The Panipat Standoff: Starvation, Cold, and Nightly Skirmishes (November-December 1760)
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Fundamental Problem: Can't Retreat, Can't Advance
The Geometric Trap
The Reality:
- Two massive armies blocking each other's path
- Marathas can't go north (Abdali blocks them)
- Abdali can't go north (Marathas block him)
- Neither can retreat effectively
- If one retreats: the other attacks their exposed back
The Holkar Dilemma:
- Holkar's entire career built on strategic retreat
- Always fought ganimikawa (surgical strikes + withdrawal)
- Never experienced forced frontal battle
- Deeply uncomfortable with current situation
- No escape route from battle he doesn't want
The Locked Position:
- Both armies facing each other ~3-5 miles apart
- Must go past each other eventually
- Can't avoid it geographically
- Can't negotiate their way out
- Can't retreat safely
- Battle is now inevitable, just timing uncertain
The Assessment Period: Slow Motion Toward Conflict
Why No Immediate Battle?
The Mutual Understanding:
- Both sides need to evaluate strength/weakness
- Both realize consequences will be devastating
- Both recognize outcome unpredictable
- Rushing into battle = strategic mistake
- Better to spend months preparing
The Time Investment:
- Takes 3-4 months of assessment
- Constant probing and reconnaissance
- Small skirmishes to test defenses
- Gathering intelligence on composition
- Evaluating morale and discipline
The Human Cost During Waiting:
- Even though no full battle yet: thousands dying
- Major nightly skirmishes (3-4,000 deaths per night not unusual)
- Raids on each other's camps
- Testing defensive positions violently
- Constant low-level warfare
The Starvation Reality
The Logistics Nightmare
The Scale of Need:
- 120,000-150,000 people total (Maratha side)
- Plus 70,000-100,000 (Afghan side)
- Massive herds of animals (horses, camels, elephants)
- Animals require constant feeding and water
- Single day's food requirement = enormous
The Supply Problem:
- No local allies in Panipat (Muslim majority, see invaders)
- Surrounding area can't support 200,000+ people
- Can't "stumble into" extra food
- Must actively forage/buy/take food
- Food sources limited and disputed
The Daily Reality:
- Soldiers constantly foraging for grain
- Can only go north (south is Abdali's army)
- Afghans send raiding parties to intercept foragers
- Marathas send 3,000-5,000 soldiers as protective escort
- Food acquisition becomes military operation
The Economic Collapse
The Currency Problem:
- No money to buy food from locals
- Start selling valuables for food
- Gold, jewelry, valuables traded for grain
- How long can this continue?
- Eventually: nothing valuable left to trade
The Morale Impact:
- Started with high morale (recent victories)
- 3-4 months of starvation erodes confidence
- Hungry soldiers = demoralized soldiers
- No way to reverse this during stalemate
- Morale keeps declining: "down and down and down"
The Climate Factor: Environmental Warfare
The Cold Advantage
Maratha Suffering:
- From Deccan region (warm climate)
- Not accustomed to north Indian winter
- Clothing inadequate for cold
- Temperature: 12-24 degrees (well below freezing)
- Physical suffering from weather
Afghan Advantage:
- From Afghanistan (mountain regions, cold climate)
- Experienced with winter conditions
- Better clothing and preparation
- Cold doesn't bother them
- Natural environmental advantage
The Compounding Problem:
- Starvation + cold = double suffering
- Hunger harder to bear when freezing
- Morale damage accelerates
- Physical health deteriorates faster
- Marathas at environmental disadvantage
The Nightly Skirmishes: Testing and Raiding
The Pattern of Night Warfare
How It Happens:
- Armies camped 3-4 kilometers apart (very close)
- Sudden raids at night by 5,000-10,000 soldiers
- Unexpected attacks on unprepared positions
- Skirmish lasts 6-8 hours
- Then attackers retreat at dawn
The Purpose:
- Test defensive positions
- Evaluate enemy morale/readiness
- Judge combat effectiveness
- Harass and deplete enemy
- Gather intelligence on tactics
The Casualty Toll:
- 3,000-4,000 dying per night not unusual
- Major skirmishes, not minor raids
- Deadly encounters despite being "tests"
- Cumulative damage over months
- Both sides losing manpower constantly
The Strategic Dilemma: Artillery vs. Traditional Warfare
Holkar's Philosophy vs. Bhau's Innovation
Holkar's 40-Year Approach:
- Ganimikawa (surgical strikes)
- Attack when you choose time/place
- Give thrashing then withdraw
- Terrorize on your own terms
- Strategic mobility (cover distance quickly)
The Bajirao I Legacy:
- Cover 100 km in half day (enemy expects 2 days)
- Surprise before enemy prepared
- Strike swiftly and withdraw
- Cavalry-based strategy
- Never before had artillery
Holkar's Problem:
- Never seen effective artillery
- Trained entire career without guns
- Deeply uncomfortable with this style
- Can't fall back on experience
- Fighting a new kind of war
Bhau's Modern Approach
The Artillery Belief:
- Seen it work at Kunjapura
- Convinced it's war-winning technology
- French-trained system under Ibrahim Khan Gardi
- Long-range cannon fire dominates
- Frontal assault with support
The Technology:
- 10,000-person artillery regiment
- French-taught techniques
- Most advanced guns in India
- Abdali lacks equivalent artillery
- Should give Marathas advantage
The Problem:
- Artillery needs discipline (Marathas lack this)
- Needs coordination (breaks down in chaos)
- Maratha culture emphasizes individual valor
