidence
His Belief:
- Artillery will dominate like it did for Babur
- Maratha discipline sufficient
- Fortifications at Panipat will hold
- Abdali will crack under pressure
- Victory is achievable
His Uncertainty:
- Hasn't tested his army in full battle
- Artillery team not fully trained
- Discipline questionable (will break)
- Abdali very experienced
- Outcome far from certain
The Role of Preparation
Babur's Advantage
The Lead Time:
- Knew he would fight Lodi
- Selected Panipat location
- Built fortifications methodically
- Positioned artillery perfectly
- Chose battle time/place
The Completeness:
- Every detail calculated
- Every position strategic
- Every preparation purposeful
- No improvisation needed
- Perfect execution possible
Bhau's Situation
The Constraints:
- Forced into battle by geography
- Can't choose ideal location
- Can't choose ideal timing
- Can't fully control conditions
- Must adapt constantly
The Improvisation Requirement:
- Much less control
- Must react to Abdali's moves
- Weather unpredictable
- Troop readiness variable
- Perfect execution unlikely
The Intelligence Factor
Babur Knew His Opponent
The Information:
- Lodi's reputation known
- Traditional tactics known
- Force composition known
- Command quality known
- Psychological profile known
The Advantage:
- Could predict Lodi's moves
- Could prepare specific counter-tactics
- Could position forces optimally
- Could time battle perfectly
- Surprise advantage with Babur
Bhau's Unknown
The Questions:
- Abdali's exact force composition?
- His specific tactics against Marathas?
- His artillery capability exactly?
- His likely strategy?
- His psychological breaking point?
The Risk:
- Less predictable opponent
- More adaptive enemy
- Unknown tactical innovations
- Uncertain force strength
- Surprise advantage with Abdali
Where This Leads: Bhau is studying Babur's victory as a template. He sees parallels: artillery vs. traditional cavalry, fortifications holding, enemy foolishly attacking. But Lodi's situation was unique—defending king with reputation on line, facing weapon he'd never encountered. Abdali is neither a conventional defender nor an ignorant of firearms. He's an experienced general facing an experienced empire with proven adaptability. History might repeat at Panipat, but it won't repeat identically.
Babur knew exactly what would happen. He taunted Lodi, Lodi attacked, Babur's guns decimated him, victory decided by noon. Simple. Perfect. Over. But that was because Lodi was predictable and artillery was magic. Bhau is betting that history repeats exactly. But Abdali is no Lodi. He's a general who's been fighting wars his whole life. He's seen guns before. He won't attack Bhau's fortifications. He'll think. He'll adapt. He'll find another way. And Bhau might realize too late that studying Babur's victory doesn't guarantee your own.
The Supply Line Strategy: Bhau's Desperate Plan to Squeeze Abdali (November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Flawless Plan: Pincer Movement + Supply Disruption
The Double Pressure Strategy
Bhau's Concept:
- Pincer action from two directions
- Bundele attacks from south (from Doab)
- Bhau presses from north (at Panipat)
- Abdali squeezed in the middle
- Can't respond to both threats simultaneously
The Supply Line Angle:
- Govind Pant and Gopal Ganesh disrupt supplies
- Cut off food coming from Doab region
- Block resources flowing to Abdali
- Force him to starve or retreat
- Economic warfare alongside military
The Theory:
- Flawless in conception
- Both elements complementary
- Creates stress from multiple directions
- Abdali loses both militarily and logistically
- Should be devastating if executed
The Geographic Setup
The Locations:
- Abdali at Panipat (north)
- Bundele attacking from south through Doab
- Supplies coming from Rohilkhand (east of Ganga)
- Must cross Ganga to reach Doab
- Must cross Doab to reach Panipat
The Logistics Routes:
- Doab region between Yamuna and Ganga
- Where Shuja of Doab is stationed
- Where supplies must pass through
- Where Bundele could disrupt
- Bottleneck for Abdali's supplies
The Cross-Ganga Route:
- Rohilas stationed across Ganga
- On eastern bank of Ganga
- Supplies come from their territory
- Must cross Ganga to enter Doab
- Must cross Doab to reach Panipat
The Problem: Bundele Isn't the Right Man
Who Is Govind Pant Bundele?
The Background:
- Civilian administrator
- Tax collector by profession
- Not primarily military leader
- Aged personality (not young/vigorous)
- Can't make swift military movements
The Capability Issue:
- Lacks military training/experience
- Can't move army quickly
- Lacks experience in major operations
- Better suited for administrative tasks
- Pushed beyond his expertise
The Pleading for Resources:
- Before Panipat: begged for more forces
- Asked for at least 20,000 soldiers
- Peshwa refused (budget constraints)
- Marathas didn't have the money
- Nana Sahib didn't want to spend
The Result:
- Bundele has insufficient forces
- Can't execute the pincer movement properly
- Can't create the scissor effect
- Can't block supplies effectively
- Plan fails for lack of resources
The Timing and Geography
The Geographic Challenge
The Distances:
- Bundele starting from south/Doab area
- Needs to create chaos in Rohilkhand
- Rohilkhand across Ganga (major river)
- Must cross Ganga at multiple points
- Then cross entire Doab region
- Then reach Afghan supply lines
The Complexity:
- Not simple linear attack
- Requires crossing major rivers
- Must navigate friendly territory first
- Then infiltrate enemy-held areas
- Coordinating with Bhau timing critical
The Monsoon Advantage
The Season Change:
- Early November: monsoon ending
- November: much easier travel
- Water receding from fields
- Conditions improving for movement
- Opportunities opening up
Why This Mattered:
- Previous months: impossible movement
- Monsoon flooding created barriers
- Water made crossing difficult
- Supplies harder to transport
- November: window opens
The October 14 Letter: Original Plan
What Bhau Asked For Initially
The First Requests:
-
Get boats ready for Yamuna crossing
- Bridge of boats to cross river
- Immediate tactical advantage
-
Negotiate with Shuja of Doab
- Bring him to Maratha side
- Or at least neutralize him
- Remove from Abdali's coalition
Why These Mattered:
- Boats: could have crossed Yamuna before Abdali
- Shuja: could have cut off supplies earlier
- Combined: might have prevented Abdali's consolidation
- Timing: before Panipat position established
The Failure:
- Bundele couldn't deliver boats in time
- Shuja couldn't be recruited/persuaded
- Both missions failed months ago
- Bhau fell out of favor with Bundele then
- All subsequent requests tainted by this failure
The November 4 Letter: Escalating Demands
The Tone Shift
The Anger Building:
- November 4: just 5 days after Panipat
- Frustrated with lack of support
- Money desperately needed
- Bundele repeatedly failing
- Patience wearing thin
The Letter Content:
"I have written repeatedly about the need for funds here. Yet you are postponing the issue and writing vacuous letters that you are doing so now and within two or three days. Your efficiency is found wanting. Without delay, find a way to send the funds."
The Urgency:
- Not request anymore: demand
- Not gentle: blunt criticism
- "Vacuous letters" = empty promises
- "Efficiency found wanting" = you're failing
- "Without delay" = immediately
The Situation Briefing
What Bhau's Letter Says:
- "I am at Panipat entrenched before Abdali"
- "An array of guns before us"
- "He is unable to move anywhere"
- "Our Pindaris go and bring away his camels, horses"
- "Nobody chases them"
The Reality Check:
- Bhau projecting confidence but desperate
- Actually harassing Abdali successfully (true)
- But own position dire (unstated)
- Needs money immediately
- Running out of resources fast
The New Requests
The Changed Plan:
- No longer: "come join the main army"
- Now: "Create disturbance in Shuja and Rohila territory"
- Cross Ganga into their lands
- Cause chaos in rear areas
- Cut off their support to Abdali
The Rationale:
- Shuja and Rohilas now allied with Abdali
- They're supporting him
- If harassed, must defend homeland
- Can't focus on supporting Abdali
- Creates diversion and weakens support
The Funding Request
The Desperation:
"Send the funds to Delhi. I will get it from there. Come to Patparganj as soon as possible with rapid marches."
The Pressure:
"You will never get a time such as this to show how well you can serve."
The Anger:
"In these days, nothing is done as instructed by anybody. Then what use are you to us?"
The Assessment:
- Bhau losing patience
- Bundele not delivering
- Funds critical need
- Can't wait any longer
- Relationship breaking down
The Supply Line Geography: The Real Problem
The Rohilkhand Connection
The Location:
- Rohilkhand across Ganga (east bank)
- Not in Doab region
- Separate geographic area
- Different river system
- Requires separate strategy
The Supply Route:
- Supplies originate in Rohilkhand
- Come west across Ganga
- Enter Doab region
- Cross Doab heading north
- Reach Abdali at Panipat
The Disruption Point:
- Best place to cut: Rohilkhand itself
- Or crossing Ganga from Rohilkhand
- Or traversing Doab
- Bundele could intercept at any point
- But needs forces and coordination
The Suj a Factor
Who He Is:
- Nawab of Doab region
- Initially seemed neutral
- Later joined Abdali's coalition
- Providing supplies through his territory
- Making himself useful to Afghans
Why He Mattered:
- Controlled territory supplies must pass through
- Could have blocked them (chose not to)
- Could have been persuaded (wasn't)
- Became Abdali's ally instead
- Now part of supply chain
The Capture/Allegiance:
- Suja may have been coerced
- Forced to support Abdali
- No choice available
- Even if regretting, trapped
- Cannot abandon without consequences
The Strategic Disconnect
What Bhau Wanted vs. What Bundele Delivered
Bhau's Needs:
- Major military operations
- Cutting off multiple supply lines
- Coordinating with main army
- Timing attacks precisely
- Resources and funds immediately
Bundele's Limitations:
- Civilian administrator
- Aged, not vigorous
- Insufficient troops (wanted 20,000, got nothing)
- Geographic constraints
- Can't move swiftly enough
The Mismatch:
- Asking warrior to do civilian job
- Asking civilian to do warrior job
- Each poorly suited for current role
- Bundele: "I can collect taxes"
- Bhau: "I need combat operations"
The Four-Month Buildup
The Original Failure (October):
- Boats weren't ready
- Shuja wasn't recruited
- Double mission failed
- Bundele fell from favor
- Trust broken then
The Current Status (November):
- Still requesting impossible tasks
- Still expecting delivery
- Still criticizing failure
- Still demanding immediate action
- Relationship poisoned permanently
The Harsh Reality
What Bundele Actually Could Do
Realistic Capability:
- Create local disturbances
- Harass supply lines somewhat
- Gather taxes from territory
- Mobilize perhaps 5,000-10,000 troops maximum
- Not enough for strategic impact
What Bhau Needed:
- 20,000+ troops for pincer
- Coordinated timing with main army
- Swift military movements
- Cutting major supply routes
- Game-changing strategic impact
The Gap:
- Bundele: 1/4 of needed strength
- Strategy needs both elements
- Missing one: whole plan fails
- Can't compensate for shortage
- Plan collapses without resources
The Personnel Problem
Bundele's Age:
- Can't make swift movements
- Can't react quickly to circumstances
- Can't lead dangerous raids
- Exhausted from extended service
- Wrong person for dynamic warfare
What's Needed:
- Young, aggressive commander
- Swift decision-making
- Daring tactics
- Quick reconnaissance
- Active leadership
The Final Assessment
Bhau's Patience Breakdown
The Statement:
"His balance had now been gone because, you know, he was so far maintaining some kind of balance. But now he was getting angry."
The Cause:
- Months of unfulfilled promises
- Critical needs unmet
- Resources desperately needed
- Nothing delivered when needed
- Relationship at breaking point
The Blame Distribution
Bundele's Fault:
- Can't deliver on requests
- Insufficient forces
- Can't move swiftly
- Aging, not vigorous
- Wrong person for job
Bhau's Fault:
- Unrealistic expectations
- Gave difficult tasks to civilian
- Didn't allocate sufficient resources
- Didn't plan for failures
- Expected impossible execution
Nana Sahib's Fault:
- Refused to fund adequately
- Wanted to save money
- Didn't see strategic importance
- Budget constraints > military need
- Penny-wise, pound-foolish
The Consequence
What Doesn't Happen
The Plan That Failed:
- No major pincer movement
- No cutting of Rohilkhand supply line
- No crushing Shuja/Rohila territory
- No supply line disruption
- No squeezing Abdali from two sides
The Opportunity Lost:
- If executed properly: devastating
- Could have changed battle outcome
- Could have forced Abdali's retreat
- Could have avoided bloodshed
- Lost because of insufficient resources
The Broader Pattern
Maratha Resource Constraints
The Issue:
- Always underfunded
- Always stretching resources
- Always doing more with less
- Always making impossible requests
- Always hoping for miracles
The Contrast:
- Abdali: well-funded by Afghans
- Abdali: can pursue multiple strategies
- Marathas: constrained by poverty
- Marathas: must prioritize constantly
- Marathas: always improvising
Where This Leads: Bhau's flawless pincer plan dies not because it's bad strategy, but because Bundele lacks resources and capability to execute. The Marathas have brilliant plans but insufficient funds. Abdali has fewer brilliant plans but more resources. The irony: if Bundele had 20,000 troops and moved swiftly, Abdali might never have made Panipat. But Nana Sahib's budget constraints cost them the game. Sometimes wars aren't won or lost in battle. They're won or lost in the ledgers of treasury officials making budget decisions.
Bhau asked. Bundele promised. Nothing was delivered. Months passed. Bhau's patience evaporated. "Your efficiency is found wanting," he wrote. But the real problem wasn't Bundele's efficiency. It was Nana Sahib's penny-pinching. 20,000 troops would have done it. Would have changed everything. But the money wasn't there. So Bundele did nothing. And the flawless plan remained forever theoretical.
Desperate Attempts and Final Battle Preparations (November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Critical Window: When Marathas Had the Advantage
Early November: The Supply Crisis in Abdali's Camp
The Situation (November 5+):
- Food shortage developing in Abdali's camp
- Prices skyrocketing (inflation)
- Supplies running out quickly
- Morale declining in Afghan camp
- Marathas relatively well-supplied and cheap prices
The Maratha Advantage:
- Better supply situation
- Lower prices on necessities
- Higher morale
- Growing confidence
- Perfect moment to attack
Krishnaji Joshi's Assessment (Early November):
- Written in his account
- "In these 2-4 days, Kshayas will come as a gift"
- "Only for a moment it will be lost"
- "If they attack, we will obliterate them"
- Confidence in overwhelming victory
The Strategic Moment
The Window:
- Abdali hadn't eaten well for 10 days
- Supplies running dangerously low
- If Marathas attacked: Afghan army vulnerable
- If they didn't attack: Abdali would starve or be forced to retreat
- Either way: Maratha advantage
The Challenge:
- In 15 more days: Abdali would completely wither away
- Starvation would do what military couldn't
- Just needed patience and pressure
- Window closing as supplies ran out
The Psychological Moment:
- Abdali calling himself "Shaham Shah" (King of Kings)
- But hasn't taken action in 10 days
- Looks scared or unprepared
- Marathas saw this as weakness
- This was the moment to strike
Why They Didn't Attack
The Mystery:
- Had clear advantage
- Had supply superiority
- Had morale advantage
- Had perfect tactical moment
- Yet chose not to attack
The Reasons:
- Still assessing weaknesses
- Still evaluating strengths
- Still not confident in coordination
- Still concerned about artillery integration
- Still worried about discipline breaking
The Internal Maratha Conflict: Holkar vs. Ibrahim Khan
Holkar's Last Stand: The Ganimikawa Proposal
The Suggestion:
- During this standoff period
- Holkar proposed surgical strikes (ganimikawa)
- Use cavalry mobility instead of frontal assault
- Attack at time/place of Maratha choosing
- Return to proven tactics
His Reasoning:
- 40 years of successful experience
- Never seen artillery work in actual battle
- Doesn't believe it will be decisive
- Fears frontal assault = slaughter
- Wants to use what he knows
His Conviction:
- "We are going to be slaughtered"
- Following Bajirao I's proven strategy
- Follower of Shivaji's mobile tactics
- Believes in cavalry dominance
- Opposes static fortified warfare
Ibrahim Khan's Counterattack
His Concern:
- If Holkar's ganimikawa wins the day
- What happens to artillery?
- What happens to his regiment?
- What happens to his job?
- What happens to his 10,000 soldiers?
The Threat to His Position:
- Artillery won't be needed
- His expertise becomes useless
- His payment becomes unnecessary
- His 10,000 troops become redundant
- Loses favor with Bhau permanently
His Self-Interest:
- Brought specially for this battle
- Promised monthly payments
- Has 10,000 people to feed
- Can't afford to be sidelined
- Career and livelihood at stake
The Lack of Unity
The Underlying Problem:
- Different generals with different interests
- Holkar: wants his tactics to prevail
- Ibrahim Khan: wants his artillery to prevail
- Bhau: torn between them
- Army doesn't speak with one voice
The Lack of Cohesion:
- "Ulterior motives" throughout
- Each leader protecting turf
- Not unified command structure
- Not single strategic vision
- Multiple competing agendas
The Resolution
Bhau's Decision:
- Overrules Holkar (as before)
- Supports Ibrahim Khan's approach
- Commits to artillery-based strategy
- Promises coordination
- Warns: "Don't worry, we'll stay together"
Ibrahim Khan Quieted:
- Bhau reassures him
- Won't be abandoned
- Will use him fully
- Kunjapura proved it works
- Trust the plan
The Artillery Problem: Speed vs. Power
The Fundamental Issue
Artillery Advantages:
- 2 km range (cutting edge)
- Devastates formations
- French technology (latest)
- Proven at Kunjapura
- Potentially war-winning
Artillery Disadvantages:
- Needs bulls and elephants to move
- Incredibly slow to reposition
- Can't move with cavalry charges
- Heavy equipment = logistics nightmare
- Cavalry leaves it behind easily
The Trap
The Danger:
- Cavalry charges fast
- Artillery stays behind
- Gap opens between them
- Cavalry gets surrounded without support
- Artillery can't provide covering fire
Ibrahim Khan's Fear:
- Artillery gets abandoned
- Left isolated
- Becomes sitting target
- Gets overrun
- Soldiers get killed
The Solution:
- Must fight together
- Must move together
- Can't chase cavalry with artillery
- Must have unified timing
- Everything coordinated
Abdali's Response
His Caution:
- Never approaches within 2-3 km
- Stays out of artillery range
- Doesn't come directly in front
- Won't engage on Maratha terms
- Waits for actual battle
His Strategy:
- Avoid the artillery advantage
- Don't let them choose terms
- When battle starts: no choice
- Then they can't fire on each other's forces
- Then artillery less decisive
The Final Preparations: Fortifications and Deployment
The Great Trench
The Construction:
- 12 feet deep (massive)
- 60 feet wide (enormous)
- Dug completely around camp
- Soil piled on top
- Cannons positioned on top
The Purpose:
- Prevent night infiltration
- Slow cavalry approaches
- Protect infantry
- Create killing zone
- Control battle space
The Message:
- Not rushing into battle
- Taking time to prepare
- Serious defensive position
- Expecting prolonged engagement
- Ready for anything
The Deployment
The Setup:
- Non-combatants moved to Panipat town
- Women, children, elderly sent to safety
- Warriors positioned around camp
- Warriors appointed to specific locations
- Clear chain of command
The Clarity:
- Everyone knows their position
- Everyone knows their duty
- Everyone knows what's expected
- No improvisation
- Coordinated response system
The Bundele Failure: The Final Assessment
What Didn't Happen
The Failed Requests:
- Bridge of boats never built
- Shuja never recruited to Maratha side
- Supply disruption never executed
- Money never sent
- Reinforcements never arrived
The Timeline:
- 4-5 months of failing
- Since October requests
- Continuous disappointment
- Mounting frustration
- Trust permanently broken
The Impact on Bhau
The Deterioration:
- Lost confidence in Bundele
- Fell out of favor
- Became unreliable ally
- Couldn't be counted on
- Only northern contact gone
The Strategic Consequence:
- Can't execute pincer movement
- Can't cut off Rohila-Abdali connection
- Can't disrupt Suja's support
- Can't block supplies effectively
- Plan becomes theoretical only
The Last Desperate Plea
What Bhau Asked:
- Create trouble in Rohila/Suja territories
- They might withdraw to defend homes
- Abdali would lose allies
- Would weaken coalition
- Might force retreat
The Reality:
- Bundele couldn't deliver
- No forces available
- No capability demonstrated
- No resources provided
- Plan never executed
The Psychological Standoff
What Both Sides Saw
Maratha Perception:
- Abdali is weakening
- Starvation is working
- Supplies running out
- Morale declining
- Time is our ally
Afghan Perception:
- Marathas well-supplied
- Well-positioned
- Artillery formidable
- Discipline improving
- Time is their advantage
The Paradox:
- Both think other has advantage
- Both think time favors them
- Both preparing carefully
- Both avoiding rash action
- Both locked in stalemate
The Reality
The Actual Situation:
- Both armies were suffering
- Both needed to end stalemate
- Both had vulnerabilities
- Both had strengths
- Both needed the other to move first
Key Themes
- Missed Opportunity - Maratha had supply advantage but didn't exploit it
- Internal Conflict - Different generals with competing interests
- Technology vs. Tactics - Artillery vs. cavalry debate unresolved
- Speed vs. Power - Fundamental contradiction in strategy
- Coordin ation Problem - Multiple armies with different interests
- Trust Issues - Holkar distrusts Ibrahim Khan; Bhau distrusts Bundele
- Psychology - Both sides see weakness in other; both see strength in self
The Desperate Calculation
For Marathas:
- Could wait for Abdali to starve
- Could attack while advantaged
- Could maintain siege mentality
- Could exhaust resources
- But morale would decline anyway
For Afghans:
- Could attempt breakthrough
- Could outlast Maratha supply
- Could wait for Maratha collapse
- Could force Maratha decision
- But starving soldiers wouldn't fight
The Trap:
- Both locked in mutual vulnerability
- Both needing something to break
- Both afraid of wrong move
- Both aware stakes are total
- Both knowing something must give
Where This Leads: By late November, the window of Maratha advantage is passing. Abdali's supplies are getting critical but not yet lethal. Maratha morale is holding but questions about coordination persist. Holkar and Ibrahim Khan represent fundamental divide in strategy. Bundele has proven useless. And both armies are running out of patience and resources. Something has to break soon. The waiting game can't continue indefinitely.
This was the moment. Early November, Abdali starving, Marathas strong, perfect chance to strike. One decisive attack and the war ends. But they didn't attack. They waited. They assessed. They argued among themselves about tactics. And while they waited, Abdali's supplies stabilized enough to survive. The window closed. And no one got a second one.
Supply Lines and Camp Operations: The Hidden Logistics War (November-December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Supply Situation: Inflation vs. Abundance
Maratha Camp Advantages
The Better Position:
- Supplies abundant and cheap
- Prices low compared to Abdali's camp
- Plenty of food for soldiers
- Resources for animals
- Better situation for morale
The Psychological Impact:
- Maratha soldiers giddy/confident
- Seeing Afghan troubles
- Harassing Afghan periphery
- Shutting down supply routes
- Feeling superior
The False Interpretation:
- Soldiers thought: "Afghans avoiding us"
- Believed: "They're scared to attack"
- Actually: "They're planning strategy"
- Misread caution for cowardice
- Didn't understand Abdali's calculations
Afghan Camp Difficulties
The Inflation:
- Prices skyrocketing
- Supplies expensive
- Resources scarce
- Ordinary soldiers suffering
- Logistical strain showing
The Reality:
- Not hesitation (as Marathas thought)
- But careful deliberation
- Planning approach, not avoiding
- Thinking through options
- Abdali being strategic, not cowardly
The Desperate Search for Resources
Bhau's Mounting Needs
The New Demands:
- Still needs Bundele to disrupt supplies
- Still needs supplies himself
- Increasingly worried about own supplies
- "Securing enough supplies for himself"
- Constant anxiety about provisions
The Contradiction:
- Wants Bundele to cut Abdali's supplies
- Worried about own supply lines
- Both armies desperate for provisions
- Both competing for same limited resources
- Vicious cycle of scarcity
The Mid-November Mood Shift
The Change:
- Initial confidence eroding
- Initially: "God has favored us"
- By mid-November: "Things getting worrisome"
- False sense of security wearing off
- Reality of situation sinking in
The Realization:
- Not as good as first thought
- Danger growing, not shrinking
- Time working against them too
- Can't sustain indefinitely
- Must resolve soon
The Gunpowder Crisis: New Demands
The November 15 Request
The New Urgency:
- After 15 days of skirmishes
- Bhau makes new demand
- "We need gunpowder"
- Specifically "Tari" (explosive compound)
- Immediate need, not future
The Composition:
- Khandi: unit of measurement (~10 kg)
- Explosive powder mixed
- Metal compounds (chisel/metal dust)
- Creating explosive charge compound
- Needed for all weapons
The Desperation:
- Demanding from Bundele (who has no supplies)
- Asking for critical ammunition
- Can't manufacture locally
- Dependent on supply from south
- Another task Bundele can't complete
The War of Attrition
The Artillery Consumption:
- Cannons firing in skirmishes
- Gunpowder getting depleted
- Can't manufacture more
- Must have external supply
- Running low on ammunition
The Vulnerability:
- Artillery useless without powder
- Can't fire if ammunition gone
- Would fall back to traditional warfare
- Would negate Bhau's strategy
- Creates critical vulnerability
The Supply Line Challenge: The Vanzari Network
Who Are The Vanzaris?
Their Role:
- Supply caste/profession
- Gathering supplies professionally
- Making deliveries to army
- Contract employees
- Paid for services, not soldiers
Their System:
- Go around gathering supplies
- Don't go through major villages
- Travel wilderness paths
- Travel at night for safety
- Avoid detection and attack
The Reason for Secrecy:
- Danger from Afghan raiding parties
- Could be ambushed anytime
- Supplies could be stolen
- Supply people could be killed
- Extreme risk involved
The High-Risk Operation
The Dangers:
- If caught: executed
- If attacked: killed
- If supplies stolen: lost resource
- If person captured: interrogated
- Death almost certain if discovered
The Incentives:
- Good remuneration from Bhau
- Money worth the risk
- Better pay than usual
- But extremely dangerous
- Many probably didn't survive
The Night Travel:
- Moving in darkness
- Less likely to be spotted
- Less likely to be attacked
- But harder to navigate
- Slower movement overall
The Scale of Operation
The Numbers:
- Needed to supply 125,000+ soldiers
- Plus 100,000+ animals
- Going 15-20-30 miles to gather
- Multiple trips needed
- Constant resupply required
The Coordination:
- Vanzaris leaving at night
- Gathering from surrounding areas
- Avoiding major population centers
- Returning with supplies
- Feeding massive camp
The Camp Restrictions: Security Concerns
Why No One Could Leave
The Rule:
- Soldiers couldn't leave camp
- Civilians couldn't wander
- Strict control on movement
- No unsupervised departures
- Everyone tracked
The Reasons:
- Fear of being attacked
- Risk of being captured
- Possibility of running away
- Fear soldiers would flee
- Morale deterioration risk
The Reality:
- Some soldiers scared of fighting
- Some might desert if chance appeared
- Big armies could collapse fast
- Desertion spreads fear
- One person running = others follow
Abdali's Personal Inspection
His Approach:
- Takes his son Taimur Shah
- Goes around camp personally
- Observes what's happening
- Checks on troops
- Assesses morale
The Purpose:
- Knows where people are
- Can respond to problems
- Sees morale directly
- Can increase morale
- Personal leadership presence
The Army Camps:
- Not small scattered force
- Multiple sprawling cities
- Sub-camps within larger camp
- Different military units
- Massive coordination needed
The Intelligence Gathering System
Skirmishes as Information Collection
The Purpose:
- Not meant for victory
- Meant to gather information
- Test opponent's capabilities
- Identify weaknesses
- Assess tactical response
What They Learn:
- How many soldiers remain combat-ready
- What are their tactics
- Where are they positioned
- How is their morale
- What are their strengths/weaknesses
The Cost:
- Soldiers come back injured
- Some soldiers come back dead
- But information invaluable
- Each skirmish teaches something
- Cumulative knowledge building
The Debriefing Process
The Information Exchange:
- Injured soldiers debriefed
- Asked about what they saw
- Asked about Afghan movements
- Asked about Afghan morale
- Asked about Afghan tactics
The Learning:
- Commanders assess results
- Evaluate new information
- Adjust strategy accordingly
- Plan next skirmish
- Continue gathering intelligence
The Realization: This Will Be Terrible
Both Armies Understanding the Cost
The Awareness:
- Both realized severity
- This won't be easy victory
- Consequences will be severe
- Both sides will suffer
- Massive casualties guaranteed
The Psychology:
- Abdali: hasn't faced this before
- Bigger force than he'd encountered
- Different military system (artillery)
- Risk of complete defeat
- Must be very careful
The Maratha Side:
- Realized difficulty
- Didn't believe in coordination
- Worried about discipline
- Knew casualties would be immense
- Couldn't retreat if things went wrong
The Stalemate Calculation
Why Each Side Hesitates
Maratha Reasons:
- Want to know Abdali's weaknesses
- Want to assess strengths
- Want infantry/cavalry to coordinate
- Want artillery to integrate
- Want time to prepare
Afghan Reasons:
- Want to understand Maratha capabilities
- Want to find artillery vulnerability
- Want to evaluate morale/discipline
- Want to assess tactics
- Want time to adapt
The Mutual Hesitation:
- Both want more information
- Both want better preparation
- Both want fewer surprises
- Both aware of cost
- Both hoping other side retreats
The Deliberative Mode
What's Happening:
- Both armies slow
- No rushing into action
- Taking time to think
- Evaluating options
- Preparing carefully
The Message:
- This is serious
- Will be decided fight
- Not going to be quick
- Casualties will be massive
- Both sides need to be ready
The Communication Paradox
Messengers Despite Proximity
The Situation:
- Armies facing each other closely
- Can't move south quickly enough
- But messengers can
- Messages going secretly
- Must be sent in secretive way
The Routes:
- To Delhi (relay point)
- To Pune (Peshwa)
- Letters going back and forth
- Not fast but possible
- Secret routes being used
The Purpose:
- Bhau asking for supplies
- Requesting gunpowder
- Demanding money
- Asking for support
- Coordinating strategy
The Harsh Reality
What Both Camps Know
The Truth:
- Can't win easy victory
- Will be costly struggle
- Heavy casualties certain
- Outcome unpredictable
- Time advantage doesn't exist
The Dilemma:
- Waiting means slow attrition
- Attacking means immediate casualties
- Staying means slow starvation
- Leaving means disastrous retreat
- No good options remain
Where This Leads: By December 1760, both armies are grinding away in the stalemate. Marathas still have supply advantage but it's eroding. Afghans starving but surviving. Gunpowder running low. Bundele completely failed. Intelligence gathering continuing nightly. Both armies know this will be catastrophic. Both preparing for worst. Both locked in until one force gives. The waiting is destroying them even faster than battle would.
The Vanzaris moving at night through the darkness, carrying supplies through enemy-patrolled lands, risking execution if caught. That's the real war while the armies wait. The invisible supply line determines who survives to fight. Not the grand strategy. Not the artillery. The night runners carrying grain and powder through darkness. That's what wins wars. That and the willingness to sacrifice disposable people to feed the machines of war.
Kashi Ram Shivadev: The Bilingual Witness to Panipat (1734-1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Key Historical Figure: An Unexpected Observer
Who Is Kashi Ram Shivadev?
His Background:
- Brahmin scholar and administrator
- Marathi-speaking (originally from Maharashtra)
- Learned Farsi language later
- Working as a "Dubashi" (bilingual translator)
- Bridge between two cultures and languages
His Timeline:
- In 1734: Congratulated Bajirao I on victory
- Service to Bajirao I's forces
- Later: Employed in Suja Uddaula's court
- By 1760: Still active and observing
- At Panipat: Eyewitness to massive event
His Age Context:
- Around 60 years old during Panipat (1760)
- Had 26 years experience (1734-1760)
- Witnessed major events
- Veteran observer of politics
- Elderly but still sharp
The Dubashi Role: Linguistic Bridge
What A Dubashi Does
The Definition:
- "Dubashi" = one who speaks two languages
- Translator between Marathi and Farsi
- Facilitates communication across languages
- Cultural mediator
- Political liaison
Why It Mattered:
- Maratha commanders spoke Marathi
- Afghan/Persian court spoke Farsi
- Needed translation layer
- Needed cultural understanding
- Needed neutral go-between
His Unique Position
The Language Expertise:
- Knew Marathi from birth
- Learned Farsi working in Suja's court
- Could navigate both systems
- Understood both mentalities
- Invaluable bridging figure
His Political Leverage:
- Was with Suja Uddaula court
- Wrote letters on Suja's behalf
- Had inside access to decisions
- Knew what was being discussed
- Understood secret negotiations
The Middle Man: Between All Three Powers
Suja Uddaula's Position
Who He Was:
- Nawab of Doab region
- Caught between Marathas and Afghans
- Neither fully supporting either side
- Playing both sides when possible
- Trapped by geography and circumstance
His Origins:
- Ancestors from Iran
- Court spoke Farsi
- Persian administrative system
- But ruling Indian territory
- Awkward hybrid position
His Role in Triangle:
- Madhyastha (middleman)
- Between Bhau (Marathas)
- Between Abdali (Afghans)
- And between both powers
- Neutral but pressured
Kashi Ram's Access
His Knowledge:
- Knew what Suja was discussing
- Knew Maratha-Suja conversations
- Knew Afghan-Suja interactions
- Knew secret negotiations
- Knew which side was winning negotiations
His Intelligence Value:
- Three-way communications
- All languages available
- All perspectives understood
- Unique vantage point
- Ultimate insider position
His Understanding:
- No purely military intelligence
- But strategic/diplomatic knowledge
- Knew intentions, not tactics
- Understood which side would yield
- Could predict outcomes
His Historical Record: The Memoir
Writing After the Battle
The Timeline:
- Battle of Panipat: January 14, 1761
- Memoir written: 19 years later (~1780)
- After all major events settled
- After he had time to reflect
- Safe to publish views
The Source Material:
- Personal observations
- Conversations he overheard
- Letters he translated
- Official documents he handled
- Firsthand experience
The Value:
- Only bilingual witness we know of
- Only person in all three camps
- Only person with full picture
- Marathi + Farsi languages
- Professional documentation
Abdali's Army Composition: October 18, 1760
The Force Strength
The Cavalry Organization:
- 24 regiments total
- 1,200 cavalry per regiment
- Total: 28,800 cavalry troops
- Elite force composition
- Heavy cavalry concentration
The Guard Duty:
- Slaves provided guard duty
- One mile periphery around Abdali's tent
- Protecting commander-in-chief
- Concentric security rings
- Abdali's personal safety paramount
The Weapons Arsenal:
- "Jamburak" = large diameter guns
- Camel-mounted artillery
- Swivel guns on camel backs
- Typical Afghan weaponry
- Designed for mobile warfare
The Gap: Maratha vs. Afghan Artillery
The French Technology:
- Maratha: French latest technology
- French-trained gunners
- Long-range capability (2 km)
- Rapid-fire capability
- European innovation
The Afghan Equipment:
- Traditional heavy guns
- Camel-mounted weapons
- Limited range (~500m or less)
- Slower to reload
- Older technology
The Advantage:
- Maratha: 4x range advantage
- Maratha: faster fire rate
- Maratha: better accuracy
- Afghan: mobility advantage
- Afghan: terrain familiarity
The Importance of First-Hand Evidence
Why Kashi Ram Matters
The Reliability:
- Was actually there
- Witnessed events directly
- Translated official communications
- Not relying on hearsay
- Professional documentation
The Perspective:
- Saw all three sides
- Understood all languages
- Knew all intentions
- Had access to secrets
- Could judge motivations
The Credibility:
- No obvious bias (not Maratha or Afghan)
- Professional (trained observer)
- Educated (Brahmin scholar)
- Experienced (26 years service)
- Aged at observation time
His Sub-Camp Position
The Locations:
- First: Delhi (observing)
- Then: Panipat (in Suja's tent)
- Within larger Abdali camp
- Multiple sub-camps (Rohila, Suja, Abdali's own)
- Nested camp structure
The Advantage:
- Could move between camps
- Observed all three perspectives
- Saw supplies, morale, tactics
- Noted quality of commanders
- Assessed realistic strengths
The Strategic Picture He Provides
What We Learn From Him
The Intelligence:
- Abdali had 28,800 cavalry (not just vague "large force")
- Specific regiment structure
- Specific weapons capabilities
- Specific guard arrangements
- Professional military organization
The Comparison:
- Marathas had different artillery
- Marathas had different organization
- Marathas had different tactics
- Afghans had mobility advantage
- Marathas had firepower advantage
The Assessment:
- Not simply "Marathas strong" or "Afghans strong"
- More nuanced: Different strengths
- Marathas: Firepower and fortifications
- Afghans: Mobility and experience
- Battle outcome = who uses strengths better
The Documentary Value
For Historical Understanding
What He Captured:
- Force composition details
- Weapon specifications
- Camp organization
- Leadership visibility (Abdali's actions)
- Intelligence gathering practices
What He Understood:
- Not just numbers but quality
- Not just weapons but tactics
- Not just organization but morale
- Not just structure but strategy
- Complete military picture
The Irreplaceable Perspective:
- Bilingual witness
- Educated observer
- Professional documenter
- Insider position
- Decades of experience
His Unique Contribution to History
The Missing Voice
In Most Histories:
- Either Maratha accounts
- Or Afghan accounts
- Or British observations
- Rarely do we have insider
- Rarely bilingual witness
- Rarely middleman perspective
What Kashi Ram Provides:
- Bridge between cultures
- Translation of intentions
- Understanding of both sides
- Neutral assessment capability
- Proof of legitimacy to both views
The Value for Us:
- Can verify facts through translation
- Can check biases
- Can understand both sides
- Can appreciate complexity
- Can see war from unique angle
The Context of His Service
The Trajectory
1734:
- Serving Bajirao I
- Documenting Maratha victories
- Professional scribe/translator
- Building reputation
1760:
- At Panipat witnessing
- 26 years of experience
- Aged 60 years old
- Observing greatest battle
- Recording for posterity
Post-1761:
- Documented what he saw
- Waited 19 years to publish
- Likely due to safety concerns
- Wanted accurate reflection
- Wanted proper context
The Professional Documentation
The Letter Writing
His Role:
- Wrote letters for Suja
- Translated diplomatic communications
- Recorded conversations
- Documented negotiations
- Professional scribe
What He Preserved:
- Official correspondence
- Diplomatic exchanges
- Strategic discussions
- Troop movements
- Supply arrangements
The Archive Value:
- These letters survived
- Historical record preserved
- Details documented professionally
- Not emotional accounts but factual
- Reliable source material
The Elderly Observer
Why Age Matters Here
His Perspective:
- 60 years old in 1760
- Had seen 26 years of warfare
- Understood patterns
- Could predict outcomes
- Experienced perspective
His Credibility:
- Not young and rash
- Not emotionally involved
- Not personal grudges
- Professional distance
- Trained objectivity
His Understanding:
- Recognized this as historic moment
- Understood significance
- Wanted to document accurately
- Waited to be safe before publishing
- Valued accuracy over speed
Where This Leads: Kashi Ram Shivadev is the closest thing we have to an impartial observer of the Third Battle of Panipat. Bilingual, educated, with access to all three camps, he provides documentary evidence of forces, weapons, organization, and strategy. His memoir written 19 years after allows reflection without immediate fear. He bridges Marathi and Farsi worlds, understands both mentalities, and can judge both sides fairly. In a war of propaganda and selective histories, his voice—despite being unknown to many—provides crucial balance.
He was sixty years old and had been watching empires rise and fall for twenty-six years. He spoke both languages. He moved between all three camps. He translated the words that meant life or death. When the battle came, he was there. And when it was over, he wrote down what he'd seen. Not for glory. Not for revenge. Just for the record. For history. For the truth.
Kashi Ram's Detailed Breakdown: Afghan Forces at Panipat (October 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Complete Afghan Army Composition
Abdali's Core Force: 24 Battalions
The Structure:
- 24 battalions total
- 1,200 cavalry per battalion
- Total: 28,800 cavalry troops
- Elite formation soldiers
- Professional military organization
The Named Commanders:
- Shah Wali Khan
- Jahan Khan
- Shah Pasand Khan
- Nasir Khan
- Baluch
- Barkhurdar Khan
- And many other leaders
- Deep bench of experienced generals
The Personal Guards: Abdali's Slave Force
The Inner Circle:
- 6 of the 24 battalions = Abdali's personal slaves
- Completely loyal to Abdali personally
- Fiercely protective of commander
- Deadly force composition
- Operating within 1-mile radius of Abdali's tent
Their Role:
- Guard duty around Abdali's tent
- One-mile protective perimeter
- Prevent any infiltration
- Ensure Abdali's safety
- Highest loyalty tier
The Artillery Arsenal: Diverse and Mobile
Jamburak Guns: The Heavy Mobile Artillery
The Design:
- Large diameter guns (bigger than standard)
- Camel-mounted weapons
- Two soldiers per camel
- Facing opposite directions (180°)
- Mobile while mounted on camel
The Quantity:
- 4,000 Jamburak guns total
- Requires ~2,000 camels (2 guns per camel)
- Significant camel corps needed
- Logistical challenge for movement
- Constant repositioning possible
The Advantage:
- Can move with army
- Can rotate 360° for targeting
- Lighter than ground-mounted cannons
- More flexible positioning
- Afghan military specialty
Fixed Cannons: Limited Range
The Limitation:
- Fixed cannons present
- Short range (~500 meters or less)
- Can't hit Marathas without being hit
- Dependent on position
- Less effective at distance
The Implication:
- Can't engage French artillery (2 km range)
- Must wait for Marathas to approach
- Must rely on mobile artillery
- Defensive positioning necessary
- Range disadvantage critical
The Coalition Forces: Multiple Allied Armies
Suja Uddaula's Contingent
His Force:
- 2,000 cavalry
- 2,000 foot soldiers
- 20 cannons of various sizes
- Secondary military power
- Doab region commander
His Role:
- Supporting Abdali
- Supplying through Doab
- Providing local knowledge
- Contributing fighting force
- Trapped ally status
Najib Khan's Rohila Warriors
The Force:
- 6,000 cavalry
- 20,000 foot soldiers
- Some missile weaponry
- Significant fighting force
- Rudimentary missile technology
The Internal Tension:
- Dunde Khan and Hafiz Rehmat Khan
- Disliked Najib Khan
- Considered him an upstart
- Not fully unified command
- Rivalry within coalition
The Perception:
- Najib = Abdali's agent in India
- Trusted advisor to Abdali
- Close relationship with commander
- But local Rohila leaders skeptical
- Created internal stress
Ahmad Khan Bangush's Force
The Smaller Contingent:
- 1,000 cavalry
- 1,000 foot soldiers
- Some cannons
- Minimal contribution
- Symbolic presence more than combat power
The Total Afghan Forces: Detailed Breakdown
Kashi Ram's Accounting
His Calculation:
- Abdali total: 80,000+ fighting forces
- Maratha total: 70,000 fighting forces
- Direct observation/documentation
- Professional historian accounting
- Contemporary record
The Details:
- 41,000 cavalry (Abdali's core)
- 38,000+ foot soldiers
- ~70 cannons (various types)
- ~2,000 camels (with Jamburak)
- Slave guards and officers
The Reserve Forces
The Uncommitted Troops:
- Four times larger force than battle army
- Came to Panipat but not committed to battle
- Inferior weapons and animals
- Could be called upon if needed
- Secondary-tier fighting force
The Implication:
- 80,000+ committed fighters
- Additional 240,000+ reserve forces (if numbers scale)
- More likely: additional 40,000-50,000 reserves
- Overwhelming numerical advantage
- Ability to sustain losses and continue
The Durani Advantage: Superior Horses and Physiology
The Durani People
Their Characteristics:
- Afghan tribal group
- Sturdy and stout build
- Tall stature naturally
- Adapted to mountain warfare
- Superior physical conditioning
The Physical Advantage:
- Bigger horses (Durani horses)
- Longer-distance capability
- More powerful animal genetics
- Used to harsh terrain
- Better adapted to climate stress
The Horse Superiority
Indian vs. Durani Horses:
- Indian breed: smaller stature
- Indian breed: shorter distance capability
- Durani breed: larger and stronger
- Durani breed: can travel farther daily
- Different genetics from different environments
The Trade-offs:
- Indian horses: more fuel-efficient
- Indian horses: adapted to heat
- Durani horses: stronger for combat
- Durani horses: better for sustained campaigns
- Each has advantages/disadvantages
The Complete Afghan Order of Battle
Core Leadership Structure
Abdali's Army (28,800 cavalry):
- Multiple named generals
- 24-battalion structure
- 6 battalions = personal slave guard
- Organized command hierarchy
- Professional military system
Allied Forces:
- Suja: 4,000 fighters
- Najib's Rohilas: 26,000 fighters
- Ahmad Khan: 2,000 fighters
- Total allied: ~32,000 fighters
- Adding to Abdali's core = 60,000+
The Weaponry Summary
Cannons:
- Jamburak: 4,000 (camel-mounted, 360° swivel)
- Fixed cannons: limited number (short-range)
- Suja's cannons: 20
- Najib's cannons: some
- Ahmad Khan's cannons: some
- Total: ~100+ cannons/Jamburaks
Other Arms:
- Cavalry sabers/swords
- Infantry spears/swords
- Muskets (some)
- Missiles (rudimentary)
- Traditional Afghan weaponry
The Quality Assessment
First vs. Second Tier Forces
First Tier (Abdali's 28,800):
- Professional cavalry
- Well-trained soldiers
- Proven in Afghan wars
- Loyal to Abdali
- High-quality fighting force
Second Tier (Allied forces):
- Decent fighting capability
- Regional forces
- Some experience
- Variable loyalty
- Competent but not elite
The Hierarchy:
- Abdali's slaves = elite guards
- Abdali's cavalry = professional soldiers
- Allied cavalry = experienced warriors
- Allied foot soldiers = trained infantry
- Clear quality gradation throughout
The Logistical Reality
The Numbers and Sustainability
The Force:
- 80,000 committed fighters minimum
- 20,000-50,000 reserve fighters
- 100,000+ total personnel with support
- 2,000+ camels
- 30,000+ horses
The Supply Needs:
- Food for 100,000+ people
- Food for 30,000+ animals
- Fodder for horses/camels
- Water for all
- Ammunition and powder
The Challenge:
- Traveling from Afghanistan
- Dependent on supplies from Doab
- Can't manufacture locally
- Must sustain in hostile territory
- Limited local support (Muslim population only helps so much)
The Comparative Assessment
Against Maratha Forces
Abdali's Advantages:
- More cavalry (28,800 vs. Maratha equiv.)
