Bhau's Nizam Campaign & The Cannon Regiment (October 1759 - January 1760)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary


The Fog of War

The Information Gap

What Peshwa Didn't Know:

  • A thousand miles between Pune and Shukratal
  • Dattaji enforcing siege at Shukratal
  • Unknown to Peshwa: Ahmad Shah Abdali beginning fifth invasion

The Timeline:

  • September 1759: Abdali took off for Punjab
  • But not known in the Deccan
  • Nanasaheb Peshwa thought: "Everything going fine"
  • Thought: "Abdali busy fighting tribal wars in Afghanistan"

The Reality:

  • Situation rapidly changing in north
  • Nobody had understanding of how serious it was
  • Fog of war

Why Communication Was So Slow

The Problem:

  • Even if people in north knew
  • Would take two weeks to get message to Pune

Before Nanasaheb Gets Message:

  • Two weeks minimum
  • Way too long
  • No instant messaging
  • No WhatsApp

The Danger:

  • By time you know = too late
  • Can't respond quickly
  • Strategic blindness

The Deccan Front: Campaign Against Nizam

Why Keep Forces at Pune

December 1759:

  • Fighting contingent deliberately kept at Pune
  • Even though:
    • Malhar Rao Holkar in Jaipur
    • Dattaji around Delhi
    • Some force in Punjab

The Reason:

  • Always watching out for Nizam
  • Couldn't leave Pune fully unprotected
  • Capital city
  • Nizam was unpredictable

The Threat:

  • Nizam may sneak up on Pune
  • Had to have protective cover
  • Constant danger

Sadashiv Rao Bhau: The Southern Commander

The Appointment

October 13, 1759:

  • Sadashiv Rao Bhau moved to war tents outside Pune
  • Preparing to set out on campaign against Nizam

Who He Is:

  • Cousin of Nanasaheb Peshwa
  • Bajirao I = father of Nanasaheb
  • Bajirao I's brother had a son
  • That son = Bhau
  • Called "Bhau" with affection (means brother)

Why Him:

  • Nanasaheb not highly inclined to lead military campaigns himself
  • Though he could
  • Gave leadership of southern campaign to cousin

The English Observation

William Price (English envoy in Pune since August 1759):

"This morning, about four o'clock, Sado Bhau unexpectedly took the field, pitching his tent a little without the town. His sudden departure, it is thought, is occasioned by some advices received of the Mughals. Report says that Salavat Jung and Nizam Ali are likely to accommodate matters, and that the latter has a very powerful army."


The Cannon Regiment Problem

Two Artillery Chiefs: The Tension

Muzaffar Khan:

  • Gardi artillery chief in Maratha army
  • Never on good terms with Sadashiv Rao Bhau

Who Are the Gardis:

  • Secular Maratha army recruited some Muslims
  • From Telangana (southern province)
  • These Muslims called Gardis
  • Specialized in cannon regiment

The Bad Blood:

  • Bhau had opposed Muzaffar Khan joining Marathas in first place
  • Personality conflict
  • Not about religion - Ibrahim Khan Gardi also Muslim

Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Prize Recruit

Who He Is

Background:

  • Nephew of Muzaffar Khan
  • Nizam's erstwhile artillery chief
  • Also trained by Bussy (the French general)

Why Bhau Wanted Him:

  • Superior to Muzaffar Khan
  • Better trained
  • Better reputation
  • Personal preference

Why Marathas Needed Cannon Expertise

The Reality:

  • Marathas did not have expertise within their hold
  • Had to hire from outside

The Source:

  • Muzaffar Khan: Trained by Bussy
  • Ibrahim Khan Gardi: Trained by Bussy
  • French general had trained several people
  • From that particular area
  • Happened to be Muslims

The Evolution:

  • Never there during Shivaji's time or after
  • Only recently understood importance
  • First time recognizing cannon regiment necessity

Why Cannon Regiment Became Essential

The Strategic Shift

The Old Way (Shivaji's Era):

  • Started with protective/defensive moves
  • Guerrilla warfare (Ghanimikawa) very important
  • Conquering lands:
    • Depend on treachery
    • Depend on Ghanimikawa
    • Rarely engage in frontal battles

The New Reality:

  • Marathas becoming established power like Mughals
  • Had to fight one-on-one in open field
  • Transformed from small army to huge army
  • Had to fight battles old-fashioned way

The Geographic Problem:

  • In the north = no mountains
  • Can't do Ghanimikawa
  • No Sahyadri mountains
  • No mountain forts
  • Had to fight in open, fertile plains

