The Aftermath of 1757 & Raghunath Rao's Return (1756-1758)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Eyewitness Account: Horror at the Yamuna
The Quote (Post-Massacre)
What the Witness Saw:
"When I arrived at the banks of Yamuna River, I realized I can cross the Yamuna River to the other bank. The river water that was polluted by blood was looking with a yellow tinge."
The Timeline of Blood:
- First week: River water turned completely red
- Second week: Developed a yellow tinge
- Blood pollution so severe it changed the river color
- Visible evidence of the massacre scale
The Destruction: Complete Devastation
What Was Lost
Material Destruction:
- Everything Abdali destroyed
- All possessions looted
- Nothing left intact
- Total wipeout
Spiritual Destruction:
- Temples totally defiled
- Holy places desecrated
- Sanctity destroyed
- Prestige annihilated
- Cultural heritage violated
The Warning:
"If we allow these kind of tribes to come into India, then the wealth, women and any civilization will not be intact. It will be all destroyed."
The Historical Parallel: Nadir Shah Redux
The 1739 Comparison
Nadir Shah's Invasion (1739):
- Brought Abdali as his soldier
- Did similar destruction
- Massive looting
- Civilian massacres
Abdali's 1757:
- Same level of destruction as Nadir Shah
- Following his mentor's playbook
- Potentially even worse
- The student became the master
The Failure of Protection
Nobody Came to Help
The Local Kings & Royals:
- Didn't come to rescue
- Stayed hidden in forts
- Protective sanctuaries
- Just saving their own lives
- Too scared to act
The Military Failure:
- Marathas couldn't stop it
- Jats couldn't stop it
- Nara Samvar = massacre of humans
- Insufficient forces
- Unprepared
What Saved Them:
-
Cholera epidemic struck Abdali's camp
- Soldiers dying like insects
- Divine curse (according to survivors)
-
Summer heat
- Pathans couldn't bear Indian summer
- Afghanistan is cold, India is hot
- Heat drove them out
- Natural defense
The Pathan Identity
Who Are Pathans?
Definition:
- Afghan tribe (prominent one)
- Abdali was part of a Pathan tribe
- Several sub-tribes within Pathan
- Collectively called "Pathan"
Why They Couldn't Stay:
- Accustomed to cold Afghan climate
- Indian summer = unbearable
- Would have stayed longer otherwise
- Heat was India's defensive advantage
The Inevitable Return
The Fear
The Reality:
"Now Abdali has left. But there is no telling when he can come back. It's probably that he will come back. It's just a matter of time."
The Question:
- Which force in India will take up fight with Abdali?
- Is there a protector?
- Who can save India from these savage barbarians?
The Border: Attaq Fort
The Boundary Town
Location:
- West and north of Lahore
- Town on the boundary between India and Afghanistan
- Strategic fort at Attaq
Historical Control:
- During Aurangzeb's time: Controlled by Mughals
- Had proper Subedar there
- Secure border
Current Status (1757-1758):
- Very contested
- Going back and forth in control
- Abdali getting stronger
- Mughals getting weaker
- Out of Mughal control
- Out of Maratha control
- In flux
- Getting under Abdali's control
The Shrinking Empire (September 1757/1758)
Raja Kishwarath's Letter to Nanasaheb
What He Wrote:
Past Territory:
- Attaq was part of Indian territory
- Under Aurangzeb or Marathas
- Secure boundary
Current Territory (Lost):
"Attaq, west: Multan, Kabul. East: Bengal, Ayodhya, Prayag, Rohilkhand."
New Reality:
- Attaq is gone (lost to Abdali)
- Can only control from Multan eastward
- Multan (much east and south of Attaq)
- Everything going eastward
- To Ayodhya
- To Bengal (far east)
The Conclusion:
- Mughal Empire has shrunk drastically
- Major territory loss
- Border pushed far back
His Response:
"Why should we be worried? The Mughals are so downtrodden anyway."
- Not worried about Mughals
- But what about Abdali?