- Durani horses superior
- More experienced generals
- Proven battle record
- Unified command structure
Abdali's Disadvantages:
- Fewer cannons (100 vs. 200)
- Shorter cannon range
- Mobile artillery less effective at distance
- Away from home territory
- Supply line stretched
The Overall:
- 80,000 vs. 70,000+ (slight advantage)
- But quality advantages offset some numbers
- Composition more experienced
- Better physical conditioning
- More cohesive command
Kashi Ram's Documentary Value
What He Provides
The Evidence:
- Direct observation of forces
- Named commanders documented
- Specific troop counts
- Weapon descriptions
- Organizational structure
The Reliability:
- Professional observer
- Bilingual capability
- Access to all camps
- Trained documentation
- 19 years later written (reflection time)
The Significance:
- Only detailed breakdown we have
- Only observer in all three camps
- Validates historical estimates
- Provides specific numbers
- Creates baseline for comparison
Where This Leads: Kashi Ram's documentation gives us precise numbers: Abdali with 80,000+ fighters of high quality, superior horses from Afghanistan, deep command structure, and diverse weaponry. The Afghan forces are professional, experienced, and equipped with both traditional and newer weapons. The Durani heritage means superior physiology and horses. But the 2 km range disadvantage vs. Maratha artillery is critical. Abdali knows he can't win a long-range artillery duel. He must close to close combat where his experience, numbers, and warrior culture give advantage.
Kashi Ram counted every soldier. 28,800 cavalry in core force alone. Six battalions as personal guards—that's 7,200 men whose only job was keeping Abdali alive. Four thousand Jamburak guns on camels—mobile firepower moving with the army. Durani horses bigger and stronger than anything in India. Eighty thousand fighters total. He wrote the numbers down. And he knew what they meant. Abdali wasn't just invading. He was bringing a professional, experienced, well-equipped military machine. Not a horde. A disciplined force.
The Maratha Fighting Forces: Quality vs. Quantity at Panipat (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha Force Composition: Multiple Tiers
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's European-Trained Regiment
The Force:
- 2,000 cavalry
- 9,000 foot soldiers
- ~200 cannons
- Advanced artillery support
- French-trained gunners
The Military System:
- "Kawayati fauz" = European-style disciplined army
- Coordinated unit tactics (not individual warriors)
- Command and control structure
- Concerted actions as groups
- Revolutionary for Indian warfare
Why This Mattered:
- Traditional Indian forces = individual brave warriors
- No coordination between units
- No unified command structure
- Each soldier fights independently
- Doesn't function as cohesive army
The European Innovation:
- British, French, Portuguese introduced discipline
- 1,000 soldiers = single coordinated unit
- If commander says move, all move together
- If commander says fire, all fire together
- Act as one organism, not collection of individuals
Bhau's Core Fighting Force
The Breakdown:
- 55,000 cavalry
- 15,000 foot soldiers
- 200 cannons
- "Bhanu Maji" special forces (personal elite)
- High-caliber warriors
The Quality:
- Top-notch soldiers
- Properly trained
- Properly paid
- Expected to be highest quality
- Tested and proven
The Morale:
- Understand why they're fighting
- Regular payment (monthly)
- Professional soldiers
- Motivated to victory
- Committed to cause
Pandhari Forces: The Mercenaries
The Nature:
- Not disciplined soldiers
- Self-interested fighters
- Loot-focused operations
- Free for hire
- Soldiers of fortune
The Reality:
- Go around and loot villages
- Not paid regularly by any commander
- "Live off the land"
- Not highly trained
- Not highly motivated
The Problem:
- May not fight to the last man
- Morale dependent on circumstances
- Given motivation: will fight
- Without motivation: will flee
- Unreliable in crisis
The Necessity:
- Still a fighting force
- Help with numbers
- Can contribute to battle
- But quality questionable
- Expendable compared to core
The Total Maratha Force: Different Estimates
Kashi Ram's Count
His Assessment:
- Abdali: 80,000 fighting force
- Marathas: 70,000 fighting force
- Direct observation basis
- Professional documentation
- Contemporary record
Yudhunath Sarkar's Analysis
His Method:
- Counted dead after battle
- Assessed survivors
- Calculated based on losses
- Historian-based approach
- Analytical methodology
His Numbers:
- Abdali: 60,000 fighters
- Marathas: 45,000 core fighters
- Plus Pandhari forces (secondary tier)
- Different composition than Kashi Ram
- More conservative estimate
The Accounting:
- Core Maratha: 45,000 (high-quality)
- Pandhari: ~5,000-10,000 (mercenary)
- Total: ~50,000-55,000 vs. 60,000 Afghan
- Afghan advantage: 10,000-15,000 troops
- But Maratha artillery advantage significant
The Critical Quality Distinction
Abdali's Second-Tier vs. Maratha Second-Tier
Abdali's "Hangami" Forces:
- Contract/semi-permanent soldiers
- Not fully fledged but committed
- Better than Pandhari mercenaries
- More disciplined
- More motivated
Maratha's Pandhari Forces:
- Pure mercenaries
- Loot-focused
- Minimal training
- Low motivation
- Unreliable
The Advantage:
- Abdali's reserves > Maratha's reserves
- Even second-tier Afghans > second-tier Marathas
- "Kamasal" forces (lower quality)
- Afghan second-tier better than Maratha second-tier
- Quality gap throughout hierarchy
The Non-Combatant Workforce: The Hidden Army
Servants and Support Staff
The Numbers:
- Maratha: ~100,000 support personnel
- Afghan: fewer (less developed infrastructure)
- Both armies depended heavily on support
- Not fighting force but essential
- Logistical backbone of army
The Roles:
- Food procurement and preparation
- Tent pitching and maintenance
- Animal care (horses, camels, elephants)
- Sentry/guard duty
- General maintenance work
The Logistics:
- Like a small town moving
- Everything a town needs to function
- Shopkeepers and merchants (Boongi)
- Cooks and kitchen staff
- Animal handlers and farriers
- Barbers and medical staff
The Maratha Advantage: Family Entourages
The Commanders' Families:
- Major sardars brought families
- Bhau brought his wife: Parvati Bhai
- Appa Mehendare brought wife: Lakshmi Bhai
- Nana Fadnavis brought his mother
- Others brought wives for holy site tourism
The Holy Site Tourism:
- Kashi (Varanasi) pilgrimage interest
- Mathura visit opportunity
- Religious significance
- Women wanted to participate
- Seen as spiritual journey with military campaign
The Enthusiasm Factor:
- Marathas extremely confident
- "We're going to win"
- Why not bring families?
- Why not make it pilgrimage trip?
- Overconfidence led to bringing dependents
The Burden of Support Staff: The "Lag Load" Concept
The Necessary Evil
The Metaphor:
- Like tying log around cow/buffalo's neck
- Prevents animal from running fast
- Can still move but slower
- Dragging weight slows progress
- Eventually you catch it anyway
The Application:
- 100,000+ support staff are "lag load"
- Necessary for army function
- But slow down operations
- Can't move quickly with them
- Reduce flexibility
The Problem Times:
- In adverse situations, they become liability
- When things don't go as planned
- When army needs to be mobile
- When quick withdrawal needed
- Dead weight in crisis
The Women and Children Issue
The Vulnerability:
- Can't protect themselves
- Must be protected by army
- Requires dedicated guard forces
- Takes fighting troops from battle lines
- Reduces combat effectiveness
The Distraction:
- Commanders worried about families
- Not fully focused on battle
- Emotional attachment affects judgment
- Family safety = divided attention
- Reduces strategic flexibility
The Historical Precedent: Mughal vs. Maratha Tradition
The Mughal System: Integrated Families
The Practice:
- Mughal emperors brought families
- Mughal princes brought families
- Elite warriors brought families
- Standard military practice
- Tradition for centuries
The Implementation:
- Women installed on elephants
- Back of army positioning
- Reserve troops guard them
- Protected entourage system
- Accepted military practice
The Problem:
- Battle doesn't spare anybody
- Women as non-combatants vulnerable
- What happens when things go wrong?
- Can't defend themselves in crisis
- Becomes strategic liability
The Shivaji Tradition: Minimal Entourage
The Approach:
- Shivaji never took families
- Even in final southern campaign
- Minimal support staff
- Lean military machine
- Focused on mobility
The Difference:
- Shivaji: guerrilla/mobile warfare
- Needed speed and flexibility
- Couldn't afford support burden
- Families would slow operations
- Strategic doctrine required it
The Peshwa Evolution:
- Started with Shivaji's methods
- Bajirao I maintained lean force
- But over time: expanded entourages
- More settled empire style
- More Mughal-like operations
The Mastani Incident: Why Wives Came Along
Bajirao I's Controversial Marriage
The Situation:
- Campaign in Bundelkhand
- Married Mastani
- Brought her back to Pune
- Created major havoc
- Challenged traditional norms
Who Was Mastani:
- Hindu father, Muslim mother
- Born Muslim (or converted)
- Beautiful and accomplished
- Not Hindu (major issue)
- Second wife (another issue)
The Reaction:
- Hindu society wouldn't accept her
- Refused conversion to Hinduism
- She chose to remain Muslim
- Massive resistance in Pune
- Religious and cultural crisis
The Consequence: Why Wives Now Travel
The Fear:
- Men going to north
- Coming back with second/third wives
- Women wanted to prevent this
- Decided to go with husbands
- "We'll accompany you"
The Decision:
- Royal families agreed to travel
- Elite warriors' wives agreed
- Prevention strategy against remarriage
- Keep watch on husbands
- Control the situation
The Rationalization at Panipat:
- Tremendous confidence in victory
- "We're going to win"
- Why not bring families?
- Wives could do pilgrimage
- Make it tourism trip alongside victory
The Overconfidence Problem
The Mental State
The Belief System:
- Absolutely certain of victory
- No doubt whatsoever
- "Nothing else can happen"
- Only outcome = winning
- Didn't think of uncertainty
The Reality:
- Battle = inherently uncertain
- Especially on plains (no cover)
- Multiple factors unpredictable
- Overconfidence = strategic blindness
- Set up for disappointment
The Composition Summary
What They Had
Fighting Forces:
- 45,000-55,000 core fighters (depending on count)
- 5,000-10,000 Pandhari mercenaries
- Total: 50,000-65,000 combat troops
- 200+ cannons (French technology)
- Disciplined core (Gardi's regiment)
Support Forces:
- ~100,000 support staff
- Women and children
- Families of commanders
- Servants and merchants
- Animal handlers
The Total:
- 150,000-165,000 total personnel
- Mix of combat and non-combat
- Significant proportion = non-warriors
- Reduces combat effectiveness
- Increases logistical burden
Where This Leads: The Maratha forces are smaller (50,000-70,000 fighters depending on count) but more disciplined—at least the core Gardi regiment. But the Pandhari mercenaries are unreliable second-tier troops, worse quality than even Abdali's secondary forces. The 100,000+ support staff—especially women and families—create a massive liability. They needed protection, slowed movement, and distracted commanders. The overconfidence (thinking victory inevitable) led to bringing pilgrims and wives. It was a strategic blunder that turned the army into more of a traveling city than a war machine.
Fifty thousand good fighters. Ten thousand mercenaries who'd rather loot than die. One hundred thousand support staff. And one hundred thousand dreams of pilgrimage and victory. They brought their wives and mothers thinking this was going to be a procession to glory, not a battle. The wives wanted to tour Kashi. The mothers wanted holy blessings. The soldiers wanted victory. What nobody imagined was that wives and mothers and pilgrims would end up being what lost the war.
The Family Burden: Wives, Mothers, and Dependents at Panipat (1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha Camp: A Small City Moving
The Non-Combat Population
The Scale:
- ~100,000 support/dependent personnel
- Comparable to combat forces
- Create logistical city
- Not warriors but necessary
- Essential infrastructure
The Functions:
- Food procurement
- Cooking and meal preparation
- Tent pitching and camp setup
- Animal care (horses, camels, elephants)
- Maintenance of equipment
- Sentry and guard duty
- General sundry work
The Workers:
- Boongi = maintenance workers
- Shopkeepers and merchants
- Kitchen staff and cooks
- Animal handlers
- Barbers and medical staff
- Equipment repairers
- Water carriers
- Laundry workers
The Mughal Parallel
The Historical Tradition:
- Mughal emperors brought families
- Mughal princes brought families
- Elite warriors brought families
- Standard military practice
- Accepted for centuries
The Logistics System:
- Women installed on elephants
- Positioned in back of army
- Reserve troops provided guard
- Formal protective system
- Established military structure
The Commander's Families at Panipat
Bhau's Wife: Parvati Bhai
Her Status:
- Wife of Sadashiv Rao Bhau
- Commander-in-chief's wife
- Traveled with campaign
- In Maratha camp at Panipat
- High-status dependent
Her Role:
- Symbolic presence
- Family representation
- Emotional support (possibly)
- Morale element for troops
- Status marker for commander
Appa Mehendare's Wife: Lakshmi Bhai
His Position:
- Important military commander
- 7,000 soldiers reporting to him
- Significant force under his command
- Major player in battle
- Elite ranking
His Family:
- Brought wife Lakshmi Bhai
- Travel with campaign
- Protected in camp
- Added to entourage burden
- High-status family
Nana Fadnavis and His Mother
The Notable Case:
- Important courtier in Peshwa court
- Brought his mother
- Also brought wife
- Religious tourism interest
- Pilgrimage objective combined with war
The Motivation:
- Mother wanted to visit holy places
- Kashi (Varanasi) pilgrimage
- Mathura visits
- Combined religious and military mission
- Extended family participation
The Mastani Legacy: Why Wives Now Accompany
The Historical Context
Bajirao I's Campaign:
- Went to Bundelkhand
- Married Mastani there
- Brought her back to Pune
- Major cultural crisis
- Religious and social chaos
Who Was Mastani?
Her Background:
- Hindu father, Muslim mother
- Born of interfaith union
- At time when Hinduism dominant
- Not accepted as Hindu
- Refused forced conversion
Her Choice:
- "If I must be Muslim"
- Stayed in Muslim identity
- Accepted her faith choice
- Refused cultural compromise
- Maintained her identity
The Resistance:
- Hindu society wouldn't accept her
- She was "not Hindu"
- Second wife (bigger issue)
- Massive resistance in Pune
- Cultural/religious backlash
The Consequence: Prevention Strategy
The Fear Among Elites:
- Men going north for campaigns
- Coming back with second wives
- Coming back with third wives
- Pattern threatening traditional families
- Women losing control
The Decision:
- "We have to go with them"
- Wives would accompany husbands
- Prevent remarriage in north
- Control what happens
- Keep families intact
The Precedent:
- Became new tradition
- Elite women started traveling
- Royal families participating
- Military campaigns = family events
- Wives as guardians/companions
The Panipat Confidence: Why Families Were Brought
The Psychological State
The Certainty:
- "This is going to be victory"
- "Nothing else, you know"
- "We are going to win"
- "That's the only outcome"
- Absolute conviction
The Overconfidence:
- Didn't think of battle uncertainty
- Didn't consider losses
- Didn't imagine defeat
- Didn't plan for crisis
- Completely optimistic
The Rationalization:
- "Why not bring wives?"
- "Why not bring families?"
- "We're going to win anyway"
- "Make it pilgrimage trip"
- "Visit holy sites during victory march"
The Shivaji Comparison
His Military System:
- Never took families
- Even on final southern campaign
- Minimal support entourages
- Lean fighting force
- Focused on mobility and victory
The Difference:
- Shivaji: guerrilla warfare
- Needed speed and flexibility
- Families would slow operations
- Couldn't afford support burden
- Military doctrine demanded it
The Evolution:
- Bajirao I: similar approach initially
- Over time: expanding entourages
- More settled empire style
- More Mughal-like practices
- Less mobility focused
The Real Cost of Dependents
The "Lag Load" Concept
The Metaphor:
- When you don't want animal to run
- Tie wooden log around neck
- Can't run at full speed
- Dragging weight slows progress
- Makes it harder to escape
The Application:
- 100,000+ support staff = lag load
- Necessary for army survival
- But slows down operations
- Reduces strategic flexibility
- Prevents rapid movement
The Crisis Situation:
- When plans go wrong
- When retreat needed
- When mobility critical
- Support staff become dead weight
- Can't protect themselves while protecting army
The Protection Burden
The Reality:
- Can't let them fend for themselves
- Must protect dependents
- Takes troops from combat
- Reduces fighting force
- Strategic disadvantage
The Psychological Impact:
- Commanders distracted
- Worry about families
- Emotional attachment
- Divided focus
- Can't be fully aggressive
The Battlefield Effect:
- Some troops guarding non-combatants
- Those troops can't fight
- Effective force reduced
- Flexibility reduced
- Options constrained
The Servant Class: The Real Support System
The Boongi: Maintenance Workers
Who They Are:
- Maintenance staff
- Kitchen workers
- Equipment repairers
- Tent pitchers
- Camp administrators
Their Work:
- Cooking meals for 150,000+
- Pitching/taking down tents
- Caring for horses/camels/elephants
- Repairing weapons and equipment
- Collecting water
- Washing clothes
- General camp maintenance
The Scale:
- Massive operation
- Like small city logistics
- Can't function without them
- Army starves without them
- Army freezes without them
The Merchants and Shopkeepers: The Boongi
Their Role:
- Buy and sell goods
- Procure supplies
- Trade between armies
- Manage local commerce
- Handle financial transactions
Their Function:
- Provide goods to army
- Liquor/tobacco/extras
- Buying local supplies
- Selling loot acquired
- Financial intermediaries
The Necessity:
- Army needs access to goods
- Can't have pure military state
- Soldiers have non-essential needs
- Morale depends on variety
- Commerce essential to function
The Numbers and Scale
The Composition
Fighting Forces:
- 45,000-70,000 (estimates vary)
- Core disciplined units
- Pandhari mercenaries
- Officers and commanders
Support/Dependent Population:
- ~100,000 (conservative estimate)
- Families of commanders
- Servants and workers
- Merchants and shopkeepers
- Non-combatant staff
The Ratio:
- Nearly 1:1 ratio of fighters to support
- Similar to Mughal armies
- Necessary for operation
- But creates vulnerability
- Limits mobility and flexibility
The Strategic Implications
The Lost Mobility
What It Means:
- Can't move quickly
- Can't retreat easily
- Can't maneuver strategically
- Can't execute surprise tactics
- Must fight where positioned
The Advantage Lost:
- Traditional Maratha strategy = mobility
- Under Shivaji: quick strikes, withdrawal
- Under Bajirao: surprising enemy
- Now: locked in place
- Can't use speed advantage
The Morale Factor
The Psychological Edge:
- Families present = confidence boost
- Families present = forced commitment
- Can't retreat (families behind you)
- Can't lose (families depend on victory)
- Emotional stakes raised
But Also:
- Families present = distraction
- Families present = worry about protection
- Families present = decisions second-guessed
- Families present = emotional weight
- Can't think clearly under pressure
The Sheer Logistical Challenge
Feeding 150,000 People and Animals
The Daily Need:
- Food for 50,000-70,000 fighters
- Food for 100,000 support staff
- Food for 30,000+ horses/camels
- Food for 5,000+ elephants
- Massive quantity required daily
The Supply Chain:
- Vanzaris working at night
- Moving through hostile territory
- Gathering from surrounding areas
- Delivering to massive camp
- Constant resupply needed
The Vulnerability:
- Dependent on fragile supply lines
- Each day without supplies = crisis
- Each disruption = pain
- Each loss of supply route = starvation
- Entire operation dependent on logistics
The Irony and Tragedy
The Confidence vs. Reality
What They Thought:
- "We'll win"
- "We're better"
- "Abdali will retreat"
- "Victory is certain"
- "Why not bring families?"
What Actually Happened:
- Battle uncertain
- Abdali committed
- No easy victory
- Families became liability
- Overconfidence led to defeat
The Lesson:
- War always uncertain
- Confidence ≠ preparation
- Certainty blinds strategy
- Assumptions lead to mistakes
- Bringing dependents = vulnerability
Where This Leads: The Marathas brought wives and mothers and merchants to Panipat because they were absolutely certain they would win. They had 100,000 support staff creating a small city in motion—necessary for function but limiting mobility. They had families of commanders needing protection, taking troops from combat lines. They had the weight of 150,000 total personnel in a warfare context designed for speed and mobility. And they had all this because they never imagined they could lose. The overconfidence that seemed justified by earlier victories became the very thing that prevented them from winning this crucial battle.
One hundred thousand families following the army north. Wives thinking of pilgrimage. Mothers thinking of holy Kashi. Children traveling for the adventure. And the soldiers trying to win a war while protecting a city. When things went wrong—and things did go very wrong—all those wives and mothers and children became exactly what slowed them down when they needed speed most. Exactly what they couldn't protect when battle came. Exactly what made every defeat more bitter and every retreat more impossible. The Mughal tradition of taking families to war worked when you were certain of victory. It became a catastrophe when you were wrong.
The First Major Skirmish: Maratha Victory and Mounting Desperation (November 22-27, 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The November 22 Skirmish: A Tactical Victory
The First Significant Engagement
The Date:
- November 22, 1760
- First skirmish of major intensity
- Described 5 days later in letter (November 27)
- Both armies seeking to test each other
- High stakes testing engagement
The Participants:
- Afghan Najib Khan's forces attacked from right flank
- Maratha Shinde and Holkar defending right flank
- Suja Uddaula intervened to save Najib
- Limited engagement, not full-scale battle
- Deliberate testing by both sides
The Battle Details
The Afghan Attack:
- Najib Khan led assault on right flank
- Targeted Shinde and Holkar positions
- Meant to test Maratha defenses
- Probe for weaknesses
- Find gaps in formation
The Maratha Response:
- Held their position
- Repelled Afghan attack
- Inflicted heavy casualties
- Impressive defensive performance
- Limited time/darkness ended battle
The Casualties
Afghan Losses:
- 300-400 men killed
- 500-700 wounded
- Over 100 horses captured
- Significant losses for probe attack
- Worse than expected
Maratha Losses:
- Less than 40 men killed
- Dramatically lower casualty rate
- Far better ratio than Afghans
- Impressive defensive success
- Confidence boosting
The Letter Assessment
The Maratha Confidence:
- "The Afghans were broken and beaten"
- "There cannot be another leader like Bhau"
- "We will soon defeat Abdali"
- "Satwari" (very soon will destroy Afghan army)
- High morale after engagement
The Reality:
- Impressive tactical victory
- Limited scope engagement
- Not reflective of full battle potential
- Skirmish ≠ army-wide battle
- But still morale-boosting
The Suja Intervention: The Hidden Player
Why Suja Saved Najib
The Situation:
- Najib getting beaten badly
- Maratha pressure too much
- Would have been wiped out
- Army in collapse
- Needed rescue
The Intervention:
- Suja Uddaula's forces arrived
- Stopped the beating
- Saved Najib's remaining army
- Prevented complete destruction
- Critical lifeline
The Alliance Dynamics:
- Suja protecting Najib Khan
- Najib is close to Abdali
- Najib = Abdali's agent in India
- Suja saving Abdali's key ally
- Coalition holding together (barely)
The Darkness Factor
Why Battle Stopped:
- Darkness falling made fighting impossible
- Can't distinguish enemy from friend
- Risk of friendly fire
- Confusion in darkness
- Forced both sides to withdraw
The Maratha Belief:
- Without darkness: would have won decisively
- Would have destroyed Najib's force
- Would have broken the coalition
- Could have shifted momentum
- Bad timing saved Afghans
The Death of Krishnaji Joshi: War's Random Toll
Who Was Krishnaji Joshi?
His Background:
- Courtier in Peshwa court in Sanwarwada (Pune)
- Political functionary, not warrior
- Traveled with Bhau's entourage north
- Part of camp administrative staff
- Non-combatant but engaged
His Role:
- Written important assessment letters
- November 5: optimistic letter about victory
- Participated in camp decision-making
- Observed situation firsthand
- Provided intelligence to Pune
The Death
The Incident:
- November 28, 1760
- Sitting in his tent
- Stray bullet hit him in head
- Sudden, random death
- No military engagement at moment
The Symbolism:
- Not soldier, not warrior
- Just administrative official
- Still killed by war
- Random nature of conflict
- Danger everywhere
The Professional Class
Types in Camp:
- Warriors: fighters
- Administrative: courtiers, officials
- Logistics: supply managers
- Financial: accountants (like Bhau)
- Support: servants, merchants
The Qualification:
- Even non-warriors expected to fight if needed
- Bhau: financial analyst + battle commander
- Joshi: court official who could participate
- Flexible roles in Indian courts
- Multiple competencies expected
The Communication Problem: The One-Month Delay
The Courier System Challenge
The Distance Problem:
- One month for letters Panipat → Pune
- Panipat to Pune: ~1,000+ miles
- Horseback courier relay
- Mountain passes, river crossings
- Slow, dangerous journey
The Strategic Consequence:
- Real-time tactical decisions impossible
- Peshwa in Pune months behind actual events
- By time letter arrives: situation changed
- Can't respond to current crisis
- Decisions made in information vacuum
The Authority Structure
The Delegation:
- Peshwa ceded authority to Bhau
- Bhau making tactical decisions
- Peshwa not directing in real-time
- Bhau has autonomy in north
- Communication too slow for coordination
The Problem:
- Peshwa didn't understand gravity
- Couldn't see actual conditions
- Didn't know how dire situation was
- Letters don't convey full reality
- Only facts, not emotional weight
The Missed Opportunity: The Peshwa's Potential Support
What Could Have Been Done
Nana Sahib's Option:
- Send 20,000-30,000 troops from Pune
- Attack Abdali's rear flank
- Create pincer movement
- Put Abdali between two armies
- Similar to Bundele plan but with resources
The Timeline:
- Take 1-2 months to reach Panipat
- Battle delayed anyway (not urgent)
- Would arrive in time for main engagement
- Would fundamentally change odds
- Would trap Abdali between forces
Why It Didn't Happen:
- Peshwa didn't understand need
- Didn't see gravity of situation
- Didn't have the will
- Was sick with TB himself
- Wasn't warrior-spirited
Peshwa's Personality
The Comparison:
- Father (Bajirao I): outstanding warrior
- Son (Nana Sahib): not specialized in warfare
- Administrative competence but not military
- More suited to court than battlefield
- Lacked aggressive instinct
The Health Factor:
- Fighting TB at time
- Losing weight rapidly
- Weakening condition
- No confidence for bold action
- Physical health mirroring strategic weakness
The Persistent Bundele Problem
The Repeated Demands
The Continuous Plea:
- Written several times to Govind Pant
- "Take 5,000-7,000 troops"
- "Go into Doab"
- "Stop supplies to Abdali"
- Still not done after months
Why It Mattered:
- Abdali's 100,000+ total personnel
- 100,000+ support staff
- Massive supply requirements
- All coming from Doab region
- Cutting supplies = crippling force
The Fundamental Problem:
- Bundele not a trained fighter
- Revenue officer, not military commander
- Age 60, not vigorous youth
- Lacked fighting spirit
- Couldn't execute military operations
The Desperation
What Remained:
- Still hoping he'd do it
- Still expecting miracle
- Still sending letters pleading
- Know he won't but hoping anyway
- Grasping at straws
The Financial Crisis: Gold Melted for Payroll
The Desperation Measures
The Reality:
- "Shortage of money is a problem"
- Melted down gold and silver
- Converted to coins for payment
- Last resort funding
- No other options left
The Priority:
- Ibrahim Khan must be paid first
- 10,000 troops under him
- Monthly payroll commitment
- His condition from day one
- Can't default or lose him
Ibrahim Khan's Leverage
His Insistence:
- "My troops must be paid"
- Even with money shortage
- Even if Marathas starving
- My soldiers first
- Non-negotiable condition
The Reality:
- Without him: no artillery advantage
- With him: can compete with Afghans
- His 200 cannons = game-changing
- 10,000 trained soldiers = core force
- Can't afford to lose him
The Afghan Awareness
The Knowledge:
- Afghans impressed by Ibrahim's artillery
- Know the threat it poses
- Keep distance (1.5-2 km minimum)
- Within that range: burned by cannons
- Can't match his firepower
The Stalemate Status: Cold War
The Actual Situation
The Reality:
- Bundele hasn't cut supplies (as hoped)
- Abdali not attacking (as feared)
- Both sides at standstill
- Minor skirmishes only
- No resolution emerging
The Strategic Bind:
- Marathas: want Abdali to attack into artillery range
- Afghans: won't attack into artillery range
- Both: waiting for other to make mistake
- Both: running out of resources
- Both: trying not to blink first
The Desperation
Maratha Perspective:
- Won the skirmish impressively
- But can't sustain indefinitely
- Money running short
- Supplies running short
- Need decision soon
Key Themes
- Tactical Victory vs. Strategic Stalemate - Won skirmish but can't break impasse
- The Communication Handicap - One-month delays eliminate real-time coordination
- The Bundele Failure - Persistent expectation that never materializes
- The Financial Hemorrhage - Melting gold/silver to pay commitments
- The Ibrahim Khan Dependency - Everything depends on keeping him paid
- The Peshwa Weakness - Leadership absence at critical moment
- The Bitter Irony - Won battle, losing war through logistics
Where This Leads: The Marathas win an impressive skirmish on November 22, but it doesn't change the fundamental situation. Bundele still can't cut supplies. Peshwa still won't send reinforcements. The money crisis deepens. They're melting gold to pay mercenaries. Abdali won't attack. They can't force him. The momentum from victory fades as the financial crisis deepens and the stalemate continues. They had the Afghan army on the ropes in that skirmish. The darkness saved Abdali. And the fundamental weaknesses of the Maratha position remain unchanged.
They beat the Afghans that day. November 22. Crushed them when Najib attacked. Would have destroyed his entire force if the darkness hadn't fallen. Suja had to save him. The Marathas were glowing with confidence—"No leader like Bhau," "Soon we will defeat Abdali." But five days later, Krishnaji Joshi sat in his tent and a stray bullet found him. Random. Meaningless. He wasn't even fighting. Just writing letters. And the fundamental problem remained: Abdali wouldn't attack into their artillery. Bundele wouldn't cut his supplies. Peshwa wouldn't send help. And the money was running out.
Bhau's Secret Memoirs: Thoughts, Doubts, and Political Limits (Late 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Kaifiyat: Bhau's Unfiltered Thinking
What Is The Kaifiyat?
The Document:
- "Bhau Sahib Kaifiyat" = Bhau's thoughts/analysis
- Written by someone close to Bhau
- Anonymous author (possibly Nanath Puranthi)
- Based on observations of Bhau's thinking
- Third-person account of his thoughts
Its Significance:
- Not found in other official letters
- More honest/unfiltered than formal correspondence
- Reveals doubts and fears
- Shows internal conflict
- Authentic account of psychological state
The Authorship Question:
- Not written by Bhau himself
- Written by person close to him
- Someone who witnessed events
- Could interpret his thoughts/feelings
- Likely survived the battle
The Author's Survival
The Challenge:
- Had to survive the Panipat battle
- Escape without major injuries
- Return to Pune alive
- Write account within a year
- No small feat
The Validation:
- Freshness of memory
- Authenticity of details
- First-hand observation
- No time for embellishment
- Real-time emotions captured
The Identity:
- Possibly Nanath Puranthi
- Courtier in Peshwa court
- Went on northern campaign
- Escaped after battle
- Returned to safety
The Enthusiasm vs. Reality Gap
Early November: High Morale
The Confidence:
- First month of skirmishes: excitement high
- Enthusiasm ("Utsah") very strong
- "Hooked up for the fight"
- Feeling of invincibility
- Optimistic expectations
The Reality Check:
- Even with enthusiasm: needing supplies
- Money running short by late November
- Food supplies declining
- Still wanting/needing material goods
- Can't fight on excitement alone
The Problem
The Analysis:
- Govindpant couldn't cut Abdali's supplies
- Abdali not ready to attack Marathas
- Both sides avoiding full commitment
- Minor skirmishes only
- Stalemate persisting
The Afghan Caution:
- Abdali too smart to be reckless
- Won't foolishly throw forces forward
- Waiting for Maratha mistake
- Testing rather than attacking
- Strategic patience wearing Marathas
Vishwasrao's Desperation: The Letter to Peshwa
The Brother's Plea
The Context:
- Vishwasrao Peshwa = Bhau's brother
- Writing to their father (Nana Sahib)
- Desperate plea for help
- Critical resource shortage
- Acknowledging Bhau's pride
The Key Quote:
- "You'll get 10 sons like me"
- "But not a brother like Bhau"
- Acknowledging his uniqueness
- Expressing his value
- Desperate plea for support
The Honest Assessment
What Vishwasrao Reveals:
- "We don't have the resources"
- "Send more or else we're doomed"
- "Brother won't tell you he needs help"
- "He's in a risky position"
- "We are in troublesome situation"
The Contradiction:
- Bhau projecting confidence publicly
- But actually desperate privately
- Worried about losing face
- Can't admit weakness to Peshwa
- Vishwasrao forced to do it for him
Bhau's Pride Problem
The Issue:
- Won't tell Peshwa the truth
- Thinks admitting need = losing face
- Supposed to be leading to victory
- Given assurance of success
- Can't now say "uncertain"
The Consequence:
- Peshwa doesn't understand gravity
- Can't provide appropriate support
- Doesn't send reinforcements
- Underestimates danger
- Leaves campaign under-resourced
The Afghan Strength Reality
Vishwasrao's Assessment:
- "Gilcha (Afghan army) appearing stronger"
- Than originally thought
- Reassessing upward
- More formidable opponent
- Than expected intelligence indicated
The Implications:
- Initial estimates wrong
- Afghans better organized
- Abdali more capable
- Threat level increasing
- Situation more dire
The Stalemate Logic: Why They Can't Attack
The Battle Decision Dilemma
The Uncertainty:
- "Consequences will be devastating no matter what"
- Battle outcome uncertain
- Both sides will lose heavily
- Can't predict winner
- Only guarantee: massive casualties
The Waiting Strategy:
- "Tire out the enemy"
- Let logistics do the work
- Whoever runs out first: loses
- Supply depletion = defeat
- Attrition strategy
The Resource War
The Real War:
- Not about tactics/fighting
- About supplies/endurance
- "Whoever gets tired or runs out = loses"
- Easy to beat weakened opponent
- They'll "agree to any surrender terms"
The Assumption:
- Marathas thought they'd last longer
- Had better supply position
- Could outlast Afghans
- Afghans would break first
- Wrong assumption
Bhau's Strategic Limitations: The Statesman vs. Warrior Problem
The Political Context
The Bigger Picture:
- War about territory control
- "Boundary to be redrawn"
- Where Afghanistan and India intersect
- Not about Delhi throne
- About regional dominance
Abdali's Position:
- "Wants control of Punjab"
- Claims it as part of his empire
- Has appointed his own subedar
- Has own officials in Punjab
- Refusing to withdraw
The Maratha Position:
- "That's not going to happen"
- Punjab belongs to Mughal India
- Afghans are foreigners
- "All Indian powers should defend"
- No budging on this
The Impossible Situation
The Sticking Point:
- Nobody willing to budge
- Abdali won't give up Punjab claim
- Marathas won't accept his claim
- Potential truce only "on our terms"
- No middle ground available
The Coalition Problem: Bhau Couldn't Unite India
The Bhau Strategy
His Vision:
- All Indian powers unite
- Stand together against Afghans
- Afghans = total foreigners
- Should have united defense
- Common cause against invasion
The Reality:
- Only Marathas willing to fight
- Rajputs didn't join
- Suraj Mal Jat didn't join
- Others neutral or opposed
- Suja Uddaula ambiguous
- No unified Indian response
The Leadership Failures
The Political Weakness:
- Bhau couldn't make Indian kings unite
- Couldn't build coalition
- Couldn't create common cause
- Failed at political strategy
- Left alone to face Afghans
The Commander Weakness:
- "Not a good politician and not a good commander either"
- Fought like warrior on ground
- But should have been general/statesman
- Supposed to coordinate strategy
- Not get personally involved in fighting
The Role Confusion
The Wrong Job:
- "Supposed to be general and statesman"
- "Not supposed to get on ground fighting"
- Got personally involved in battle
- Lost oversight of bigger picture
- Fought like warrior instead of commanding
The Desperation Mounting
The Crisis Indicators
The Reality:
- Enthusiasm declining
- Money decreasing
- Supplies running short
- Funds running short
- "In a pickle"
The Psychological State:
- Mounting stress
- Growing doubt
- Pressure building
- No relief in sight
- Crisis deepening
The Impossible Choice
The Options:
- Start battle in hurry: devastating
- Wait indefinitely: unsustainable
- Negotiate: requires Punjab concession (unacceptable)
- Get reinforcements: Peshwa won't send
- Cut Abdali's supplies: Bundele can't do it
The Result:
- Trapped in stalemate
- No good option
- Every choice bad
- Time working against them
- Crisis point approaching
The Hidden Desperation
What Wasn't Said Publicly
The Private Reality:
- Bhau very worried
- Situation more dangerous than admitted
- Younger brother forced to beg for help
- Peshwa doesn't understand
- Command structure failing
The Challenge:
- Pride preventing honesty
- Face-saving preventing pragmatism
- Confidence projection preventing realism
- Bravado preventing asking for help
- Doomed by own pretenses
Key Themes
- The Kaifiyat Truth - Reveals thoughts hidden from official record
- Pride vs. Pragmatism - Bhau won't admit desperation
- Brother's Burden - Vishwasrao forced to tell truth Bhau won't
- Peshwa Ignorance - Doesn't understand actual situation
- Coalition Failure - Couldn't unite Indians against Afghans
- Role Confusion - Warrior instead of statesman/general
- Stalemate Unsustainable - Can't last indefinitely
- Mounting Desperation - Crisis point approaching
Where This Leads: Beneath the confident letters sent south, Bhau is privately terrified. The Kaifiyat reveals the real thinking: this is more dangerous than admitted, resources are critical, Afghans stronger than expected. Vishwasrao is forced to be the voice of reason his brother won't be. Peshwa in Pune has no idea how dire things are. And Bhau's failure to unite other Indian powers means the Marathas stand alone. The stalemate is unsustainable. Something must break soon. And when it does, it will be catastrophic.
What Bhau thought at night, in his tent, away from public view. That's what the Kaifiyat reveals. Not the confident letters sent south. Not the warrior confidence shown to troops. But the real thinking. The doubts. The fears. The calculation that whatever happens in this battle—win or lose—it will be devastating. That the Afghans are stronger than anyone expected. That the Marathas stand alone because he failed to unite India. That the stalemate is unsustainable. That something must break. And that when it breaks, it might not break his way.
The Peshwa's Paralysis: Nana Sahib's Tuberculosis and Absent Leadership (November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Peshwa's Crisis: Health and Helplessness
Nana Sahib's Departure from Pune
The Timeline:
- Middle of November 1760
- Left Pune for Ahmadnagar
- November 17: left from Daund
- Came to Siddhatek
- Planned to camp for a few days
The Reason:
- Sick with tuberculosis (TB)
- Losing weight very rapidly
- Classic TB symptoms manifesting
- Physical deterioration accelerating
- Health crisis deepening
The Disease: Tuberculosis in India
The Nature of TB:
- Bacterial infection (root cause)
- Spreads through poor conditions
- Triggered by malnutrition
- Worsened by damp living conditions
- Exacerbated by lack of exercise
The Social Context:
- "Typical Indian disease"
- Mumbai heavily affected (slums, monsoon)
- Overcrowded cities = high transmission
- Poor nutrition creates vulnerability
- Damp monsoon season = prime conditions
The Medical Reality:
- No medicine available at time
- No cure possible then
- Death ultimately certain
- Progressive wasting disease
- Slow decline to death
The TB Dynamics: Poor Living and Disease
Why TB Thrived
The Contributing Factors:
- Improper eating/insufficient nutrition
- Damp living conditions
- Lack of exercise/physical activity
- Crowded spaces
- Poor sanitation
The Modern Parallel:
- Mumbai still struggles with TB
- Slums = TB epicenter
- Monsoon season = worst period
- Poor nutrition = vulnerability
- Overcrowding = transmission
The Timeline to Death:
- Progressive weight loss
- Increasing weakness
- Declining energy
- Susceptibility to infections
- Eventually fatal
The Strategic Consequence: Absent Leadership
What Couldn't Happen
The Missed Opportunity:
- Peshwa should have sent 30,000 troops
- Attack Abdali's rear from Pune direction
- Create pincer movement
- Would have changed battle outcome
- Would have cornered Abdali
The Timeline:
- Takes 1-2 months to reach Panipat
- Battle delayed anyway
- Would have arrived in time
- Would have been decisive
- But never happened
Why It Didn't Happen
The Multiple Failures:
- TB making Peshwa weak
- No warrior spirit for bold action
- Didn't understand situation gravity
- Lacked knowledge from distant north
- No confidence in military action
The Personality Gap:
- His father (Bajirao I): outstanding warrior
- Son: not warrior-spirited
- More suited to administration
- Better at court politics
- Lacked aggressive instinct
Bhau's Letters and Unspoken Crisis
The Contents
Vishwasrao's Plea:
- Letter from younger brother to father
- Claiming Bhau won't tell the truth
- "Your brother is one of a kind"
- "He will sacrifice himself on altar"
- "Without resources, we're doomed"
The Subtext:
- Bhau projecting confidence publicly
- Actually desperate privately
- Can't admit weakness to Peshwa
- Doesn't want to lose face
- Pride preventing honest communication
The Information Gap
The Problem:
- Peshwa sitting in Pune
- Doesn't understand north situation
- Thinks Mughals are weak = easy win
- Doesn't see the real threat
- Doesn't know Afghans more formidable
The Crisis:
- Supplies running short
- Funds running short
- They're "in a pickle"
- Can't start battle hastily
- Consequences will be devastating
The Military Situation
The Stalemate Status
The Reality:
- Bundeli couldn't cut supplies
- Abdali won't attack
- Both sides stuck
- Minor skirmishes only
- No resolution
The Logic:
- Whoever runs out first: loses
- Supply depletion = defeat
- They want to tire enemy out
- Whoever's army breaks first: loses
- Agreement to unfavorable surrender terms
The Problem:
- This strategy unsustainable
- Both armies running low
- Time not their friend
- Must resolve soon
- Tension mounting
The Political Dimension: The Bigger Picture
What This War Was Really About
The Territory Dispute:
- Boundary between Afghanistan and India
- Punjab = the contested region
- Abdali claims it as his territory
- Marathas say it belongs to Mughal India
- Neither will concede
The Afghan Position:
- Abdali appointed his own subedar (governor)
- Posted his own officials in Punjab
- Claims ownership of territory
- Keeps returning to exploit it
- Refuses permanent withdrawal
The Maratha Position:
- "That's not going to happen"
- Won't let Afghans claim Indian territory
- Wanted all Indian powers to unite against him
- Wanted to draw boundary at Afghanistan
- Unwilling to compromise
The Coalition That Never Was
Bhau's Vision:
- All Indian powers unite against foreign invader
- Defend territory together
- Common cause against Afghans
- Maratha leadership coordinating defense
- India responding as one
The Reality:
- Only Marathas fighting
- Rajputs didn't join
- Suraj Mal Jat didn't join
- Suja Uddaula remained ambiguous (trapped)
- No unified Indian response
The Consequence:
- Marathas alone against Afghans
- Can't expect help from others
- Must rely on own resources
- Abandoned by potential allies
- Fighting for all of India but supported by none
The Leadership Problem
Bhau's Dual Failure
The Political Failure:
- Couldn't unite Indian powers
- Couldn't build coalition
- Couldn't create common cause
- Failed as statesman
- Left isolated
The Military Failure:
- Got personally involved in fighting
- Should have been coordinating overall strategy
- "Not supposed to get on ground fighting"
- Role confusion: warrior vs. general
- Fighting like soldier instead of commanding like general
The Both/And Problem:
- Not a good politician
- Not a good commander either
- Failed at statecraft
- Failed at generalship
- Wrong person for job that required both
The Peshwa's Absent Hand
What Leadership Should Have Done
The Options Available:
- Send significant reinforcements south
- Create rear-attack threat
- Force Abdali to split forces
- Relief for northern army
- Option for compromise settlement
Why It Didn't Happen:
- TB making him weak
- No warrior spirit for bold action
- Didn't understand gravity
- No confidence in military decisions
- Paralyzed by disease and doubt
The Impact
The Consequence:
- Northern army truly alone
- Can't expect southern help
- Must solve problem with own forces
- No safety net available
- All-or-nothing situation
The Convergence of Failures
The Perfect Storm
The Contributing Factors:
- Bhau's pride preventing honest reporting
- Peshwa's TB preventing bold action
- Peshwa's lack of warrior spirit
- Distance preventing real-time coordination
- Coalition never formed
- Bundele unable to execute
- Supplies dwindling
- Money running out
The Result:
- Army abandoned
- Leadership paralyzed
- Resources failing
- Coalition nonexistent
- Stalemate unsustainable
- Crisis inevitable
The TB Context: Disease as Metaphor
The Literal Problem
The Physical Reality:
- Nana Sahib dying from TB
- Getting weaker monthly
- Losing weight progressively
- Declining energy severely
- Death approaching
The Weakness It Caused:
- Can't make bold decisions
- Can't undertake physical hardship
- Can't pursue aggressive strategy
- Can't personally lead forces
- Can't inspire confidence
The Metaphorical Problem
What It Represents:
- Peshwa authority declining
- Central power weakening
- Leadership capability failing
- Strategic vision corrupted
- Command authority lost
The Consequence:
- Bhau given autonomy he might not deserve
- Decisions made in power vacuum
- No check on Bhau's confidence
- No wisdom from experienced leader
- Younger generation left to themselves
The Tragic Irony
The Timing
The Bad Luck:
- Bhau needed northern support
- Peshwa most able to provide it
- Peshwa getting weaker from TB
- Weakest moment for bold action
- Unavailable when most needed
The Parallel:
- Bhau fighting for territory
- Peshwa fighting for health
- Both losing
- Both inadequate for role
- Both failing at critical moment
Key Themes
- Disease as Disability - TB making Peshwa ineffective
- Absent Leadership - Peshwa paralyzed by illness
- Pride Preventing Help - Bhau won't ask Peshwa for aid
- The Coalition That Wasn't - Bhau alone against Afghans
- The Warrior Deficiency - Peshwa not warrior-spirited
- The Dual Role Failure - Bhau failing as both politician and general
- The Gap in Command - No strategic coordination between north/south
- The Convergence of Crises - Multiple failures at same time
Where This Leads: While Bhau fights in the north and tries to project confidence, the Peshwa in Pune is dying of tuberculosis, getting weaker by the day, unable to make bold decisions. The very person who could send reinforcements, create a rear-threat, and relieve pressure is incapacitated. Bhau won't admit he's desperate. Peshwa doesn't understand the situation. And Bhau's failure to build a coalition means the Marathas stand completely alone against a professional Afghan army. The stalemate at Panipat is unsustainable. Something must break. And when it does, there will be no reinforcement coming from the south.