The Cannon Advantage

What It Does:

  • Softens up enemy lines before cavalry charge
  • Long-range strike capability
  • Can reach enemy before they see you
  • Makes huge difference in flat land
  • Only thing that will win wars in north (they realized)

In Flat Land:

  • Can't leave battle to chance
  • Need ace up your sleeve
  • Without advantage = 50-50 battle
  • Cannon regiment = that ace

The Famous Cannon Incident: Bussy at Charminar

The Backstory

What Happened:

  • Reminded them of when Sadashiv Rao Bhau heard about Bussy
  • Bussy had cannon regiment in Hyderabad
  • Could keep Nizam at bay in his own capital
  • Demonstrated raw power of cannon technology

Why They Were Impressed:

  • Such a good cannon regiment
  • One man with cannons > entire Nizam army
  • Technology = absolute power

The Realization:

  • "We need long-range cannons"
  • "We need a force trained in it"
  • "This is the ace we need"
  • Otherwise can't project Maratha power to north
  • Otherwise stuck playing old Shivaji tactics

The Problem:

  • Old way: Retreat to Raigarh, Rajagarh, Simhagarh when threatened
  • New reality: In northern plains, nowhere to run
  • "You are in front of each other"

Ibrahim Khan Agrees to Join (January 1760)

The Deal

What He Brought:

  • With my thousand soldiers
  • Will join Bhau
  • 1,000 man cannon regiment

The Importance:

  • These were best trained cannon force available
  • Bussy was Frenchman
  • Trained his guys for months
  • Highly disciplined
  • Long-range cannons (1-2 kilometers)

The Maratha Cannon Advantage vs. Afghan Cannons

What Afghans Had

Small Cannons:

  • Regular small cannons
  • Range: About 500 meters or less

Zamboorak (Camel Guns):

  • Particular name: Zambak or Zumbak
  • Small cannons mounted on camel backs
  • People sitting on camels riding them
  • Called Zumbak

How It Worked:

  • Camels move around
  • Moving cannons
  • Wherever they see enemy in front
  • Launch these small cannons
  • Range: At most 200 feet, 100 feet
  • Very creative

What Marathas Had (Ibrahim Khan Gardi's Regiment)

The Long-Range Cannons:

  • Going up to one to two kilometers
  • Can't escape them
  • Reach you before you even see Marathas on battlefield

The Technological Gap:

  • Afghan cannons: 100-500 meters
  • Maratha cannons: 1,000-2,000 meters
  • Massive advantage

The Fatal Flaw: Maratha Indiscipline

The Glory Problem

Why Cavalry/Foot Soldiers Opposed Cannons:

  • Scared of these tactics
  • Scared of this style of fighting

Why:

"Because they will no longer get the glory and the credits."

The Logic:

  • Once cannons soften up enemy ranks
  • Destroy them before cavalry charges
  • Then Peshwa would say: "You guys are no good"
  • "My cannon force is doing the job"
  • "You're just wiping it off"
  • "Just doing the final thing"

The Lack of Discipline

What They Wanted:

  • Go up in front
  • Show how brave they are
  • Show how great soldiers and fighters they are
  • With swords and spears
  • Traditional glory

What This Meant:

"They didn't understand that it's not about credit. It's about winning the battle and being disciplined."

The Problem:

"That discipline had not still gotten into the Maratha ranks."


The Tactical Disaster

What Should Happen

Proper Sequence:

  1. Cannon force fires long-range
  2. Softens enemy ranks
  3. Destroys enemy formations
  4. Then cavalry charges
  5. Easy victory

What Actually Happened in Battle

The Fatal Error:

  • Fighting force and cavalry got ahead of cannon force
  • Jumped in front of cannons

The Consequence:

  • Then what happens?
  • They get shot by their own cannons
  • Or artillery has to stop firing
  • Thus other army can beat them

The Reality:

"That is exactly what happened on the real battlefield."