- Bigger threat ignored
Flashback: 1756 Campaign Planning
The Rajput Tribute Collection
The Plan:
- 1756 - Peshwa decided campaign in North
- Goal: Collect tribute from Rajputs
- Going back two years before 1757 invasion
The Backstory - How Tributes Began:
-
Shinde and Holkar helped Rajputs
- In succession battles (brothers fighting for power after father's death)
-
Desperate deals were made
- Rajputs under duress
- Agreed to whatever terms
- "Give us X amount per year"
- "In 10 years we'll pay everything we agreed to"
-
After coming to power:
- Realized it's impossible to pay
- Didn't have the tax base
- Didn't have capacity
- Bad deals to begin with
-
Started backtracking
- Within 1-2 years
- Couldn't keep paying
- Broke agreements
Why Peshwa Needed the Money:
- Constantly in need of funds
- Cannot conquer North India without money
- Army salaries needed
- New equipment required
- Horses, supplies, etc.
- Resources for money were limited
The Only Option:
- Go back and insist on tributes that were agreed to
- Force collection
- Needed for campaigns
Raghunath Rao's Fatal Mistake
The Failure to Hold Territory
What He Did Wrong:
"Raghunath Rao didn't think about a permanent force in Punjab or in Delhi or all the way to the northwest."
What He Should Have Done:
- Keep strong Maratha force in conquered areas
- Create administration
- Establish government
- Maintain law and order
- Like Shivaji did
Shivaji's Method:
- Whichever areas he conquered
- Created system immediately
- Administration in place
- Government functioning
- Wouldn't be left in chaos
Raghunath Rao's Failure:
- No permanent presence
- Only X number of forces (insufficient)
- Gave Abdali easy way to reconquer
- Could have held the territory
- But didn't establish proper control
The Distance Problem
Pune to Punjab
The Geography:
- Thousands of kilometers/miles away
- From Pune (home base) to Punjab
- Huge distance to maintain
- Even communication difficult
- Leadership nearly impossible
The Result:
- Had some stations
- But woefully short of resources
- Insufficient personnel
- No proper system
- Not sustainable
The Lesson:
- Can't control territory from that far
- Must have local administration
- Must have permanent forces
- Distance defeats empire-building
The Delhi Complexity (1756-1757)
Beyond Just Collecting Tribute
The Situation Was More Complex:
- Not just about getting money from Rajputs
- Delhi was in chaos
The Power Struggle:
| Person | Position | Goal |
|---|---|---|
| Mughal Emperor | Weak ruler | Powerless |
| Current Wazir | In position | "I'm not going anywhere" |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Wanted to be Wazir |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab (Safdar Jung's son) | Wanted to be Wazir (father had been) |
The Prestige:
- Being Wazir of Mughal Empire = great thing
- Huge prestige
- Almost like being king
- Everyone wanted it
The Result:
- Lot of tussle between power centers
- Nobody to control anything
- Everyone weak
- Basically chaos
- Anarchy
- Constant complexity
Why Marathas Had to Step In
The Rohilla Insufficiency
Najib Khan's Forces:
- Had probably 5,000-15,000 Rohillas
- Woefully short to establish order
- Could say "listen to me"
- Could say "I'll set up order"
- But couldn't actually do it
- Insufficient strength
The Vacuum:
- Somebody had to create order
- Only party that potentially could: Marathas
- They had the strength
- They had the organization
- Natural candidates
The Three Problems:
- Money shortage for Peshwa (constant)
- Delhi totally unstable (chaos)
- Abdali question (will return anytime)
Abdali's Status:
- Not a 24/7 issue
- Would suddenly come
- Stay 3-4 months
- Get what he could
- Then leave
- Intermittent problem
The Constant Problems:
- Peshwa's money needs
- Delhi's instability
- Mughal emperor weak
- Too many power centers
The Second Campaign North (1756)
Sending Raghunath Rao Again
The Decision:
"So then once again, Mr. Peshwa decided to send his younger brother to the north."
- "Once again" = had already come back once
- But circumstances required return
- Sent Raghunath Rao north again
The Fighting Season: Post-Monsoon Tradition
Why October?
