The Supply Crisis: From Victory to Desperation

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

Why Marathas Came North (The Bigger Picture)

Their Rationale:

• Defending Hindustan's sovereignty against foreign invasion
• Preventing Abdali's hegemony over India
• Sacred duty to stop external aggression (not selfish)
• No one else could negotiate/resist (Mughal too weak)
• Needed to act even though it wasn't strictly their problem

The Problem:

• Most northern allies didn't understand this motivation
• They saw: "Marathas here for their own expansion"
• Thought: "When this is done, Marathas will dominate us"
• Result: Everyone opportunistic, no unified Indian response

The Reality:

• Marathas had no business being there (not their territory)
• But they went anyway because someone had to
• Thought they alone could defend Hindustan's interests
• Everyone else too weak, too divided, or too selfish

The Logistics Problem: Feeding 100,000+ People

The Numbers:

• Bahu's force: 65,000-70,000 soldiers
• Additional noncombatants: 25,000-30,000 (pilgrims, old people, dependents)
• Total: ~95,000-100,000 people
• PLUS: Camels, elephants, bulls, horses, countless animals
• Mobile city traveling through hostile territory

Why This Was Impossible:

• Not modern era: No planes, trains, trucks for supply runs
• Had to source food locally
• Delhi area: Limited food supply
• Need to feed so many mouths daily
• Animals also needed massive food quantities

The Practical Problem:

• Moving this many people = moving a town
• Where do supplies come from in unsupportive territory?
• Citizens in Delhi didn't support Marathas
• No local allies to provide supplies
• No supply chain infrastructure

The Morale Shift: August to September

August 1760: Maratha High Point

• Captured Delhi (symbolic victory)
• Red Fort broken (military victory)
• Abdali's camp in depression/frustration
• Maratha soldiers hopeful
• Afghan soldiers angry at Abdali for keeping them in India
• Marathas looked like winners

Why Afghan Morale Was Low:

• Came to India for loot and quick victory
• Expected 3-4 months max, then go home
• Instead: Now staying 8-9 months (twice expected time)
• Away from families, own lands
• Some had businesses waiting
• Missing important duties back home
• Patience completely worn out

Afghan Army Expectations:

• Abdali shares loot with army (incentive system)
• Soldiers expect: Fight, loot, go home
• Promised: Quick campaign, big treasure
• Reality: Long siege, slow war, no treasure found
• Soldiers losing faith in leadership

August 25: Abdali Crosses Yamuna (The Game Changer)

The Situation:

• Yamuna was monsoon-swollen (supposedly impassable)
• Marathas thought: Abdali can't cross with full army
• Bahu thought: Safe as long as Yamuna separates them

Abdali's Move:

• Found crossing point (spies didn't detect it)
• Successfully moved army to west bank
• Now on same side as Marathas
• Everything changed

The Impact on Afghans:

• After Abdali crossed, morale shifted
• Showed Abdali was decisive/capable
• Meant: Actual battle was coming
• Meant: Maybe quick victory possible
• Restored some hope to demoralized army

The Meaning:

• Abdali went from "stuck on wrong side" to "here to fight"
• His action showed: "I'm committed, ready for battle"
• Army realized: "Okay, we're doing this"
• Psychologically restored some faith

The Resource Comparison

Abdali's Advantages:

• Located in Doab (between Yamuna and Ganga)
• Local rulers supported him (Najib Khan, Rohilas)
• Power elite allied with him
• Could requisition supplies easily
• Had fewer noncombatants to feed
• Full local support network

Maratha Disadvantages:

• Located in Delhi (but no local support)
• Citizens hostile/unwelcoming to Marathas
• Mughal emperor absent (treasury empty)
• No allied rulers in area
• Had massive noncombatant burden
• Zero local support network

The Reality:

• Abdali sitting pretty with supplies flowing in
• Marathas struggling to feed themselves
• Abdali could wait indefinitely
• Marathas running out of time/resources

The Army Composition Problem

Bahu's Army Structure:

• Core force (25,000): Well-trained, disciplined
• Shinde contingent: 15,000-20,000 (from his territory)
• Holkar contingent: 15,000-20,000 (from his territory)
• Misc. hired groups: Various sizes
• Heterogeneous, not unified

The Artillery Problem:

• Bahu's core forces trained in long-range cannon warfare
• Other contingents had NOT seen this style
• Most soldiers grew up with traditional Indian warfare
• Expected: "Two armies face, we advance, hand-to-hand combat"
• Reality: "Cannon fire from 2+ km away, then advance"
• Fundamental mismatch between expectations and tactics

The Skepticism:

• Other contingents skeptical of cannon effectiveness
• Hadn't seen artillery used at scale
• Didn't understand new warfare mechanics
• Weren't trained for this style
• Could cause coordination problems in actual battle

Bahu's Letter to Govind Pan Bundela (August)

Key Message:

