The Siege Endgame: Starvation, Fog & Desperate Morale (December 1760)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The Dying Animals & Accumulating Corpses

Livestock Crisis: From Meerut A. Ahmadi's account:

"Thousands of cattle and horses died because they had no food to eat. Their energy depleted, they fell as though entering Yama's kingdom (death itself)."

Environmental Degradation:

• Dead animals left to rot in camp
• Accumulating stench throughout Maratha encampment
• Trenches dug for graves filled with dead bodies
• Two-month stationary position = months of garbage and corpse accumulation
• Hygiene conditions deteriorating rapidly

Winter Conditions & Visibility

Seasonal Collapse:

• Days shrinking rapidly (winter solstice territory)
• Dense fog covering region day and night
• Visibility severely reduced even during daytime
• Nighttime completely obscured by darkness and fog

Supply Dependencies Now Critical:

• Food (completely exhausted in Panipat town)
• Firewood (essential for survival in harsh cold)
• Water (difficult to obtain safely)
• Animals (most dying from starvation)

Strategic Problem:

• No one willing to leave camp to gather supplies
• Constant threat of Afghan raiding parties
• Creating de facto siege conditions
• Trapped in place by combination of enemy pressure and harsh environment

The Two-Month Standoff

Historic Unprecedented:

• No forces of this size had stood opposite each other for this length in history
• ~2 months since October 28-29 arrival
• Both armies waiting for opponent to attack first

The Psychology:

• Each side hoping opponent would grow desperate and attack
• Whoever attacks loses advantage (they're depleted, demoralized, weaker)
• But attrition favoring Abdali, not Marathas

The Asymmetry:

• Afghan advantage: Supply lines intact from Doab, relatively stable conditions, fresh troops arriving from Kabul
• Maratha disadvantage: Supply lines cut, depleting resources daily, stuck in cold weather they're unprepared for, accumulating corpses and stench

Neither Side Ready to Start:

• Both awaiting opponent to break first
• Both understanding this was largest battle of era
• Both aware: 50-50 chance of success, catastrophic losses either way
• But only Marathas felt pressure to attack (supplies running out)

Maratha Firepower Preservation

Strategic Limitation:

• Marathas conserving ammunition and firepower
• Couldn't afford wasteful raids or skirmishes
• Had to save everything for final pitched battle
• Each shot, each cannon blast, had to count

Afghan Advantage:

• Could conduct raiding operations without depleting reserves
• Intercept Maratha supply parties without commitment
• Pressure Marathas without risking main force
• Essentially infinite ammunition compared to desperate Marathas

Nana Fardanavis's Desperate Assessment (December 28, 1760)

The Observer on Site:

• Nana Fardanavis: Peshwa's courtier, present at Panipat
• His mother came as tourist (temple pilgrim)
• Wrote letter to brother Moroba Hiala back in Pune

The Conditions Report:

"Govind Panth's head was cremated here. The Afghans are treacherous, hence we are entrenched in Mughal fashion. There have been two months of fighting. Both sides still desire to fight. God will give the results. The enterprise has turned out heavier than expected. There is no money and prices are high, so the army is rattled."

The Analysis:

Why Marathas Can't Match Afghan Raiding

The Dilemma:

• Afghans conduct hit-and-run raids to intercept supplies
• Why can't Marathas send 2,000-3,000 soldiers to protect supply parties?

The Answer:

• Afghan raiders are pure fighters (dedicated military unit)

• Maratha supply parties must:

  • Travel distance to find food grains
  • Negotiate prices with suppliers
  • Carry/protect procured supplies on return
  • Defend themselves while burdened
  • All simultaneously

• Divided attention = vulnerability

• Carrying supplies = reduced fighting capability

• Afghan interceptors = fresh, light, focused fighters

Sacrifice Logic:

• Marathas could sacrifice some soldiers to protect supply parties
• But hunger = death anyway
• Can't solve the fundamental problem: outnumbered and outmatched in logistics

Jaankoji Shinde's Last Letter (January 4, 1761)

The Writer:

• Jaankoji: now head of Shinde clan (age 22-23)
• Uncle Taji Shinde died
• Writing to his representative elsewhere

Battle Update:

• "We had two battles and killed 5-7,000 Afghans"
• "Injured another 3,000 of them"
• "Captured 3-400 of their flags"

Position Report:

• "Abdali has come on the road to Delhi"
• Meaning: Afghan forces now occupy Delhi-Panipat road
• Marathas sitting on escape route to Afghanistan
• Neither side can easily retreat

Tone Assessment:

• No fear expressed
• No demoralization yet (though physical conditions mentioned)
• Still combat-ready mentally
• Understanding that this will be decisive (50-50 odds, catastrophic losses)
• Acceptance of dangerous situation

The Final Pressure Point

Maratha Commanders' Ultimatum:

• Major warriors from different clans meet with Bhau
• Message: "We don't want to die like this"
• "We would rather die on the battlefield than die here from starvation"
• "Somebody should come from south and engage Abdali"
• "But that's not happening, so we have to fight now"

The Logic:

• Waiting = slow death from cold/hunger/disease
• Fighting = quick death in battle, but with honor
• Better to die fighting than rotting in camp
• Staying put = certain gradual destruction
• Battle at least offers 50-50 chance and puts fate in their hands

Bhau's Position:

• Had been waiting for reinforcements from south
• Hoping for flanking action while he held Abdali
• But Peshwa delayed, Nizam obstructed, reinforcements never came
• Commanders forcing his hand: fight now or lose army to attrition

Timeline (Final Days)

Key Insights

Attrition as Strategy: Abdali didn't need to win—he just needed Marathas to slowly die in camp. The fog, cold, dead animals, stench, starvation—all were weapons.

The Firepower Problem: Marathas couldn't waste ammunition on skirmishes. This defensive posture meant they couldn't contest supply routes. Afghan raiders operated freely while Marathas watched.

Morale Paradox: Despite physical horror conditions, military will remained strong. No panic, no demoralization in combat sense. But the body's needs (food, warmth) were overriding the warrior's will to wait.

Two-Month Standoff Precedent: Historians note this was unprecedented in scale. Never had armies this large faced each other this long. The accumulated horror was without historical parallel.

The Commanders' Revolt: The decision to fight came not from Bhau's strategy but from soldiers' desperation. The army forced its leader to action. Waiting = guaranteed loss. Fighting = chance of victory.

Where We Left Off: It's January 10, 1761. Marathas are physically breaking down but mentally still ready to fight. Commanders are demanding battle. Abdali is in control, waiting for Marathas to crack. But the Marathas haven't cracked—they're about to attack. The 14th of January awaits. Everything comes down to the next few days.

The worst part wasn't the fighting—it was the waiting. Fighting, you could control your fate. Waiting meant watching your horses die, smelling the corpses, feeling the cold seep deeper into your bones every night. By early January, no Maratha wanted to wait anymore. They didn't care about Peshwa's reinforcements that were never coming. They didn't care about strategy. They just wanted to stop dying slowly and die fast, on their feet, like warriors. So they marched out to Panipat field. And Abdali, finally, was ready for them.