The Road to Panipat: Logistics, Rivers & Strategic Gambles
Marathi History Book Reading Session Summary
The Monsoon Problem
The Geographic Trap:
- Yamuna swollen from monsoon (4-5 km wide, impossible currents)
- No armies could cross during monsoon in pre-modern India
- Marathas came too late in summer (June/July arrival)
- Monsoon conditions: 3-4 days nonstop rain, then respite, then rain again
- Absolutely no historical precedent for monsoon warfare
The Time Pressure:
- Marathas couldn't wait for monsoon to pass (September-December)
- Food supplies and troop salaries unsustainable
- Money was scarce—couldn't afford extended campaign
- Had to fight or go home
The Dilemma:
- Geographic condition (monsoon) made fast movement impossible
- Financial condition (lack of funds) made slow waiting impossible
- Solution: Get to Delhi, get resources, then engage Abdali
The Delhi Campaign (July-August)
The Initial Success:
- Sent forces ahead with heavy artillery
- Red Fort was heavily defended but guns broke it open
- Fort walls pulverized by Maratha cannons
- Yakub Khan (defender) sought negotiated exit
Dattaji's Revenge:
- Kutub Shah (Afghan general who killed Dattaji Shinde) was found hiding in Red Fort
- Kutub Shah was beheaded publicly as revenge
- Precious war elephant (taken by Afghans earlier) was recovered
- Justice delivered but bitter
The Strategic Achievement:
- Controlled Delhi and the fort
- This was major victory politically
- BUT treasury was empty—Delhi had been looted already
- Morale boosted but finances not
The Game-Changer: Abdali Crosses Yamuna
The Setup:
- Marathas thought monsoon + Yamuna = Abdali stuck on east bank
- Bahu sent spies to watch crossing points
- Confident Abdali couldn't/wouldn't cross
August 25th Shock:
- Abdali successfully crossed Yamuna with full army
- Now on same side as Marathas
- Massive strategic surprise—game changer
Why It Mattered:
- Eliminated Yamuna as barrier
- Made direct confrontation inevitable
- Shifted from siege warfare to open battle
- Reduced Maratha tactical options to zero
The Gambhir River Obstacle
A Tributary That Almost Broke Them:
- Even crossing Gambhir River (tributary to Yamuna) took 1 month
- Ghod Pachad = "Horse-Taker" (currents swept away mounted soldiers)
- Vortexes and swirling currents made crossing impossible
- Monsoon swelling made every water crossing nightmarish
The Meaning:
- If small tributary took a month, Yamuna crossing would be months
- Delayed Marathas' southern movement significantly
- Lost precious time
The March to Panipat
The Sequence:
- Crossed Gambhir after 1 month of delays
- Moved quickly toward Agra (south of Delhi)
- Agra was empty and looted (no resources)
- Moved further south toward Panipat
- Found Abdali camped south of Panipat
The Standoff:
- Both armies ~10 km apart near Panipat
- Neither could advance without blocking the other
- Abdali wanted to go back to Afghanistan (tired, army exhausted)
- Marathas wanted to go back home (money running out)
- But neither could bypass the other peacefully
The Inevitable:
- Both understood battle would be "humongously violent"
- Both wanted to avoid it
- But paths were completely blocked
- Only option: Fight
The Delhi Conquest
Bahu's Strategy:
- Once Yamuna crossing impossible, redirected to Delhi
- Sent Shinde, Holkar, Suraj Mal, Imad-ul-Mulk with forces
- Planned to capture fort and extract resources
The Reception Problem:
- Mughal emperor wanted Maratha help
- BUT was terrified of 80,000-90,000 Maratha soldiers
- Dilemma: Need them but don't trust them
- Worried Marathas would put own person on throne or demand tribute
Why This Mattered:
- Couldn't trust Delhi to cooperate openly
- Had to use artillery to force the issue
- Destroyed Red Fort somewhat in the process
- Got victory but hollow (empty treasury)
The Politics of Ambition
Suraj Mal's Gambit:
- Wanted to be emperor/caretaker in Delhi
- Proposed himself to Marathas as replacement
