The Tightening Siege: Supply Raids & Strategic Repositioning

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Grain Campaign (Late December 1760)

Maratha Supply Desperation:

• Grains and animal feed running critically low
• Bhau sent Shinde-Holkar army (10,000 soldiers) to Karnala (near Ambala)
• Mission: Collect grains and supplies for camp

Afghan Blockade Response:

• Abdali sent counter-force to intercept the grain raid
• Strategy clear: starve Marathas into submission
• Force them to attack in weakened, demoralized state
• Win through attrition rather than pitched battle

Outcome:

• Minor skirmishes occurred but indecisive
• Marathas managed to secure some supplies (net gain mission)
• Demonstrated ongoing supply vulnerability even with victories

Firewood Crisis in Winter

The Cold Problem:

• Harsh northern winter required firewood for survival
• Dry wood burned at dawn and dusk for warmth gathering
• Marathas not accustomed to sub-zero temperatures
• No winter attire (brought southern clothing)
• Firewood collection became life-or-death necessity

The Pindharis Ambush:

• Pindharis (militia/plunder forces) sent to collect firewood
• Small unit: ~100-200 men
• Not professional soldiers but loot-and-raid fighters
• Afghans (under Shahapasand Khan and Jahan Khan with 5,000 troops) intercepted at night
• Afghan surprise attack killed all of them in darkness
• Demonstrated Afghan control of night operations and supply line harassment

Abdali's Camp Repositioning Strategy

Expanding the Control Zone (December 30):

• Abdali moved camp southeast of original position
• Increased distance between camps by 5-6 miles
• Covered the entire intervening space with forces
• Created buffer zone where Marathas couldn't operate freely

Geographic Advantage:

• Canal to west of Maratha camp (7 km away) provided maneuvering room
• Enough space for Abdali's massive army to operate and position troops
• Separated from canal meant no natural defensive barriers close to Afghan position
• Allowed Afghan scouts to constantly monitor Maratha movements

Road Control Strategy:

• Delhi-Panipat road crucial supply and communication route
• Afghan camp movement now positioned to cut this road
• Marathas forced to use forest paths instead of established routes
• Established roads rare in region—very few alternatives existed
• Effectively blocked all official routes to Delhi

Camp Size:

• Afghan camp itself spread over several kilometers
• Included: camels, bulls, elephants, horses, personnel from multiple allied forces
• Suja Uddhawla's contingent, Rohila forces, Bangash forces
• Separate sub-camps for each group within larger encampment
• Justifies reputation as "biggest battle of 18th century"

The Courier Disaster (January 1761)

The Mission:

• Bundele had collected funds before his death
• Bhau needed cash: suppliers only accept hard money, not credit
• Sent 2,000 soldiers under Parashar Dadaji to Delhi
• Retrieve approximately 150,000-200,000 rupees in hard currency

The Departure:

• Left Delhi January 1, 1761
• Carrying large ransom-level sum of money
• Escorted by 2,000 soldiers for protection
• Thought they were heading to secure Maratha camp

The Fatal Mistake:

• Didn't know Abdali had moved camp southeast
• Thought Afghan camp was still in original position
• Accidentally marched directly into Abdali's new camp location
• Realized error only when too close to escape

The Catastrophe:

• Started speaking in Marathi (thought they found Maratha camp)
• Language gave away their identity immediately
• Afghan forces attacked and looted them completely
• Afghans took the entire money shipment
• Some soldiers escaped back to Maratha camp
• Most were killed or captured
• Complete disaster: lost funds and soldiers in one operation

Doab Counter-Offensive Failure

Gopal Ganesh Parve's Mission:

• Similar to Bundele (administrator-commander type, not warrior)
• Sent by Bhau to attack Awadh (Ayodhya/Suja Uddhawla's kingdom)
• Strategy: same as Bundele's earlier success—cause panic among Abdali's allies
• Make Suja's soldiers fear for their families back home
• Destabilize Afghan alliance from within

The Execution:

• Used "surgical strikes"—quick hit-and-run raids
• Attack, grab supplies/cause damage, retreat rapidly
• Designed to appear everywhere without being catchable

Why It Failed:

• Suja kept defensive forces at home (didn't commit everything to Panipat)
• Awadh defenders repelled Parve's strikes successfully
• Parve lacked numbers for sustained offensive
• Couldn't threaten Suja's homeland meaningfully
• Supply lines from Mirath remained intact (Bundele already dead)
• No way to interdict Abdali's resources effectively

Strategic Stalemate Approaching

Maratha Options Exhausted:

• Can't starve Abdali (Bundele dead, Doab offensive failed)
• Can't cut supply roads (Camp repositioning blocks them)
• Can't recover lost money (Courier ambushed)
• Can't weaken allies from within (Suja's defenses holding)
• Limited supplies in camp with 40-50,000 dependents

Time Running Out:

• Battle date approaching rapidly
• Both sides positioning for confrontation
• Marathas increasingly desperate for decisive engagement
• Abdali increasingly confident in setup

Timeline

Key Insights

The Courier Ambush: Most tragic aspect: wasn't a military defeat but a logistics failure. One wrong turn (not knowing camp moved) and the entire financial lifeline destroyed.

Camp Repositioning as Strategy: Abdali didn't need to attack—he just repositioned and the geography did the work. The southeast move cut roads, showed control, and prevented Marathas from any offensive action.

The Doab Strategy Ends: Bundele was irreplaceable. Parve had none of his geographic knowledge, local relationships, or strategic positioning. His failure shows how dependent Maratha strategy was on one man.

Winter as Tactical Weapon: Every night ambush (Pindharis), every supply raid, every temperature drop—all part of wearing down a force unprepared for the climate.

Delhi Disconnected: By cutting the Delhi road, Abdali effectively isolated the main Maratha force. No reinforcements could arrive, no messages flow freely, no supplies come through official channels.

Where We Left Off: It's early January 1761, roughly one week from battle. All Maratha offensive options have collapsed. The courier disaster removes last financial reserves. Doab strategy completely failed. They're boxed in, cold, hungry, demoralized, and facing an enemy with intact supplies and momentum. The stage is set for final confrontation.

Every strategic option the Marathas had tried—starving supplies, cutting roads, creating panic among allies, recovering funds—had failed or been countered. Bundele's death was the first domino. The courier ambush was the second. By early January, Bhau was out of moves. He could either retreat in shame or fight. Retreat meant admitting defeat. Fighting meant accepting the one thing he'd been trying to avoid: a pitched battle against a fresh, well-supplied army. The walls were closing in.