While Bhau fought in Panipat, Nana Sahib was dying in Siddhatek. Not from battle wounds. From tuberculosis. The TB that came from poor nutrition, damp conditions, crowded camps. Progressive wasting. He got weaker each day. And as he weakened, the Maratha cause weakened with him. A general needs his sovereign's support. Abdali had it. Bhau didn't. He had a dying Peshwa in Pune who didn't understand what was happening in the north. Who was too sick to send reinforcements. Who lacked the warrior spirit to do what needed to be done. And Bhau, stuck in Panipat with dwindling supplies and no political coalition, couldn't even ask for help because asking meant admitting he was desperate. Admitting he was failing. Admitting the invincible general was human after all.
The Point of No Return: Deterioration and Despair (December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Warning: Things Are About to Get Tragic
The Narrator's Preface
The Tone Shift:
- "A lot of bad things are going to happen"
- "Tragic from now until battle itself"
- "Not pretty"
- "Lots of death and destruction"
- "People getting clobbered"
The Intensity:
- Things going downhill very fast
- "Very quickly"
- Marathas starting to starve
- Abdali taking control of resources
- Peshwa in Pune doesn't know reality
- "False bravery" attempting counterattack
The Realization:
- Next month+ will be catastrophic
- Everything deteriorating
- No good options remaining
- Only worse choices ahead
- Battle becoming inevitable in worst possible circumstances
The Maratha Collapse: Starvation and Demoralization
The Multiple Crises
The Resource Crisis:
- Starving army
- Running out of food
- Running out of supplies
- Running out of money
- Can't sustain indefinitely
The Psychological Crisis:
- Getting demoralized
- Hunger sapping morale
- No allies in area
- Totally alien territory
- Can't count on local support
The Coalition Failure:
- Sikhs didn't come to aid
- No Sikh-Maratha alliance
- Sikhs didn't sacrifice supplies
- No mutual understanding
- Completely alone
The Peshwa's Impotent Response
The Attempt:
- Peshwa "willing to put life on line"
- "False bravery" attempting help
- Trying to mount counterattack
- Can't go forward due to health
- Tb preventing bold action
The Reality:
- 1,500 miles distance
- 4 months to reach battlefield
- Rivers and terrain obstacles
- Health deteriorating
- Moral support only (meaningless)
The December Skirmishes: The Games Begin
The Intervening Period
The Timeframe:
- Month and a half before actual battle
- Many skirmishes during this period
- Major events happening
- Getting progressively worse for Marathas
- Bad for Maratha morale
The Scale:
- Each skirmish like whole battle on smaller scale
- Big-time battles despite being skirmishes
- Significant casualties
- Real combat, not just probing
The Death of Appa Barwant Rao Mehendri
Who Was He?
His Status:
- Upper-level commander (Bhau's level)
- Very important commander
- In perfect sync with Bhau
- Appa Barwant Chowk in Pune named after him
- On same wavelength with Bhau
His Alliance:
- Unlike Holkar-Bhau tension
- Mehendri and Bhau completely aligned
- Both believed in same strategy
- Both advocated artillery-focused warfare
- United in vision
The December Skirmish Death
The Battle:
- December skirmish involving major commanders
- Jankoji Shinde's group getting weaker
- Mehendri goes to help Jankoji
- Gets surrounded by Afghan forces
- Trapped in difficult position
The Beheading Attempt:
- Afghan forces trying to behead him
- Trophy mentality (like scalp-taking)
- Capture = decapitation goal
- Had captured him
- Attempted execution
The Rescue and Death:
- Maratha forces learned of capture
- Came to his aid
- Saved him from decapitation
- But half his head already cut off
- "Half dead" when rescued
The Final Insult:
- Died before leaving skirmish
- Dead body brought back
- Afghans didn't get trophy
- But took his life anyway
- One of Bhau's best commanders gone
The Significance
The Loss:
- Not ordinary commander
- Upper-level strategic figure
- Bhau's trusted ally
- Could have inspired army
- His loss demoralizing
The Brutality:
- Shows Afghan tactics
- Scalping/trophy mentality
- Dehumanizing warfare
- Psychological terror
- Evidence of savagery
The Age Factor:
- Possibly 40s (guessing)
- Not young/quick
- Maybe slower reactions
- Wrong place/wrong time
- Combat fatigue factor
The Strategic Reassessment: Bhau's December Communications
The December 23 Letter
The Context:
- After month+ of stalemate
- After numerous skirmishes
- Marathas getting worse
- Still projecting confidence
The Content:
- "Don't worry about bills"
- "We are here, we'll take care of it"
- Bills = payment obligations
- Still trying to pay vendors
- Reassuring about finances
The Subtext:
- Money still an issue
- Trying to maintain normalcy
- Vendors still supplying (somehow)
- Credit system still functioning
- Can't fully acknowledge crisis
Nana Fadnavis's Assessment
The Overview:
- "Everything went as per intention"
- Except for Mehendri's death
- General strategy on track
- But losing key commanders
- Attrition taking toll
The Emerging Pattern
What's Becoming Clear
The Mathematical Reality:
- Skirmishes = major battles (casualties similar)
- Each month losing commanders
- Each month losing soldiers
- Each month weaker position
- Trajectory toward catastrophe
The Psychological Reality:
- Morale declining steadily
- Hunger eroding confidence
- Cold weather taking toll
- Deaths of important figures demoralizing
- Sense of doom building
The Strategic Reality:
- Can't win through attrition
- Afghans better positioned for waiting
- Marathas deteriorating
- Must break stalemate soon
- But any break = desperate attack
The Dual Attrition Strategy
What's Happening
Both Sides Doing Same Thing:
- Trying to cut each other's supplies
- Trying to starve opponent
- Trying to demoralize enemy
- Trying to force attack
- Waiting for first to break
The Maratha Problem:
- Breaking faster
- Losing commanders
- Losing soldiers
- Losing supplies
- Losing hope
The Afghan Advantage:
- Breaking slower
- Supplies more assured
- Leadership more united
- Morale more stable
- Time is their ally
The Atmosphere: Winter and Death
The Physical Environment
The Cold:
- December cold biting
- Northern India winter severe
- Marathas unprepared (summer clothes)
- Afghans prepared (leather coats)
- Physical suffering increasing
The Darkness:
- Literal: winter darkness earlier
- Metaphorical: atmosphere growing dark
- Sense of doom increasing
- Hope fading
- Despair building
The Accumulating Deaths
The Pattern:
- Krishnaji Joshi: stray bullet
- Appa Mehendri: beheaded
- Unnamed soldiers: skirmishes
- Each death = demoralizing
- Pressure building
Key Themes
- The Irreversible Decline - Marathas deteriorating faster than Afghans
- The Attrition Trap - Both using same strategy, one breaks faster
- The Command Loss - Important commanders dying (Mehendri)
- The Physical Suffering - Cold, hunger, inadequate equipment
- The Psychological Collapse - Morale declining with each death
- The False Optimism - Still projecting confidence while deteriorating
- The Inevitable End - Only question is when, not if
- The Brutality - Afghan tactics showing savagery and terror
Where This Leads: By December, the Maratha position is crumbling. Mehendri's death in a skirmish—half his head cut off before rescue—shows the brutality of what's happening. Each skirmish costs commanders. Each cold night costs soldiers to freezing. Each day costs food to starvation. Bhau still sends letters trying to reassure people about paying bills, but the reality is deteriorating rapidly. The Afghans are stronger, better supplied, better positioned, and more patient. The Marathas are breaking faster. The question is no longer whether they can win. It's whether they can survive.
December came and with it the cold that killed as surely as swords. Appa Mehendri went into a skirmish to save Jankoji Shinde. The Afghans surrounded him. Cut at his head with swords. His soldiers came and saved him from beheading—barely. But half his head was already gone. He was "half dead" before they brought his body back. One of Bhau's best commanders. The one who believed in the same strategy. Dead before the real battle even started. And the skirmishes kept happening. Each one another battle. Each one costing more commanders, more soldiers, more hope. Winter had come. The cold was killing. The hunger was killing. And the Afghans were patiently waiting while the Marathas slowly broke apart.
Abdali's Strategic Retreat: The Four-Mile Repositioning (Late November 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Context: Delhi and Kunjapura
Abdali Blocked from Delhi
The Situation:
- Marathas between Delhi and Abdali's army
- Disconnected from Delhi completely
- Maratha camp in middle
- Can't freely contact Delhi
- Strategic barrier created
Why This Mattered:
- Delhi had some troops
- Delhi had support structure
- Marathas preventing use
- Limited Abdali's options
- Cut off from resources
The Kunjapura Factor
The Original Plan:
- Kunjapura was Abdali's supply fort
- Storing supplies for return journey
- Planned as resupply point to Afghanistan
- Would pass through on way back
- Critical logistical hub
The Problem:
- Delhi itself was experiencing famine
- No supplies available in Delhi
- Made Kunjapura even more important
- All supplies depended on Kunjapura
The Kunjapura Destruction
The Incident:
- Marathas attacked Kunjapura fort
- Destroyed supplies stored there
- Killed many of Abdali's people
- Destroyed his base
- Killed soldiers guarding supplies
Abdali's Motivation:
- Extremely disturbed by destruction
- Moved by atrocities against his forces
- "Shasan" (punishment) motivated him
- Crossed Yamuna after hearing news
- From east to west crossing
Why He Crossed:
- Had to respond to destruction
- Couldn't let it stand unanswered
- Morale issue for army
- "Must punish them or accepting superiority"
- Had to show allies could retaliate
The Reality Check at Panipat
The Initial Excitement
His Emotion:
- "Tremendous passion initially"
- Ready for battle
- Motivated to punish Marathas
- Angry about Kunjapura
- Wanted vengeance
The Mood:
- Energized by destruction news
- Crossed river decisively
- Ready to engage
- Confident in retaliation
- Passion running high
The Sight That Changed Everything
The Realization:
- Arrived at Panipat
- Saw Maratha camp
- Saw Maratha size
- Saw Maratha artillery
- Reality check struck
The Calculation:
- "Not going to be easy"
- "Equally large army"
- "Big artillery guns"
- "They can dish out punishment too"
- Consequences would be "great"
The Shift:
- "Excitement running low"
- Realized not simple victory
- Understood outcome uncertain
- "Chanakya says: uncertain"
- Decided to be patient
The Strategic Shift: From Aggressive to Passive
The New Strategy
The Realization:
- "Not going to be simple"
- Can't rush into battle
- Must assess situation
- Need time to evaluate
- Patience necessary
The Decision:
- "Take it easy"
- Don't be hastily walked into battle
- Wait for right moment
- Be really patient
- "No matter how long it takes"
The Logic:
- Unknown outcome = too risky
- Battle could go either way
- Defeat = disaster
- Better to wait
- Force Marathas to attack
The Supply Disruption Strategy: Mutual Attrition
The Parallel Strategies
What Happened:
- Marathas cutting Abdali's supplies (partially)
- Govind Pant somewhat successful (but not fully)
- Not as effective as hoped
- But doing some disruption
Abdali's Counter:
- Realized Marathas doing same thing
- Thought: "I will do exactly same"
- "Alec can do same thing to you"
- Counter-supply disruption strategy
- Mirror tactics
The Outcome:
- Both using identical strategy
- Both trying to starve each other
- Both trying to demoralize
- Both trying to force attack
- Both waiting for other to break
Why This Worked Better for Afghans
The Assessment:
- Marathas breaking faster
- Afghans breaking slower
- Bundele partially successful but not fully
- Afghan supplies better assured
- Time is Afghan advantage
The Maratha Problem:
- Can't sustain indefinitely
- Must resolve soon
- Running out of time
- Deteriorating position
- Pressure building
The Repositioning: The Four-Mile Move South
The Decision
The Timing:
- Late November
- After realizing battle uncertain
- After deciding patience strategy
- After implementing supply disruption
- Clear strategic shift
The Distance:
- Moved 4-5 miles farther south
- Increased distance from Marathas
- Was within 2 miles before
- Now 4-5 miles away
- Deliberate separation
The Direction:
- Southeast direction
- "Agney" direction = southeast
- Toward Yamuna River
- Closer to water
- Closer to supply routes
The Rationale: The Three Reasons
Reason 1: Avoid Accidental Battle
The Problem:
- Skirmishes happening frequently
- Could escalate accidentally
- Proximity dangerous
- Easy to stumble into battle
- Didn't want that
The Solution:
- Increase distance
- 4 miles = buffer zone
- Harder to start skirmish
- Can't get back quickly
- Protects from surprise
Reason 2: Water and Survival
The Need:
- Camp = 70,000-80,000+ people
- All need water daily
- Massive quantity required
- Can't transport long distances
- Must be near source
The Resource:
- Yamuna River = sweet water
- Essential for survival
- Non-negotiable requirement
- Better to be close
- Ensures supply
Reason 3: Supply Line Protection
The Routes:
- Supplies coming from east of Yamuna
- Coming from Suja's territory
- Coming from Rohila areas (Najib Khan)
- Coming from across Yamuna
- Must receive on western bank
The Positioning:
- Closer to Yamuna = better position
- Can receive supplies directly
- Less distance for interference
- Bundele can't disrupt as effectively
- Protection of supply routes
The Winter Advantage: Lower Water Levels
The Monsoon Effect
The Change:
- Monsoon ending (late November/early December)
- Water levels dropping
- Flow becoming "same"
- Much lower than monsoon
- Traversable conditions
The Implication:
- Boats can cross easily
- From east to west bank
- Previously difficult
- Now much easier
- Supply flow increased
The Supplier Base:
- Double supplies
- From Suja's areas
- From Rohila territories (Najib's area)
- Both can access
- Redundant supply lines
The Maratha Misinterpretation
What They Thought
The Analysis:
- "Abdali backed out"
- "Went back by four miles"
- "Because of fear of artillery"
- "Evidence he's scared of us"
- "Confirming our artillery advantage"
The Confidence:
- Saw retreat as victory
- Thought they had him
- "We've got ace up our sleeves"
- "Artillery going to decide battle"
- "Evidence of what we thought"
The Reality
What Actually Happened:
- Not fear-based retreat
- Deliberate strategic repositioning
- Part of patience strategy
- Part of supply protection
- Part of waiting game
The Misunderstanding:
- Confidence based on wrong interpretation
- Thought they had advantage
- Actually losing advantage daily
- Thought Abdali scared
- Actually Abdali patient
The Genius of the Move
Why It Worked
The Multi-Purpose Strategy:
- Avoided accidental battle (risky)
- Protected water supply (essential)
- Protected supply routes (critical)
- Forced Marathas to stay put (good)
- Allowed waiting strategy (patient)
- Made skirmish harder (reduced risk)
The Psychological Effect:
- Marathas thought they won
- Thought Abdali scared
- Boosted false confidence
- Made them overestimate position
- Set up for shock
The Patient Calculation
The Timeline:
- "No matter how long it takes"
- "Willing to wait"
- In meantime: stock supplies
- Force Marathas to attack
- By then they'll be hungry/weak
The Endgame:
- "Vulnerable position"
- "Going hungry"
- "Morale down"
- "Animals dying"
- "Exactly what happened"
The Elegance of the Strategy
Why Abdali Won
The Thinking:
- Can't accidentally walk into risky battle
- Wanted deliberately started by Marathas
- Skirmishes create distance problem
- 4 miles = no man's land
- Can't do surgical strike and escape
The Result:
- Marathas forced to commit
- Can't do small probes
- Must do full attack
- On Abdali's ground
- With Abdali's time advantage
Key Themes
- Strategic Patience - Abdali choosing waiting over fighting
- Supply Logistics - Repositioning for supply security
- Psychological Manipulation - Letting Marathas think they won
- Risk Management - Avoiding accidental escalation
- Water Resources - Essential survival factor
- Environmental Advantage - Winter making river crossing easier
- The Four-Mile Trap - Creating buffer zone that favors defense
- False Victory - Marathas celebrating retreat as win
Where This Leads: Abdali's retreat appears to be a victory for Marathas. They think their artillery scared him. In reality, he's executed a perfect strategic repositioning. He's protected his water supply, improved his supply routes, created a buffer zone against skirmishes, and positioned himself to force the Marathas into a desperate attack. By December, the Marathas will be starving while Abdali is comfortable. The "retreat" was actually the setup for the kill.
He came to Panipat angry, ready to punish the Marathas for destroying Kunjapura. Then he saw their camp. Saw their size. Saw their artillery. And his passion cooled. He realized this wouldn't be easy. So he moved back. Four miles. Southeast. Toward the Yamuna. The Marathas watched him retreat and celebrated. "We scared him!" they said. "Our artillery drove him back!" They thought it was victory. But it was actually strategic perfection. He put his camp where the water was, where the supplies came through, where the distance made skirmishes impossible, where he could wait indefinitely. And the Marathas, thinking they'd won, celebrated into December while getting hungrier and hungrier and more desperate. The retreat was the trap. And they walked right into it.
The Winter War: Cold, Hunger, and the Final Desperation (December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Winter Setting: Early December at Panipat
The Seasonal Shift
The Time:
- Late November/early December
- Winter fully arriving
- Northern India biting cold
- Not Maratha homeland weather
- Extreme for southern soldiers
The Temperature:
- Intense cold
- Northern plains brutality
- Marathas unprepared
- Afghans comfortable
- Massive weather disadvantage
The Clothing Crisis: Summer Clothes in Winter
The Maratha Problem
The Reality:
- Dressed for summer weather
- Came from warm south
- Clothing inadequate for season
- Never been this far north before
- Not their natural home
The Consequence:
- Can't keep warm
- No winter coats
- Freezing at night
- Can't function properly
- Physical deterioration
The Afghan Advantage
Their Preparation:
- From Afghanistan (mountain winters)
- Used to severe cold
- Wearing leather coats (Angarkha)
- Angarkha = winter coat
- Designed for brutal cold
The Contrast:
- Afghans comfortable
- Marathas suffering
- Physical advantage
- Morale advantage
- Survival advantage
The Firewood Problem: The Winter Fuels
The Basic Need
What's Required:
- Bonfire heat essential
- Evening hours freezing
- Early morning worse
- Can't sleep in tent without warmth
- Central heating nonexistent
The Fuel:
- Serpent = dried wood
- Used for bonfire fuel
- Burns for hours
- Provides body heat
- Essential for survival
The Procurement Problem
The Solution:
- Cut down nearby forest trees
- Chip into small pieces
- Use as firewood
- Massive operation
- Feeding 150,000+ people
The Risk:
- 500-600 soldiers foraging
- Exposed to Afghan attack
- Vulnerable position
- Had to send military protection
- Combat-ready soldiers required
The Dilemma:
- Need firewood or freeze
- But foraging risky
- Must send protection
- Takes fighting men from camp
- Can't afford to lose them
The Encirclement Game: Supply Disruption War
What Both Sides Are Doing
The Strategy:
- Cut each other's supplies
- Whoever depletes first: loses
- Whoever survives: wins
- Attrition warfare
- Logistical warfare
The Reality:
- "Game was to cut enemy supplies"
- "Whoever did best = demoralize enemy"
- "Can't eat, drink, no clothes"
- "Don't want to go to war"
- "Just sit there and starve"
The Maratha Attempt
Bhau's Letters:
- December 6: Demanding Gopal Ganesh attack
- "Cross Yamuna and do as directed"
- "Attack Suja Uddola's areas"
- Create instability in his kingdom
- Force him to defend home
The Tactical Purpose:
- Abdali's allied forces nervous
- In camp wanting to leave
- If homeland attacked: must defend
- Would abandon Abdali
- Break up coalition
The Afghan Coalition Fracturing
The Pressure on Allies
Their Status:
- Najib Khan (Rohila commander)
- Suja Uddaula (Doab ruler)
- Bangash (Ahmad Khan)
- Others from northern territories
- Far from home
Their Problem:
- Can't stay indefinitely
- Miss their kingdoms
- Worried about homelands
- Tired of waiting
- Want to go home
Their Advocacy:
- Pushing for truce
- Want to negotiate peace
- Want to "protect honor"
- "Let us get out"
- End this waiting game
Abdali's Response
The Tone:
- Calm and quiet
- Decisive
- Authoritarian
- "Guys, shut up"
- End of discussion
The Message:
- "You're uninformed"
- "Not knowledgeable about war games"
- "When it comes to strategies and plans"
- "Leave it to me"
- "I know how to go to war"
The Command:
- "In other areas: do what you like"
- "But battlefield strategy: my domain"
- "Just leave it to me"
- "I'll wait for right time"
- "You'll be victorious"
The Waiting Game: Abdali's Patience
His Philosophy
The Core Belief:
- Action in battle can't be rushed
- Right time must come
- No point in hurrying
- Supplies coming in
- Can wait months if needed
The Logic:
- Demoralize Marathas as much as possible
- Force them to attack from desperation
- Without supplies: only option is attack
- Then already demoralized
- Perfect conditions for victory
The Maratha Desperation: December 6 Letter
Bhau's Command to Gopal Ganesh
The Assessment:
- "Abdali has no strength to attack us"
- "Our firing hurt him"
- "Killed men and horses in camp"
- "Out of fear he moved 2 kilometers"
- "Took his guns away"
The Verdict:
- "This is his courage reducing daily"
- "We will soon defeat him"
- "Unless you deliver (not just talk)"
The Implicit Crisis:
- Expense of maintaining armies huge
- "Expense will be waste" if no action
- Threatens Gopal Ganesh with irrelevance
- "Prove your worth"
- "Do what I'm asking"
The Strategic Demand
The Order:
- Cross Yamuna
- Attack Suja's areas
- "Take landlords on your side"
- "Even if you sustain loss"
- "Implement right up to Delhi"
The Target:
- Suja's mother back home
- General Beni Bahadur (military commander)
- Still defending homeland
- Can force Suja's return
- Break Abdali's coalition
The Goal:
- Suja worried about home attack
- Suja becomes distracted
- Suja wants to leave Panipat
- Goes to defend kingdom
- Coalition fractures
The Parallel Strategies: Mirror Image
What's Happening
Both Sides Doing Same Thing:
- Marathas attacking Suja's homeland
- Afghans trying to disrupt Maratha supplies
- Both trying supply disruption
- Both trying coalition disruption
- Mutual attrition strategy
The Irony:
- Same strategy
- Different effectiveness
- Afghans better positioned
- Marathas more desperate
- Outcome predictable
The Chess Match
The Moves:
- Afghans: "Cut their supplies"
- Marathas: "Attack their allies"
- Afghans: "Not just supplies but stability"
- Marathas: "Not just supplies but coalition"
The Difference:
- Afghans succeeding better
- Marathas getting desperate
- Time running out for Marathas
- Time on Afghan side
- Endgame approaching
The Physical Deterioration
What's Happening to Marathas
The Hunger:
- Supplies running low
- Can't eat/drink enough
- Nutrition failing
- Energy declining
- Bodies weakening
The Cold:
- Winter coat shortage
- Freezing at night
- Can't warm up
- Physical suffering
- Health declining
The Morale:
- Seeing allies abandon
- Watching commanders die
- Running out of supplies
- Winter taking toll
- Hope fading
The Afghan Comfort
The Advantages:
- Proper clothing for weather
- Better supplies
- Better positioning
- Less pressure
- More time
The Coalition Strain
Afghan Allied Forces
Their Complaint:
- Want to go home
- Tired of waiting
- Need to defend kingdoms
- Getting tired of "waiting game"
- Advocating for peace
Abdali's Response:
- Tells them to shut up
- Takes personal control
- Won't allow defection
- Keeps them in line
- Uses authority
The Control:
- "Leave it to me"
- "I know how to go to war"
- "Just wait"
- "I'll make you victorious"
- Charismatic authority
The Endgame Positioning
What's Clear by December
The Reality:
- Marathas deteriorating
- Afghans stable
- Waiting game favoring Afghans
- Time running against Marathas
- Must break stalemate soon
The Maratha Hope:
- Attacking Suja's lands
- Disrupting Afghan coalition
- Forcing early battle
- Can't sustain waiting
- Must force decision
The Afghan Plan:
- Wait as long as needed
- Supplies assured
- Morale holding
- Coalition intact
- Force Marathas to attack
Key Themes
- The Winter Weapon - Cold affecting Marathas more than Afghans
- The Firewood Shortage - Every need requires military risk
- The Supply Attrition - Both sides playing same game, one winning
- The Coalition Pressure - Afghan allies nervous, wanting to leave
- The Abdali Authority - Keeping coalition together through leadership
- The Maratha Desperation - Must force action soon
- The Time Factor - Every day Marathas get weaker
- The Parallel Strategies - Both cutting supplies/allies
Where This Leads: By December, the Marathas are freezing in clothes designed for summer, starving as supplies dwindle, and losing commanders to skirmishes. They're attacking Suja's homeland hoping to break the Afghan coalition. Abdali sits calmly with better supplies, better clothing, better morale, and better position. His allied forces want to leave, but he holds them through authority and calm confidence. The Marathas are in the desperation phase. The Afghans are in the control phase. The battle is coming because Marathas must force it. And when it comes, they'll be weaker than ever.
December in northern India was a weapon all by itself. The Marathas shivering in summer clothes while the Afghans wore leather coats. Searching the nearby forests for firewood to survive the night. Sending armed foraging parties to get supplies because Afghan raiders were everywhere. Getting weaker each day. Hungry. Cold. Desperate. And Abdali just waited. Calm. Patient. His supplies coming across the Yamuna. His coalition held together by force of personality. Telling his nervous allies: "Leave it to me. I know how to go to war. Just wait." And they waited. Because they had to. Because he was right. Because winter was doing his job. Because every day the Marathas got weaker and he got stronger. Because time was all he needed. And he had plenty of it.
The December 7 Skirmish: Tactical Victory, Psychological Defeat (December 7, 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Context: Desperate Measures and Supply Lines
The Food Crisis
The Reality:
- Maratha population: 100,000+ people
- Plus massive animal herds
- Must be fed daily
- Supply lines compressed/under stress
- Getting painful
The Cash Problem:
- No money coming from Delhi (Marathas controlled it but Abdali blocked it)
- On cash-only basis for supplies
- Suppliers won't give credit (don't know who will win)
- In stressed condition: no credit available
- Must pay hard money immediately
The Creative Solution
The Melting Down:
- Whatever gold/silver available
- Whatever ornaments/utensils they had
- Melted down all precious metals
- Minted new coins
- Called: "Bhau Shahi," "Malhar Shahi," "Janko Shahi"
- Named after the three main force commanders
- These became currency
The Effectiveness:
- Solved supply problem for weeks/days
- Could get supplies with new coins
- Temporary measure
- Eventually ran out of meltable materials
Bundele's Continued Failure
The Frustration:
- Bhau "irate" with Govind Pant Bundele
- Couldn't destroy Afghan supply lines
- Wasn't cutting supplies coming from Doab/Rohilkhand
- Bhau expected him to do exactly what Abdali was doing
- Tables turned on Maratha
The Reality:
- Bundele not effective
- Older (approaching 60)
- Not a fighter to begin with
- Tax collector/administrator background
- Bhau expecting too much
The Doab Operations: Finally Getting Somewhere
The Geopolitics
What Is Doab:
- Land between Yamuna and Ganga rivers
- Technically the definition
- Suja Uddaula's kingdom located there
- Fertile farmland
- Lots of granaries
The Breakthrough
The Success:
- Finally: 4,30,000 rupees collected
- Handed to Naro Shankar (Maratha commander in Delhi)
- Could be sent to Bhau's camp
- Got into Doab area
- Started collecting grains
The Free Reign:
- Bundele had 6,000-7,000 soldiers
- Freely moving around Doab
- Nobody could stop him
- All forces concentrated at Panipat
- Shuja's forces tied up with Abdali
The Chokepoint: Mirath
The Strategic Location:
- Mirath: town in Doab area
- Where most supplies transported from
- To Abdali's camp
- Bundele now understood had to choke it
- Started attacking that area
The Result:
- Supply lines choked up
- Inflationary cycle started in Abdali camp
- Supply disruption working finally
- Afghan camp feeling it
- Allies starting to worry
The Coalition Panic
The Effect:
- Allies (Suja Uddaula, others) starting to worry
- Bundele destroying fields/houses in Doab
- Local people panicking
- Allied commanders thinking: "What about my home?"
- Less likely to want to fight
The Communication Crisis
The Messengers Problem
The Difficulty:
- Distance Panipat to Pune: 1,500+ kilometers
- Goes through Abdali's area
- Afghans could intercept messengers
- Can't travel main routes (attacked)
- Must use byways/lesser-known paths
The Result:
- Peshwa not getting news from Panipat
- Maybe one or two letters reaching him
- Very rare
- Communication nearly cut off
- Peshwa operating in information vacuum
The December 7 Skirmish: Bhau's Wooden Challenge
The Setup
The Challenge:
- Marathas cleared jungle around Chhazpur
- Erected wooden column/pole
- National flag raised
- Fire lit for Abdali
- Literal invitation to battle
The Meaning:
- Physical challenge
- "Come and fight with us"
- At this specific location
- Come and take on the Marathas
The Afghan Response
The Participants:
- Afghan troops emerged to fight
- Led by Najib Khan and Suja Uddaula
- Abdali stayed behind (not personal participation)
- Forces engaged in serious skirmish
Bhau's Orders:
- Maintain positions
- Don't retreat
- Stand ground
- Hold formation
The Battle: Holkar's Near Rout and Recovery
Holkar's Crisis
The Attack:
- Shuja attacked Holkar's forces
- Holkar's men began retreating/running
- Army breaking apart
- Crisis moment
Holkar's Response:
- Sat on ground on a mat
- Told men: "Run away, save your lives"
- "I will sit here and be killed"
- "Let them cut my head and take it away"
- Dramatic sacrifice gesture
The Recovery:
- Army heard this
- Turned back from retreat
- Fought valiantly
- Chased away Shuja
- Rallied to commander
The Central Battle: The Huzurat Under Attack
The Elite Force
What Is Huzurat:
- Reserved, best-trained Maratha army
- Comes from Pune
- Well-fed soldiers
- Well-salaried warriors
- Elite fighting force
The Afghan Attack
The Strategy:
- Najib and Shuja attacked Huzurat
- Also targeted Bhau and Vishwas Rao directly
- Decapitating strike attempt
- Target the leadership
- Trying to kill/capture commanders
The Support:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi joined to help
- Used artillery guns in skirmish
- Artillery specialist
- Protecting elite force
Barwant Rao Mehendri's Death
The Battle Moment
His Engagement:
- Moved forward with few men
- Began fighting
- Part of elite Huzurat force
- Direct combat engagement
The Wounding:
- Bullet hit him in chest
- Fell from his horse
- Corpse on ground
- Afghans moved forward to behead him
- Maratha soldiers rushed to retrieve body
The Rescue:
- Maratha soldiers pulled corpse by feet
- Dragged toward camp
- As Afghans rushed forward
- Jankoji Shinde sallied forth
- Attacked Afghans furiously
- Rohillas slaughtered
- Abdali didn't come out to help
- Well past sunset
The Casualties
The Scale:
- Rohillas lost 5,000 men
- According to Kaifiyat account
- Nana Fadnavis says 4,000-5,000 attackers
- Fighting went 6 hours into night
- Marathas lost ~150
- Had 600-700 injured
- Abdali forces lost 1,500 soldiers
The Maratha Assessment:
- Tactically: "Went very well for us"
- Strategic: "Only due to Barwant Rao's death, it was good for them"
- Won the battle militarily
- Lost psychologically
The Aftermath: Sati and Morale Collapse
The Tradition: Sati (Immolation)
The Practice:
- Widow immolates on husband's pyre
- Not compulsory but elected tradition
- Women considered it their duty
- Some wouldn't be convinced otherwise
- Ritual suicide/self-immolation
The Historical Precedent:
- Shivaji opposed this practice
- When his stepmother wanted to do it
- He convinced her not to
- Called her to refuse
- She agreed to his persuasion
- Shivaji was reformer on this issue
Lakshmi Bhai's Choice
The Situation:
- Barwant Rao's wife: Lakshmi Bhai
- Young son left behind: Appa Barwant
- Wife decided to immolate herself
Bhau's Plea:
- Tried to change her mind
- Knew it would lower morale
- Knew it would demoralize camp
- Tradition was elective, not compulsory
- Begged her to reconsider
Her Refusal:
- Didn't listen to Bhau
- Entrusted son to Bhau
- "You take care of him, I will die"
- "I will immolate myself"
- Refused all persuasion
The Psychological Impact
The News:
- Spread throughout camp
- "Not something that brings spirits up"
- Demoralizes entire Maratha camp
- Young son left orphan
- Wife publicly choosing death
The Legacy:
- Appa Barwant Chowk named after her son (or possibly father)
- Barwant Rao Mehendri's name remembered
- Wife's choice became part of legend
- Tactical victory overshadowed
- Psychological blow irreversible
The Commanders' Relationship with Bhau
Mehendri vs. Holkar
Mehendri:
- Very close advisor to Bhau
- Trusted friend
- Believed in same strategy (artillery)
- Aligned on war-fighting approach
- Bhau depended on him
Holkar:
- Experienced personality
- Seen many battles
- Didn't align with Bhau
- Opposed frontal warfare strategy
- Preferred surgical strikes
- Saw Abdali's fury, was concerned
- Worried "not up to it"
The Difference:
- Mehendri: "Jive with Bhau," same wavelength
- Shinde: "Okay but no Dattaji," younger but serviceable
- Holkar: Major disagreement on tactics
- Abdali: "Very strategic, very experienced general"
- Abhau relied most on Mehendri
The Loss
What Mehendri Represented:
- Bhau's vision of modern warfare
- Artillery-centered strategy
- Unified command
- Shared tactical philosophy
- Trusted advisor
The Void:
- No replacement of his caliber
- Loss personally affects Bhau
- Loss strategically affects army
- Morale damaged intensely
- Momentum lost
Key Themes
- Tactical Victory, Strategic Loss - Won battle, lost leadership
- The Sati Tragedy - Traditional practice undermines morale
- Supply Desperation - Melting down gold to pay for grain
- Finally Breaking Through - Bundele finally effective at choking supplies
- The Decapitating Strike - Afghan attempt to kill commanders
- Holkar's Loyalty - Despite disagreements, rallies his men
- Mehendri's Irreplaceability - Bhau's closest ally and strategic partner
- Communication Isolation - Cut off from Peshwa/Pune
- Widow's Choice - Lakshmi Bhai's immolation as turning point
- Momentum Shift - From tactical superiority to psychological disintegration
Where This Leads: December 7, 1760, the Marathas win a clear tactical victory. They inflict 1,500 casualties on the Afghans while losing 150 of their own. But it's meaningless. Barwant Rao Mehendri—Bhau's closest advisor, his strategic partner, the one who believed in his vision—is killed. And then his widow, refusing all persuasion, immolates herself in front of the entire camp. The news spreads. Morale shatters. A military victory becomes a psychological defeat. The news of Mehendri's death and his wife's sati ripples through the Maratha camp like a shock wave. Meanwhile, Bundele finally gets supplies from Delhi and finally starts choking Abdali's supply lines from Mirath. But it's too late. The Marathas just lost their most important commander and their most important ally—morale.
December 7. The Marathas beat the Afghans in a fair fight. Inflicted more casualties. Held the ground. It should have been a victory. But Barwant Rao Mehendri took a bullet in the chest. When his men got him back, his body was already being scalped by Afghan soldiers. And his wife—Lakshmi Bhai—watched her husband brought back dead. She didn't grieve. She didn't retreat into the camp. She decided to immolate herself on his pyre. In front of everyone. In front of the entire army. And no matter what Bhau said, no matter how hard he pleaded with her, she wouldn't change her mind. She handed her young son to Bhau and walked into the flames. And the entire Maratha camp watched their best commander's wife choose death over life. The tactical victory meant nothing. The psychological defeat meant everything.
The Panipat Crisis: Supply Lines & Strategic Breakdown
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha Supply Crisis
The Core Problem:
- Maratha camp at Panipat held ~100,000 people + animals
- Afghan forces under Abdali had besieged them
- Delhi was blocked to the south (under Abdali's control)
- No credit available—suppliers demanded cash only in uncertain conditions
The Cash Solution:
- Marathas melted down gold, silver, ornaments, and utensils
- Minted coins: Bhau Shahi, Malhar Shahi, Janko Shahi (named after three commanders)
- Used these coins to purchase grains and supplies
- Temporary fix, but limited by available bullion
Govindpant Bundele's Mission:
- Sent to Doab (land between Yamuna and Ganga rivers)
- Task: Collect grains and send to Bhau's camp
- Had 6,000-7,000 soldiers under his command
- Free movement because all major forces were at Panipat
The Doab Strategy: Choking Abdali's Supplies
The Geography:
- Doab = fertile land between Yamuna and Ganga rivers
- Contained many granaries (productive farmland)
- Main supply hub: Mirath (town supplying Abdali's camp)
Bundele's Success:
- Attacked the Mirath supply route
- Effectively "choked up" Abdali's supply lines
- Caused inflation in Abdali's camp
- Created panic among Afghan allies (who worried about their homes being destroyed)
The Counter-Response:
- Abdali received reinforcements: Atai Khan arrived from Kabul with 10,000 fresh soldiers
- Abdali Prime Minister Shahawali Khan ordered Atai Khan to stop Bundele
- Sent Nazib Khan to guide Atai Khan to Bundele's location
- Strategic decision: Use new troops immediately rather than let supply lines fail
The Bundele Ambush & Death (December 20, 1760)
The Deception:
- Jeta Gujar (local landlord) was supposed to deliver tribute to Bundele at Qaziabad
- Instead, he informed Abdali of Bundele's exact location
- Atai Khan's force crossed Yamuna near Baghpat (December 17-18)
- Approached flying Maratha commander's flag to look like friendly forces
The Attack:
- Bundele's army thought approaching force was Maratha reinforcement
- Only recognized it as Afghan when too close
- Atai Khan: 10,000+ fresh soldiers (numerically superior, well-rested)
- Bundele: 7,000 soldiers (spread thin, not battle-ready)
Bundele's Fate:
- Surprised while doing daily chores
- Attempted to flee on horseback
- Couldn't mount horse in time (he was elderly)
- Colleagues twice tried to help him but Afghans were too close
- Left behind as others fled
- Beheaded after 30 years of service to the Peshwa
- Head sent first to Nazib Khan, then to Abdali (December 22)
Strategic Consequences
Maratha Plan Collapses:
- Bundele was the "last resort" to starve Abdali's camp
- His death ends the Doab starvation strategy
- Without Bundele's interference, Abdali's supplies are secure
- Inflation in Afghan camp will subside
The Maratha Position Weakens:
- Bhau's last viable strategy to weaken Abdali is gone
- Afghan supply lines intact
- Maratha forces remain under supply stress (limited cash from melted coins)
- Pressure on Marathas to engage in direct battle increases
Historical Pattern
Echo of Sikandarabad:
- Malhar Rao Holkar was previously surprised by Abdali at Sikandarabad
- Was waiting for treasure delivery when attacked
- Now same trap sprung on Bundele
- Showed Afghan strategy: strike unprepared targets with surprise
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 17-18 | Atai Khan crosses Yamuna near Baghpat |
| Dec 20 | Surprise attack on Bundele's forces at Qaziabad |
| Dec 20 | Bundele killed, head taken by Afghans |
| Dec 22 | Bundele's head sent to Bhau via Abdali |
Key Insights
The Supply Problem: Marathas solved short-term cash crisis by minting coins but created long-term vulnerability. Only works if they can maintain the siege or force a favorable battle soon.
Bundele's Significance: Despite being older and not primarily a fighter, Bundele was crucial to the Maratha strategy. His absence exposed how dependent they were on specific individuals.
Abdali's Flexibility: Rather than defend passively, Abdali immediately moved reinforcements to counter the threat. Fresh troops from Kabul showed he had reserve capacity.
Jeta Gujar's Betrayal: Local landlord switched sides opportunistically—showed Marathas couldn't control even their ostensible territory. Doab inhabitants neutral at best, hostile at worst.
Where We Left Off: With Bundele dead, the Maratha strategy of starving Abdali is finished. Their supply situation remains precarious. Bhau must now consider direct confrontation. The siege mentality is breaking down. Both sides are moving toward the decisive battle.
Bundele did what few men could do—he successfully strangled Abdali's supply lines from 1500 kilometers away. But age caught up with him when Abdali finally decided to stop playing defense. One old commander, thirty years of service, gone in an ambush. And with him went the Maratha's best chance to win without fighting. Now the armies would have to settle it on the field.
Bundele's Defeat & Supply Line Victory for Abdali
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary (Continuation)
Recap: The Supply War Context
Bundele had been successfully cutting off supplies to Abdali's camp through attacks on the Doab region, especially the Mirath supply hub. This caused inflation and panic among Abdali's Afghan allies. Abdali decided to eliminate this threat.
The Reinforcements Arrive
Abdali's Solution:
- Abdali's Prime Minister Shahawali Khan's nephew, Atai Khan, arrived from Kabul
- Brought 10,000 fresh soldiers
- Represented Abdali's reserve capacity from Afghanistan
- Fresh troops ready for immediate action
The Assignment:
- Shahawali Khan ordered Atai Khan to deal with Bundele
- Nazib Khan provided local knowledge and guides
- Mission: Locate and eliminate Bundele
- Clear the Doab of Maratha interference
The Trap & Attack
Jeta Gujar's Betrayal:
- Local landlord who was supposed to pay tribute to Bundele
- Instead informed Abdali of Bundele's exact location
- Gave Abdali the settlement names and whereabouts
- Solved his tribute problem and got Abdali's help simultaneously
The Ambush Setup (December 17-20, 1760):
- Atai Khan crossed Yamuna near Baghpat (reversing Abdali's earlier crossing direction)
- Marched into Doab where Bundele was collecting tributes
- Used deception: carried Maratha commander's flag (Naro Shankar's flag)
- Bundele's army thought reinforcements were arriving
The Surprise Attack:
- At Qaziabad, Bundele was awaiting tribute payments
- Afghan forces approached under false colors
- Attack came when Maratha forces were unprepared
- Superiority in numbers and freshness: 10,000+ Afghan vs. 7,000 Maratha
Bundele's Death
The Final Moment:
- Bundele was engaged in routine daily tasks when attack commenced
- Recognized danger immediately and ran for his horse
- Couldn't mount quickly (age and fitness factor)
- Colleagues twice attempted to help him mount
- Afghans closed too quickly, forced companions to flee
- Left behind as others escaped
- Beheaded by Afghan forces
The Aftermath:
- Bundele's head taken by Afghans
- First delivered to Nazib Khan
- Then sent to Abdali
- Sent to Bhau as a message on December 22, 1760
Strategic Implications
Maratha Plan Defeated:
- Bundele's death ended all Maratha attempts to starve Abdali
- Supply choking strategy was their "last resort"
- Without Doab interference, Abdali's supplies are now secure
- Inflation in Afghan camp ends
Pressure Mounts on Marathas:
- Forced to consider direct military engagement
- Can't hope for Abdali to weaken gradually
- Their own supply situation remains precarious (coin minting limited)
- Battle becomes inevitable rather than optional
Significance of Bundele:
- Elderly commander, 30 years of service to Peshwa
- Not a traditional warrior but administrator/strategist
- Effectiveness showed intelligence matters more than youth
- His loss was strategic blow, not just loss of a general
Abdali's Strategic Response Shows
Flexibility: Rather than wait for supply lines to be completely cut off, took immediate action Reserve Capacity: Fresh troops from Kabul demonstrated deeper resource base than Marathas Adaptation: When strategy of attrition wasn't working, pivoted to direct elimination Intelligence: Used local informants (Jeta Gujar) effectively
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 17-18, 1760 | Atai Khan crosses Yamuna near Baghpat |
| Dec 20, 1760 | Attack on Bundele at Qaziabad |
| Dec 20, 1760 | Bundele killed, head taken |
| Dec 22, 1760 | Bundele's head sent to Bhau via Abdali |
Key Insights
The End of Starvation Strategy: With Bundele dead, the Maratha hope for victory through economic pressure dies. They must now fight.
Age vs. Skill: Bundele's failure wasn't due to lack of ability—his strategy worked brilliantly. It was simply outmaneuvered by Abdali's decisive action.
Local Loyalty Issues: Jeta Gujar's quick switch to Abdali showed Marathas didn't have deep local support. Doab was strategically important but politically unsecure.
The Cost of Distance: Bundele was 1500 km from Pune headquarters. Communication was slow and uncertain. When Abdali moved quickly, there was no way to warn or reinforce him.
Where We Left Off: The last Maratha offensive strategy has failed. Bundele's head is on its way to Bhau as a message. The Marathas now have no choice but direct confrontation. All strategic options have collapsed. The path to Panipat battle is now inevitable.
Bundele was the most effective weapon the Marathas had—not a cavalry commander or a strategist of battles, but a man who understood how to cripple an enemy without fighting. He nearly starved Abdali's camp through sheer persistence. But he was sixty years old, and when the Afghans came, they came with ten thousand fresh soldiers who didn't give him time to think. One old man's effectiveness couldn't outweigh being outnumbered and exhausted. His death meant the Maratha dream of victory without a great battle was over. Now only blood would settle it.
The Collapse of Maratha Offensives & Doab Strategy
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Strategic Situation Post-Bundele
The Maratha Camp Crisis:
- 40-50,000 dependents in addition to fighting forces
- Includes women, elderly men, pilgrims visiting temples/holy sites
- Bazar Bungi (support personnel): cooks, servants, porters, logistics handlers
- All must be fed but don't contribute to actual combat
- Supply lines severely restricted and dwindling
Climate Disadvantage:
- Northern winters extremely cold
- Marathas from Deccan unprepared for harsh weather
- No proper cold-weather clothing (dressed for southern climate)
- Biological adaptation issues—bodies not accustomed to freezing temperatures
- Becomes existential crisis combined with supply shortage
Bundele's Death & Its Significance
The Ambush (December 20, 1760):
- Afghans used deception: flew Naro Shankar's flag from Delhi
- Bundele thought reinforcements were arriving
- Afghans under Atai Khan (10,000+ troops) attacked by surprise
- Bundele attempted to flee but couldn't mount horse in time
- Son (Bharaji) couldn't save him despite trying twice to help him mount
- Beheaded after 30 years of loyal service to Peshwa
Atai Khan's Fate:
- Ironically, Atai Khan himself was killed during Panipat battle just one month later
- Killed while sitting on elephant during battle by a Maratha cavalryman
- One month gap between Bundele's death and his own
Head as Message:
- Bundele's head first sent to Najib Khan (Abdali's agent in India)
- Then forwarded to Abdali himself
- Sent to Bhau on December 22, 1760
- Psychological weapon: proof of supply strategy's destruction
The End of Maratha Strategic Options
Bundele's Supply Choking Plan Destroyed:
- Bundele's death ends any hope of starving Abdali's camp
- This was the Maratha's "last resort" strategy (Manasubha)
- No other commander could effectively operate in Doab like he did
- Naro Shankar (Delhi commander) was too distant and isolated
- Yamuna crossing during winter flooding prevented reinforcement
Why No One Could Replace Bundele:
- Doab was geographically detached from Delhi
- Required ability to move independently with small force
- Bundele had built relationships with local landholders
- Geographic isolation meant commanders from Delhi couldn't easily reach or operate there
Geographic & Logistical Barriers
Delhi's Isolation:
- Delhi sits on western bank of Yamuna
- To access Doab requires crossing Yamuna
- Winter flooding made crossing extremely difficult
- Bundele could operate because he was already positioned there
- New commanders couldn't establish supply operations once he was gone
Kashiraj Pandit: The Multilingual Courtier
Background:
- Originally worked for Peshwa
- Later transferred to serve Shuja Uddhawla's kingdom
- Bilingual: fluent in Indian languages AND Farsi (Persian)
- Valuable as translator and administrator
Role in Abdali's Camp:
- Present in Abdali's camp because his boss (Shuja) was there
- Shuja was allied with Abdali
- Kashiraj's skills essential: reads/writes Farsi for documents from Iran
- Acts as bridge between Persian/Iranian administrative world and Indian languages
- Important courtier for translating diplomatic/administrative correspondence
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 20, 1760 | Bundele killed in ambush by Atai Khan |
| Dec 22, 1760 | Bundele's head sent to Bhau |
| Jan 1761 | Panipat battle (Atai Khan killed) |
Key Insights
Supply Crisis Deepens: With Bundele gone, Marathas lose their only effective tool for economic warfare. They're now fully dependent on direct military engagement.