- Marathas refused (wanted Peshwa or Peshwa's son Vishwas Rao)
- Never actually fought despite being there
The Real Plan (Secret):
- Marathas wanted Vishwas Rao (Peshwa's son) as figurehead in Delhi
- Peshwa would rule from distance (proxy)
- Problem: Delhi society expected Muslim/Mughal on throne
- Hindu or Maratha king would destroy political legitimacy
- So kept it secret to avoid dissension
Why Suraj Mal Left:
- His proposal was rejected by Marathas
- Didn't want to fight for someone else's victory
- Took his 10,000 soldiers home (or at least didn't fully participate)
The Financial Crisis
The Numbers:
- Daily expenses: Over 100,000 (currency units)
- Mouths to feed: Soldiers + pilgrims + religious seekers + emperor's family
- Income from Delhi: Zero (treasury was empty)
- Couldn't pay Gardi's gun commanders (critical bargain)
The Constraint:
- Could delay soldiers' salaries somewhat
- Could NOT delay Gardi payment (contractual obligation)
- 9,000-10,000 artillery men had to be paid
- This was the #1 commitment
Historical Debate: Sardesai's Interpretation
Different Historian's Take:
- Bahu originally wanted to cross Yamuna in July and fight Abdali there
- When that proved impossible, switched to Delhi plan
- Eventually realized Delhi offer no escape from Abdali
- Had to commit to fight near Panipat by default (no other choice)
This Changes the Narrative:
- Wasn't strategic brilliance to go to Delhi
- Was desperation and tactical adjustment
- Hoped quick Delhi victory would give resources for real battle
- Instead, got reputation boost but empty pockets
Geography as Destiny
The Terrain Trap:
- North Indian plains: Open, flat, no mountains
- Opposite of Deccan (Marathas' home)
- Monsoon swells all rivers to impassable levels
- No good defensive positions
- Have to fight in open
Why This Matters:
- Marathas evolved for hill warfare (Shivaji's legacy)
- Required full adaptation for plains warfare
- Artillery worked but wasn't total solution
- Needed different army composition, different tactics, different mindset
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Late June | Marathas reach Yamuna, too swollen to cross |
| July | Attempt to capture Delhi regions |
| July-August | Red Fort attack and capture |
| August 25 | Abdali crosses Yamuna (game changer) |
| August-September | Gambhir River crossing delays (1 month) |
| September-October | Move toward Panipat |
| Late October | Both armies camped near Panipat, 10 km apart |
| January 1761 | Battle of Panipat (finally) |
Key Strategic Failures
- Timing: Arrived too late in season (monsoon not over)
- Logistics: Insufficient funds for extended campaign
- Trust: Couldn't work openly with Delhi authorities
- Geography: Stuck in open plains (worst terrain for Marathas)
- Coordination: Lost Suraj Mal's active participation
The Fundamental Problem
Why They Had to Fight:
- Can't retreat (financial situation unbearable)
- Can't wait (monsoon conditions unsuitable)
- Can't bypass Abdali (physical paths blocked)
- Can't negotiate satisfactorily (too many demands)
Solution: Fight and hope artillery wins. But hope is not strategy.
Where We Left Off: Both armies positioned near Panipat, separated by ~10 km. Financial pressure, monsoon conditions, and blocked paths have made battle inevitable. Bahu has lost Suraj Mal's support, sustained heavy expense with no financial return, and faces a veteran commander (Abdali) on terrain where traditional Maratha tactics don't work. The clock is ticking—supplies are running out, soldiers are unpaid, morale is uncertain.
The monsoon that should have been their ally became their enemy. The rivers that should have blocked Abdali couldn't block him. The time that should have given them options had run out. Every choice they made—going to Delhi, waiting for Yamuna to cross, staying committed to the campaign—seemed right at the time but collectively created a trap with only one exit: battle.