What Could Have Been:

  • Cannon force was doing their job
  • Really burning the enemies
  • Afghans did not have these long-range cannons
  • But weren't allowed to finish softening enemy lines

Ibrahim Khan Gardi: The Hero's Story

In the Actual Battle

What He Did:

  • His cannons going 1-2 kilometers
  • So effective they almost made Abdali retreat
  • Creating havoc on Afghan army

The Impact on Abdali's Army:

  • At one point, they started fleeing battlefield
  • Towards Afghanistan
  • Before they realized not totally defeated
  • Really created havoc

Abdali's Near-Retreat:

  • Abdali was in rear guard (always in back)
  • Never in front
  • Had camels, horses, all that
  • Also had 30-40 wives in very back

The Preparation to Flee:

  • Gave orders to mount wives on horses
  • Thought: "This is lost now"
  • Said: "I have to save my wives and their honor"
  • If captured by Peshwa, don't know what will happen
  • Orders to leave: "We are leaving now"

The Afghan General's Desperation

What He Did:

  • General in front lines
  • Saw destruction being caused by cannons
  • Got down from horse on battlefield
  • Started eating the mud

Why:

  • Looked at soldiers fleeing left and right
  • Total chaos
  • Started appealing to them:
    • "Hey, where are you going?"
    • "Afghanistan, Kabul is thousands of kilometers away"
    • "You have to stand and fight"
    • "That is your only alternative"
    • "Please don't do this"
  • Started weeping

The Desperation:

"It became so desperate for the Afghan army."


Ibrahim Khan's Capture & Death

The Injury

What Happened:

  • Ibrahim Khan gets injured in battle
  • Captured by Abdali's forces
  • Brought in front of Abdali

Abdali's Offer

What Abdali Knew:

  • The kind of leadership Ibrahim Khan had
  • Tremendous expertise
  • Made all the difference

The Offer:

"Join me. Join me as the chief of my cannon force. I will give you the topmost position in my army and all the honors that you want."

The Context:

  • Ibrahim Khan was severely injured

The Refusal

Ibrahim Khan's Response:

"Never."

His Reasoning:

"Because I have eaten the salt of Peshwa and do as you wish with me, but I will never join you."

The Declaration:

"I am a Hindustani. I am the son of the soil and you are Afghan, you are Afghani and I will never, ever be joining you. Because I am a Hindustani, I am part of the family."

The Loyalty:

  • Felt kinship with his Deccanites
  • "I have eaten the salt of Peshwa"
  • He's been good to me
  • He is my employer
  • Cannot betray him

The Execution

Abdali's Reaction:

  • Got irate
  • Immediately ordered capture
  • Slaughtered right there and then

The Assessment:

"He was loyal to the last minute when he didn't have to. But he was."

His Personality:

  • Did a fantastic job
  • Loyal beyond necessity
  • Refused when he could have saved himself
  • Chose honor over life

The Professional vs. Unprofessional

The Problem with Maratha Army

The Assessment:

"Maratha army was unprofessional."

Why:

  • Wanted individual glory
  • Couldn't maintain discipline
  • Jumped ahead of cannons
  • Ruined tactical advantage
  • About credit, not victory

The Contrast:

  • Ibrahim Khan: Professional, disciplined
  • Maratha cavalry: Undisciplined, glory-seeking
  • One = winning strategy
  • Other = self-defeating

Key Players

NameRoleAffiliationNotes
Sadashiv Rao BhauSouthern commanderMarathas (Pune)Cousin of Nanasaheb, leading Nizam campaign
Nanasaheb PeshwaPeshwaPuneNot inclined to lead campaigns himself
Ibrahim Khan GardiArtillery chiefJoined Marathas1,000 soldiers, trained by Bussy, hero
Muzaffar KhanArtillery chiefMarathasNot on good terms with Bhau
BussyFrench generalFormerly with NizamTrained the Gardi commanders
William PriceEnglish envoyPuneObserving and reporting
NizamHyderabad rulerTarget of Bhau's campaign

Timeline

DateEvent
Aug 1759William Price arrives in Pune
Sept 1759Abdali begins invasion (unknown in Pune)
Oct 13, 1759Sadashiv Rao Bhau moves to war tents
Late 1759Bhau recruits Ibrahim Khan Gardi
Jan 1760Ibrahim Khan agrees with 1,000 soldiers
Later (Battle)Ibrahim Khan's cannons almost defeat Abdali
Later (Battle)Ibrahim Khan captured, refuses Abdali, killed

Critical Insights

The Information Warfare Problem

The Two-Week Gap:

  • Takes 2 weeks for message Pune → Delhi
  • By time Peshwa knows = too late
  • Can't coordinate strategy
  • Can't send reinforcements in time

The Consequence:

  • Northern and southern fronts disconnected
  • Can't respond to Abdali invasion
  • Strategic paralysis
  • "Fog of war" literal and figurative

The Technology Revolution

Why Cannons Changed Everything:

  • Shivaji era: No cannons, guerrilla warfare worked
  • Northern era: Flat land, need cannons
  • 1-2 km range vs. 100-500m range = dominance
  • Can't fight modern war with old weapons

The Adaptation:

  • Marathas finally understood this
  • Hired foreign-trained experts
  • Muslims from Telangana
  • Secular army = pragmatic
  • Religion < expertise

The Discipline Gap

The Cultural Problem:

  • Maratha culture = individual heroism
  • Glory in personal combat
  • Sword and spear warriors
  • Face-to-face honor

The Modern Warfare:

  • Artillery = impersonal
  • Long-range killing
  • No individual glory
  • Team coordination essential

The Conflict:

  • Old warriors can't adapt
  • Want credit for victory
  • Jump ahead of cannons
  • Ruin tactical advantage
  • Professional discipline hadn't entered Maratha ranks

Ibrahim Khan's Hindustani Identity

The Powerful Moment:

  • Muslim man
  • Trained by French general
  • Working for Hindu Peshwa
  • Refuses to betray employer
  • Declares himself "Hindustani"

What It Represents:

  • Secular Indian identity
  • Loyalty to land > religion
  • "Son of the soil"
  • Afghan = foreigner
  • "I am part of the family"

The Irony:

  • Most loyal Maratha soldier = Muslim
  • Most treacherous = Hindu kings (Madho Singh, etc.)
  • Identity > religion

The Near-Victory That Never Was

What Almost Happened:

  • Ibrahim Khan's cannons devastating Abdali
  • Afghans fleeing battlefield
  • Abdali preparing to retreat
  • His general eating mud and weeping
  • Marathas were winning

What Went Wrong:

  • Own cavalry jumped ahead
  • Couldn't use cannons anymore
  • Lost tactical advantage
  • Indiscipline = defeat

The Tragedy:

  • Victory was in their hands
  • Technology advantage was there
  • Leadership was there (Ibrahim Khan)
  • But cultural indiscipline lost it

The Glory vs. Victory Problem

The Mathematics:

  • With cannons softening enemy: 80% victory chance
  • Cavalry gets no glory but victory certain
  • Cavalry jumps ahead: 50-50 chance
  • Cavalry gets glory if they win
  • But much more likely to lose

The Choice:

  • Certain victory with no personal glory
  • OR uncertain victory with personal glory
  • Marathas chose personal glory
  • Lost the battle

The Professionalism Gap

Ibrahim Khan:

  • Trained for months by Bussy
  • Disciplined regiment
  • Followed orders
  • Coordinated tactics
  • Professional soldier

Maratha Cavalry:

  • Individual warriors
  • Personal honor code
  • Ignored overall strategy
  • Wanted individual credit
  • Unprofessional army

The Lesson:

"This is not about credit. It's about winning the battle and being disciplined."

The Wasted Advantage

What Marathas Had:

  • 1-2 km range cannons (best in India)
  • Trained artillery chief (Ibrahim Khan)
  • 1,000 disciplined soldiers
  • Technological superiority
  • Winning strategy

What They Threw Away:

  • Let cavalry ruin cannon advantage
  • Lost coordination
  • Turned dominance into defeat
  • Snatched defeat from jaws of victory

What's Coming

The Setup:

  • Bhau preparing Nizam campaign (October 1759)
  • Ibrahim Khan Gardi recruited with 1,000 soldiers
  • Best cannon force in India now with Marathas
  • But Abdali already invading in north (unknown to them)
  • Two-week information gap

The Tragedy:

  • This amazing artillery chief
  • With the best cannons
  • Almost defeated Abdali
  • But Maratha indiscipline ruined it
  • He'll be captured and killed
  • Loyal to the end
  • "I am a Hindustani"

The Lesson Not Learned:

  • Professionalism > personal glory
  • Discipline > individual heroism
  • Modern warfare ≠ traditional combat
  • But Marathas won't learn in time

October 1759 - January 1760: While Bhau recruits the best artillery commander in India, while Ibrahim Khan brings 1,000 trained soldiers and French long-range cannons, while technological superiority is finally in Maratha hands - nobody in Pune knows Abdali is already in Punjab. The fog of war is literal (northern winter) and figurative (two-week message delay). And when battle finally comes, when Ibrahim Khan's cannons are winning, when Abdali himself is preparing to flee with his 40 wives, when Afghan generals are eating mud and weeping in desperation - Maratha cavalry will jump ahead for personal glory, ruin the cannon advantage, and turn certain victory into catastrophic defeat. Ibrahim Khan will be captured, will refuse to betray the Peshwa even to save his life, will declare "I am a Hindustani," and will be slaughtered for his loyalty. The best soldier in the Maratha army was a Muslim. The most treacherous were the Hindu kings. Identity over religion. Loyalty over life. But glory over victory? That's what cost them everything.