Camp Composition Problem: The 40-50,000 dependents aren't just extra mouths—they're politically necessary (pilgrims, merchants, families) but militarily useless. They drain resources while contributing nothing to fighting capacity.
Winter as Enemy: Cold isn't just discomfort—it's a strategic weakness. Unprepared soldiers need extra fuel, food, clothing. Afghans from cooler climates have advantage.
Message in the Head: Abdali sending Bundele's head to Bhau isn't just cruelty—it's tactical. It says: "Your supply strategy is finished. Your best commander is dead. You have no alternatives."
Geographic Isolation: Doab's separation from main Maratha forces meant whoever controlled it dominated supplies. Bundele's death means Abdali can now supply himself without hindrance.
Where We Left Off: The last viable Maratha strategy has been eliminated. Bundele's death represents not just the loss of a commander but the end of any path to victory without direct battle. Marathas must now commit to pitched combat with limited supplies, in cold weather, against an enemy with intact supply lines. The strategic noose is tightening around Bhau's camp.
Bundele was the kind of commander who understood that controlling supply lines meant controlling outcomes. He nearly won the war without a battle. But when Abdali decided to stop playing defense and sent Atai Khan, the game changed. One old man couldn't fight ten thousand fresh troops arriving from Afghanistan. With Bundele's death, the Marathas lost their last chance at indirect victory. Now only the field would decide it.
The Tightening Siege: Supply Raids & Strategic Repositioning
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Grain Campaign (Late December 1760)
Maratha Supply Desperation:
- Grains and animal feed running critically low
- Bhau sent Shinde-Holkar army (10,000 soldiers) to Karnala (near Ambala)
- Mission: Collect grains and supplies for camp
Afghan Blockade Response:
- Abdali sent counter-force to intercept the grain raid
- Strategy clear: starve Marathas into submission
- Force them to attack in weakened, demoralized state
- Win through attrition rather than pitched battle
Outcome:
- Minor skirmishes occurred but indecisive
- Marathas managed to secure some supplies (net gain mission)
- Demonstrated ongoing supply vulnerability even with victories
Firewood Crisis in Winter
The Cold Problem:
- Harsh northern winter required firewood for survival
- Dry wood burned at dawn and dusk for warmth gathering
- Marathas not accustomed to sub-zero temperatures
- No winter attire (brought southern clothing)
- Firewood collection became life-or-death necessity
The Pindharis Ambush:
- Pindharis (militia/plunder forces) sent to collect firewood
- Small unit: ~100-200 men
- Not professional soldiers but loot-and-raid fighters
- Afghans (under Shahapasand Khan and Jahan Khan with 5,000 troops) intercepted at night
- Afghan surprise attack killed all of them in darkness
- Demonstrated Afghan control of night operations and supply line harassment
Abdali's Camp Repositioning Strategy
Expanding the Control Zone (December 30):
- Abdali moved camp southeast of original position
- Increased distance between camps by 5-6 miles
- Covered the entire intervening space with forces
- Created buffer zone where Marathas couldn't operate freely
Geographic Advantage:
- Canal to west of Maratha camp (7 km away) provided maneuvering room
- Enough space for Abdali's massive army to operate and position troops
- Separated from canal meant no natural defensive barriers close to Afghan position
- Allowed Afghan scouts to constantly monitor Maratha movements
Road Control Strategy:
- Delhi-Panipat road crucial supply and communication route
- Afghan camp movement now positioned to cut this road
- Marathas forced to use forest paths instead of established routes
- Established roads rare in region—very few alternatives existed
- Effectively blocked all official routes to Delhi
Camp Size:
- Afghan camp itself spread over several kilometers
- Included: camels, bulls, elephants, horses, personnel from multiple allied forces
- Suja Uddhawla's contingent, Rohila forces, Bangash forces
- Separate sub-camps for each group within larger encampment
- Justifies reputation as "biggest battle of 18th century"
The Courier Disaster (January 1761)
The Mission:
- Bundele had collected funds before his death
- Bhau needed cash: suppliers only accept hard money, not credit
- Sent 2,000 soldiers under Parashar Dadaji to Delhi
- Retrieve approximately 150,000-200,000 rupees in hard currency
The Departure:
- Left Delhi January 1, 1761
- Carrying large ransom-level sum of money
- Escorted by 2,000 soldiers for protection
- Thought they were heading to secure Maratha camp
The Fatal Mistake:
- Didn't know Abdali had moved camp southeast
- Thought Afghan camp was still in original position
- Accidentally marched directly into Abdali's new camp location
- Realized error only when too close to escape
The Catastrophe:
- Started speaking in Marathi (thought they found Maratha camp)
- Language gave away their identity immediately
- Afghan forces attacked and looted them completely
- Afghans took the entire money shipment
- Some soldiers escaped back to Maratha camp
- Most were killed or captured
- Complete disaster: lost funds and soldiers in one operation
Doab Counter-Offensive Failure
Gopal Ganesh Parve's Mission:
- Similar to Bundele (administrator-commander type, not warrior)
- Sent by Bhau to attack Awadh (Ayodhya/Suja Uddhawla's kingdom)
- Strategy: same as Bundele's earlier success—cause panic among Abdali's allies
- Make Suja's soldiers fear for their families back home
- Destabilize Afghan alliance from within
The Execution:
- Used "surgical strikes"—quick hit-and-run raids
- Attack, grab supplies/cause damage, retreat rapidly
- Designed to appear everywhere without being catchable
Why It Failed:
- Suja kept defensive forces at home (didn't commit everything to Panipat)
- Awadh defenders repelled Parve's strikes successfully
- Parve lacked numbers for sustained offensive
- Couldn't threaten Suja's homeland meaningfully
- Supply lines from Mirath remained intact (Bundele already dead)
- No way to interdict Abdali's resources effectively
Strategic Stalemate Approaching
Maratha Options Exhausted:
- Can't starve Abdali (Bundele dead, Doab offensive failed)
- Can't cut supply roads (Camp repositioning blocks them)
- Can't recover lost money (Courier ambushed)
- Can't weaken allies from within (Suja's defenses holding)
- Limited supplies in camp with 40-50,000 dependents
Time Running Out:
- Battle date approaching rapidly
- Both sides positioning for confrontation
- Marathas increasingly desperate for decisive engagement
- Abdali increasingly confident in setup
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 30, 1760 | Abdali moves camp southeast; controls Delhi-Panipat road |
| Jan 1, 1761 | Parashar Dadaji leaves Delhi with 150,000+ rupees |
| Jan 6, 1761 | Courier forces accidentally enter Abdali camp; looted and massacred |
| Late Dec-Early Jan | Gopal Ganesh's raids in Awadh repelled |
Key Insights
The Courier Ambush: Most tragic aspect: wasn't a military defeat but a logistics failure. One wrong turn (not knowing camp moved) and the entire financial lifeline destroyed.
Camp Repositioning as Strategy: Abdali didn't need to attack—he just repositioned and the geography did the work. The southeast move cut roads, showed control, and prevented Marathas from any offensive action.
The Doab Strategy Ends: Bundele was irreplaceable. Parve had none of his geographic knowledge, local relationships, or strategic positioning. His failure shows how dependent Maratha strategy was on one man.
Winter as Tactical Weapon: Every night ambush (Pindharis), every supply raid, every temperature drop—all part of wearing down a force unprepared for the climate.
Delhi Disconnected: By cutting the Delhi road, Abdali effectively isolated the main Maratha force. No reinforcements could arrive, no messages flow freely, no supplies come through official channels.
Where We Left Off: It's early January 1761, roughly one week from battle. All Maratha offensive options have collapsed. The courier disaster removes last financial reserves. Doab strategy completely failed. They're boxed in, cold, hungry, demoralized, and facing an enemy with intact supplies and momentum. The stage is set for final confrontation.
Every strategic option the Marathas had tried—starving supplies, cutting roads, creating panic among allies, recovering funds—had failed or been countered. Bundele's death was the first domino. The courier ambush was the second. By early January, Bhau was out of moves. He could either retreat in shame or fight. Retreat meant admitting defeat. Fighting meant accepting the one thing he'd been trying to avoid: a pitched battle against a fresh, well-supplied army. The walls were closing in.
The Peshwa's Crisis: Financial Collapse & Strategic Hesitation
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Maratha Defense Divided
Three-Army Problem:
- One Maratha army in Deccan defending against Nizam
- One large army at Panipat (under Bhau) fighting Abdali
- Peshwa attempting to raise a third army for northern reinforcement
- Massive resource drain across three simultaneous fronts
The Financial Reality:
- Empire has expanded territorially but drowning in debt
- Accumulating loans of 50 lakh rupees (500,000 rupees) for Abdali conflict alone
- Peshwa increasingly distracted and ill
- Not a natural warrior or strategist (lacks father's military mind)
- Facing mounting financial challenges alongside military crisis
Peshwa's Desperate Letter to Bhau (December 1760)
The Complaint:
- "Our wealth increased, that's why we expanded empire" (sarcastic)
- But now: "We owe crores of rupees in loans"
- Bitter irony: controlling more land but financially bankrupt
- Questions usefulness of controlling vast territory when drowning in debt
Specific Demands to Bhau:
- Sent 10-12 lakh rupees (100,000-120,000 rupees) already
- Taken loans of 15 lakh rupees (150,000 rupees) on his end
- Expects Nizam Ali to join (needs 3 lakh rupees—30,000)
- Brother Raghunath Rao's army: 15,000 soldiers (needs funding)
- Artillery: 15-20 lakh rupees (150,000-200,000 rupees)
- Total needed: 40 lakh rupees (400,000 rupees)
- Asking Bhau to send 5 lakh to Raghunath Rao and 5 lakh to himself
Peshwa's Movement Plans:
- Traveling via Burhanpur to reach Hindustan
- Planned for Marga (December-January)
- Brother Raghunath Rao recruiting Nizam Ali
- Plan was for Peshwa to reach Delhi with reinforcements
The Nizam Ali Betrayal
Nizam's Double Game:
- Technically allied with Marathas (treaty obligation to defend Mughal)
- Supposed to join Raghunath Rao and march north with him
- Required by treaty to protect Mughal empire against foreign invasion
- But understood geopolitical reality: if Marathas defeat Abdali, they dominate north
The Strategic Calculation:
- "Enemy of my enemy is my friend" logic
- If Marathas win Panipat, they become overwhelming power in north India
- If Abdali wins, Muslim power restored (better for Nizam's position)
- Either way, Marathas represented greater long-term threat to Nizam's independence
- Chose to hedge: didn't openly rebel but delayed and obstructed
The Delaying Tactic:
- Kept making excuses
- Delayed mobilizing his forces
- Never actually marched north with Raghunath Rao
- Forced Raghunath Rao to stay back in Deccan to monitor him
- Prevented reinforcements from reaching Bhau at critical moment
Net Effect:
- Peshwa lost ability to send promised north army
- Raghunath Rao stuck in Deccan watching Nizam
- No reinforcements reached Panipat
- Bhau left without expected support from south
The Peshwa's Paralysis
Physical & Mental Condition:
- Peshwa was sick/ill during this period
- Not naturally inclined to warfare or strategy
- Lacks his father's military genius and decisiveness
- Caught between wanting to help Bhau and handling home situation
Conflicting Priorities:
- Couldn't leave Deccan undefended against Nizam
- Needed to arrange southern defense before going north
- But if he stayed, Bhau wouldn't get reinforcements
- If he left, Nizam might attack Pune or Maratha heartland
- Impossible choice between two fronts
The Attempt:
- Originally planned to send Raghunath Rao north with Nizam
- Thought this would hold Nizam and provide reinforcements
- When Nizam delayed and refused, plan collapsed
- Raghunath Rao forced to remain as watchdog on Nizam
Intelligence from the Field
Contemporary Report (December 10, 1760): A Maratha letter writer in Deccan reported:
"Shrimanta (Peshwa) will head for Burhanpur. Bhau Sahib is in difficult situation. The Pathan of Dali (Abdali) and Bhau have skirmishes every day. News reports 20 days of daily battles. Both are equal so far. Bhau Sahib's courage is tremendous. He made Shinde and Holkar's army stand and give battle (despite their reluctance to fight). God will give success."
What This Shows:
- Daily skirmishes happening (not static siege)
- Bhau personally displaying courage and forcing reluctant commanders to fight
- Neither side had clear advantage yet (equal so far)
- Situation was ongoing struggle, not settled
Financial Breakdown
Maratha Expenditures Documented:
| Source | Amount | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Peshwa's loans (Deccan) | 15 lakh rupees | War financing |
| Already sent to Bhau | 10-12 lakh rupees | Panipat campaign |
| Expected Nizam Ali support | 3 lakh rupees | Reinforcement costs |
| Raghunath Rao's 15,000 army | ? | Recruitment/supply |
| Artillery needs | 15-20 lakh rupees | War machines |
| TOTAL REQUESTED | 40 lakh rupees | Complete war effort |
| Total debt incurred | 50+ lakh rupees | Long-term obligation |
The Supply Chain to Bhau
Route Problems:
- Funds had to travel from Deccan to Panipat
- 1500 km distance through uncertain territory
- Had to avoid Abdali's interception
- Vulnerable at every stage
Example of Failure:
- Parashar Dadaji's courier mission (January 6) proves this
- 150,000+ rupees lost to ambush
- 2,000 soldiers killed/captured
- Shows how fragile financial lifelines were
Political Reality
The Deccan Hostage Situation:
- Peshwa couldn't leave Deccan undefended
- Nizam was technically ally but couldn't be trusted
- Had to keep Raghunath Rao there to monitor him
- Created forced division of Maratha strength
Why Nizam Wouldn't Commit:
- Treaty obligation didn't align with self-interest
- Mughal empire already dying/irrelevant
- Maratha victory = Maratha hegemony over all north
- Nizam's kingdom safer if powers balanced
- Better outcome: Abdali weakens Marathas, Nizam plays kingmaker
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 9, 1760 | Peshwa writes to Bhau from Burhanpur requesting funds |
| Dec 10, 1760 | Field report: Bhau fighting daily skirmishes, situation unclear |
| Dec 1760 | Nizam Ali delays and refuses to march north |
| Jan 1761 | Raghunath Rao remains stuck in Deccan watching Nizam |
Key Insights
The Structural Problem: Marathas controlled too much territory to defend. Protecting Deccan AND fighting Abdali AND trying to raise new armies was unsustainable.
The Financial Trap: Every rupee sent north was a rupee not available for defense/administration elsewhere. War with Abdali was becoming national mobilization—entire empire at risk.
The Nizam's Brilliance: Without directly betraying Marathas or breaking treaty, Nizam made sure they couldn't win. Delay and obstruction were more effective than open rebellion.
The Sick Peshwa: Unlike his father Balaji Bajirao (brilliant strategist), Nana Sahib lacked the mental/physical toughness to make hard choices. He wanted to help Bhau but couldn't sacrifice home defense.
The Missing Reinforcements: Bhau was expecting support from south that never came. The Peshwa's paralysis meant one army had to carry the entire war effort alone.
Where We Left Off: The Peshwa is paralyzed—too sick to fight, too distracted to lead, surrounded by financial crisis and the impossible choice between two fronts. Bhau won't get the reinforcements he was promised. The Nizam has effectively neutralized the southern Maratha armies through simple obstruction. As Bhau faces Abdali on January 14, he's entirely on his own. The empire is divided and the center is weak.
The Peshwa wanted to help. He really did. But he was sick, he wasn't a military man, and he was drowning in debt. Every letter to Bhau was basically: "I want to send help but I need more money, and I don't have it." Meanwhile the Nizam played it perfectly—didn't rebel, just delayed, didn't fight, just obstructed. By the time Peshwa realized what was happening, it was too late. Raghunath Rao was stuck in Deccan, no third army materialized, and Bhau was facing Abdali alone. The weakness at the center had doomed the armies in the field.
The Peshwa's Desperation: Isolation & Fundraising Through Marriage
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Communication Blackout at Paitan
Location & Timing (December 21, 1760):
- Peshwa reached Paitan/Rakshas Bhuvan (Paitan famous for sarees; Eknaath Maharaj saint from there)
- Stopped near the town, away from main routes
- Had no interest in getting watered down or exposed
Information Vacuum:
- Cut off from news coming from Panipat
- Last letter received: first week of December (written November 14)
- Over a month out of date by December 21
- Afghan interception made message flow nearly impossible
- No recent updates on actual situation at Panipat
The Alarm Begins:
- Peshwa understood two massive armies faced each other at short distance
- With such proximity and no news, logic suggested Maratha side was being shut out
- Bad omens: silence meant either war was happening or communications completely blocked
- Growing worry but no concrete information
Peshwa's Desperate Letter to Baburao Koneer
The Content: Peshwa wrote to Baburao Koneer (in Jhashi, far north):
"Bhau wrote that the two armies are only 5 miles apart with daily skirmishes occurring. Given such large armies in close proximity, why is there such an absence of news? Has war occurred or has peace been negotiated? I don't know which it is."
The Dilemma:
- Armies too close to not be fighting constantly
- But receiving no battle reports or casualty news
- Could mean either outcome (war or peace)
- Complete uncertainty about what's happening
Letters Getting Through (Barely)
Courier Success Rate: Several letters managed to reach Pune despite blockade, dated after November 15:
- November 20 (Barwant Rao)
- November 27
- December 5 (Abdali moved camp—this news got through)
- December 6 (Gopal Ganesh Barve)
- December 23 (Bundele's death, sent by Shinde courtier)
- December 28 (Nana Fardanavis's brother Moroba Hiala wrote from Panipat)
Communication Timeline:
- Each letter took ~3 weeks to arrive
- By the time they reached Pune, events were already outdated
- January 10 or so before some December messages arrived
Example of Courier Risk:
- December 18: Peshwa gave messenger instructions to deliver Delhi messages
- Messenger was caught by Afghan (Pathan)
- Messenger managed to escape with some of the message
- Shows constant danger of interception
Marriage for Funds Strategy
The Desperation:
- Peshwa needed money urgently
- Had no way to raise funds through normal channels
- Identified wealthy merchant/moneylender families
The Plan:
- Interviewed marriage-age girls from wealthy families
- December 9, 12, 15: viewed candidates
- Selected families with liquid money reserves
- Strategy: marry into money-lending families to access their wealth
The Marriage (December 29-31, 1760):
- Married Radha Bai, 9-year-old daughter of wealthy money lender
- Also married off two of his officers to other girls from money-lending families
- Three-day celebration (December 29-31)
- Distributed large donations to needy people (tradition for elite families)
- Showed wealth and morality through charitable giving at weddings
How It Worked:
- When marriages were rejected: still gave gifts to girls (consolation prizes)
- Peshwa's decision was absolute (great honor to marry into Peshwa family)
- Girls and families couldn't refuse without losing face
- Selected families were essentially coerced into financial relationships
- Donations given during wedding celebrations: money flowing back out for show, but family relationships created opportunity for loans
The Distraction:
- While these weddings occurred, emergency situation at Panipat deteriorating
- Peshwa unaware of severity or urgency
- Focused on wedding logistics, traditions, and fundraising
- No reliable news arriving to convey crisis
Journey North Begins
Departure (December 31, 1760):
- Peshwa finally began journey toward north
- Only after wedding obligations completed
- Still sick and uncertain about situation
- Bringing new wife and wedding entourage with him
Why So Late:
- Weddings completed (essential for fund-raising)
- Communications blackout meant he didn't fully understand urgency
- Last letter was a month old—couldn't assess real time severity
- By waiting until December 31, Panipat battle was only 2 weeks away
The Presentation Opportunity
Dad's Suggestion:
- After finishing the book, Rohan should present at Itihas Manch (History Forum)
- Create 25-30 PowerPoint slides
- Present in English with Western perspective
- Dad will help coordinate with Chetan
Why This Matters:
- Third Battle of Panipat is culturally significant to Maharashtrians
- Near-universal emotional response to mention of Panipat
- Verbal expression: "That's Panipat" (idiom meaning catastrophe)
- 1760 (Satrashesat) is landmark year in collective memory
- Presentation would attract significant audience and discussion
Geographic Context
Paitan: Northern Deccan town, famous for Paitan sarees (traditional textile), birthplace of saint Eknaath Maharaj
Rakshas Bhuvan: Town near Paitan (Bhuvan = house, so "Demon's House")
Jhashi: Far north, indicating how spread out Maratha communication networks were
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 9, 12, 15 | Peshwa interviews marriage candidates |
| Dec 18 | Courier caught trying to deliver messages |
| Dec 21 | Peshwa reaches Paitan; realizes information gap |
| Dec 29-31 | Wedding celebrations with Radha Bai |
| Dec 31 | Peshwa begins journey north |
| Jan 14 | Panipat battle (2 weeks away) |
Key Insights
Communication as Strategic Weapon: Abdali's blockade wasn't just physical—it was informational. By cutting off messages, he kept Peshwa ignorant of the urgency. The Peshwa couldn't react to a crisis he didn't know existed.
Forced Marriage as Financing: In desperation, Peshwa weaponized marriage customs. What should be a ceremony of love became a coercive financial transaction. The weddings were theater for extracting wealth.
The Distraction Problem: Peshwa was genuinely trying to help Bhau but was pulled in multiple directions. Wedding obligations, fundraising, southern defense, illness—all prevented focused attention on northern crisis.
Too Little, Too Late: Even after starting December 31, Peshwa wouldn't reach Panipat before January 14 battle. The months of delay (Nizam's obstruction, fundraising, weddings) meant he couldn't possibly arrive in time.
Elite Traditions as Liability: Wedding donations and ceremonies had to happen because refusal would damage Peshwa's reputation. Even in crisis, maintaining elite status required ritual expenditure.
Where We Left Off: Peshwa is finally on his way north (December 31) with new wife and wedding entourage. But it's too late—Panipat battle is 2 weeks away. Communication blackout has kept him ignorant of how dire the situation is. Bhau will fight Abdali without reinforcements. The empire's center has been too distracted to help its armies in the field.
The Peshwa tried everything: letters to the Nizam (who ignored him), loans (which he couldn't repay), and finally marriage (which bought him a few lakh rupees). But none of it mattered because he was always one month behind reality. By the time a message arrived telling him things were desperate, the crisis had already evolved past desperation into catastrophe. And he was still in Paitan, marrying a nine-year-old girl while his armies starved at Panipat.
The Siege Endgame: Starvation, Fog & Desperate Morale (December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Dying Animals & Accumulating Corpses
Livestock Crisis: From Meerut A. Ahmadi's account:
"Thousands of cattle and horses died because they had no food to eat. Their energy depleted, they fell as though entering Yama's kingdom (death itself)."
Environmental Degradation:
- Dead animals left to rot in camp
- Accumulating stench throughout Maratha encampment
- Trenches dug for graves filled with dead bodies
- Two-month stationary position = months of garbage and corpse accumulation
- Hygiene conditions deteriorating rapidly
Winter Conditions & Visibility
Seasonal Collapse:
- Days shrinking rapidly (winter solstice territory)
- Dense fog covering region day and night
- Visibility severely reduced even during daytime
- Nighttime completely obscured by darkness and fog
Supply Dependencies Now Critical:
- Food (completely exhausted in Panipat town)
- Firewood (essential for survival in harsh cold)
- Water (difficult to obtain safely)
- Animals (most dying from starvation)
Strategic Problem:
- No one willing to leave camp to gather supplies
- Constant threat of Afghan raiding parties
- Creating de facto siege conditions
- Trapped in place by combination of enemy pressure and harsh environment
The Two-Month Standoff
Historic Unprecedented:
- No forces of this size had stood opposite each other for this length in history
- ~2 months since October 28-29 arrival
- Both armies waiting for opponent to attack first
The Psychology:
- Each side hoping opponent would grow desperate and attack
- Whoever attacks loses advantage (they're depleted, demoralized, weaker)
- But attrition favoring Abdali, not Marathas
The Asymmetry:
- Afghan advantage: Supply lines intact from Doab, relatively stable conditions, fresh troops arriving from Kabul
- Maratha disadvantage: Supply lines cut, depleting resources daily, stuck in cold weather they're unprepared for, accumulating corpses and stench
Neither Side Ready to Start:
- Both awaiting opponent to break first
- Both understanding this was largest battle of era
- Both aware: 50-50 chance of success, catastrophic losses either way
- But only Marathas felt pressure to attack (supplies running out)
Maratha Firepower Preservation
Strategic Limitation:
- Marathas conserving ammunition and firepower
- Couldn't afford wasteful raids or skirmishes
- Had to save everything for final pitched battle
- Each shot, each cannon blast, had to count
Afghan Advantage:
- Could conduct raiding operations without depleting reserves
- Intercept Maratha supply parties without commitment
- Pressure Marathas without risking main force
- Essentially infinite ammunition compared to desperate Marathas
Nana Fardanavis's Desperate Assessment (December 28, 1760)
The Observer on Site:
- Nana Fardanavis: Peshwa's courtier, present at Panipat
- His mother came as tourist (temple pilgrim)
- Wrote letter to brother Moroba Hiala back in Pune
The Conditions Report:
"Govind Panth's head was cremated here. The Afghans are treacherous, hence we are entrenched in Mughal fashion. There have been two months of fighting. Both sides still desire to fight. God will give the results. The enterprise has turned out heavier than expected. There is no money and prices are high, so the army is rattled."
The Analysis:
| Factor | Status |
|---|---|
| Supplies | Critical shortage of food, firewood, water |
| Morale | Maintained but wearing thin |
| Finances | No money; prices inflated |
| Combat Will | High—both sides still want to fight |
| Physical Conditions | Deteriorating (dead animals, fog, cold) |
| Duration | 2 months of stalemate |
Why Marathas Can't Match Afghan Raiding
The Dilemma:
- Afghans conduct hit-and-run raids to intercept supplies
- Why can't Marathas send 2,000-3,000 soldiers to protect supply parties?
The Answer:
-
Afghan raiders are pure fighters (dedicated military unit)
-
Maratha supply parties must:
- Travel distance to find food grains
- Negotiate prices with suppliers
- Carry/protect procured supplies on return
- Defend themselves while burdened
- All simultaneously
-
Divided attention = vulnerability
-
Carrying supplies = reduced fighting capability
-
Afghan interceptors = fresh, light, focused fighters
Sacrifice Logic:
- Marathas could sacrifice some soldiers to protect supply parties
- But hunger = death anyway
- Can't solve the fundamental problem: outnumbered and outmatched in logistics
Jaankoji Shinde's Last Letter (January 4, 1761)
The Writer:
- Jaankoji: now head of Shinde clan (age 22-23)
- Uncle Taji Shinde died
- Writing to his representative elsewhere
Battle Update:
- "We had two battles and killed 5-7,000 Afghans"
- "Injured another 3,000 of them"
- "Captured 3-400 of their flags"
Position Report:
- "Abdali has come on the road to Delhi"
- Meaning: Afghan forces now occupy Delhi-Panipat road
- Marathas sitting on escape route to Afghanistan
- Neither side can easily retreat
Tone Assessment:
- No fear expressed
- No demoralization yet (though physical conditions mentioned)
- Still combat-ready mentally
- Understanding that this will be decisive (50-50 odds, catastrophic losses)
- Acceptance of dangerous situation
The Final Pressure Point
Maratha Commanders' Ultimatum:
- Major warriors from different clans meet with Bhau
- Message: "We don't want to die like this"
- "We would rather die on the battlefield than die here from starvation"
- "Somebody should come from south and engage Abdali"
- "But that's not happening, so we have to fight now"
The Logic:
- Waiting = slow death from cold/hunger/disease
- Fighting = quick death in battle, but with honor
- Better to die fighting than rotting in camp
- Staying put = certain gradual destruction
- Battle at least offers 50-50 chance and puts fate in their hands
Bhau's Position:
- Had been waiting for reinforcements from south
- Hoping for flanking action while he held Abdali
- But Peshwa delayed, Nizam obstructed, reinforcements never came
- Commanders forcing his hand: fight now or lose army to attrition
Timeline (Final Days)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 28-29, 1760 | Marathas arrive at Panipat |
| Early Dec | Bundele killed; supply choke strategy fails |
| Dec 28 | Nana Fardanavis reports critical conditions |
| Dec 30 | Abdali repositions camp southeast |
| Jan 4, 1761 | Jaankoji reports two victories, no fear yet |
| Jan 6 | Courier ambushed; remaining funds lost |
| Jan 10+ | Commanders demand battle |
| Jan 14 | Battle of Panipat begins |
Key Insights
Attrition as Strategy: Abdali didn't need to win—he just needed Marathas to slowly die in camp. The fog, cold, dead animals, stench, starvation—all were weapons.
The Firepower Problem: Marathas couldn't waste ammunition on skirmishes. This defensive posture meant they couldn't contest supply routes. Afghan raiders operated freely while Marathas watched.
Morale Paradox: Despite physical horror conditions, military will remained strong. No panic, no demoralization in combat sense. But the body's needs (food, warmth) were overriding the warrior's will to wait.
Two-Month Standoff Precedent: Historians note this was unprecedented in scale. Never had armies this large faced each other this long. The accumulated horror was without historical parallel.
The Commanders' Revolt: The decision to fight came not from Bhau's strategy but from soldiers' desperation. The army forced its leader to action. Waiting = guaranteed loss. Fighting = chance of victory.
Where We Left Off: It's January 10, 1761. Marathas are physically breaking down but mentally still ready to fight. Commanders are demanding battle. Abdali is in control, waiting for Marathas to crack. But the Marathas haven't cracked—they're about to attack. The 14th of January awaits. Everything comes down to the next few days.
The worst part wasn't the fighting—it was the waiting. Fighting, you could control your fate. Waiting meant watching your horses die, smelling the corpses, feeling the cold seep deeper into your bones every night. By early January, no Maratha wanted to wait anymore. They didn't care about Peshwa's reinforcements that were never coming. They didn't care about strategy. They just wanted to stop dying slowly and die fast, on their feet, like warriors. So they marched out to Panipat field. And Abdali, finally, was ready for them.
The Final Gamble: Negotiations Fail & Battle Is Decided
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Strategic Impasse (Early January 1761)
The Realization:
- December 7, 1760 skirmish: Marathas nearly won but lost commander Mangare
- Peshwa received this news in late January (month late)
- Time has come to "settle the account"—debt must be paid
- Procrastination no longer possible
Why Marathas Couldn't Wait:
- Understood this would be epic battle with terrible casualties
- Both sides suffering significant losses already
- But supplies running critically short on Maratha side only
- No hope for reinforcements (Peshwa stuck in Deccan, Nizam obstructing)
- Waiting = guaranteed starvation; fighting = chance at victory
Failed Negotiation Attempts
Initial Proposal (Late December/Early January):
- Bhau tried negotiating through Suja Uddhawla
- Suja had contacts with Shah Wali Khan (Abdali's Prime Minister)
- Shah Wali Khan was "reasonable and peacemaker" type
- Suggested: Abdali accept tribute from Marathas and return to Afghanistan
Why Abdali Hesitated:
- Concerned about Afghan settlers in India (Rohilas, especially Najib Khan)
- What would happen to them once Abdali left and Marathas regrouped?
- Felt responsibility to protect fellow Afghans in India
Consultation with Rohila Chiefs:
- Abdali asked Najib Khan, Dundee Khan, and other Rohila leaders
- Most Rohilas were willing to accept truce (didn't want bloodbath)
- Battle outcome unpredictable (50-50 odds)—too much risk
- Would prefer certain terms to uncertain warfare
Najib Khan's Ultimatum
The Decisive Voice:
- Najib Khan stood alone against compromise
- Had religious support from Kazi Idris (Islamic preacher)
- Idris framed it as Jihad (holy war against infidels)
Najib's Logic to Kashiraj Pandit:
"His excellency Suja is my prince and I consider myself his servant. But owing to youth, he does not realize the consequences. His proposal shows sympathy with Marathas—not realistic. Peace is not a chain that prevents breaking of faith. All this Maratha humility is due to cunning and deceit. As soon as the Shah turns back to Afghanistan, this storm will break upon my head and sweep away Islam. The Maratha is a thorn in the garden of Hindustan. If not uprooted now, it will pierce my safety again."
The Shrewd Calculation:
- Najib understood: moment Abdali leaves, Marathas will return
- Marathas always try to eliminate Muslim power in India
- Even accepting tribute doesn't change their long-term goal
- Any peace is temporary; Marathas will eventually come back to finish job
- Therefore: must destroy them completely while Abdali is present
- Abdali is only protection mechanism Rohilas have
Kazi Idris's Religious Argument
The Jihad Frame:
- Idris Khan (Islamic religious preacher) supported Najib
- Argued this was religious duty, not material concern
- Believers fight regardless of consequences
- If they die: martyrs for Islam
- If they win: greatest victory
The Message:
"This is Dharma Yuddha (religious war/Jihad). Don't worry about shortages, supplies, or death. That's Allah's concern. Your duty is to fight the infidels (Kafirs) and kill them. That is what Allah commands. Material concerns don't matter. Your duty is Jihad."
The Logic:
- Removes cost-benefit analysis
- Makes it binary: fight or betray Islam
- No middle ground acceptable
- Following Chanakya's logic: if death equals victory, what's there to lose?
- Makes Afghan fighters extremely dangerous (willing to die, so might take enemy with them)
Abdali's Decision
The Turning Point:
- Abdali agreed with Najib and Idris Khan
- Accepted their argument: Marathas = fundamental threat to Muslim power
- Rejected all truce proposals
- Declared: "Either I gain victory or I completely wipe you out"
- Single-minded commitment to total victory
Why Abdali Sided with Najib:
- Understand Maratha pattern: constantly try to displace Muslim power
- Peace treaty = temporary respite, not permanent solution
- Once Abdali leaves, Marathas will resume their expansion
- History showed Marathas not to be trusted once danger passes
- Better to settle it now, decisively
The Entourage Problem
Bhau's Burden:
- Responsible for 40-50,000+ dependents in camp
- Wives, servants, old men, pilgrims visiting holy sites
- Cannot fight while protecting non-combatants
- Cannot abandon them (creates moral/political crisis)
- Stuck with them: they consume supplies but can't contribute to defense
Two Options Only:
- Fight it out without regard to outcome
- Surrender
No Middle Ground Left
Suja's Position & Final Mediation
The Trapped Ally:
- Suja still in Abdali's camp (nominally his ally)
- Not fully committed to Abdali (compelled to be there)
- Afraid of Abdali but also negotiating with Marathas through courtiers
- If Marathas lose: still has to deal with them later (they'll come back)
- Tried to find middle ground between camps through Kashiraj Pandit
Historical Reality Check:
- Marathas DID come back after Panipat
- Returned to Delhi with full force within 5 years
- Retook the city completely
- Suja's fear of permanent Maratha presence was justified
Bhau's Desperation Moves
Distribution of Funds (Before Battle):
- Distributed 50,000 rupees to army
- Told soldiers: "You've fought valiantly, continue doing so"
- Attempted morale boost before final battle
- Soldiers already somewhat demoralized (starvation, waiting, constant skirmishes)
Attempt to Protect Vishwasrao:
- Bhau offered proposal for Vishwasrao to return to Deccan before battle
- Wanted to save young prince (had taken responsibility for his safety)
- Worried about explaining to Peshwa if Vishwasrao died
Vishwasrao's Refusal:
- Young prince rejected escape option
- Refused to abandon army that had protected him
- Said: "I came here to get battle experience and become hard. I'm not leaving now."
- Bhau and Vishwasrao had become very close during year together
- Vishwasrao wrote to father: "You'll get a son like me, but you won't get a brother like Bhau"
- Symbolic of trust between them despite age/experience gap
The Battle Council
The Participants:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau (overall campaign commander)
- Vishwasrao (Commander-in-Chief by title, but inexperienced)
- Malhar Rao Holkar
- Jankoji Shinde (age 22-23, head of Shinde clan)
- Other important personalities (experienced warriors)
The Consensus:
- Starvation = certain death
- Waiting = guaranteed loss (supplies exhausted)
- Fighting = chance at victory (50-50 odds)
- Decision: Fight the battle and decide tactics
What Wasn't Discussed:
- No written notes survived the battle
- Documents likely destroyed when Marathas lost
- Can't know exact tactical discussions planned
- Only general strategy known: go to battle
Timeline (Final Days)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Dec 7, 1760 | Skirmish where Marathas nearly win (Mangare killed) |
| Late Dec | Shah Wali Khan proposes truce to Abdali |
| Early Jan | Najib Khan refuses truce ("Marathas are thorn") |
| Jan 4 | Jaankoji's letter (last from camp) |
| Jan 6 | Courier ambushed; funds lost |
| Jan 10 | Final negotiation attempts fail |
| Jan 10+ | Commanders demand battle |
| ~Jan 13 | Battle council convenes; final decision made |
| Jan 14 | Battle of Panipat begins |
Key Insights
The Negotiation Failure: Not due to unreasonable demands but due to fundamental incompatibility. Abdali (via Najib) understood: any peace is temporary if Marathas aren't destroyed. Given Maratha history of expansion, this analysis was correct.
Religious Motivation vs. Pragmatism: Kazi Idris's Jihad argument won over Shah Wali Khan's pragmatism. Religious framing made fighting mandatory, removed cost-benefit analysis, made compromise impossible.
The Rohila Paradox: Most Afghans wanted truce. But their representative (Najib) refused, forcing them into battle against their preference. Shows how one principled person (or religious authority) can override majority will.
Suja's Impossible Position: Tried to be mediator but trapped between camps. Correct in realizing Marathas would return. But his youth and inexperience (as Najib noted) made his peace proposals unpersuasive.
The Young Prince's Choice: Vishwasrao rejecting escape isn't naive—it's politically/militarily sound. Leaving would destroy morale, suggest leadership lacks confidence, weaken army psychologically. His commitment to stay with army was strategically necessary.
The Moment of No Return: Once Najib and Idris convinced Abdali, negotiations were dead. No compromise possible when one side frames it as religious duty. The battle became inevitable—not from military logic but from religious conviction and political calculation.
Where We Left Off: Battle council meets. All options exhausted. No more negotiations possible. Tactics and strategies discussed (notes lost). Abdali has decided: total victory or total destruction. Marathas understand: fight now or starve later. The armies face each other waiting for someone to give the signal. January 14, 1761 is hours away.
Bhau tried everything: patience (waiting for reinforcements), diplomacy (offering surrender terms), religious claims (matching Afghans' Jihad with Maratha pride). Nothing worked. Because Najib Khan understood something Bhau was still learning: some conflicts can't be negotiated away when one side believes the other's fundamental existence threatens them. Abdali didn't fear losing soldiers—he feared that without this victory, Marathas would eventually push Afghans entirely out of India. So he said no to peace. And on January 14, Bhau finally understood: there was no option left but to kill or be killed.
Abdali's Strategic Dilemmas & The Road to Battle
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Najib Khan's Convincing Argument to Abdali
The Core Proposal Rejected:
- Suja through Shah Wali Khan offered: accept tribute, return to Afghanistan
- This appealed to Abdali (not interested in ruling India, just wanted tribute and resources)
- Seemed reasonable: get money, leave, let Marathas and locals figure it out
Najib's Counter-Argument:
"The Marathas are the thorn of Hindustan. If they were out of the way, the empire might be your majesty's whenever you should please."
What This Meant:
- Abdali's real goal: free access to India for plunder/tribute on his terms
- With Marathas gone: no effective power to resist him
- Could come back anytime and extract resources without opposition
- Tribute now = one-time payment; plunder later = unlimited extraction
The Political Reality:
- Delhi had no real power (just ceremonial Mughal emperor)
- No other force capable of defending against Afghan invasion
- If Marathas eliminated: India = open for exploitation
- Better outcome than accepting single tribute and leaving
Abdali's Original Hesitations
The Afghan Soldier Problem:
- Abdali's army had been in India over a year (much longer than expected)
- Soldiers thought campaign would last ~6 months maximum
- Homesickness and dissatisfaction increasing
- Long deployment = morale problem (soldiers want to go home)
This Was His "Biggest Rouse" (source of discontent)
The Kandahar Threat:
- October 1760: Back in Afghanistan, someone declared himself emperor
- Took over Kandahar (major Afghan city)
- This was challenge to Abdali's authority
- Created pressure to return home and consolidate power
Why Abdali Nearly Left:
- Long deployment affecting soldier morale
- Domestic challenge to his throne
- Maratha negotiations offered honorable exit (get tribute, preserve face)
- Could have justified going home due to internal threats
But He Stayed Because:
- Najib convinced him: eliminate threat now, exploit India later
- Long-term benefit outweighed short-term costs
- Kandahar issue could wait; Maratha problem couldn't
Historical Context: Kandahar & Hindu Afghanistan
The Gandhari Connection: From Hindu epic (Mahabharat):
- Gandhari was princess of Kandahar (originally called Gandhar)
- Married blind Rajput king Dhritarashtra
- When she learned he was blind, she blindfolded her own eyes to show solidarity
- This historical memory embedded in Hindu tradition
Original Hindu Kingdom:
- All of Afghanistan was originally Hindu kingdom
- Gandhar = kingdom of Gandhari's father
- Over centuries: became Kandahar
- Represents Hindu-Aryan heritage of region
Why This Matters Historically:
- Shows religious transformation of region
- Hindu kingdoms became Muslim kingdoms
- Parallels Maratha situation: Hindu vs. Muslim power struggle
- Region's entire identity shifted from Hindu to Islamic
The Rohila Position & Internal Afghan Divisions
Rohila Reluctance for War:
- Most Afghan/Rohila leaders did NOT want to fight
- Understood 50-50 odds = catastrophic risk
- Preferred negotiated settlement
- Would accept truce terms (certain outcome > uncertain battle)
Why Najib Stood Alone:
- Understood his own existential threat
- Long-term perspective: Marathas will eventually eliminate all Afghans in India
- Accepted Jihad argument: religious duty overrides material concerns
- Had support from Kazi Idris (religious authority)
The Pressure on Other Afghans:
- Once Najib and Idris committed to Jihad frame
- Other Afghan commanders "basically placed to fight the battle"
- Would be shamed (as "Ghazi" or warrior) if they advocated retreat
- Religious duty argument removed their objections
- Group psychology: once one leader commits religiously, others follow
Abdali Agrees with Najib
The Final Calculation:
- Shuja is "young and relatively inexperienced"
- His peace proposal shows naivety
- Marathas are fundamentally untrustworthy
- Pattern of behavior: constantly seek to eliminate Muslim power
- Any truce = temporary arrangement; hostilities will resume when balance shifts
The Decision:
- Accepted Najib's strategic analysis
- Agreed with Idris Khan's religious framing
- Confirmed: this must be decisive battle, no compromise
- Either total victory or total destruction of Marathas
- No middle ground acceptable
Why Abdali's Camp Was in Better Position
Supply Situation:
- Afghan supply lines intact from Doab/Mirath
- Regular food, water, firewood deliveries
- Animals not starving (unlike Maratha horses)
- Soldiers had adequate provisions
- Could sustain siege indefinitely
Contrast with Marathas:
- Trapped in northern region with no local friends
- Sikh traders transactional (cash only, no sympathy)
- Doab supplies cut off (Bundele dead, Gopal Ganesh's raids failed)
- Unable to sustain prolonged wait
Geographical Factor:
- Had Marathas been south of Panipat (in Deccan): similar good supply position
- Instead, in northern region controlled by hostile/neutral powers
- Isolation = vulnerability
- Abdali's supply advantage was decisive long-term factor
The Final Pressure on Marathas
Last-Ditch Money Mission Failed:
- January 6: Parashar Dadaji's courier mission ambushed
- 150,000-200,000 rupees lost or captured
- 2,000 soldiers killed/captured
- Would have sustained camp for weeks
- Loss created "real emergency situation"
Now Truly Desperate:
- No money remaining
- No supplies
- No hope for reinforcements
- No negotiated solution possible
- Only options: surrender or fight
The Decision Made:
- Maratha commanders demanded battle
- Bhau distributed remaining funds (50,000 rupees) as morale boost
- Battle council convened
- Tactics and strategies discussed (notes/details lost)
- Final decision: go to battle January 14
Suja's Last Mediation Effort
As Final Gambit:
- Sent Kashiraj Pandit to Najib Khan (last attempt to influence decision)
- Kashiraj represented Bhau's side
- Attempted to convince Najib of wisdom in peace
Najib's Response:
- Respectful to Suja ("his excellency is my prince")
- But firm: Suja is young and doesn't understand realities
- Offered to explain in person later
- But made clear: cannot accept truce
- Went directly to Abdali to report mediation attempt and reinforce his position
The Pattern:
- Najib constantly monitoring for peace attempts
- Immediately reporting to Abdali to keep him firm
- Preventing any softening of resolve
- Acting as ideological guardian of the decision to fight
Timeline (Final Strategic Phase)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 1760 | Kandahar revolt in Afghanistan (threat to Abdali) |
| Dec 1760 | Abdali considers truce option |
| Early Jan | Shah Wali Khan proposes peace terms to Abdali |
| Early Jan | Najib Khan refuses and argues for battle |
| Early Jan | Kazi Idris provides religious justification (Jihad) |
| Early Jan | Suja sends Kashiraj Pandit to negotiate with Najib |
| Early Jan | Najib reports mediation to Abdali |
| Jan 6 | Courier mission fails; Maratha funds lost |
| Jan 10 | Najib and Abdali confirm: battle only option |
| Jan 14 | Battle of Panipat |
Key Insights
The Kandahar Factor: Abdali's original hesitation to stay wasn't purely military—he had domestic throne to secure. But Najib's argument (eliminate Marathas now, rule India later) outweighed internal threats. Shows how immediate military advantage can override political convenience.
