Army Speed Debate & The Contradictory Letters (June 1760)

Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary

The 18th Century Army Speed Defense

Marg Akraman - The Rate of March

What It Means:

• Marg = path
• Akraman = traversing on the path
• Talking about "the time it took to cover x miles"

The Author's Point:

"Basically in the 18th century the army used to travel at the rates that he already mentioned. That was the normal practice. That's what he is saying."

The Comparison:

• On par with 17th century armies
• On par with 18th century armies
• This was just how armies moved

The Dholpur Stop: One Month Explained

Why He Stopped

The Duration:

"Even if we consider his rate or speed, or considering the fact that he stayed or camped at Dholpur for one month..."

Why One Month?

"He was waiting for certain factions or some contingents to come there so that he can decide upon his diplomatic reach, the kingdom, how to go."

The Purpose:

• Deliberations
• Strategic planning
• Waiting for different groups to arrive
• Diplomatic coordination
• "Now I recall" - this was mentioned before

The Verdict:

"But even considering that one month, he still was on par with what armies used to travel in the 18th century in terms of their speed."

The Conclusion:

"He wasn't so far behind on that front."

Nana Fadnavis's Report from Sirhonj

Writing to His Uncle

Who Wrote:

• Nana Fadnavis (or Fadni)
• From Sirhonj
• To his uncle
• About "what was happening there"

The Pathan Moves: Ramgad Taken

The Report

What Happened:

"Pathan came to Ramgad, which they took away from Jat - so that is Sureshwar Jat."

• Pathans (Afghans) took Ramgad
• It was previously controlled by Sureshwar Jat
• Now in Afghan hands

The Siege of Itawa

Maratha Stronghold Under Pressure

Itawa:

• A city
• Maratha stronghold
• Had Maratha presence there

What Happened:

"Najib Khan and Jahan Khan basically laid a siege (morche) so that Marathas won't be able to reinforce their troops or do any such thing."

The Strategy:

• Cut off reinforcements
• Isolate the Maratha garrison
• Prevent supply lines
• Trap them inside

Hafiz Rahimat Khan: The Peace Offering?

The Rohilla Overture

Who He Was:

• Another Rohilla commander
• Different from Najib Khan
• Senior Rohilla figure

What He Did:

"He may have come to see if he can switch Sureshwar Jat from his new priority position towards Abdali."

Salukha:

• Means reconciliation
• "But reconciliation with whom?"
• Speculating: with Abdali
• Trying to negotiate

The Mission:

• Came to Sureshwar Jat
• On behalf of Abdali
• Saying "let's negotiate and find a way out"
• Peace overture

The Two-Faced Game

The Contradiction

On One Hand:

• Hafiz Rahimat Khan offering reconciliation
• "Let's talk, let's negotiate"
• Peace feelers

On The Other Hand:

• Najib Khan and Jahan Khan planning to attack
• Maratha presence in Itawa under siege
• Active military operations

The Assessment:

"So he's saying that their actions don't jive. They're playing a two-faced game. They cannot be believable or they cannot be trusted."

The Conclusion:

• Afghans/Rohillas not acting in good faith
• Peace talks = stalling tactic?
• Or genuine split between Rohilla commanders?
• Can't trust them

Nana's Strategic Advice

Waiting for Bhau

The Letter Closes:

"Proper action or deliberations will be done once Bhau gets into Mathura."

The Plan:

• Wait for Bhau to reach Mathura
• Mathura on the banks of Yamuna
• Take appropriate actions then
• Coordinate strategy once he arrives

June 4, 1760: Departing Gwalior

The March Continues

The Location:

"4th of June 1760, Bhau started off from Gwalior. Today it is in Madhya Pradesh."

The Route:

• Left Gwalior
• Crossed a small river on 4th of June
• Came to the banks of Chambar river

The Chambar River: Tributary to Yamuna

Why This Matters

Upanadi:

• Means tributary
• Chambar = tributary to the Yamuna

The Situation:

"He now is on the banks of Chambar river. And he has to cross it in order to get to Yamuna or to Mathura."