The Tradition:
- New invasions begin after monsoon
- Monsoon ends by October
- "Seema Ullanghan" = Boundary crossing
- Tradition of starting campaigns then
Two Critical Reasons:
Reason 1: Rivers Become Crossable
During Monsoon:
- Rivers swell massively
- Width of 100 meters → becomes a mile wide
- Almost impossible to cross
- Elephants, camels, horses can't cross
- No bridges
- Maybe small boats
After Monsoon:
- Water recedes
- Rivers crossable
- Army can move
Reason 2: Farmers Become Available
The Farming Calendar:
- Farmers needed in monsoon
- Plant grains
- Do harvest
- Essential work
Maratha Army Composition:
- 60% were part-time fighters
- Primarily farmers
- Needed for agriculture during monsoon
After Harvest:
- From October/November onward
- Until summer
- Farmers are unemployed
- "I don't have anything to do"
- "I can join for fighting"
- Available for campaigns
The Logic:
"They might as well be fighting. Hey, I'm available."
Seema Ullanghan: Boundary Crossing
The Concept
Definition:
- Seema = boundary
- Ullanghan = cross
- Together: Cross the border into new territory
The Tradition:
- Around October/November
- After monsoon over
- Ground is not wet anymore
- Otherwise army gets bogged down
The Strategy:
- Cross your kingdom's boundary
- Go into foreign territory
- Capture it by fighting
- New battle season begins
- In enemy territory
The October 1756 Plan
Raghunath Rao's Departure
The Decision:
- Start from Pune in October 1756
- Standard timing
- After monsoon
- When farmers available
- When ground dry
The Goals:
- Collect tributes from Rajputs
- Stabilize Delhi
- Establish Maratha presence
- Create administration
Key Players
| Name | Role | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Raghunath Rao | Peshwa's younger brother | Being sent north again (Oct 1756) |
| Nanasaheb (Peshwa) | Maratha leader | Making strategic decisions in Pune |
| Raja Kishwarath | Regional king | Writing reports about territory loss |
| Najib Khan | Rohilla leader | Insufficient forces, wants to be Wazir |
| Shuja-ud-Daulah | Awadh Nawab | Wants to be Wazir |
| Current Wazir | Delhi official | In position, resisting others |
| Mughal Emperor | Nominal ruler | Weak and powerless |
| Abdali | Gone but will return | Left after summer heat and cholera |
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 1739 | Nadir Shah's invasion (brought Abdali as soldier) |
| 1756 | Peshwa plans campaign to collect Rajput tributes |
| October 1756 | Raghunath Rao to depart from Pune |
| 1756-1757 | Campaigns in North |
| 1757 | Abdali's invasion and destruction |
| After 1757 | Cholera and summer heat drive Abdali out |
| September 1757/1758 | Raja Kishwarath writes about territory loss |
| 1758+ | Abdali expected to return |
Geography
The Border Zone:
- Attaq - boundary fort (lost to Abdali)
- Lahore - major city (east/south of Attaq)
- Multan - new boundary point (further east/south)
The Empire:
- West boundary: Moved from Attaq → Multan
- East boundary: Still reaches Bengal
- Shrinkage: Significant territory lost
The Distance:
- Pune (south) → Punjab (northwest) = thousands of km
- Too far to control effectively
- Communication difficult
- Leadership impossible
Key Themes
- The Horror Witnessed - Yamuna River red with blood
- Natural Defenses - Cholera and summer heat
- Nobody Protected - Local kings hid in forts
- The Inevitable Return - Abdali will come back
- Border in Flux - Attaq lost, empire shrinking
- The Tribute Problem - Rajputs can't pay, Marathas need money
- Raghunath Rao's Error - No permanent forces left behind
- The Distance Problem - Can't control from Pune
- Delhi Chaos - Multiple claimants, no order
- Seasonal Warfare - Post-monsoon campaign tradition
- Part-Time Army - 60% are farmers who join after harvest
- The Vacuum - Only Marathas can fill it
Critical Insights
The Natural Defenses
What Saved India:
- Not military strength (failed)
- Cholera epidemic (divine intervention per survivors)
- Summer heat (Pathans couldn't handle it)