Religious Framing as Tiebreaker: When military/strategic arguments split Afghans (most wanted truce, Najib wanted battle), religious argument (Jihad) became decisive. Kazi Idris made refusing battle seem like betrayal of Islam. This psychological/spiritual argument overrode pragmatic concerns.
Najib's Strategic Genius: Understood something others missed: peace with Marathas buys time only, not safety. Marathas are structurally committed to eliminating Muslim power as part of their expansion. Therefore: must destroy them now while external power (Abdali) available. This analysis proved correct—Marathas did return within 5 years.
Suja's Mediation Failure: Being reasonable doesn't win against ideological commitment. Najib operated from assumption that compromise is impossible. Suja's offers, however generous, couldn't overcome this fundamental belief about Maratha intentions.
The Camp Supply Advantage: Abdali's superior supplies weren't accidental—they reflected his strategic success at controlling logistics. Marathas couldn't match this because they lacked local allies, were positioned in hostile/neutral territory, and had larger non-combatant population to feed.
Where We Left Off: Najib Khan has successfully convinced Abdali. Battle is now inevitable. Kandahar unrest in Afghanistan is setting, but Panipat is the priority. All negotiations dead. All options exhausted. Maratha camp is truly desperate (no money, no supplies, no hope). Afghan camp is determined (supplies secure, religious duty clear, strategic advantage understood). The armies now wait for the signal to engage. The next reading will likely cover the actual battle itself.
Abdali almost left. He had good reasons to leave: homesick soldiers, trouble at home, honorable offer of tribute on the table. But Najib Khan understood what Suja didn't: that some opponents can't be managed with concessions, only with complete elimination. He convinced Abdali that temporary peace = temporary problem. Real victory = permanent peace. And Kazi Idris gave it religious cover: not greed but Jihad. So Abdali stayed. The die was cast. Within days, the largest battle of the 18th century would begin.
The Point of No Return: Psychology, Decision-Making & Battle Imminent
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Moment Everything Changed
Settlement of Accounts (Metaphor):
- When people borrow and don't pay, eventually accounts must be settled
- Zero out the debt and start fresh
- Time has now come for Marathas and Afghans: accounts must be settled
- No more waiting, negotiating, or procrastinating possible
The Psychological Shift:
- Early months: Marathas procrastinated (waiting for reinforcements, hoping for fortune)
- They understood fighting would be epic battle with terrible casualties
- Results wouldn't be good for anybody—going to be bloody
- But procrastination is no longer viable option
Why the Shift:
- Supplies nearly exhausted (especially food, firewood, animals)
- Waiting = guaranteed slow death (starvation)
- Fighting = 50-50 chance (better odds than waiting)
- Someone must break first; better to control when/how
The Three Hopes That Failed
Hope 1: Relief from South
- Expected Peshwa or Nizam Ali to arrive with reinforcements
- Would attack Abdali from flank
- Bhau would hold center while south hammered from other side
- Status: Failed (Peshwa sick, Nizam obstructing, Raghunath Rao stuck in Deccan)
Hope 2: Starvation of Afghan Camp
- Bundele was strangling supply lines
- Abdali's camp suffering inflation and supply shortage
- Would eventually force Afghans to attack in weakened state
- Status: Failed (Bundele killed; Gopal Ganesh's raids repelled; supplies secured)
Hope 3: Negotiated Settlement
- Suja serving as intermediary
- Could arrange honorable terms, preserve army
- Abdali might accept tribute and leave
- Status: Failed (Najib and Idris Khan convinced Abdali to fight; negotiations rejected)
The Realization:
- All three paths have closed
- No external help coming
- No way to weaken opponent gradually
- No peaceful solution possible
- Only path forward: direct confrontation
The Single-Mindedness of Victory
Abdali's Declaration:
"Either I gain victory or I completely wipe you out. Total victory or total destruction. Nothing in between."
Irshamji (Single-Mindedness):
- Hindi/Sanskrit word capturing complete focus on one goal
- Removing all alternative options mentally
- Committing fully to outcome regardless of cost
- Making it binary: win or die
What This Meant:
- No retreat option
- No half-measures
- No compromise acceptable
- Must fight until one side is destroyed
- Psychological advantage: when both sides know it's fight-to-death, aggression increases
Vishwasrao & The Question of Escape
Bhau's Dilemma:
- Took responsibility for young prince's safety
- Vishwasrao sent by Peshwa to gain battle experience
- But now situation appeared hopeless
- Offered option: "You can go back, I'll handle the battle"
Vishwasrao's Reasoning for Going:
- "I came to get battle hardening experience"
- "I came to learn tactics, strategies, alliances"
- "This is that battle"
- "I'm not leaving the army that protected me"
- Refused to desert comrades, especially after they'd protected him
Why Bhau's Proposal Made Sense:
- Protects heir to empire
- Preserves young leadership for post-war recovery
- Demonstrates that Peshwa isn't throwing away princes
- Politically wise move
Why Bhau Couldn't Force Him:
- Vishwasrao was technically commander-in-chief (by title)
- Bhau held only campaign authority
- Can't compel royal to abandon post
- More importantly: forcing him would destroy army morale
- If even princes flee, soldiers lose confidence
The Real Reason Vishwasrao Stayed:
- Not youthful foolishness but military necessity
- Army morale depends on leadership example
- If prince escapes, soldiers ask: why should we stay?
- Leadership must show complete commitment
The Battle Council Convenes
The Participants:
- Sadashiv Rao Bhau (overall campaign commander)
- Vishwasrao (Commander-in-Chief, young but committed)
- Malhar Rao Holkar (experienced commander)
- Jankoji Shinde (age 22-23, head of Shinde clan—actually quite young himself)
- Other major warriors/commanders (all experienced battle veterans)
Only Vishwasrao Lacked Experience:
- Rest were tested in multiple campaigns
- Had seen many battles, understood tactics and strategy
- Holkar and Shinde: both older, seasoned commanders
- Good balance of youth (determination) and experience (wisdom)
The Consensus Decision:
"There is tremendous hunger and shortage of supplies. Instead of dying with hunger, let's die on the battlefield."
The Logic:
- This problem (starvation) won't be solved by negotiation or truce
- Can't negotiate away the supply shortage
- Only approach: fight it out and gain victory
- Victory = escape from impossible situation
- Defeat = same starvation anyway (just quicker)
Decisions Made:
- Go to battle (confirmed)
- Decision point: how to fight and when to do it
- Tactical details: lost (no notes survived)
The Morale Reality Before Battle
Physical Condition:
- Soldiers demoralized by waiting and starvation
- Dead animals in camp (stench affecting everyone)
- Cold weather taking toll on unprepared Southerners
- Animals dying without food
Mental State:
- But combat will remained strong
- Desire to fight still intense on both sides
- Despite physical hardship, no panic or defeatism (yet)
- Soldiers understood what was coming
Bhau's Inspirational Role:
- Spent 50,000 rupees distributing money to army
- Told them: "You've done great job so far, continue fighting valiantly"
- Acknowledged: "You're not done yet, we're going to final battle"
- Attempted to maintain morale through recognition and funds
Why This Mattered:
- Shows Bhau understood psychological warfare
- Soldiers need acknowledgment of effort
- Money (even if small per person) shows care for welfare
- "Great job so far" frames starvation as sacrifice, not failure
The Supply Situation at This Point
Maratha Supplies:
- Food nearly exhausted
- Firewood scarce (essential for survival in cold)
- Money completely gone (after courier ambush)
- Animals dying from starvation
- 40-50,000 dependents consuming resources without contributing
Afghan Supplies:
- Intact supply lines from Doab and other areas
- Regular deliveries of grains, animals, firewood
- No shortage or starvation
- Soldiers adequately fed and equipped
- Can sustain indefinite siege
The Asymmetry:
- Afghans in comfort; Marathas in crisis
- This advantage doesn't matter in pitched battle
- Once armies clash, supply lines become irrelevant (few days of intense fighting)
- Paradoxically: Afghan supply advantage works against them (removes incentive to attack)
- Maratha supply crisis forces action (removes choice)
The Role of Sikh Traders
Geographic Reality:
- Panipat very close to Punjab/Sikh territory
- Marathas tried reaching out to Sikh traders for supplies
- Sikhs = pragmatic merchants, not ideological allies
Sikh Position:
- No established relationship with Marathas
- No religious or political kinship
- Transactional only: money for goods
- Treated Marathas as outsiders
- Required cash/gold for all transactions (no credit or sympathy)
What This Meant:
- Marathas couldn't leverage any alliance
- Couldn't appeal to religious/cultural kinship
- Couldn't negotiate better terms
- Had to pay full price in hard currency (which they didn't have)
- Sikhs remained neutral, waiting to see who wins
Kashiraj Pandit's Mediation Role
The Key Intermediary:
- Courtier/translator for Suja Uddhawla
- Fluent in Farsi (Persian) and Indian languages
- Could communicate between Persian/Afghan world and Indian world
- Traveling between camps attempting to negotiate
How Communication Worked:
- Bhau would write letters to Kashiraj (hand-written)
- Letters passed through Suja's channels to Afghan side
- Kasraj would deliver proposals to Shah Wali Khan, Najib Khan
- Afghan responses came back through same channels
Why Through Kashiraj:
- Direct Maratha-Afghan communication too formal/hostile
- Using Suja as intermediary shows neutrality (sort of)
- Kashiraj's linguistic skills bridge cultural gap
- Allows proposals without loss of face
Timeline (Final 5 Days)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 9-10 | Final negotiation attempts ongoing |
| Jan 10 | Najib Khan refuses all peace proposals |
| Jan 10 | Kazi Idris frames battle as Jihad |
| Jan 10 | Abdali confirms: total victory or total destruction |
| Jan 10-11 | Kashiraj fails to sway Najib in last mediation |
| Jan 11-12 | Maratha battle council meets |
| Jan 12-13 | Tactical discussions (details lost) |
| Jan 13 | Final decisions made |
| Jan 14, 1761 | Battle of Panipat begins |
Key Insights
The Shifting Psychology: Early months (Oct-Dec): waiting was viable strategy. By January: waiting became death sentence. When supplies run out, passivity = suicide. Activity (battle) becomes the only survival option psychologically.
Vishwasrao's Choice as Symbol: Young prince refusing escape isn't just courage—it's strategic necessity. If even princes flee, army morale collapses. His decision to stay is what held the army together in final hours.
Negotiation Window Closing: As Jan progressed, each side became MORE committed, not less. Najib's religious argument strengthened. Marathas' desperation deepened. Negotiations became impossible not because neither wanted them, but because both sides had invested too much (in commitment, in sacrifice) to back down.
The Sikh Neutrality as Indicator: Sikhs refusing credit/sympathy shows no one in north saw Marathas as winning. Even potential allies wouldn't trust a Maratha victory (otherwise would advance credit). This isolation was itself devastating.
Bhau's Battle Readiness: Despite everything (desperation, starvation, isolation), when battle council met, it was full of experienced warriors. Bhau had one thing going for him: quality of commanders. If the battle were just about military skill, Marathas had it. If it was about supply/momentum/morale, Afghans had it.
Where We Left Off: Battle council has concluded. Tactics discussed but lost to history. All three hopes have failed. All negotiation attempts exhausted. Both sides now mentally committed to fight-to-death. Soldiers in both camps know this is it. The morning of January 14, 1761: armies will engage. The biggest 18th century battle is about to begin.
By January 10, everyone understood. Marathas: reinforcements aren't coming, supplies are gone, waiting means starvation. Better to die fighting. Afghans: peace means Marathas will return later anyway, better to eliminate them now. Both sides stopped looking for escape routes. Both sides made peace with death as likely outcome. Vishwasrao refused to leave. Bhau distributed what little money remained. Najib kept whispering to Abdali. On January 14, they would find out which philosophy would prevail: the pragmatism of peace or the certainty of jihad.
The Breaking Point: Commanders Demand Battle & Strategic Options Collapse
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Three-Month Accumulation of Horror
The Stench Problem (From Abdali's Biography):
- After three months stationary in one place: ~100,000+ people in small area
- Constant skirmishes occurring (minor battles daily)
- Dead bodies in ditches (human and animal)
- Uncleanliness compounded by dead body stench
- Became unbearable—something HAD to be done
- But Marathas couldn't move away from camp (trapped by Afghan siege)
The Desperation: From Abdali's Farsi biography:
"The Marathas after the late battle were confined within their fortification and their distresses arising from stenches and scarcity of provisions increased every day."
This was Abdali's strategy working: make them desperate enough to attack in weakened state.
The Commanders' Revolt at Bhau's Tent
The Informal Assembly:
- Important commanders and sardar (chiefs) crowded around Bhau's tent
- Not threatening but intensely demanding
- Totally bothered by continuing situation: how much longer to wait?
- People dying, animals dying, stench unbearable
The Ultimatum: From the commanders (reported by Kashiraj Pandit 19 years later):
"We don't want to die here. We haven't eaten anything for two days. Don't keep us dying here without food and water. We will go to battle with zest. Whatever happens will happen. We don't care. But we can't stay here."
The Psychological Shift:
- Not worried about dying on battlefield
- Deeply worried about dying slowly here without supplies
- Better to die fighting than rotting in camp
- Frame: death in battle = honor; death from starvation = degradation
Bhau's Decision-Making Process
The Acceptance: Bhau said: "I agree with you and we will do whatever is agreed upon by the majority."
This was crucial: decision made by CONSENSUS, not just command.
The Strategic Dilemma: Bhau was wrestling with three conflicting concerns:
-
Afghan Strength Growing Daily:
- "Gilchiyat se bar diwas bahut jaali" (Afghan power increasing daily)
- Our army is getting rotten (from lack of food/supplies)
- Many horses dead; cavalry becoming foot soldiers
-
The Escape Route Problem:
- Wanted to go to Delhi (on return route to Deccan)
- But Afghan army blocking the Delhi road
- Forest too thick on other routes—no good paths out
- Trapped: blocked forward, blocked to sides, surrounded by forest
-
The Geometric Trap:
- Marathas: on western side of Yamuna
- Afghans: to the south, blocking Delhi road
- Can't go north (back to original position—makes no sense)
- Can't go west (thick forest)
- Can't go directly south (Afghan army)
- Only real option: go southeast toward Yamuna, then follow river south to Delhi
The Initial Plan: Retreat While Fighting
Bhau's Concept:
- Use artillery in front to keep Afghans at distance
- Move whole entourage (including 40-50,000 non-combatants) down south along Yamuna bank
- Not primarily to fight but to escape
- Artillery creates "no man's land"—keeps Afghans from advancing too close
- Slow progression toward Delhi
Retreat & Fight Simultaneously:
- Can't do both effectively (Holkar's objection)
- Must either fight or retreat, not both
- But Bhau's idea: limited skirmishes/artillery duels while moving, NOT full battle
The Goal:
- Reach Delhi where Maratha garrison stationed
- Get supplies, rejuvenate army
- Then decide next steps from position of strength
- Not to fight all-out battle, but to escape with army intact
Commander Disagreements
Shinde & Holkar's Position:
- Agreed plan made sense IF they survive the escape
- Right now under duress and starving
- Better to move to secure location with supplies first
- THEN fight if necessary
- But don't engage all-out battle while retreating
Malhar Rao Holkar's Specific Objection:
- Can't retreat and fight at same time
- This is militarily impossible
- If you're fighting, you're committed; if retreating, you're committed
- You can't do both effectively simultaneously
Bhau's Response:
- Acknowledged difficulty but it's the plan we have
- Doesn't mean starting tomorrow though
- Proposed delay until Sunday (6 days away)
The Timeline Argument
Bhau's Pressure:
- Today is Tuesday
- Waiting until Sunday = 6 more days
- "In 6 days, people will die from starvation or go join Afghans"
- No point in waiting if people are dying anyway
- START TOMORROW (Wednesday)
Why This Mattered:
- Every day in camp = more deaths from starvation
- Delay meant giving more time for demoralization to set in
- Soldiers losing strength daily (no food for 2+ days already)
- Moving action sooner = while troops still have some strength left
The Non-Combatant Problem
Who Had to Be Protected:
- Women (wives, families)
- Elderly men
- Pilgrims/holy site tourists (came for religious reasons)
- Maintenance staff (cooks, servants, logistics)
- Merchants (needed for supply transactions)
- Non-fighting support personnel
How It Would Work:
- Would place them in center of rectangular formation
- Army surrounds them as they move
- Defense of non-combatants: only AFTER Afghans attack
- Until then, focused on moving and artillery positioning
The Burden:
- 40-50,000 extra mouths to feed
- Don't contribute to fighting
- Consume supplies daily
- Slow down movement
- Required dedicated protection during battle
- But can't abandon them (political/moral crisis)
The Psychological Reality
Death Preference Shift: Originally: "Better to die fighting than starving" Now refined to: "Better to try escaping and fighting limited battles than die in camp" This was a tactical shift, not just emotional
The Officers' Thinking:
- They calculated odds
- All-out pitched battle = catastrophic losses both sides
- Escape attempt while fighting = lower losses, keeps army intact
- Better to lose some to escape than lose all in apocalyptic battle
Abdali's Biography Account
The Decisive Moment (January 14): From Farsi source:
"On Wednesday, the sixth of Jamaudi, the second month, they drew up their forces on the plane, placing the European artillery in front and attacked the enemy."
This confirms: Marathas initiated with artillery in front, planning forward movement (southeast toward Yamuna).
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Early Jan | Commanders assemble at Bhau's tent |
| Early Jan | "For two days we haven't eaten anything" |
| Early Jan | Decision: escape plan approved |
| Jan 13 | Bhau proposes waiting until Sunday (6 days) |
| Jan 13 | Commanders reject: "Too many will die in 6 days" |
| Jan 13 | Bhau agrees: "Start tomorrow (Wednesday)" |
| Jan 14 morning | Forces drawn up with artillery in front |
| Jan 14 | March begins southeast toward Yamuna |
Key Insights
The Humiliating Reality: Bhau didn't want to fight. He wanted to escape. The "battle" of Panipat was never intended as a pitched battle—it was intended as a running retreat with artillery support. This completely changes the historical narrative.
Commander Consensus as Strength: Bhau's decision was legitimate because commanders agreed. It wasn't dictatorship; it was consensus under crisis. This gave orders legitimacy even though the situation was desperate.
The Starvation Threshold: Two days without food was THE breaking point. Not psychological but physiological. Soldiers at that point will fight or do anything because their bodies demand action.
The Geometric Trap: Marathas had nowhere to go except toward Afghans. All other routes blocked (forest, rivers, impossible terrain). This forced the confrontation even though Bhau wanted to avoid it.
Artillery-Centric Strategy: This reveals Marathas were thinking: artillery > cavalry > infantry. They wanted to use long-range weapons to avoid close combat where Afghan numbers could overwhelm them. Revolutionary for Indian warfare (more European-influenced approach).
Where We Left Off: Decision finalized: march southeast toward Yamuna tomorrow (January 14). Form rectangular formation with non-combatants in center. Use artillery to keep Afghans at bay while moving south along Yamuna bank toward Delhi. Goal: escape with army intact, not fight all-out battle. The plan is extremely ambitious—requires perfect discipline and coordination.
Bhau had wanted to retreat. He never wanted the all-out battle that everyone remembers. His plan was elegant: form a moving rectangle, put artillery in front, move southeast toward safety, keep Afghans at arm's length with gunfire, reach Delhi. But it required something Maratha armies didn't specialize in: perfect discipline and formation discipline, not individual heroics. It also required Afghans to let them pass peacefully. Both assumptions would prove wrong by the end of January 14.
The Escape Plan: Rectangular Formation & Artillery-Driven Strategy
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Why Bhau Didn't Want This Battle
The Strategic Reality:
- Both armies equally matched (as Chanakya would say: uncertain outcome)
- Maratha army demoralized, down, starving, losing animals
- Afghan army comfortable, supplied, not in urgent need
- 50-50 odds of victory—too much risk
- Bhau's preference: avoid pitched battle entirely
The Support Plan Issue:
- Plan required defending non-fighting staff ONLY AFTER Afghans attacked
- Until then: focused on moving, forming up, establishing artillery positions
- Non-combatants wouldn't be defended proactively—only defensively when needed
- This included: logistics staff, cooks, merchants, women, holy pilgrims
Why This Structure:
- Can't spare forces for preemptive defense
- Need all available soldiers for the formation and movement
- Defense of non-combatants only becomes active when battle unavoidable
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Artillery Plan
The Core Concept:
- Arrange forces in rectangular formation
- Non-combatants protected in center
- Artillery positioned at front and flanks
- Rectangle slowly inches toward Yamuna (to the east)
The Movement Sequence:
- Start moving southeast from current position
- Travel ~8-10 miles to reach Yamuna bank
- Once at Yamuna: place river at back (physical barrier)
- Continue moving south along riverbank
- Keep Afghans at bay with artillery fire
- Eventually reach Delhi (~10-15 miles further south)
The River Advantage:
- Yamuna at "low raft" or low tide season (can cross if needed)
- Provides natural barrier to back of formation
- Prevents Afghans from surrounding them
- Gives defenders advantage of position
The Key Disagreement: Holkar's Objection
Holkar's Position:
- Can't retreat and fight at same time
- Either you fight (committed) or retreat (committed)
- Doing both means doing neither well
- This is militarily impossible
The Fundamental Tension:
- Formation requires discipline and holding position
- But if holding position against Afghans, that IS a battle
- If moving/retreating, can't pause for combat
- These are contradictory objectives
Bhau's Counter:
- Understood the difficulty
- Plan is sophisticated but necessary
- Emphasized: if executed properly, mostly artillery battle (not hand-to-hand)
- Don't need to break formation to fight—artillery does the fighting
The Rectangular Formation Strategy
The Shape & Purpose:
- Rectangle = defensive formation (not aggressive)
- All sides protected by soldiers/artillery
- Center = vulnerable non-combatants
- Front = strongest (artillery + elite warriors)
- Sides = adequate defense
- Back (eventually) = Yamuna River
The Movement:
- Entire rectangle moves as unit
- No breaking ranks
- Stay disciplined
- Move southeast first, then south along river
The Critical Requirement:
"To make this plan work in a fruitful manner, the most important thing was extremely strict discipline. Because nobody can break the ranks. If they do, it falls into normal combat."
This was THE critical weakness: Marathas weren't disciplined formations. They were cavalry/individual warrior cultures.
Holkar's Specific Tactical Question
The Problem:
- Afghan camp is to the south
- Maratha rectangle moving southeast toward Yamuna
- When rectangle reaches Yamuna and turns south, they'll be on RIGHT SIDE of Afghan position
- "How are you going to go past the right hand side of Afghan army? They are not going to let you just pass by."
The Challenge:
- Movement path brings Marathas into close contact with Afghan right flank
- Afghans will naturally oppose/attack this flank
- If formation breaks, it's full battle (not what Bhau wants)
Ibrahim Gardi's Answer: Chaos Through Artillery
The Solution:
- Artillery concentrates on Afghan RIGHT FLANK
- Creates "chaos"—destruction, deaths, soldiers running
- Destroys the Afghan right flank before it can organize resistance
- Vacuum created = space for rectangle to pass through
The Execution:
- Artillery softens right flank
- Whatever resistance remains: handled by strong right flank of rectangle
- As rectangle moves, Holkar positions at back (rear guard)
- Holkar faces ire of Afghan army while rectangle escapes
- Gardi follows with artillery, maintaining pressure
Why This Upset Holkar:
- He'd be fighting rearguard action while trying to move
- High casualty position
- Exactly what he warned about: fighting while retreating
- Not glamorous or strategic, just brutal holding action
The Discipline Problem
Why Discipline Matters:
- If soldiers break formation to pursue Afghans: loses strength of rectangle
- If soldiers break to retreat: loses cohesion, becomes chaotic
- If soldiers get distracted by anything: entire plan collapses
- Rectangle's strength is ONLY in maintained formation
Why Marathas Struggled With This:
- Maratha military culture: cavalry charges, individual prowess, heroic feats
- NOT formation discipline like European armies
- NOT standing ground while maintaining lines
- This plan required behavior opposite to their tradition
Example of What Could Go Wrong:
- Artillery creates chaos on Afghan right flank
- Some Maratha warriors see disorganized Afghans
- Decide to pursue/kill them (traditional warrior thinking)
- Break ranks to charge
- Rectangle loses cohesion
- Becomes regular battle (exactly what Bhau wanted to avoid)
The Path to Delhi
The Geographic Logic:
- Yamuna ultimately reaches Delhi
- By moving along Yamuna bank, path naturally leads to Delhi
- Delhi has Maratha garrison (supplies, reinforcements)
- Reach Delhi = reach safety
- Distance: ~10-15 miles south from Yamuna
The River Route:
- Yamuna on left/back side
- Rectangle facing right (toward Afghans)
- Front facing mostly south/toward Afghan lines
- Continuous movement preventing encirclement
Why This Path Worked:
- Afghans can't encircle (river blocks)
- Afghans can only attack right flank
- Rectangle moving away (toward Delhi) = not standing to fight
- Minimal losses if discipline maintained
Maratha Confidence in Afghan Passivity
The Assumption:
"Afghan Marathas were sure that the Afghan army will not obstruct the Maratha movement going towards the south along the Yamuna bank."
The Logic:
- If Marathas don't engage in all-out war, Afghans won't either
- Both sides would suffer enormous casualties
- Afghans have no reason to force total destruction battle
- Both armies have already lost heavily
- Symbolic resistance expected, but not all-out attack
The Problem With This Assumption:
- Assumes Afghans want to avoid catastrophic battle
- Assumes both sides will follow unwritten "rules"
- Doesn't account for Abdali's "total victory or total destruction" mindset
- Najib Khan was committed to fighting to finish
The Risk Calculation
If Plan Succeeds:
- Reach Delhi with army intact
- Get supplies, rejuvenate
- Position of strength with garrison support
- Can continue fighting from favorable position
If Plan Fails (Afghans Attack All-Out):
- Rectangle breaks apart in chaotic battle
- Non-combatants caught in open
- Worst possible outcome
- Entire army destroyed along with thousands of dependents
Why Bhau Took This Risk:
- Staying in camp = certain slow death (starvation)
- Moving = chance (50-50) at reaching Delhi safely
- Commanders demanded action
- Staying meant losing army to demoralization/starvation
- Moving means at least trying to escape
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 13 | Commanders demand action |
| Jan 13 | Bhau proposes: move Wednesday (next day) |
| Jan 13 | Plan finalized: rectangular formation, artillery-driven |
| Jan 14 dawn | Forces organized into rectangle |
| Jan 14 | March begins southeast toward Yamuna |
Key Insights
The Discipline Paradox: Marathas are warrior culture (individual heroics) trying to execute European-style formation warfare. This was their fundamental weakness. The plan required something they never trained for.
The Afghan Right Flank: This was chosen as breakthrough point because it was most vulnerable to artillery and most easily disrupted. Strategic insight: focus maximum firepower on one flank, break through there, run.
Holkar's Reluctant Agreement: He never loved the plan. But he accepted because: (1) commanded to, (2) consensus decision, (3) alternative (staying/fighting all-out) was worse. His misgivings would prove prescient.
The Psychological vs. Military Distinction: Bhau wanted psychological escape ("we're not fighting, we're leaving"). But military reality was: moving formation under fire = fighting. His attempt to reframe battle as "escape" was denial of military reality.
Yamuna as Key Resource: River provided the one defensive advantage Marathas could use effectively: natural barrier. Bhau understood this was crucial to plan's viability.
Where We Left Off: Plan fully articulated. Rectangle to be formed. March southeast toward Yamuna beginning January 14. All commanders briefed. Discipline emphasized as critical requirement. Forces ready to move. But whether Marathas can maintain formation discipline under fire while moving is untested. The next reading will likely describe what actually happens when the movement begins.
Bhau's plan was clever but fragile. It required three things simultaneously: maintaining perfect formation, fighting artillery duel with Afghans, protecting 40,000+ non-combatants, and moving 10+ miles to safety. It also required Afghans to cooperate by not pressing all-out attack. On paper, it might work. In practice, against an enemy committed to total destruction and a force unaccustomed to formation discipline, it was a gamble. The next few hours would tell if it was a brilliant escape plan or just postponed catastrophe.
The Rectangle Plan Finalized: Artillery, Discipline & The Escape Route
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Recap: Bhau's Core Strategy
The Formation:
- Rectangle shape
- Non-combatants in center
- Army surrounding them
- Slow movement toward Yamuna River
The Movement:
- Go southeast first (8-10 miles) to reach Yamuna
- Place river at back (east)
- Continue south along river toward Delhi
- Keep Afghan army on right flank
The Distance:
- Current location to Yamuna: ~8-10 miles southeast
- Yamuna to Delhi: ~10-15 miles south
- Total journey: ~18-25 miles
- Expected duration: 2-3 days of continuous movement
The Discipline Question
Why It's Critical:
"The most important thing was extremely strict discipline. Because nobody can break the ranks. If you break the rank, then it is all out war."
The Dynamic:
- Rectangles strength: ONLY in formation
- Once broken: becomes regular battle
- Regular battle = Bhau's plan fails
- Regular battle = all-out war (exactly what he wanted to avoid)
The Problem:
- Marathas are NOT a formation-based military culture
- They're cavalry, warriors, individual fighters
- This plan requires standing in line, holding position, not breaking
- It's asking them to behave opposite to their tradition
How The Rectangle Breaks Through
Step 1: Artillery Creates Chaos
- Ibrahim Gardi's artillery targets Afghan right flank
- Massive bombardment and destruction
- Creates "vacuum"—spaces, deaths, disorganized soldiers
- Afghan right flank temporarily incapacitated
Step 2: Strong Right Flank Advances
- Maratha rectangle's right side is strong (elite warriors)
- Moves through the vacuum created by artillery
- Encounters minimal organized resistance
- Pushes through the gap
Step 3: Holkar's Rearguard
- Holkar positioned at rectangle's back (rear guard)
- Faces approaching Afghan army
- Holding action while rectangle escapes
- Gets "ire of the Afghan army" (heavy combat)
- Gardi's artillery provides covering fire from back
Step 4: Continuous Movement
- Don't pause, don't consolidate
- Keep moving southeast toward Yamuna
- Artillery keeps firing to intimidate/damage Afghans
- Rectangle never stops—perpetual motion escape
Holkar's Concern (Proven Right)
His Objection:
- Can't retreat and fight simultaneously
- Rearguard position forces him into prolonged combat
- While moving/retreating = no good fighting position
- Forces can't be effective in both roles at once
Why He Was Right:
- Rearguard is historically highest casualty position
- Fighting while moving = disorganized fight
- Afghanistan superior in open field combat
- Holkar's forces would bear the brunt
Why Bhau's Plan Needed Him Anyway:
- Someone has to hold off Afghans
- Only Holkar strong enough to do it effectively
- Necessary sacrifice for rectangle to escape
- Accepted because alternative (staying) was death anyway
The Confidence in Afghan Restraint
Maratha Assumption:
"Afghan Marathas were confident that the Afghan army would not stop the Maratha army from going towards Delhi, along the Yamuna bank."
The Theory:
- If Marathas don't specifically seek all-out battle
- Afghans won't force one either
- All-out war = catastrophic losses both sides
- Better to let them go than lose armies in total destruction
- May give "symbolic resistance" but not all-out attack
Why This Made Sense:
- Abdali had already achieved major military goals
- Afghan soldiers want to go home (long deployment)
- Supplying huge army is expensive/difficult
- No reason to pursue total annihilation if Marathas leave
Why This Was Wrong:
- Underestimated Abdali's commitment to total destruction
- Didn't account for Najib Khan's influence (want total Maratha elimination)
- Didn't account for religious Jihad argument (Kazi Idris)
- Misread the situation: Afghans WANTED total destruction
The Yamuna Advantage
Geographic Position:
- Yamuna on left/east side of rectangle
- Acts as natural barrier/wall
- Prevents flanking from that direction
- Forces Afghans to attack from right side only
The Tactical Benefit:
- Rectangle only has to defend 3 sides (right, front, back)
- River does 4th side defense
- Reduces perimeter, concentrates forces
- Defensive advantage in moving formation
The Escape Route:
- Yamuna leads to Delhi
- Delhi is destination anyway
- River provides natural corridor to safety
- Geographic logic: follow Yamuna = reach Delhi
The Artillery-Centric Approach
Why Artillery Matters:
- Long range (can hit Afghans from distance)
- Can create chaos before close combat
- Keeps armies separated (no hand-to-hand)
- Rectangle can move while artillery covers
The Problem:
- Requires discipline from soldiers (not breaking ranks to pursue wounded Afghans)
- Requires constant supplies (ammunition)
- Requires gunners to stay focused/professional
- Revolutionary for Indian warfare (Maratha forces weren't used to this)
The Assumption:
- Artillery superiority will keep Afghans at distance
- Limited close combat (hand-to-hand)
- Mostly artillery duel + movement
- If discipline maintained: casualties minimized
Potential for Surprise Flank Attack
The Risk Identified:
"Remember, if the Maratha army was able to reach the Afghans, then there would have been a threat of falling into the hands of Abdali."
What This Means:
- If rectangle reaches far enough south
- Could potentially get BEHIND Afghan army
- Could attack Afghan right flank from unexpected angle
- This would be ideal for Marathas (surprise attack)
Why Afghans Would Fear This:
- Rectangle is moving toward Yamuna/Delhi
- If it reaches too far, could swing around
- Could hammer Afghan flank from side/back
- Would force Afghans to engage all-out (losing advantage of supplies/position)
The Strategic Implication:
- Both sides fear the other will use movement to gain advantage
- Neither side trusts the "no all-out battle" assumption
- Each watching for moment to strike decisively
- Confidence in restraint is fragile
Timeline (Final Hours Before March)
| Date | Time | Event |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 13 | Afternoon | Commanders assemble, demand action |
| Jan 13 | Evening | Bhau announces plan: move next day |
| Jan 13 | Night | Preparations: organize rectangle, brief commanders |
| Jan 14 | Dawn | Forces organized into rectangle formation |
| Jan 14 | Morning | March begins southeast toward Yamuna |
Key Insights
The False Confidence: Marathas convinced themselves Afghans wouldn't force all-out battle. This wasn't based on communication or agreement—just assumption. Afghans never agreed to let them leave.
The Rectangle as Psychological Tool: Beyond military function, the rectangle symbolized: "We're leaving in order, not fleeing in panic." Psychological message to army (we're organized), to Afghans (we're prepared), to Marathas themselves (discipline matters now).
The Holkar Sacrifice: By accepting rearguard role despite objections, Holkar was accepting he'd bear heavy casualties. This was real strategic sacrifice—not heroic, just brutal necessity.
The Yamuna as Goal: Everything in the plan depends on reaching Yamuna. Once there, half the work is done (river provides defense). If Afghans prevent reaching Yamuna, plan fails completely.
The Discipline Requirement as Weakness: Bhau knew this. This is why he emphasized it so heavily. He was asking warriors to do something unnatural to them. Their success depended on soldiers overcoming their own nature.
Where We Left Off: Preparations complete. Forces organized. March about to begin (January 14 morning). Everything depends on: (1) maintaining rectangle discipline, (2) artillery effectiveness, (3) reaching Yamuna safely, (4) Afghan willingness to let them leave. Only one of these assumptions will hold. The next reading will likely describe what actually happens when movement begins.
Bhau had a plan. It was clever. It required discipline, courage, and luck. It also required trusting that Afghans would honor an unspoken truce. On the morning of January 14, the rectangle formed. Soldiers took positions. Artillery moved to front. Non-combatants settled in center. Holkar took the back. And Bhau gave the signal to move southeast. What happened next would determine if it was brilliant escape or catastrophic last stand.
The Plan Explained: European Rectangle Strategy & Why It Matters
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Plan Recap (In Simple Terms)
What Bhau Wants:
- Get out of current position WITHOUT all-out war
- Escape south toward Delhi with army intact
- Keep Afghan army at distance with artillery
- Avoid hand-to-hand combat (where Afghans superior)
How the Rectangle Works:
- Form rectangular formation (all soldiers around perimeter)
- Put non-combatants in center (protected by formation)
- Artillery in front (keeps Afghans away)
- Move southeast toward Yamuna River
- Once at river: follow south along bank toward Delhi
- Keep extreme discipline (no breaking ranks)
Holkar's Objection (Valid)
The Problem:
- Can't retreat and fight simultaneously
- Rearguard position (Holkar's role) forces him into continuous combat
- This is militarily impossible to do effectively
- Fighting while moving = no control, disorganized chaos
Why Bhau Overruled Him:
- It's the only viable option available
- Staying = slow death from starvation
- Fighting all-out = catastrophic losses both sides
- Escape attempt = only way to preserve army
- Recognized difficulty but "it's what we have to do"
The European Roots of the Strategy
Who Invented It:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi studied under French generals
- Strategy comes from French military tradition
- NOT an Indian innovation
Famous Historical Examples:
-
Udgir Battle: Nizam used exact same rectangle strategy
- Kept Maratha army waiting outside for SEVERAL DAYS
- Marathas couldn't break the formation
- Effective for extended periods
-
Waterloo: Duke of Wellington's famous rectangle
- French attacked repeatedly
- Couldn't breach the disciplined English formation
- Protected the "tail" (non-combatants/supply) while maintaining defense
Why It Works (In Theory):
- Protects vulnerable personnel (women, dependents, supplies)
- Maintains concentrated defensive power
- Artillery can rain fire while soldiers hold formation
- Moving formation keeps initiative
The "Tooth to Tail" Concept
Definition:
- "Tooth" = combat effective forces (soldiers, cavalry, artillery)
- "Tail" = non-combat support (cooks, servants, merchants, women, pilgrims)
The Problem:
- Maratha camp had massive tail: 40-50,000 non-combatants
- Only ~75,000 actual fighting forces
- Ratio: ~1 tooth for every 1 tail (very vulnerable)
- European armies had better ratios
How Rectangle Solves It:
- Rectangles specifically designed to protect the "tail"
- Non-combatants shielded by soldier ring
- Allows movement with large support population
- Works IF discipline maintained
Artillery as The Real Weapon
Maratha Advantage:
- Long-range artillery (European-style)
- Range: 1-1.5 kilometers
- Can keep armies separated
- Prevents close combat
Afghan Disadvantage:
- Didn't have comparable long-range artillery
- Relied on cavalry, elephants, close combat
- Inferior in artillery duel
- Better at hand-to-hand/charges
The Gardi Strategy:
- Let artillery do the fighting
- Keep armies separated by sustained fire
- Prevent opportunity for Afghan cavalry to charge
- Rectangle moves while artillery maintains distance
The Discipline Problem (Critical)
Why It's Essential:
"If you break the rank, then it is all out war. If soldiers get into hand-to-hand combat, there is likelihood of getting into all out battle."
The Paradox:
- Maratha strength: individual warrior prowess, cavalry charges, heroics
- Rectangle needs: formation discipline, staying in line, NOT breaking to pursue
- These are opposite requirements
- Warriors naturally want to fight; rectangle requires NOT fighting
If Discipline Breaks:
- Soldiers see disorganized Afghans after artillery strike
- Instinct: charge and kill them (traditional Maratha way)
- One charge breaks formation
- Whole rectangle collapses
- Becomes all-out battle (worst case scenario)
- Bhau's careful plan evaporates
The Afghan Strategy Against It
What Afghans Would Do:
- Watch for Maratha right flank (where it's closest)
- Try to punch wedge into rectangle
- Attempt to separate cavalry from foot soldiers
- Create chaos and collapse formation from inside
The Defense:
- Artillery keeps them too far away to breach
- Strong right flank of rectangle handles any penetration
- Rectangle keeps moving (never stopping to consolidate)
- Movement prevents Afghan maneuvers from taking effect
Guns & Reloading Problem
Maratha Guns:
- Country-made, inaccurate
- One bullet at a time
- Took ~5 minutes to reload
- Very inefficient for sustained battle
The Reload Gap:
- Artillery fires → Afghan charge → guns being reloaded
- Window where guns can't fire
- Rectangle must hold discipline during this gap
- If soldiers break during gap → Afghan penetration
- That's why "no breaking ranks" is absolute requirement
Solution:
- Artillery and soldiers working together
- Coordinated firing (some guns always loaded)
- Soldiers don't break—they hold formation
- Rectangle keeps moving even during reload cycles
Equipment & Preparation
Officer Armor:
- Body armor (Chilkhata) for important commanders
- Swords (Talwari), daggers (Jambiya), spears (Bhala)
- Personal guns (though inefficient)
Afghan Advantage:
- Horses emphasized (massage/care before battle)
- Maratha cavalry primary weapon
- Afghan emphasis: elephants, camels, camel-based Jamburak artillery
- Jamburak = small cannon on camel (rotating, swivel-able)
- Like mobile mini-tank
- Two-person crew
- Short range (~30-40 meters) but devastating
- Can move around battlefield creating chaos
Afghan Elephants:
- Decorated with seats
- Carry important commanders
- Allow observation of battlefield
- But very visible/exposed to attack
- Old-fashioned tactic (vulnerable)
Why Bhau Believed He Could Succeed
His Confidence Based On:
- Artillery superiority (Europeans-trained, 1.5 km range)
- Afghans lacked equivalent long-range weapons
- Rectangle formation proven (Wellington, Nizam)
- Discipline maintainable (if commanders enforce)
- Movement gives tactical flexibility
- Goal is escape, not victory—different psychology
His Wrong Assumption:
- That Afghans would let them pass peacefully
- That artillery intimidation would prevent close combat
- That Maratha soldiers would maintain discipline under fire
- That both sides wanted to minimize casualties
Timeline to Battle
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 13 Evening | Plan finalized in battle council |
| Jan 13 Night | Strategy messengers sent through camp |
| Jan 13 Late Night | Troops briefed on discipline requirements |
| Jan 14 Early Morning | Forces organized into rectangle |
| Jan 14 Morning | March begins southeast toward Yamuna |
Key Insights
The Innovation vs. Tradition Problem: Bhau chose a European defensive strategy that required European-style discipline. But Marathas were warriors/cavalry culture, not formation soldiers. This fundamental mismatch was the plan's greatest weakness.
Artillery as Equalizer: Bhau's only advantage over more numerous/experienced Afghan force was artillery. Entire plan depended on: (1) maintaining separation via artillery, (2) soldiers NOT breaking ranks to pursue. Both were fragile assumptions.
The Wheel vs. Cavalry Dilemma: Maratha strength was cavalry charges. Rectangle strategy required NOT charging. It was asking them to overcome their nature and training.
Proven But Untested at Scale: Wellington's formation worked at Waterloo. Nizam's worked at Udgir. But neither involved moving 125,000 people (including 40,000+ non-combatants) across open terrain while maintaining formation under fire. This was untested at this scale.
The Real Gamble: Not whether the plan was good, but whether Maratha soldiers could execute it. Bhau was banking on discipline in an army culture that valued heroic individual action.
Where We Left Off: Plan fully explained. Rectangular formation justified by historical precedent (Wellington, Nizam). Discipline emphasized as critical requirement (but Maratha weakness). Artillery presented as key advantage. If executed perfectly, escape was possible. The question: would soldiers maintain discipline when battle began?
Gardi's rectangle was elegant on paper. Move southeast, maintain formation, let artillery keep enemies away, slip past to Delhi, escape. It was European military science—proven effective, logically sound, perfectly reasonable. The problem: it required Maratha soldiers to act like European soldiers. To stand in formation. To not break ranks. To let their enemies run away instead of pursuing. On the morning of January 14, that assumption was about to be tested against the reality of men who were warriors first, soldiers second.
Dawn of January 14: The Battle Begins to Unfold
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Final Hours Before (January 13, Late Night)
The Consultations:
- Until late night January 13: continuous planning in Maratha camp
- Discussing exact how to execute retreat/skirmishes
- Morning of January 14: would launch movement attempt
- Tactics and strategy being finalized (no stopping now)
The Core Intent (Final Reminder):
"They didn't want to have an all-out war because that was going to be tough."
Strategy: Form rectangle, keep non-combatants in center, slowly move south-eastward, keep distance via artillery, avoid direct confrontation.
The Message Sent:
- Strategy announced "from top to the bottom" of Maratha camp
- All soldiers briefed on discipline requirements
- Everyone understood: no breaking ranks
- Everyone understood: goal is escape, not victory
The Last Meal:
"Whatever grains and supplies remained, medicine chose me on that evening."
Interpreted as "last supper"—soldiers ate final rations that evening, knowing outcome uncertain.
The Morning of January 14
The Preparation (Pre-Dawn, ~6 AM):
- Sun not yet risen (probably 6 AM)
- Maintenance staff, women, old pilgrims woke up
- Made breakfast
- Gathered belongings (had settled for 2-3 months)
- Got camp ready for movement
Personal Grooming for Battle:
- Soldiers wore FETA (traditional headgear)
- Applied turmeric on faces (medicinal value, not paint)
- Turmeric is antibacterial
- Stops blood flow when applied to cuts
- Protects against wounds
- Practical medicine, not superstition
The Message This Sent:
"This was the true picture of an army that was willing to fight and go down fighting and die."
Soldiers understood implications: this would be epic battle, no escape route, either victory or death.
Army Composition & Equipment
The Numbers:
- Maratha side: ~125,000 total (including 30-40,000 non-combatants)
- Fighting force: ~75,000 at most
- Afghan side: ~100,000
- Total engaged: ~200,000+ people
- Scale: largest battle of 18th century (or even earlier)
Officer Preparation:
- Commanders put on body armor (Chilkhata)
- Armed with: swords, daggers (Jambiya), spears (Bhala)
- Personal guns (though ineffective)
- Battle dress over regular clothes (multiple layers for cold)
Horses Prepared:
- Massaged and readied (Maratha cavalry primary weapon)
- Horses were critical—Maratha strength was cavalry
- Without good horses: cavalry useless
Afghan Equipment:
- Elephants: decorated, carried command seats
- Commanders observed from elephant seats
- Could see battlefield from height
- But highly visible/exposed (old-fashioned)
- Camels with Jamburak (swivel cannon)
- Two-person crew
- Mobile artillery, short range (~30-40 meters)
- Could create chaos in localized areas
- Like moving tanks
- Regular horses and foot soldiers
- Different emphasis: not primarily cavalry-dependent
Bhau's Last Hope: Message to Kashiraj
Even This Morning:
"It is said that Bhau still had not lost hope of striking a truce."
Even as forces organized, Bhau hoped Suja Uddhawla could negotiate peace.
The Message:
"The vessel is totally full of water and there is no more space for water. That means our patience has run out. We cannot wait any longer."
Translation: "The pot is full—we're at the breaking point. Whatever efforts you can make for truce, do it NOW or else we fight."