The Chambar Crossing Problem

Multiple Issues

Problem #1: Monsoon

"The problem with crossing Chambar is first and foremost now the monsoon is coming or is already there."

The Timing:

"4th of June is not too far away from 7th of June" (when monsoon typically begins)

Problem #2: Ravines on Both Banks

"Chambar river, both the banks were not horizontal. There are ravines all over the banks - it's not a flat land."

What This Means:

• Can't just walk up onto the bank from the river
• Ravines = steep gullies and cliffs
• "Small ravines and stuff"
• Difficult terrain

Problem #3: The Cannons

"So you can't really bring these huge cannons through there."

The Challenge:

"It was difficult because he has to carry all the cannons and elephants. Everything has to go across the river. And that's where he got bogged down."

How Long It Took: 8-10 Days

The Struggle

The Duration:

"It took him like 8-10 days to cross Chambar."

By June 8, 1760:

• Finally crossed Chambar
• Came south of Dholpur
• Entered Jat territory

Dholpur:

• Part of Jat territory
• Sureshwar Jat's domain

The Shivaji Connection

The Same Road

Historical Echo:

"Dholpur also was - Shivaji also passed through Dholpur on his way back [from Agra]. That's where he said 'I am Shivaji.'"

Narvar Gati:

• Little bit south of Dholpur
• Where the famous declaration happened

The Route:

"So the road was the same road actually. When you are going from south to north or north to south, there were not too many roads you can take."

The Infrastructure:

• Only one main route
• "One of one"
• "Rough roads - not really concrete or anything"
• "Not quality"

Now in Jat Territory

Meeting Sureshwar Jat

The Location:

"Now he is in Jat territory. Sureshwar Jat - that is his territory now. So he may meet with him or talk to him."

Forces Converging: End of June

The Merger Begins

South of Dholpur:

• Bhau got together with [someone from] Dholpur

End of June:

"Jankoji Shinde and the Shinde army joined him."

The Result:

"So now it's all coming together - into one big group."

Understanding Maratha Confederacy

The Political Structure

What It Was:

"You have to understand, Maratha rule was a confederacy. Confederacy means the Marathas, they were split into different factions."

The Geographic Distribution:

• One faction in Indore
• One in Gwalior
• One around Delhi
• One in Gujarat

The Command Structure:

"All these, they have their own separate commanders. But they all reported to Nanasaheb Peshwa."

The Freedom:

"In their own areas they had some amount of freedom."

Why:

"The acreage or the geographical extent was so big that Peshwa could not say that all of them is my rule. It just wouldn't work."

The Parallel:

"Even Mughals were the same way - they had their own vassal kings and stuff like that."

The Intelligence Exchange

What Holkar and Shinde Knew

The Information:

"Now Holkar and Shinde, they were aware of what negotiations were taking place between Hafiz Rehman Khan and Mr. Jat."

What They Did:

"They informed Bhau of what those negotiations were, how they were going on."

Why It Mattered:

"Because it was important - if there was something that Bhau can pick up on, if Abdali is willing to compromise or there is something that they can agree upon, then it would turn into a different mission."

The Hope:

• Maybe avoid battle
• Find diplomatic solution
• If Abdali willing to negotiate
• Change the whole mission

The Kaifiyat: Bhau's Personal Record

What It Is

Kaifiyat:

"It's kind of Bhau is talking. His story. Somebody wrote up his story or as though he is telling what he was going through each and every day of the campaign."

Like An Autobiography:

"Kaifiyat is actually his own daily diary, you can say."

Who Wrote It:

"Somebody was writing because basically he was not writing at all because he has so many things to look after. But somebody observed him throughout the campaign, talking about what he was going through each and every day."

The Record:

• Daily account
• From Bhau's perspective
• Observer writing it down
• Personal thoughts and experiences

The First Contradictory Letter: "Don't Come"

From Holkar & Shinde in the Doab

Their Location:

"Raja Sri Malharji Holkar and Jankoji Shinde were in the Antarvedi."

Antarvedi/Doab:

"The same thing as what we call it: Doab. The area between Yamuna and Ganga."

