Date	Location	Decision	Rationale	Impact
June 13, 1760	Sindakhed	Leave on Padwa festival	Auspicious day	Delay start
October 11, 1760	Delhi	Move toward Kunjapura	Celestial timing	Follow schedule
October 20, 1760	Kunjapura	Win battle decisively	Military execution	Victory achieved
October 21, 1760	Kunjapura	Decide to go to Kurukshetra	Blind devotion	Fatal decision
October 21-Nov	En route to Kurukshetra	Move 50 km north, then back	Religious pilgrimage	Lose strategic position
Late November	West of Yamuna	Scouts report Abdali crossing	Too late to respond	Game over
January 1761	Panipat	Battle occurs	No choice left	Disaster

Key Players and Their Positions at This Time

Person	Role	Decision on Kurukshetra
Bhau	Supreme Commander	Approved/ordered the detour
Holkar	Army Commander	Likely opposed (wanted strategic movement)
Raghunath Rao	Back in Pune	Wrote advice letters (too late)
Nana Sahib Peshwa	In Pune	Unaware of escalating situation
Scouts along Yamuna	Surveillance	Successfully spotted crossing (but too late)

The Core Problem: Decision-Making Framework

What Bhau Used:

Spiritual/religious considerations
Astrological consulting
Troop morale/civilian desires
Personal pride and honor
Irrational superstition

What Bhau Should Have Used:

Enemy vulnerability assessment
Own positioning advantage
Speed and surprise value
Geographic advantage (Yamuna crossing)
Rational risk calculation

The Disconnect:

Had correct system (scouts, communication)
Lost advantage through location choice
No amount of scouting helps if 200 km away
Information speed < travel speed

The Bigger Pattern: Andhashraddha in Command

Throughout the Campaign:

Major decisions made by celestial timing
Religious duty overrode military necessity
Superstition presented as strategic thinking
Irrationality normalized in command structure

Who Benefited:

Religious priests/astrologers (consulted constantly)
Civilian morale (religious ceremonies provided)
No one (strategically speaking)

Who Suffered:

Military operations (delayed, distracted)
Maratha army (lost advantage)
Maratha empire (lost war)
Indian independence (British filled vacuum for 200 years)

The Tragedy: Right System, Wrong Execution

What They Got Right:

Scout system along Yamuna
Communication network
Military discipline for battle
Artillery advantage
Numerical strength

What They Got Wrong:

Positioning of scouts
Strategic location of army
Timing of major moves
Decision-making framework
Willingness to subordinate ritual to necessity

The Irony:

They had superior position
They had warning system
They lost advantage through location
They knew they should be watching Yamuna crossing
They went to religious pilgrimage instead
By the time they realized: Too late

Where This Leads: By late October 1760, the Marathas have all the tactical pieces: scouts, communications, artillery, numbers, and recent victory. But Bhau's decision to visit Kurukshetra puts them 180 km from the critical crossing point. When Abdali moves to cross Yamuna, the scouts report it, but the army is too far away to respond. The window of vulnerability closes. Abdali's army crosses intact. The strategic advantage evaporates. And six weeks later, they meet on the plains of Panipat—this time on equal terms instead of Marathi advantage.

It seems like a small detour. Just 50 km north to see a holy site. The civilians want it. The soldiers would appreciate the blessing. The priests say the timing is good. What's the harm? Except that 50 km north then 180 km back south takes weeks. And in those weeks, the enemy moves. The scouts see it coming but they're 200 km away. By the time they march back, he's already across. And that changed everything. Shivaji would have known this. But Bhau was young, confident, and surrounded by people telling him that gods prefer Thursday and Saturday battles. So he went to Kurukshetra. And in doing so, he lost the war.