The Urgency:
- 3 AM: Kashiraj woke Suja up with Bhau's letter
- Signified to Afghans: something major about to happen
- Both sides now knew battle was imminent
- This was the final moment for peace
The Afghan Response (3 AM)
Suja's Reaction:
- Went immediately to Abdali's tent
- Woke Abdali
- Said: "Time has come to prepare Afghan camp"
- Emphasized: "Marathas saying 'pot is full'—battle is coming now or never"
Abdali's Immediate Actions:
- Got on horse (despite early hour)
- Rode about a mile
- Gave order: "Get ready for battle"
The Realization:
- Found some soldiers returning with loot
- They told him: "Marathas are leaving the battlefield"
- Meaning: Marathas moving out of camp toward attack position
The Key Insight:
- Maratha army moved 1-1.5 miles ahead of previous position
- Was now ~2-2.5 miles closer instead of original ~4 miles distance
- This aggressive positioning = serious intent to attack/move
- No longer defensive camp posture—active movement beginning
Kashiraj's Description of Abdali
The Image: Kashiraj (who was in Afghan camp) described Abdali at moment of decision:
"Shaha was sitting on horse and was smoking hookah."
The Detail:
- Hookah contained mild narcotic/opium mixture (Aafu)
- Not tobacco (modern hookah-style)
- Gave slight high but didn't knock out user
- Common among Afghan/royal people
- Habit that couldn't be given up
The Symbolism:
- Here is Abdali: on horseback, calm enough to smoke, about to commit to battle
- Not panicked, not frantic
- Methodical, controlled response to threat
Abdali's Battle Orders
The Process:
- Called Shah Pasand Khan and Chief of Staff
- Began assigning positions to different contingents:
- Shah Pasand Khan: to left flank of Najib Khan
- Chief of Staff: center
- Other commanders: assigned relative positions
- Different contingents (Rohilas, Suja's forces, others) coordinated
- Each given specific place in formation
Why This Matters:
- Afghan army wasn't monolithic
- Multiple groups: Abdali's core, Najib Khan's Rohilas, Suja Uddhawla's contingent
- Each brought own commanders/organization
- Required coordination to act as unified force
- Abdali essentially choreographing formation to prevent friendly-fire chaos
The Morale Building:
- After positioning ordered: musical instruments played
- Created "martial spirit" in army
- Battle cry/encouragement to troops
- Psychological preparation for combat
The Uncertainty on Both Sides
Abdali's Assumption:
"Based on Abdali's talking it came across as though he felt that Marathas won't come up for fighting. Instead they will just be coming closer or doing some strategic maneuver. Or maybe flee or just decide to call it quits."
He wasn't fully prepared for battle—expected maneuvers, not fight.
The Reality:
- Neither side fully prepared for apocalyptic battle
- Neither side had clear military superiority
- Both sides understood stakes were catastrophic
- Both sides tried to avoid it for months
- Now forced into confrontation by circumstances
Why Both Sides Reluctant:
- Maratha losses: no supplies, horses dying, exhaustion
- Afghan losses: long deployment, soldiers wanting home, expensive supply lines
- Both armies: could be decimated in total war
- Both armies: had no guarantee of victory
The Game They'd Been Playing:
- Positioning, skirmishing, trying to get "someone to slip up"
- Hoping to make battle lopsided by exposing weaknesses
- Testing without committing
- Now forced to commit
The Parting Gift Ritual
Before Movement:
"Just to symbolize their companionship, they were each and everyone given this. That was offered to everybody so that, you know, because now you don't know who's going to live and who's going to die."
Seems to be a ritual gift (details unclear) given to all soldiers.
The Meaning:
- Acknowledgment that some won't survive
- Parting gift before separation
- Symbolic of: "We face uncertain fate together"
Why This Matters:
- Soldiers being sent into formation movement
- Risk of getting separated: some ahead, some behind, some left, some right
- May not see each other again even if they survive
- Gift was connection/memory token
Timeline (Final Hours)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 13, Late Evening | Final strategy briefing in Maratha camp |
| Jan 13, Night | Message to all troops about discipline |
| Jan 13, Late Night | "Last supper"—final meal before movement |
| Jan 14, 3 AM | Bhau sends "pot is full" message to Kashiraj |
| Jan 14, 3 AM | Kashiraj wakes Suja; Suja wakes Abdali |
| Jan 14, 3-4 AM | Abdali horseback inspections; orders "get ready" |
| Jan 14, Early Morning | Abdali coordinates contingent positions |
| Jan 14, Early Morning | Maratha soldiers apply turmeric, put on headgear |
| Jan 14, 6 AM | Non-combatants make breakfast, pack belongings |
| Jan 14, Dawn | Maratha rectangle begins to form |
Key Insights
Bhau's Persistent Hope: Even at 3 AM, even as forces mobilized, even as movement began, Bhau hoped Suja could negotiate peace. This wasn't weakness—it was honest assessment that battle would be catastrophic for both sides.
Abdali's Calm Response: Not panicked, not reckless. Methodical positioning of contingents, musical encouragement. He was experienced general who understood coordination mattered. Shows Afghan army was also disciplined/professional.
The Ritual Elements: Turmeric application, headgear, parting gifts, breakfast before march—these weren't superstition. They were soldiers mentally/physically preparing for death. Recognition that this was different from skirmishes.
Neither Side Expecting All-Out War: Abdali thought Marathas would maneuver. Marathas hoped Afghans would let them pass. Both wrong. Both unprepared for total annihilation battle. Both thought 3-month siege had established terms.
The Scale: 200,000+ people engaged, largest 18th-century battle, Maratha soldiers applying medicine on faces, Afghan general sitting on horseback smoking hookah—all of it converging toward moment when plans meet reality.
Where We Left Off: It's January 14 dawn. Rectangle forming. Maratha non-combatants preparing for movement. Afghan contingents positioned. Battle hasn't started yet but both sides are mobilizing. The moment when careful plans meet the chaos of actual warfare is about to begin. Next reading will likely describe first contact, what actually happens when the rectangle tries to move southeast.
At 3 AM on January 14, 1761, two generals on opposite sides of history woke up to make the same decision: this can't be delayed anymore. Bhau sent his final message (hoping against hope for peace). Abdali got on his horse (calm, methodical, professional). Two hours later, at dawn, soldiers on both sides prepared for battle. Some applying turmeric (medicine), some smoking hookah (calm), some massaging horses (dependence on them), some packing camp. In a few hours, both sides' careful plans would meet the reality of 200,000 people trying to kill each other. Neither was ready. Neither wanted it. But both had run out of choices.
The Final Moments: Doubts, Deployments & The Threshold of Chaos
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Immediate Context
The News Arriving:
- 3 AM: Bhau's message "pot is full"
- 3-4 AM: Kashiraj wakes Suja wakes Abdali
- 4-5 AM: Abdali riding, giving orders
- 6+ AM: Forces mobilizing on both sides
- ~7-8 AM: Battle preparations complete
The Political Context (Updated):
- Kashmir tensions (recent terrorist massacre of 26 Indian tourists)
- Selection of victims based on religious test (Kalma recitation, circumcision check)
- Indian military response: strikes on Pakistan-based terrorist organizations
- Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant groups targeted
- This is all backdrop while Panipat about to explode—3 continents, 3 centuries, 3 different conflicts
Soldiers' Personal Preparation
The Head Covering:
- FETA: traditional headgear worn by soldiers
- Not modern military helmet
- Traditional/cultural headwear
The Turmeric Application:
- Applied to faces as practical medicine (not war paint)
- Turmeric is antibacterial
- Stops blood flow when applied to wounds
- Helps prevent infection
- Every soldier doing this = acknowledgment that wounds expected
- Practical war medicine, common sense preparation
The Symbolism:
"This was the true picture of an army that was willing to fight and go down fighting and die. They understood what the implication of this fight was going to be, because there was no escaping."
This wasn't reluctant army. This was army psychologically prepared for apocalyptic battle.
Abdali's Final Doubts
The Critical Admission:
"Based on Abdali's talking it came across as though he felt that Marathas won't come up for fighting. Instead they will just be doing some strategic maneuver or maybe flee or decide to call it quits."
Abdali expected: maneuvers, feints, maybe withdrawal—NOT actual battle.
What This Reveals:
- Even Abdali wasn't fully convinced battle was inevitable
- Even he hoped they'd negotiate at last minute
- His military setup was cautious, not aggressive
- He was prepared IF battle happens, but didn't fully believe it would
Why Both Sides Doubted:
- 3 months of siege without battle (unprecedented)
- Both armies knew stakes were catastrophic
- Both had tried multiple exit strategies
- Both understood losses would be enormous
The Formation Coordination Challenge
The Afghan Problem:
- Afghan forces: not unified single army
- Abdali's core: his personal forces
- Najib Khan's Rohilas: separate contingent with own commanders
- Suja Uddhawla's forces: allied but independent
- Other groups: regional forces with own agendas
The Coordination Required: Had to position everyone:
- Shah Pasand Khan: left flank of Najib Khan
- Chief of Staff (Shah Wali Khan): center
- Other commanders: assigned specific sectors
- Each contingent given relative position
- Musical instruments played to unify spirit
Why This Mattered:
"Remember this is not a monolithic disciplined army. Different contingents have joined them."
If positions wrong: friendly fire, coordination breakdown, chaos. If positions right: unified force acting together.
This was actual military leadership: understanding different groups, positioning them to work together.
Kashiraj's Detailed Observations
His Access:
- In Abdali's camp as Suja's courtier
- Witnessed command decisions firsthand
- Reported back what he saw
- Historical record depends on his account
What He Saw: Abdali smoking hookah on horseback—image of calm, methodical decision-making, not panicked rushed response.
The Hookah Detail:
- Not modern tobacco hookah
- Contained Aafu (mild opiate) mixed with something
- Gave slight high but not knockout
- Common for Afghan/royal elite
- Habit they couldn't give up
- Even in battle morning: Abdali maintained his routine
The Psychological Point:
- Shows discipline, routine, controlled response
- Not showing panic or desperation
- Methodical military professionalism
- War as management, not emotion
The Maratha vs. Afghan Readiness
Maratha Advantages:
- Long-range artillery (1-1.5 km range)
- Cavalry-based force (strong in open field)
- Morale: soldiers willing to fight and die
- Discipline: rectangle formation maintained
Maratha Disadvantages:
- Starvation condition (weakened physically)
- Haven't fought major battle in months
- Need to protect 40,000+ non-combatants
- Heavy reliance on discipline (historical weakness)
- Cold weather (not prepared for)
Afghan Advantages:
- Supplies intact (well-fed, fresh)
- Long deployment (experienced fighters)
- Unified under experienced general (Abdali)
- Cohesive force (fighting as unit for months)
- No non-combatants (lighter, more mobile)
Afghan Disadvantages:
- Inferior artillery (can't match Maratha 1.5 km range)
- Soldiers want to go home (morale issue)
- Different contingents (coordination challenge)
- Far from home (supply lines stretched)
The Uncertainty on Both Sides
The Strategic Stalemate:
"In both the armies it was problematic to go to battle, full-fledged battle. And none of the armies was totally superior. It was totally undecided how the outcome will play out."
- Neither could steamroll other
- Victory not guaranteed for either side
- Losses would be catastrophic either way
- Outcome: completely unpredictable
Why They'd Avoided Battle for 3 Months:
"Both sides knew it. That is why both these powerful armies had been in front of each other without having a full fledged battle because nobody could predict what will be the final outcome."
Fear of unknown was greater than fear of starvation/attrition.
The Game of Chess:
"They were doing this game of chess to get someone to slip up or maybe make the battle lopsided if possible by exposing them."
Both trying to:
- Get opponent to make mistake
- Expose weakness without committing
- Find diplomatic solution
- Avoid commitment to total war
The Final Moments of Choice
Kashiraj's Role:
- Last diplomatic messenger
- Carried Bhau's final "pot is full" message
- Woke Suja at 3 AM
- Gave signal: negotiation window closing
Abdali's Response:
- Literal and psychological: got on horse
- Gave orders to prepare
- Positioned contingents
- Played music to encourage troops
- Accepted: battle is now happening
Bhau's Perspective:
- Hoped even as forces moved
- Held out hope Suja could negotiate
- Sent final message with urgency
- Prepared for war but prayed for peace
The Paradox:
- Both generals hoping battle wouldn't happen
- Both generals preparing for battle to happen
- Both understanding if it happens, catastrophic
- Both accepting it might be unavoidable
The Bakhar Account (Unreliable)
The Conflicting Report: From Bhau's Bakhar (historical chronicle):
"Abdali sent message to Bhau: today we should do a truce. Bhau says: let me consult and then we will reach the truce."
Why Take With Grain of Salt:
- Bakhars are historical narratives, not official documents
- Biased toward their subject
- Not always reliable
- This account suggests Abdali proposed peace at last minute
- But other sources don't corroborate
The Interpretation: Could mean:
- Abdali did propose peace (and it was rejected)
- Bhau wanted to appear as peacekeeper (narrative control)
- Miscommunication or misinterpretation in translation
- Bakhar romanticizing the moment
Either way: shows last-minute diplomacy attempts (even if unclear exactly what was said).
The Scale of What's About to Happen
The Numbers Again:
- Maratha side: 125,000 total (75,000 fighting)
- Afghan side: ~100,000
- Total: ~200,000+ people
- Largest 18th-century battle
- Possibly largest battle in Indian history to that point
The Scope:
- Not just military units: families, pilgrims, merchants
- Rectangle formation: first time attempted at this scale with this many non-combatants
- Discipline required: unprecedented for Indian armies
- Casualties: likely to be catastrophic
The Moment:
- January 14, 1761
- Dawn breaking over Panipat plain
- 200,000+ people preparing for contact
- No clear victor expected
- No one fully ready
- No one fully willing
- But no way to avoid it anymore
Timeline (Final 4 Hours)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 3 AM | Bhau's "pot is full" message sent |
| 3 AM | Kashiraj wakes Suja |
| 3-4 AM | Suja wakes Abdali |
| 4 AM | Abdali on horseback; orders "prepare" |
| 4-5 AM | Contingents positioned; music plays |
| 5-6 AM | Maratha soldiers applying turmeric |
| 6 AM | Non-combatants making breakfast |
| 6-7 AM | Rectangle formation assembling |
| ~7-8 AM | Both sides ready; awaiting first contact |
Key Insights
Mutual Hesitation: Abdali didn't think Marathas would fight. Marathas hoped Afghans would let them go. Both wrong. Both surprised at what was actually about to happen.
Uncertainty as Weapon: Fear of unknown kept both sides from attacking for 3 months. Now that moment ending—but fear of unknown still there. Both know if battle happens, it could go either way.
The Leadership Styles:
- Bhau: prays for peace even as soldiers prepare for war
- Abdali: calm, methodical, smokes hookah while positioning troops
- Both understanding magnitude of moment
- Both approaching it differently (emotion vs. discipline)
The Soldier's Perspective: Applying turmeric, checking horses, eating breakfast—regular soldiers doing practical things while generals debate strategy. Soldiers probably knew battle was inevitable. Generals still hoping it wasn't.
The Diplomatic Breakdown: Even at 3 AM, Bhau trying to use Kashiraj/Suja as diplomatic channel. By 4 AM, Abdali responding with military preparations. Window for negotiation literally closing in real time.
Where We Left Off: Dawn of January 14, 1761. Both sides mobilized. Both sides' careful plans about to meet reality. Bhau still hoping for peace via Kashiraj. Abdali positioning contingents and preparing for war. Rectangle forming. Afghan forces coordinating. The threshold is here. In minutes to hours, first contact will determine if this is limited skirmishing (as both planned) or apocalyptic battle (as both feared).
At dawn on January 14, 1761, two armies that had been staring at each other for three months finally had to make the choice they'd been avoiding. Bhau sent one last message hoping for peace. Abdali put on his hookah and prepared for war. Soldiers applied turmeric and checked horses. Kashiraj watched it all happen, recording it for history. And somewhere between the Maratha rectangle forming and the Afghan contingents coordinating, the point of no return was crossed. In a few hours, the largest battle of the 18th century would begin. And everyone—generals and soldiers alike—knew that one way or another, nothing would be the same after.
The Formations Revealed: Who Fights Where & First Contact
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Bhau's Final Instructions
The Core Message:
"We should be straight going towards Yamuna. If the Afghan camp stays on their side, meaning doesn't interfere our movement going towards Yamuna, then there is no reason to battle. Only if they obstruct, then we are going to offer resistance."
The Intent:
- NOT to fight an all-out battle
- Goal: reach Yamuna River to the east
- If Afghans don't interfere: just move
- If Afghans block: use artillery to clear path, then continue moving
- Keep marching toward Yamuna—don't get drawn into pitched battle
The Contingency:
- If Afghans come between formations: put cavalry in between and get them out
- All the while keep marching toward Yamuna
- Don't engage just because you want to fight
- Clear obstruction and continue movement
The Maratha Formation (45,000 fighting forces)
The Rectangle Structure:
- Artillery in front (1,000 musketeers under Ibrahim Khan Gardi)
- Main body: cavalry and foot soldiers
- Rear guard: Malhar Rao Holkar
- Non-combatants in center (protected by formation)
- Total: ~125,000 people, ~45,000 fighting forces
Key Commanders in Order:
- Front: Ibrahim Khan Gardi (1,000 musketeers with artillery guns)
- Front-Center: Turks and support units
- Center: Naum and Bishwas Khan on elephants (command position)
- Right Flank: Yeshwant Rao Pawar, Jankoji Shinde, Mahadaji, Tukoji Shinde
- Back: Malhar Rao Holkar (rear guard, rearguard position)
Fighting Force Breakdown:
- 11,500 Uzraq (elite trained, well-paid, highly motivated personal army)
- 20,000 from Shinde and Holkar (10,000 each)
- 1,000 musketeers (Ibrahim Khan's artillery crew—CRITICAL)
- ~12,500 other warriors and commanders
- Total: ~45,000 fighting forces
Why Gardi Had Confidence:
- 1,000 trained musketeers managing European-style artillery
- Long-range capability (1.5+ km)
- Infantry support
- Flat terrain (no hiding places for Afghans to use advantage)
- Artillery would be decisive in flatland battle
The Afghan Formation (~60,000 fighting forces)
The Crescent Moon Shape:
"Afghan army formation was like a crescent moon. That is how it appeared as though they have taken the Marathas, like cradling a baby in your arms."
Formation curved to envelope potential Maratha escape routes.
Afghan Right Flank (Most Important—Where Battle Begins):
- Rohila Forces: ~14,000-15,000 soldiers
- Under Najib Khan (leader of Rohila contingent)
- Position: right side (where Marathas moving toward)
- This is where first major fighting occurs
Afghan Center:
- Shah Wali Khan: 16,000 soldiers
- Chief of Staff to Abdali
- Center of formation
- Most vulnerable to Maratha artillery
Other Afghan Positions:
- Barkhurdar Khan: right flank (position 8-9 on map)
- Rehmat Khan: left side of Rohila contingent
- Other contingents: positioned in crescent formation
Abdali's Personal Protection:
-
Slave Units (Kolegan): 5,000-7,000 personal slaves
- Brainwashed from childhood
- Would die on command without question
- Completely loyal, no negotiation possible
- Trained from infancy to obey absolutely
-
Personal Reserve Force: 3,000 elite soldiers
- Spare/backup force
- Could be used if things went badly
- Stayed with Abdali
Abdali's Position:
- At very back of formation on small hillock
- NOT in front (Maratha sources called him "Namard"—cowardly, not a real man)
- But actually brilliant strategically:
- Could see entire battlefield
- Could direct reinforcements where needed
- Could respond to collapse of any sector
- Stayed alive to lead
Why Abdali Distrusted His Indian Allies
The Strategic Arrangement:
- Hindi/Hindustani and Afghan contingents alternated
- NOT grouped together by nationality
- Afghans interspersed with Indian forces
The Reason:
"He was not completely convinced of the Hindustani army's commitment and loyalty. He wanted them not to be one big chunk. If they try to flee or something, then the Afghans would stop them."
The Fear:
- Hindustani forces might mutiny
- Might coordinate with Marathas
- Might flee mid-battle
- Afghans between them would prevent escape
- Afghans would stop any rebellion or retreat
Why This Made Sense:
- Different ethnicities, religions
- Hindustani forces (Suja's, Rohilas, others) = hired allies, not true believers in Jihad
- Afghan core = true believers in Abdali, Jihad, survival
- Mixing them meant: Afghans could monitor, control, prevent coordination
The Direct Opposition
Who Faces Whom:
- Gardi's Artillery (Maratha front) vs. Rohilas (Najib Khan) & Barkhurdar Khan (Afghan right)
- Shinde & Holkar (Maratha right flank) vs. Shah Wali Khan (Afghan center)
- Maratha Rectangle moving southeast toward Yamuna while being attacked
The Financial Pressure on Gardi
The Last Conversation (Before Battle):
- Gardi went to Bhau with complaint: "I've insisted on paying troops on time for 9-10 months"
- Bhau always had money problems since leaving Udgir
- Gardi never wavered: "Pay my soldiers or I'm gone"
- Now: "The treasury is empty. We haven't gotten paid either."
Gardi's Statement:
"You have been very upset with me that I didn't care about your treasury situation and insisted that my troops be paid on time. But now the treasure is over, meaning there is no money left and we haven't gotten any salary either. But it doesn't matter now. Today you will see how my troops are deserving of the salary on the battlefield. I see, because they will devastate the Afghans."
The Meaning:
- Gardi's soldiers so disciplined and trained that they'll fight without pay
- His confidence: they'll deliver victory through artillery
- Then payment won't matter (victory or death either way)
- Showing absolute faith in his troops' quality
Timeline of Battle Start
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Early morning | Formations arrayed against each other |
| Morning | Maratha rectangle begins moving southeast toward Yamuna |
| Morning-Noon | Afghans refuse to let Marathas pass |
| First Contact | Ibrahim Khan Gardi's artillery starts firing |
| Immediate Reaction | Afghan Rohilas and Barkhurdar Khan attacked |
| First 3 Hours | Artillery proving devastatingly effective |
Key Insights
Gardi's Confidence Justified:
- 1,000 trained musketeers with European artillery
- Long-range advantage (1.5+ km vs. Afghan short range)
- Flat terrain (no cover, artillery dominant)
- Financial sacrifice by troops (no pay but fighting anyway) shows discipline
- His troops understand: artillery is their strength, stay professional
Abdali's Command Structure:
- Crescent formation designed to encircle/envelope
- But also defensive (protect right flank where Marathas attacking)
- Alternating Hindustani/Afghan units = control strategy
- Reserve forces with Abdali = strategic flexibility
- Back position = allows overall battle management
The Maratha Problem:
- Rectangle formation is sound in theory
- But cavalry naturally wants to charge
- Discipline required to hold formation
- Gardi's artillery needs protection from cavalry (support units)
- Coordination between cavalry/infantry/artillery: CRITICAL
The Alliance Weakness:
- Abdali doesn't fully trust Hindustani forces
- This is his biggest strategic vulnerability
- If Rohilas or others break/flee, whole formation collapses
- He's banking on fear (Afghans between them) to maintain discipline
Where We Left Off: Formations ready. Morning of January 14. Maratha rectangle beginning to move southeast toward Yamuna. Afghans immediately refusing passage. Gardi's artillery opening fire. First contact beginning. The 3-month stalemate finally breaking into actual combat. Artillery about to prove its worth or fail against overwhelming numbers.
Gardi walked into battle without being paid. His thousand musketeers walked with him. He told Bhau: "You'll see what they're worth." And as the morning light hit the Panipat plains on January 14, 1761, they did. For three hours, the artillery tore through Afghan lines like nothing they'd ever seen. The problem wasn't the artillery. The problem was that Marathas had to hold formation while watching cavalry win. And cavalry warriors don't hold formation when they see victory.
The First Hours of Battle: Artillery Dominance & Afghan Lines Breaking
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Battle Opening (Morning, January 14)
The Movement Begins:
- Maratha rectangle starts moving southeast toward Yamuna
- Afghans immediately refuse passage
- Gardi's artillery begins firing
- First contact: artillery versus Afghan right flank (Barkhurdar Khan, Rohilas, Najib Khan)
The Afghan Response:
- Attack Maratha right flank (positions 4-5 on formation)
- Try to bog down Marathas, prevent eastward movement
- Attempt to force engagement instead of allowing escape
The Turning Point:
- Maratha rectangle must turn/face right to defend against Afghan attack
- This turns them away from original Yamuna direction
- Bhau's careful escape plan immediately modified by enemy action
- Rectangle must fight while still trying to move
The First Three Hours: Gardi's Triumphant Artillery
The Initial Success:
"For three hours, the Maratha army was advancing as though the knife goes through butter. It was working wonderfully."
What Happened:
- Gardi's artillery systematically destroyed Afghan right flank
- Rohilas suffered tremendous losses (thousands killed)
- Barkhurdar Khan's regiment (positions 8-9) severely weakened
- Najib Khan's position (position 12) devastated
- Cannonballs reached deep into Afghan formations
The Casualty Situation (Until Noon):
- Out of 9 Rohila regiments: 6 suffered massive losses
- Hafiz Rehmat Khan (Rohila commander): ill, carried in palanquin (stretcher/box), trying to find Dunde Khan Rohila
- Afghan right flank: essentially broken by artillery fire
- Thousands dead
Even Gardi Himself Injured:
- Despite directing artillery successfully
- Was wounded in battle
- But continued operations (didn't abandon position)
- Troops stayed unified, fighting as group
The Promise Held:
"Gardi's promise so far was holding up. The numbers didn't matter because they had the cannons."
Artillery proved: quantity doesn't overcome quality cannon fire at distance.
The Problem: Cavalry Support Timing
What Should Have Happened: Cavalry support (Yeshwant Rao Pawar, Vithal Shivadev) should have:
- Let artillery pound enemy until completely demoralized
- Once enemy broken, fresh cavalry charges in
- Routing enemy = cavalry pursuit/destruction
- Rotate: one cavalry unit attacks, other waits fresh for next assault
- Continuous pressure, rotating fresh troops
What Actually Happened:
- Cavalry came too early/wrong timing
- Got in front of artillery while guns still firing
- Gardi had choice: fire on Afghans (hit own cavalry) OR stop firing (lose advantage)
- Chose to stop (wouldn't kill own soldiers)
- Cavalry got injured by Afghan country-made guns
- Had to retreat (before achieving breakthrough)
- Cavalry no longer available for follow-up assault
Why This Mattered:
- Gardi created hole in Afghan lines through artillery
- But cavalry didn't exploit it immediately
- Afghan lines had time to partially reform
- Momentum lost
- No continuous exploitation of advantage
The Irwin/Blocker Analysis: European vs. Maratha Battle Tactics
How French/European Forces Did It (Correctly):
- Artillery softens/demoralizes enemy thoroughly
- Cavalry waits (disciplined, controlled)
- When enemy demoralized/broken: cavalry charges
- At distance (50-100 meters): cavalry fires country-made guns
- Once very close (6-8 feet): switch to swords/spears (melee)
- This coordination: "cavalry in unison with artillery"
The Style/Doctrine: Called "coordinated artillery-cavalry assault"—precise timing, controlled cavalry, artillery support throughout.
What Marathas Lacked:
"What you see here is that Marathas had not mastered this type of battle with the long range artillery. They had the artillery which was skilled. But the rest of the cavalry and foot soldiers, they were not used to work in unison."
The Problem:
- Gardi's artillery: European-trained, highly skilled
- Cavalry: traditional Maratha warriors, undisciplined coordination
- Never trained to work together at this level
- Cavalry got impatient, charged too early
- Infantry/cavalry coordination: broken
The Artillery Mobility Problem
The Fundamental Issue:
- Gardi's cannons pulled by bulls (extremely slow)
- Cavalry moves on horses (extremely fast)
- Artillery can't keep up with cavalry charges
- Cavalry races ahead → artillery can't follow
- Artillery left behind = useless (can't fire, might hit own soldiers ahead)
The Consequence:
- If cavalry advances too far: artillery stops firing
- If cavalry retreats back: artillery back in action
- This creates timing problems
- Cavalry can't exploit artillery advantage because they're not coordinated
The Retreat Problem:
- If Marathas have to retreat: artillery even slower
- Cavalry can escape on horses
- Artillery pulled by bulls: massive liability
- If bulls injured: can't move guns at all
- Artillery becomes trapped/captured
The Solution (Used by French/Europeans):
- Either: abandon artillery (spike guns with nails to prevent capture)
- Or: keep cavalry tightly coordinated with artillery (don't advance beyond support range)
- Gardi's problem: Maratha cavalry didn't understand this coordination need
The Breakdown of Bhau's Plan
What Was Supposed to Happen:
- Rectangle moves southeast toward Yamuna
- Artillery keeps distance, artillery does the fighting
- Cavalry/infantry maintains formation
- Eventually reaches Yamuna River, follows south to Delhi
- Minimal casualties, successful escape
What Actually Happened:
- Afghans attack right flank immediately
- Rectangle must turn/face toward attackers
- Plan to move southeast disrupted
- Now fighting defensive action
- Cavalry gets impatient with artillery-only approach
- Charges too early, breaks coordination
- Gets damaged, has to retreat
- Artillery loses protection, becomes vulnerable
By Noon (First 3-4 Hours):
- Gardi's artillery worked brilliantly
- But no exploitation of advantage
- Afghan lines damaged but not broken
- Cavalry unavailable for follow-up
- Battle turning into grinding attrition
- Original escape plan abandoned
Why Cavalry-Dominated Armies Struggled With Artillery
The Cultural Issue:
- Cavalry cultures: individual prowess, charges, heroics, quick victory
- Artillery warfare: patience, discipline, coordination, grinding attrition
- Maratha tradition: cavalry charge wins the day
- Artillery reality: needs protected position, time to reload, coordinated support
- Fundamental clash of military cultures
Gardi's Alien Army:
- 1,000 musketeers = European-trained soldiers
- Not Maratha tradition
- Professional, disciplined, skilled
- But operating in Maratha army that didn't understand their needs
- Isolation from rest of army = vulnerability
The Result:
- Had the weapon (artillery)
- Didn't have the doctrine (coordinated artillery-cavalry operations)
- Couldn't execute advanced tactics
- Cavalry/infantry kept making mistakes (charging too early, not protecting artillery)
- Artillery forced to stop firing to avoid hitting own soldiers
The Afternoon Situation (Setting Up)
By Noon:
- 3 hours of successful artillery bombardment
- Afghan right flank devastated (Rohilas, Barkhurdar Khan hit hardest)
- Thousands dead
- But: no breakthrough to exploit
- Cavalry scattered/damaged
- Afghan lines still holding (though weakened)
- Gardi injured but continuing
- Artillery running low on ammunition potentially
The Expectation:
- Afternoon: this is when cavalry should exploit breakthrough
- Full wedge into Afghan formation
- Complete collapse of right flank
- Encirclement of Afghan forces
- Potential total victory
The Actual Outcome:
- TBD (reading pauses here)
- But set up suggests: cavalry didn't do follow-up
- Afternoon will be different from morning
- Afghanistan consolidating position
- Maratha momentum fading
Timeline
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Early Morning | Rectangles formed, facing each other |
| Morning | Maratha moves southeast; Afghans attack right flank |
| Morning-Noon | Gardi's artillery devastating Afghan right |
| Noon | 3 hours of successful bombardment complete |
| Noon-Afternoon | Critical juncture: does cavalry exploit advantage? |
Key Insights
Gardi's Success & Isolation: He proved artillery could dominate in flatland. But he was fighting almost alone—cavalry didn't support properly, infantry couldn't protect him, communication with Bhau's command broken. His triumph was tactical but not strategic.
The Coordination Failure: Marathas had the weapons (artillery) but not the doctrine. French/European armies had BOTH. This is why professional armies beat traditional warrior cultures—not always through superior weapons, but through understanding how to use them together.
Cavalry's Impatience: Cavalry warriors naturally want to charge. But artillery requires patience. "Let me soften them, THEN you charge." Maratha cavalry couldn't wait. Charged too early, disrupted artillery support, got damaged, had to retreat.
The Escape Plan's Death: By noon, Bhau's rectangle-escape-plan was completely abandoned. Battle was now defensive (fighting Afghan attacks) instead of offensive (moving toward Yamuna). All the careful planning from night before: "stayed on paper."
The Real Issue: Not that artillery doesn't work. It does (killed thousands). Issue is coordinating artillery with cavalry/infantry in real time during chaos of battle. Gardi could do it. Rest of Maratha army couldn't.
Where We Left Off: First 3 hours: Gardi's artillery dominating, Afghan right flank shattered, thousands dead. But cavalry support failed. No follow-up. By noon, it's a grinding battle instead of triumphant breakthrough. Afternoon approaching with situation unclear. Gardi still fighting despite injury. But momentum fading due to coordination failure.
Gardi's artillery had one perfect morning. Three hours where European military science proved superior to traditional warriors. Artillery did exactly what it was supposed to do: devastate enemy at distance before cavalry closes. But then Maratha cavalry got impatient. They charged when they should have waited. Got in front of the guns. Got shot by Afghan rifles. Had to retreat. And suddenly the artillery's perfect morning advantage had turned into a grinding battle where numbers would matter. And Abdali had more numbers.
The Afternoon Crisis: Cavalry-Artillery Coordination Breaks Down
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Midday Transition (Noon Approaching)
The Situation at 12 Noon:
- 3+ hours of Gardi's artillery dominating
- Afghan right flank (Barkhurdar Khan, Rohilas) devastated
- Thousands dead, lines broken
- Wedge created = opportunity for cavalry exploitation
What Should Happen (According to Irwin/Military Doctrine):
- Rest and rotation: artillery units pull back slightly
- Fresh cavalry unit charges through gap created by artillery
- Hit demoralized/retreating Afghans
- Drive them back, break formation completely
- Fresh cavalry second wave: comes in after first wave retreats
- Continuous pressure keeps enemy off-balance
What Actually Happened:
- Cavalry support (Vithal Shivadev, Yashwant Rao Pawar) got in front of artillery
- Artillery had to stop firing (couldn't hit own cavalry)
- Cavalry got hit by Afghan country-made guns
- Cavalry injured, forced to retreat
- No fresh cavalry available for rotation
- Gap created by artillery: not exploited
- Momentum lost
The Coordination Error Explained
The Position Problem:
- Vithal Shivadev (labeled #2 on formation map)
- Right next to Gardi's artillery
- SUPPOSED to stay "very tightly enmeshed with the artillery"
- Instead: got in front of guns
Why This Mattered: Artillery on battlefield works at ~500-1000 meters range.
- If cavalry protecting them: cavalry should be 300-500 meters away
- Not directly in front blocking the line of fire
- Cavalry position: supposed to prevent enemy from charging artillery
- Cavalry got: wrong position, wrong timing
The Consequence:
- Artillery couldn't continue fire mission
- Lost momentum from devastating first 3 hours
- Afghan lines time to reorganize
- Cavalry had to retreat wounded
- Gardi now without cavalry protection
- Artillery vulnerable to direct attack
The Blocker Doctrine: Slow Artillery Problem
The Core Issue:
"At the time of the battle, the artillery units were static meaning they won't move too much. The foot soldiers and artillery would make all the movements. Because the artillery was being carried by the bulls who were extremely slow."
The Practical Realities:
- Cannons pulled by oxen/bulls (very slow movement)
- Cavalry on horses (very fast movement)
- When cavalry charges forward: artillery left behind
- Artillery can't keep up with cavalry advance
- Creates gap between protecting force and protected asset
If Bulls Are Injured:
- Can't move artillery at all
- No alternative transport available
- Cannons become fixed in position
- Must be defended or abandoned
The Retreat Problem:
- If order comes to retreat: bulls are slow
- Cavalry escapes on horses
- Artillery stuck, moving at bull-speed
- Becomes trapped/captured/destroyed
- This is disaster
The Documented Solution (Blocker Reference)
Historical Record: Blocker researched how armies solved this problem:
"The artillery units were static. The foot soldiers and cavalry made all the movements. Because the artillery was being carried by the bulls who were extremely slow."
The Practical Response:
- Keep cavalry tightly coordinated with artillery (don't let them separate)
- Artillery stays forward while cavalry protects locally
- Don't advance cavalry far ahead of artillery support
- If cavalry must retreat: artillery retreats with them (or is abandoned)
The Abandonment Option:
- If forced to retreat and bulls too slow
- Spike the guns (drive nails through key parts to disable them)
- Leave cannons behind so enemy can't use them
- Cavalry escapes with horses
- Artillery sacrificed to allow escape
Why This Failed at Panipat
The Mismatch:
- Gardi's artillery: European-trained, skilled, knows doctrine
- Maratha cavalry: traditional warriors, not trained in artillery-cavalry coordination
- Never practiced working together
- No shared doctrine/understanding
- Cavalry expected to charge and win (traditional way)
- Artillery expected: "support my charges"
- But artillery reality: "I need you to stay close and protect me"
The Communication Failure:
- Cavalry didn't understand they should wait for artillery preparation
- Cavalry didn't understand they should stay within range
- Cavalry got impatient (warriors want action)
- Charged at wrong time (before artillery fully demoralized enemy)
- Got damaged (Afghan rifle fire)
- Retreated before achieving breakthrough
- Left artillery exposed
Gardi's Problem:
- 1,000 highly trained musketeers
- Infantry support present
- But no cavalry that understood how to work with artillery
- Expected protection: didn't get it properly
- Expected exploitation of gaps: cavalry got hurt first
Comparative Doctrine: French vs. Maratha
French/European Armies (Working Model):
- Artillery softens enemy thoroughly
- Cavalry waits, disciplined, in reserve
- When enemy demoralizes: cavalry charges
- Cavalry stays coordinated with artillery
- Infantry follows cavalry (supports exploitation)
- Continuous coordination throughout battle
- Result: artillery advantage translated to victory
Maratha Approach (Broken Model):
- Gardi's artillery attacks (European style)
- Maratha cavalry sees enemy breaking
- Cavalry charges immediately (traditional warrior style)
- Doesn't wait for full demoralization
- Gets in front of artillery fire
- Gets hit by Afghan guns
- Loses momentum
- No follow-up possible
- Result: artillery advantage NOT translated to victory
The Cultural Problem: Individual warrior culture doesn't naturally understand "wait for support."
- Cavalry warrior mentality: see opportunity, charge
- Artillery mentality: support is essential, coordinate timing
- These don't naturally mix
The Afternoon Turning Point
By Early Afternoon (Post-Noon):
- Maratha momentum fading
- Cavalry damaged/scattered
- Artillery still functional but isolated
- Afghan right flank hurt but not defeated
- Afghan center (Shah Wali Khan, 16,000 soldiers) still intact
- Afghan reserves (Abdali's 5,000-7,000 slave units) never engaged
The Shift:
- Morning: Maratha advantage (artillery dominating)
- Afternoon: Battle becomes grinding attrition
- Night/continuing: Maratha exhaustion, Afghan reserves fresher
- Numbers start mattering more than technology
The Failure to Exploit:
"No one was taking advantage of this hole that they had carved. So the whole thing did not was not as advantageous."
Three hours of artillery success: wasted because cavalry couldn't follow up properly.
The Larger Historical Lesson
Why Professional Armies Beat Traditional Warriors: Not always because of better weapons, but because of:
- Understanding how weapons work together
- Discipline to coordinate actions
- Patience to execute doctrine
- Communication between units
- Support for specialized forces
Gardi vs. Maratha Army:
- Gardi: professional, understands artillery
- Rest of army: traditional warriors, doesn't understand new warfare
- Mismatch = failure to capitalize on advantage
- Better weapons don't guarantee victory if not coordinated
The Irwin Analysis: Historian researched why Indian armies struggled with artillery:
- Had the cannon technology
- Didn't have the doctrine to use it properly
- Cavalry still charged (old way)
- Infantry still fought individually (old way)
- Artillery isolated, not supported properly
- European armies: integrated artillery into coordinated tactics
- Indian armies: added artillery to old tactics
Timeline (Noon to Afternoon)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Noon | 3 hours of successful artillery bombardment complete |
| Noon+ | Cavalry support gets in front of artillery |
| Noon+ | Artillery forced to stop firing |
| Noon+30 | Cavalry gets hit, forced to retreat |
| Early Afternoon | No follow-up exploitation happening |
| Afternoon | Battle becomes grinding attrition instead of breakthrough |
Key Insights
The Morning-to-Afternoon Failure: Maratha artillery won the morning completely. Should have translated to afternoon victory through exploiting the gap. But cavalry coordination failure prevented this. By afternoon, momentum lost, opportunity passed, battle returned to balance/grinding.
Technology vs. Doctrine: Having artillery doesn't mean you'll win with artillery. You need to understand how to use it. Gardi understood. Maratha cavalry didn't. This mismatch turned morning victory into afternoon stalemate.
The Bull Problem Was Real: Artillery pulled by slow bulls created actual constraint. Cavalry had to choose: advance (leaving artillery behind), or stay back (not exploiting gap). Either way: coordination breaks down. This wasn't just tactical error—it was structural to 18th-century warfare.
Professional vs. Traditional: Blocker's research shows this pattern across battles: traditional cavalry armies adding European artillery but still using traditional cavalry tactics. Never fully coordinating. Result: waste of artillery advantage.
The Afternoon Shift: This is where the battle turned from Maratha advantage to even contest. Morning: technology won. Afternoon: discipline mattered more. By evening: numbers mattered most. Afghans had more soldiers. Marathas' one advantage (artillery) couldn't be sustained without coordination.
Where We Left Off: Afternoon approach. Artillery advantage not exploited due to cavalry coordination failure. Maratha momentum lost. Afghan right flank damaged but not defeated. Afghan center and reserves still untouched. Afternoon will be grinding battle. Night approaching. Marathas exhausted. Afghans have fresh reserves. The question: can Gardi's artillery sustain enough pressure through afternoon/evening? Or does Afghan numerical advantage become overwhelming?
By noon on January 14, Gardi had proven something: European artillery could devastate traditional warriors. Three hours of perfect execution. But then Maratha cavalry, trained for a thousand years to charge and win, got impatient. They charged before the artillery finished the job. Got in the way of the guns. Got hit by Afghan rifles. Had to retreat. And suddenly the perfect morning was just the morning. The afternoon would be different.
The Center Holds (Until It Doesn't): Maratha Cavalry Breakthrough
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Critical Afternoon Development
The Setup: After 3 hours of artillery dominance (morning), battle has shifted. Afghan right flank (Rohilas, Barkhurdar Khan) devastated. But now: direct cavalry assault on Afghan CENTER.
The Combatants:
-
Maratha Side: Vishwas Rao & Sudarshi Rao (leading the Huzurat—elite 11,000-strong personal army)
- Vishwas Rao on horse named Pari
- Sudarshi Rao on horse named Dilpak
- These are renown, battle-hardened cavalry
-
Afghan Side: Shah Wali Khan (Abdali's Wazir/Prime Minister—16,000 soldiers)
- Most important man in Afghan command structure after Abdali
- CENTER of formation
- Directly opposite Maratha center
The Breakthrough Moment
What Happened:
"Maratha attack was so intense that the Afghans had to retreat and a lot of losses were incurred."
The Specific Casualty:
- Atai Khan (Shah Wali Khan's nephew)
- Who had previously killed Govindpant Bundeli
- Killed in this battle
The Afghan Center's Failure:
- Attack so quick and intense: Afghan center didn't have time to react
- Huzurat action: well-known for being "swift and fierce force"
- Afghan soldiers started FLEEING
- Central regiment: appearing to collapse
The Embarrassment Factor:
"This is unbecoming of the Afghan force because Shah Wali Khan, he is the wazir or the prime minister. This simply is not acceptable because everybody else were allies."
Shah Wali Khan represents the Afghan army PROPER (core forces loyal to Abdali). If his regiment breaks, it's catastrophic for morale/unity.
The Scale of Success
Maratha Penetration:
- 13,000 cavalry force pierced Afghan center
- Very fierce battle between both centers
- Maratha initiative and overwhelming violence
- Afghan lines devastated
The Historical Descriptions:
Historian Not-So-Kar (specialized in Orange/Marathi history):
"13,000 cavalry force was it just fell upon the Afghan center. It was just a very fierce battle."
The Poetic Description (from sources):
"As though the ground and the sky, it became one. The heaven kind of had not seen this kind of battle. Extremely intense, involved tremendous violence."
Maratha Domination (Figure of Speech):
"As though somebody should be drinking water from the river, Marathas were swallowing the Afghans."
Translation: Making quick work of them, complete dominance.
Foreign Historian's Account (British, 1912, Usually Critical of Bhau):
"Bhau just fell upon Shahwali Khan's force like a snowstorm."
Even a historian usually critical of Bhau had to admit: this was impressive cavalry work.
The Battlefield Situation by Afternoon
Afghan Position:
- Right flank: collapsing (destroyed by artillery earlier, now broken)
- Center: collapsing (penetrated by Maratha cavalry, fleeing)
- Confusion and huge slaughter on Afghan side
- Soldiers: either fleeing, dead, or injured
Maratha Position:
- Right flank: successful (broke through)
- Center: successful (cavalry breakthrough, pushing deep)
- Artillery: mixed (6 units not functioning as intended, but 3 still operating effectively)
- Momentum: swinging Maratha direction
The Neutral Observer's Assessment:
"If a neutral observer had been present and looked at the scenario on the battlefield, he would have felt that Afghan force is about to be defeated or is basically is not up to the task."
The Stunning Fact:
"Even though considering Abdali's numerical superiority and Afghan soldiers physically taller and stronger, even considering all that, it was looking as though Abdali was going to lose this fight."
Afghans had MORE soldiers, BIGGER/STRONGER soldiers, and yet: Marathas appearing to win.
Why This Was Winning (For Maratha)
Advantages Evident by Afternoon:
- Cavalry quality: Huzurat elite and fierce
- Artillery still working (3 units operating)
- Momentum: enemy fleeing/broken
- Leadership: Bhau's cavalry leadership effective
- Morale: Marathas attacking, Afghans retreating
Critical Factor: Artillery 6 units down doesn't matter if cavalry doing breakthrough work. Infantry following breakthrough = can attack disordered enemy.
The Fundamental Problem (That Nobody Saw Yet)
What Bhau Did Right:
- Intense cavalry assault on center
- Pushed hard, broke Afghan lines
- 13,000 cavalry forward
What Bhau Did Wrong:
- Left artillery behind (by about a mile)
- Cavalry advanced too far ahead
- Lost coordination with artillery support
- No longer protected artillery
- Artillery can't follow cavalry (bulls too slow)
The Deviation from Plan: Original plan: move southeast toward Yamuna with artillery in front, non-combatants protected in rectangle.
Actual: cavalry surged ahead, broke formation, pursuing victory instead of executing plan.
Shah Wali Khan's Desperation
When Suja Sent Kashiraj (Messenger): Found Shah Wali Khan in state of despair:
- Sitting on ground
- Putting soil/dirt in mouth (figurative expression of complete hopelessness)
- Soldiers fleeing
- Nothing he could do to stop them
His Angry Plea to Soldiers:
"My friends, our country is far, far away. How far will you run? There is nothing in between. You will die or you will live. But nowhere to run."
Basically: retreat is pointless, we're surrounded, might as well fight.