What They Wrote:

"From there they sent letters that: 'Saheb (meaning Bhau), do not come forward.'"

Why They Said This:

• "Don't hurry up coming in the Doab"
• "Because situation is not favorable to us"
• "It may be unstable"
• Just speculating about reasons

Their Alternative Proposal

Send Reinforcements, Not Yourself

What They Asked:

"Send forces to augment our force. Send backup, reinforcements. But don't come yourself - that's what I understand."

Their Claim:

"They are saying if you send us backup, then we ourselves will defeat Abdali's forces in the Doab."

The Implication:

"So you don't have to bring your army across Yamuna River. We will do it for you."

Their Attitude:

"They were just trying to be showing that we are in control and everything is good. We're handling it."

The Reality:

"But that's probably an ego."

The Status Argument

Why Bhau Shouldn't Come

Their Reasoning:

"If you yourself come into the Doab to fight with Abdali and his forces, then your respect (Ahab) will go down."

The Logic:

"For you to come here it shows that Abdali is your equal rival. But it doesn't dignify the Peshwa or his family member coming."

What They're Saying:

• You don't have to come
• We will take care of it
• Should not be giving Abdali too much respect
• Or too much status
• Doesn't deserve Bhau coming to the Doab
• Beneath his dignity

The Second Contradictory Letter: "We Need You!"

The Complete Opposite

Now They're Saying:

"But [then] we are no longer... [different message]. Or this is some commentary on the letter."

The Real Assessment:

"The Gilche (Afghans) - Afghan army is too strong. And unless both of us get together, unify, we won't be able to defeat them."

Tolna:

• Means to balance
• Need to balance against them
• Can't match them alone

The New Narrative:

"So this is a kind of the other narrative. They are basically saying, Gilche means Afghan army is too strong. So we have to come together as all factions of the Maratha contingent. Then only we will be able to balance them. And then we can effectively give them befitting reply."

The Contradiction Analysis

Two Opposite Messages

Message #1:

• Don't come yourself
• Send reinforcements
• We got this
• Would lower your status
• We're in control

Message #2:

• Afghan army too strong
• Need everyone together
• Can't defeat them alone
• Must unify all factions
• Please come

The Question:

• Which one is true?
• Are these from different times?
• Different people?
• Changed assessment?
• "I don't know what exactly is happening here"

Key Players

Timeline

Geographic Context

The Route:

• Gwalior (June 4 departure)
• Small river crossing
• Chambar River (8-10 days to cross)
• South of Dholpur (same road Shivaji used)
• Jat territory
• Headed toward Mathura (on Yamuna)

The Doab:

• Between Yamuna and Ganga
• Where Holkar and Shinde already are
• Where letters coming from
• Target destination

Itawa:

• City in the region
• Maratha stronghold
• Under siege by Najib Khan and Jahan Khan

Critical Insights

1. The 18th Century Speed Defense

The Argument:

• This was normal speed for armies
• Even with one month stop at Dholpur
• On par with historical examples
• Can't criticize for being slow
• That's just how armies moved

The Implication:

• Critics are anachronistic
• Expecting modern speeds
• Ignoring historical context
• Bhau wasn't unusually slow

2. The Chambar Disaster

The Small River Problem:

• Took 8-10 days to cross
• Ravines on both banks
• Monsoon starting
• Cannons extremely difficult
• Elephants struggling

The Warning Sign:

• If small tributary takes 10 days
• How long for Yamuna? (much bigger)
• Foreshadowing the river crossing disaster
• Geography defeating them

3. The Confederacy Problem

The Structure:

• Multiple independent factions
• Own commanders
• Own territories
• Loose coordination
• Report to Peshwa but have freedom

The Challenge:

• Hard to unify command
• Different priorities
• Ego conflicts
• Communication delays
• Not a unified army

4. The Contradictory Messages Mystery

Possibility #1: Ego Then Reality

• First: proud, think they can handle it
• Then: realize they can't, need help
• Pride before reality check

