Bhau's March Speed: Defending Against the Critics (1760)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The March from Sindakhed: Why Leave in March?

The Dilemma

When Bhau Left:

• Departed from Sindakhed in March 1760
• Three months before monsoon begins (early June)

Why This Was Problematic:

• Three months = not enough time for large army
• Had to cross multiple rivers
• Cover enormous distance (850 miles)
• Would get stuck when monsoon hits

The Calculation:

"June 5th or 7th, monsoon begins. Everybody knows that."

What Happens:

• Leave in March
• Travel for 3 months
• End up reaching target around mid-June
• Right when monsoon floods everything
• "Then you're grounded. You have to be grounded."

Why Leave So Late Then?

The Urgency

The Problem:

• Shinde and Holkar armies in the north
• "Totally ineffective"
• Getting beaten up
• Losing control of the situation

The Necessity:

"Something had to be done."

The Trade-off:

• Bad to leave in March (monsoon timing)
• Worse to stay in Pune (lose the north)
• No good options
• Had to respond

The Reality:

• They couldn't defend themselves
• "Nobody will take them seriously"
• Tax collection would stop
• Tribute collection would stop
• Everything would collapse without reinforcement

The Critics' Argument

What People Say

The Common Criticism:

"Bhau's army was going too slow. Why did it take so long to get to the north?"

The Logic:

• Had he reached Delhi before June 5-7 (before monsoon)
• Would have been "a different matter"
• Could have created favorable conditions
• Everything would have been reversed

The Claim:

"Had Bhau been there earlier, then he would have created a very tough situation for Abdali."

The Counterfactual:

• Get there earlier = defeat Abdali
• Win the battle with Abdali
• Change the whole situation in his favor
• Victory instead of disaster

The Defense: Army Speed in the 18th Century

The Author's Rebuttal

The Core Argument:

"At that time the army used to travel at a very slow pace."

Why This Matters:

• This wasn't Bhau being slow
• This was normal for 18th century armies
• Criticism doesn't make sense
• "It wasn't feasible" to go faster

Historical Army Speed Comparisons

Example 1: Farrukhsiyar (1722)

Who He Was:

• Mughal Emperor
• From the book "Army of the Mughals" by Irwin (1713)

His March:

• September 23, 1722: Left Patna
• January 4, 1723: Reached Agra (Sarai Begum)

The Math:

• Took ~4-5 months
• That's the pace of Mughal armies
• "That was kind of a given"

Example 2: 1723 March (Also from Irwin)

The Statistics:

• 106 days to cover 585 miles
• Works out to ~5 miles per day

The Significance:

"That's a very slow pace."

Comparing to Bhau:

• Bhau did 850 miles in 120 days
• Works out to ~7-8 miles per day
• Actually better than the Mughals

The Verdict:

"So he wasn't as bad, you know, he was competitive. Better than that."

Example 3: Bajirao Vishwanath & Hussain Ali (1718)

Who They Were:

• Bajirao Vishwanath = Peshwa at the time
• Bajirao I also went with him (as his son)
• Hussain Ali = one of the Sayyid Brothers

The Mission:

• Went from Aurangabad to Delhi
• 98 days to complete the journey

Why They Went:

• Rescue people taken hostage by Aurangzeb
• Shahru, his mother, stepbrothers, others
• They were taken to Delhi
• Went with small army to get them back

The Other Goal:

• Secure the Chaut (one-fourth tax) from Mughal Emperor
• Get Subhas (provinces) in their name
• This was when they secured those rights (1718)

The Distance:

"Aurangabad to Delhi is a much shorter distance than from Pune to Delhi."

Yet:

• Still took 98 days
• With a small army
• Much lighter than Bhau's force

Bhau's Special Handicap: The Artillery

Why Bhau Was Even Slower

What He Carried:

• Heavy artillery
• Long-distance French cannons
• Massive guns

The Problem:

"Someone literally had to be pushing or these horses had to be pulling these cannons."

The Reality:

• Not horses - bulls pulled the cannons
• "Horses don't do it. It's the bulls."
• Bulls had to be very strong
• "They could only walk at a certain pace"

Why He Brought Them:

• Believed in the artillery
• Had seen it work at Udgir battle against Nizam
• Long-distance artillery was his ace
• "He was a believer"

The Calculation:

"Nobody knew who would win [without the artillery]. It would be a toss-up."