His Message to Suja:
- Asked Kashiraj to reach Suja immediately
- "Send me reinforcements or I will be destroyed totally"
- Sitting on ground, helpless
But Suja Couldn't Help:
- His own contingent endangered (might become next Maratha target)
- Concerned with protecting his own position
- Adopted "wait and watch" stance
- Didn't intervene (political calculation)
The Army Composition by Afternoon
What Still Functioned (Afghan):
- Abdali's personal slave units: untouched, fresh
- Reserves: not yet engaged
- Right flank survivors: regrouping
- Some contingent support: holding
What Was Damaged (Afghan):
- Center (Shah Wali Khan): broken, fleeing
- Right flank (Rohilas): destroyed, casualties
- Morale: Afghan soldiers questioning loyalty/survival
What Was Intact (Maratha):
- Artillery: still have 3 functioning units
- Cavalry: still have 13,000+ elite
- Infantry: following breakthrough
- Leadership: Bhau in control
Timeline (Afternoon, Hour by Hour)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Post-Noon | Huzurat cavalry surge ahead |
| Afternoon | Attack on Afghan center so fierce |
| Afternoon | Shah Wali Khan's soldiers start fleeing |
| Afternoon | Atai Khan killed |
| Afternoon | Afghan center appearing to collapse |
| Afternoon | Cavalry now ~1 mile ahead of artillery |
Key Insights
The Cavalry Success: Maratha cavalry proved devastating against structured enemy formations. Huzurat's reputation as "swift and fierce force" was completely justified. They broke the Afghan center in one assault.
The Timing Window: By afternoon, Afghans had already lost right flank (artillery), center (cavalry breakthrough), and were appearing to lose. This was the moment where Maratha victory appeared possible.
The Wazir's Position: Shah Wali Khan represents the "true" Afghan army (core loyal forces). His collapse was critical because it showed: even the core was breaking under Maratha assault. Not just allies fleeing—Afghan proper was failing.
The Unnoticed Danger: Bhau's cavalry achieved breakthrough success but got separated from artillery support. This created vulnerability, but in moment of victory, no one noticed the danger.
The Numerical Reality: Despite being outnumbered, despite Afghan soldiers being physically larger, despite Afghan numerical superiority: Marathas were winning through:
- Superior cavalry quality
- Better morale
- Effective leadership
- Willingness to press attack
Not through numbers, but through tactics and aggression.
Where We Left Off: Afghan afternoon collapse. Right flank destroyed. Center penetrated. Shah Wali Khan desperate. Maratha cavalry 1 mile ahead of artillery. Everything appearing to go Maratha direction. Afghan core appearing to break. But cavalry separated from support. Night approaching. Abdali still has fresh reserves. The battle is turning but fragile.
By mid-afternoon on January 14, Bhau had something he didn't have that morning: a real chance to win. Not through artillery domination, but through cavalry excellence. The Huzurat proved what cavalry could do when properly deployed. They broke the Afghan center. Shah Wali Khan was sitting on the ground putting dirt in his mouth—symbol of complete defeat. Suja was watching and waiting. Abdali's core was breaking. For one moment, Maratha victory looked possible. The problem: Bhau's cavalry was 1 mile ahead of the artillery that was supposed to protect them. And night was coming.
The Fatal Mistake: Cavalry Surges Ahead, Plan Collapses
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Critical Error Identified
What Should Have Happened (Original Plan):
- Maratha rectangle moves SOUTHEAST toward Yamuna
- Artillery stays in FRONT of rectangle
- Cavalry protects sides and follows artillery
- Rectangle maintains integrity
- Non-combatants protected in center
- Artillery keeps distance between armies
What Actually Happened:
- Cavalry surged ahead of artillery (ABOUT 1 MILE)
- Left rectangle formation
- Left artillery behind and unprotected
- Cavalry now fighting independently
- Artillery can't support cavalry anymore
- Plan abandoned for pursuit of victory
The Positional Error (With Map References)
The Formation Reference:
- #1 = Ibrahim Khan Gardi (artillery unit)
- #2 = Vithal Shivadev (cavalry support—supposed to protect artillery)
- #3 = Bhau (command center)
- #8-9 = Afghan Barkhurdar Khan & right flank
- #10 = Afghan Shah Wali Khan (center)
What Should Have Happened:
- Cavalry (#2-3) stays BEHIND #1 (artillery)
- Artillery attacks Afghan #8 (Barkhurdar Khan right flank)
- Creates wedge in Afghan right flank
- Cavalry exploits wedge to the RIGHT and AROUND Afghan position
- Rectangle continues southeast toward Yamuna
- Artillery continues protecting
What Actually Happened:
- Cavalry went FORWARD and IN FRONT of artillery
- Now at position where artillery CAN'T support (cavalry would block fire)
- Cavalry now directly fighting #10 (Shah Wali Khan center)
- Instead of exploiting right flank breakthrough: got drawn into center fighting
Why This Was Catastrophic
The Immediate Problem: Cavalry surged ahead → artillery stopped firing (can't hit own cavalry in front) → Afghan center got breathing room → artillery advantage lost
The Structural Problem: Now cavalry fighting WITHOUT artillery support:
- Can't retreat back to artillery (too far)
- Can't advance further (unsupported)
- Fighting becomes hand-to-hand
- Afghan numerical superiority becomes relevant
- Maratha advantage (artillery) neutralized
The Formation Problem: Rectangle formation BROKEN:
- Non-combatants now unprotected (in middle with no surrounding soldiers)
- Line integrity lost
- Can't move toward Yamuna (cavalry blocking path)
- Can't execute original plan anymore
The "Why" (Overconfidence)
What Happened in Cavalry Mind:
"Maybe they thought that they could win this one just by directly hitting the Afghan army because things were going in their favor by now."
The Pattern:
- Morning: artillery dominated, but cavalry coordination failed
- Afternoon: cavalry had breakthrough success against center
- Cavalry thought: "We're winning! Let's finish this!"
- Forgot: we're winning BECAUSE of artillery support
- Pushed forward thinking they could win alone
The Discipline Problem:
"That was the problem, you know, that they were new to this artillery-led warfare. It needed utmost discipline. Instead, these guys thought that they could win this one and let's finish it off."
Exactly what Bhau had warned about: cavalry needs discipline in artillery warfare.
The Immediate Consequences
For Cavalry (Bhau's Center):
- Now fighting Shah Wali Khan directly (hand-to-hand)
- More even battle (not dominated position anymore)
- Exposed without artillery
- Can't easily retreat
For Artillery (Gardi's Unit):
- Cavalry blocking their fire lanes
- Can't protect advancing cavalry anymore
- Now vulnerable to Afghan counter-attack
- Separated from main force
For Rectangle (Original Plan):
- Formation destroyed
- Non-combatants now unprotected
- Can't move toward Yamuna
- Plan completely abandoned
For Overall Strategy:
- No longer escape attempt (Yamuna movement)
- Now full-scale battle
- Exactly what Bhau wanted to AVOID
- Now forced into it anyway
Suja's Intelligence (Kashiraj Report)
What Suja Saw (From Left Flank Position):
- Shah Wali Khan's soldiers fleeing
- Central Afghan position collapsing
- Confusion in Afghan camp
- Sent Kashiraj to find out what's happening
What Kashiraj Found:
- Shah Wali Khan sitting on ground (despair)
- Soldiers won't stop fleeing
- Wazir absolutely helpless
- Commander paralyzed
Suja's Dilemma:
- Could send reinforcements to Shah Wali Khan
- BUT: would expose his own contingent to Maratha attack
- Maratha cavalry surging through center = danger to any moving army
- Made "wait and watch" decision
- Didn't intervene (political survival calculation)
Shah Wali Khan's Final Plea
His Desperate Message:
"My friends, our country is far, far away. How far will you run? There is nothing in between. You will die or you will live."
Translation: Retreat is pointless, nowhere to run to, might as well fight.
His Call for Help:
- "Send reinforcements or I will be destroyed totally"
- Sitting on ground, completely helpless
- No personal power to stop fleeing soldiers
- Needed help from Suja
But Suja Couldn't Help:
- His own soldiers endangered
- Didn't want to be next target
- Waited to see how things developed
- Left Shah Wali Khan alone
The Afternoon Map Update
New Formation After Cavalry Surge:
- Cavalry (#3) now ~1 mile AHEAD of artillery (#1)
- Fighting directly with Shah Wali Khan (#10)
- Artillery off to the side (can't effectively support)
- Rectangle formation: destroyed
- Non-combatants: now vulnerable in center
The Planned Route (Not Followed):
- Should have gone southeast, then around Afghan right flank
- Should have continued south toward Yamuna
- Instead: went north directly into Afghan center
- Now locked in direct combat with Wazir
The Critical Turning Point
What This Moment Represents:
- Morning: technology (artillery) dominated
- Afternoon: quality cavalry breakthrough
- Now: cavalry separated from technology
- Battle returned to: numbers matter
Why This Lost the War: Afghans have:
- More soldiers
- More fresh reserves
- Larger/stronger soldiers
- Abdali's personal slave units (untouched)
- Ability to rotate fresh forces
Marathas had:
- Superior artillery
- Superior cavalry quality
- But now: artillery isolated
- Cavalry cannot sustain alone
The Mistake: Bhau violated his own doctrine. The whole plan depended on: artillery in front, cavalry support, coordinated movement. Instead: cavalry charged ahead, artillery couldn't follow, coordination broke down.
Timeline (Critical Afternoon Period)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Early Afternoon | Cavalry breakthrough successful against center |
| Afternoon | Cavalry continues surging forward (~1 mile ahead) |
| Afternoon | Cavalry now fighting Shah Wali Khan directly |
| Afternoon | Artillery can no longer support |
| Afternoon | Suja sends Kashiraj to learn what's happening |
| Afternoon | Shah Wali Khan reports soldiers fleeing |
| Afternoon | Suja decides NOT to send reinforcements |
| Afternoon | Formation integrity completely lost |
Key Insights
The Irony: Cavalry's greatest success (breaking through center) became the cause of its isolation. Each moment of success encouraged further advance, until separated from support.
The Discipline Failure: Exactly what Irwin warned about: cavalry and artillery must stay coordinated. The moment cavalry goes 1 mile ahead: coordination broken, artillery advantage neutralized, all fancy planning becomes irrelevant.
Suja's Pragmatism: Suja didn't refuse to help Shah Wali Khan out of cowardice—he did it out of survival calculation. If his own contingent gets attacked: he's destroyed. Better to wait and see. This is why coalition armies are fragile.
The Plan's Fragility: The rectangle-escape-toward-Yamuna-with-artillery plan depended on discipline. One cavalry surge breaks everything. Not because the plan was bad, but because executing it required something the Maratha army couldn't maintain: staying together.
The Battle Shift: This is the moment the battle shifted from "Maratha technological advantage" to "Afghan numerical advantage." Gardi's artillery was neutralized not by Afghan counter-fire, but by Maratha cavalry being undisciplined.
Where We Left Off: Cavalry surged 1 mile ahead. Lost coordination with artillery. Now fighting Shah Wali Khan in direct combat. Formation broken. Plan abandoned. Artillery isolated. Afghan reserves fresh and untouched. Evening/night approaching. Marathas winning tactically but losing strategically. Cavalry can't sustain alone against Afghan numbers. This mistake will compound through the night.
By late afternoon, Bhau had one moment where victory looked possible. Afghan center broken, cavalry surging through. All he had to do was stay coordinated with artillery, keep the formation moving toward Yamuna. Instead, cavalry got greedy. Saw broken enemy, thought "we can win alone." Surged ahead. By the time they realized the mistake, it was too late. Artillery was 1 mile behind. Non-combatants unprotected. Formation destroyed. And night was coming. Abdali still had his reserves. And now the Maratha cavalry was fighting without support.
The Afternoon Turning Point: Najib Khan's Tactical Genius & Maratha Collapse Begins
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Situation Recap
Where We Were:
- Bhau's cavalry surged 1 mile ahead of Ibrahim Khan Gardi's artillery
- Left behind: artillery unit vulnerable, formation broken
- Cavalry now fighting Shah Wali Khan (Afghan center) directly
- Afghan right flank already devastated earlier
The Setup for This Reading: Cavalry is now fully committed. Artillery can't support. What happens next determines the battle.
Bhau & Huzurat's Mistake (Repeated)
The Original Plan:
- Bhau should have stayed WITH Ibrahim Khan Gardi's artillery unit
- Artillery targets Afghan RIGHT FLANK (Rohillas, position #8)
- Creates wedge through right flank
- Whole rectangle moves left/around that breakthrough
- Escape toward Yamuna continues
What Actually Happened:
- Bhau and Huzurat went about 1 MILE AHEAD of artillery
- Artillery left on left side, now can't support
- Bhau now facing Afghan MAIN UNITS (Shah Wali Khan center)
- Lost flexibility to change direction
- Locked into combat
The Consequence:
"Now it would have been possible for Huzurati to get out of the battle and change direction. But now that they were one mile ahead of their own artillery units, they could not change the plan and come to the left because they were now dealing with the main Afghan units."
Cavalry committed. No escape. Must fight.
Shah Wali Khan's Collapse & Flight
His Situation:
- Commander-in-Chief (Wazir) of Afghan CENTER
- Facing Bhau's elite Huzurat cavalry
- His own soldiers starting to flee
- Helpless to stop them
His Desperate Plea:
"My country is far away, thousands of miles. How far will you run? You can't flee 10 miles and get back to safety. Either fight or die here."
No one listened. Soldiers fled anyway.
His Position:
- To his RIGHT: Suja Uddhawla (hesitant ally)
- To his RIGHT beyond Suja: Najib Khan Rohila (aggressive ally)
- In front: Bhau's cavalry
- Being pushed back, line collapsing
Najib Khan's Tactical Genius Revealed
Who He Is (Critical Context):
- Shrewd personality, strategic mind
- Previously killed Jankoji Shinde's uncle (Dr. Hrishin)
- Shinde army extremely angry/vengeful because of this
- Facing Jankoji Shinde's army directly
- Personal survival depends on NOT losing this battle
Why This Battle is Existential for Najib:
"Because if Abdali loses, Najib will be decimated. The Marathas are extremely angry with him. He killed their commander. He invited Abdali to India. If Abdali loses, Najib doesn't escape—he dies."
But Others Can Survive:
- Suja probably will live (Marathas might spare him)
- Abdali might be captured but released (he's a king)
- Najib: NO MERCY. Will be hunted down and killed.
So Najib understood: this isn't a battle he can lose. This is survival.
Najib Khan's Tactical Innovation
The Sand Barrier Strategy: Facing Shinde's cavalry charge, Najib created defensive structures:
"He created sand hills or sand banks, about 4.5-5 feet tall, in front of his position."
How It Worked:
- Creates sand barriers (~5 feet tall) between his army and Shinde's
- As Shinde advances: creates NEW sand barriers in front
- On the fly barrier building = constant defensive line
- Keeps Shinde at distance, prevents cavalry charge
The Fire Arrow Attack: Along with sand barriers, sends continuous wave of fire arrows:
"Asankhya (unlimited/too many) fire missiles—arrows with burning tips that would ignite targets."
The Effect on Maratha Cavalry:
- Horses panicked by fire arrows
- Elephants terrified of burning missiles
- Animals confused, going "helter-skelter"
- Couldn't maintain formation
- Became directionless, chaotic
The Result:
- Najib held Shinde's cavalry at 2 MILES distance
- Prevented cavalry from closing
- No hand-to-hand combat possible
- Shinde couldn't overrun his position
- Stalemate maintained
The Brilliance of Najib's Strategy
What Made It Work:
- Understanding the threat: Shinde wants revenge, will charge
- Defensive positioning: Sand barriers prevent breakthrough
- Psychological warfare: Fire arrows terrify animals
- Flexible defense: Keep building barriers as enemy advances
- Cautious advance: Move slowly while creating barriers, never get pinned
Why It Was Brilliant:
- Turned cavalry advantage (Shinde's) into liability (horse panic)
- Turned distance into ally (kept 2-mile separation)
- Used fire as weapon (psychological + practical)
- Matched aggression with stubborn defense
- Kept his own army intact
The Larger Battle Picture (By Mid-Afternoon)
Afghan Center (Shah Wali Khan):
- Collapsing under Maratha cavalry assault
- Soldiers fleeing
- Commander helpless
- Getting pushed backward
Afghan Right Flank (Najib Khan Rohila):
- Holding against Shinde cavalry
- Creating defensive barriers
- Sending fire arrows
- Maintaining 2-mile distance
- Not being overrun
The Contradiction: Afghan center breaking, Afghan right flank holding. Both fighting same Maratha army, completely different results.
Najib's Personal Motivation
His Famous Statement:
"I am only interested in Swarasimha's interest in what happens today. The rest of the people—Abdali, Afghan army, Suja—they may leave after this battle. But I will be here."
Translation: "This is MY homeland. For me, this battle is existential. For them, it's temporary."
Why This Matters:
- Afghans fighting for conquest, then return home
- Suja fighting for political position, can negotiate either way
- Abdali fighting for military victory, then can retreat
- Najib fighting for SURVIVAL IN INDIA
So Najib has most at stake. Fights hardest. Uses best tactics. Refuses to break.
The Maratha Threat: Marathas know Najib invited Abdali to India. They will NOT forgive this. So Najib knows:
- If Afghan loses: Najib dies (hunted down)
- If Afghan wins: Najib survives
- No middle ground
- No escape
The Psychological Element
Najib's Warning (Implicit): Everyone else is looking for exit strategy. Only Najib is committed to winning. This means: when others break/flee, Najib will fight harder. When Maratha cavalry pushes, Najib will push back.
The Fire Arrows: Not just military tactic. Also psychological:
- Shows desperation (will burn own crops/land)
- Shows commitment (willing to risk everything)
- Creates fear (animals panic, soldiers hesitate)
- Signals: "I won't break"
Timeline (Afternoon to Evening)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Afternoon | Bhau/Huzurat still 1 mile ahead of artillery |
| Afternoon | Shah Wali Khan's center collapsing |
| Afternoon | Najib Khan activates sand barrier strategy |
| Afternoon | Fire arrows begin targeting Shinde cavalry |
| Afternoon | Shinde held at 2-mile distance |
| Evening Approaching | Stalemate developing on right flank |
Key Insights
Najib vs. Everyone Else: Everyone else in Afghan army had an exit strategy. Najib didn't. This made him dangerous. People with nothing to lose fight hardest.
The Fire Arrow Tactic: Brilliant psychological warfare. Not just practical (stops cavalry charge) but symbolic (shows commitment, creates fear). Modern armies would call this "asymmetric defense."
Sand Barriers (Low Tech, High Effectiveness): No fancy artillery needed. Just earth moved around to create protective walls. Stops cavalry. Slows infantry. Buys time. Shows: you don't need technology to stop technology.
The Contrast:
- Center (Shah Wali Khan): breaking, fleeing, lost
- Right (Najib Khan): holding, fighting, committed
Shows battle outcome depends as much on commander as on soldiers. Najib's willingness to fight = his soldiers' willingness to hold.
The Turning Point: This is where Maratha momentum starts to die. Afghan right flank (Najib) not breaking. Afghan center (Shah Wali Khan) breaking but slowly. Maratha artillery isolated. Cavalry tired. Evening approaching. Fresh Afghan reserves untouched.
Where We Left Off: Afternoon. Bhau's cavalry still pursuing Shah Wali Khan but slowly winning. Shinde's cavalry blocked by Najib's tactics. Both sides digging in. Evening/night approaching. Artillery still isolated. Afghan reserves still fresh. Maratha momentum fading. This is where Maratha victory becomes impossible.
Najib Khan understood something everyone else missed: this battle was about survival, not victory. While Abdali thought about conquest and return, while Suja thought about political position, while Shah Wali Khan thought about honor—Najib thought about staying alive. So he did something desperate. He burned arrows and moved earth. He refused to break. And when Shinde's cavalry charged, they found: not a defeated enemy, but a wall of fire and sand. The Maratha momentum that had looked unstoppable in the afternoon hit that wall. And stopped.
The Tide Turns: Abdali's Counterattack & The Afternoon Crisis
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Morning Dominance (9 AM - 1 PM / 12 Noon)
The Maratha Winning Position:
- Right flank: devastated Afghan lines
- Center: Marathas reached outskirts of Abdali's tent (his command post!)
- Left flank: Shah Pasand Khan making steady advancement
- Overall: Marathas on the ascendancy
The Scale of Success: From 9 AM to 1 PM (about 4 hours):
- Afghan right flank: almost completely destroyed
- Afghan center: heavily damaged
- Only Shah Pasand Khan's left flank remaining relatively intact
- Marathas pressing toward Abdali's personal position
The Witness Account (Kashiraj):
"From 8 AM to exactly 12 noon, the war was ongoing. Even though the dead and injured in Suja Uddhawla's area were negligible, overall Marathas were on the ascendancy."
Translation: Even Suja's contingent (which wasn't heavily fighting) noted Marathas winning overall.
Historian Scott Waring (50 years after battle, 1810):
"Bhau and Vishwas Rao had killed about 18,000 of Shah Wali Khan's troops. They had broken the 'Kambarda' (spine) of the army—made them non-functional. Actually killed 3,000."
18,000 "broken/ineffective" but only 3,000 actually dead (rest wounded/routed).
The Afghan Collapse
What Was Happening:
- Afghan troops fleeing battlefield in panic
- Looting their own camps in mad rush
- Trying to escape back to Afghanistan
- Officers couldn't stop the rout
Why They Were Breaking:
- Maratha artillery devastation (earlier in morning)
- Maratha cavalry breakthroughs
- Afghan center collapsing under Bhau's assault
- Momentum completely toward Marathon
The Psychological Shift: From confident army to panicked retreat. Soldiers wanted OUT.
Abdali's Critical Decision: Emergency Reserves Deployed
The Moment of Truth: An inexperienced commander would have:
- Surrendered
- Fled
- Lost hope
- Admitted defeat
But Abdali was veteran general. Kept "cold head."
His Response: Called up his SPECIAL REGIMENT: the Nasakachi regiment (1,500 elite soldiers)
- Personal, most-trusted troops
- Divided into two battalions
- Job: Stop the rout
What They Did:
"The 1,500 soldiers started threatening people or the troops, the Afghan troops that were fleeing the battlefield. They basically threatened them, making sure they understand the consequence of running away, which is being killed."
Translation: Use force/threats to stop fleeing soldiers.
- "You stop running or I kill you"
- "Afghanistan is thousands of miles away—you can't run there"
- "Only option: fight"
The Results:
- Fleeing soldiers brought back to line
- Sent to reinforce right flank (destroyed by Marathas)
- Sent to reinforce center (Shah Wali Khan's position)
- Turned rout into organized defense
Abdali's Command Structure Under Crisis
The Key Orders: Abdali ordered two critical commanders:
- Shah Pasand Khan (his Prime Minister/Chief of Staff)
- Najib Khan (the Rohila who can't afford to lose)
Command: "March forward. Make progress toward Marathas. Keep advancing."
Why These Two:
- Shah Pasand Khan: most trusted, represents Afghan core
- Najib Khan: has existential stake (will die if loses)
- Both reliable under pressure
- Both positioned to exploit opportunities
The Strategic Shift: From defensive (trying to hold) to aggressive (counter-attacking).
Abdali's Personal Contingency Plan
The Pragmatic Preparation: From Shamlu Bakharka's (historian in Shah Pasand Khan's contingent) account:
"Abdali took note of the rapid advancement of the Marathas. He gave order to load up his wives and children on Ajay horses and camels."
What This Means: Abdali preparing family for evacuation:
- If tide can't be turned: can at least save his dependents
- Non-combatants don't decide battles
- Women/children removed to safety
- Then Abdali commits himself to fight or die
The Message:
- "I'm not confident of victory"
- "But I'm not surrendering either"
- "My family is safe, now I can fight freely"
- Maximum commitment possible
The Reality Check
Maratha Advantages:
- Intense attack
- Breakthrough in multiple sectors
- Reaching Abdali's personal tent
- Enemy in panic/rout
But:
- Still not decisive victory
- Afghan center still holding (barely)
- No complete encirclement of Afghan army
- Abdali still alive and commanding
Afghan Resilience:
- Abdali keeping cool head
- Emergency reserves activated
- Fleeing troops being organized
- Counter-attack being organized
The Afternoon Turning Point (Post-Noon)
The Previous Advantage: Morning (9 AM-12 PM): Marathas dominated. Afghan army collapsing.
The New Reality: Afternoon (12 PM onward): Abdali counter-organizing. Reserves activated. Officers holding line.
The Maratha Problem:
- Still separated (cavalry ahead of artillery)
- Exhausted from morning assault
- No new reserves (used all forces)
- Afghan fresh troops arriving (1,500 Nasakachi)
The Turning Point Signal: The chapter title changes: from "Bharti" (HIGH TIDE) to "Ohoti" (LOW TIDE/TIDE GOING OUT)
"Bharti is the high tide. Ohoti is when the tide is pulling out. So now the Marathas will be on the receiving end. The tide is turning."
Key Insights
Abdali's Genius: Not that he prevented rout (emergency reserves did that). Genius was: kept cold head when everything seemed lost, made decisions quickly, deployed reserves at critical moment.
The Timing of Reserves: Didn't deploy 1,500 Nasakachi early (would waste them). Deployed them exactly when Afghan collapse happened and needed stopping. Perfect timing.
The Contingency Plan: Evacuating family showed Abdali understood: "I might lose here." But also showed: "I'm committed to trying." Removed his family so he could fight without worrying about them.
The Morning vs. Afternoon Shift: Morning: Maratha momentum unstoppable. Afternoon: Abdali reorganizing. This is the battle's true turning point—not a single moment but a shift from 9AM-12PM momentum to 12PM+ counter-momentum.
Scott Waring's Observation: Even historian 50 years later noted: Afghan army had never seen this intensity of attack. Shows Maratha morning assault was genuinely exceptional—just couldn't be sustained.
Timeline (Critical Afternoon Transition)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 9 AM | Morning assault intensifies |
| 9 AM-12 PM | Maratha dominance, Afghan collapse |
| ~12 PM | Abdali recognizes crisis |
| 12 PM | Deploys Nasakachi (1,500 reserves) |
| 12 PM | Orders family evacuation |
| 12 PM | Commands Shah Pasand Khan & Najib to counter-attack |
| 12 PM+ | Afghan defense organizing |
| Afternoon | Tide beginning to turn |
Where We Left Off: Noon. Abdali's counterattack beginning. Maratha momentum about to be checked. Afghan reserves activated. Family evacuated. Fresh troops organizing. The morning's Maratha triumph about to meet afternoon's Afghan resistance. The battle's real turning point just happening.
By noon, everything had inverted. Morning: Maratha dominance, Afghan collapse. Abdali understood: he had maybe two hours before his army completely broke. So he did something counterintuitive—evacuated his family (accepting possible defeat) while deploying his best troops (fighting for victory). He couldn't stop the panic with words. So he used his 1,500 most loyal soldiers as a cork to plug the bleeding. It worked. By noon, Afghan army had stopped fleeing. By early afternoon, it started fighting back. The morning's Maratha victory was about to become the afternoon's grinding stalemate. And that's when Abdali would have the advantage.
The Catastrophic Afternoon: Vishwas Rao's Death & The Leadership Doctrine
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Decisive Moment
The Sniper Attack: From Abdali's fortune (luck/circumstance):
"One of the bullets struck Vishwas Rao in the head, and the other struck Bhau in his shoulder/arm area where the arm starts from the body."
The Results:
- Vishwas Rao: Killed instantly (shot in the head)
- Bhau: Wounded in shoulder/arm (injured but survived initially)
The Historical Assumption: After being wounded, Bhau dismounted from his elephant and rode a horse instead, personally entering the fray. (Some debate about exact sequence, but consensus: Bhau got directly involved in close combat after this point.)
The Military Crisis: Visible Leadership Doctrine
The Historical Reality (Irwin's Analysis):
"In those days, whatever was the plight of the commander-in-chief would decide how the battle will go. Whether you lose or win depends on whether the leader is dead, alive, injured, or passionately fighting."
The Practice:
- If leader dead or not visible: army flees battlefield
- If leader visible and fighting: army continues
- Leader visibility = decisive factor in outcome
The Consequence: When Vishwas Rao (most important military second-in-command) was VISIBLY killed, psychological impact was catastrophic.
Soldiers see:
- Vishwas Rao dead
- Bhau wounded
- Command structure falling apart
- Time to flee?
The Visual Symbol: The Empty Elephant Seat
Why Elephants Mattered:
- Royal/elite commanders rode on elevated elephant seats (Howdah)
- Soldiers could see commander from distance
- Visibility = confidence the leader is alive and commanding
- Empty seat = leader dead or fled
The Maratha Problem: When Bhau dismounted from elephant to ride horse:
"Upon seeing the elephant seat empty, the army fleeing was very usually acceptable or commonly understood thing."
Translation: Empty elephant seat = soldiers understand commander is dead/gone = time to flee.
Historical Precedent (1757): General Jengabaj Khan had commented on this exact problem:
"Abdali said: This practice of sitting on the top of the elephant seat is not good anymore because the elephant will go wherever it wants. You can't control it. And besides, the Howdah (Mena) is made for sick people to carry, not for royals who are leading the fight."
Abdali was calling the tradition outdated:
- Elephant uncontrollable
- Not suitable for active combat leader
- Creates vulnerability
Abdali's Tactical Innovation: Leadership from Position of Strength
Abdali's Model (Different Approach): Instead of being on prominent elephant seat where vulnerable:
- Positioned far back (not abandoned, just strategic)
- On a small hillock for elevated view
- With binoculars to see battlefield
- With messengers going back and forth for real-time intel
- Out of immediate danger but fully informed
Why This Was Genius:
- Visibility Alternative: Messengers keep him informed = leadership is active
- Safety: Far enough back to not be easy target
- Strategic Vision: Elevated position = can see whole battlefield
- Communication Network: Messengers = command authority flows continuously
- Survivability: If he dies, leadership continuity through deputies
The Technology Advantage: Having binoculars in 1761 was innovation for the time. Allowed Abdali to:
- See distant movements
- Make informed decisions
- Adjust tactics in real-time
- Command with authority based on actual knowledge
The Leadership Visibility Problem for Marathas
Bhau's Dilemma:
- Vishwas Rao killed = major psychological hit
- Bhau wounded = further morale damage
- Empty elephant seat = soldiers seeing signs of defeat
- Traditional doctrine: leader must be visible to keep army fighting
Bhau's Choice: Dismounted from elephant, got on horse, entered combat personally.
Why:
- Show he's still alive
- Show he's still fighting
- Restore army morale through personal example
- Be visible as leader
The Risk:
- Puts wounded commander directly in combat
- Increases chance of being killed
- No strategic distance/overview
The Dilemma: If Bhau stays on elephant:
- Safe, can command
- But soldiers see empty seat, think he's abandoned/dead
- Army flees
If Bhau dismounts to fight:
- Soldiers see him fighting
- Morale restored
- But wounded commander in direct danger
- Lost strategic command position
The Cultural Comparison
Shivaji's Innovation (Earlier Leader): Shivaji never used elephants for fighting. He avoided the tradition entirely:
- Stayed mobile
- Didn't become a target
- Led through tactics, not visibility
Abdali's Innovation: Abandoned the elephant tradition. Used:
- Strategic positioning
- Binoculars (technology)
- Messengers (communication)
- Elevated position (visibility of situation, not visibility of self)
Bhau's Traditional Approach: Still bound by the tradition. Had to:
- Show himself
- Get visible to army
- Enter combat personally
- Accept the danger
The Afternoon Reality
What Just Happened: Morning: Maratha dominance, Afghan collapse, cavalry reaching Abdali's tent. Afternoon transition: Abdali deployed reserves, Afghan counter-attack organizing. Now: Vishwas Rao killed, Bhau wounded, leadership doctrine collapsing.
The Turning Point: This is it. When commander-in-chief is wounded and second-in-command is dead, the momentum shifts.
Not because of tactical failure, but because of:
- Psychological impact
- Visibility doctrine
- Loss of command authority
- Soldier morale collapse
Key Insights
Abdali's Seasoned Judgment:
- Recognized traditional tactics (elephant visibility) were outdated
- Implemented modern approach (strategic positioning + technology + communication)
- Showed willingness to innovate
- Proved to be better leadership model
Bhau's Predicament: Bound by tradition:
- Can't abandon visibility doctrine
- Must show himself to keep soldiers fighting
- Forced to take personal risk
- Wounded but must keep fighting
The Invisible Cost: Vishwas Rao's death wasn't just loss of a commander. It broke the psychological contract: "Our leaders are invincible." When soldiers see leader killed, different army emerges.
The 18th Century Reality: Battle outcomes decided as much by who is visible/alive as by tactics/numbers. Loss of visible leadership = loss of army's will to fight.
Timeline (Critical Afternoon Progression)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Early Afternoon | Vishwas Rao shot in head, killed instantly |
| Early Afternoon | Bhau shot in shoulder/arm, wounded |
| Early Afternoon | Bhau dismounts from elephant |
| Early Afternoon | Soldiers see empty elephant seat |
| Early Afternoon | Morale crisis begins |
| Early Afternoon | Bhau mounts horse, enters combat personally |
| Afternoon | Maratha momentum shifts from offensive to defensive |
Where We Left Off: Vishwas Rao dead. Bhau wounded. Elephant seat empty. Maratha soldiers seeing signs of command collapse. Bhau forcing himself into personal combat to restore confidence. But momentum already shifted. Afghan reserves counterattacking. Afternoon crisis full force.
The morning belonged to Bhau and his cavalry. They reached Abdali's tent. They broke the Afghan center. They killed thousands. But at some point in the early afternoon, a sniper's bullet found Vishwas Rao's head. Another found Bhau's shoulder. That's when everything changed. Not because of tactics. Because in 18th century warfare, the army follows the visible leader. When the leader is dead or absent, soldiers stop fighting. Bhau understood this. So he got on his horse and rode into the fray, wounded and bleeding. He had to be seen. He had to show the army he was still fighting. But by then, the moment had passed. Abdali had his chance. And he took it.
The Leadership Visibility Doctrine: Why Elephant Seats Lose Battles
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Nadir Shah's 1739 Observation (From Foreign Military Perspective)
Who He Was:
- Shah of Iran/Persia
- Invaded India in 1739
- Brought Abdali as his servant/foot soldier
- Witnessed Indian military practices
His Shocking Discovery:
"This practice of Indian kings riding on elephants in wartime is very strange and very counterproductive."
His Analysis:
"In war time, they come on the elephant and thus they become the target of the enemy forces because you are visible, you are mounted on a high seat. So it's very easy to target you."
The Fatal Flaw:
- Commander mounted on elevated elephant seat = highly visible target
- Enemies focus all fire on the commander
- Kill the commander = army collapses
- You're literally putting a target on your back
Historical Pattern: 40-Year European Strategy (1745-1785)
The Documented Tactic: From 1745-1785 (40-year span):
- Europeans (British, Portuguese) won multiple Indian battles
- Used one consistent strategy: sharpshooting the elephant
- Knew exactly how to win: kill the king/commander
The Method: Europeans practiced precision targeting on elephants carrying commanders:
- Artillery focused on elephant seat
- Marksmen sniped commanders
- Once commander fell: army collapsed
- Battle over
Why It Worked Every Time: Because Indian armies had ONE critical weakness: they couldn't fight without visible commander.
The Mughal Parallel
Same Vulnerability: The Mughals (who ruled before this period) did the exact same thing:
- Commanders on elephants
- Visible, prominent, vulnerable
- Same targeting strategy defeated them
The Evolution: Eventually Indian kings/forces learned:
- Stopped the elephant-seat practice
- Moved to horseback leadership
- More mobile, less visible, less vulnerable
But the Problem Remained: Even on horseback, the visibility doctrine persisted:
"If one soldier runs away from the battlefield, that sets the plane in motion. Then the whole army starts fleeing and that creates trouble. Once the train begins, that's the end of it."
Single soldier fleeing → cascades into full rout.
The Panipat Precedent: Battle of Panipat II (1556)
The Historical Parallel: Same location (Panipat), 205 years earlier (1556 vs. 1761):
- Fought between Akbar (Mughal) and Hemu (Afghan)
- Hemu commanded Afghan forces defending Delhi
- One arrow decided the entire battle
The Arrow Shot: Hemu had just ascended to throne, had:
- 1,500 war elephants
- Strong left/right flanks
- Middle position still surviving
- Was winning the battle
Then: One arrow hit Hemu in the head
The Result:
- Hemu fainted/lost consciousness
- Forces didn't understand why to keep fighting
- "Who is paying our salary now?"
- Entire army fled
- Battle lost in seconds
The Insight:
"Indian forces did not understand or could not comprehend the fact that once your paymaster is dead or severely injured, you should keep fighting. They couldn't fathom that idea."
Soldiers thought: "My employer is gone. Who's paying me? Why should I fight?"
The Fundamental Problem
The Indian Army Weakness: Not a tactical problem. A psychological/cultural problem.
Fighting was transactional:
- Someone paid you
- You fought
- That person was your connection to meaning
- If they died: contract ended
- No understanding of "fighting for larger cause"
The Shivaji Exception: Shivaji was different. He created:
- Sense of fighting for bigger cause
- National/patriotic motivation
- Not just "king pays me"
- "We fight for our people/land"
Most armies never achieved this.
Why This Matters for Panipat III (1761)
The Exact Same Pattern:
- Vishwas Rao killed (shot in head) → psychological collapse
- Bhau wounded (shot in shoulder) → command structure failing
- Empty elephant seat → soldiers see signs of defeat
- Cascade effect begins
The Lesson Not Learned: 205 years after Hemu's death by arrow, exact same vulnerability:
- Commander visibility doctrine
- Emotional attachment to specific person
- Loss of visible leader = loss of army
Key Insights
Nadir Shah Was Right: Foreign observer sees what Indians couldn't: the elephant seat is a death trap. It's like volunteering to be the #1 target.
The 40-Year Pattern: Europeans didn't defeat Indian armies through superior tactics. They used the same winning formula every time: kill the visible commander. Indians never learned to defend against this.
The Psychological Vulnerability: Not that Indians were cowardly. They just couldn't conceptualize fighting without visible purpose. The paymaster dying meant contract ended. This wasn't weakness—it was cultural norm.
The Cascading Failure: One person fleeing creates momentum. Then another. Then another. Soldiers look around, see others leaving, think "must be bad news" and leave themselves. Rumor spreads faster than truth.
Why Shivaji Was Revolutionary: He understood what others didn't: soldiers will fight for something beyond personal paymaster. Fighting for land/people/independence is different psychological contract. More resilient to commander loss.
Timeline Comparison
| Battle | Year | Commander | Method | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panipat II | 1556 | Hemu | Arrow to head | Fainted, army fled, lost |
| Panipat III | 1761 | Vishwas Rao | Sniper bullet to head | Killed, army fled, losing |
Same tactic, 205 years apart. Same result.
Where We Left Off: Understanding the historical pattern that explains why Vishwas Rao's death is so catastrophic. Not just loss of commander but collapse of the entire psychological contract that holds the army together. This isn't new—it's been happening for centuries in Indian warfare.
Nadir Shah came to India and saw something the Indians couldn't: you keep volunteering to die. You put your commander on an elephant, make him visible, and then act shocked when the enemy shoots him. The Europeans learned this by 1745. By 1756, they'd perfected it. And by 1761, it happened again at Panipat. Same tactic. Same vulnerability. Same result: one well-placed bullet, and the entire army collapses. Not because of cowardice, but because the soldiers' psychology was built around following one person. Kill that person, and you kill the army.
The Collapse: Defectors, Rumors, and Cascading Desertion
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Defector Problem (Early Afternoon)
Who They Were: About 2,000 Afghan soldiers who had joined Maratha forces with Vittal Shivadev
Where They Came From: From Kunjapura Fort:
- Marathas captured the fort
- Some defenders died, some were captured, some surrendered
- Those who surrendered agreed to fight with Marathas
- ~2,000 of them came over
The Recruitment Logic: Marathas would "love to swell their ranks" - add numbers to their army.
The Hidden Problem:
"These are not Abdali's camp defecting. These were potentially Kunjapura forces, and they were someone else's Afghan. That was a mistake. They may end up double-crossing Marathas."
They're not committed to Maratha cause—they're opportunists.
The Identification System
The Saffron Headgear: To prevent friendly fire/confusion:
- Defectors given saffron headgear/turbans
- Easily identifiable as "good Afghans" (allied with Marathas)
- Distinguishes them from Abdali's forces
The Theory: "If we mark them, we'll know who's who in the chaos"
The Reality: In chaos, nothing works perfectly.
The Betrayal (Around 3 PM - After Vishwas Rao's Death)
The Moment: When Vishwas Rao died and chaos erupted:
- Defectors threw away saffron headgear
- Switched sides immediately
- Revealed they were waiting for exact moment
Their Position:
- In rear lines of Maratha force
- Close to "Bunge" (support staff, non-combatants)
- Cooks, merchants, maintenance personnel
- All the logistics/supply people
Their Attack:
"They started attacking these support staff on the Maratha side. They threw away their headgear and started fighting the Maratha side. They attacked the non-combatants in the back."
The Tactical Impact: 2,000 enemies suddenly appearing in the rear = complete breakdown of Maratha rear-guard security.
The Psychological Amplification
The Appearance vs. Reality:
"What appeared was that Abdali's army had reached all the way to the back of the Maratha camp."
Not true, but appeared true:
- Soldiers at front don't know defectors are only 2,000
- They see Afghans attacking from rear
- Think: "Afghan main force has broken through"
- Panic cascades
The Rumors:
- Vishwas Rao dead (fact)
- Afghans in rear (partially true—defectors)
- Abdali winning (unverified rumor)
- Battle is lost (false, but believed)
The Information Problem:
"You cannot see the entire battlefield, like both sides. You only see 100 meters ahead of you. If this is what people are saying, then you tend to believe it."
Soldiers can't verify rumors. They only know:
- Their visible commander area
- What others are saying
- The general feeling
The Rumor Effect:
"Rumor spreads faster than the truth."
By 3-4 PM:
- Rumor: Marathas are losing (partly true at this point)
- Rumor: Afghans in rear (defectors, but who knows that?)
- Rumor: Commander might be dead (Vishwas Rao is dead)
- Rumor: We should flee (natural conclusion)
The Cascading Desertion
First: Vittal Shivadev
- Believed rumors/confusion
- Supposed to be fighting
- Left his position and fled
- Takes ~5,000 soldiers with him
The Impact of Commander Leaving:
"When Tom, Dick, and Harry soldiers see their commanders fleeing, they think 'oh, that's over.' Their leader believed the rumors, so soldiers think the rumors must be true."
Second: Damaji Gayakwar
- Badly injured (already wounded)
- Was with Vittal Shivadev
- Follows Shivadev's retreat
- Takes ~3,000-4,000 soldiers
- These are his personal followers/army
Third: Malhar Rao Holkar
- Timing unclear (maybe ~1-2 PM or slightly later)
- Left battlefield with 5,000-6,000 soldiers
- Took western route toward Yamuna then south toward Delhi
- Gave safe passage by Najib Khan Rohila (the Afghan commander)
Why Holkar Got Safe Passage:
- Had good relationship with Najib Khan
- Najib made sure he "was given safe passage"
- Otherwise dangerous for Holkar (major commander) to escape alone with 6,000 soldiers
- Abdali would normally chase him
- But battle still ongoing, so Abdali forces couldn't spare manpower
- Holkar timed his escape perfectly
Holkar's Motivation (Disputed)
Theory 1: Forced Responsibility Before battle, Bhau allegedly told Holkar:
"If we are on the losing side and if I am not to be seen or something happens, you have responsibility of saving my wife. Take her back to safety."
Holkar's wives came with him. So maybe he left to fulfill this duty?
Theory 2: Strategic Disagreement
- Holkar never believed in this battle plan
- Never liked frontal attack strategy
- Never believed in artillery power
- Fought for first 4-5 hours but then left
- Thinks: "I told you this wouldn't work"
The Terrain Argument: Bhau said: "We're in flatland. There's no mountain, no jungle. We need artillery to compensate."
Holkar said: "Do the Ganimikawa style" (Shivaji's guerrilla tactics with terrain advantage)
Bhau: "There IS no terrain here. Your strategy won't work."
The Reality: Probably both. Holkar:
- Was responsible for Bhau's wife (duty to leave early)
- Didn't believe in the plan (justification for leaving)
- Had strategic disagreements (ongoing tension)
- Timed his escape well (showed competence)
The Net Effect
The Number Loss: After Vishwas Rao's death, three major commanders left with ~13,000 soldiers:
- Vittal Shivadev: ~5,000
- Damaji Gayakwar: ~3,000-4,000
- Malhar Rao Holkar: ~5,000-6,000
The Total:
- Maratha total fighting force: ~50,000-60,000
- Suddenly lost: ~13,000 (roughly 20-25%)
- Lost: 3 important commanders
The Cascading Effect:
"If some of them are leaving, then people who are fighting will question themselves as to why am I fighting? If others are leaving, it has the dynamics of its own."
When important commanders flee, it creates:
- Doubt in remaining soldiers
- Rumor of defeat
- More soldiers fleeing
- Momentum toward collapse
The Timing
The Battle Duration:
- Started: ~8-9 AM
- Morning dominance (Maratha): 9 AM - 12 PM
- Afternoon crisis: 12 PM - 3 PM
- Mass desertion: ~3 PM onward
- Battle effectively over: ~6:30-7 PM (winter darkness)
Total: ~9-10 hours of continuous battle
With 200,000+ people engaged.
Bhau's Strategic Error
The Larger Mistake: Bhau was not as experienced as Abdali:
- Brave warrior ✓
- Good fighter ✓
- Strategic commander ✗
The Specific Error:
"He got into the battlefield himself like he's a soldier. That's not what you should be doing when you're commander-in-chief."
- Dismounted from elephant
- Got on horse
- Entered direct combat
- Got wounded
- Lost command authority
- Couldn't control the collapsing situation
The Personality Issue: "He was very hot-headed. Couldn't control himself."
Warrior instinct overrode commander instinct.
Key Insights
The Defector Gambit: Recruiting 2,000 defectors seemed smart. But they were never loyal. They were waiting for chaos. One visible sign of defeat (Vishwas Rao dying) and they flipped. Numbers don't matter if they're not committed.
The Information Vacuum: Soldiers couldn't verify rumors. So they believed them. Rumor: Afghans in rear = panic. Reality: only defectors. But who knew?
The Commander Cascade: When one commander flees, it triggers others. Vittal leaves → Damaji follows → soldiers of both follow → Holkar sees collapse → leaves with safe passage (negotiated with enemy!).
Holkar's Pragmatism: He had pre-negotiated safe passage with Najib Khan. Shows: Holkar was hedging his bets. Knew battle might go south. Had escape plan. Executed it professionally.