Possibility #2: Different Sources

• Different commanders
• Different assessments
• Not coordinated
• Confusion

Possibility #3: Deliberate Confusion

• Trying to keep options open
• Hedging their bets
• Not committing
• Playing politics

Possibility #4: Time Gap

• Situation changed between letters
• First: before seeing full Afghan strength
• Second: after engagements, now scared

5. The Status Game

The Argument:

• If Bhau comes = elevates Abdali
• Makes him equal rival
• Lowers Bhau's dignity
• Should send subordinates

The Problem With This:

• Abdali is serious threat
• Not acknowledging reality
• Ego over tactics
• Status concerns vs survival

The Irony:

• They want reinforcements
• But claim they're winning
• Can't have both
• Contradiction reveals truth

6. The Diplomatic Chaos

Multiple Simultaneous Tracks:

• Hafiz Rahimat Khan offering reconciliation
• Najib Khan & Jahan Khan besieging Itawa
• Sureshwar Jat being courted by both sides
• No coordinated Afghan strategy?
• Or deliberate confusion tactic?

The Assessment:

"Their actions don't jive. Playing two-faced game. Cannot be trusted."

The Question:

• Is this Afghan confusion?
• Or strategic ambiguity?
• Keep opponents guessing?
• Genuine split between commanders?

7. The Siege Strategy

Itawa Under Siege:

• Cut off Maratha stronghold
• Prevent reinforcements
• Isolate garrison
• Systematic approach

The Pattern:

• While offering peace talks
• Also conducting siege warfare
• Talk and fight simultaneously
• Keep all options open

8. The Kaifiyat Record

Why It Matters:

• Personal perspective
• Day-by-day account
• Bhau's thoughts and experiences
• Primary source for understanding decisions

The Problem:

• Written by observer, not Bhau
• How accurate?
• Filtered through someone else
• Possibly self-serving account

9. The Monsoon Timing Disaster

The Math:

• June 4: at Chambar
• June 4-13: crossing Chambar (10 days)
• June 7: normal monsoon start
• Already too late
• And this is just a small tributary!

The Implication:

• If tributary takes 10 days in monsoon
• Yamuna impossible
• Stuck until monsoon ends
• Campaign timeline destroyed

10. The Historical Road

The Route:

• Same road Shivaji used
• Only main route north-south
• Rough, unpaved
• No alternatives
• Predictable movements

The Problem:

• Enemy knows where you're going
• Can't surprise them
• Limited options
• Terrain dictates strategy

The Two Narratives

Narrative #1: We're Winning

From Holkar & Shinde:

• Don't come, send reinforcements
• We got this under control
• Would lower your status to come
• Abdali not that serious
• We're handling it

The Subtext:

• Keep credit for ourselves
• Don't want Bhau taking over
• Ego and territory protection
• "We're in control"

Narrative #2: We're Desperate

Also From Holkar & Shinde:

• Afghan army too strong
• Need everyone together
• Can't defeat them alone
• Must unify all factions
• Please help us

The Subtext:

• Actually scared
• Overwhelmed by Afghan strength
• Need backup desperately
• Reality setting in

Where We Left Off

The Situation:

• Bhau crossed Chambar (took 10 days!)
• South of Dholpur, in Jat territory
• Jankoji Shinde joining him (end of June)
• Headed toward Mathura (on Yamuna)
• Holkar and Shinde already in Doab
• Sending contradictory messages
• First: don't come, we got this
• Second: Afghan army too strong, need everyone

The Questions:

• Which message is true?
• Are Holkar and Shinde reliable?
• Why the contradiction?
• Can they actually hold Doab without Bhau?
• How long will Yamuna crossing take (if Chambar = 10 days)?
• Is Abdali offering genuine peace talks?
• Or stalling while besieging Itawa?
• Will forces unify properly?
• Or maintain separate commands?

The Chambar crossing took 10 days for a small tributary. The letters from the Doab say two opposite things in the same breath: "Don't come, we're handling it" and "Afghan army too strong, need everyone." One of these is true. One is pride. The monsoon has started. The Yamuna still ahead. And somewhere in the contradiction between those two letters is the truth about how desperate the situation really is.