• "I have broken the back of the enemy"
• Why? Because Abdali was promising things to Najib Khan
• Now Abdali looks weak (stuck on wrong side of Yamuna)
• Abdali losing credibility with allies
• Abdali considering negotiations over fighting

What Bahu Believed:

• Taking Delhi = took away Abdali's objective
• Abdali came to control Delhi
• Now Marathas control it
• Abdali's mission compromised
• Maybe Abdali will just negotiate and leave

The Reality:

• Bahu was being too optimistic
• Abdali hadn't given up
• Would recover from this setback
• Crossing Yamuna restored his position
• Bahu's confidence in August would be shattered in September

The Shift: Letters Show Desperation

June 26, 1760 (Chambar):

• Spending too much on replacing dead horses
• Can't feed people = can't take care of animals
• Delhi has no government/administration
• No one has resources to help
• This is relatively early—still hopeful tone

September 1, 1760:

• Getting no loans from anyone
• Can't pay soldier salaries
• People going hungry
• Situation worsening fast

September 15, 1760:

• Animals starving (nothing to eat)
• People starving (even high-placed officials going hungry)
• Still no loans available
• Situation "really looking bad"
• Total despair in two weeks

The Money Situation

Where Funds Came From:

• Peshwa allocation (already used)
• Expected tribute/revenue collections
• Expected loans from moneylenders
• Plunder from Red Fort

Where Funds Went:

• Soldier salaries (non-negotiable)
• Cannon crew payments (critical)
• Food for 100,000 people (unsustainable)
• Animal fodder (essential)
• Equipment maintenance
• Daily expenses: Over 100,000

The Income Problem:

• No tributes actually flowing in
• Moneylenders refusing loans (too risky)
• Delhi treasury: Empty (already looted)
• Red Fort: Yielded some silver, but limited
• No consistent income stream

The Pontoon Bridge Mentioned

Govind Pan Bundela's Task:

• Build pontoon bridge across Yamuna
• Would allow easier crossing
• Would enable better supply lines
• Would connect to Doab region

Why It Matters:

• If Marathas could cross Yamuna at will
• Could forage in Doab
• Could coordinate with Govind Pan Bundela
• Could relieve supply pressure

The Problem:

• Bundela didn't have forces to build and defend it
• Bundela was old (60 years old, very old for the time)
• Bundela had only 8,000-10,000 troops
• Not sufficient for major engineering project
• Plus he also couldn't secure Shuja as ally (second task)

The Bundela Situation

What Bundela Was Supposed To Do:

1. Build pontoon bridge across Yamuna
2. Bring Shuja to Maratha side (alliance)
3. Provide funds/supplies

Why He Couldn't:

• Too old (60 years = ancient for the era)
• Too few troops (8,000-10,000)
• Not battle-ready forces (meant for tax collection, not warfare)
• Never got the resources Peshwa could have sent
• Asked Peshwa for 25,000-30,000 soldier force earlier
• Peshwa couldn't spare them

The Irony:

• If Peshwa had sent Bundela the force he requested
• Bundela could have done these tasks
• Would have relieved supply crisis
• Might have changed outcome
• But Peshwa didn't have resources to spare

The Perception Shift

August: In Maratha Camp

• "We've won Delhi"
• "Abdali is scared"
• "Afghan army morale is broken"
• "We're the winners"

August: In Abdali's Camp

• "Marathas got Delhi"
• "We're stuck on wrong side"
• "This campaign is going wrong"
• "Maybe we should negotiate and go home"

September: In Maratha Camp

• "We're running out of food"
• "No money coming in"
• "People starving"
• "How long can we sustain this?"

September: In Abdali's Camp

• "We crossed Yamuna"
• "We're on same side now"
• "Now we can fight"
• "Momentum is returning"

The Core Problem

Maratha Strategic Error:

• Won the battle (taking Delhi)
• But lost the campaign (supply collapse)
• Military victory ≠ Strategic victory
• Controlling territory without resources = hollow victory

The Timing Curse:

• Came in wrong season (monsoon)
• Had wrong supply infrastructure
• Had wrong local support
• Had massive noncombatant burden
• Couldn't afford to wait, couldn't afford to fight

Timeline

Where We Left Off: Marathas are facing existential supply crisis. Went from August confidence ("We've won") to September desperation ("We're starving"). Meanwhile, Abdali has crossed Yamuna and is moving toward confrontation. Time is running out. Money is gone. Supplies are nearly exhausted. And the monsoon that should have protected them is making everything worse (rivers impassable, roads impassable, nowhere to get supplies).

They had won the battle for Delhi but were losing the battle for survival. Every day in Delhi cost more than they had. Every day without battle meant more starvation. And they couldn't fight until monsoon ended. So they were trapped: can't feed themselves, can't cross the river, can't stay in place, can't leave. This is what victory looked like when your supply lines break down. You win the battle and starve in the victory.