The Snowball Effect: Morning: 75,000 Marathas winning. Afternoon: 62,000 Marathas losing. Not because of tactics, but because 13,000 left (or were tied down by defectors attacking rear).
Where We Left Off: By 3-4 PM, Maratha collapse accelerating. Defectors attacking rear. Three major commanders fled with 13,000 soldiers. Remaining forces demoralizing. Battle still ongoing (continues until dark ~7 PM) but outcome already decided. Maratha momentum reversed completely.
By 3 o'clock in the afternoon, everything fell apart. Vishwas Rao was dead. Bhau was wounded. The defectors Marathas had recruited threw off their turbans and started killing supply staff. Rumors of Afghans in the rear spread like fire. Vittal Shivadev looked around, saw chaos, decided he was leaving. Took 5,000 soldiers. Damaji Gayakwar, wounded and following Shivadev, took another 3,000-4,000. Malhar Rao Holkar, who'd never believed in this battle, had already negotiated safe passage with Najib Khan Rohila (the enemy!) and slipped away with 6,000. In the space of an hour, 13,000 soldiers vanished. Not killed. Just left. And when soldiers see commanders leaving, they figure if it's good enough for the boss, it's good enough for them. That's when the rout became inevitable.
The Final Stand: Jumburak Cavalry & Bhau's Refusal to Escape
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Afternoon Collapse Intensifies
The Maratha Situation (Post 3-4 PM):
- 13,000 soldiers already deserted (Shivadev, Gayakwar, Holkar)
- Cavalry surged 1 mile ahead of artillery
- Afghan right flank (Najib Khan, Shah Pasand Khan) now converging on center
- Huzurat (elite 11,000-troop Maratha force) under overwhelming attack
- Three-directional assault from Afghan forces
The Artillery Problem:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi still wounded but fighting
- Can't use artillery effectively (Bhau's cavalry in the way)
- No protection for artillery unit (needs cavalry/foot soldiers to defend)
- Artillery becomes vulnerable to direct attack
The Afghan Game-Changer: Jumburak Cavalry
What Changed: When Maratha artillery lost effectiveness, Afghan army deployed Jamburak (mounted camel artillery).
The Jamburak Advantage:
- Not long-range (not like 1.5 km artillery)
- Short-range but MOBILE
- Two people per camel with rotating cannon
- Effective at ~30 meters distance
- Creates massive localized damage
- Can move wherever camel goes = flexibility
The Tactical Shift: From artillery battle (long-range, stationary) to hand-to-hand combat (close-range, mobile).
Why This Mattered:
"Marathas had no answer to this. Every both armies had their strong points and weak points. This one, the Marathas had no answer to."
Maratha forces trained for cavalry/open field battles. Not for mobile camel-mounted artillery in close combat.
Abdali's Multi-Year Preparation
The Timeline:
- 1752: Abdali began practicing this technique
- 1752-1761: Nine years of refinement
- 1761 (January 14): Perfected version deployed
The Military Innovation: Created multiple regiments of Jumburak cavalry:
- One regiment: ~1,000 soldiers with camel-mounted artillery
- Multiple regiments: created a coordinated force
- Each rider carried burning sticks to light the matchlock (ignite the gun)
The Deployment Pattern:
"First regiment will attack with guns blazing and come back. With sequence, second, third regiments attack. First, then second, then third."
Systematic rotation:
- Fresh regiment charges in, creates chaos
- Retreats when fired upon
- Next fresh regiment charges in
- Rotate through regiments
The Effect: Continuous waves of Jumburak cavalry = continuous chaos = enemy can never organize.
Bhau's Final Crisis
The Situation:
- Three-directional attack (right flank Afghan, center Shah Wali Khan, left side Rohila)
- Huzurat surrounded, being overwhelmed
- Counter-attacks attempted multiple times
- Each counter-attack reduces fighting force (killed or deserted)
Bhau's Three Counter-Attacks: Attempted three times to break through Afghan encirclement:
- Each time fewer soldiers available
- Each time weaker impact
- Numbers dwindling due to casualties + desertions
"His effect was lessening as the time went on. It was tough to overcome these number differences."
The Message from Officers: Tukoji Shinde (from Shinde clan, fighting beside Bhau) approaches and says:
"Maharaj, Kshatra Dharma chi sharat sharat sharat (Warrior clan, you have done everything a warrior can do). You have done the maximum a warrior can do—you are fighting to your utmost. Why don't you get out of the battlefield? There is no point in dying in vain here."
Translation: "Boss, you've done everything humanly possible. Time to leave before we all die."
Bhau's Response:
"Where should I go and whom should I face? This is a question of my honor. I can save my life but it has no meaning. Who will listen to me and who will I face that I was given this responsibility and I didn't do what I was supposed to do? I have failed and I have no way I can show my face."
His Decision:
- Refuses to flee
- Won't abandon battlefield
- Will die honorably fighting
- Better to die here than live in shame
"There is no life for me if I run away from this battle. At least I will do the honorable thing of dying on the battlefield. That's the only thing I can do."
The Officer Exodus (Disputed)
Kaifiyat Account (Bhau's Records - Wishful Thinking): Says Bhau "did soldiering and commanding as it was supposed to be done" and "Rohilas were pushed back."
The Reality Assessment:
"That is what he said in the Kaifiya. So this is all wishful thinking. But that is not what will probably happen."
Bhau's own records are propaganda—making himself look good.
Actual reality:
- Getting surrounded
- Counter-attacks failing
- Losing soldiers
- Refusing to escape
- Preparing to die
Other Officers' Fates
Samshir Bahadur:
- Son of Bajirao I (father of Maratha Empire) and Mastani (Muslim woman)
- Never accepted as Hindu despite being warrior
- Fighting beside Bhau on battlefield
- Dies in combat on January 14
Jankoji Shinde:
- Fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with Bhau
- Among the central forces
- Status unclear but fighting intensely
Yashwant Rao Pawar:
- On left side of Bhau
- Fighting in central plank
- Killed while fighting
Ibrahim Khan Gardi:
- Wounded but still fighting
- Eventually surrounded by Rohilas
- Arrested (not immediately killed)
The Strategic Reality
What Went Wrong:
- Morning: Maratha artillery dominated
- Afternoon: Maratha cavalry separated from artillery
- Late afternoon: Jumburak cavalry devastates at close range
- Commander desertion cascades
- Final stage: Bhau surrounded, refusing to escape
Why Jumburak Won:
- Artillery advantage (1.5 km range) lost
- Hand-to-hand combat advantage (mobile camel artillery)
- Systematic rotation of fresh cavalry
- Maratha forces had no answer
The Time Factor:
- Started 8-9 AM
- Over by 6-7 PM (winter darkness)
- ~9-10 hours of continuous battle
- Momentum: Maratha morning → Afghan afternoon/evening
The Honor vs. Pragmatism Debate
What Tukoji Shinde Argued: "Live to fight another day. Commander-in-chief shouldn't die meaninglessly."
What Bhau Believed: "Honor matters more than life. Better to die fighting than live in shame."
The Cultural Context: This is the Kshatra Dharma (warrior clan code):
- Face your enemy
- Don't run
- Die with honor if necessary
- Shame worse than death
The Historical Question: Was this bravery or foolishness?
- Could Bhau have lived and rebuilt?
- Would survival have been seen as cowardice?
- Would it have changed the outcome anyway (army already collapsing)?
Timeline (Final Hours)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 1-2 PM | Holkar escapes with Najib Khan's permission |
| ~2-3 PM | Vittal Shivadev flees, Damaji Gayakwar follows |
| 3 PM+ | Jumburak cavalry deployed in systematic rotations |
| 3-4 PM | Three-directional Afghan attack intensifies |
| 4 PM | Bhau refuses to flee despite officer pleas |
| 5-6 PM | Final counter-attacks failing, situation hopeless |
| 6:30-7 PM | Darkness falls, battle effectively over |
Key Insights
The Jumburak Game-Changer: Abdali's nine-year preparation of this weapon system paid off. It was designed specifically to counter long-range artillery in close-quarters combat. And it worked.
Bhau's Tragic Flaw: Brave warrior, poor commander. Got into combat himself instead of directing forces. Made himself a target instead of staying strategic. Honor killed him—literally.
The Honor Code Problem: Kshatra Dharma demanded he die fighting. But maybe pragmatism (escape, regroup, fight another day) would have been wiser. Too late for that now.
Officers' Perspective: Those who left (Holkar, Shivadev, Gayakwar) might have been pragmatists. Those who stayed (Bhau, Shinde, Pawar) were honoring the code. Different choices, different outcomes.
Where We Left Off: Bhau refusing to flee. Huzurat surrounded. Counter-attacks failing. Jumburak cavalry systematically rotating to destroy Maratha center. Evening approaching. Darkness coming. Battle nearly over. Bhau choosing death with honor over escape with shame.
By late afternoon on January 14, everything Bhau had tried to accomplish had failed. The morning's victory was gone. The afternoon's hope was gone. Now only one choice remained: die fighting or flee in shame. Tukoji Shinde begged him to leave. "Save yourself, Commander. There's no point dying here." But Bhau understood something deeper: if he fled, everything was lost—the battle, the honor, the respect of his soldiers, his place in history. So he chose to stay. To fight. To die with sword in hand rather than live with shame in his heart. It was a choice that was very Maratha. And it was the choice that sealed his fate.
The Encirclement Complete: Bhau Surrounded, Final Officers Fall
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Battle Diagram Evolution
The Map Progression: Historians documented the changing battlefield positions throughout the day as forces moved.
The Question of Accuracy:
"These maps must come from historical accounts or books. War is a dynamic thing. After the battle, somebody must have described it. But who would have—Abdali's people or Holkar's people retreating?"
The Sources: Mostly from Abdali's perspective (his people documented their victory). Some from retreating forces.
The Caveat:
"It's not to be taken 100% accurate, but somebody would have gotten the bird's eye view. It's a difficult one."
Maps show approximate positions, not precise battle lines.
The Complete Encirclement
From The Diagram:
- Bhau (Huzurat) in CENTER
- Vizier (Shah Wali Khan) in front of Huzurat
- Abdali's forces coming from THREE SIDES
- "Completely surrounded"
The Visual: Latest map shows Bhau trapped with Afghan forces converging from:
- Right side (Najib Khan Rohila, Shah Pasand Khan)
- Front (Shah Wali Khan's center)
- Left side (Other Rohila commanders)
What This Meant: No escape route. No retreat path. No reinforcement possible.
Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Fate
His Situation:
- Wounded but still fighting
- Trying to continue artillery operations
- Artillery crew also under fire
- Surrounded by Rohila forces
His Capture:
"Even though Ibrahim Khan Gardi was injured, he was still fighting. But soon enough, the Rohilas surrounded him and they arrested him."
Not killed immediately, but captured/arrested.
The Significance: Capture of artillery chief = end of Maratha long-range advantage.
The Artillery Unit's Vulnerability
The Critical Problem:
"Artillery unit cannot defend itself. They have to be protected. Otherwise they can be easily taken out."
What Happened:
- Bhau separated from artillery (1 mile ahead)
- No infantry/cavalry protecting gun crews
- Rohilas surrounded them
- Forced to surrender/abandon guns
The Result: The one weapon that made Marathas competitive was lost.
Bhau's Final Conversation with Officers
First Message - Kaifiyat Account: Bhau telling Bhaskar (some officer):
"This thing is not going to have a positive outcome. I had put a lot of trust in you. You should stand firm and resist."
Bhaskar's Response:
"The people are fleeing our people. So I will go and re-induct them in the battlefield. Where would I go by deserting you? I'm doing everything I can."
Bhaskar volunteered to go rally fleeing soldiers.
His Fate:
"He went to basically get back these fleeing people and re-induct them in the battlefield, but he just vanished. He didn't come back. So he may have been killed or something. Or he just himself fled."
Either:
- Killed trying to rally soldiers
- Saw the writing on the wall and fled himself
Nobody knows.
Officer Deaths During Final Stand
Sonji Bhaapkar:
"Sonji Bhaapkar was one of the people who was killed in the battlefield."
Died fighting in central forces.
Tukoji Shinde's Message: After seeing Bhau's refusal to flee, Tukoji Shinde goes to Bhau and says:
"Maharaj, Kshatra Dharma chi sharat (Warrior clan, you have done everything). You have done the maximum a warrior can do. Why don't you get out of the battlefield? There is no point in dying in vain."
Essentially: "You've proven yourself. Time to leave."
Yashwant Rao Pawar: Left side of Bhau, fighting in central plank. Status: dead while fighting.
Bhau's Final Refusal
The Question: When Tukoji advised escape:
"Where should I go and whom should I face? This is a question of my honor. I can save my life but it has no meaning. Who will listen to me? Who will I face knowing I was given this responsibility and didn't do what I was supposed to do?"
The Logic:
- Escape = survive with shame
- Fighting = die with honor
- Both lead to "loss" but one preserves dignity
His Decision:
"There is no life for me if I run away from this battle. At least I will do the honorable thing of dying in the battlefield. That's the only thing I can do."
What He's Saying: "My honor is worth more than my life."
The Honor vs. Pragmatism Paradox
What Could Have Been:
- Escape with officers
- Regroup in Deccan
- Fight again another day
- Possibly survive
What Actually Happened:
- Refused to flee
- Died fighting
- Became legendary
- But lost the war anyway
The Cultural Truth: In Maratha culture (Kshatra Dharma), the choice was clear:
- Fleeing = cowardice = eternal shame
- Dying fighting = heroism = eternal honor
Not a logical choice, but a cultural one.
The Mystery References
"Rao Sahiban Kade Pahave": Some reference to another person or character. Text is unclear:
"Look at now who is he referring to... Yeah, I don't know, uh, rao rao sahiban kade pahave... Yeah, I don't know, maybe he's someone else from the lore."
Unclear who "Rao" is referring to.
"They Did Work": Incomplete phrase, meaning lost in transcription. Reader himself confused:
"He jumped from his horse, uh, okay. They did work. I didn't follow what is that? Uh, yeah. Oh, I don't know what that means maybe the english version will have a little bit better."
Some action or event described but details unclear.
The Afternoon Summary
The Cascade of Collapse:
- Morning (9 AM - 12 PM): Maratha dominance
- Afternoon (12 PM - 3 PM): Afghan counter-attack
- Late Afternoon (3 PM - 6 PM): Complete encirclement
- Evening (6 PM - 7 PM): Final resistance, darkness falls
The Key Moments:
- 3 PM: Vishwas Rao killed
- 3 PM: Officer exodus (Holkar, Shivadev, Gayakwar)
- 4 PM: Jumburak cavalry devastates
- 5 PM: Complete encirclement
- 6 PM: Bhau refuses to flee
- 7 PM: Darkness, battle effectively over
The Numbers:
- Started: ~75,000 fighting Marathas
- Lost to desertion: ~13,000
- Killed/wounded: ~10,000+
- Remaining: ~50,000 still engaged but trapped
Key Insights
The Diagram's Importance: Shows what contemporaries observed: complete encirclement. Not a open battlefield anymore, but a closing net.
Ibrahim Gardi's Capture: Symbolic end of Maratha technological advantage. Long-range artillery → captured. Only close-range Jumburak left.
Officer Faithfulness vs. Pragmatism:
- Those who fled: Holkar, Shivadev, Gayakwar (pragmatists)
- Those who stayed/died: Bhau, Shinde, Pawar, Samshir Bahadur (honorable)
- No "right" choice, just different values
Bhau's Psychology: By late afternoon, no longer calculating victory. Only calculating how to die well. This shift from strategic to tactical-personal doomed the battle.
The Invisible Turning Point: Not one moment, but a cascade: Vishwas Rao death → officer exodus → Jumburak effectiveness → complete encirclement → refusal to flee. Each moment inevitable given what came before.
Where We Left Off: Bhau completely surrounded by Afghan forces. Artillery captured. Officers dead or fled. Final phase: Bhau holding position until darkness. Kaifiyat accounts (Bhau's records) claims he was winning—obviously propaganda to preserve honor in historical record. Reality: losing, surrounded, choosing honorable death.
By 6 PM on January 14, the maps would have showed what everyone on the battlefield knew: Bhau was surrounded. Three sides of Afghan forces closing in. No escape route. No reinforcements coming. And Bhau—warrior, commander, son of the Peshwa—standing in the center with sword drawn, refusing to leave. Not because he could win. But because leaving would mean he'd failed. And for Bhau, failure was worse than death. So he would stay. He would fight. And when the darkness came, and the Afghans finally overran his position, they would find him there—not running, not begging, but standing. The way a warrior dies when he's lost everything but his honor.
Panipat Aftermath: Desertion, Fall of Heroes & The Maratha Diaspora
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Final Hours: Collapse & Last Stand
Ibrahim Khan Gardi Captured:
- Artillery commander defeated and taken prisoner
- Artillery units disband without leadership
- Maratha army's main advantage (artillery) lost
- Line collapses rapidly
Tukoji Shinde's Message to Bhau (After Vishwas Rao's Death):
- "You have reached the pinnacle of fighting ability"
- "But no amount of fighting changes foregone conclusion at this stage"
- "Better to quit and save yourself to fight another day"
- Recognized battle was lost, urged retreat
Bhau's Response:
- Refused to leave battlefield
- "Where does one go? To whom does one show one's face?"
- Jumped off horse with Mukundji Shinde to fight alongside him
- Raised Zaripatka (victory flag) on horse, ordered victory music
- Hoped to inspire army to return and fight
- Nobody came back. Army fully panicked
The Massive Desertion: Nana Farnavis's Account
The Full Army Collapse:
- Left wing officers led the retreat (set example of flight)
- Right wing (Shinde and Holkar) stood aloof, didn't help
- Royal standard seen retreating
- By the end: only ~200 soldiers remained with Bhau
- Of 100,000 soldiers, not a single officer stayed with him
Nana Farnavis's Analysis:
- Soldiers had sworn in peacetime to "sacrifice 1000 lives" for Bhau
- Turned out to be "mere companions of prosperity, deserters in adversity"
- Complete panic and demoralization
Root Cause (As Discussed):
- Maratha warfare tradition: morale dependent on visible leader
- When king/commander appears dead/defeated: entire army flees
- 40,000+ noncombatants (women, children, elderly) also fled battlefield
- Army couldn't sustain discipline without visible authority figure
Rawlinson's Account: Bhau's Final Hours
The Scenario:
- Flanks crumbling, Vishwas Rao dead, situation hopeless
- Mounted favorite Arab horse, charged into Afghan lines alone
- Killed numerous Afghans in personal combat
- Surrounded and overwhelmed by superior numbers
- Eventually killed in the melee
Evacuation Stories: The Women's Escape
Parvati Bhai (Bhau's Wife):
- Put on horse, sent away by Janu Bhintada
- Horse tired after 20-25 miles
- Janu Bhintada carried her on his back the rest of way
- Met Malhar Rao Holkar, taken to Gwalior Fort for safety
- Eventually survived and reached safety
Malhar Rao's Justification (Controversial):
- Claimed Bhau ordered him to save the women when battle turned south
- Got thousands of women and noncombatants to safety
- BUT: Author notes this doesn't align with other evidence
- Nana Farnavis's mother and wife: no trace of them (disappeared)
- Malhar Rao needed good excuse for leaving battlefield early (honor issue)
- Likely: saved some women but not all, story partly self-serving
Casualties & Captured Warriors
Killed in Battle:
- Vishwas Rao (shot in head)
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi (initially captured, later died from wounds)
- Many named officers and sardar (leaders)
Severely Wounded & Captured:
- Ibrahim Khan Gardi (artillery commander)
- Jankoji Shinde
- Samasheer Bahadur (Bajirao I's son) - captured but reached Jaat territory (friendly), died from wounds
Fled the Battlefield:
- Damaji Gaye
- Akwad Vithal Shivadev
- Malhar Rao Holkar (left early with women)
Killed Outside the Battle:
- Antaji Mankeshwar - near Farrukhabad, killed by Baluch fighters
Post-Battle: The Diaspora
Abdali's Return to Kabul:
- Took thousands of Maratha prisoners of war
- In Baluchistan: Baluch warlords had helped him entering India
- Paid them back: gifted Maratha prisoners as slaves
- Thousands of Marathas left in Baluchistan
The Maratha-Baluch Communities (Modern Legacy):
- Descendants still exist in Baluchistan (now Pakistan)
- Converted to Islam over generations
- BUT: still maintain Maratha identity as "Maratha-Baluch"
- Celebrate festivals, follow rituals, revere Shivaji
- Still speak some Marathi, retain traditions for marriages/births/deaths
- Under-developed region (mountainous, no water), but intelligent population
- Fully integrated yet maintaining roots (5th-10th generations)
Other Diaspora Groups:
-
Haryana Marathas ("Road Marathas"):
- Fled to Haryana (today's northern India)
- Never returned to Maharashtra after war
- Integrated into Haryana society but maintain Maratha traditions
- Chose not to return even after Afghan threat passed
-
Kabul Marathas:
- Women and others taken to Kabul by Abdali
- Integrated into Afghan society
- Descendants remember their Maratha origins (generations later)
The Deeper Issue: Military Doctrine Failure
The Maratha Structural Weakness:
- Built on individual warrior prowess and cavalry
- Depended on visible leadership for morale
- When leader fell or was absent: entire system collapsed
- No institutional continuity outside of personal authority
Compared to Abdali's Model:
- Positioned remotely but with messengers (continuous authority)
- Could survive death of leader (system continues)
- Maratha system couldn't - completely personality-dependent
Where We Left Off: Battle lost, army destroyed, leadership killed, survivors scattered across three continents as diaspora. The immediate aftermath shows not just military defeat but complete collapse of command structure. What was once 100,000-strong force is now refugees, slaves, and scattered survivors. The price of Panipat goes far beyond the battlefield.
In one afternoon, an empire of 100,000 became ghosts. Bhau died charging at impossible odds. His wife rode horses and human backs to escape. His soldiers became slaves in Baluchistan, exiles in Haryana, captives in Kabul. The Marathas won the morning. The Afghans won the day. But the real loser was the idea that an army could hold together without seeing its commander. When Bhau's elephant stood empty, the entire structure fell. And it fell forever.
Escape & Survival: Post-Panipat Journeys of Nana Farnavis & Mahadhaji Shinde
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
Political Aftermath: The Succession Crisis
Raghoba's Ambition:
- Nana Sahib's younger brother
- Wanted Peshwa position for himself
- Killed Narayan Rao (Nana Sahib's young son, age ~8-9)
- Claimed he ordered "Dharave" (arrest), not "Marave" (kill)
- Wife Anandi Bhai allegedly changed orders: "Dhru" → "Mu"
- Created the phrase "Dhru ca maa karne" (corrupt the original order into killing)
Succession Order:
- Nana Sahib (died/defeated at Panipat)
- Vishwas Rao (killed at Panipat)
- Madhav Rao (became next Peshwa)
- Narayan Rao (killed by Raghoba as child)
Assessment:
- Raghoba's extreme ambition was destructive to Maratha rule
- Prioritized personal power over empire stability
Nana Farnavis: From Court Attendant to Statesman
His Role at Panipat:
- Age 19, just being groomed as courtier (not trained warrior)
- Came with mother and wife
- Not properly trained in battle tactics/gear
- Became burden on campaign (needed defense, food, resources)
- Watched Bhau's final stand from near the action
- Miraculously escaped despite proximity to final collapse
His Escape Journey:
Initial Advice (from Ramaji Panth):
- Strip off expensive clothes, ornaments, horse
- Dress as commoner with loincloth/dhoti only
- Go on foot with minimal group
- Reason: Status symbols make you target for Afghans
- Without obvious wealth = safer
The Flight:
- First Attack: Less than 1 course (4 km) from Panipat, Afghans killed some companions and guide; Nana let go
- Second Attack: 12 courses later, Afghans killed all remaining colleagues; Nana hid in tall grass, escaped
- Exhaustion March: Walked 16 courses (32 miles) without food/water; forced to eat tree leaves
- Hindu Gosavi's Help: Found hut of Hindu monk who gave food and shelter
- Merchant's Cart: Next merchant offered ride to Jaipur, but Nana suspicious of treachery, walked instead
- Raiwiri Refuge: Rich man Ramji Das gave week of shelter
- Jat Stronghold Dig: Reached with escort from merchants
- Wife's Safety: Learned wife was taken to Jinji by Visoji Burhan Purkar (safe with relation Naropant Gokhale)
- Dakkan Journey: From Dig, headed south toward Dakkan
- Mother's Death: Learned mother died during escape (deep melancholy), initially wanted to retire to Kashi/Varanasi
- Return to Service: Friends convinced him to return, perform last rites, rejoin Nana Sahib Peshwa (who was advancing north)
Later Life:
- Became major statesman and courtier to successive Peshwas
- Important diplomat and administrator
- Founded second pillar of strength for Maratha recovery
Mahadhaji Shinde: Escape Through Violence
Background:
- Related to Tajshinde clan (relative of Shinde family)
- Young but escaped Panipat
- One leg permanently injured
His Mistake:
- Unlike Nana: didn't discard horse or status symbols
- Rode high-energy horse (valuable animal)
- Made him visible target for looting/robbery
The Chase & Attack:
- Stout, tall Afghan Pathan chased him on horseback
- Thought Mahadhaji was wealthy/important (worth robbing or claiming prize)
- Mahadhaji initially escaped at speed but couldn't lose him
- Horse fell into ditch, Mahadhaji thrown
- Afghan caught up, drew sword
- Spat on Mahadhaji, struck his knee with sword
- Knee injury crippled him for life (leg became non-functional)
Lasting Trauma:
- Never forgot the incident for rest of life
- Couldn't sleep properly due to nightmares
- Haunted by memory of Afghan Pathan chasing him
- Constant PTSD symptoms
Later Achievement:
- Despite crippling injury, went on to do "great things"
- Returned to Delhi with army
- Became major figure in Maratha recovery
The Panipat Museum Artifact
Historical Item:
- Kelkar Museum had Howdah (royal elephant seat) from Panipat campaign
- Brought back from battlefield
- Evidence of Maratha presence and return journey
- No longer visible in museum (unclear what happened to it)
Bhau's Final Stand: The Deliberate Martyrdom
The Last Attempt:
- When army completely fled, all hope lost
- Took 50 remaining soldiers into Afghan camp
- Not attempting to win battle = accepting loss
- Committed to "Hautatmya" (martyrdom/deliberate self-sacrifice)
The Concept:
- "Hutaatma" = martyr
- "Hautatmya" = act of becoming martyr (deliberate self-sacrifice)
- Preferred death on battlefield to return alive
- "Better to die than come back alive"
Result:
- Charged into Afghan lines
- Died in combat
- Achieved his martyrdom
Key Themes
Status Symbols as Danger: Nana's escape proved that visibility = vulnerability. The more markers of wealth/status, the more likely to be targeted. Stripping to loincloth saved his life; Mahadhaji's refusal to abandon horse cost him his leg.
Luck vs. Preparation:
- Nana: got lucky multiple times but followed sound advice
- Mahadhaji: didn't follow advice, got unlucky, paid permanent price
- Both required luck to survive, but preparation improved odds
Institutional Survival: Unlike Bhau (who died), Nana survived and rebuilt. This reflects difference between personal honor (death) vs. institutional duty (survival to serve). Nana's choice to live enabled Maratha recovery.
Trauma as Legacy: Mahadhaji's injury wasn't just physical - psychological damage lasted lifetime. PTSD in 18th century manifested as nightmares, sleep deprivation, haunting memories.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 14 afternoon | Panipat defeat, retreat begins |
| Jan 14 evening | Nana strips down, begins escape on foot |
| Jan 14-15 | Multiple Afghan attacks, companions killed |
| Jan 15-16 | 32-mile march without food/water |
| Jan 16+ | Finds shelter with Hindu monk, then merchant |
| Days after | Wife located in Jinji, safe |
| Later | Mother dies during escape journey |
| Eventually | Reaches Dakkan, rejoins Nana Sahib Peshwa army |
| Parallel | Mahadhaji injured in ditch, crippled for life |
| Post-Battle | Both become major figures in Maratha restoration |
Where We Left Off: Two key survivors detailed - Nana Farnavis (future statesman) and Mahadhaji Shinde (future military figure). Both escaped, both traumatized, both recovered to rebuild Maratha power. The battle's survivors show that defeat wasn't absolute - some leadership survived to continue the struggle.
Panipat was absolute defeat, but not absolute destruction. Some men lived. Some escaped. Some stayed silent about their flight, others lied about their duty. Nana stripped to nothing and walked 32 miles through Afghan lands. Mahadhaji got his leg slashed and never slept properly again. Bhau died on his terms, in combat, as he chose. The battle ended, but its ghosts haunted the survivors for decades. What Panipat took was a generation's certainty. What it left behind was trauma, crippling, and unfinished business.
Post-Panipat Succession: Raghoba's Ambition & The Three and a Half Wise Men
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Three and a Half Wise Men (Peshwari Era)
The Concept:
- During Peshwa rule, there were "three and a half wise men"
- Advisory figures who guided state policy
- Nana Farnavis was one of them
- Served as prominent courtier after Panipat
Nana Farnavis's Rise:
- Arrived at Panipat at age 19 with wife and mother
- Survived the battle and escape
- Upon return to Pune, established himself as major courtier
- Became one of the key advisors in Peshwa court
- Played crucial role during turbulent succession period
The Succession Chain
Nana Sahib Peshwa:
- Defeated at Panipat
- Died within 6 months of the battle
- Had four sons:
- Vishwas Rao (killed at Panipat)
- Madhav Rao
- Narayan Rao
- [Fourth son unnamed in transcript]
Madhav Rao Becomes Peshwa:
- Next in line after Nana Sahib's death (both Bhaau/Bhau and Vishwas Rao dead)
- Great Peshwa by all accounts
- Did excellent administrative work
- Ruled ~7-8 years
- If he had lived longer, would have done greater things (consensus among historians)
- Died relatively young
Narayan Rao (Madhav Rao's Successor):
- Barely 12 years old when Madhav Rao died
- Not yet adult, too young to rule independently
- Became vulnerable to succession challenges
Raghoba's Treachery
Background:
- Full name: Raghoba Rao (also called Rabunath Rao)
- Nana Sahib Peshwa's younger brother
- Had NOT been sent to Panipat campaign (despite being capable)
- Reason: He came back with huge loans on previous campaigns, nearly bankrupt the state
- Nana Sahib couldn't afford to send him again
His Military Experience (Before Treachery):
- Had gone north on two campaigns before Panipat
- Deep knowledge of Northern India politics and landscape
- Understood "who is who" and weaknesses
- Was warrior AND administrator
- Could have been good choice - BUT trusted with money poorly
- Created loans during both northern campaigns
Why He Wasn't Sent to Panipat:
- Financial irresponsibility
- Too expensive to maintain
- Nana Sahib directly told him: "Can't send you, you incur too many loans"
- Likely resented being left out of campaign
His Ambition:
- Believed he SHOULD be the Peshwa after Madhav Rao's death
- Objected to Narayan Rao (nephew, young child) becoming Peshwa
- Thought succession should pass to him (uncle)
The Murder:
- Assassinated Narayan Rao (age ~12, son of Nana Sahib)
- Wanted to clear path to become Peshwa himself
- Had nephew killed in cold blood
The Political Response:
- Court case filed against Raghoba
- He was arrested
- "Ugly time" in Maratha politics
- Three and a Half Wise Men (including Nana Farnavis) played major role in handling crisis
- Complex because Raghoba himself was a Peshwa (difficult to arrest/punish Peshwa)
The Deeper Problem: Raghoba's Destructiveness
His Impact:
- Created lots of trouble after taking power
- Totally possessed by ambition
- "Thought he was possessed" (supernatural implication - utterly unhinged)
- Destructive to Maratha rule
- Prioritized personal power over empire stability
Assessment:
- Despite military knowledge and experience
- Despite understanding Northern Indian politics
- His fundamental ambition and ruthlessness made him terrible ruler
- Nephew's blood on his hands destroyed legitimacy
Key Themes
Panipat's Cascading Consequences:
- Victory went to Wrong person (didn't solve succession)
- Nana Sahib's death created vacuum
- Created power struggle that led to murder of child
- Showed how battle defeat could unsettle throne
The Cost of Ruthlessness:
- Raghoba had knowledge and experience
- But moral bankruptcy disqualified him
- Killing child for throne = permanent destruction of reputation
- Three and a Half Wise Men had to handle aftermath
Financial Mismanagement as Disqualification:
- Raghoba's loans in previous campaigns
- Showed poor judgment with resources
- Nana Sahib's decision to exclude him from Panipat WAS justified
- Sometimes saying "no" to ambitious general is correct decision
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1760, Jan 14 | Panipat battle |
| ~1760, July | Nana Sahib Peshwa dies (6 months after battle) |
| ~1760 | Madhav Rao becomes Peshwa (age ~20s) |
| ~1767-1768 | Madhav Rao dies (after ~7-8 year rule) |
| 1768 | Narayan Rao (age ~12) becomes Peshwa |
| 1768 | Raghoba assassinates Narayan Rao |
| 1768+ | Court case against Raghoba; Three and a Half Wise Men intervene |
Where We Left Off: Raghoba's treachery introduced. Narayan Rao murdered. Succession crisis creating need for council of wise men. Raghoba will be subject of separate book that goes deeper into his destructiveness.
Raghoba had been to the north twice and seen empires rise and fall. He understood power. But he didn't understand that power taken with blood on your hands is power that rots from inside. He killed a child to sit on a throne. The three and a half wise men had to clean up his mess. And Nana Farnavis, the boy who'd walked 32 miles barefoot to escape Panipat, was one of them. History has a sense of poetic justice sometimes.
The Aftermath: Refugee Routes, Najib Khan's Safe Passage & The Massacre
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Exodus: Three Escape Routes
The Reality at Sunset (Sandhya - 6 PM):
- By early evening, battlefield had few remaining fighters
- No Maratha commander-in-chief (Bhau dead/gone)
- Minimal resistance remaining on battlefield
- Afghans still present but not concentrated
- Winter season meant early sunset (~5-6 PM) - fighting window closed
The Maratha Options: Soldiers who couldn't follow commanders had two choices:
- Southeast to Delhi (difficult/hazardous route)
- North to Panipat Town (closer but Afghan-controlled)
The Safe Passage: Holkar's Exception
Holkar's Route to Delhi:
- Crossed Chambar River (natural barrier)
- Reached Hindu-friendly area where he felt safer
- Had ~5,000 soldiers with him
- Took Parvati Bai (Bhau's wife) and her escort with him
- Traveled safely to Delhi
The Secret: Najib Khan's Protection
- Najib Khan Rohila (Afghan) gave Holkar a "royal path" (safe passage)
- Allowed Holkar's army to pass unmolested
- Special relationship: Adopted father-and-son bond
- Najib Khan instructed: "Let this guy and his army pass, don't interfere"
Why This Mattered:
- Without Najib's protection: Holkar would have been caught/killed
- Holkar couldn't have escaped with large force
- Showed cracks in Afghan-Maratha unified opposition (some personal relationships transcended politics)
- "Not everybody could do that" - Holkar was exception due to personal connection
The Consequence:
- If Najib hadn't protected Holkar: there would have been "no battle" (Afghan victory would be total)
- Holkar's escape represented smallest number surviving with organized force
The Panipat Town Refugees
Why Panipat Town Was an Option:
- Battlefield was south of Panipat Town itself
- Soldiers fleeing north could reach town (shorter distance)
- Hoped to find asylum/safety among civilian population
- Delhi route was hazardous and required permission/good fortune
The Problem:
- Afghan army could pursue into Panipat Town
- Not all refugees found safety
- "Some were lucky, some were not" (coming next in narrative)
- Most were unarmed, exhausted, desperate
The Reality:
- Either fleeing to Panipat = risky
- Or fleeing to Delhi = risky
- Most chose Panipat Town (closer)
- "They were doomed either way"
- Many found temporary asylum in villages around Panipat
The Ditch Catastrophe
The Context:
- Marathas had dug 12-foot trench around camp (defensive measure)
- Designed to prevent Afghan night infiltration
- 60 feet wide, significant barrier
The Battle Morning (January 14):
- Maratha soldiers crossed the trench to attack
- Later had to retreat back across it
The Escape Evening:
- Soldiers fleeing battlefield toward Panipat Town
- Had to cross same ditch
- In the panicked rush, many fell into it
- Suffocated from bodies piling up
- The ditch became mass grave
The Tragedy:
- Defensive structure became death trap
- Soldiers dying not from Afghan blades but from own fortifications
- Crushing, suffocation, chaos in narrow 12-foot pit
The Post-Battle Capture & Massacre
The Next Three Days (January 14-17):
- Afghans swept battlefield and surrounding area
- Caught many fleeing soldiers
- Captured prisoners of war
- Found dependents (noncombatants) who couldn't flee fast
The Scale:
- Total Maratha camp: 125,000-140,000 people
- Many were support staff, dependents, maintenance personnel
- Not all were soldiers
- Unarmed, exhausted, trapped
The Slaughter:
- "Huge massacre" over three days
- Not all prisoners taken as slaves
- Many killed immediately on battlefield/in Panipat
- Afghan practice: built minars (towers) from human heads
- Constructed ~100 such "piles of heads"
The Afghans' Precedent:
- Never before had such massacre of Hindus happened
- This was novel, setting new record
- Contemporary observation: "Won't happen in future either"
- But this statement proved wrong (foreshadowing)
Why So Many Killed vs. Enslaved:
- Too many prisoners to transport
- Logistics impossible for 125,000-140,000 person camp
- Only some could be enslaved
- Rest executed
The Pattern:
- Those with commanders (like Holkar) escaped with army
- Those without protection tried Panipat Town route
- Those caught became prisoners
- Some enslaved, many more killed
- Those who fell in ditch suffocated
Key Themes
Escape by Leadership:
- Organized army under commander = escape route (Delhi)
- Leaderless soldiers = panic, poor decisions
- Najib Khan's protection = complete safety for Holkar
- Everyone else = exposed to Afghan pursuit
The Ditch as Metaphor:
- Protection becomes trap
- Same structure that defended camp now kills defenders
- Ironic death - not in combat but in retreat
- Pile-up of bodies shows chaos/panic
Massacre as Precedent:
- Afghans establishing new level of brutality
- ~100 towers of heads = systematic, deliberate
- Shows not random violence but calculated terror
- Hindu casualties unprecedented at that scale
The Logistics of Defeat:
- Can't move 140,000 people as prisoners
- Have to make choice: enslave some, kill rest
- Murder becomes administrative problem
- Happens "next three days" - methodical, not frenzied
Dependency as Vulnerability:
- 40,000+ noncombatants (women, children, elderly) = burden
- Can't fight, can't flee quickly
- Become targets in post-battle aftermath
- Some saved (like Parvati Bai via Holkar)
- Many more caught and killed
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 14, Morning | Battle begins, soldiers cross trench to attack |
| Jan 14, Afternoon | Maratha retreat begins |
| Jan 14, 5-6 PM (Sandhya) | Fighting effectively ends (sunset) |
| Jan 14, Evening | Mass exodus - three routes (Delhi, Panipat, escape via commanders) |
| Jan 14, Evening | Soldiers fall into trench while fleeing, suffocate |
| Jan 14-17 | Afghan pursuit and capture continues |
| Jan 14-17 | Massive massacre of prisoners; towers of heads built |
Geographic Reference
- Chambar River: Natural barrier between Panipat and safer Hindu areas; Holkar crosses it safely
- Delhi: Southeast direction, ~10-15 miles away; Holkar's destination
- Panipat Town: North of battlefield; close refuge but Afghan-controlled
- Panipat Villages: Surrounding areas where some found temporary asylum
Where We Left Off: Battle over. Soldiers scattered in three directions. Ditch becomes mass grave. Afghans begin systematic three-day massacre of prisoners. Towers of human heads constructed. About 100 piles created. Survivors either escaped with commanders, hid in Panipat area, or captured and killed/enslaved. The real casualty count extends beyond the battle into post-victory slaughter.
The ditch killed more people than courage did. Bhau died fighting. But thousands more died suffocating in the very fortification meant to protect them. And after that, for three days straight, the Afghans killed and stacked heads. They wanted a record. They got one. A hundred towers of skulls. That's what total victory looked like. Not just winning the battle. Winning the right to massacre the losers without restraint.
The Flight & Massacre: Afghan Pursuit & Systematic Killing
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Collapse & Direction of Flight
Late Afternoon (After Commander-in-Chief Dead/Gone):
- Marathas still fighting until afternoon
- Once leader gone: immediate loss of cohesion
- Army split into different directions fleeing
- No unified retreat route
- Soldiers fleeing in all four directions in panic
Two Escape Options:
- Toward Delhi (southeast) - dangerous, far
- Toward Panipat Town (north) - closer but unsafe
- Those without discipline = scattered chaos
Those Who Crossed Yamuna (Via Commanders Like Holkar):
- Made organized retreat toward Delhi
- Had leadership structure
- Escaped relatively intact
- Small percentage of total force
Those Without Commanders:
- Fled in all directions
- Many toward Panipat Town (closer refuge)
- Fell into ditch while crossing
- Suffocated from pile-up
- Killed by own fortifications
The Ditch Deaths (Detailed)
The Setup:
- Marathas had dug defensive ditch around camp
- 12 feet deep, 60 feet wide
The Tragedy:
- During panic retreat, soldiers rushed to cross
- Many fell into ditch
- Got crushed/suffocated from bodies piling up
- Died from suffocation, not combat
- Hundreds died in this manner
The Pursuit: 15-20 km Chase
Afghan Decision to Pursue:
- Saw Marathas fleeing in all directions
- Understood no organized battle remaining
- Started chasing with tremendous zeal
- Pursued up to 20 kilometers north toward Panipat town
Why Afghans Pursued So Aggressively:
- Revenge Motivation: Afghan camp had sustained heavy losses for 3-4 months
- Artillery Casualties: Maratha artillery killed many during siege
- Historical Grievance: Remember Marathas killed many Afghans at northern fort
- Momentum: Fleeing army looks weak, easy prey
The Hunt:
- Marathas fleeing in panic, not organized
- No defensive formation
- Being hunted like prey
- Afghan soldiers felt empowered by victory
The Camp Looting
What Afghans Found:
- Maratha camp itself was kangal (impoverished)
- Very little food remaining (eaten during siege)
- No valuable supplies (traded away for grain)
- Whatever existed: looted anyway
Who Was In Camp:
- Dependents (unable to flee with army)
- Maintenance staff, cooks, porters
- Women, children, elderly
- Religious pilgrims (came as "holy site tourism")
- They had stayed in rear of camp during battle
- Couldn't flee fast enough once Marathas retreated
The Killing: "Nirghrun" (Merciless/Unforgiving)
- Women, children, elderly couldn't flee
- Afghans killed them in very unmerciless way
- No mercy shown
- Nirghrun = acted without any humanity
The Second Day: Systematic Classification & Massacre
The Organization:
- First day: Couldn't kill everyone (too many)
- Second day: Afghans organized systematic killing
- Classified prisoners into groups:
- Men (potential fighters)
- Women (could be enslaved)
- Children (could be enslaved)
- Elderly (killed)
The Categorization:
-
Men: Beheaded (entertainment/recreation)
- Reason: Dangerous if armed, no use as slaves
- Afghans "entertained themselves" by beheading
- Called it "karmanukh" (entertainment)
-
Women & Children: Kept as slaves
- Could be transported/used
- Had economic/reproductive value
The Victory Towers (Minars):
- Heaps of severed heads built in front of tents
- Used as victory towers/signs
- Thousands of heads stacked
- Psychological terror/dominance display
- Similar to Mughal practice from centuries past
The Religious Justification
Suja Uddhavla's Objection:
- Didn't want the battle to begin with
- Not extremist like other Afghan leaders
- Relatively friendly to Marathas
- Objected to indiscriminate massacre
- Thousands fled to him seeking refuge
Afghan Religious Argument:
- Islamic concept: Killing Kafir (non-believers) = virtuous act
- Viewed favorably by Allah
- Promised good points on judgment day
- "Cheat code" to religious merit
- Made massacre morally justified (in their theology)
The Counter to Mercy:
- Afghans told Suja: "We've committed to our people to kill them"
- Seen as win-win: revenge + religious merit
- Not question of morality = question of faith
- Made systematic killing into religious duty
Historical Analysis: Grant Duff (British Historian)
Grant Duff's Observation:
- British studied Panipat battle ~50-60 years later
- Noted: Afghan cruelty was exceptionally brutal
- Even normally cruel people show some mercy
- Afghans showed no mercy whatsoever
- "Manu-tela kalanka" (put stigma on humanitarianism)
Reasons for Afghan Cruelty:
- Military grievance: Maratha artillery + siege
- Religious sanction: Clergy recommended jihad
- Revenge motivation: Personal losses
- Combined = zero restraint
The Broader Consequence:
- British noted: Panipat destroyed last organized opposition
- Marathas weakened/depleted
- Created power vacuum in India
- Mughals gone (no fighting spirit)
- Rajputs, Jats: small forces only
- British found "fertile ground" to take over
- Took advantage immediately after 1761
Timeline (The Massacre Period)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| Afternoon | Marathas flee all directions |
| Dusk | Soldiers fall into ditch, suffocate |
| Evening | Afghan pursuit begins, chases 15-20 km |
| Evening | Maratha camp looted |
| Evening | Dependents caught, killed "nirghrun" |
| Day 2 | Systematic classification of prisoners |
| Day 2 | Men beheaded for entertainment |
| Day 2 | Women/children separated for slavery |
| Day 2 | Minars (head towers) constructed |
Key Insights
The Escape Quality Mattered:
- Those with commanders = organized retreat
- Those without = chaotic panic = many deaths in ditch
The Defenseless Were Targets:
- Army could disperse and hide
- Dependents (women, children, elderly) couldn't
- They became the massacre victims
- Not soldiers, but civilians
Religion as Permission:
- Afghans reframed massacre as religious duty
- Made morality irrelevant
- Turned cruelty into virtue (in their theology)
- Suja's objections overruled by religious consensus
The Vacancy Consequence:
- Panipat didn't just kill soldiers
- Killed Maratha organizational capacity
- Created power vacuum in India
- British stepped into that void within years
- Panipat = inadvertent gift to British imperial expansion
Cruelty as Precedent:
- Contemporary observation: "Won't happen again"
- But it did (historically inaccurate prediction)
- Set template for Afghan/Muslim conquests
- Normalized systematic killing
Where We Left Off: Two-day massacre detailed. Head towers constructed. Thousands killed or enslaved. Power vacuum created in India. British noted this as opportunity. Battle's aftermath extended far beyond the battlefield into systemic destruction of Maratha capacity.
The ditch killed some. The pursuit killed more. But the systematic killing of the helpless—women, children, elderly—that's what destroyed something deeper than an army. It destroyed trust, safety, the assumption that war has limits. The Afghans built towers of skulls to celebrate. They called it virtue. Fifty years later, the British looked at the ruins and thought: "Perfect opportunity." And they were right.