Why This Matters:
- Can't rely on these forever
- Abdali will come back
- Need actual military solution
- Natural defenses are temporary
The Nadir Shah Pattern
The Mentor-Student Relationship:
- Nadir Shah (1739) brought Abdali as soldier
- Abdali learned from the master
- Now doing same destruction
- Same looting tactics
- Same brutality
- Potentially worse
The Implication:
- This is a proven model
- Worked for Nadir Shah
- Working for Abdali
- Will work again
- Need to break the cycle
The Tribute Trap
The Vicious Cycle:
- Rajputs desperate (succession crisis)
- Promise huge tributes to Shinde/Holkar
- Get help, win power
- Realize tributes impossible to pay
- Start backtracking
- Marathas need the money
- Have to force collection
- Creates resentment
- Weakens alliances
The Problem:
- Bad deals from the start
- Rajputs couldn't pay
- But Marathas needed money
- No good solution
Raghunath Rao vs. Shivaji
Shivaji's Model:
- Conquer territory
- Immediately create administration
- Establish government
- Law and order systems
- Leave it functional
- Move to next conquest
Raghunath Rao's Model:
- Conquer territory
- Leave insufficient forces
- No administration
- No government
- Leave it in chaos
- Return to Pune
The Result:
- Shivaji's territories stayed conquered
- Raghunath Rao's territories lost again
- Abdali easily reconquered
- Fundamental strategic error
The Wazir Musical Chairs
Three People Want It:
- Current Wazir (in position)
- Najib Khan (Rohilla, has local forces)
- Shuja-ud-Daulah (son of former Wazir)
Why They Want It:
- Huge prestige
- Almost like being king
- Real power (emperor is weak)
Why It Matters:
- Internal fighting weakens everyone
- Nobody can actually govern
- Everyone competing, nobody leading
- Creates the vacuum Marathas could fill
The Part-Time Army Problem
The Reality:
- 60% of Maratha army = farmers
- Only available after harvest
- Need to return for planting
The Advantage:
- Large army when needed
- Don't pay them year-round
- Cost-effective
The Disadvantage:
- Seasonal warfare only
- Can't campaign during monsoon
- Must finish before planting season
- Time-limited campaigns
Why October Start:
- Harvest done
- Farmers available
- Rivers crossable
- Ground dry
- Perfect timing
The Distance Doom
The Math:
- Pune to Punjab = thousands of kilometers
- Communication takes weeks
- Orders take weeks
- Reinforcements take months
The Impossibility:
- Can't govern from that far
- Can't respond to crises
- Can't maintain control
- Must have local presence
Raghunath Rao's Failure:
- Understood the conquest
- Didn't understand the hold
- Won battles, lost territories
- Tactical success, strategic failure
Foreshadowing
What This Sets Up:
- Raghunath Rao going north again (Oct 1756)
- Without learning the lesson (no permanent forces)
- Money still a problem (need tributes)
- Delhi still chaos (no order established)
- Abdali will return (it's inevitable)
- Border shrinking (Attaq lost, Multan next?)
- Marathas must fill vacuum (only ones who can)
The Questions:
- Will Raghunath Rao establish permanent presence this time?
- Will he collect enough tribute?
- Will Delhi stabilize?
- When will Abdali return?
- Will Marathas be ready?
1757-1758: The Yamuna runs yellow with blood, temples lie desecrated, and Abdali is gone - driven out by cholera and summer heat, not by any army. Nobody protected the people. The kings hid in their forts. The Marathas and Jats couldn't stop it. Only nature saved India this time. But everyone knows he'll be back. It's just a matter of when. Meanwhile, the Mughal Empire shrinks. Attaq is lost. The border moves east to Multan. Delhi is chaos - three men fight to be Wazir while the emperor is powerless. Raghunath Rao is being sent north again in October 1756, after the monsoon, when the farmers are available and the ground is dry. But will he learn from his mistake? Will he leave permanent forces this time? Or will he conquer and abandon again, leaving the door open for Abdali's inevitable return?