- Artillery requires unified command structure
- Eventually they "broke the line"
The Ibrahim Khan Gardi Problem: Trustworthiness
The Red Flag
Who He Is:
- Muslim general
- Previously served Nizam of Hyderabad
- Captured/convinced to switch sides after Maratha victory
- Brought 10,000 troops with him
- Teaches French artillery techniques
Why Holkar Suspects Him:
- Only joined Marathas 1-2 years ago
- Loyalty not tested in actual battle
- Was on opposite side recently
- Muslim working for Hindu empire
- Could switch sides mid-battle
The Risk:
- If he stops artillery fire in middle of battle: catastrophic
- If he switches to Abdali: Marathas lose major advantage
- Dependency on untested commander
- No long-term relationship with Marathas
- All eggs in his basket
How He Got Hired
The Recruitment:
- Bhau attacking Nizam's forces
- Saw Ibrahim's artillery in action against him
- Impressed by effectiveness
- After Nizam lost: demanded Ibrahim as part of peace terms
- Nizam forced to hand him over
His Conditions:
- "I'm fine with switch BUT pay my 10,000 soldiers monthly"
- Not Maratha style (they pay at end of campaign)
- Had to be paid first regardless of Maratha debt
- Unusual demand but he was essential
- Financial burden added to Maratha stress
His Proven Track Record:
- Delivered at Kunjapura (devastating effect)
- Showed he could execute
- But Holkar still doubts his long-term loyalty
- One success ≠ permanent allegiance
- Suspicion remains valid
The Competing Strategies: Assessment
Neither Strategy Optimal
Holkar's Limitation:
- Ganimikawa can't work in forced frontal battle
- Experienced repeated losses even with his strategy
- Afghan cavalry too agile for his tactics
- Doesn't work against disciplined enemy
- No one-size-fits-all solution
Bhau's Limitation:
- Artillery powerful but requires discipline
- Maratha army isn't disciplined enough yet
- Not mastered European-style warfare
- Still learning coordination
- Will break under pressure
The Northern Plains Problem:
- Completely flat terrain
- No mountains for 100s of kilometers
- No natural defensive positions
- Cavalry can move freely
- Ganimikawa and artillery both needed
The Real Issue
The Immature Implementation:
- Bhau confident but inexperienced with artillery
- Thinks they've "mastered" European warfare (they haven't)
- Maratha army still learning coordination
- Discipline not yet internalized
- Confidence exceeds actual capability
The Observer's Assessment:
- Both strategies have merit
- Neither fully addresses terrain challenges
- Neither fully supports the other
- Bhau overconfident in artillery alone
- Holkar right about needing other approach but wrong about exclusivity
Key Themes
- Starvation as Warfare - Cold and hunger eroding morale more than combat
- Environmental Disadvantage - Climate favors Afghans, hurts Marathas
- Nightly Raiding - Constant low-level warfare during "peaceful" standoff
- Trust Issues - Dependence on untested foreign general
- Philosophical Clash - Old methods vs. new technology
- Strategic Impatience - Both sides need time to prepare but can't afford it
- No Good Options - Every choice has major downsides
The Cumulative Damage
Physical Toll
Casualties During Standoff:
- Nightly skirmishes: 3,000-4,000 killed regularly
- 3-4 months of this: 270,000-480,000 potential casualties
- But armies smaller than that, so constant regeneration impossible
- Rotating who goes on raids
- Everyone experiencing losses
Health Deterioration:
- Starvation affecting combat readiness
- Cold weakening physical strength
- Disease spreading in crowded camps
- Forced constant vigilance (no rest)
- Morale destruction worse than physical damage
The Moral Toll
Responsibility of Command:
- Bhau and Abdali aware thousands will die
- Thousands of women, children in Maratha camp
- All vulnerable to being killed
- Both commanders deeply conscious of responsibility
- Not light decision to enter battle
The Civilian Vulnerability:
- Non-combatants with army (religious pilgrims, families)
- "Sitting ducks" if things go wrong
- No way to protect them in battle
- Adds weight to every decision
- Commanders feel this burden
The Timeline of Decline
Late October-Early November:
- Armies arrive at Panipat
- Morale high (recent victories)
- Confidence dominant
November-December:
- Assessment period begins
- Nightly skirmishes start
- Food becomes problem
- Morale starts declining
December-January:
- Starvation worsening
- Cold increasing
- Morale eroding further
- Casualties accumulating
- Preparation continuing
Where This Leads: By December 1760, both armies are experiencing the real costs of prolonged standoff. Marathas are starving and freezing. Afghans are patient but also suffering logistics strain. The nightly skirmishes are costing thousands. Morale is fragmenting. Everyone knows the big battle is coming, but the waiting is destroying the army before it even happens. In January, they'll be ready because they have to be—they can't continue like this much longer.
The battlefield isn't always the place where wars are lost. Sometimes it's the waiting ground. The Marathas came from the warm south with high morale and recent victories. Three months later, they're starving, freezing, and demoralized. Meanwhile, the Afghans who can handle the cold are sending raiders at night to steal their food. And every commander knows: thousands more will die in the battle itself. But they have no choice. They're locked in. They have to fight. And everyone—soldier and civilian alike—is counting down the days until it happens.