His Confidence:

"He believed that [artillery] will give him the win."

The Dholpur Stop: One Month Camp

What Happened

At Dholpur:

• Bhau "just camped and stayed there for a month"
• Not moving, just waiting

Even With That:

"So even with that, his overall speed wasn't too slow."

The Calculation:

• Including the one-month Dholpur stop
• His average speed still competitive with historical armies
• Still did ~7-8 miles per day overall

The Bottom Line

The Verdict on Bhau's Speed

The Conclusion:

"In the 18th century, when armies travelled long distance, that is how it was. So he was not doing anything below par."

Even Accounting For:

• One month stopped at Dholpur
• Heavy artillery slowing him down
• Massive army (80,000+ soldiers + 50-60,000 civilians)
• Terrible timing (monsoon)

Still:

• Competitive with historical examples
• Actually faster than Farrukhsiyar
• Only slightly slower than Bajirao/Hussain Ali (who had small, light force)

Key Comparisons Table

The Monsoon Problem Revisited

Why It Mattered So Much

The Timing:

• March departure = arrives mid-June
• Monsoon begins early June
• Soggy earth, flooded rivers
• "Not meant for armies to be on march"
• Animals can't walk properly
• Bullock carts stuck

The Historical Pattern:

"Nobody did that in India ever because generally armies went to battle probably by November."

The Scale:

• 80,000+ soldiers
• 50-60,000 civilians
• "Like big village moving" from place to place

Why Critics Miss the Point

The Constraints Were Real

What Critics Ignore:

1. 18th century armies were slow - that's just how it was
2. Heavy artillery - bulls can only move so fast
3. Massive scale - 130,000+ people total
4. Rivers to cross - took month just for Chambar (small river!)
5. No better alternatives - had to leave in March (Shinde/Holkar losing)

What Would Have Worked:

• Leave in November or December (previous year)
• Arrive by March/April (before monsoon)
• Plenty of time to position forces
• Cross rivers when they're low (pre-monsoon)
• Fight in favorable conditions

Why That Didn't Happen:

• Situation in north wasn't critical yet in late 1759
• By time it became urgent (Jan/Feb 1760)
• Too late to arrive before monsoon
• Forced into bad timing

The Artillery Question

Why Not Leave It Behind?

Holkar Later Says:

• Store heavy guns at Gwalior fort
• Use cavalry for quick movements
• Do surgical strikes instead
• Gherao (surround) tactics, not frontal battle

Why Bhau Disagreed:

• Seen artillery work at Udgir
• Confident it would win the battle
• "Only thing he could believe in"
• Without it = total toss-up
• "Nobody knew who would win"

The Trade-off:

• Artillery = confidence in victory
• Artillery = slow march = bad timing
• But without it = maybe no chance at all?

Critical Themes

1. The Impossible Choice

Leave early with incomplete preparation, or leave late and get caught by monsoon. There was no good option by March 1760.

2. The Technology Paradox

Artillery might win the battle, but it guarantees you'll arrive at the wrong time. Faster march might mean better timing, but losing the battle anyway.

3. The Historical Context

Criticism of Bhau's speed ignores that no 18th century army moved faster with that kind of scale and equipment. He actually beat historical averages.

4. The Constraints Compound

• Heavy artillery (slow)
• Huge army (slow)
• Multiple rivers (slow)
• One-month stop (slow)
• Monsoon approaching (time pressure)
• Still faster than Mughal armies

5. The Counterfactual Problem

"If only he'd gotten there earlier" assumes he could have gotten there earlier. The historical evidence suggests: no, he couldn't.

Where We Left Off

The Situation:

• Bhau's speed was competitive with 18th century standards
• Actually better than Mughal armies
• But still arrived right as monsoon hit
• The timing was forced by March departure (responding to crisis)
• The critics have a point about timing
• But miss the constraints that made faster march impossible

The Question:

• Could anyone have done it faster?
• Or was the disaster baked in once they left in March?
• The historical evidence suggests: once you leave in March with heavy artillery and a massive army, you're screwed by monsoon no matter what you do.

The critics say Bhau was too slow. The historical record says he was actually pretty fast for an 18th century army carrying heavy artillery. But both miss the real point: the disaster wasn't the slow march - it was the impossible choice between abandoning the north or marching into monsoon. By March 1760, there were no good options left.